It stops everything happening at once.

Imagine a movie, but every frame projected simultaneously ... the divine white light of god-consciousness. Even the darkest soul, from the view of eternity, is nothing but a flash of white light. — unenlightened

But use a book instead of a film for your example. The entirety of the book is happening at once. All the pages are there at all times, as opposed to the film that requires movement across the light. This would suggest that "happening" references conscious perception of the thing as opposed to anything to do with the thing.

But I also realize that's not always the case because the sun comes and down regardless of who's watching.

Can you control not being hungry? No. Can you control not thinking about being hungry when you are starving? It's possible. Arguably, up to a point. — Outlander

There are obvioulsy some thoughts not within your control, like hunger, disgust, fear, etc., which is consistent with there being some physical actions that are not within your control, like your heartbeat, your breathing, and flinching if an object is thrown at you, etc.

But, consider Descartes' comment here:

“But when I perceive something very clearly and distinctly, I cannot but assent to it. Even if I will to the contrary, I am nevertheless drawn into assent by the great light in the intellect; and in this consists the greatest and most evident mark of human error.”

This goes beyond as you were saying, arguing that choice is not part of the deliberative process, but conclusions as to all sorts of matter are determined by clear and distinct perceptions.

Compare that to William James:

“Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.”

This allows for choice of the will (under particular circumstances, particularly when the intellect is indeterminate).

As with Descartes, he'd argue that a belief in God (for example) is clear and distinct and not subject to doubt, which means he must believe in God. Choice isn't part of his equation. As to James, he'd argue that a belief in God is a matter of choice.

having a surprisingly hard time locating any discussions in the literature of mental-to-mental causation -- that is, the idea that one thought or image could cause another thought or image. I've looked through the usual suspects on causation but haven't nailed it yet. Can anyone on TPF help?

Much appreciated! — J

Not sure if this touches on your question: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doxastic-voluntarism/

This is a discussion of whether you have control over any of your thoughts, which addresses the issue of what causes thoughts.

Who gets the wife — noAxioms

I suspect, in any event, the wife chooses.

I feel like this conversation bounces all over the place. You can be individualistic and egalitarian simultaneously. You can also be hyper competitive and consumerist by adopting a collectivist position, as you see, for example, in immigrant communities in the US where pooling of recorces is common. You can also be individualistic and not be competitive, but instead just prefer self sufficiency.

You can also be religious and be capitalistic or very much not (not just Eastern religions, but also priests monks, and the like).

The point being that these laments about the value of humanity and our ethical reatment of one another doesn't track so nicely to general societal attitudes, religious orientations, or competitive spirits as it does just to old fashion adherence to morality.

The culture of individualism gave rise to an inflated sense of the worth of the self, even grandiosity. — Jack Cummins

A high sense of self worth does not equate to feelings of grandiosity. It's a Wonderful Life did not portray George Bailey as someone who thought highly of himself or someone who felt entitled to more than others. Mr. Potter portrayed the Grinch like character, concerned only with money and power. You might decipher anti-capitalistic or anti-consumerist themes in the movie (as well as in A Christmas Carol), but that doesn't equate to an acceptance that human life is of less than infinite value. I'd argue that it shows just the opposite - that the quantification of life's value to dollar and cents is what is truly dehumanizing precisely because it reduces the worth of the self to numbers..

It's a wonderful life..

It's common for folk with idealist tendencies to confuse what they believe, understand, think etc. with what is true. — Banno

What you're saying perchance isn't just that pseudo idealists (those with idealist tendencies) confuse the mental as the only real, but it's that's true idealists are confused because they think the mental is the only real.

In other words, true idealists are being true to their worldview. It's not as if they're realists but have illogically assessed the consequences of representationalism to mean there is no ontological truth (as a pseudo idealist might).

As in, Berkeley is logically consistent and Kant allows a distinction between the unknowable noumena (the ontologically real) and the phenomena (the mentally known). Those folks aren't muddling epistemology with ontology.

Again, in the Nature survey, the data is as follows:

Does a measurement require an observer?
Yes, and they must be conscious: 9%
Yes, but consciousness is not relevant (and an 'observer' can include
interaction with a macroscopic environment): 56%
No: 28%
Not sure: 8%

The supposition that there is a consensus amongst physicists that consciousness is an inherent feature of the physical universe is a fabrication. 84% of physicists reject the idea that consciousness is necessary for measurement. — Banno

Consciousness isn't an inherent feature of the physical universe, but a description of the physical universe without reference to consciousness is incoherent. The measurement (meaning the measuring devices' reaction to the physical event) occurs without consciousness, but what are we even talking about when we talk about events that exist in a universe that have never been provided attributes described by the senses?

So: "If a tree falls in the woods...", basically — Outlander

No. That suggests Jung was some sort of Berkelian idealist. He was not making any metaphysical claim at all. He was only indicating our psyche is mediated by our perceptions and so our consciousness of reality defines who we are.

The world existed before this hypothetical observer was even born, and would have existed if that never happened, and continues still to exist long after we're gone. I can have an idea about anything that exists, — Outlander

He's not suggesting otherwise. To the extent the external world is mediated and not directly knowable, that would evoke Kantian references of the noumenal, but not suggestions of reality blipping in and out of existence as we blink.

C.G. Jung once said that the world only exists when you consciously perceive it. In that theory, only what I see truly exists. What I do not see, or what I am not aware of, therefore does not exist. — Jan

Substitute "the world" with "your world."

Actual quote from Jung is:

“Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists for us only in so far as it is consciously reflected by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being.”

Schrödinger had ideas along similar lines. — Jan

I can't agree with this assessment.

Jung was a psychologist, not a physicist. He meant only that our world, what we know, live, and breathe, what it is to be, is rooted in our consciousness.

This is not a statement about reality generally. It is a statement about what constitutes our personal reality. The "practically speaking" qualification makes it all the more difficult to suggest he was making any claim about the world generally.

Just finished The Magician of Lublin. The metaphor of self-imprisonment as an obstacle for atonement was truly brilliant.

Is it metaphysics or is it sociology? — T Clark

Metaphysica of sociology. As in, what is a society (or subpart) composed of. The "ant trap" (name of his book) is the error (his thesis) of falling into the trap (as he says many social theorists do) of thinking of society as an aggregate of its individuals (i.e. a bunch of ants making a colony).

The SEP was written by this same author.

Why would I choose to die so that my replica can live? I don't understand that. You've not cured my illness. You've just created a new person just like me without my illness. Why can't we both live? Why do we need another of me without arthritis? Why not make a whole team of people like me, all with different qualities (like one can cook really good, one cuts the grass really well, one is a good plumber, one is airline pilot, etc.) and send them to my family and job and I can get all sorts of stuff done while old arthritic me bitches in the recliner looking for the remote?

I do like me a questionaire.

​Ethics in Action: How do you personally resolve ethical contradictions that arise in your everyday life? — Astorre

I don't resort to philosophical analysis for determining what is ethical. I find ethical theories post hoc attempts to describe why you act in instinctively ethical ways. To the extent a contradiction arises, I just weigh the two and try to figure out what is best.

​Coping with Life's Challenges: Does your knowledge of philosophy help you deal with life's difficulties, losses, or existential anxiety? — Astorre

I don't. That's the purpose of religion.

​Balancing Depth and Superficiality: How do you find a balance between your philosophical mindset and the superficiality you encounter in others? — Astorre

We can learn from everyone. I think it's a mistake to assume the philosophically minded offer more than those not so.

Does philosophical thinking change your approach to relationships, friendships, and love? If so, how? — Astorre

To the extent being philosophical is synonymous with being even tempered, then I suppose it makes me not tempermental, but I don't think philosophy made me that way. I think that's just the way I am.

Beyond that, we have to be satisfied that we don't have any linguistic fingers that can't touch consciousness? — frank

Wittgenstein discusses how language is used, not the mystery in your head. So it's not that he's denying your inner world. He's just saying it can't be spoken about directly. That's not to say you can't say "I feel pain" and be understood, but our understanding is based upon how we as a community use words, not based upon me knowing whether your inner referent (your beetle) is the same as my inner referent (my beetle). We don't speak of beetles, except as words, not as beetles.

It left me pondering how I know what it's like to be conscious if I can't know what it's like for other people. Wouldn't I need something to compare or contrast it with? I wasn't thinking about the ineffability issue. It would be closer to a private language problem, where I wouldn't be able to speak confidently about continuity of consciousness. I wouldn't be able to say it's this and not that. Maybe I have to assume other people experience things differently so I can say pinpoint something unique about me? Is it my POV that's unique? — frank

You can't know what the other person's beetle is like. You can speak about your experiences, but ultimately the words you use are defined by how you use them, not by your internal state. So when you say "I feel pain," the word "pain" just means how people use it, but because the word only means how it is used and it does not have a referent of your internal pain does not suggest you don't actually have pain.

Where I've used "pain," the same holds for the word "consciousness." That is, "I am conscious," or "I am aware," or whatever you wish to convey is definable by the words as they're used, not by the internal state.

When you seek to discuss the actual internal state as to what it is, the private sensation, you are outside what Wittgenstein would allow language to do. You're discussing metaphysics. Language isn't for that sort of discussion because meaning is use, not meaning is internal referent.

So, as to how you know that you are conscious? You experience it. You are therefore conscious. "Knowing" is a loaded term because it requires a justification, so it's more consistent just to say you are in pain without saying "I know I am in pain because I feel pain" which might implicate a metaphysical conversation about homonculi. The consistency of your word usage is controlled by public correction, not by consistency of the internal referent.

I think.

Might it be that the physicalist worldview is deficient in some respect. — Wayfarer

I've not argued a physicalist worldview. I've only argued that paranormal experience doesn't offer proof of substance dualism. My basis isn't just that physical monism offers a possible explanation, but it's that it's contradictory to use physical evidence to prove the non-physical.

That is, you can claim souls, gods, and ghosts exist, but you can't show me pictures of anything other than their physical attributes. If I can see it, it's physical.

Empirical proof for the existence of the non physical simply makes no sense.

Brassica napobrassica — Banno

This makes the H2O - water point, right? The scientific term means something different from the common one, but they collapse under the same set, losing that distinction.

So are swedes and rutabegas and purple top turnips extensionally identical? — Banno

At my grocery store, a rutebega is a large round root with purple on all parts, for some reason with a very waxy exterior. A turnip is smaller, shown in the picture you provided. A Swede is a tall blonde specimen from up north.

Are they extensionally identical? Is water and H2O?

Why would being infinite make it uncertain? There are infinite odd numbers, but no uncertainty here. Infinity does not lead automatically to vagueness. — Banno

That's an interesting point, but doesn't this reference a distinction in categories between analytically defined and empirically defined?

If sorting infinite root vegetables, some will be rutabegas, some we're not sure, and some will be Swedes.

But every other integer after 1 is odd no matter how high we count.

So, the rutebega set is infinite across all possible worlds as is the not-sure-if-rutebega set, but we have zero not-sure-if-odd set.

That is, I feel your odd number counter example was not applicable. It's of a different sort.

I also think my rutebega/Swede distinction raises another sort of problem along the lines of your kidney talk.

If redness is all things that are red in all possible worlds, then that set is infinite as is the set of of all things we're not sure are red. If there is infinitely uncertainty as to redness, then what value is our redness set in telling us what is red?

Mine might just be a vagueness objection that implicates infinite vagueness, but isn't the purpose of the extensionalism exercise to eliminate just that?

It depends on how "car" is specified. — litewave

Maybe replace "specified" with "used." Otherwise, you just have a purely prescriptive language, and not one that really exists.

Is it possible (logically consistent) for the property of being the king of France to be instantiated? If yes, then it is instantiated in some possible world. If not, then it would be self-contradictory. — litewave

So when you say everything must have a referent, you're speaking modally, meaning it has a hypothetical referent in a possible world? I didn't get that from your OP.

It depends on how "car" is specified. Usually it is specified as "self-propelled vehicle on four wheels". In that case, the property of being a car is the set of all self-propelled vehicles on four wheels. — litewave

Why can't a car have 3 wheels and why wouldn't a broken car still be a car?

I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. This set would be the property, and the elements of this set would be the instances of the property. For example, the property of redness would be identified with the set of all red things, or the property of being a car would be identified with the set of all cars. — litewave

There are properties that exist that are not of a referent, like the property of being the King of France attaches to no object, yet being the King of France is a property nontheless. There are also no essences of objects that would dictate which set all examples belong, like whether a particular car belongs in the set of cars is contextually dependent.

Searle, Wittgenstein.

In modern western societies, a testimony that appeals to clairvoyance falls under misrepresentation of evidence, an inevitable outcome under witness cross examination in relation to critical norms of rational enquiry and expert testimony, possibly resulting in accusations of perjury against the witness. I would hazard a guess that the last time an American court accepted 'spectral' evidence was during the Salem witch trials. — sime

I agree with this generally, but I don't think it's a fair criticism of @Sam's position. That is, in court, if the physical evidence contradicts the testimonial evidence or if the testimonial evidence is not possible under the laws of physics as we know them to be, then then testimonial evidence fails. If it doesn't fit, you must acquit so to speak.

If we accept the priority of the laws of physics over testimony as a given, then it would become impossible to ever challenge the laws of physics as we know them to be by testimony.

To give two differing examples to make this point: If I say I saw Bigfoot, you might challenge that because you don't believe there to be a Bigfoot, but it's not based upon the fact that our laws of physics deny the possibility of there being a Bigfoot. You will listen to my testimony and others and you may or may not believe Bigfoot was seen, but it stands as a possibility that there is a Bigfoot. As a juror, you would be weighing the credibility of the testimony.

If I say I had an NDE and you say that me saying it can never overcome the fact that disembodied spirits are physically impossible, and no matter how convincing I might be, you reject it based upon your belief in the priority of physics over testimony, then you are creating a situation where I can never prove the NDEs exist. As a juror, you would not be weighing the credibility of the testimony. You would be rejecting it as impossible.

My question is not silly. Considering that your thoughts are mental events and have no physical properties, I wonder how they could affect physical processes, such as typing. Do you have an explanation for that? — MoK

This makes an assumption that NDEs or any paranormal experience involving disembodied spirits (ghosts, reincarnation, etc) challenges Cartesian dualism. It would seem that type of evidence, if accepted as valid, would be amenable to monistic theories. That is, if I can see a ghost, it must be physical. If I can leave my body and see myself on the operating table, then whatever that floating mass is has the ability to see. These are all examples of physical interactions. It takes light to see and soundwaves to hear, and there must be some apparatus to sense them.

My point here is that if we take the mind/body interaction problem seriously, we don't just shrug our shoulders and claim that ghosts exist as a seperate substance in a mysterious way, but we say instead that ghosts must be physical as well. Once you start observing and measuring, you're a physicist, and you need to categorize your discoveries scientifically. That is, it is impossible to physically prove the non-physical.

If you want to put this to a clean test, pick a single, well-documented case that meets my five standards—volume/diversity/consistency are background, but the decisive screens are firsthand plus independent corroboration, and run your three courtroom filters on it: exclude hearsay, interrogate it as you would on cross, and then weigh credibility in light of the objective traces (records, witnesses, timestamps, objects). If it fails, I’ll strike it from the “strong” column. If it passes, then by your own rules, it deserves evidential weight. — Sam26

Well, you have the burden here of proving NDEs exist. It's not upon me to go through the volumes of claims and cross them off the list one by one. So, give me the one that meets the criteria and we'll see if it survives.

First, that testimonial evidence is a valid way of justifying one's conclusions, and moreover, one's beliefs. Most of what we know comes from the testimony of others. Thus, it's a way of attaining knowledge. — Sam26

Let's talk then about how testimonial evidence is typically accepted as proof of a fact. Testimony is the primary method used in courtrooms for fact finders to consider when determining fairly important matters, like whether a person should have his liberty or life taken from him or whether he should be indebted to another for millions of dollars.

There are all sorts of rules, referred to as rules of evidence that, for our purposes, could be called pragmatic epistimology, meaning the applied ways we consider evidence generally, but testimony specifically, trustworthy. Without getting into all the rules, I'll just focus on a few: (1) hearsay, (2) cross examination, and (3) the weighing of credibility. I'm sure another lawyer out there might think it better to focus on other rules, but these are enough to make my point.

To begin: Hearsay is an out of court statement conveyed by another in order to prove its truth. Think of it as "I heard Bob say [i.e. hear say] that Mike shot Joe." We don't trust that because we need to hear from Bob as to what Bob said, not me. You can't question me on what I witnessed because all I can tell you is what I heard.

So, when you tell me that you read a book that offered testimony from a witness as to their NDE, or even further removed, testimony of testimony from another as to what someone said, I have second and third hand evidence, none of which I can question.

And that brings me to the second issue: Cross examination. I have to be able to seriously question the witness to know what happened. Reading a witness statement without asking all sorts of details, particularly ones like how much familiarity someone might have with operating rooms, who they may have spoken with between the event and the testimony, the very particular thing they said without embellishment at the time of the event, who was present to corroborate the testimony, whether those corroborating witnesses have offered consistent information, and on and on and on.

And then there is the weighing of credibility. All the things I've said have to be considered, and it's perfectly appropriate for someone just not to buy it. To listen to the witnesses and feel like it just doesn't add up, that the speakers seem flaky, motivated, confused, or whatever it might be is a very acceptable to reason just not to beleive what they're saying.

The point here is that you're asking me to believe NDE testimony has been offered in a way that leads to no other conclusion than to admit that our physical laws as we know them have been violated. That's just way too much to ask. I would need a videotaped OR, watching a pronouncement of death, seeing a patient revived and then hearing that patient then tell of his observations he made without using his eyes from a bird's eye view hovering in the operating room.

Since I don't have that, it's very reasonable for me to reject the testimony. In fact, it's fairly unreasonable to read a bunch of books on NDEs and then believe it's possible to see without eyes. Other experiments show that just cannot be done. That there are volumes and volumes of evidence amounts to nothing if that evidence isn't subjected to meaningful scrutiny.

Started "The Ant Trap" by Brian Epstein. A book on social ontology. If I'm following (and there's always that), his thesis is that marriage (for example) is valid if (1) there is grounding by my having met the requirements of marriage like an officiant married me, a filed a license, etc, and (2) there is anchoring by society having accepted and created rules as to what that marriage means. This supposedly offers a better explanation from the traditional individualistic versus holistic theory that says you are married if (A) you as an individual hold yourself out to be and believe yourself to be married and (B) the community a a whole recognized you as married. The limitation of A is that it doesn't allow an explanation for how you can believe yourself to be married but not be married because you don't have a license and the limitaiton of B is that it doesn't explain how the license doesn't get tied back to the community rule.

It's interesting because it's not the standard "language is use," but it's trying to explain the ontology of marriage (or any social event) itself, making it modern day analytic metaphysics far removed from the Cartesian type.

Oh, indeed, you and I would never make use of AI... — Banno

The old tu quoque fallacy.

To be clear though, you can use AI, just not:

"AI LLMs are not to be used to write posts either in full or in part (unless there is some obvious reason to do so, e.g. an LLM discussion thread where use is explicitly declared). Those suspected of breaking this rule will receive a warning and potentially a ban.

AI LLMs may be used to proofread pre-written posts, but if this results in you being suspected of using them to write posts, that is a risk you run. We recommend that you do not use them at all."

You can interact with AI all you want, you just can't have it write your posts. I use AI all the time. Bounce ideas off it. Use its search engine feature. But whatever I post is in my own words and understanding, and I don't use it as source information, but locate whatever it says on some independent site.

Where it says you can't use it to write posts, it means literally as @Athena was suggesting. You can't just plug in info and have it spit you out a response. You can learn whatever you learn however you learn, and once learned, you can tell us what you learned.

This is no different than having your friend do your homework for you. If he explains you the topic, you read the book, you understand it, you do the assignment, you're fine. If he does it for you, then you cheated, and no one likes a cheater.

But you can't just say feel free to have your friend do your homework because it's impossible for your teacher to know, which is kinda what you did say.

:clap:

I don't know where you got that you need AI to present your case.

It's a rule that is unenforceable in practice. — Banno

Respect for the rule of law assures compliance.

I do appreciate your thoughts, and no one's objective is to make anyone's life more difficult, but the rule has an important purpose in assuring we are communicating with one another and not with bots.

So, the rule does stand. That being said, it does appear you've responded to me without AI coherently and passionately, which means you will do just fine without sending us bot created messages.

What is the reasoning for this prejudice? — Athena

AI offers the best explanations
You want the best explanation for why AI can't be used here

Ergo, ask AI why you can't use AI here.

hat is hilarious. Just try to go against nature and see how well that works. — Athena

Very well. Sketch your best guess about how we evolved and then insist we stay true to that course else be punished by Mother Nature.

Even assuming you've accurately described humanity's educational odyssey from the cave until today in those few paragraphs and you've deciphered with accuracy "what is natural to our species," take a look at this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_to_nature

This position is no where near complete; and I would appreciate it, though, if people could engage with me on this position and its claims to help further or kill the ideas in it. — Bob Ross

My thought is that this is an attempt to justify Christianity upon rationality alone without reliance upon revelation, perhaps because you believe rationality is a firmer basis for belief than revelation or faith alone. Your views on the Trinity, incarnation and sacrifice, grace, mercy, and justice, and the distinctions between heaven, hell, and purgatory are clearly Christian. Suggesting that we could arrive at those ideas without introduction to and indoctrination to Christianity, but that we could arrive at that through reason alone will not ring true to anyone but a very devout Christian.

You do move away from Christian orthodoxy in some places, like hell not being eternal, with the possibility of posthumous salvation, purgatory taking on a more traditional hell-like state, you seem to redefine original sin, you describe a purely rational state when we go to heaven (which seems consistent with your desire to prioritize rationality as an attribute), and you see this propensity to prioritize the rational with the way you describe atonement, which I didn't completely follow.

If I had to offer a single assessment, it would be that you're trying to sort out your very Christian beliefs and orientation in a way that comports with your philosophical leanings. It presents an account of your religious journey, which I think would be well received by a pastor with philosophical leanings and who isn't overly orthodox in his views, but less so to a conservative minded priest.

To the average reader with no Christian leanings (me, for example), I don't find it all persuasive in terms of convincing me that your views might arise without an a priori commitment to Christianity. The person who might find this interesting is a Christian who is troubled with some of the consequences of Christianity, so he's doing like most religious people do who are otherwise devout believers: they modify the doctrine in a personally palatable way and often convince themselves that they have uncovered the truer form of the religion lost somewhere in time.

In terms of the text giving guidance itself, such a disconnect (if one takes the point of the text as being primarily documentary) could hardly have been lost on the writer or any redactor. It's like that for a reason. There are a number of cases like this in the Bible, right from Genesis 1 vs Genesis 2. And I think this at least suggests a close reading. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It could be just that there were multiple versions of the various stories and a desire to create a single consistent story was of less priority to the person who sewed the various accounts together than was protecting as much original text as possible.

This posits that there were multiple sources for the Bible and that the redactor's primary objective was that of an archivist of foundational literature.

This is a widely held view.

We await Tim's providing an coherent explanation of what an essence is, and why it is needed. — Banno

What do you await? How it's used? It's irrelevant that there are no essences we can point to.