It's a part of the story, not the whole of it. In particular that juxtaposition of a linguistic and non-linguisitic world needs some critique. The individual a and the individual constants "a" could not inhabit seperate worlds if we are going to do things with the one by using the other. — Banno

Yes, of course that's right. I was lazily using what I thought was a standard formulation. Let me try to put the point another way. A dictionary defines word in terms of other words. It is surely obvious that, if that is all there is to it, there will be a massive problem in actually using language for many of its standard purposes, such as shopping lists. Of course, Wittgenstein was right to say that ostensive defition requires an understanding of "where the word is stationed in the language", but he didn't suggest that ostensive definition didn't work, did he?

It makes no difference if we first assign names, then predicates, or if we first assign predicates and then names. — Banno

I get that. But my, possibly naive, point is that whichever we assign first, we must be assigning without the use of whichever we assign second. If we have assignd names to constants, we have something we can assign to predicates. Obviously, we cannot at the same time use predicates to assign names to constants. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, the other way round.
I had thought that the point of the concept of a rigid designator was that the assignation of names to constants was, from the logical point of view, arbitrary, so the problem didn't arise. (The causal account of naming could safely be seen as beyond the scope of formal logic.) I seem to have got that wrong.
I feel forced to a view that names and predicates require each other and so must be interdefined by a process that defines both at the same time - unless in some way the point is the structure and not the process of construction.

But your general point carries here, in that the separation between syntax and semantics in a formal logic is deceptively simple, and so somewhat unlike the semantics of a natural language. — Banno

H'm. I don't know enough logic to comment. But I would be surprised if there were no difference between formal logic and natural language in that respect. The concept of syntax (grammar) was invented long after natural languages developed - and I find it hard to believe that the latter was developed in a systematic way.

The puzzle is why the extension of "red" includes these apples and not those ones. — Banno

I agree entirely with both your points. But I don't see what the puzzle is? That could only be puzzling to someone who couldn't perceive the difference.

So if our age thinks God's existence is undecidable, then a better P for the Christian way of life would be historical, political, or ethical propositions which are thought to be decidable. — Leontiskos

That's an interesting thought. Do you have an example?

I don't follow any of that. And now you are saying, "'3 > 1' is not empirical, therefore it must be necessary [inclusive or] analytic." — Leontiskos

I'm sorry I made a mistake. I was trying to do your work for you. I should have just asked the question. Given that "3>1" is not empirical (even though it is truth-apt), how do you classify it?
I may be wrong, but I am unclear whether truth-apt (meaning true-or-false) is really applicable to propositions that are true in all possible worlds. Perhaps you can clarify that for me?

That's a perfectly valid argument, and the Christian can't say, "Oh, but ways of life are not truth-apt, so your argument is illegal. My way of life is, 'protected from refutation.' " — Leontiskos

I agree that remark would not help their case. One cannot just announce that a proposition is protected from refutation. One protects a proposition from refutation by the moves one makes in the argument. In the case you give, I would expect the Christian to reject the second premiss "God does not exist".

Nowhere have I claimed that material implication exhausts the point I am making, and therefore your point about material implication does not actually count as an objection to my thesis. — Leontiskos

I'm sorry. I was under the impression that when a philosopher uses the arrow of implication, by convention they are talking about material implication. But you are right, modus tollens etc. are much older than Frege's logic.

Here it seems that you are conceding my point. You seem to recognize that we might encounter a fact about the world (~P) which causes us to change our (S). — Leontiskos

St. Paul might be a good example. But here's a puzzle. I've got very confused about whether it is the Christian way of life that demonstrates the existence of God or God that demonstrates the Christian way of life. Perhaps even both?
But the point here is that although St. Paul did radically change his way of life, he still managed to live in the same world as the rest of us, so did not abandon large parts of the way of life he was living before his conversion.
The critical role for standard philosophy of ways of life is that they establish and enable our practices, including our ability to formulate propositions, evaluate them and so forth (and I include making judgements of value in this). St. Paul may have modified his beliefs, but the fundamental abilities were not touched. They were differently applied.

I could have more accurately said, "The point here is that if ways of life can validate propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions." — Leontiskos

As we get deeper into this, it is necessary to question your use of "validate" here. Ways of life do not, in themselves, validate anything. They are the foundation on which we build our practices of validating things. They establish or enable those practices.
I don't question our ability to evaluate how we live and to identify room for improvement. But that ability presupposes the existence of ways of life and at least a continuity in our modification of them.

Here it seems that you are conceding my point. — Leontiskos

Partly, yes. But now I'm modifying that concession by insisting that part of the role of ways of life is beyond validation, because it is the foundation on which our practices of validation are built. (Believe it or not, this is new territory to me, and I'm thinking on my feet. So things may change.)

If having many interpretations means there is no fact of the matter, then there can be no truth for indecisive murder cases either, since interpretations vary. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In some cases, like the puzzle pictures, more than one interpretation is applicable and there is no fact of the matter that will decide the issue. In those cases, it would not be wrong to say that both interpretations are true, though I would add "in a modified sense of the word". But one could also say that both interpretations are correct or satisfactory or valid. I think that accurately reflects the facts of the matter.
But in other cases, like your indecisive murder case, there is an assumption that somewhere there is a fact of the matter that will arbitrate between competing interpretations; after all the person in the dock either did, or not did not, kill the victim. (Actually, in some cases, that assumption may be false. It is not impossible for more than one person to share the guilt, and the law has devised various ways of coping with those situations.)

Truth is not a matter of interpretation―if something is true it is simply true. Beliefs are matters of interpretation. Don't conflate belief with truth and much confusion will clear up for you. — Janus

I agree with you that truth and interpretation do not sit easily together. In puzzle picture cases, I agree that it is not satisfactory to simply say that the interpretation of the picture as that of a rabbit is true, or that the interpretation as a duck is true. For me, the truth of the matter is that the picture can be interpreted both ways and even, possibly, as a collection of marks on paper.

If you want to talk about reasons to believe, then they shouldn’t be confused with logic implications. If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, — neomac

I agree with you. It's a complicated issue.

Giving an interpretation to a formal language involves assigning individuals to the individual variables (names, in a natural language) involved. a to "a", b to 'b" in the exemplary case. — Banno

Yes. But that assignment happens before the assignation of individuals to predicates. So, presumably, predicates can play no part in assigning individuals to individual variables. Hence only rigid designators can be used here.

Properties, or more properly predicates, are not something apart from those individuals, but sets of individuals. f={a,b,c} or whatever. — Banno

I didn't think I was questioning that.

Not sure you can seperate these. For example, Wittgenstein points out that ostension is already a part of the language. One has to understand the activity of pointing to follow a pointer. — Banno

Yes, he does. But ostensive definition was thought at one time to be the way that language reaches out from the circle of words (as in definitions) to attach to the (non-linguistic) world. Has that changed?

Well, I would first say that something which is truth-apt is not necessarily empirical. "3 > 1" is truth-apt, but not empirical, for example. But I would agree that a proposition which is truth-apt is true or false (or else capable of being true or false). — Leontiskos

Yes, I hoped you would want to add propositions like that. Do we call them necessary or analytic? Or both?

Well I think <this post> of mine is the thing we have primarily been focused on. The key idea: — Leontiskos

I don't think this is a key idea at all. It goes nowhere.
It is statements or propositions that substitute for the variables in a formula like that. You cannot substitute the Eiffel Tower for either S or P. But ways of life and practices are about what you have to know - be capable of doing - before you can make a statement, never mind draw an inference from it.
It looks like you want to substitute the Christian way of life for S and God's existence for P. Or is it the other way round? Never mind. The question that matters here is how we determine whether God exists. Until we can agree on that, there is no way an agreed conclusion can be achieved.
There is also an uncomfortable dilemma in the background. If S implies P, then we may want to establish wether S is true. Suppose we find an argument, with premisses R that implies S. Then R implies S and S implies P. It looks as if an infinite regress is looming here, with the uncomfortable result that nothing can ever be proven. The alternative is to find a starting-point. What might that be? That's what talk of ways of life and practices is about.

You seem to recognize that we might encounter a fact about the world (~P) which causes us to change our way of life (S). — Leontiskos

Yes. That was a pragmatic decision. But it's scope is limited. The idea that a fact about the world might persuade to wholesale change in our way of life misunderstands what a way of life is. But amending or revision does not seem impossible to me, though I have no idea what Wittgenstein would say about the idea.

I could have more accurately said, "The point here is that if ways of life can validate propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions." — Leontiskos

Yes. Subject to the restriction that propositions emerge from ways of life via practices, so the changes will be changes of detail.
But it is worth remembering how much Christianity has changed in the last three hundred years. The church thought that Galilean physics was heresy, but seems to have managed to swallow it in the years since then. Evolutionary theory was thought to flatly contradict the Bible, but many Christians (but, yes, not all - far from it) have managed to swallow that as well. I'm sure you can think of other examples.

I miffed that a bit. It was actually St. Augustine writing about St. Ambrose, who practiced silent reading. Augustine found it strange. — Leontiskos

Thanks.

Saint Anselm? I'll have to google now. — Srap Tasmaner

Thanks very much. Perhaps I should have paused before posting.

St. Augustine was considered strange in that he practiced silent reading. — Leontiskos

Thanks. It's good to know I was not wrong.

But I can also appreciate more subtle conceptual or psychological analysis. If you feel like providing yours, I can try to be more specific. — neomac

I don't have one. But I did wonder about feelings like the feeling of falling, or the feeling of an insect crawling up your arm, or feeling sick (nausea) or dizzy. "Feeling" seems to cover a multitude of sins, some of which count as emotions. Feeling confident is certainly something we say, and you seem to recognize that it is not the same kind of feeling as feeling angry or happy when you call them epistemic. I don't have any intuitive understanding of that category, so I feel somewhat at sea. Oh, and by the way, when I draw a conclusion from a conclusive argument, is that also a feeling?

That's fairly persuasive as a theory of the origin of speech, but I don't think it necessarily indicates that we can't speak meaningfully while alone. The part of the motor cortex that orchestrates speech is separated from the portion that handles comprehension. It's not clear that the unity of consciousness we enjoy today is the way humans have always been. It may be that talking to ourselves has been around as long as talking to each other has. — frank

Well, there is a theory that reading in the ancient classical world was always reading out loud. Reading to oneself in sllence developed later. Sadly, I have lost my note of where I got this story. However, one can see this process at work by watching small children as they learn to read. Even it is not true, it seems to me to be a plausible myth of the origin of talking to oneself.

That's not what's private about private reference -- rather, I'm arguing that it's the independence from "triangulation" or the need to have a listener comprehend the speaker's reference. — J

Is there any reason why we can't distinguish two phases of reference? The speech act and the hearer's response, which acts as feeback to bring into line any misunderstandings.
Where speaker and hearer are one and the same person, we have, so to speak a limiting case. One of the limitations is that the tendency, over time, of language to wander from its original starting-point. A solitary speaker has, and requires, no feedback.
The involvement of other people puts a brake on this for a solitary individual. Of course wandering still occurs, but occurs as the result of many individuals communicating with others, so the changes are controlled by consensus.

We assign an interpretation to this syntax by assigning an individual to each of the individual variables, a to "a", b to "b", and so on.
So, assigning a property to an individual happens in a different part of the logic to assigning a name to an individual. — Banno

This quote from @Banno is from the other thread, explaining to me how formal logical systems are constructed. This process seems to me to assume that assigning properties to individuals presupposes the assignation of names to their references. But perhaps I have misunderstood.
Of course, that's not a problem if we are simply using natural language as opposed to constructing one. But it would be nice to be able to say that referring and describing are interdependent activities. They really need each other.
Incidentally, ostensive definition is the traditional way of escaping from the endless circle of descriptions (I believe). Wittgenstein's point about this is, as I understand it, that there is no guarantee of success. But if we can sort out misunderstandings, why do we need a guarantee of success?

I can feel more confident about the disposition of business partners to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those I decided not to partner with, as much as I can feel more confident about the disposition of friends or relatives to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those who are not my friends or relatives. — neomac

Oh, I see. Emotions = feelings. That's a new one to me.

Listen, this conversation is getting long and unwieldy. Rather than answering the whole bevvy of issues you are now raising, why don't you just point me to two of them that you deem most central, and I will answer those. — Leontiskos

It certainly is. I'll do my best.

The intellectually honest naysayer needs to start admitting that they don't think religious claims are truth-apt. They can't have it both ways: — Leontiskos

This is the remark that I responded to. I took truth-apt to mean true-or-false, (i.e. empirical) and responded because I do think they are not true-or-false. We've discussed some of the reasons for that. I admit it may seem counter-intuitive, because it is said in philosophy that all claims of existence must be empirical. The alternative (unless all religious beliefs are pseudo-propositions) is that they are analytic or meaningless. Neither of which really make much sense. However, empirical or analytic are not the only options. Wittgenstein has richer resources. (I realize you won't like them.)

1. Hinge propositions are not non-truth-apt. They are true, in such a way that whatever else gets questioned in the debate, they are protected from refutation. "God exists" is a good example.
2. I think I've mentioned Wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing as" and this seems to me a really useful way of understanding what it going on here. A believer interprets the world in a different way from the unbeliever, seeing it as meaningful where an unbeliever sees it as meaningless - and finds meaning in it in a different way.
I know you don't like quotations but I don't want to waste your time, so let me make it clear that I know that you don't like Wittgenstein and I expect you to criticise this idea - and I will defend it as best I can. As a starting-point, the suggestion is that philosophical theories about the world are like interpretations of a picture. Which leaves all sorts of questions unanswered, but at least gives some understanding of the problem.

There are further possibilities, but they are not attractive to me;-
3. Axioms are also not non-truth-apt. Nowadays, they are stipulated (assumed) to be true, but it used to be the case that they were thought to be self-evident.
4 Presuppositions, in presuppositionalism, are simply adopted as true - an arbitrary starting-point. I don't quite see how any apologetics could develop from this

We've spoken a good deal about ways of life. Wittgenstein's use of the term, they are the foundations of language and are the basis of our understanding of truth and falsity, so not truth-apt, any more than practices are. Practices are just our way of doing things; they include the ways in which we establish truth and falsity and so provide a bridge between ways of life and language. We learn these as children as part of learning how to negotiate life. They are not themselves true or false but enable us to make statements that are true or false.`
In practice, our lives are more complicated than that, and our ways of life and practices are always liable to development and change, often in response to facts about the world. But the relationship goes two ways and is more complicated than material implication.

The implication of this is to give space to a world in which more than one way of life and one world-view may have at least provisional legitimacy at the same time. For me, that's the way the world is. Wittgenstein writes as if there is only one way of life in the world, and it is shared by all human beings. It is true that all human beings share something of their way of life, but they also differ enormously and I don't think that view holds water.

OK. So where do you want to start?

Beliefs do not need to be about what exists, their identity or properties, beliefs can also be about how people behave. — neomac

Well, I was thinking that beliefs about people name, age, address place of work - neutral facts - don't count for anything like as much as about how they behave with us.

It is precisely because friends, parents, and dogs behaved in ways we approved of in the past, that we can believe they will do it again, and rely on it in our life (maybe even under daring circumstances). — neomac

But to describe these relationships in that bloodless way does not distinguish these personal relationships from business partnerships etc. This is where the idea of faith as involved emotion does have appeal. Friends and family are the people that you love and are committed to; that goes beyond approving of their behaviour - it precisely means that you won't walk away whenever you disapprove of their behaviour. There is a lot of variation here, so I think that all we can say is that commitment when times are rough is at least on the table, and walking away will need justification.

But we do seem to be broadly in agreement. Faith is a complicated business and escapes from many of the formulas that people suggest.

“emotion” because it has to do with “how I feel about something” and “epistemic” because faith is about “beliefs” (e.g. God exists, Jesus has both a devine and human nature, God is a trinity, etc.). — neomac

I think your view is being skewed by the religious use of faith - which does seem to be about beliefs. I agree that one can be faithful to one's beliefs (or principles). But if you think about common-or-garden phrases like " faithful friend", or "supporter/fan" or "husband/wife", or "servant" or "dog", I think you will see that in those cases, it is not about belief at all. It is about how someone behaves - different behaviour in each case, as required by the relationship in each case. "Faithful picture" or "account" are different, but obviously not about any beliefs.
But I think the religious use of faith is more complicated than it seems. In the Christian faith, the creed and signing up to it are very important. In other faiths, beliefs are less important. What matters most is behaviour - behaving according to the moral code, taking part in the liturgy and so on. Religion is only part about belief and only about belief as part of a whole way of life. Acccepting a religion is accepting the obligation to live according to those rules.
Does faith involve emotion? Yes, I would agree that it does.

What I’m getting at is that a person is able to self reflect and carry out a restructuring of the psychological make up of themselves. — Punshhh

Yes, that is clearly true. The question is, what more can we usefully say?

I would place this in the context of an internal process within the self, which does not necessarily require a thorough analysis. — Punshhh

There's two more difficult terms. Sometimes the self is me, not a part of me. Sometimes not. Equivalent to the ego or not? But then, we do want to talk about processes going on "within" the person (as opposed to the body). Sometimes they are conscious and sometimes not. But there doesn't seem to be any agreement how this can be done. (In one way, ordinary language sets our starting-point, but it seems too limited for what we want to do.)

When you say “ego”, presumably you are referring the the thinking person, the mind. — Punshhh

I would like to treat "ego", "self", "mind" as all equivalent to "person" - unless and until a more detailed and more objective framework can be developed.

So if P is not truth-apt, then S might or might not be truth-apt.
— Ludwig V
Well I never said that. The problem here is that implication doesn't make sense among non-truth-apt things, but that's a separate issue. — Leontiskos

Not in so many words, but you did say this:-

If P is not truth-apt, then of course S need not be truth-apt. — Leontiskos

and I think that what I said follows from that.

The trouble is that we might well disagree about whether a given proposition, such as "God exists", is truth-apt or not.
— Ludwig V
How is that supposed to be "trouble"? Try presenting an argument to the effect that, "We might disagree about whether P is truth-apt, therefore Leontiskos' claim is false." — Leontiskos

It is trouble because you have to covince me that "God exists" is truth-apt before I'll be convinced by your argument.

These two claims contradict one another. One moment you say that S cannot entail true or false propositions, and the next moment you say that S implies P and P is true. This is a good example of the problem with Wittgenstein's approach. — Leontiskos

Yes, you are right. I carelessly continued using S without remembering that you had already assigned a value to it. I should have used a different variable, such as T. I'm sorry.

He won't make an excuse and abandon the obvious fact that where S implies P and P is truth-apt, so too is S. — Leontiskos

Why on earth do you suppose he abandons that?

Of course if you think he makes a good point you can introduce that same point in your own words, but appeals to his name will be ineffective for me. I have no regard for his name, and these topics help explain why. — Leontiskos

Thank you for clearing that up. I mention his name because I had the impression that it is courteous to identify the source of other people's arguments when deploying them and because it saves time if you accept the argument. If you don't, then we may have to do this the hard way.

I don't think the argument is wholesale invalid. The idea behind it is that intractable disagreement among intelligent persons can signify a more fundamental problem (and that this problem could be related to what is or is not truth-apt). There is a rationale to the idea, even if I think it is wrong in this case. — Leontiskos

That is indeed a more nuanced understanding. But now I need to ask why you think it is wrong in this case.

As far as I'm concerned, wherever it goes, it supports my point. Suppose I present an argument and it is convincing. In that case an atheistic way of life will be falsified (or invalidated) by the propositional truth. Or suppose I present an argument and it is unconvincing. In that case a theistic way of life will be less plausible given the propositional truth. Either way the propositional outcome will bear on ways of life. — Leontiskos

That would be correct if "God exists" is true-or-false, like "Unicorns exist". You seem to think that it is. I think that it isn't. Until that is sorted out, your schema above does not apply. I believe that "God exists" is comparable, not to "Unicorns exist" but to "Matter exists" or "Consciousness is an illusion".

The theories are therefore empirically inadequate given the way people often change their mind with regard to religious propositions (and faith propositions more generally). — Leontiskos

I'm speechless. What on earth does that have to do with it?

If the atheist says, "I believe God does not exist, and nothing will ever convince me otherwise," then I would say they are just being stubborn and irrational. If there is nothing that would convince him otherwise, then he is not taking the question seriously. — Leontiskos

How would you prove that? Only by begging the question.
Incidentally, I could reply in kind - "If the theist says, "I believe God does exist, and nothing will ever convince me otherwise," then I would say they are just being stubborn and irrational. If there is nothing that would convince him otherwise, then he is not taking the question seriously." But that would be disrepectful. I take you more seriously than that.

P.S. I think you need to address this in order to ensure that our whole conversation is not based on a misunderstanding:
Well if something is false then it is truth-apt, so this makes me think that you don't understand what "truth-apt" means.
— Leontiskos — Leontiskos

Yes, you are right, of course. I wrote that passage badly, without explaining myself. It doesn't matter, so I withdraw the claim.

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. S could be a way of life or practice. — Leontiskos

If P is not truth-apt, then of course S need not be truth-apt. — Leontiskos

If P is not truth-apt, then S need not be truth-apt; but then S might be truth-apt. So if P is not truth-apt, then S might or might not be truth-apt. The trouble is that we might well disagree about whether a given proposition, such as "God exists", is truth-apt or not.

I don't know what "being protected from reputation" means, but the point is that truth-apt things are open to scrutiny. — Leontiskos

That's a typo. I mean "protected from reFutation". To illustrate what I mean, let me sketch an argument in which this protection occurs. The point here is not whether the argument as stated is a good one, but just to illustrate what I mean by "protected from refutation". Suppose someone asserts that God always answers prayers. A possible reply might be "But yesterday you were praying for fine weather to-day and look, it's raining." The protective answer is "But sometimes the answer is No."

I suppose I just stand by what I already said. If Wittgenstein thinks his "ways of life" are not truth-apt and yet entail true or false propositions, then he is in a pickle. — Leontiskos

No, that's not what Wittgenstein thinks. His discussion of ways of life and practices is not extensive; it's little more than a series of hints. But the foundations of language cannot possibly entail true or false propositions; if they did, they would already be language and therefore not the foundations of language.

As an illustration, consider the foundations of mathematics. Some people are inclined to think that the foundations of arithmetic, at least, are the practice of counting. This practice entails no arithmetical truths whatever, but it does make it possible to work arithmetical truths out. (We could go further and think that the practice of counting has foundations in our practice, in language, of distinguishing one apple from the next one and recognizing that there is more than one wasp eating the second one.) All of this is sketching, of course.

As Wittgenstein is worrying about the foundations of rationality, there is a much quoted moment when he comes to the end of the justifications that he can offer and exclaims "But this is what I do!". An example of this point in argumentation is concluding that, since S implies P and S is true, P is true. There is no more to be said. Anyone who can't see that needs education, not more argumentation. (Charles Dodgson somewhat anticipated Wittgenstein here by writing a dialogue in which the tortoise refuses to conclude that Achilles won the race and Achilles sets out to convince him. It doesn't work.)

I don't usually engage that question in these contexts, as the inquirer is just looking for something to try to debunk. I'm also not sure what it has to do with this conversation, especially given that you said my point about relativism, "Would be a bad argument." — Leontiskos

That seems a very sound policy. I was looking for examples that would show what I was trying to assert. I was not looking to engage in those arguments. I've outlined a couple of arguments above, and I hope they help.

But yes, relativists will say, "People endlessly disagree about proposition X, therefore it must not be truth-apt." That's a common argument. — Leontiskos

When I said that's a bad argument, I was agreeing with what I thought was your point - that the conclusion does not follow from the premiss. I don't know whether you think that "God exists" is an empirical statement or not, but I think it very unlikely that there is any empirical fact that would persuade you to abandon that claim. Equally there is for me no empirical statement that would persuade me to accept that God does indeed exist. Hence, I do not believe that "God exists" is an empirical claim.

So I would say, it is the being, working with the personality who wrestles with the ego. — Punshhh

I have a problem with any theory that divides the person/self into separate elements like this. When we do the wrong thing, we are usually anxious to shift the blame away from ourselves. One of the tactics is to attribute the agency to something that is not us (not our selves). I didn't do that, my appetites did it. I don't want to say that it is never appropriate to think in this way, but I do want to say that it is sometimes inappropriate to think in this way. We find addictions very hard to classify, with some people seeing the addiction that is not the person, but which takes over control of the person, and other people thinking that it is just the result of a "weak will" - as if going to some sort of gym would sort the problem out.

A tipping point is reached beyond which there is a strength of feeling and knowledge that one is living a gooder life and yet not feeling the lesser for it, but the more for it. Again a tipping point is reached beyond which one can grab hold of and tether the ego. — Punshhh

Yet you seem to be able to tell this story without the help of the analysis, until the very last moment, when you revert to the "ego", and I want to say that it is your ego that took you through the process of training that allows you to grab hold of the ego and tether it (yourself). I have no idea what a Zen master would say about this story, but I say that the point is that you have not tethered yourself, but set yourself free. Or rather, you were taking the process as a process of tethering, but now you can see it as a process of freeing yourself. Life in the wild, we might say, is not freedom; it is suffering. But No, it is both. The paradoxes are endless. That, no doubt, is where the Zen master comes in.

I mean, you could give your definition of "true," but the point here is that if ways of life can be validated by propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions. Ways of life and propositions cannot be neatly separated. — Leontiskos

I agree that ways of life and propositions cannot be neatly separated. For me, at least, that was the significance of accept Hadot' remark.

But yes, relativists will say, "People endlessly disagree about proposition X, therefore it must not be truth-apt." That's a common argument. — Leontiskos

Thatl would be a bad argument. So, could I ask what arguments you propose as evidence that God exists?

I think hinge propositions are another example of the confusion I outlined, insofar as they involve the claim that non-truth-apt axioms entail truth-apt propositions. — Leontiskos

Hinge propositions are not non-truth-apt. They are true, in such a way that whatever else gets questioned in the debate, they are protected from reputation. "God exists" is a good example - unless you can tell me what arguments you would accept as evidence that God does not exist.
Axioms are also not non-truth-apt. They are stipulated (assumed) to be true. Presuppositions, in that theory, are simply adopted as true in something of the same way.
Ways of life, on the other hand, in Wittgenstein's use of the term, are the foundations of language and are the basis of our understanding of truth and falsity, so not truth-apt, any more than practices are. Practices are just our way of doing things; they include the ways in which we establish truth and falsity. In practice, our lives are more complicated than that, and our ways of life and practices are always liable to development and change, often in response to facts about the world. But the relationship goes two ways and is more complicated than material implication.

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. S could be a way of life or practice. — Leontiskos

The question will always be, then, whether P is really truth-apt and not false.

Except that we know that some people achieve success despite all the odds and setbacks, just look at any list of entrepreneurs or Hollywood stars. This evidence of success, despite barriers and failures is why some people think it's worth taking chances. I'd argue that faith in something which cannot be demonstrated follows a very different trajectory. — Tom Storm

We do indeed see a great deal of stuff about people who have succeeded against the odds, and, as you point out, not only in fiction. We don't see nearly as much about the people who try to follow in their footsteps and fail - and they are the vast majority. Anyone who looks at the numbers for successful and unsuccessful business start-ups and thinks rationally will walk away. Ditto careers in music, acting &c. Even philosophy!

I'm surprised at your last sentence. That's exactly what I'm trying to talk about. But N.B. I do not want to go down the rationalist road of saying that people who do that are crazy and irrational and even unphilosophical. I'm trying to identify what makes such projects worth while, and not just foolishness.

For me, “faith” often implies belief without evidence, possibly without good reason, and perhaps even in the face of contrary evidence. — Tom Storm

I was also trying to tease out why you said that faith often implies those things, which suggests that sometimes faith does not imply those things.
Come to think of it, perhaps my thought is only that commitment is often a good thing, though always implying an acceptance of risk, or at least ignorance about what the future holds. Whether that is a good thing or a bad one will depend on the nature of the project, not on whether it succeeds. Commitment that takes a doctor to Gaza is a good thing, I think. Commitment that takes a soldier into an aggressive war is, on the whole, a bad thing. Whether a commitment to getting to the top of Mt. Everest is a good thing or not is not clear to me. Ditto religious commitment.

Again a tipping point is reached beyond which one can grab hold of and tether the ego. — Punshhh

Yes, I understand that the ego is the ox. But who is it that tames the ox/ego? The story would lose its point if we could imagine the ox willingly submitting to the tamer. You speak of "one" or "me", which seems to be neither ox nor ego. I sometimes think that the journey is something that happens to us adn which we cope with as best we can, rather than being something that we decide to do.

For me, “faith” often implies belief without evidence, possibly without good reason, and perhaps even in the face of contrary evidence. — Tom Storm

I suppose the only way to see any value in faith is to think about the times when it implies something different.
It is odd, though, that one of the commonest story-lines in our burgeoning entertainment industry is the lone hero who is gripped by an unorthodox, even crazy, idea and pursues it relentlessly in the face of all opposition. The ending is, of course, triumphant vindication. Which is all very well, but perhaps not the most sensible idea to feed into the minds of people.
I think that faith, if it is ever to count as a good thing, must be the willingness to start on a project, accepting the risk of failure, but willing to see it through to the end anyway. Whether it is actually a good thing in particular cases, will depend on our evaluation of the project.

What we can do with formal logic is to show the coherence of some fragments of natural language. — Banno

I can see that. I can also see room for a good deal more philosophy. But I think that going there would be a bit off topic for this thread. Thank you for all your help.

For example, if S is the "way of life" of theism or atheism, and P is a proposition like, "God exists," then we have a case where a way of life is truth-apt. If P is true, and yet is made false by a way of life, then that way of life is to that extent false. — Leontiskos

Forgive me. I get your drift. However ways of life, unlike propositions about them, are not true or false. But they can be validated by or founded on facts which are articulated by propositions; those propositions need to be true if they are to do their job.

When Pierre Hadot emphasizes the way that ways of life and discourse are mutually influencing, he is crucially aware that latter also influences the former. — Leontiskos

I don't want to waste time bickering about whether your argument is valid or not. I'll skip to agreeing with you and Pierre Hadot. OK?

In one way, you are quite right. However, I am puzzled why there appears to be no end to the argument about the existence of God and inclined to think that the possibility of such an argument is an illusion. I find Wittgenstein's ideas about interpretations ("seeing as") interesting because puzzle pictures seem to be a case where two incompatible statements are both true - in a modified sense of true. In addition, Wittgenstein articulates the concept of "hinge" propositions, which are protected from refutation by their role in the practice(s) they support.

Wittgenstein, drawing much from Hume, formed the idea of ‘hinge propositions’, in which there are particular propositions that one may believe but in addition, one may exempt from doubt. It is the belief in these particular propositions that enables one to begin one’s scientific investigations. They are not supported by reasons.

(copied from [url=https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk › index.php › aporia › article › download › 2027 › 1496]Fluharty - Hinge propositions[/url])
.. and then there's Presuppositional apologetics - Wikipedia. This one is not my cup of tea, but I gather it has followers. This is a variety of fideism, which has its place in philosophical discourse because it was Hume's position. (People forget that Hume had one exception to his general critique of miracles - the Resurrection. He does not claim to believe in it on rational or empirical grounds.)

All I'm saying here is that there are alternatives to hammering round the ancient necessary proofs and empirical arguments.

I think those are problems in themselves. And they are behind most of the culture wars, genocides, and brainwashing of children and the gullible. Also given that they are intellectually dishonest, in that they claim to know more than can justifiably be claimed to be known, I believe they should be disavowed and even disparaged. Of course I'm not suggesting that people should be punished merely for being ideologues. dogmatists or fundamentalists, though. — Janus

That's right. I was feeling for the point at which dogma etc. becomes a problem that needs to be addressed by social action. Which is a delicate but important matter.

Those who are reputedly "touched by the divine" are usually the saints and the sages and they would seem to be the least likely to be ideologues, dogmatists or fundamentalists. — Janus

I believe that to be true as well.

Roughly, any other alternative interpretation would be equivalent to possible world semantics. — Banno

OK. But when I hear "There's a possible world in which P", I understand this to be equivalent to "It is possible that P". So far, I haven't identified any difference that matters in my world. Am I right?

I somewhat regret suggesting a third level, since the gap between a formal modal and a natural language is no where near at the level of the gap between a syntax and a semantics. — Banno

Well, from my point of view, the question where natural language sits in relation to the formal system is important. I don't think the difference between the two gaps is a problem at all.

Right, I haven't been saying that I see a problem with people interpreting their mystical experiences, and entertaining whatever personal beliefs they do. The problem I see is when they conflate their interpretations with knowledge and make absolutist truth claims. In other words dogma, ideology and fundamentalism are the problems...thinking others should believe as they do. — Janus

Broadly, I agree. But I think we have to modify what we have been saying a bit. Putting it crudely, it is not dogma, ideology and fundamentalism in themselves that are the problem. It is the bad behaviour that those things lead to - no, sorry, correction - often lead to. I don't mind people being dogmatic or even fundamentalist, so long as they behave themselves in a civilized fashion - that is, adapt to the world as it is, as opposed to eliminating or attempting to eliminate those features of the world that they disapprove of. (Since everybody has an ideology, we should only condemn ideologies that seek to suppress, by inappropriate means, other ideologies.)
In short, the important distinction between a mere hallucination and a vision of God is the question of harm to self and others in everyday life.

Are we really expecting those touched by the divine to say, ‘I encountered a higher power and I know we are all one, but I’ll keep it in perspective because intellectually this is the right thing to do?' — Tom Storm

That is indeed asking a bit much. But the practicalities of existence do demand that one not use inappropriate methods to compel (insofar as that's even possible) belief amongst other people.

The ego has to be tamed like the ox in Zen is tethered to the post. — Punshhh

Yes, but how do I decide who is the ego and who the ox-tamer?

The intellectually honest naysayer needs to start admitting that they don't think religious claims are truth-apt. They can't have it both ways: — Leontiskos

I'm a bit cautious about a general claim about all religious claims. I don't exclude the possibility that some, even many, may be truth-apt. But I do think that an important part of religious claims are interpretations of the world that are the basis of various ways of life and practices and that those interpretations are not truth-apt. The same applies to secularism and atheism.

This is a very strange debate. You seem to be arguing that the world is going to hell in a handbasket because of the dominance of liberalism. But I believe that the world is going to hell in a handbasket because of the increasing dominance of illiberal forces, some of which call themselves neo-liberal. We agree about something! On the other hand, I'm not sure there has ever been a time when the world wasn't going to hell in a handbasket. Certainly, not in the last three hundred years.

I can't work out what the key points are here. Some possibly random comments:-

I think the voices that helped develop our current thymos-phobia and logos-skepticism were themselves plenty dogmatic and stuck living out their own myth, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. It is certainly true that the successes of liberalism in, let us say the 19th and 20th century were the result of deep commitment and dogged determination. So it is odd that you think that people of that kind are "thumos-phobic" (if I've understood what you mean by that correctly). Their positions were based on rational argument, so it is also odd that you think that they were "logos-sceptical" (If I've understood what you mean by that correctly).

people who won't storm beaches or resist sieges (who lack thymos) also won't stand up to public corruption or resist the temptation to public corruption, and won't forgo current consumption for the sake of future goods — Count Timothy von Icarus

My understanding of thumos is that everybody has it - the capacity to adopt and pursue values with commitment and effort. The problem with it, for Plato at least, is that it needs to be directed correctly. It may be true that reluctance to forego current consumption may be part of the reluctance of Europe to support Ukraine properly. But a big part of it is a reluctance to go to war. I don't think that's a bad thing, (so long as it is not overdone!)

One way this manifests, in classical terms, is essentially the claim that man only has concupiscible appetites (i.e. an attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain), while ignoring the existence of irascible appetites (i.e. an attraction to the pursuit of arduous goods, where hope, not pleasure, is the key positive motivating force). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think this distinction would stand up to analysis. But perhaps you are channeling the distinction between epithumia and thumos? In any case, it seems to me that the widespread condemnation of epithumia is wrong-headed. Our appetites include things that are not merely pleasurable but essential. The problem arises when they are pursued to excess or in the wrong way.

They (sc. the humanities) are the ground, as you say, for making men capable of self-governance and self-rule (collectively and individually) as well as the ground for a common stock of ideas for political life, the pursuit of a common good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That, or something very like it, is indeed the traditional argument for them. But, for many, what happened in Germany in the first half of the 20th century has more or less destroyed that argument. At the very least, we have to note that love of the humanities is not sufficient to prevent people going down some very wrong paths.

If I'm understanding Banno correctly, he's agreed with, and explicated, my talk about a "different level." To say, "The fact that 'a' has the reference it has is not a feature or property of a" is basically the same as saying, "Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure -- it belongs to the semantic interpretation." Or so I believe, and if that's wrong, it's on me, since Banno has been perfectly clear. — J

I can see that it is not part of the first level. "Semantic interpretation" looks like the second level.

And to this we might add a third level, where we seek to understand what we are doing in a natural language by applying these formal systems. So for propositional logic, we understand the p's and q's as standing for the sentences of our natural language, and T and F as True and False. For predicate logic, we understand a,b,c as standing for Fred Bloggs, the Eiffel tower and consumerism, or whatever. — Banno

For what it's worth, I think reference is on the third level, because that's where we encounter the Eiffel Tower etc. I expect Banno will put us right.

The thing is, "a" has no properties at all. It's a name. So there is actually a symmetry of sorts! "'a' refers to a" is not a property of a, and "a is the reference of 'a'" isn't a property of "a", not because it isn't included in the list of "a"'s properties, but because there is no such list. — J

I suspected as much.

In order to give a coherent interpretation to these systems, Kripke taught us to use possible world semantics. In a way all this amounts to is a process to group the predicates used previously. So we said earlier that "f" stands for {a,c,e}, and to this we now add that in different worlds, f can stand for different sets of individuals. So in w₀ "f" stands for {a,c,e}, while in w₁ f stands for {a,b}, and so on in whatever way we stipulate - w₀ being world zero, w₁ being world one, and so on. Now we have added a semantics to the syntax of S4 and S5. — Banno

Thanks for this. It does make sense. I'll have to take it for granted that there are no other successful interpretations. I know that logicians accepted this as the only viable possibility.

For these two reasons, having a name is not usually considered as having the property of having that name. Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure — it belongs to the semantic interpretation. — Banno

Many thanks for this. I can see the sense in it.

if I additionally ask about how "a" comes to stand for the Eiffel Tower, we can't answer that in terms of the interpretation of "a" -- that is, the various properties that can now be predicated of a based upon our interpretation. We have to move to a different level and talk about how or why "a" has the reference it has, which is not a feature or property of a, any more than my name is a property of me. — J

But part of my puzzlement was because of an apparent asymmetry between referring to something and being referred to by something. You don't explicitly say much about "a". But fixing the reference must involve both "a" and a. So I would have thought that "a"'s referring to a is also not a property of "a". Is that right?

And to this we might add a third level, where we seek to understand what we are doing in a natural language by applying these formal systems. — Banno

OK. So now the question whether the concept of a rigid designator is part of the formal system and must be assessed in that context, or part of natural language and assessed in that context. (There's something odd about classifying philosophical logic as "natural language", so perhaps we need a third alternative - not quite natural, not quite formal, but bridging.)

By "logos-skepticism," I mean skepticism about the capacity of logos (reason, rationality) to be the organizing principle and asperation of society and individual life. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you are missing an important point. For many in the aftermath of the two world wars, it was clear that the Grand Narratives that they had inherited were a busted flush. They perceived that those narratives involved a great deal of irrational myth-making, which could not stand up to a rational critique. New departures were an absolute necessity in order to avoid any repetition of history. (OK, that's an emotional sketch. But I don't think it is wrong. It is an appalling failure and a great sadness that they project appears to be on the brink of falling apart. But perhaps it never really stood a chance.)

More to the point, people are unlikely to want to storm beaches or resist sieges in the name of "reasonableness," i.e., to take the sorts of personal and collective risks that civilization requires. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's true. But the embrace of reasonableness was intended to avoid the necessity of storming beaches and resisting sieges, which were regarded as grossly uncivilized activities. Risks, by all means, but avoidance of barbarity as a priority.

There is a lot going on there, but one theory I like is that the reason the humanities latched on to this sort of style and thinking so readily is that the early-20th century focus on the primacy of science left the humanities as "a mere matter of opinion and taste." — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is certainly true. Are you suggesting that it is not a problem? Things have moved on since the fifties, though the Arts and Humanities are still in a perilous position. But then, so are the (pure) sciences, which seem to survive as the hand-maidens of Applied Science and Engineering, which is where the money is - or, if you prefer, are essential to the modern economy.*
I should not be too scathing here. In the curriculum of medieval universities, the professions, (Theology, Medicine and Law) were the crowning subjects. Humanities (otherwise known as the trivium) were preparatory, grounding subjects. It was only in the 18th and 19th centuries that the status of the Humanities improved and became the mark of a civilized, cultivated person. This was a rational response to the improved market for an education for those who would never need to work.

* EDIT Please don't think that I mean to cast any aspersions on either Applied Science of Engineering. My censure is against the near ubiquitous use of money as the only or primary measure of value.

What do you mean by perceptions here, exactly? Are you referring to raw sense data? Or the entire process of observation and interpretation of observations? Because sure, we might misunderstand what we see. But that's different from questioning the validity of raw sense perception - to reality. — karl stone

I mean the latter. Raw perceptions are a myth - a construction from our recognition that there are interpretive processes at work. The moment that the light or sound or whatever arrives at our sense organs, the process of selection, editing and interpreting begins. A perception that was raw could not be perceived by us, and a perception that can be perceived by us is not raw.

All this is supplemental to the point, that there's really no alternative to accept the dualistic nature of subjective experience of an objective reality. — karl stone

Can we just concentrate on this? It doesn't help me much, because I don't understand what you are tryinng to say. It is true that experience of an objective reality requires two poles. That's because it is a relationship. The perceiver (subject) experiences the reality (object). I don't see that any metaphysical consequences follow.
To see what I mean, look at Descartes' argument. He points out that we can distinguish between mind and body and so concludes that they are two distinct things and thence that they are different substances. He interprets "distinct" in a specific way and the metaphysics grows from that. But there is no need to interpret "distinct" in that way.

Traffic lights. Their very existence presupposes a commonality of perception. And they're everywhere! As is art, colour coded electrical wires, signs saying Keep Off the Grass! etc. This very sentence assumes your ability to see, and psychologically translate perception into meaning similar - if not identical to, that which it is intended to convey. — karl stone

.. and you interpret all that in dualistic terms. But that's an interpretation, not a fact.

However, the subjectivist takes the implications of the existence of interpretational models far too far - and does so with the intent of casting the validity of perception into doubt, to undermine the empirical basis for scientific knowledge. — karl stone

I'm not a subjectivist and I don't doubt the validity of perception as such, though I do doubt the validity of some of my perception - often rightly.

Does physics conflict with common sense? I don't think it does. Certainly not Newtonian physics; it's very intuitive. Relativity gets a bit weird, but at velocities approaching the speed of light. And quantum physics gets weird, but again, by virtue of being as small and lightspeed is quick! It's hardly surprising that conditions far removed from our experience, to the absolute extremes of velocity and scale, are difficult to understand in common sense terms. — karl stone

In one sense, it is not possible that they conflict. But people think they do, so an explanation is in order. It is true that Newtonian physics is intuitive now. But it wasn't before he came up with it and many people found it seriusly counter-intuitive. Ditto Relativity.

It is everywhere confirmed that there's an internal world, and an external world - mediated by the senses. — karl stone

Do you mean that our experience confirms it? If not our experience, then what?
I think you will find it more helpful to think of that idea as a model, or an interpretation. The most helpful comparison is with the puzzle pictures, and the idea of a Gestalt is a more general version. There's a classic discussion of this in Wittgenstein. See Wikipedia - Rabbit-duck illusion

Gestalt psychology, gestaltism, or configurationism is a school of psychology and a theory of perception that emphasises the processing of entire patterns and configurations, and not merely individual components. It emerged in the early twentieth century in Austria and Germany as a rejection of basic principles of Wilhelm Wundt's and Edward Titchener's elementalist and structuralist psychology. — Wikipedia - Gestalt

Observation in science, is thus a valid basis for knowledge of the external world, particularly when observations are confirmed by an independent observer. — karl stone

Yes, but given the way that physics conflicts with common sense, it is important to point out that observations themselves tell us that some observations are wrong, mistaken, misleading and that observations themselves enable us to correct those mistakes - usually.

Does it matter? I would say no—all that really matters is how we live our lives—how we live this life, the only life we know or can be confident we can really know, the only one we can be confident that we actually have or will have. And even knowing this life is not the easiest or most common achievement. — Janus

I agree with you about what really matters, but your downright no to the question about these experiences seems to me to be over the top. So far as I know, mystical experience does not lead to harm to the mystic or to others and, on the whole, does seem to encourage peace and loving-kindness. That's important. Also, if it is important to those who follow the disciplines and/or have the experiences, then it has a certain importance for the world. But, whether it is/leads to our final destination or not, it does not seem to make any difference to the majority who do not have these experiences. Their relevance to the only life we know is not at all clear. All this is my opinion, not my dogma.

So I still want a way to characterize the difference between saying "The Eiffel Tower is tall" and "That object [pointing] is called 'the Eiffel Tower'". Yes, the first is a property and the second is not, but where do these statements fall on the syntactic/semantic spectrum? — J

@banno If I may chime in with a related question. I seem to be missing an understanding about what a property is. I can see that whatever name that object (i.e. the eiffel tower) has is distinct from any of the properties that it has qua physical object. But if "a" refers to a, then it seems to me to follow that a is referred to by "a". So if the former is a property of "a" then the latter must be a property of a? You and @J seem to agree that "a" does have a property of referring to a, but that although a is referred to by "a", that does not constitute a property. I don't see why not. I do see that one could not use it to identity the reference of "a", because it would be circular, but that's a different matter, isn't it?

Sort of. We might say Homer is the guy we think wrote the Odyssey. But turns out it was Kostas who wrote it. Now at stake is the difference between thinking of "Homer" as denoting exactly and only "the bloke who the Odyssey", and thinking of it as denoting Homer, that person. That's what this group of thought experiments target. And that in turn is the difference between the descriptive theory of reference and the idea of a rigid designator. If "Homer" and "Kostas" are rigid designators, then we can say that it was Kostas that wrote the Odyssey, and do so without fear of our system of reference collapsing. If we think in terms of the descriptive theory, and so "Homer" refers to "The guy who wrote the Odyssey", then "Homer" refers to Kostas. — Banno

I see that. But then, it seems to me to be a matter of how one thinks about it, or perhaps what question one asks. "Homer" designates just that person every time it is used. Whether we know or how we can establish just which person that is, is not a relevant question. What bothers me is that it reminds me of the power of "+1" to define an infinite numbers of steps in advance - an astonishing fact. But, of course, it isn't astonishing at all. We apply the rule and discover or generate (I don't care which) the answer. It seems to be specified in advance because we are so sure how the rule will be applied in every case. In the same way, it seems to me, "Homer" identifies the same person in every possible world (in which Homer exists) not because it can somehow reach out across all possible worlds, but because we will decide, in all possible worlds, which person is Homer - and we will decide on the basis of the facts of the case. There's no list of facts that will determine every outcome in advance, but some facts or other will determine it.
So, are"Pegasus" or "dragon" rigid designators?

There's the point, too, that we might well see that the descriptivist theory is inadequate and yet not have at hand another theory to replace it. We sometimes have to be comfortable to say "I don't know", and to see that doing so is better than trying to repair a defunct theory. — Banno

Oh, I agree with that. I count myself among the don't knows. On the other hand, I'm not committed to a binary option for theories, though intention doesn't have anything to recommend it that I can see.

It's not a property because that "a" designates a is not a formula within the system, but part of the interpretation, of the model. — Banno

OK. Interpretation sits outside both syntax and semantics, but links the two. Since it isn't a formal system, it looks to me as if it may be conducted in natural language?

Much of the apparent bumpiness here might be worked out by your looking at the formal system and how it functions. You seem to have. good intuitive grasp of the ideas involved. — Banno

H'm. I'm an old dog. But if all this is something that logicians need, I have no problem - any more than I do about what mathematicians get up to. It's when ideas get out into the rough country beyond logic (or mathematics) that I sit up and take notice.

David Chalmers, who agrees more or less with the Wittgensteinian argument that we usually don't use "real" in this way, but goes on to ask why we couldn't. He proposes a room in to which we can go, within which we can ask such questions, and discuss the consequences. — Banno

That's a very interesting idea. It has occurred to me that some philosophers present their anti-realist arguments together with some account of what reality actually is. Which might get round Austin's objection. I'm thinking of Plato, Berkeley, Dennett and perhaps Descartes. You wouldn't know where I could find some discussion of this, would you?

I think knowledge obtained via the senses can be justified as providing an accurate picture of reality because we evolved, and could not have survived were we misled by our senses. — karl stone

On the face of it, there is something wrong here. We are frequently misled by our senses, and yet we have survived - or at least enough of us have survived.

Radical Skepticism acts like a work of fiction. A work of fiction does not make assertions to prove or disprove, the very nature of a work of fiction is an absence of any assertion about the world. There is nothing to confirm or falsify in a work of fiction. So, like a work of fiction, there is nothing to confirm or falsify in the skeptic's argument as well. — Richard B

But doesn't a work of fiction have to present something that is possibly true? The anti-sceptical arguments that I've seen aim to prove that the sceptic's conclusions are not even possibly true.

Okay, so what is the fundamental problem that you see, in your own words? — Leontiskos

Well, there are a number of issues.
Every problem in philosophy seems to have its own foundation. Which of them is fundamental? That depends on the context.
The meaning of "fundamental" is ill-defined. All too often, it is a metaphor that is never cashed out.
There seems to be an idea that, every philosophical problem can be resolved simply by identifying its foundation.
It is hard to believe that all of philosophy starts with just one foundation.
In philosophy, if you identify a foundation, you will certainly start a search for some foundation of your foundation, so foundations will never provide what you are looking for.

BTW, why did you add "... in your own words"? If a quotation answered the question, why should I not post it?

However, I am not sure I want to agree it is irrefutable, which I take to mean impossible to disprove. — Richard B

Well, technically, I was reporting what Hume said, though I admit I wasn't clear about that.

When I learnt philosophy, there was a widespread belief that scepticism had been refuted by Ryle, Wittgenstein etc. But scepticism is still ubiquitous. So my puzzle is that so many people have set out to resolve, for example, Cartesian scepticism (starting with Descartes himself) and yet it keeps coming back, like a noxious weed or the Hydra. So clearly those refutations have not sufficient purchase to put the issue to bed. Like Cavell, I am pretty sure there is something else going on here, though I don't have a defensible theory of what it is. It may be simply due to the fact that scepticism is an an initiation that very many, if not all, philosophy students are expected to go through. It's also possible that it is a phenomenon of the kind that the Harman-Vogel paradox high-lights. (That paradox turns on the fact that you can create a doubt where none exists simply by asking "Are you sure about that?".)

From my perspective, the skeptic’s argument is like a work of fiction. The main difference seems to be the intention of what is being present, one being “possibly real” and the other “make believe”. We are not trying to prove or disprove the intentions of the author, but what is being said by the author. And what is being said in both case makes no sense to even talk about proving or disproving. — Richard B

That's a very interesting take on scepticism. I get the point - a fiction needs to be "possibly real" even if it is also "make believe". Come to think of it, that's exactly how Descartes presents his method of doubt. But I don't quite see why you say both that you don't agree that the sceptic's argument is irrefutable and that it is impossible to prove or disprove. Since the sceptic is presenting the argument as a proof, doesn't that impossibility contradict or refute the assertion?

As Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus, — Richard B

I like the quotation. But doesn't it also show some of the complexity about irrefutable. In normal argumentation, demonstrating that a thesis is nonsensical is regarded as a classic refutation - reduction ad absurdum. (Note, however, that he says it is obviously nonsensical. It isn't obvious to most people.)

So, the question isn’t meaningful, it’s misguided. It treats certainty as something that needs to be justified, when in truth, certainty is what makes justification possible in the first place. — Sam26

I think we can say a little more than that.

One issue is that we can't just abandon our fundamental, taken-for-granted beliefs. Descartes, for example, sets out to doubt everything, but continues to sit comfortably by his stove, writing down his thoughts with pen on paper, believing that someone else will read them sooner or later. (Hume sums up this point by saying that the conclusions of the radical sceptic make no difference - life goes on as usual. The sceptic's argument is irrefutable, but pointless.)

When we ask ordinary questions about what is real, we ask in the question in a context that tells us what the difference is between what is real and what isn't. Asking about reality in general doesn't set a context that would enable us to answer the question.

There's a big ambiguity about the question. Macbeth famously had a hallucination of a dagger after he killed the previous king of Scotland. That dagger wasn't real, didn't exist. But when you see the bent stick in water, it exists all right, but isn't what it seems. When you see through the illusion, you see reality. Many arguments of this kind don't distinguish between the two claims.

Some philosophical theories seem to fit in between these two alternatives. Plato, Berkeley, Dennett, and modern physics don't deny the existence of common sense reality, but do assert that it is very different from what common sense thinks it is. But this seems paradoxical, because if common sense reality is so misleading, what basis can it provide for the alternative account of reality? (Berkeley, I think, was acutely aware of this paradox. Hence his protestations that he is not denying the existence of anything even though he appears to be doing exactly that.)


There's a great deal in these posts that is helpful and to the point.

But I don't think they can get round the fundamental problem, which is nicely exemplified by Husserl. Somebody earlier posted a quotation from him about his intent to start his project from scratch, in poverty, etc. It's a classic idea. Such a project might have a special status, above the fray of all the competing schools. But it's not possible, as the history of phenomenology demonstrates.

Right, this is the same question I'm raising about whether something about reference needs to be included in a list of X's properties. — J

Yes. I should have acknowledged that. Sorry.
The thing is, however, that, although the argument is, IMO, sound, it is unhelpful, because it doesn't dismisses the theory, without enabling us to dissect out the truth in what he says.

Posted prematurely. Sorry.

But, in the unlikely event that some part of this description turned out to be only a seeming -- that is, factually inaccurate -- we would say we had learned something about tigers. We wouldn't say, "Oh, that wasn't a tiger after all." — J

Yes, that's true - provided we have established that the animal in question is a tiger. But perhaps it only seems to be a tiger and the seeming we discover might amount to the discovery of that fact. For example, if we think we have discovered gold and then discover that it's specific gravity is far too low, we would say "that's not gold".

I think this is pointing to the question we've tossed around already -- whether "how a reference is fixed for X" is part of the list of X's potential properties; or whether we're mixing discourses by thinking of it that way. Can I know everything (or nothing) about X without including the reference-fixing story in my knowledge (or lack thereof)? — J

You don't need to include the reference-fixing story. But you do need to know how to refer to X. If you get that wrong, the rest collapses.

We might supose that there was a bloke names Homer, and indeed he wrote the Odyssey. But possibly, it was Kostas, his acquaintance, who did the writing, and Homer stole the text and took the credit. Now if what we mean by "Homer" is just the person answering the description "the bloke who wrote the Odyssey", when we say "Homer", we'd be referring to Kostas. Indeed, if the referent of "Homer" is fixed only by "the bloke who wrote the Odyssey", we could not coherently claim that homer did not write the Odyssey, becasue that would amount to saying that the bloke who wrote the Odyssey did not write the odyssey. — Banno

This is all playing games between the context of what we know and the context of God's view. If the only description of Homer is that he wrote the Odyssey, then this story just establishes that Homer is Kostas. But you have presupposed that there are facts about Homer and Kostas that establish them as different people. You couldn't discover that Homer stole the text and the credit unless you had already discovered that Homer and Kostas were different people.

The standard interpretation is that each rigidly designates that individual in each possible world in which that individual exists. So "a" designates a in world one, and also in world two, and so on. — Banno

And so it seems that since no property need be true of "a" in every possible world, no property need be true of a proper name in every possible world — Banno

Does this work the other way round? I mean if "a" designates an object in all possible worlds in which that object exists, is it also true that that object is designated by "a" in all possible worlds in which "a" exists. Then is there a possible world in which that object exists, but the Roman alphabet was not invented?
Similarly, if "a" necessarily designates a, can we conclude that a necessarily has the property of being designated by "a"?

Doesn't Wittgenstein's account of family resemblances dispose of this supposed problem?

Good posts on your part, by the away. Fine analytic stuff. — Banno

I'm flattered. Thank you.

Science begins with everyday observations about which we could all agree. Observations can be accurate or inaccurate, so science is correctable. Religious beliefs are not like this―because their correctness or incorrectness cannot be demonstrated.
Science begins by examining things as they present to us. The basic appearance of things in our environments is not culturally mediated, and they are present to all in a shared context so it is not a matter of merely personal experience, as it is with religious experiences. — Janus

Of course, that is just an outline of the big picture. I don't disagree with it, exactly, though there are a number of devils in various details.
But perhaps we can agree that it neatly explains why science and religion cannot conflict, doesn't it? I'm happy with that conclusion, and it seems that many people feel the same way, because they are both believers in a religion (ideology) and pursue science.
On the other hand, if "The basic appearance of things in our environments is not culturally mediated, and they are present to all in a shared context" it would seem that there is something basic that is common to both religion and science. Yet you also post "personal experience" which is not shared and it seems that you think the foundation of religion lies there. But religious lives are lived in the shared world. The difference you are identifying seems to me (roughly) a matter of interpretation, of ways of seeing.

It seems to me that the "ultimate concern" of any life governed by self-reflection is the basic ethical question "how should I Iive?" Could there be strictly empirical evidence available to guide me in answering that question? — Janus

It would be a mistake not to think that faith often involves quite prosaic and everyday matters, like whether the weather forecast is accurate. Tillich's faith is a different matter. I'm sure he's right to explain faith in terms that do not limit the scope of faith to religious faith, but identify it with decisions that lie at the heart of how we live - religious or no. I doubt that there could be strictly empirical evidence to guide us in answering these questions, because the decisions in question will affect how we interpret our experiences. But there is a common denominator - whether we can make our way through ordinary life without causing undue mayhem or causing our own misery and death.

Does it include "how to fix the reference of X"? — J

Well, I guess your argument would work, provided we can fix the reference of X without appealing to any of the properties of X. But most people would say that "tiger" refers to large striped cats that live in parts of Asia. How would you fix the reference without relying on any of the known properties of tigers?
I don't know the actual history of the discovery of black swans, but I find that case easier to think about. It is possible that the discoverers found these birds floating around on a lake somewhere and said "Oh, there's some black swans - who'd have thought it?" But they might well have asked themselves whether these black, swan-like birds were really swans at all. They would have made more detailed comparisons and come to their conclusion.
I am not arguing that there are some sacred descriptions that cannot be overturned. I am arguing that it would not be possible to overturn all the known descriptions at the same time. That is like trying to saw off the branch you are sitting on - success would be catastrophic.