Was Hitler as morally valuable (and what does that mean, exactly?) as Jonas Salk? — RogueAI

I agree that the meaning of "morally valuable" is unclear. But I also think that Jonas Salk was a morally better person than Hitler. But I also think that both of them and John Doe are all equally human persons and therefore have exactly the same moral claims on the rest of us. That's what human rights are all about.

Suppose I'm faced with a choice of saving my child or a stranger's child. Am I wrong for prioritizing my kid? — RogueAI

No, of course not. But I would be wrong for prioritizing your kid over someone else's kid. (Given that we have no social connection beyond this forum.)

I do not believe everyone is equally morally valuable and so his conclusions dont apply to me — Ourora Aureis

I think I can understand what you're saying. But you need to say that you don't believe that everyone is equally valuable and consequently that Singer's argument is invalid, and so his conclusions don't apply to you. But it would be inconsistent to admit that his argument is valid and deny the obligation that follows from it.

I agree that we would not want to call that practice paying for goods. What else we might say might depend on further information. For example, are gold and silver rare or common in their environment? Do they appear to value it? And so forth.

In short this money, or what looks like money, has among them a quite different role from among us. — Wittgenstein RFM

Certainly, I would agree with that. Further investigation required. On the other hand, I wouldn't dream of calling them insane. This practice is incomprehensible but there's no need - yet - to dismiss it as insanity. After all, there's a preliminary investigation needed to work out whether insanity is a concept that can be applied to them at all.

And yet this thesis seems entirely implausible. For instance, I have never heard of a culture who does arithmetic completely different from any other culture. Where is the arithmetic that is untranslatable? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where this issue began. I think what I was trying to say that a concept of arithmetic that was incommensurable with our arithmetic seems to me incoherent. I can imagine a practice that appears to be like arithmetic, but isn't. But I can't imagine a practice of arithmetic that couldn't be translated into our arithmetic. The possibility of translation is a criterion for classifying a practice as arithmetic. I suppose we might find, as it were, fragments of arithmetic in various practices, but not a coherent single system. Or there might be parts of our arithmetic discernible in their practice and other parts missing.

However, it is not impossible for the observing community who can see these differences to carry on conversation among themselves since there is agreement in use and judgment in their language. — Richard B

Yes. But that would exclude the possibility of the kinds of interaction that would allow us to say that these people are people, or possibly even that they are alive.

And what is this amount when shared among the non-poor people of the world? 23000000000/(8000000000-700000000)=3.15dollars per year to donate (!) — LFranc

Very interesting. But it ain't going to happen, so how is it relevant?

If charity were obligatory, it just leads to this nonsensical moral theory of Singer's. — QuixoticAgnostic

That's a very interesting point.

Singer wants to generalize the obligation to help someone in imminent danger of death, in whatever way we are able, even at some cost to ourselves, to donating to a charity that serves that same purpose. There are complications, but I think most people will go along with that obligation. Walking on by when you could help is less bad than standing around watching, but still, one would feel guilty, and, IMO, justifiably so.

For people who don't live in the UK, I should explain that in the UK, the national lifeboat service is a charity, not funded or organized by any state institution, but by the Royal National Lifeboat Institute.

So, does donating to the lifeboats equate to saving the child drowning in the pond? Or is donating money to enable a hospital to buy a life-saving scanner morally equivalent to the actions of the people who operate it? I think not, because the connection between my action and the life saved is indirect, in the sense that although I am enabling someone else to save lives, I am not saving them myself. Consequently, the donation is, let us say, recommended, but not obligatory.

On the other hand, I'm not al all sure that charity in general is not obligatory. In one way, if charity is obligatory, it becomes a tax, or a question of justice. A different kind of case is the expectation that in time of, for example, famine, food must be shared equally. Again, that's a question of justice, not charity.

But there is a tradition in the West that one should donate 10% of one's income to charity (the tithe). However, that doesn't specify what the objects of one's charity should be. So I'm inclined to think that while donating to charity in general is morally obligatory, what charity one should donate to is a matter of choice, depending on one's own values.

I'm aware that I am positing that there is a moral difference between face-to-face situations like the drowning child and remote situations. It's not just moral weakness to give more generously to one's family and friends than to distant unknown people. On the contrary, that's what love and friendship mean. Whether love and friendship are morally obligatory, I'm not sure. But I am sure that I'm not morally required to love specific individuals (except, perhaps, my children) even though to love someone and be friends with others are good things. (That's not well formulated, I know.)

I can't find what category this thread is in. It says .999... = 1 but I can't find this on the main page or in the Lounge. — fishfry

We have been pushing the boundaries for a long time. I'm finding the thread via the list of "mentions". I think they are trying to persuade us to move to private discussion or stop. I'll send you my response to this post in that way. If you really want to stop, just tell me. But I think we've just opened up another layer of discussion.

OK. I didn't grasp the significance of J6 until later. I'm sorry I upset you. It wasn't in any way intended as baiting, or even provocation.

Thanks for explaining. It would be absurd for me to argue with you. I don't know anything like enough. It is indeed to be hoped that (more of) the truth, or, maybe a better balanced account, will emerge one day. I accept that Trump did not intend to overturn the whole constitution, so calling it a coup, in the normal sense, is an exaggeration. But it does seem inescapable that he was not prepared to accept the election result until he had tried everything possible to overturn it.

But, if I may, my perspective is that all politicians will play dirty when push comes to shove and the opportunity arises. There's no point in moralizing about it, that's how the world is. So there's no reason to think that Trump (or his supporters) are an exception. That's not an unreasonable view, is it?

You are both rushing ahead far too quickly. We'll get into trouble if we get too far ahead of ourselves.

I think these sorts of biological constants (constant across diverse historical/cultural variances) is what Wittgenstein is sometimes pointing to with the "form of life." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not at all sure the biological is what W meant by "forms of life". It is, indeed, something that all human beings share. However, some people talk of "a common humanity", which is also hard to interpret, but seems to be related more to the possibility of what we might call a personal relationship. But we are also quite ready to classify some human beings as inhuman or subhuman or animal - mainly on moral grounds, but sometimes in reference to the breakdown of social structures.
Two points about these issues make them special. In this context, we are dealing with ourselves. This makes the issues very different. So far, science has proceeded on the basis that the scientist is an observer who can observe without (normally) affecting what is observed. That has already broken down in sub-atomic physics and breaks down even more dramatically in psychology and neurology. (I'm simplifying here, of course. Some relatively independent observation is possible.)
But in these context, understanding people, the subject of observation is also observing the observer. This sets up a different level of interaction between observer and observed.

But this is cultural relativism, not cognitive relativism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So we have three levels - at least - of forms of life. Biological, cultural, cognitive. How many more? In any case, all these are intertwined and inseparable in practice. I mean that what we actually have to deal with is the combination of all the levels in action.

We would share with extraterrestrials all that is common to all corners of the universe, limits on the information carrying capacity of various media, ratios, etc. And this might profitably be thought of as an even broader "form of life," the form of life common to all organisms living in our universe. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It would indeed. But we would face the problem of detecting life before we could progress to detecting conscious "rational" life. No doubt we would be "limited" by comparisons with what we acknowledge as life on this planet. But a form of life that can thrive on Venus would, surely have to be rather different from the forms of life that thrive on Earth. No matter, the comparison with Earth is a starting-point and that's all we really need.

On this view, if one reads Aristotle's Organon, it might seem that Aristotle is discussing a logic quite similar to our own (and to "common sense") but really there is no way for us to know if we mean the same thing. Being separated by vast cultural differences, it rather seems we should not mean the same things when we refer to syllogisms, premises, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your discussion is really very ambitious. If we consider all the possible problems at once, they will be overwhelming. We need to deal with each problem as it comes up, with the tools (intellectual and technological) we have at hand. If you had asked Aristotle to build a nuclear collider, it would have been an overwhelming, impossible problem. Now look at us!

Now the cognitive relativist can always claims that different forms of arithmetic and logic only seem translatable—that we don't really understand Aristotle or Shankara at all. However, this seems pretty far fetched. And aside from that, it seems to leave the door open on an all encompassing skepticism, for on this account how can anyone be sure that they truly share a form of life with anyone else? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The underlined phrases are the give-away that something is being smuggled in to the argument. Those nebulous doubts are the essence of scepticism. But the desire for perfection is the enemy of progress. So it is best to do what we can and progress as we can, without being put off by the destuctive fears and ambitions of the sceptic.

Wittgenstein's point that any set of actions is still consistent with an infinite number of rules still holds. This holds with the study of nature as well. Any sort of "natural law," based solely on past observations seems doomed to underdetermination. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Underdetermination is another bogey-man. If we have a rule that works, we use until it doesn't - then we come up with another one. We can't possibly deal with all the possibilities at once, so we deal with what we have to hand.

But has not history shown that what intelligent people called “reasonable” and “unreasonable” has changed from time to time. — Richard B

Of course it has, and that's a good thing. On this planet, the common tradition gives a reasonable basis for making reasonable translations from one epoch to another.

Yep, and this was my point, if they are completely different in action/ judgement, why call it arithmetic at all. — Richard B

The supposition is not really specific enough to sensibly answer the question. We have to make decisions step by step, acknowledging mis-steps as we discover them

Well it will not be from some self evident absolute certain proposition. But that we act and judge similarly in most case to sustain the form of life. — Richard B

That I can agree with.

Spirituality can help you deal with stress by giving you a sense of peace, purpose, and forgiveness. It often becomes more important in times of emotional stress or illness.
You may feel a higher sense of purpose, peace, hope, and meaning.
Mental health disorders may be treated with the help of spirituality ...
Mental issues like depression and substance abuse can be a sign of a spiritual void in your life.
Your mental health plays a huge role in your general well-being. Being in a good mental state can keep you healthy and help prevent serious health conditions. A study found that positive psychological l well-being can reduce the risks of heart attacks and strokes.
Mental health conditions can also make dealing with a chronic illness more difficult. The mortality rate from cancer and heart disease is higher among people with depression or other mental health conditions. — webmed.com

That's better. It does not blame the patient and makes more modest claims. However, I would distinguish sharply between "spirituality" and mental health. They are far from synonymous and both are distinct from religious belief. Can the doctor sensibly advise patients to believe in a religion or some form of spirituality in order to get better faster? I don't think so. So this advice is a bit like advice to make sure one has inherited a good set of genes in order to get better.

I also don't think that it is possible to objectively measure faith, hope, or the will to survive. So, I do not trust any figures on the subject. — Tarskian

That's something we can agree on.

True, but what I would ultimately say is that sapere aude is a dead end. It is premised on the false idea that individuals have wisdom/knowledge independent of and even in opposition to traditions. On my view human progress will happen through traditions or not at all. Individuals thinking for themselves will not achieve collective progress.* Collective progress will only occur when individuals act and think cooperatively, and this is not a bad definition of tradition. (I.e. we could think of tradition as cooperative engagement with those who came before us, and thereby with those around us.) — Leontiskos

I agree with almost all of that. The mythic image of the hero in solitary confrontation with the oppressive dead hand of the past is seriously damaging.

They realized that the call to "sapere aude" was premature, and required a more educated populus before it would be able to be implemented. — Leontiskos

I agree you need people trained the right way before encouraging them to heed the motto. But given the number of academics who seem remarkably unenlightened, perhaps it is not normal academic education that is required.

The main threat to good healthcare is the lack of religion. — Tarskian

Can you back that up, with a proper study. I simply don't believe it. The main threat to good healthcare is lack of money and education.

The doctor will simply say, "The patient is not fighting. He has given up already." — Tarskian

It is true that there are powerful psychological effects that can help medical treatment. But the idea that it is all a matter of grit and determination and will-power is bunkum. It's more complicated than that, and not well understood. Some doctors may make that remark to the punters, but they know better. it is just an excuse to avoid getting sued. If your doctor tries it on with you, I recommend you find another doctor - fast.

Good healthcare is simply wasted on people who actually don't want to live. — Tarskian

Well, then, why not just offer them a merciful end instead of forcing them to endure the disease pointlessly?

For testing religions for truth. For following a religious path at all. I was just listing some benefits of this. — Igitur

It may be, of course, that the point of religion is not whether it is true or false, but whether it enables a good (eudaimon) life, or at least a life as good as it can be in the circumstances.

There are different family structures, there are half siblings, step siblings, etc. Yet, what culture believes in people who do not have biological mothers or fathers? Outside of miracles or myth, where do people accept: "that person was never in the womb?" or "oh yes, Jessie over there is another immaculate conception?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm sorry. I was careless. I'm would not dream of contesting the point that the way we reproduce, biologically and culturally (because reproduction happens at both levels) is bound to be important in any human form of life and any human practices.

Absolutely nowhere is the answer. It is truly miraculous for there to be a human being without a biological father or biological mother. A cloned human being would still have a "parent" who had two biological parents and they would still (barring astounding scientific progress) need to be born. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Huxley imagines the culmination in "Brave New World". It's hard not to think that being born from a jar and raised in a baby factory would have a profound influence on subsequent culture. Huxley doesn't follow through on that. Also, as it happens, the animals that we feel closest to reproduce much as we do.

If someone told you they had no father and had never been born of a woman would your reaction be a shrug and the thought: "why yes, people of some cultures aren't born, I suppose they spring forth from rocks fully formed? There is no truth about biological parentage in these parts." You have to be on a severe overdose of pomo to believe it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. Christianity seems to have latched on to the sales technique that rests on making a big attention-getting claim, even it is wildly improbable and most likely false, or, charitably, metaphorical.

And to be honest, I think the continual contrasting of pernicious forms of relativism with "Final Answers" (capitalized of course), "One True Canonical Descriptions," "The Only Right Way," and the like, is a strawman/false dichotomy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are people around who think that is the choice. But I misjudged you it seems. "False dichotomy" must be the answer. I'm not sure I could prove it to a determined sceptic. But empirically, our language supports both doctrines, so it must be horses for courses - in other words, a matter decided for each practice. Is that the way you would go?

if these concepts are used is such dramatically different ways in which humans act and judge in entirely different ways, why should we even talk as if they had some relationship that deserve to fall under the banner of "truth". — Richard B

Would it not be a pragmatic decision? Not that I could articulate what the criteria might be for making such a decision - whether to see all the practices linked or "truth" as multiply ambiguous. One might also go back to consider what motivates absolutism/relativism. It's a question that Cavell might ask.

You J6'd me? Are you kidding? — fishfry

Had enough. J6 was the end. — fishfry

J6. Jeez man that's all you got? — fishfry

I can see you are serious. But I have no idea what you are talking about.

The Dems refused to accept the result of the 2016 election and have been causing mischief since then, with Russiagate, two fake impeachments, lawfare, and then weakening Trump's Secret Service protection to the degree that he almost got killed. I doubt they're done yet. — fishfry

I'm not going to argue the rights and wrongs of all of that. I don't know enough. But I don't believe that Trump's hands are clean, either. Even if Trump himself didn't intend to encourage them, which is very hard indeed to believe, his supporters invaded the Capitol on Jan 6 2021.

I hope these court cases will deter some of the vandalism. — fishfry

I don't think the courts will deter anyone. The protesters are getting what they wanted. Publicity, fuss, arguments.

Many of those projects should be abolished, for good and sound reasons. — fishfry

Maybe so. But not because a single blade on a single tower snapped off.

Point being, EV's are a disaster. Green energy is a disaster. If the eco measures actually worked, I'd support them. They don't. They're a scam, and their negative impact falls mostly on the poor of the world, so that the upscale can feel better about themselves. — fishfry

Well, I'm not keen on any of it. Not least because I'm not anywhere near wealthy enough to avoid the negative economic impacts - and you are right, it will not be the wealthy who bear the brunt of them. On the contrary, they are quite likely to make money out of it. But I don't see any evidence that the whole thing is a scam. True, we're not having much effect yet. But we are nowhere near the level where we might actually slow climate change down. All I see is oil companies defending their profits and nuclear companies returning to profitability by polluting the planet for the next 100,000 years.

Bird stew? — fishfry

That made me laugh. A lot of those birds taste and smell very strongly of fish. Not surprising. They mostly eat fish and that makes them very unappetizing. They reckon that painting one of the blades black, instead of white, makes them flicker, which is enough to deter them.

You're halfway to my point of view. And now that Germany, for one, is starting to see the economic downsides of their green energy programs, the tide is turning. — fishfry

China has invested a great deal of money and years of effort in cornering the market for rare metals. They must be very confident about where we are going in the long run.

Well, herein lies the difficulty of relying too heavily on metaphors. When it comes to family relations, it seems that they can exist even if no one believes they do. For example, if Ajax is the biological father of Ophelia, this relation of paternity exists even if neither Ajax nor Ophelia (nor any of their family members) are aware of it. And not only that, but evidence of the paternity relationship is "out there" to be discovered. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, metaphors (and analogies) have to be interpreted and are all too easily misinterpreted. When it comes to family relations, for example. There are also what are sometimes called mixed families, in which the "normal" biological relations do not hold. There is an awkward question about adopted and step- children, isn't there. Is the biological or social relationship the "real" parent? Opinions differ. Which illustrates my point.

I should say that I feel more inclined to just say that their concept of "truth" no longer resembles mine; so sooner or later they are not part of the family but mere strangers. — Richard B

My comment was in relation to this. But I took it, in context, to be about our social relationships - forms of life, practices, etc. So my comment was intended to refer to the social family, rather than the biological one.

Yet because this holds for families does it mean it holds for notions o f the True or the Good? — Count Timothy von Icarus

But perhaps you knew that and were pointing out the alternative conception of the family and applying the point to suggest that the True and the Good might exist "out there" whatever our relationship or non-relationship with it happens to be - and why not add Beauty to the list?
The quotation from Grayling explains well what is troubling about relativism, and there is much in our forms of life and practices that seems to point in the other direction. But Final Answers are more elusive than we might have expected and there is also much in our forms of life and practices that presents us with relative and pragmatic truths. I don't subscribe to either, or, rather, I think that both have a place in our lives. Roughly, perhaps, Absolutes are an ideal, but what we have to live with and by is lesser, in some way, but does have the virtue of being within our reach.

I am going to start a read-though of The Blue Book soon, but the Anscombe sounds interesting. — Antony Nickles

I think so. Perhaps a read-through of that might be worth while - but let's do the Blue Book first.

Also, because we have a practice is why and how it can be rational to question, push back, live differently, etc. — Antony Nickles

Yes. Existing practices and forms of life are a starting-point, and one cannot start without one. There's a paradox, then, that our existing practices are a basis for questioning practices. But a paradoxical conclusion is just "contrary to or surprising" our existing beliefs and expectations - that's not necessarily a problem.

As well, the part people skip over is that his examples (rule-following, pointing, “seeing”, etc.) are practices that everyone can weigh in on (we each have an equal right to claims/there is no privileged position), so the proposed criteria we use, and the “grammar” of how they work, have to be accepted (by you) for it to be philosophical worth drawing conclusions from (as evidence). — Antony Nickles

Good point. It perhaps justifies the practice of letting the readers draw their own conclusions. Risky, though.

I guess there is a lot of "trouble" to go around when it comes to this thesis. — Richard B

Quite so. But perhaps it is a bit of a bogeyman. After all the trouble that goes with absolutism might be even greater. The key problem there is establishing that one has actually got hold of the absolute truth. All too often, one has not. It would be better if people were much more cautious and sceptical of such temptations.

I should say that I feel more inclined to just say that their concept of "truth" no longer resembles mine; so sooner or later they are not part of the family but mere strangers. — Richard B

Oh, surely, members of the same family can disagree without ceasing to be members of the family. There's no black-and-white rule here - just shades of grey.

But the metaphysical problem is generalized and abstracted out of time, place, actors, i.e. anything we would call “a context”. — Antony Nickles

Well, yes. I was thinking that the same is true for mathematics; but mathematics is set up to exist in that "context". The "metaphysics" that I've seen tries to do the same with ideas that are not designed in the same way. Fish out of water. Mathematics as a whale or a dolphin. Or Wittgenstein's

We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! — PI 107

Yes, a “form of life” is not a conclusion or argued, etc (though “acquiesce” implies choice; we are indoctrinated, assimilated—Rousseau’s “consent” unconsciously.) That is not to say we don’t have forms of argument or refutation, means of judging loyalty and fairness (“you picked last time”). — Antony Nickles

"Consent" would do. Perhaps we need a specialized term for these situations. The thing is, in these radical situations, we are learning skills. That's not a context in which you can give "informed consent" and once you've learnt the skill, it's too late to ask questions. I didn't ask to learn English and wondering whether English is correct or adequate or whatever is meaningless - because I can only do it in English (and, possibly one or two other languages).

But the point is that that frailty is only a possible occurrence, and so should not be interpreted into a systemic problem (concluding that there is no “rationality”, intelligibility). — Antony Nickles

That's true. But I think there's another sense in which frailty is systemic. I'm referring to Nussbaum's Fragility of Goodness. But we don't need to discuss that here.

He wanted something that would be an uncontroversial “very general fact of nature” (PI #143 and p. 230) that he presumes would be accepted as a fact, such as: parrots don’t talk to themselves (#344). — Antony Nickles

OK. I think I get that. I have been known to throw off an example only to find later that it completely back-fires.

And Witt’s idea of a moral dilemma is not like a clash of interests about a certain type of topic (say about abortion), but when everyone is at a loss as to what to do, how to go on—which is an event (and could involve any of our practices). — Antony Nickles

There are such dilemmas. But there are also dilemmas where the problem is precisely that everyone "knows" what to do, but can't agree with each other, because they insist on framing the problem differently. I'm afraid abortion, in my book, is one such case.

I would say he choose poorly (though perhaps, as worse with Nietzsche, he can’t help poking people in the eye). — Antony Nickles

"Even Homer nods" and the temptation is very hard to resist, sometimes.

This is Witt’s arrogant style on full display, as he will even state without argument the implications he posits for, say, “believing”, as if everyone would agree. — Antony Nickles

I'm not sure "arrogant" quite captures it. I prefer to think that the modesty he expresses in the Preface to PI is sincere. But it can come over as arrogant. But, by the same token, I do find other philosophers to be arrogant, though perhaps not quite in the same way. It's the idea that you can (should) present examples and observations and leave the reader to work out their significance. That may be over-confident, but it's not stupid. (I read somewhere that the practice of his parents when he was a child, when he needed telling off, was to leave appropriate books by his bedside. If true, that would explain it.)

J.L. Austin’s A Plea for Excuses is a work about ethics in that way. — Antony Nickles

Yes, and much more interesting that trudging round and round the same few dogmas. I've just re-read, after several decades, Anscombe's "Intention", which is similar. But then, real ethics is not about quasi-legal rules, but, arguably, about forms of life.

“Agreement” is here not the same either. We come to an agreement on some criteria—like how long one foot will be—but we do not agree “to” our practices (it is “agree” in the sense more of aligning, over our entire history of doing things). Still, we do judge whether, say, an apology, is correct or incorrect, but the criteria for that are different than true and false, as I can accept an apology that you do poorly (“accepting” is part of how it works differently, its “rationality” or “grammar” as Witt calls it). — Antony Nickles

I don't disagree with you. I would go further. There is a difference between agree what the criteria are to be, e.g. on what the defining example on 1 foot is to be; that is not a question of truth and falsity or correct and incorrect. (How they decide to change the standard metre in Paris is way beyond me.) Agreeing that this path is 3 feet wide is different, and true/false and correct/incorrect do apply.
Agreeing to a practice is certainly different from signing up to (learning) it, though we can sweep it under the umbrella for our present purposes. But perhaps "acquiesce" would be a more accurate term for agreeing "to" a (pre-existing) practice. But that agreement is different from agreeing with someone else where we shall go for lunch. And so on. Differences multiply. Your example of apology is a very interesting one, that I would love to discuss separately; it is very relevant to ethics.

It is exactly this framework that interprets skepticism as a theoretical “problem”, rather than the discovery that there is no fact that will ensure resolution of our moral conflicts, thus we are responsible for solving our ongoing disagreements, because we do have the means. — Antony Nickles

I certainly wasn't intending to endorse moral scepticism. I'm sorry I wasn't more explicit. However, it is true that, if we regard moral debate as a practice, we have to recognize both that facts play a part in those debates and that it is not possible to deduce any moral proposition from factual propositions alone. Hence I said that moral statements "sit awkwardly" between those two (admittedly very simple-minded) categories.
On the other hand, I'm not sure about the idea that we have the means to solve all our ongoing disagreements. In the first place, I'm not sure that all moral disagreements can be resolved. I don't think there's any guarantee of that, is there? Not that we shouldn't keep trying, at least to live peaceably with each other. In the second place, it takes two to make a deal. So, in a sense, it isn't up to "us" to solve the problems, because the community of "us" breaks down.

All criteria reflect our interests in our lives (what and how we value something), it’s only metaphysical criteria that wish to step outside of any particular practice or situation. — Antony Nickles

I have no problem whatever with this. I would add that the wish to step outside any particular practice, however, is incoherent. Any attempt to do simply generates a new context.

Sorry, it is not that we cannot understand lions, just not talking ones; it is meant to be the statement of a fact, not a scientific claim (which I try to explain here), because it is said in contrast to when we CAN work out other cultural practices, to show that we sometimes just choose not to. — Antony Nickles

I have looked at your big discussion. It needs a bit of time. For the moment, I'm really quite confused here.
1. Are you saying that we can understand lions, but that if a lion could speak to us, we would not be able to understand what was said? Of course, communication would not be instant, but Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting that there is some insoluble problem. I can't see why he would think so.
2. Are you suggesting that we could work out the common ground with a lion, but that we choose not to? Which suggests that we could if we wanted to.

However, as Hume pointed out, perceived constant conjunction of events in the world may be as much accidental as a rule. — RussellA

Yes. I believe that this issue has been much discussed in relation to Wittgenstein, though I believe it is normally framed as the difference between a regularity and a rule. There is room for some argument about exactly what Hume said or believed, but I think it would be a distraction to pursue that here.

Even if within the community that B lives in there are public rules, B will only know about them from what she perceives through her senses. But as before, what she perceives through her senses to be a rule may in fact be accidental, meaning that if she does live her life following a rule, she must have made it herself. IE, B also lives by private rules. — RussellA

IE, if individuals live by rules, as Hume's principle of constant conjunction shows, the individual cannot have discovered them through their senses, but must have made them, and in this sense are private rules. If an individual has made the rule, then they must know how to correctly apply it. However, even if the individual has made the rule, they may or may not decide to be bound by it. — RussellA

You are right to point out that each individual in a community needs to learn the rules for themselves It follows, therefore, that each of us must formulate the rules on the basis of our experience and apply them for themselves. What you seem to neglect is the point that our formulation and application of the rules is corrected by further experience. (Hume doesn't say that, but it is implicit in Hume's argument. Moreover, it is how we can distinguish between mere regularities and rules.)

An individual sees the sun rise in the east on 100 consecutive days. They become aware of the rule that the sun rises in the east, and then live by the rule that the sun rises in the east. — RussellA

But as before, what she perceives through her senses to be a rule may in fact be accidental, meaning that if she does live her life following a rule, she must have made it herself. — RussellA

I guess you mean when she makes a "leap" from the limited sample to a generalization and then treats that generalization as a rule, she has made the rule for herself. I also guess that the rule takes the form of "when the clock shows that it is morning, you can expect the sun to rise."

If an individual has made the rule, then they must know how to correctly apply it. — RussellA

Well, let's suppose that's correct. Then, in this case, what she knows is that she does not determine what is correct or incorrect. The sun does. That is, if the sun doesn't rise, she will need to abandon or modify the rule.

You have not recognized the paradox implicit in the idea that I am the final authority over my own rules. If it is true, it means that nothing that I do can conflict with the rule. Which means that the rule is empty, has no force.

There is quite a lot of stage setting that would occur to understand if such an individual had such a rule. — Richard B

Yes. Hume's version of this seems to me to be that it is a brute fact of human nature that we build up expectations as a result of constant conjunctions. I'm not sure how far Wittgenstein would disagree.

Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do". — Phil. Inv. 217

Hume is very clear that the we will not abandon our process of formulating generalizations from individual cases, no matter how persuasive the sceptic's arguments. Indeed, he recommends a month in the country as the appropriate cure for radical scepticism. The more I think about it, the less I understand why he has the reputation of being a sceptical philosopher - though he does recommend what he calls "judicious" scepticism; he's probably right about that.

As rules are private, a rule-based language must also be private — RussellA

It depends what you mean by "private".

For an individual, all the rules that they are aware of must be of their own invention, even if based on information received through their senses. As the tortoise said to Achilles, how can an individual discover just from the information received through their senses that a rule is a rule. Where is the rule that determines whether something is a rule or not, a problem of infinite regression. — RussellA

Dodgson's dialogue between Achilles and the tortoise makes a good point, but I'm not sure that your point is the same one. However, your concluding question is a good one. I assume you would not disagree that Wittgenstein's point is that no rule can determine its own application. I think that, for similar reason, no rule can determine application of another rule. We do make play with attempts to formulate such rules. But in the end, it is a matter of our agreement with each other; there is nothing else.

Can I make a rule for myself, privately? Here "privately" means "not subject to enforcement by anything else (human or otherwise)". In other words, is it possible for the correct application of my rule to be solely determined by my application of it? In yet other words, if I make my rule and determine what is the correct application of it, is it meaningful to say that I am bound by it? Consider sections 268 (Left hand giving right hand money), 270 (the diary thought experiment), 271, (remembering what "pain" means). The self-reference in the proposition makes that any such limitation empty. (I am reminded of the ancient problem whether a monarch (as law-giver and law-interpreter) is bound by the law.) Yes, I'm saying that whatever Wittgenstein's argument says or doesn't say, the idea has wider application. That's not a criticism, because Wittgenstein is preoccupied with the dualism of his day.

We imagine chaos because we want to only accept undeniable certainty and agreement (as “knowledge”), and cast everything else as “belief” or emotion or persuasion. But Witt shows is that the world has endless ways of being “rational” (having ways to account, though different), and so we can disagree intelligibly in relation from those practices. Ultimately we may not come to resolution, but that does not lead to the categorical failure of rationality, because a dispute also only happens at a time, in a context (which also gives our differences traction). — Antony Nickles

I don't disagree with this. But I think that our practices are a bit more complicated than this seems to propose. If we say that rationality is a question of our agreement in ways of life, we seem to eliminate the distinction between those agreements that we call "correct" or "incorrect" by some standard that is not set by our agreement and those agreements that are simply a matter of making a deal, so that "correct" and "incorrect" do not apply. You will understand, I suppose, that I think that agreements that are correct or incorrect are, by and large, rational agreements and the other kind are, roughly, matters of taste or convenience or pragmatics. (The difficulty of agreements about values sits awkwardly between the two.)

That may well be true. Most people choose the news that suits them.

Modern affairs and lived experience are telling me that people are broadly still sheep that need herding. — Lionino

That's odd. Many people think that trying to organize people is like trying to organize ferrets - very difficult and any organization you do achieve rapidly disintegrates. That fits better with my lived experience. But maybe you live in a different world from me.

Ok. Well I'm all talked out here. I think we've long forgotten the topic. — fishfry

Let's agree to disagree. Sorry I brought it up. No wait, you brought it up and I let you bait me for a while. — fishfry

I agree. But I would like a better mutual understanding before we move on. I don't know for sure about you, but my comments were intended to provoke a reply, but only in the interests of a discussion. I thought you were doing the same. I didn't realize that you thought I was baiting you, which is a different kettle of fish. So I apologize.

Sorry I mentioned it. — fishfry

I wasn't complaining that you did. In fact, in our disagreement, the vagueness of meaning enables a diagnosis of what we disagree about, so it was actually useful. (I'm not sure whether the same applies to the concept of metaphysics.)

Oh please. He left as gracefully as Caesar did. — fishfry

Quite so. I'm afraid I was guilty of irony, which is always dangerous. His inability to recognize when the game is up is not particularly unusual. I can think of other examples.

The Dem hysteria that started on election night of 2016 has been extremely damaging to the country. — fishfry

I agree with you that the hysteria around everything is very damaging. But I think both sides are to blame. Each side thinks that it can win by escalating the emotional temperature; the media feeds on that and joins in. The question who started it is a good one - unless the answer is to be used as a weapon of further escalation.
But neither side is really to blame. There can be little doubt that a large part of the problem is systemic - the whole set-up encourages escalation and the desire to win, rather than compromise. Again, it's not unique to the US. It's not difficult to think of other examples.

Well toss a can of soup on a painting then. You lost me here. — fishfry

Couple of soup throwers were convicted, they're going to jail. So never mind on the soup. Looks like England has had enough of the eco-loons. — fishfry

At least they threw tomato soup, which is easier to clean than pain. — Ludwig V

I see from the reports that the soup did actually damage the paint of the frame, so I was wrong about that.

Responding to those protests with outrage and attempts to suppress is exactly what they want - to attract attention and controversy. Difficult as it may be, the only thing that would persuade them to stop is ignoring them. But it is also important to reward them when they do the right thing, there should be a reasonable response to civilized and legal protests.
Failure to recognize when one is being baited is very common and failure to deal with it rationally - by not rising to the bait - frequently underlies escalation.

Did you hear about that windmill that fell apart, closing a beach during the height of tourist season? Fiberglass shards everywhere. — fishfry

I'm not sure what you expect me to say. It's definitely a bad thing. Needs to be checked out and any problems resolved - and any parties who haven't been doing their job properly held to account.

But does it show that wind farms should be abolished? I don't think so. The fact that so many people dislike them is much more relevant and it's right to be cautious about setting them up. Off-shore farms seem to be more acceptable, so it's better to be content with them. (There's the question of bird strikes as well, though I've heard that they may have found a solution to that.) I think it's unlikely that that on-shore farms can be a major contributor to the project of finding renewable sources of energy. For on-shore generation, solar farms may be more appropriate.

Fictionalism is a useful point of view. Avoids having to defend what math "means." — fishfry

Yes, Meaning is as ill-defined as metaphysics. It's usually easier not to mention it.

I hope things don't get too much worse. At the moment nobody knows if we have a president. — fishfry

It is ironical that his most Presidential act has been not to stand for his second term. He'll be a lame duck until January, but that's normal. I expect the system will survive.
There's a paradox about democracy which "of the people, for the people, by the people" misses. It is crucial that the people who lose the election accept the result. That means that the process has to be very carefully organized so that there's as little excuse for contesting it as possible. So the events in January 2021 are a concern. I've also heard that some Trump supporters have said that they will refuse to accept the result if they lose; (I assume they will accept it if they win!). That's absurd. It puts Trump in the same territory as Putin and Xi Jinping. Bluntly, hypocrites.

I support free speech. Blocking roads is not speech. — fishfry

The people who were jailed were convicted under existing laws. The new law is an opportunistic grab by those who want to ensure that free speech is allowed, so long as it cannot be heard. It's a difficult balance to strike. My complaint about those protests is that they were too effective because they produced more opposition without taking their campaign forward. Protest needs to attract attention - especially media attention, of course - without creating more opposition for the cause.

The fission waste is a problem, but you can't run the world on windmills. — fishfry

Probably not. There's also solar panels, hydro-electric, tidal, wave, and volcanic. Still, it's pretty clear that lots of batteries will be needed. China has quietly cornered the market in the rare earths that are needed for them. Now, that's a sensible way to approach the issues. The rest of us will have to pay their prices or find alternatives.

We'll all toil in the windmill factories? I think I better quit while I'm behind here. Eco hysteria is a luxury belief. Green policy hurt third world is one random link I found. — fishfry

There are two distinct problems. One is enabling as many people as possible to find decent jobs. That's a problem anyway. The other is enabling people whose jobs are phasing out to find alternative employment. That's more difficult. There have been many cases in the past (like phasing out coal) which have not been well managed. But it doesn't seem impossible. At least we could try harder.
It quite likely that third world countries will suffer more. There's a lot of talk about providing additional help to them. That seems like a no-brainer, since unless they join in it will be hard to restore stability. But, curiously, it seems to be very difficult to make progress. Why? Who could possibly be opposing that?
Does your link compare the damage to third world countries with the damage that will be caused by climate change? Or perhaps with the damage caused by existing free trade treaties?

I'm all for clean air and water. I'm also for modern civilization. The point is to strike a sensible balance, not to throw tomato soup on paintings. — fishfry

Clean air means less carbon dioxide and methane. Clean water means less plastic. Amongst other things.
Sensible balance is good. But big corporations always end up defending their shareholders' interests and fail in the end. They just waste time and money.
At least they threw tomato soup, which is easier to clean than pain. Paint has been used in the past for similar escapades. It can be cleaned off, but it is much more difficult to do so.

True. I would say that communication just generalizes language. — Apustimelogist

I wouldn't disagree with that. But, having thought about it, I want to emphasize the multifarious uses of language, many, but not all, of which involve communication in one form or another.

Similarly, what an animal communicates about is different to their actual perceptual/cognitive/physical engagement with what they are communicating about. — Apustimelogist

I'm really sorry, but I can't get my head around what you're saying here. Could you break it down for me?

What are we communicating to ourselves? — Lionino

It's a good question and I agree that communication with others and with oneself (insofar as it happens) are different.
Two different examples of communication with oneself. I make a shopping list, to communicate with my future self so's I don't forget anything. When I have gathered some of the items, I may recite the list to myself, looking at or laying my hand on, each item as I name it, so as to make sure I don't forget anything.
When I get my receipt, with each item listed, I may keep it so's I can communicate with the manager or someone at home if there is a dispute.

This is likely true. Maybe the best path is to merge the most valuable ideals. Don’t confine yourself to one set of concepts. — Igitur

That's a good recommendation. One should be sensitive to differences as well as similarities.
I think you'll find common elements, but also incommensurable ones and incompatible ones. Ideally such ideals should be tailored to one's practical and social environment?
There is much in common across the Abrahamic religions, for example, but also quite serious differences. The Tao Te Ching, however, seems to me to be almost completely incommensurable with Christianity, though I'm sure that others will disagree with me.

Language isn’t simply a tool that we use to access concepts , in its very instantiation it uses us to transform the sense of our concepts and percepts by enacting them in the world. — Joshs

I agree. Concepts do not exist independently of language in some separate platonic reality, in which concepts exist passively waiting to have a label slapped on them so that they can be thought. Understanding language gives us concepts in terms of which we can think about various things, and so our thinking is structured by them.

For Merleau-Ponty, perception is ‘languaged’, but this cannot be understood in terms of a split between thinking and communicating. — Joshs

Yes, the concepts of our language actually structure our perception.

To think and perceive is to communicate with oneself by way of the world. — Joshs

The idea of communicating with oneself is a bit awkward, isn't it? There are examples of thinking that one might call communicating with oneself - reminding oneself, exhorting oneself and so on. But I think there are also cases of thinking that are working out a problem, organizing one's thoughts and so forth. Those are not communicating with oneself or anyone else, but doing a different kind of job.

It needs to be said, as frequently as possible that the uses of language are multifarious. They are not confined to the communication of truths. I don't think it is possible to get a real understanding of language without taking that into account.

I suspect you'll come to find, e.g., that the ideal Christian is quite different from the ideal Jew and that different religions contain different visions for humanity. — BitconnectCarlos

That's very likely true. A comparative - and dispassionate - study would be very interesting.
But it also seems to me that we might also find that certain traits of human character might find recognizably similar expression in each religion - or at least those that are big enough to have internal divisions or sects. The most obvious example is fundamentalism, which seems to me to be instantly recognizable in all the major religions.

Hmmm. "No action." As a bit of a gambler back in the day, I understand that!! Probabilities 0 and 1 are no action. Not a valid bet! So I can sort of relate to your point. — fishfry

I'll settle for that. It's a very marginal point, anyway.

I better quit while I'm behind here. — fishfry

Both this argument and the one about evidence are actually aimed at the same point. Once you have introduced probability as an interpretation/application of the formal function, it is very difficult to ignore reality - metaphysics.

Clear, with some study. And consistent, well we often can't even prove our axioms are consistent. Nobody knows for sure if the axioms of set theory are consistent.
And paraconsistent logic is a thing these days. Logic in which we can allow a certain well-controlled amount of contraction. — fishfry

Yes, all true.

Fictionalism. It's all fake. But interesting and useful, so why not do it anyway and enjoy it. — fishfry

I have read about this, but didn't realize that's what you meant. It's an interesting take on the idea that we construct mathematics - and some other things as well. However, if it is fiction, it is not the same kind of fiction as literary fiction. However, fake means pretending to be something you are not. Neither is doing that.

I think the eco-loons are self-centered virtue signalers. — fishfry

I'm sure that many of them - especially the loonies - are virtue signallers. It doesn't follow that they all are. There is a real issue here.

Every time you make energy production harder you starve a few hundred thousand third-worlders to death. The Green agenda is starting to crack in Europe. We all like clean water and air, but destroying our economy in the name of "the planet" is suicidal and cruel. The billionaires flying their private jets to climate conferences give the game away. The Obamas own beach front property in two states. They must not be too worried about the seal level rising. — fishfry

There's a line of thought in eco circles that accepts that the world will not be able to make the changes quickly enough to make much difference. I think that's right. The thing is, the disruption and costs of serious climate change will be greater than the costs of changing now. If we could change now, and do it right, the disruption could be kept to a minimum. There'll be lots of work in the new industries.

I'm for nukes. Environmentally clean and abundant energy to run our world. — fishfry

Fusion could do it, and it seems to be getting closer. Fission leaves waste. There used to be a lot of concern about what to do with it. I think the plan now is to bury it and leave it alone - for 100,000 years. You can't say those guys are not ambitious.

I see in England that they threw a few highway-blockers in prison for 4-5 years. Did you see the story? A good start, I say. And the next time some trust fund vandal glues their hands to a museum floor, just leave them there. — fishfry

Don't worry. The last Government passed a new law, restricting free speech to ensure that all protest can easily be ignored. I doubt that the new Government will prioritize repealing it. The people who've been imprisoned will become martyrs - and the whole thing will escalate.

Is the Biden coup getting much play where you are? He published a letter saying he's dropping out of the race. But there's no video or photos of him signing the letter, and he hasn't been seen for five days. I have no doubt the global competition is taking note. The leader of the free world is the victim of a coup by his own political party. — fishfry

Oh, yes, it's all over the media. From here, it seems that the chaos will continue and spread. I don't think it will end with the election, either.

We don't need language to think about things. — Apustimelogist

No, that's obviously true. I suppose there are questions about what's going on. But you could also say that you don't need language to communicate. Animals can do that as well. Then there's the question whether animal communication systems count as language, or what the limits of language without words are. Hence the temptation to posit a "language of thought" - "mentalese". (This was mentioned by someone earlier in the thread.) But without some empirical evidence, I don't think there's any useful mileage in speculation. Chomsky doesn't help.
Thought a Chomskian universal language wouldn't be private. Nor are animal languages. I'm not sure about this.

I agree with holding to the metaphor — Moliere

There's no harm in pushing a metaphor as far as it will go. But it is to be expected that it will break down sooner or later. I didn't quite follow the last half of your post.

I am not sure if that arrogance is universal. Wittgenstein had quite the temper. — Lionino

I wouldn't disagree ssewith you about either arrogance or bad temper. But I think a certain level of arrogance, or at least self-confidence, is necessary to do philosophy at all.
Don't all philosophies see their tradition through their own interpretations. Isn't that built in to the whole business of reading and understanding philosophy?
Yet I agree that the criticisms of analytic philosophy that you mention are appropriate.

To me I don't see the inherent distinction between a public language and a private one other than only one person uses it. So to me it is a counterexample to the private language used by only — Apustimelogist

Yes. Wittgenstein isn't very clear about defining his target. But that may be because he wants to target all the varieties of dualism, and doesn't want to tie himself down to any specific varieties.

that language is meaningless without the need for the communication of inaccessible information, whether that communication being with other people or yourself. — Apustimelogist

It depends on your definition of inaccessible. The only thing I'm clear about is that he intends "logically" inaccessible. I don't know about communication with myself. I find "mental notes" very unreliable.

Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought — Apustimelogist

I wouldn't fight over the question of priority. That it has multiple uses is not in question, I think.

Isn't the rule following paradox, which philosophers still debate to this day, solved by the way the language center of the brain is uniform for many newborn children? I don't see how else one would solve the rule following paradox. — Shawn

It might be. But I take his point to be logical, so the expectation would be that the sceptical arguments would still apply - unless you could take "This is what I do" to be identifiable with a brain state. Don't forget that the brain is very plastic, so we may well find a great deal of variation in the ways they work. I can't see that they are likely to work in the same way that our computers work.

Maybe that is a naïve point, but, since rats and other languageless animals are known to be able to perform mental simulations, doesn't that show in a straightforward manner that language is not necessary for thought? — Lionino

A lot depends on what you mean by language. But I wouldn't be dogmatic. It could be sufficient without being necessary and it could enable kinds of thinking that are not available to other modes. "Thinking" is a very flexible concept.

Anonymous moral advice is the best, actually. — Tarskian

I can see that. The confessional is a possible example - except, of course, are priests independent? It depends on how you rate their religion.

My preference would be for someone I trust and not too close for a discussion.

It is the same for other types of advice, such as investment advice or relationship advice. They won't tell you the truth if they simply can't. — Tarskian

There's no escape from the responsibility of deciding who to ask and, in the end, what to do.

analytics cut themselves off from most pre-analytic philosophy, did everything "in-house" which entailed a lot of reinventing of the wheel in ways that look horribly philistine and only appeal to a very specific niche of people who like goofy decontextualized thought experiments, [...] — Lionino

I like that. Though some analytics don't cut themselves off from their tradition, but re-interpret it into their own language. Mind you, a lot of all that has gone on throughout philosophy, hasn't it? It just means that analytic philosophy is less special than it thinks it is. But then, every new philosophical approach thinks that. It's all very confusing.

Thanks for the clip. There's a lot in it that doesn't easily come out in prose.

Does it matter what the primary function of religious thinking is? — Igitur

It depends what you mean by primary, and the point of view.

Assuming you care about religious truth, values, or community, you would probably also attempt to practice religions — Igitur

I think you understate this. Religion is not merely about truth, but about how to live. The practice is the point, really. The truth is just there to give a basis for the practice. That's why Bhuddhism, Stoicism, etc. all figure in this discussion.

[H]istory amply shows, imo, that 'religion' is required only (or at least mostly) for herding sheep, prophets making profits and sanguinary propitiating/martyring/scapegoating. — 180 Proof

Yes, also for all of that. If religion is primarily how I am to live, others will use it for their purposes. So will I. If religion is primarily about social control (manipulation), I will demand of it that it tells me how to live.

It's curious to me that in Ancient Greece, one can discern two different social roles for religion. One is to justify the power structure. The other is to give a resource - an ally - to those who don't have power. One can see how both would be useful even though they seem contradictory. We can see both tendencies in the churches to-day.

I suspect that the primary overall social role of religion is to enable some unity in communities much larger that the "natural" one, which appears to be about 150 people. The major religions all arose at about the same time as big cities. I don't think that's an accident.

This seems like the most important thing to respond to, the idea that it is unreasonable to try out so many sects of religions. — Igitur

Yes. That's why it is perfectly reasonable to go for satisficing rather than maximizing. In other words, something that is good enough, rather than something that is perfect. (Your suggestion of looking at popular brands is close to this.) In addition, I am bound to start from where I am, that is, by evaluating the religions available in the community I happen to be born in. There's no reason to look further afield if I can manage with what is nearest to me. I don't know that objective absolute truth is the most important criterion. Something that's near enough will do.

b) The moral advice or ruling must enjoy consensus amongst independently judging scholars. These scholars must not be on someone's "payroll". — Tarskian

That's perfectly reasonable. Except that the ideal is impractical. Everyone has to make their living somehow. Independence is a mirage. We have to settle for an independent mind, which is not impossible, though difficult - and requires courage.

Right, but you see the problem here right? How does any individual ever know that they are properly chastising someone for following a rule wrong? Per Wittgenstein, they can't be sure that they ever understand a rule. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is no criterion beyond agreement between us. So if I am understood and understand, everything is in order. (It's not a question of chastisement, really. Either communication works, or it doesn't). It is also true that communication can and frequently does, break down, for one reason or another. But, again, the point is that there are ways of restoring it and even ways of coping with failures.

Imo the private language argument is about showing that when you have no external enforcement of these criteria, any kind of stable foundation for word meaning evaporates... — Apustimelogist

I agree with that.

The counterexample introduces the same kind of practical enforcement as the social case and so it doesn't contradict the point being made imo. — Apustimelogist

Yes. But I thought that was one of Wittgenstein's points. Because you said it was a counter-example, I thought that you were saying that because we can write notes to ourselves (which we clearly can), Wittgenstein was wrong. I regularly write notes to myself and they work perfectly well. But Wittgenstein's point is not that we need to be validated every time we follow a rule - that's absurd - but that we need validation sometimes - a practice of validation - , so that there is agreement about how to apply the rule.

I think this is reinforced by the observation that at the social level, social rules tend to drift, almost without anyone noticing. Language drifts, patterns of behaviour change, but there is general agreement, so communication doesn't break down. (Though in practice, of course, social unity is only partial, so the drift is more complicated than that.)

So I think we agree, and I'm sorry for my confusion.

But ... can you explain to me how today being Sunday, the probability that yesterday was Saturday is anything other than 1? — fishfry

I'm not saying that if to-day is Sunday, the probability that yesterday was Saturday is anything other than 1. Of course not. I'm saying that because today is Sunday, probability doesn't apply to the proposition that yesterday was Saturday.
(Yes, I'm writing this on Monday, but it is simpler to pretend that it is Sunday for the sake of simplifying the discussion.)

If you were a betting man, what would you bet that today being Sunday, that yesterday was Saturday? What is your credence for that proposition? How should a bookmaker set the odds? — fishfry

That bet is money in the bank, so long as the odds show a profit. But who would take the other end of it? I suppose you might find a taker who would give you your money back. But that would be an empty ritual. There's a good reason why bookies close their books when the race is over.
More politely, where there is no risk, there is no bet.

That is, if today is Sunday, what is your credence that yesterday was Saturday? — fishfry

Ah, this is a different can of worms. "Credence" is degree of belief, isn't it? And belief concedes the possibility of falsehood. So that makes sense.
But when there is no possibility of falsehood, we do not speak of belief; we speak of knowledge. So if you assign a credence to "Yesterday was Saturday", you are allowing the possibility that it wasn't. But if you assign a credence of 1, you are excluding that possibility.
In my book, credence doesn't apply.

I agree that it feels tidier to express the outcome by saying P(outcome) = 1.

I could live with "preferable," but not "should." — fishfry

I think "preferable" is better than "should". I'm happy with that.

Don't you like fiction? Do you have the same complaints about the novel Moby Dick ("He tasks me. He heaps me.") and the game of chess; one a work of fiction, and the other a meaningless formal game with entirely made-up rules? — fishfry

H'm. That's a new take on mathematics. I can understand the idea that axioms and definitions can be posited in a spirit of exploration. The point in that case is to work out the implications of certain ideas. But the axioms and definitions, even if they are, in some sense, provisional, need to be clear and consistent, don't they? Anyway, you're not telling me that the axioms and definitions of probability theory are in some sense provisional, are you?

Immigration is an issue on both sides of the pond. Liberty versus top-down control. The wokesters versus the people who never voted for the woke policies. The double standard of justice, a kid jailed fo making bicycle marks on a Pride crosswalk, while Antifa defaces statues. Don't get me started. LOL. — fishfry

It looks as if I have got you started. There are real and serious issues at stake in these disagreements. (You didn't mention climate change.) The biggest problem is that the parties have given up listening to each other. Meanwhile, Putin and Xi Jinping with Kim Jong Un and Ali Khameini are calculating that the West is so divided that they can re-make the world in their own image. There's a serious need for some waking up on all sides. Perhaps one day, the threat will be so great that we'll be forced to recognize that the things that we share are more important than the things we disagree about. I hope we don't wake up too late.

I’m picturing Woody Allen trying out Christianity by eating Wonder bread with mayo in Hannah and her Sisters. — Joshs

I guess I can get this gist of the joke from the general context. I don't remember much about the movie. Was that an actual scene, or something that you imagined?
But it makes a point, doesn't it?
Doesn't Woody find meaning through watching a Marx brothers movie? Perhaps we should wait and see what happens to us by accident.

High level functions, like language processing and production, reach down into lower level functions and color them, and everything ends up very interconnected. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quite so. Nature and nurture are so intertwined that we should be very cautious about what distinctions we want to make.
It is even possible, isn't it, that when we decode the brain, we may find that the structure of thought mirrors the structure of the language we speak - and I do not mean any universal grammar, but the grammar of specific languages.
I'm may be naive, but I've always thought of thought as talking to oneself, like reading to oneself silently. It may be that language not only helps us to get our thought in order, but enables us to do so. I've encountered people who tell me that they can think in visual images.

I would take the private language to be at its strongest when it is a straightforward rejection of Cartesian absolute privacy. There are always outward signs of any "inner" experience. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with that - whole-heartedly. But, coming back to philosophy after a long break, it seems clear to me that the philosophical context has changed.
There's a group of arguments dating back to the last century (which is not so long in philosophy) that I think of as neo-dualist. They seem to ignore the PLA, but nonetheless not so easily refuted by it. Bats, Mary's room, philosophical zombies. Not to mention the advances in neurology.

This jives with a broadly enactivist view. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. I'll sign up to that.

If a stronger formulation is taken, e.g. that private rule following is impossible because of the possibility of unknown error — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's not quite how I take it, though I admit that W says much that looks as if that's what it's about. I would argue that the real point is that there is nothing that would count as error. There's no distinction between right and wrong, which means that "right" and "wrong" have no application to a private rule. Which makes it difficult to explain what the force of the rule is.

this seems to actually follow on for social rule following too, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, I would accept that if there is social agreement on how a rule applies in a new situation, that's how it applies. Rules of etiquette, for example. Linguistic rules.

So, with the lion, it seems clear we should know what "please bring more zebra steaks sir," means if the lion says it. However, there also seems to be a sense in which the lion's inner experience, which corresponds to outward signs, is more hidden from us because we do not share the same "form of life." Yet per the topic of this thread, I do think mammals might be said to share some sort of "form of life;" we can recognize each other's emotional states decently after all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quite so. The lion is, perhaps, not a typical example. Our interaction with lions is, perhaps, a bit limited. I'm sure you know that there are many other cases where we can already distinguish what many in the field are happy to call linguistic behaviour - even in bees.

And this seems true for any thought to me. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wouldn't disagree with that.

In theory, it seems possible that given enough observations we might be able to determine to some degree "what a person is thinking about." But then the person's body is itself a sign of inner changes, which of course Wittgenstein seems to suggest. The body is just an imperfect sign in this respect, in part because we have a useful capacity for deception. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's no doubt that looking at it more closely shows a much closer relationship between body and mind than traditional dualism would want to recognize.

This is in line with Augustinian semiotics. The body is sacramental, an outward sign of inner/higher realities. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure that I understand this. But if you are saying that the Augustinian view that W seems to posit as his target has a bit more to be said for it than is usually recognized, I'll agree with you. It must be right that we learn language by observing and imitating the people around us. It's the focus on names that's the big issue.
Higher/lower realities are a bit mysterious to me. They're all equally real, after all.

Given this, it would make sense to pick popular religions and try them out, learning as much as you can, and giving each a chance to display their truth to you. When you find a religion you think contains truth, you practice it but remain skeptical, still searching other religions for more/more relevant truths. — Igitur

I'm puzzled about what you mean by trying religions out. You must mean more than going through some motions - something closer to taking them seriously. But the only ideas even close to religious that I've been able to take seriously (since I abandoned the church I was brought up in) don't require taking seriously the idea of a God or gods. Pascal seems to think that it is possible to do something like trying Christianity out, but he believes that I will end up believing it. I think he may be right; at least, it is a possible outcome. So even "acting as if" Christianity is true requires at least accepting that adopting it would be a good thing.
Then there's the issue of which variety of each religion one is to try out. It's simply not practical to think of trying out all the sects of Christianity or any of the others.
Religions do seem to think that certain altered states of consciousness. Granting their almost irresistible appeal, it seem to me obvious that they need to prove their worth in the mundane world, in which all religions need to exist. And I'm not convinced that their worth goes beyond that of a holiday - which is not negligible, but is far from the scope of anything I would consider a worth-while religion.
Trying things out is entirely reasonable. But surely, there needs to be some preliminary investigation and assessment of what is worth trying out.

We should go back to agreeing to disagree, since your understanding of probability 1 is contrary to, well, everyone else's. Is this a standard philosophical view? IMO you are choosing to confuse yourself about something very simple. — fishfry

Fair enough. We're obviously not going to reach agreement. For what it's worth, my diagnosis is that we disagree about the boundaries of the relevant context. For you, the assignment of 1 to the probability of an outcome which has actually occurred, is sufficiently defined by the context of probability theory. For me, it isn't.
I'm perfectly happy with our agreement (?) that it can be described as empty. That bothers me, but not you.

There's no meaning in symbols. That was the thesis. Mine and Searle's, at any rate. — fishfry

I can understand, roughly, why you (plural) believe that and there's a sense in which I agree. I just don't think it is the whole story.

Then you agree with my point. Credence could be influenced by evidence but need not be. — fishfry

Yes, I do. But I also think that credence should be influenced by evidence.

They might have little or no evidence themselves. Credence is just what people believe, evidence or not. If you redefine evidence as "what my friends believe," that way lies mob rule. — fishfry

Careful.

We should go back to agreeing to disagree, since your understanding of probability 1 is contrary to, well, everyone else's. Is this a standard philosophical view? IMO you are choosing to confuse yourself about something very simple. — fishfry

I hope you weren't just appealing to a vote. But if you mean that I should take more seriously the opinion of others who can be expected to know what they are talking about, then your question is valid. My view is not at all standard. That doesn't bother me. What does bother me is that the orthodox view is comprehensible and so not irrational. I'll have to reconsider.

Credence is a nice concept because we can apply the rules of probability to it, but we needn't know anything about the world to have subjective beliefs. — fishfry

Yes, I can see that. If you'll forgive me, I think that mathematicians and especially logicians tend to be to keen to get to the formalization and too quick to move from setting up the formalization to exploring it. I get stuck on the question what the value is of beliefs that have no connection with the world. To believe something is to believe that it is true.

The covid lockdowns were virtually global and were not a good idea. — fishfry

I agree with that. I went looking for the UN policy statement about this, but couldn't find it. But I did find a string of warnings about the dangers. Whatever went on in the US, disagreement was not suppressed everywhere.

Some Europeans are getting restless, are they not? — fishfry

Certainly. Their problems are different, but nonetheless based on their history. Like the Brexiteers, they want to have their cake and eat it. The difference is that their ambivalence is the question of Russia. The problem exists, but less acutely, for the whole of the mainland. Geography is inescapable, even in these times.

He all but fired the torpedo himself at the Lusitania to get the US into WWI. The Admiralty records are sealed to this day. — fishfry

Quite so. I forgot about the Lusitania.

Yes, I have thought before that a.nice counterexample to Wittgenstein's private language argument is someone writing a note to themself to remind them to do something in the future, a scenario that requires someone to enforce some relationship between words and things in the world for the sake of reminding themselves. — Apustimelogist

I'm afraid few decent philosophical arguments can easily be refuted by counter-example. Someone else can read the note, so it doesn't count as private language - even if it's in cipher.

Obviously, Wittgenstein was not a cognitivist (there are hints at it, yes); but, rather an early behaviorist at the time, influenced by Russell's own thoughts about psychology. — Shawn

There's a lot that makes him look like a behaviourist, because his target is what we might now call qualia. But what form of behaviourism does he sign up to? He doesn't use any of the appropriate language - stimulus/response, for example. (Even though the example of pain is wide open to that kind of model.) If he was a verificationist, it would not be unreasonable to read behaviourism into what he says. But he is equivocal.

Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a special form of the question “How do you mean?” The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition — Phil. Inv. 353

A contribution, not an answer.

I imagine coming to understand extraterrestrial or synthetic lifeforms capable of language would end up being a good deal more difficult than learning a new human language, although perhaps not impossible. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I guess the first problem is how we might come to understand that an extra-terrestrial or synthetic form was alive. We would have to apply the idea of a common humanity in a new context. We can do that, but I don't think we can work out the answer in advance.
I think it is helpful to look at what has been involved in decoding unknown scripts, starting with how we recognize that particular marks are a script, as opposed to a natural phenomenon or a decoration. It all depends on the assumption of a common humanity. But that won't apply to decoding the human brain. How that might apply in those circumstances is really not at all clear.

In the context of him analyzing a debate: debates turn on fixed points, and foundations are below those fixed points: a hinge can be replaced, but the foundations take time to change. — Moliere

Yes, that's true. But both have their uses in a building. Whether the same proposition can be a hinge and a foundation is hard to say. We could perhaps say that the same proposition might be used as a hinge in one context and a foundation in another. But not, I think, at the same time. Case studies would be interesting.

I'm being too poetic for the conversation. I'd take your or anyone elses reading over mine -- just some silly thoughts that came to mind. — Moliere

I didn't think your comment was silly. And we are discussing metaphors.