Why slavery? What do you wish me to see? — Banno

Who persecuted who? — Banno

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery_in_ancient_Egypt

was the first to achieve political power, in late Rome, and to unleash the logical consequence of monotheism - the repression of alternatives. — Banno

Your position is that prior to Christianity, there were no oppressive regimes, but that oppression began as the result of monotheism? That's just obviously historucally false. Egypt is one example among many.

Christianity got there first. It's a consequence of the intolerance inherent in monotheism. — Banno

Christianity wasn't the first monotheistic religion (see, e.g. Judaism and Atenism) and it's not universally accepted as monotheistic due to the trinity theology. Mormonism admits to polytheism, which holds itself to be a form of Christianity.

Hinduism is polytheistic but discriminates based upon a rigid caste system and isn't what I'd consider "tolerant."

The term "religious war" is a Western inventiion, creating a rigid distinction between secular ambitions (land, power, etc ) and religious ones. The two are always mixed.

My point being that regardless of the problematic history of Christian oppression, your quote above is factually incorrect on many levels.

Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. — Sam26

Note that you're changing grammatical forms and tenses, which changes the analysis and it could very well be identifying something idiosyncratic to English and not to language generally.

Telling someone that "I know I'm in pain" could have a meaningful use if we wish to be creative enough, but assuming the "I know" is necessarily superfluous in that sentence, that superfluousness would occur only in the present tense while the experience were actually occurring and streaming through one's consciousness.

It's a different result where you speak in the hypothetical (as you did above), where you say "only I can know whether I am really in pain." That does make sense because it clarifies the fact that no one else has access to my phenomenological state. The removal of the "I know" from that sentence changes its meaning. That the statement "I know I'm in pain" might contain a superfluous "I know" doesn't dictate that it will in all forms.

If you change the tense, you have a similar result, as in "I know I was in pain yesterday." The "I know" isn't superfluous and it's not necessarily being supplied just for emphasis, but it could actually be an assertion of a recollection that does require a justification. If you told me that I was not in pain yesterday, but I specifically recall that I was, but you keep telling me I wasn't because for some reason you choose to disbelieve me, my insistence I was in pain is based upon my justification that I remember my recollection (that was never reduced to language) of my pain. Perhaps something might jar my memory and I'll remember, "Oh yeah, I wasn't in pain yesterday; it was Monday I was in pain."

I'd also say that if you try to make "know" a term of art where it cannot ever be used except to mean that which requires a justification (which is the knowledge = justified true belief epistemological theory), then you violate Wittgenstein's own non-essentialist's claims as it relates to definitions. For something to fall into "knowledge" it only has to have the family resemblance of knowledge. It's not required that it contain X as one of its essential features. Here you're claiming that X is a justification.

As the child learns how to associate language with their pain, the child is taught new pain-behavior. This, Wittgenstein points out, doesn’t mean that the word pain really means crying, the word pain replaces crying. It doesn’t describe it. — Sam26

It doesn't follow why crying and saying "I am in pain" would ever be synonymous in terms of what they communicate and that one would replace the other. Saying "I am in pain" does not equate to crying in terms of what is conveyed to the observer.

Judaism was quite intolerant and exclusive long before Christianity began. — Ciceronianus

Then why did you say:

There was no problem of tolerance until Christianity began its relentless destruction of antiquity. — Ciceronianus

Judaism was intolerant of other religions per the First Commandment. It was monotheistic, which necessarily entailed no other gods be worshipped.

As to the ancient Greek and Roman religions, we have good evidence that the pagans worshipped several gods, and that worshipping one of them didn't require that no other gods be worshipped. — Ciceronianus

That's because it was polytheistic, but that doesn't entail that non-believers of those gods were tolerated. It simply means that under the polytheistic structure differing gods had differing powers and some did battle with one another. Do you have evidence that the Greeks openly tolerated ridicule of Zeus by Greek citizens or that if a foreigner denounced Greek religion he'd be accepted into Greek society?

One need only read the Old Testament to understand that the Jews were violent towards non-believers--they seemed to have been particularly enchanted by the thought of the infants of non-believers being wacked against stone walls--this fond wish is expressed more than once in the Old Testament. — Ciceronianus

The context of those passages I'm familiar with relate to the horrors that will be brought against the enemies of the Hebrews, not specifically against gentile non-believers for their failure to believe. Regardless of the quibble, it is clear that the Hebrews who violated the commandments of God could face deadly consequences assuming one were to accept a historicity of the Old Testament. I'm not sure though that there is an actual historical record of God actually striking folks down or of little girls getting tossed against the rocks.

That is to say, there was no flood, no parting of the sea, and likely no baby tossing in ancient Israel.. To the extent the bible says otherwise, it's not true.

If you're interested, the Talmudic rules of the death penalty are attached, which are so cumbersome, that it's not clear that anyone ever received it. https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/the-death-penalty-in-jewish-tradition/#:~:text=The%20Talmud%20endorses%20a%20similar%20position%2C%20saying%20that,without%20clear%20testimony%20at%20times%20of%20rampant%20sinfulness.

The ancient pagan religions of the Greeks and Romans were certainly friendly, even the so-called mystery religions. It wasn't unusual for someone to be an initiate of the Mithras cult and an initiate of Isis or Magna Mater. One could worship Jupiter, Asclepius as well as other gods. There was no problem of tolerance until Christianity began its relentless destruction of antiquity. The Abrahamic religions are inherently intolerant. — Ciceronianus

This is a tough historical thesis to maintain, as it would require not just a comparison to the ancient Greek religions, but to all prior religions. Historically, nations had gods and those gods warred with one another within the nation and gods from other nations warred against them as well, often having a contest of whose god was supreme, or so the mythology goes. Once you arrive at a monotheistic religion, you abandon the idea that your god is stronger than all other gods, but you hold that your god is the only god at all, and then the wars between gods end, but, of course, not the wars between the nations.

Consider as well:

"Some scholars argue that what is termed "religious wars" is a largely "Western dichotomy" and a modern invention from the past few centuries, arguing that all wars that are classed as "religious" have secular (economic or political) ramifications." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_war

This challenges the notion that religion and the secular are so nicely divided, and I would expect that very ancient cultures that engaged in war did so with some reference to their gods, as they didn't have an epistemology that divided the secular/scientific and the religious/theological.

There is also an inherent logical problem with this statement by you:

"There was no problem of tolerance until Christianity began its relentless destruction of antiquity. The Abrahamic religions are inherently intolerant."

If Abrahamic religions are inherently intolerant, it wouldn't make sense that the intolerance would lie dormant for over a thousand years until the advent of Christianity, considering the Abrahamic religion of Judaism pre-dated it by that many years. Your argument then seems to be that you find Christianity in particular intolerant, which it historically was, but, as noted above, I don't think it's a fair analysis to lay that intolerance at the feet of the religion, as I see those conflicts as tied as much to the secular (power, wealth, control) as anything else. That is to say, with or without religion, I expect that our European forefathers were going to be a brutal bunch. Religion happened to be a wonderful mode to express it, and an argument can certainly be made (especially by our enemies) that we've hardly become less violent and warlike since becoming a secular state.

I'm left with: my intuition is that there's an aspect of my experience that I can't communicate through language. Why should I doubt this intuition? Kierkegaard agrees with me — frank

Not to have you do my research for me, but do you have a quote from Kierkegaard for that?

We can conceive of machinery that would record your experience and make it available to others, so it's metaphysically possible. Whether that's physically possible in this world, we don't know yet. — frank

But I take the perception as all encompassing, not limited to just the apple I perceive, with its color, snell, etc.., but the itch on my foot, the anxiety of my overdue bill, the calm from the sound of the rain, etc. all within the state of the perception at that second We have no known symbolic feed of that from me to you like we do "apple" or even through photographic or audio representations.

If you mean by "metaphysically" possible, to mean "hypothetically" or "imaginable," perhaps, but i don't think it's physically possible and it does strain the imagination.

Describing something doesn't mean representing something "with 100% accuracy." Red Delicious apple. About 3 inches diameter. Red. I don't normally need to count how many seeds. — T Clark

Of course you don't provide the irrelevant for the purposes of the conversation. My point us that my experience of the apple can never be conveyed to you.

don't see how we can discuss the subject of the OP without talking about how we use language. — T Clark

The OP is ambiguous to the extent one wonders if it's asking (1) whether English in particular offers limitations in what it can describe as opposed to what might be only explainable in French, for example or (2) whether certain concepts are ineffable and not reducible to langauge.

As to (1), I think the consensus is no, that all langauges in principle can equally explain things, even if it requires more words or longer explanations. For example, in English, we can say "quantum mechanics" and know what that means, whereas in a tribal langauge of the rain forest, no such words or concepts exist, but it could be eventually translated sufficiently.

As to (2), I've argued they are, and that's what I addressed.

What you've addressed iare the sociological biases inherent in language, which I'd agree with. If our houses are built for our particular needs, I can imagine langauge would be similar. I don't think that what I've said regarding #1 impacts #2, but i can see debate there.

As to my objection as to what is being droned on about is this insistence to deny any reality being seperate from langauge. It attempts to. solve the problem of metaphysics and qualia by denying them.

I read the OP as asking whether there are things we can't describe in the English language and you guys are droning on about how we use language.

Can I convey my phenomenal state of the phone before me through representational symbols with 100% accuracy? I'd say no. No words could convey the boredom I'd experience while that transpired. The full experience isn't reducible or conveyable except in some hypothetical construct offering a very simplified example and an infinite amount of time.

You'll never know how I feel, regardless of the depth and breadth of our therapy sessions. Just ask any angst ridden teenager if you need further empirical proof.

I’m not one for the supernatural either. And nowhere does it state that we have to mandate people to take a vaccine and deny them access to society if they do not. It’s a simple moral decision. — NOS4A2

But this doesn't really answer @Michael's question. You're position is based upon a strict fidelity to the principle that the government lacks the legitimate power to dictate what individuals may do. That is anarchism. I'm sympathetic to the view that government power should be limited, but those limitations are going to necessarily be ad hoc and based upon societal needs and some exceptions will be difficult to justify on purely principled grounds.

So, what do we commonly hear? -- anti-vaxers, superstition, creationism, etc. While you are welcome to touch on these subjects, let's think of what we can ignore regarding the decay of science, as prep work. Then, we can move on to the real 'reality' of scientific survival: — Caldwell

I see a distinction between (1) superstition/creationists and (2) anti-vaxxers. Both are anti-scientific, but, as to #1, that deals with the enchantment issues described by Weber, where he described how science has replaced religion in modern society. If you are arguing that we're returning to religious based reasoning, your concern would be of a re-enchantment, where we are devolving back into a theocratically and mythologically based epistemology for understanding basic facts of day to day existence. I really don't see mass scale movement in that regard.

As to #2, I think the anti-vaxxers are playing upon the Kantian distinction between (a) the skeptical method and (b) skepticism. The skeptical method requires ongoing investigation in the face of uncertainty, but implicitly accepts there is a general method for arriving at knowledge. That is where I think most scientifically inclined people would fall. Skepticism, on the other hand, questions the entire enterprise of whether anything can be known, and I do think that is where many of the conspiratorial anti-vaxxers fall. They scoff at the idea that there is reliable knowledge available due to whatever bias they can imagine might be skewing the results. The anti-vaxxers parade themselves as (a), when in fact that are (b). They're not just hyper-analyzing the data on vaccines; they're questioning and rejecting the scientific method.

The problem with the general skeptics of (b) is that they have to have some ability to navigate the world, so they must abandon their generalized skepticism at some point and then just start arbitrarily accepting information as correct, without any real principled way to confirm it. It seems that as long as what they accept is not mainstream, it begins to have an air of credibility to them. We end up with people ingesting cattle deworming medications to treat a virus that has an otherwise scientifically proven preventative vaccine. That result is truly bizarre, but it has nothing to do with superstition or re-enchantment, but is the end result of an irrational, inconsistent generalized skepticism of science that doesn't have a replacement epistemology.

It's the reverse Nietzschean quandary where we killed God through our disbelief in him and now we have nothing left in its place and so we spin in circles rudderless. These people killed science, so now what are they going to do?

Assuming that people should be able to make their own health decisions, should be able to decide what they don’t want to inject into their body, the problem with vaccine mandates is that it forces or coerces people into putting biological agents into their body that they otherwise might not want to. — NOS4A2

This argument again. Sure, you have the right to bang your head against the wall until you pass out, and in a perfectly constructed libertarian world you could do that sunrise to sunset, but why do you want to do that?

Let us suppose the government one day grows tired of people banging their heads into walls and they illegalize it, other than the sacred right to being able to make really bad decisions being violated, how is society now worse off? I'm just trying to understand why a policy maker who doesn't buy into your view that the right to make stupid decisions is an inalienable right would have a problem stopping head banging if he could. Are we so committed to logical consistency in policy regardless of outcome that we will preserve that consistency damn the torpedoes, even when we are all in agreement that we're only protecting stupid behavior?

I think parents ought to decide how to protect their children when it comes to vaccination. I don’t think the government should. — NOS4A2

Why do you create this exception when it comes to vaccines? Must the parents put their children in car seats, allow them transfusions when needed, or let them play with firearms? Why is there a line drawn at vaccines, but you allow the oppressive hand of government to intervene in other instances?

As such it is completely unremarkable, on a personal level, that I might choose to remain unvaccinated and take that risk for entirely trivial reasons (preferring not to take prophylactic medicine, preferring not to support the pharmaceutical industry are just two examples). I don't need to justify those preferences any more than a skydiver needs to justify his enjoyment of free-fall. — Isaac

That you don't have to justify your decision is obvious. There are no mandates. Humor me though and provide your justification. Do you obtain the thrill of the skydiver by not taking the vaccine? Do you not take part in prophylactic medicine in all instances and do you avoid the pharmaceutical industry in all other contexts? I understand you're not required to be logically consistent, and you can do whatever you want whenever you want, but I'll assume you wish to be rational and consistent.

If your position is though that you have the right to be irrational and today is the day you wish to stand on that ground and be irrational and inconsistent, then have it, but, like I said, I think there are better things to fight for than the right to piss into the wind.

In the words of John Lennon: “life is what happens to you while you’re busy making other plans”. — Present awareness

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allen_Saunders

I'm puzzled to think that this is true, regardless as to whether this was once thought as true.

Why would you think that, that is true? Is that a hallmark of narcissism? — Shawn

I guess we all bring our own perspectives to the art we encounter, and I admit that my personal belief is that happiness is related to giving to and thinking of others. The paradox would then be that selfishness leads to self-destruction, but I recognize my view of happiness places a low premium on self-aggrandizement. I don't know that Trump, for instance, would buy into my view of happiness and I'd be hard pressed to convince him that he'd be happier not being in constant self admiration mode.

No it hasn't. At least not in a way any of us here can dispute. Let's say for the sake of argument that the vaccine is 100% effective. Does that now mean I ought to take it? You've left out any argument that we ought to take things that are 100% effective at doing what they claim to do. Fact's don't simply result in moral oughts (though see Srap Tasmaner's rather clever way of achieving this in the other coronavirus thread). — Isaac

I know this argument. It's the "I have a right to make bad decisions" argument. People are literally willing to lay down their lives for this right. I'm not real sure why it's so important for people and sort of wish they'd find another cause to fight for, like maybe feeding the hungry or helping sick kids or something.

But to your question as to how your bad decisions affect me, they cause a waste of hospital space, a shutting down of the economy, and they result in greater spread of the disease.

I see no evidence of that. I've provided more citations from properly qualified experts than any other poster and most contrary responses have been half-arsed clichés of reactionary defensiveness or outright spittle-flecked invective. How is that representative of a community in search of truth? — Isaac

Yeah, I don't agree with this. The overwhelming evidence is that the vaccine greatly reduced infections prior to the delta variant and it greatly reduces hospitalizations and serious illness with the delta. The great fears of vaccine complications has never been realized. Your arguments, at least when I was momentarily engaged, were general statistical objections that could be asserted against any medication. You've also argued that I am stuck in a bubble that I cannot get out of because I choose to heroically defend my peer group because loyalty to group is apparently my chief psychological driver.

Have you read the articles of association for the pharmaceutical companies? — Isaac

This is the hallmark of conspiratorial thinking. We look around and find those we distrust and we concoct a crime they committed without any evidence a crime was actually committed and we stand in wonder how anyone would be so gullible as to believe those scoundrels wouldn't do exactly as we suspect they did even though we have no evidence.

I'd suggest that we start looking for motives for why a crime was committed after we actually have evidence a crime was committed. Otherwise, we end up accusing people of doing things that never happened.. That I don't trust politicians doesn't mean I get to accuse them of stealing from the coffers without evidence they have stolen, and I'm not naive to argue they haven't stolen when there is no evidence of theft. Of course, if I notice money is stolen, I should probably look to those with motivations and inclinations to steal if I want to find out who has stolen.

So, as I sit here, I have zero evidence that vaccines are useless and have been imposed upon the public to extract money from a fearful population. In fact, all the evidence is otherwise. For that reason, I don't need to identify all the bad people nearby and accuse them of falsifying vaccine data, largely because I have no such data.

On the other hand, I do in fact have significant evidence that people are spreading unfounded fears and mistruths about the vaccines. I therefore should at this point try to determine who might have motivation and inclination to engage in such conduct and figure out who they are.

But anyway, you don't have to convince me that there are bad people doing bad things. The prisons are filled with them and I trust we haven't rounded them all up. I do need to know a bad thing has actually happened before I accuse someone of something though.

these circumstances, there is no basis to make a reasonable decision. What is needed, and what is lacking, is trust. Trust is the liquidity of the knowledge economy, and of society in general. — unenlightened

But truth does have an annoying way of eventually coming out, which will either be when the vaccinated start having all sorts of mysterious symptoms or the when unvaccinated start dying. It seems the latter is happening. The glee I now have in saying "told you so!"

I believe, as simply as I can, Narcissus lived an unremarkable life in ancient times, fell in love with himself, and by psychologists got called a narcissist (the causality is clear), and this we remember him to this day?

This all strikes me as strange, or telling of our times. What do you think about all this, as stated, or am I missing something here?

The only person comparable who enjoyed such a life, would be, to myself, Nero(?) — Shawn

The part you got wrong is that he actually did as he was described to have done or that it is at all relevant whether he actually did as he is said to have done. Such is the case with myths and parables.

Let's not spend time asking why the hare even thought it would be an interesting contest with the tortoise either. That would miss the point.

But back to point, consumption with self leads to destruction might be one way to say what it says. That's a most general statement at least.

I claimed that they don't understand negation. The "no" command is not an example of that. — frank

You're saying he couldn't generalize the comment of "no" to mean to do the opposite of what the affirmative comment is? If that's all you're saying, then I'll agree you're probably right, but that has to do with the level that dogs can conceptualize things. That isn't to say dogs don't understand language or that it means that if they did fully understand language he'd be able to figure out what you meant. It just means dogs have limits to understanding. I could probably teach my dog to gather 1 bone, 2 bones, or 3 bones, showing a full understanding of number concepts 1, 2 and 3. I'd probably lose him if I asked him to gather two times the number of bones that he had feet. I'm not sure that's a language issue though.

A five year old can't do calculus, despite having access to language.

And how do they go about doing that? Is it 'true' that abortion is unacceptable after six weeks, or is it 'false'? What on earth would true and false mean in this context and how would we go about pinning down only one version of it? — Isaac

There's a category difference between fact based questions and moral ones, and the inquiry here has been of factual ones (i.e. the effectiveness of vaccines). In any event, I do believe in moral realism and reject subjectivism. So, whether a fetus may ethically be aborted does have a final answer, but I'll admit it (like many factual questions) is unclear. Whether it is morally ethical to murder my neighbor, on the other hand, isn't a matter of meaningful debate. That there are some issues readily known and others not does not logically entail that there is sufficient uncertainty in the world for universal skepticism. It just means we can know some things better than others.

It doesn't have to admit it. Advertisers have a good deal of success getting people to wear believe Nike trainers are better than any other brand. Did they need to appeal to universal truth to do that? Or did they need to get a few famous sports celebrities to wear Nike? — Isaac

Contextualized to this debate, here in a philosophy forum where you would want to be persuasive, fidelity to the truth would be the way you would sway others. Whether Michael Jordan believes we should or shouldn't vaccinate wouldn't work here, but to the extent you're arguing that people make bad decisions based upon bad information, we very much agree.

Really? So the 'power seekers' are the ones spreading the anti-vax message among otherwise sensible scientists, while the poor powerless government and pharmaceutical industry just want everyone to be happy? Who are these devils? Name names man, they need to be held to account. — Isaac

Your sarcasm isn't even logical. If you think it absurd that I'd suggest the pharmaceutical companies are pure and honest (which I didn't), you can't then submit that it's absurd for me to suggest there are politicians who are less than pure and honest.

You can Google for the names of those politicians and those politicizing the anti-vax movement as well as me. What I can say is that pharmaceutical companies, epidemiologists, and public health officials have primary reasons for existence other than the securing of power. I realize they are corruptible, but a politician unapologetically and openly makes it his primary focus to obtain power. We can hypothesize conspiracies as they relate to the dishonest motives of any person or industry, but, with politicians, we have to accept as point of fact that they are waking up every morning with no other ambition than to secure votes and power. That, unlike the others mentioned, is their primary focus.

Do you take this to mean that free will is required for all knowledge other than moral?

Freedom of the will is a necessary precondition of some human understanding, but not any human understanding consistent with pure intuitions. That which takes the place of pure intuitions operating under speculative empirical conditions, are the so-called hypothetical or categorical imperatives, which legislate in the same manner but under practical moral conditions alone. The former has to do with what is, the latter what ought to be. — Mww

Do you have a direct reference to Kant for support of this claim? It's what I was getting at and it seemed to follow from my very imperfect understanding of Kant, but do you know where he specifically asserts that the "speculative cognition of freedom" is required for judgment or something along those lines?

Which claim?

I don't know what an "empirical claim" is. There are claims. Justifications can be empirical. It's kind of rare for a claim to be justified entirely empirically. We usually like some logic in the mix. — frank

For one, the claim was that a dog doesn't know what "no" means. It is an empirical claim, meaning you are asserting a synthetic fact, claiming to know something about dogs. We know things about dogs by observing dogs and gathering data about dogs. I want to know what it is specifically that has been gathered about dogs that draws you to that conclusion. I realize that reason will be imposed upon your data. I wasn't arguing for some type of hyper exclusive empiricism.

I do wonder, though, whether the claims made about the limitations of what a non-linguistic entity may know really are just analytic claims about what propositional knowledge is. If we assume propositional knowledge refers only to the linguistic understanding of a sentence, it would be logically impossible for a non-linguistic entity to possess such knowledge. My position is not that, but it's that propositional knowledge is that knowledge that can be reduced to language, but the underlying content of the proposition pre-exists the language and exists separately from it, thus allowing the non-linguistic entity the ability to possess that knowledge.

That is, are you saying "a dog doesn't know what 'no' means"? or are you saying "a dog cannot know what 'no' means"? If the former, we have an empirical dispute and need to do research. If the latter, we have a logical problem regarding what "know" means.

Whether you agree or not, the basic idea is old and has little to do with who's best at reading a dog's mind.

Being stands out against non-being.

It's the the answer to the question you asked. — frank

It's an empirical claim is it not? Where is the empirical proof? My observations inform me otherwise.

Let us assume you are a computer entirely controlled by an algorithm. When you are asked a question, the computer computes, but its algorithm is of unknown validity. It might provide a correct answer. It might not. Regardless of whether it is correct, as long as it is allowed to compute, you will recite your answer as well as the basis the computer provided you substantiating your decision.

For any answer you give, of what value would it be for me to ask you if it's correct and to provide your basis, and won't the problem be compounded if I also am controlled by an algorithm as well?

That is to say, you're just going to recite to me what you must.

Must we not assume independent judgment to assess anything meaningfully?

thought: no, your dog does not understand "no". Understanding what another says means there is agreement between both parties, and a dog's received meaning has no conceptual contextualization. — Constance

Not sure how you know what a dog knows. But anyway, if you take my phone and I say "no," how is your understanding of no different from my dog's in terms of type and not degree of understanding.

Our beliefs are objective only if arrived at through reason.
2. If our beliefs are caused then they are not arrived at through reason.
Therefore
3. If our beliefs are caused, then they are not objective.

Is that the argument? I mean, (2) is clearly true, but what's the justification for (1)? Why isn't (1) something more like "Our beliefs are only objective if supported by reason"? or — Srap Tasmaner

This is the quandary - if you accept that beliefs that are caused are not arrived at by reason, you have no way of knowing whether they happen to also be reasonable.

So, (1) I believe the earth is round based upon causality, and (2) there are objective reasons to believe the earth is round. How do I ever know #2, given #1? All I have access to is #1.

Independent agency (the ability to have free choice) I take as a given (compare perhaps to a Kantian pure intuition) required for an intelligible view of the world. If we don't presuppose we are capable deciding before we decide, the enterprise of deciding is meaningless.

One's opinion will be formed, in large part, by the opinion which is used as a membership token for the social groups to which one wishes to belong, or the social roles one plays. — Isaac

And this I disagree with. Choice of opinion is dependent upon all sorts of drivers, perhaps some upon their desire to fit in, others other factors, but in all instances not fixed and a matter of choice. Many, hopefully most, form their opinion based upon a fidelity to finding the truth.

To the extent you argue opinion is controlled by forces beyond your control, your argument ceases to have persuasive value because it admits to not being based upon truth and it denies my responses are based upon truth.

The larger narrative your position speaks to is to give credence to a post-truth description that tries to avoid harsh criticism of fringe nonsense like ant-vaxx positions, suggesting those opinions have equal validity, with rejection of anti-vaxx being based not upon objectivity, but just upon me wanting to get along with my peers by showing them I stand against anti-vaxx.

The sometimes violent peer division you've identified isn't a complex sociological and psychological matter that just naturally exists within each of us, but it is the outcome of a nefarious and intentional political effort to polarize and divide the population to acquire political power. That there is such division over such minor requests like wearing masks and getting an FDA approved vaccine (and the unadulterated bullshit of the "stolen" election) speaks to the power of our power seekers in creating camps and securing votes. It needn't be this way.

That people can be swayed by group identity desires, fear, prejudice and whatever else is nothing new, but the choice of what to do remains in the hands of the people. We're not lemmings and the responsibility rests with us, and we can't blame our bad choices on just trying to get along with our peer group.

So, if your vaccination decision is based upon your wanting to get along with your party of choice, you've abrogated your responsibility as a responsible person.

Apparently, all land on Earth is now some form of private property of "the nation states". — Michael Zwingli

Explain this. Do you want all land to be privately held with each landowner being an independent sovereign, or do you want all land communal? As you've stated it, it's private yet belongs to the nation state, which isn't clear.

course, there have been cultures, such as certain "Native American" cultures, wherein the concept of the private ownership of land would have been considered absurd — Michael Zwingli

Except that's a myth. https://daily.jstor.org/yes-americans-owned-land-before-columbus/

So I'm inclined to pass by the whole question as ill-formed, and I'm not at all inclined to throw in with either side. There's plenty of other stuff to think about. — Srap Tasmaner

This line of discussion wasn't intended to sway your opinion on determinism, but was initiated only to explain my objection to @Isaac's line of argument. I raised the psychologist's fallacy, and you asked for a better description of it. I get that the free will debate isn't something that everyone will be interested in thinking through,, but if an argument is presented that implicates an unworkable logical outcome, that can't be ignored simply because it broaches a topic not of personal interest.

In a free world we’d build roads together in common enterprise. But since we live in a statist world we cannot. So your property is declared eminent domain, the state’s property, and a road goes through your property without your say in the matter. — NOS4A2

What law proscribes the voluntary building of roads in a common enterprise? I'd think the barrier to such a communal sense of purpose would be lack of cooperation, not government intervention.

Let's assume eminent domain were illegalized, describe your vision of how new roads would be built.

the dog thinks, "I shouldn't stay in the road." then it would appear that the dog is using language. — frank

My dog thinks "I shouldn't knock over the garbage can, " but then he does, and I can tell from the way he's now under the bed that not only does he know he shouldn't have, he doesn't want to get in trouble, so he's hiding.

I'm right that dogs can't understand the significance of "not", and I think I am, can you see why that would limit its ability to form complex thoughts? — frank

Do you have a dog? My dog definitely understands "no."

These are just such odd claims that are empirically false. I remember my philosophy professor explaining to me the simplistic and limited intellectual capacity of animals, and I thought then (as now) whether he ever spent time with animals.

Intellectual ability among the species is a matter of degree, not type. I'd imagine chimps and baboons would make this more clear, but alas, zoning laws won't allow me those.

The "fixed" part is just empirically false, but can't I believe that my beliefs are fully determined by my state and my environment, rather than a matter of free choice, and just note that what I read, the arguments people make to me, and so on, are also part of my environment, and go into modifying my state? — Srap Tasmaner

If the algorithm of the universe dictates Srap will believe X, it will be so. If you claim your beliefs are from what you read, that will be the case because the algorithm dictated you would say that. All is determined, even your beliefs for why you have your beliefs. If you take seriously the idea that your beliefs are beyond your control, you have no reason to debate your beliefs.

I place the ability to freely judge an argument in the category of foundational assumptions required to make the world intelligible. If you wish to reject this foundational assumption, you go the way of the solipsist, and it's for that reason I don't find that objection worth debating. It's a universal rejection of reason, and it could be inserted in every thread on this site.

Telling me I'm stuck arguing for X because my ilk just believes that way ends every debate, thus my claim it is an anti-philosophical, anti-rational position.

It arose earlier, more along the lines of arguing that the position one assumes in the Covid debate is determined by political alignment/ social identification and we're only fooling ourselves to suggest otherwise. That is, our justifications are mere self preservation rationalizations. If that is the case, then those informing us of this must realize that their wisdom is nothing but rationalization as well and therefore useless.

I place this in the camp of deterministic problems, where you are forced to deny meaningful assessment can exist but must accept you just must believe as you must. No one can get outside his own bubble and is stuck with accepting what he will regardless of the evidence or logic presented to him.

It's anti-philosophical and anti-rational. It asserts a fixed state of beliefs for all based upon predetermined psychological factors.