So I have come to the conclusion that really American society thinks that murder and suicide are OK. — Wayfarer

Hyperbole, indeed.

hy·per·bo·le

/hīˈpərbəlē/

noun
noun: hyperbole; plural noun: hyperboles
exaggerated statements or claims not meant to be taken literally.

synonyms: exaggeration, overstatement, magnification, embroidery, embellishment, excess, overkill, rhetoric;

No, Americans don't like murder. Even if increased societal gun ownership could be linked to increased murder rates, a refusal to control gun ownership would not logically suggest that the society must like murder. What it would mean (assuming the issue were being democratically determined) is that the society believes that the positive consequences of gun ownership outweigh the negative.

The prevailing view, though, is not that the issue is one of democratic concern, but it is that gun ownership is an inherent right, constitutionally protected. This is not to say that there is not widespread support for gun ownership in the US, but it is to say that even if there weren't, there would be limitations on the regulations that the government could impose on gun ownership.

Aside from pandering to the gun lobby, the Republicans major pastime is launching vexacious litigation against public health, which they describe as 'communism'. — Wayfarer

It's possible that the gun lobby has disproportionate power due to political maneuvering, but I suspect its power really arises from the general sentiment among Republicans that the gun ownership is an inherent right. That is, Republican legislators are not voting in support of gun ownership just to appease the powerful gun lobby, but they are voting that way because that's actually what their constituency is demanding.

No, because rather than saying "this is what it means to be human" I would say "these are the things that we call 'human' and these are some of things that a lot of these things have in common". It's an entirely different approach – and one that doesn't require that there be necessary requirements to qualify as human. Because it's not about qualifying as human but about whether or not describing this thing as human is more-or-less consistent with how we already use the word. — Michael

It is irrelevant whether we say "this is what is means to be human" or whether we say "this is what "human" means." In either event, you are attempting to identify a particular metaphysical attribute that is essential for humans (or "humans"). That is, whether we are (1) trying to figure out how we use a term or (2) trying to figure out what certain beings have in common, in either event, we are analyzing for similarities and trying to determine when two things are similar enough to be the same type of thing.

All of this is to say that your distinctions between actual humans, utterances that describe actual beings, and others' thoughts about human beings make no difference to this analysis. All are equally external objects that possess the same basic material metaphysical existence. Whether we are talking about things or words about things, both are equally metaphysically things.

I don't see why it matters at all whether we say that "all humans have the following similarities" as opposed to our saying "all uses of the term 'human" have the following similarities."

Essentialism only works when we know exactly what it means to be X – e.g. where X is a triangle or a bachelor. But when it comes to something like humanity or personhood then we have to abandon essentialism and accept instead a family resemblance among the things which we – as a matter of convention – designate as "human" or "person". — Michael

I don't see how resorting to family resemblance offers a solution. You are still left with the requirement that for X to be a human (for example) that X have certain attributes, with those attributes being defined as "resemblances."

I would define a human as that entity that has certain a certain set of attributes, with no particular attribute being essential.

I liked the Cointreau advertisement better than Dylan — Bitter Crank

It's not about Dylan. It's about me being tangled up in blue.

And if there were no environment for a leg to move - to exert pressure against, to be oriented amongst - there would be no such stimulus from the brain. — StreetlightX

But this is just to say that the brain is the center of the nervous system with nerves extending out to the legs, with those nerves communicating input back to the brain. Nothing here suggests that thought is occurring outside the brain anymore than it would make sense to say that my thinking of my desk occurs at the desk simply because the light rays have bounced off them and then back to my eye and then my brain. That is, the stimulus is "out there" and it somehow interacts with a sensory organ and then it is processed by the brain. With touch, the sensory organ is the body making contact with the object. With sight, it's the light coming off the object back to the eye.

The body's significance for me has less to do with it's flesh and blood than it's kinesthetics capacities; there's a reason thought is not associated with inanimate objects. It's animation, motility and the ability to engage in encounters that form the basis of thought. — StreetlightX

But you could think without having any movement outside the brain, as a quadriplegic would. What makes an inanimate object unable to think is the fact that there must be certain matter in motion to bring about thought. The movement that occurs within a rock on the subatomic level is actual movement; it's just not the sort of movement that leads to thought. We could quibble over the term "animate" I suppose, but things like cockroaches, oysters, and worms all move about, but I don't know how much thought we might attribute to them. There are even plants that move, and as I noted there are humans that can't move, so it's hard to relate movement to thought.

(I sometimes wonder - if by evolutionary chance our mouths were in our feet, would we not 'hear' our 'internal voice' in our feet? — StreetlightX

If for some reason we believed our thought occurred in our feet, it would only mean we would be wrong. Thought occurs in the brain. We can test that theory by first crushing our foot and then crushing our brain and then measuring which resulted in a greater decreased loss of thought.

Some men can't dance because they are too inhibited, and some men suffer from "pelvic lock" which makes it difficult for them to "get down and boogie" so to speak. — Bitter Crank

I don't think it's just lack of inhibition. I think it's lack of natural skill and probably practice and training. The same would hold true of an inability to play tennis or golf. I'm a very uninhibited tennis player, yet I suck just the same. My pelvis gyrates freely as I play, offering a treat for the ladies.

On a few occasions, sufficiently lubricated, I made a stab at it — Bitter Crank

It is important to lubricate before stabbing away.

Manning gives an example of this in terms of a certain phenomenology of dance. She writes: “Two dancers take a step forward. [They] begin to feel the dance take over. They feel the openings [of movement] before they recognize them as such, openings for movement that reach toward a dance of the not-yet. As [the dance] takes form, the intensity of moving together translates into a step, this time to the front and around. — StreetlightX

It's fairly clear, though, that the movement of the leg is determined by the stimulus it receives from the brain. If we severed the spinal cord so that the brain couldn't cause the leg to move a certain way, the leg would remain lifeless.

That is, thought does occur in the brain. That seems to be a rudimentary fact.

Regardless, of what significance is this in the metaphysical debate? If we were to determine that thought does occur in other areas of the body (and I think someone once posted a link showing that hunger occurred in the stomach without the brain's assistance or some such), how would that affect the materialist position in any real way? Whether my pain is in my head or my arm, as long as we're limiting it to a physical event, then we're sufficiently materialist to contradict the dualist positions suggesting that the pain occurs in some non-physical realm.

So if all the guns and ammo were to disappear tomorrow, the rate of murder might not change all that much. The white southerners and the black sons of the south living in northern ghettos would continue to kill each other, with knives probably, at the same high rate as they do with guns. At least there would be fewer bystanders killed. — Bitter Crank

I agree with much of what you've said here, but I don't know if I'd apply the same cultural influences to everyone in the South. The Celtic culture has been blamed for the southern violence, which was most notable in Appalachia after the Civil War.

It seems a stretch to blame black violence in the north on their southern roots from hundreds of years prior. It's also hard to associate black violence with the Southern Celtic culture because the Celtic culture and southern black culture were not intertwined. The black population was centered in the plantation regions and not in the poor mountain regions where the Celtic culture was. Appalachia is overwhelmingly white and extremely poor (other than the city folk who have bought vacation mountain cabins).

I also have a problem relating gun violence in rural communities with urban violence in cities. The former arises over exaggerated honor and pride and the latter over money and drugs.

But, I do agree that the South is a particularly violent region, which likely has as much to do with historical educational failings, racial disparity, and poverty than anything else. That being said (and I've not looked at the figures), I would suspect that over time the South's numbers will improve because of major population shifts southward.

In civil suits, punitive damages are considered by the jury after being told of the wealth of the party being punished. The Supreme Court has held that punitive damages must also bear some correlation to actual damages, with a proportion of greater than 10:1 being suspect. That is, if I cause actual damages of $100, you can't then penalize me $1m. So, yes, the general wealth of the party can be considered, but there are limitations on what is considered constitutionally permissible.

This is not a simple concept, though. Consider the windfall to the injured party when he has the fortune of being injured by a rich guy and not a poor guy. Consider also the fact that those with money are typically insured, meaning they will be covered for their loss. Punish away, but the rich have a whipping boy that will accept their punishment for them.

In the criminal context, fines are usually limited by statute within a range. As a general matter, the wealth of the party is an irrelevant consideration by the court, as justice is supposed to be blind to such matters.

Why is that? Consider the other side of the coin. Should I imprison a rich person for one day considering he would lose a considerable amount of money and reputation, but I should imprison a homeless person for a month for the same crime because his loss of freedom would be of minimal consequence to him? That is to say, if we look upon wealth with a blind eye, then neither the rich nor the poor will receive extra benefit or punishment based upon their status. The rich are not, despite the prevalent view here, inherently bad.

Such a term is not often bandied about on these forums, but it effectively states that human beings have the freedom to choose their beliefs. Doxastic determinism claims the reverse: we do not possess the freedom to choose what we believe in. — Thorongil

My very first post at PF was about this, although I didn't know the term "doxastic." It was actually this question that caused me to search for a philosophy forum so that I could post it. I posted on several sites only to either be ignored or to get some pretty worthless responses. The old PF members responded, I stuck around, and the rest is history.

My thoughts were a bit different though. I had long questioned the existence of free will generally, and it was the relationship between free will and knowledge that finally led me to accept the existence of libertarian free will as a necessary given, even if it is problematic (to say the least: the uncaused cause). To deny free will is to deny knowledge and to deny knowledge is to deny reason, and to deny reason is to deny any basis for understanding anything.

If we accept reason, then when we drop a ball, we accept that it will fall based upon our prior observations of it dropping. That is, we are presented with a variety of reasons that might explain our observation, and we exercise judgment based upon those observations, and that judgment leads us to conclusions. A judge who has formed a pre-determined course of action is no judge at all.

On the other hand. if we accept that there is an unbreakable causal chain, then the reason we believe that the ball falls when we drop it may or may not be related to what we have previously seen. That is, we're going to believe the ball falls when we drop it regardless, as that is what the cosmos of causes has caused us to believe. In a deterministic system, we cannot hold that our beliefs are the result of what is observed as true, but we must accept that our beliefs are just things in our heads that could have come about by any prior event. The fact that we believe our beliefs are the products of reason hardly makes it so.

The concept of "persuasion" therefore makes no sense to a determinist. One does not persuade a judge. A judge is forced into making his decision by all the applicable worldly causes, regardless of whether the decision bears any relationship to reality. What you think is persuasion is simply you barking your pre-determined noises toward a judge and the judge then barking his pre-determined response.

Since our beliefs (and therefore our knowlege, K=JTB) to the determinist are not based upon justifications nor truth, but just on whatever happens to bounce into the brain of the decision maker, we have no knowledge at all. That being the case, we can know nothing at all if determinism is true.

Such was my theory years ago, and it remains so. It was at that point that I stopped arguing about free will, as I considered the matter solved. To deny free will is to deny the abilty to speak intelligently about anything at all. If you disagree and claim that determinism and knowlege are compatible, then I'd submit that you're just saying that because you had to.

Only because no one beat me to it: Phallus erectus gigantus.

I agree, and I actually have opinions that will find more acceptance with the general public than they do here.

Regarding whether this site should grow, of course! It is far from unwieldy at the moment, and I look suspiciously upon any suggestion that it remain a tiny, uncompetitive entity. We can worry about being massive and cumbersome at some point in the very distant future.

My suggestion is that a collaborative effort be made to arrive at a meaningful marketing plan outside of public discussion groups. We are no doubt mostly among friends. Mostly, just mostly.

Your post indicates he was technically found innocent, although that was not my understanding of the articles I read. The matter was civil, not criminal, meaning reference to guilt or innocence entirely mischaracterizes the proceedings.

Of course, I'm just going on what I read, but if you know more, do share.

Now that PF is a for profit company, are you currently on its payroll or do you remain there as a volunteer?

If we're simply saying that the mind includes activity outside the brain but we admit that the extra-brain activity is non-cognitive, then the thesis becomes somewhat trivial, simply offering a novel definition of "mind." If, however, we adhere to a definition of "mind" that requires a cognitive (or at least conscious) aspect, then it seems my objection would hold, namely that what occurs outside the brain is fundamentally different than what occurs internally.

My general reaction to the paper was that I didn't see why one must commit to the idea that cognition occurred outside the mind simply because a problem could be more easily solved by reorganizing it in a more solvable way.

For example, I can determine that a particular Tetris piece will fit into the larger puzzle by manipulating the piece on the screen. I'm not thinking through the screen; I'm just simplifying the problem by moving the piece in a way that visibly and more obviously fits.

We might have to think they're real not to be worried, but they don't have to be real for us to worry about them, which means there might not be anything real, even though we're worried about things.

Real things we take seriously, unreal things we do not take seriously, because of how they may effect us, or their significance. — Wosret

No, things we think are real we take seriously, not "real things we take seriously." It doesn't matter whether it's real or not real; it only matters if we think it's real.

Why can't you be worried about an unreal threat, like when you're afraid of something that really will never happen, like being afraid a bear is going to eat you when you go camping when really there aren't any bears. Also, you could not be worried about a real threat, like when you go camping in the woods in a cave with a bunch of bears, but you thought they were all really nice, but it turns out that they were sons of bitches.

I thought I'd use bears and caves as my example because that's something that we've all come across.

I would love to give the face of this forum to somebody who represents an oppressed minority [however much Hanover may protest ;)] like bell hooks? — Moliere

My suggestion:

But is it possible for this to function as a boycott to the original website and force them run the forum properly? It'll be difficult to produce a platform as good as the one Paul built up. Or is that too much of a stretch (because they're just pure scammers or something along those lines) — Saphsin

You have a lot of quit in you.

No, this is not a protest site. It's not a temporary port in the storm. It's not a cheap imitation. It's not the junior varsity team.

This is a kick ass replacement of a noble effort that miserably failed due to poor financial management. Instead of sitting by our bedside waiting for us to die, weep for the others who have yet to realize their captain has failed them and their ship is sinking.

This is our site, our reality, so we get to write the history. That's how it works.

Someone give me a flag damnit. I need to wave something. I'm feeling all inspired.

Yes, I'm making a distinction now though because Nik seems to be saying and doing all the right things over there (not that I trust him at all) while Porat is kindly doing his best to drive people out of his hands and into our warm embrace. — Baden

It didn't take Porat to force me into your warm embrace.

Is that I can't know everything about real things? For instance, I can't know everything about the Eiffel tower. It's real. If there's a tower of which I know every true statement, that has to be a tower I made up. It's imaginary. — Mongrel

Most times I can't recall my dreams, meaning that I'm not even an expert of my own imagination. Other times my dreams have been crushed, which has nothing to do with what we're talking about, but it's a melancholy aside.

The difference between the real and the unreal is that the real is out there and the unreal in here. I know, very simple, but sometimes we have to accept that everything we learned in kindergarten (and even before) is true.

Secondly it suggests that it's impossible to talk about things which aren't mind-independent things (like Frodo, or Hitler winning World War II). — Yahadreas

It suggests only that it's impossible to talk about things that have no correlation to a previous experience of a mind independent thing. That is, I cannot talk about winning, unless you can point me to some prior experience of an occurence that you can compare to winning. We can form new thoughts about prior interactions with the real, but that doesn't equate to me being able to have knowlege without experience of the real.

It is far simpler to accept that to talk about a thing only requires talk and understanding (which requires recognising the relationship between words and either other words or empirical situations). — Yahadreas

An empirical situation is a mind independent thing, so I don't know how that fits into what you're saying.

On the most fundamental level I don't know how we can deny realism if we accept that language exists as a communicative tool. How is it that I hear your utterances if they don't exist apart from me? What am I hearing if there is nothing real outside me other than the echos of my mind?

I downloaded it and will read it tonight.

Xyzjoel wasn't mentioned.

Rumor has it that TGW is here by another name.

Looks like we've all forgotten Banno. Should I send a PM? I thought someone else would have gotten him by now... — Moliere

I PM'd him and it indicates it was read, but I've not seen him here or there.

Er... how do I send a PM to multiple members at once? I must be doing it wrong? — Sapientia

The quickest way is just to make a new post so everyone can see it. The shout box also works. There's this program called Tor that might be helpful.

Some of those mentioned would pop in and out, so they may not even know anything has changed.

What about Maia and Jessica17 or whatever her name was?

So who are we missing over here among the regulars? The only one I can think of is Banno, but maybe there's someone else I've forgotten.

So very glad you're here.

I'm confused by your post. Are you saying Paul sold something else?

Reading about Jew conspiracies eh? No surprise. — Wosret

Also, just to clarify, the book is about how the Jewish Orthodox community characterizes its own history within the realm of Judaism, not how it attempts to misstate its significance to the world at large. The community is very insular, so it would have no interest in tooting its own horn and being noticed generally. Actually, it often takes the opposite approach, trying to downplay significant differences when dealing with the non-Jewish culture due to fears of being noticed. Historically being noticed was not an advantage.

The book is written from a secular perspective, but draws interesting parallels about communities create their histories.

Don't eh me, you Canadian.

I'm currently reading "Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites Its History," which is really on point to this question. It distinguishes between heritage and history, with the former being an unapologetic factually inaccurate view of the past, reciting past events purposefully designed to inspire and elevate. We see the same in our own domains, whether it be a glorification of the Old South ignoring mistreatment of blacks or American history overlooking its treatment of native peoples.

My own view is that the distinction between history and heritage is one of degree and not black and white. What happened is always seen through the lens of what you want to have been, regardless of your best efforts at neutral journalism. This may explain why diametrically opposed political ideologues can never agree on whether a news report has been fairly reported.

I'm somewhat sympathetic to the view of characterizing events as meaningful in some higher sense, as opposed to even attempting to portraying black and white facts neutrally, as I question whether it can be done, especially in areas where the stakes are high.

Using the bullshit du jour we just went through as an example, I could just enumerate the facts, or I could tell you what it meant, highlighting the critical issues for effect and downplaying areas where I may wish to protect someone or something, and sticking to those facts that are thematic.

For example, we've all been extremely careful not to question Paul's motives, and even as I bring it up now, there are likely those who feel a sacred cow is being mishandled. Am I right, or am I right? We have our heritage to protect.

We're in a heated battle for most likes, so I played the odds and criticized Rand.

He didn't make diddly squat for 12 years of work.

I am encouraged by the folly of our competitor.