Comments

  • Wading Into Trans and Gender Issues
    I think the extremes fail and the ultimate social consensus will be found somewhere in the middle ground.Baden

    :up:
  • Wading Into Trans and Gender Issues
    realpolitik will prevail, of course. I anticipate sports organisations dithering between the reactionary and progressive approaches until some level is found where few folk complain, and a new stasis is reached.Banno

    :up:
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    But any truth has relevance only insofar as it could be seen to be true, or stipulated to be true in a fiction.Janus

    I think you are correct.

    But I also think that truth plays a role in a structure. Mostly we care about belief, and 'true' seems like a tool for talking about beliefs, perhaps in imagining them as certain, for instance. As Brandom might put it, we've invented words that allow us to talk about our thinking. Humans become self-consciously logical through inventing concepts like inference and truth...which 'only' made explicit what they are already in fact doing.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    I'm not understanding what you]re saying here; can you explain further?Janus

    If I tell you that there are plums in the icebox, I'm talking about those plums in that icebox. I'm not foregrounded my imagination or my motives for passing on the news. 'Phenomenologically' there's no detour through my visual imagination (not, I mean, in my semantic intentions.) The meaning of the assertion is worldly, directly revealing our shared situation. A rational reconstruction might include your motives, what you pictured, but this would be semantically secondary, in my view.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    It's true regardless of being seen or imagined.Banno
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    Let's call you a correspondence theorist, then.Luke

    I wouldn't mind, except the dominant version seems to include too much machinery.

    You are now creating further issues by drawing a distinction between a truth bearer without meaning (i.e. string-of-words) and a truth bearer with meaning.Luke

    It's just the use/mention distinction. To mention P, I put it in quotes. To use it, I don't put it in quotes.

    My theory, which looks deflationist and minimal to me, is that there is just 'P' and P, mention and use. If 'P' is true, then P is the case and P is (a part of) the world.

    Granting the truth of 'P', I suppose that one could call the mention of P a picture of the use of P.
    That is the sense I can make of correspondence.

    But note that @Janus is mentioning the visual imagination, which seems connected to a third thing (an imagining of P or something) that's not use and mention as described above. I take some CT proponents to use three parts in their explanatory machine, where I want to use exactly two.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    When I read "the cat is on the mat" I picture a cat on a mat.Janus

    Fair enough. But that's not the intention of 'te cat is on the mat.' Because we can say 'I am picturing a cat on the mat just now." We reveal the world to one another in our true claims.
  • Wading Into Trans and Gender Issues
    A more progressive response would be to re-assess the way in which capacities are grouped, removing the questionable place of gender or sexuality as a proxy.Banno

    We might consider though that men like playing with men and women with women. In other words, it's not just about raw performance but also about the style of play and the feel of a single-gender situation. I'm speculating here, but I'd guess that cis women feel pretty comfortable playing with trans women. Probably cis men feel comfortable playing with trans men too. The issue of fairness is a concern, because people clearly like to excel. But that's not the only or even the primary reason to play sports, is it ? I envision the joy of teamwork being a big part of it.
  • Wading Into Trans and Gender Issues

    :up:
    As long as we progressives aren't attacking science, I think we are in the clear. We don't want a Lysenko-style disaster. But a quick search seems to show that some progressives are a little too willing to chuck out science. Here's a politicized 'definition' of biological sex.

    ...The binary system (wo/man) set by the medical establishment to reinforce white supremacy and gender oppression, usually based on genitals and sometimes chromosomes. Because this is usually divided into ‘male’ and ‘female,’ this category ignores the existence of intersex people and natural sexual variations within the two broader recognized categories.

    e.g. The falsehood of “biological sex” is a driving force behind the debates around trans people in sports, even though all research shows there’s virtually no difference between them and their peers.
    https://translanguageprimer.com/biological-sex/

    Note that the concept of intersex depends on the very polarity being challenged. Biological sex is also called a falsehood, seemingly an attack on biology. One could defend this as being simply sloppy, with the intended point being that too much is made of biological sex in that particular context. It is ammo for the other side though, who love casting progressives as reality-denying sentimentalists who pave the road to hell with good intentions.

    Then we have the primary definition offered by a medical dictionary.
    1. the fundamental distinction, found in most species of animals and plants, based on the type of gametes produced by the individual; also the category to which the individual fits on the basis of that criterion.
    https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Biological+sex

    As far as I can tell, the rational approach is to accept biology and not make a big deal of it, because 'psychological identity is real and important' ... and cultural and up to us.
  • Wading Into Trans and Gender Issues
    Putting aside challenges to biology (which would seem to be anti-scientific and justly targeted by allusions to 1984), the issue seems to be simply one of norms. How can we balance our desire to be fair and kind with our desire to maintain personal freedom ?

    I suggest that we be careful with 'tranphobe' while also protecting the rights of trans individuals. Maybe some of my fellow liberals/progessives tend to cast their challengers as [synonym of evil] a little too readily. For instance, I don't think TERFS are necessarily crazy. (Ree ree ree.) Some folks on both sides want to pretend that the issue is already settled, but I think we are making the rules up as we go along. It's messy. For thousands of years we've taken a certain duality for granted, treating sex and gender as one clump.

    It's possible that our biological sex will one day be a secret hidden in our medical records.
  • Wading Into Trans and Gender Issues
    >>A "man" is what is socially recognized as a man. A "woman" is what is socially recognized as a woman. Since there is no overwhelming social consensus, it's up to us to argue one into existence.Baden

    :up: .
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    "The cat is on the mat" is a symbolic expression, or representation of that seeing or imagining, and the two are thus associated, although not in any absolute or essential sense, but just because we do associate themJanus

    If that's someone means by the CT, then I'd put them in my camp. But my impression is that usually an intermediate something is involved, not just a true sentence and a reality-meaning of that true sentence.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    That the cat is on the mat is a fact, not a sentence. "The cat is on the mat" is a sentence.Banno

    :up:
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    If the "picturing" is true, in the sense of hitting the mark, of being accurate, then we have truth, if not, then we have falsity.Janus

    Are we to understand the string of words as a 'picture' ? Do we really need this metaphor ?

    I can see why it's tempting. We are such visual creatures that we use visual metaphors for grasping meaning.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."

    Your position is unclear to me. I understand the deflationary theory to be opposed to and different than (and simpler and cleaner than ) the correspondence theory.

    Some versions of the CT look deflationary to me, so the beef may often/largely be merely terminological.
  • Future Belief - New Age vs Atheism (wrt Psychedelics, Quantum Theory, Reality, Karma, Consciousness)
    I see people who lie and deceive as being couched in fear and not fully aliveJanus

    I agree. Call it prejudice, but telling the truth seems beautiful and noble to me. I connect this to intuitions that Kantian articulated. Lying steals autonomy from others, treats them as a means.

    Philosophical theories of truth (correspondence versus redundancy, etc,) seem mostly 'amoral' or just technical.

    This thread is maybe playing with both aspects, the central practical/moral conception of honesty and the dry conceptual issue of truth.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    Perhaps one can find ones way through supposedly incompatible beliefs by further articulating one’s own approach such that it is capable of subsuming alternative beliefs?Joshs

    Sure. One understanding of Hegel is that individuals and cultures progress in response to contradictions that appear in the concepts they continually make more explicit by using. Probably not 'subject' (thing that aims at coherence of beliefs), either private or communal, is ever safely free of contradictions. Instead it takes time (or even 'is' Time) for contradictions or conceptual incompatibilities to become manifest and fixed. Such fixes themselves reveal flaws. The system swells as it falls forward. (We walk by delaying a forward fall.)
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    Much of the progress of science consists not in correcting ‘wrong’ theories from the past , but in producing concepts in areas where they were no concept
    at all .
    Joshs

    :up:

    I agree, and I value Popper for emphasizing this. Creativity is central. We grow our shared beliefs, our best guess at the truth.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    The actuality that corresponds to "the cat is on the mat" is the cat being on the mat. This is exactly the logic of the T-sentence. Or Aristotle's formulation: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”.

    Both express the logic of correspondence, the logic of common usage; it is basic, what more do we need? There is no need to complicate matters, when it comes to something even children easily understand, it seems to me.
    Janus

    To me that's just the redundancy theory, which I embrace. I attribute this to Aristotle, or I think his formulation works with the redundancy approach just fine. My motive is also the same. Keep it clean and simple. The meaning of a true assertion just is (a part of) the world.

    I take the CT, rightly or wrongly, to postulate something that 'makes' the meaning of the assertion true, something that the meaning 'gets right.' In other words, I take the CT to postulate some nonsemantic stuff that 'agrees' with the semantic payload.

    Note that we don't want a string of words to correspond to cat-on-the-mat-ness. So even 'correspond' is too much machinery here and only makes a mess.

    The meaning of 'P' is P. If 'P' is true, then P is the case, and P is a piece of the world.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."

    In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each "I-the-man" and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this 'living together.' We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world... Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in this together, belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic meaning... The we-subjectivity... is constantly functioning. — Husserl
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lifeworld

    Husserl seems to be gesturing at the same 'pregiven' shared situation or primordial we-world that I'm calling the minimally specified world.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    Is Heidegger also too Cartesian? He rejected truth as correctness in favor of truth as whatever discloses itself to Dasein.Joshs

    How's this ? What we believe just is reality for us,... and what you believe just is reality for you. We construct what we believe from sifting and rejecting or assimilating individual's claims.

    To me Husserl seems too individualistic. His later stuff seems to react to Heidegger's critique and give sociality its due.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    I am attracted to naturalistic models that don’t cut corners , either by reifying materiality through reductive physicalism , or by making the manifest image of conceptualization unaccountable to the empirical world.Joshs

    :up:

    Me too.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    We co-inhabit the partially shared construction we call a space of reasons, within which we invent, discover, agree and disagree.Joshs

    We co-inhabit (only) the shared part. But I think that's what you meant. It's that unshared part that makes the seems operator useful. We are constantly developing the shared part, working towards consensus.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    What one creates or co-creates in language implicates and is reciprocally dependent on material changes in one’s world.Joshs

    So do you believe in a thing-in-itself (atoms and void) or just a relatively 'material' side of a continuum ?
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    Stirner is absurd in many ways, but his work excavates, more of less explicitly, the minimal normative X...that in which one agent can claim precedence or authority over another.
    Sacred, then, is the highest essence and everything in which this highest essence reveals or will reveal itself; but hallowed are they who recognize this highest essence together with its own, i. e. together with its revelations. The sacred hallows in turn its reverer, who by his worship becomes himself a saint, as likewise what he does is saintly, a saintly walk, saintly thoughts and actions, imaginations and aspirations, etc.

    It is easily understood that the conflict over what is revered as the highest essence can be significant only so long as even the most embittered opponents concede to each other the main point,—that there is a highest essence to which worship or service is due. If one should smile compassionately at the whole struggle over a highest essence, as a Christian might at the war of words between a Shiite and a Sunnite or between a Brahman and a Buddhist, then the hypothesis of a highest essence would be null in his eyes, and the conflict on this basis an idle play. Whether then the one God or the three in one, whether the Lutheran God or the être suprême or not God at all, but "Man," may[Pg 50] represent the highest essence, that makes no difference at all for him who denies the highest essence itself, for in his eyes those servants of a highest essence are one and all—pious people, the most raging atheist not less than the most faith-filled Christian.

    In the foremost place of the sacred,[26] then, stands the highest essence and the faith in this essence, our "holy[27] faith."

    As Marx and even Hegel point out, Stirner's ego is itself a spook. But understanding Stirner's ego as the group ego is one way to understand objective idealism. There's nothing outside or above us. Our beliefs just are (the intelligible structure of) reality for us, while we hold them. We are godless or just gods to ourselves. We reject the irrational as unreal, and we beat the real into rational shape. This is according to rationality as we know it so far, for rationality is part of the world that it updates and controls. (In fact, though, many humans evade this terrible freedom and cling to notions of a skydaddy.)
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    Found a thread-relevant quote in a strange source.
    You have spirit, for you have thoughts. What are your thoughts? "Spiritual entities." Not things, then? "No, but the spirit of things, the main point in all things, the inmost in them, their—idea." Consequently what you think is not only your thought?[Pg 45] "On the contrary, it is that in the world which is most real, that which is properly to be called true; it is the truth itself; if I only think truly, I think the truth. I may, to be sure, err with regard to the truth, and fail to recognize it; but, if I recognize truly, the object of my cognition is the truth." — Stirner
    https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34580/34580-h/34580-h.htm#Page_3
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    Why? To me all it entails or suggests is that for every actuality a true corresponding proposition can be formulated.Janus

    That actuality in its 'nudity' is hard to make sense of. The actuality of the cat being on the mat is that the cat is on the mat. Redundant, it seems to me.

    Folks might use their visual imagination and 'see' the cat on the mat as the 'real thing.' But this makes the truthmaker inaccesibly private and implicitly visual.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    Husserl argued that there is no veil between subject and world. What appears to us, in the mode that it appears to us, is not a proxy or representation of something independent of what directly appears, but is the thing in itself ( whether imagined, perceived, remembered).Joshs

    Husserl has its virtues, but my non-Husserl-expert impression is that he's too Cartesian.

    --God is real. He talked to me last night.
    --No, he didn't. Take these pills, sir.

    Is it not safely taken for granted that individual humans have incompatible beliefs? So that not all of them can be right ?

    Husserl asserts there is no veil between subject and world.
    Duffenhaur asserts clearly there is such a veil.
    By Husserl's light, Duffenhaur must be right, so that Husserl must be wrong, so that maybe Duffenhauer is not right after all, so that maybe Husserl is right after all, and so on.

    The minimal concept of the world is something we can be wrong about.
    Or am I wrong to say so ?
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    If instead of a formal fact , we were to take ‘no independent facts of the world’ as a performative act arising from within the midst of contextual sense-making, obliged to re-validate itself the same differently in each new contextual instantiation of its use, then we would have a way of thinking and talking about what happens to notions like truth and belief when they are examined from a radically contextual vantage.Joshs

    I can relate to the ideas like the coherent version relativism, which might be described as absolute pragmatism. It's all 'just' speech acts, suggestions, co-creation rather than co-discovery. The only deep problem with this that I can make out is its utter lack of authority. As soon as one wants to bind others in terms of what they ought to believe, one is in a normative space. From a structuralist perspective, something is going to play the role of [what's-better-to-believe] and something else is going to name [the-reason-why-it's-better.] This role is more important in my view that all the different names we might have for it. This is Stirner's implicitly structuralist X (the 'holy' or the 'sacred.')

    'It's just my opinion that everything is just our opinion.'
    'Good for you! Next, please.'

    'We don't discover but make reality together.'
    'Well...I don't want to make that version of reality with you, the version where we make rather than find it. Next, please.'
  • Future Belief - New Age vs Atheism (wrt Psychedelics, Quantum Theory, Reality, Karma, Consciousness)
    This is born out by the ambiguity of the word 'fact', as it refers to both states of affairs and propositions about them.Janus

    :up:
  • Future Belief - New Age vs Atheism (wrt Psychedelics, Quantum Theory, Reality, Karma, Consciousness)
    But it seems that "crystalline web of concepts just is the world that is the totality of facts, while the things are the sensations, impressions and images.Janus

    :up:

    Are you also a deflationist about truth ? If we focus only on the true asserts in the concept system, that'd seem to be the world itself. Any actual individual will presumably have false beliefs. So we might talk of a imperfectly grasped world for this individual.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    If there are no independent facts of the world to fix our concepts to, them concepts liken pragmatic relevance, consistency, anticipatory compatibility and coherence replace true and false belief as expressions of how we cope with our world. This is self-creation rather than a fitting of language with fact.Joshs

    Does it make sense to take as a fact that there are no independent facts of the world to fix our concepts to ? Seemingly not, right ? And this approach itself would have to be established and defended in terms of the very pragmatic relevance it would institute as a replacement for truth.

    the general categories that would be called ‘truth’ and ‘belief’ are not themselves stably fixed by their relation to the facts of an empirical world.Joshs

    Wittgenstein's intentions aside, I'm skeptical myself about the 'empirical' world stabilizing metacognitive concepts like 'belief' and 'truth.' I suggest that 'true' plays a role like 0 or 1 or North. 'Belief' looks intimately related to the 'seems' operator. I doubt humans will stop needing 'seems', 'believe', 'supposed', and synonyms to make sense of one another.

    I don't think we can peel language off the world to see it 'naked.' This is the classic uncashable check, cousin of the idea of an alien conceptual scheme that's utterly difference than ours.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    If "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" for a large class of cases, then the same or similar can probably be said for the meaning of a sentence.Luke

    I think Robert Brandom does a good job of adding meat to the bones of 'meaning is use.' We perform concepts. Rather than concepts gripping the world directly, an inferentialist (following Kant) takes judgments to be the minimal units that individuals can be responsible for. "I took off my boots in the snow because I like my toes warm" does not make sense. "He had a bad teeth,so he ate lots of sugary food." Again, confusion, lack of skill with English. Their norms that govern intelligibly. These aren't the kind that get you shamed if broken but just misunderstood. On top of these norms (one kind fading into another) we have those for coherence and relevance, etc. Meaning is tribal property, but it's constantly being tweaked by individual invention that catches on.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    The deflationist cannot have statements/beliefs on one side as distinct from the world on the other side without committing themselves to a non-deflationary theory of truth.Luke

    To me the terminology is not that important. I would like us to do more with less, so I am defending an approach that uses the string-of-words (signifier) on one side and the worldly meaning (signified object-concept) of that string on the other. I imagine that other tempting choice would use three parts, like the signifier, the signified-as-concept, and the signified-as-worldly-object.
    This would be 'snow is white,' the concept of the whiteness of snow, and the 'actual' (visual?) whiteness of snow.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    I'm not sure for what reason a deflationist would say that "snow is white" is true; it's not because of any facts of the matter.Luke

    A deflationist would talk about beliefs. A history of the development of the concepts and snow could be presented. What kinds of light/objects tends to get called 'white' could be discussed. From a deflationist point of view, your are dragging in way too much metaphysical baggage. 'True' has a use in the language. It's expressive. To take an assertion for true is, among other things, to allow it as the premise in any inference whatsoever. I think this is in implicit in if P then Q. 'If P is true, then we can be sure that Q is true.'
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."

    Sticks and stones may break my bones...Luke

    Is that a fact about the world ? But it's 'just' concepts right ?

    Note that there's a difference between the string-of-letters 'stone' and the concept of a stone (the meaning of 'stone'.)
  • Future Belief - New Age vs Atheism (wrt Psychedelics, Quantum Theory, Reality, Karma, Consciousness)
    I think that because rationality and science rely on objectification, which is an abstraction from experience, a judgement of it, so to speak, they cannot touch the essence of religion and the poetical making of sense.Janus

    It's perhaps as if a crystalline web of concepts sits in a bath of ineffable of sensation and emotion.
  • Future Belief - New Age vs Atheism (wrt Psychedelics, Quantum Theory, Reality, Karma, Consciousness)
    Getting the life back into life could be, is in my understanding, getting beyond projects, ideals and meta-narratives, getting back to a kind of experience that was essentially there in childhood: getting back to the enchantment of the world, just as it is.Janus

    :up:

    I suppose it's just the articulation of a personal (anti-)project that sounds pretty good. I guess it's 'iterable' or 'legible' in that someone else could like the sound of the project and adopt it. But, since you aren't arguing that one ought to embrace the project, but only that you happen to have done so, it's be an example of what I've contemplated as coherent 'relativism.'

    I don't mean that you are a relativist or anything. At one time I was fascinated by how one could coherently express a non-normative, non-self-subverting blend of relativism, pragmatism, and skepticism. I decided that the key is giving up the desire to bind or appeal to universal norms. Instead of 'we can't know,' this character can say 'I don't think I do know.' Or they say 'let's maybe try this' instead of 'here's the correct way.'
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    we all live differently in the one world.Janus

    :up:

    The salient point is, that common world is not something we ever experience, but is a formal stipulation based on resemblance and memory.Janus

    we never perceive a whole object, we only perceive impressions or images, the continuity and resemblance of which lead the rational intellect to posit the object as the (transcendent) origin of the impressions,Janus

    It's only when we theorize and slow down that we infer that we must be 'automatically' synthesizing objects from light hitting our retina, but surely our sense organs, along with the rest of us, take their own unique tours through this world.

    Inquiring into our individual ideas of the shared world does make sense to me, but I don't think one can reduce the shared world very much trouble. Consider the claim that the common world is 'a formal stipulation based on resemblance and memory.' Isn't this claim itself, according to itself,a part of 'a formal stipulation based on resemblance and memory' ?

    If you just mean our visual image of the world, so that metaphysical statements aren't self-referential, that makes more sense. My hunch is that the visual imagination is what makes the correspondence theory of truth attractive. One lays eyes and hands on the plums in the icebox, confirming 'there are plums in icebox.' Perhaps the same thing is happening here ? It seems to me that our conceptuality is mostly automatically public. We talk about the couch not my view on it (unless that view becomes relevant...and, since we have the words for it already , it sometimes has been.)