Yet, with each new mass murder in the U.S. we have people from all over the world increasingly calling for civilians to be disarmed, for the indivudual's right to bear arms to be seen as a myth that never had any moral or intellectual foundation, and for only the police and the military to be allowed to possess firearms. — WISDOMfromPO-MO
An egregious fact that is unconstitutional in spirit if not in fact. — Thorongil
The significant difference between the thermostat and the human belief is that the thermostat necessitates action, and in the human being belief doesn't necessarily result in action. One may or may not act on a belief. That's free will. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, but then I don't really hold with phenomenalism in humans either. — Pseudonym
The thermostat isn't conscious, although I thought we've already been discussing that.If you wish to assert that "it's clear that something different is happening when I believe it's too hot and the thermostat switches on the furnace.". I'd like to hear an argument as to why you think that, I'm not going to just take your word for it. — Pseudonym
This is a philosophy forum, not a linguists forum, I'm not so interested in how the word is used so much as what we can learn from it. — Pseudonym
That's why I keep coming back to the question of whether there is any meaningful job being done by restricting the word belief to conscious creatures. What is it about consciousness that makes belief data different from any other data (such as that which is stored in the position of a bimetallic strip)? — Pseudonym
What is it about consciousness that makes belief data different from any other data (such as that which is stored in the position of a bimetallic strip)? — Pseudonym
A belief is an attitude to a proposition in some way, I think perhaps we can all agree on that (although maybe not). The question is whether there is any need for the holder of that attitude to be aware they are holding it. — Pseudonym
What differentiates a thermostat from the examples you give is that in the examples, there is no outside observer to whom the data is relevant. We're all quite comfortable with the idea that a computer hard drive contains data, it's all just diodes, but we call it data because the outcome is unpredictable to us. The ice in some way 'contains' the data that it's below freezing point, but that data was not unpredictable to us, the thermostat's data is. — Pseudonym
I'm a determinist, so as far as I'm concerned, a person putting a coat on is a direct mechanistic consequence of the environment acting on their biological system. No different to the air temperature acting on the thermostat and causing it to switch the heating on. Yet at some point in time, we want to be able to say that the person 'believes' it is cold and it is this belief that causes them to put a coat on. — Pseudonym
In order to be a cause, this belief must be a prior state of the biological system. More specifically it must be exactly that particular state which causes the coat putting on activity. If that state is what a belief is, then logically, that same prior state must also be a belief in the thermostat. — Pseudonym
Not at all, there are many perfectly rational people (myself included) who consider consciousness to be an illusion, that we are distinguishable from thermostats only in the number of such computations we can carry out at any one time. In fact, I would go as far as to say that, if we allow for some phenomenal emergence, then actually most philosophers of mind agree that our brains work in this way. There is nothing ontological to distinguish us from thermostats other than volume of data processed. — Pseudonym
As I said, if you've already made up your mind as to what 'believe' should mean and what is apparently "clear" about the differences between the state of our brains when we believe something and the state of the bimetallic strip in a thermostat when is 'believes' it is cold, then what purpose is there to your involvement in this discussion? — Pseudonym
Indeed, and the thermostat, if broken, might turn the heating off despite 'beliving' that it is cold, but we would in both cases be equally able to judge that something has gone wrong. I'm still not hearing anything of this magical difference between humans and thermostats which actually makes any difference to the meaning and use of the term 'belief'. — Pseudonym
Firstly, no we can't figure it out, but that's an entirely different debate and unnecessary herebecause, secondly you're talking here about consciousness (which I agree it is easy to see the thermostat doesn't have). You have yet to establish why you think it necessary for belief to be linked to consciousness. What job does such a restriction do to the meaning and use of the word? — Pseudonym
Sure, when is a chair a chair. Some things are clearly not chairs and some things clearly are, but that I can't tell you the exact dividing line hardly means there are no chairs. But, back at you, the same question. When is a belief a belief? Does the tree waving in the wind believe the wind is blowing? Does the ice forming in the freezer believe the temperature fell to 0 degree Celsius? Does the grape crushed on the floor believe that people are heavier than grapes?So what about insects, bacteria, unconscious people, philosophical zombies, AI... Where do you draw the line on what can have beliefs and why? — Pseudonym
That's the whole point of my example. What are we defining if we insist that belief requires a concious state (a state which we cannot even reliably identify since no-one is agreed what conciousness is anyway)? — Pseudonym
If you think a belief requires conciousness in order to define it, in order to separate it meaningfully from other similar states without conciousness, then what is the job that adding conciousness as a condition is doing for our definition? What error would we be making if we were to describe the thermostat as 'believing' it was cold on the basis of it's behaviour (turning the heating up) other than insulting your anthropocentric view that humans must have a whole series of special words to describe their states of being? — Pseudonym
Yes, you've discovered it. I don't believe a word I'm saying, but I feel the need to keep humans in their esteemed place in the world so I'm insisting upon an anthropomorphic definition of belief. No, I do believe that cats and dogs have beliefs too, but not thermostats or waving trees.What error would we be making if we were to describe the thermostat as 'believing' it was cold on the basis of it's behaviour (turning the heating up) other than insulting your anthropocentric view that humans must have a whole series of special words to describe their states of being? — Pseudonym
First of all we are talking about a test to decide whether a person is old enough to engage in sexual activities with other people, not rape. — Sir2u
My idea would be applied before the act, not after. — Sir2u
Again here you go towards rape and victims, not age of consent which I was discussing. And apart from underage sex being called statuary rape there is quiet often a bit of willingness and even wantonness involved on the part of the victim. — Sir2u
I think philosophers in general ought to be more reluctant to take part in these discussions over "what is X?" questions. The debate about the meaning of the word can be endless and fruitless if there are no criteria for a succesful definition and no purpose served by the defining. — PossibleAaran
I can find you a thermostat which clearly 'beleives' it's cold — Pseudonym
One will not find a belief by dissecting a brain. Beliefs are found in behaviour, including spoken behaviour. — Banno
It's not a matter of subjective interpretation, it's the question of can we apprehend an object directly with the intellect, without the medium of sense phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, just like how we come to learn about external objects, we also come to learn about who we are (our subjectivity). This is not something that we see clearly - we can (and often are) wrong about what we want, who we are, what we react like, what will make us happy etc. It is only by going through phenomenal experience that we come to learn more (hopefully) about who we (phenomenally) are. But we are often deceived about our intentions, our desires, and our inner states. Often, we also deceive ourselves into thinking we are so and so, or we are capable of so and so, when in truth we aren't.
So yes, TimeLine is right that there is a subjective "in-itself" - but she's wrong that we have access to it. — Agustino
Not so much of a question type test, but more in line with psychological development and maturity. Obviously there would be a part of it that would question the person's knowledge about the risks and consequences of sex would have to be included, but it would be more important from my point of view to evaluate their ability to make rational decisions.
And I don't think that there should be a practical section to the test. — Sir2u
I think Kant is right on the point that we can't know an object freed of all subjective interpretation. The perspective from nowhere makes no sense.That's why Aristotle placed intuition at the highest level of knowledge. Kant simply defines "intuition" in an odd way (as you explain in the other thread), and this dismisses "intuition" in the traditional sense, disposing of our access to the noumenon. — Metaphysician Undercover
They didn't need to 'save' anything, the amount of money they spent taking this child away from his twin and his mother could have been used to give the entire family a comfortable life and both children an excellent education in their respective country. — TimeLine
I am currently moving through an adoption arrangement in Australia (known as Permanent Care) and despite the fact that the child cannot be taken care of by the parents due to a number of possible reasons and hence why the courts take responsibility that enable the order for myself to be the primary carer on a permanent basis, if the parents are still alive we are legislated to ensure visitation rights a number of times. Because, psychologically, this is important for the child. — TimeLine
You could love a person not because you actually love them, but because they epitomise the right type of object that furthers your social position. It is the same thing, just more sophisticated. — TimeLine
How is subjective (being the unconscious) phenomenal? — TimeLine
If subjective experience is noumenal then we are attaching knowledge to the unconscious realm, which is unknowable. — TimeLine
Be careful. This is not the shoutbox so I would appreciate you responding appropriately or not responding at all. — TimeLine
You're talking about the dichotomy of thing in itself and appearance and have no clue what that even means. Great. I mentioned that your metaphysics isn't very good, no wonder you don't participate in many of the metaphysical discussions here. — Agustino
Productive self-experience. The framework that determines our value through others is paradoxically narcissistic, despite a reliance on others, because there is an absence of an active orientation towards being. — TimeLine
Either that or they could only save one life, so they did what they could do. The couple did a deed far greater than I, as I adopted no one. I'd also say that even if (and I don't think it's the case) this couple adopted a child and saved him from misery and did it for no reason other than for fame and attention, I still applaud them. A child saved is a child saved, regardless of intent.I read recently that a couple adopted a child from Thailand and the mother had twins, but they took only one child and never looked back neither did they help the family. To them, adoption was an image, they did not actually care about the child clearly by not caring about the family of the child, they just wanted a token adopted child for social reasons rather than moral. — TimeLine
What do you think of the following quote: I do not only see the rose, the rose also sees me. — TimeLine
You suggest that it does not, that a plant's growth has purpose, but no intent. I find that difficult to accept, as I see no other meaning to "purpose", except as an object to be attained. The object to be attained is what the thing intends. We could however, assume that "intent" refers to a special type of purpose, a type of purpose specific to conscious agents, so that "intent" implies "purpose", but "purpose" does not imply "intent". — Metaphysician Undercover
Let me see if I understand your claim. We observe that living things act with purpose, but this does not provide us with what we need to conclude that living things act with purpose. Commonly called "the problem of induction". — Metaphysician Undercover
Nothing in the article about "a human could observe another person's time slowing relative to his own."
As you said, it is incoherent. — Rich
No one has ever observed another person's life slowing. — Rich
Clocks are not time. — Rich
Of course v they do. They do it all the time and they vocalize these feelings — Rich
Never heard this happen anywhere by anyone. This is comparable to flying dogs. I'll be v this under the c heading off fabricated evidence? — Rich
So science denies that people can feel time slow, despite the enormous evidence to the contrary, but feel it is perfectly sensible that one human can observe another person's time slowing. — Rich
