I've been dithering about whether to get back into this. I've been looking for a way to do so without simply playing partisan to one side. — Srap Tasmaner

Well we owe you, because the thread is in need of such a thing. :up:

The conflict here is certainly about (1). — Srap Tasmaner

I agree.

I would like to see this approached as an open question, but I'd like to frame it in a particular way, as a question about (1), upon which we all agree. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, so we are searching for a question...

That's close enough to what I have in mind, only I'd throw in every sort of framework, worldview, evidence regime (or whatever it's called, Joshs has mentioned this), and so on. If you like, you could even throw in language-games. — Srap Tasmaner

So now we are asking, "Are there [paradigm/framework/worldview/evidence regime/language game/scheme]-independent standards?"

Is that the question you want to ask?

I thought "context" was too broad, and I am similarly worried that your question is too broad. I think I vaguely understand what you mean, though. When talking about this "question" (it is questionable whether it is a single question), I will try to use a single term to help us keep to the same page.

In the thread we have been talking about whether there is some criterion which applies to all ("scientific") fields, rather than only to a subset of them. I think that question is more manageable, but we can ask many. I am not averse to questions.

So here's how I would want to address question (2): is there some mechanism available for prying yourself out of a given scheme/worldview/framework, and is that mechanism the use of reason? We might see this as a step required for the change or evolution of a worldview (though not the only way), or as a mechanism for shifting from one paradigm to another, Kuhn be damned. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, so the premise here is that I'm stuck and I need to be pried out?

I haven't read Kuhn's book either, but perhaps we're asking if there is some common thread between the two paradigms in which the shift is effected.

So there are two ways it could be anchored to issue (1): either (a) as what connects one thingy (worldview, framework, conceptual scheme) to another, or changes a thingy noticeably; or (b) as something that enables you to free yourself entirely from the false prison of all thingies. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. We could also say (c) that there is some standard that is being followed both before and after the paradigm shift. A standard that is not affected by the paradigm shift. This is like (a) but it abandons the premise of prying out what is stuck.

I want to add that it seems clear to me that the project of the Enlightenment hoped that reason could pull off (b), and much follows in its train (reason is the birthright of all, no one need ever again be beholden to another in areas of knowledge, and so on). — Srap Tasmaner

Right.

So is it possible to set aside all worldviews, frameworks, and schemes, by the use of reason? (To achieve, in that much-reviled phrase, a "view from nowhere".) Is reason the crucial means by which one jettisons the current framework for a new one? Or is there something other than reason that can allow such transition or liberation? — Srap Tasmaner

What if we give our preliminary answers to the questions on the table before proceeding? Would that be a bad idea? Here is a collection of the questions:

• Q1. Are there context-independent standards?
• Old2. Are there context-dependent standards?
• Q2. Is there some mechanism available for prying yourself out of a given scheme/worldview/framework, and is that mechanism the use of reason?
• Q3. Is there some criterion which applies to all ("scientific") fields, rather than only to a subset of them?
• Q4. Are there [paradigm/framework/worldview/evidence regime/language game/scheme]-independent standards?
• Q5. Is there something that connects one thingy (worldview, framework, conceptual scheme) to another?
• Q6. Is there something that enables you to free yourself entirely from the false prison of all thingies?
• Q7. Is there some standard that is being followed both before and after a paradigm shift?

My preliminary answers, to the best of my ability and in a yes/no format:

• Q1. Yes, depending on what is meant by 'context'.
• Old2. Yes.
• Q2. Yes, and it will involve but not be exhausted by reason.
• Q3. Yes.
• Q4. Yes...ish. (yes/yes/eh/yes/yes/yes)
• Q5. Yes. (yes/yes/yes)
• Q6. No, even if we omit "the false prison of."
• Q7. Yes.

It's not some principle that leads to knowledge, but repeated, open, communal discussion. — Banno

Where do you suppose principles come from?

As for a principle in mind in between . . . once again, for what field of discourse, for what practice? — J

This whole approach is misguided, namely your idea that we need to look at one single field. The whole question is about overarching relations, both of the whole and between fields. Zooming in on one field will never answer such a question. Looking at an isolated part will never tell you about the whole qua whole, nor will it tell you about relations between parts. This appeal to look at a single field in isolation is another prelude to evasion.

The thing is, once you acknowledge that there are perhaps intermediate, context-derived principles or standards . . . there's little left to disagree about! That's all I've been saying. You've seemed to fall back so often on "either we have an absolute, context-independent standard in all cases, or it's random chaos!" that I had to keep trying to draw attention to the middle ground. — J

There are two questions:

1. Are there context-independent standards?
2. Are there context-dependent standards?

You have refused to answer the first question for 17 pages. Every time you are asked about the first question you dodge and start talking about the second question.

I'm sure you know what I'm going to say!: "Brownian motion" as the only alternative here is yet another either/or binary, about as useful as "absolute" and "arbitrary." Couldn't we allow that something in between is more characteristic of how such practices actually work? — J

Getting you to answer questions is like pulling teeth. That's why a theory like "Brownian motion" has to be postulated. Because you won't give honest answers to simple questions.

The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Following this:

Since this word "arbitrary" has come up so consistently, I'm wondering if possibly some of us are using it to mean different things. But I'm going to use it to mean "not based on any particular reasons; like a throw of the dice." On that understanding, I would answer the second question this way: "It doesn't, but if the discipline is longstanding and has smart, experienced practitioners, quite quickly the demand for good reasons will channel the discussion away from arbitrary and unfounded practices. Furthermore, just about no one presents their views in this way." — J

Right, so this is an appeal to a sort of virtue epistemology. Virtues are principles, so I can get behind that. However, I don't think "smart" and "experienced," are necessarily good virtues here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why do you see this as a virtue epistemology? Here is what I think is required for a virtue epistemology in the way you are intending:

1. Intersubjective agreement grounds knowledge.
2. Virtuous classes will more reliably produce knowledge intersubjectively.
3. We ought to be virtuous; or we ought to look to the virtuous class and not the non-virtuous class.

It looks like @J accepts (1) and (2) but not (3), and without (3) I don't think you have virtue epistemology. @J presumably wouldn't admit that the virtuous class is better than the non-virtuous class, given that this would require an "over-arching standard."

It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of this sort of thing:

And stretching a point, you can even call this authoritarian: If you say otherwise on a test, the teacher will flunk you! But there's nothing pernicious about any of this. It comes with the territory of an accepted formal system. — J

Is it authoritarian or isn't it? And is authoritarianism pernicious or isn't it? Do you see how you are unable to answer such simple questions? — Leontiskos

When someone uses evaluative terms but claims to be using them in a value-neutral way, you're in trouble. This is true whether the evaluative terms are positive ("virtue") or negative ("authoritarianism"). The person who talks about the non-pernicious authoritarianism is manipulating language in a very problematic way.

This is another way to understand why it is fraught to simply assume that @J is doing "virtue epistemology." Virtue epistemology takes for granted the normativity that @J is vacillating on.

I don't think that's accurate. The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. It isn't against argument and reasons, it just denies overarching standards for them, or even general principles. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But what does it mean to not be against arguments and reasons but deny overarching standards? Isn't rationality itself an overarching standard? I certainly couldn't be for squirrels but against mammals, given that squirrels are mammals.

I agree with most of your post, but I don't think it contradicts what I've said. Granted, I was trying to give a sort of microcosm of the reasoning, so that probably needs sussing out. For example:

The difficulty I see is different. First, a very robust pluralism insulates claims from challenge. This is sort of the opposite of democratization; it's atomization. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note that the position I set out both insulates claims from challenge and results in atomization. I don't think either are incompatible with democratization. So this is an example of how I think you are right and yet it does not clash with what I've said.

But let's look at a place where it might clash:

But that's very different from excluding reasons. Reasons are discussed. I suppose though that reasons arguably lose their purchase without any clear principles. "You're just engaged in post hoc rationalization, political bias, appeals to emotion, contradicting yourself, your premises are false, your argument isn't logically valid," etc. doesn't necessarily work as a "reason" if these are not considered to be illegitimate in general, but only illegitimate on a case by case basis. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's right, and we could revise 3 so that it doesn't exclude reason-giving, but instead excludes certain forms of reason-giving. I want to say that however we devise 3, it will eschew strong attempts to rationally influence others. As I tried to illustrate with the more- and less-grievous transgressions, at some point a line will be drawn, and that line will have everything to do with the Expectation of Rational Bindingness (ERB). Someone who thinks that rationality binds us and that we ought to be persuaded by (good) arguments will have a higher ERB. Someone who thinks that rationality does not bind us and who disagrees that we ought to be persuaded by arguments—however good—will have a lower ERB. They will also differ on whether and to what extent good and bad arguments exist in the first place.

To give an example, someone who gives an argument and expects their interlocutor to be persuaded by the argument will tend to have a higher ERB than someone who gives an argument but doesn't really expect their interlocutor to be persuaded. And a moral realist will have a higher ERB than a moral non-realist by definition, at least with respect to moral arguments and claims.

In @J's utopia everyone has relatively low ERBs, and therefore the intentional strength of arguments will be limited. Combative argumentation will be non-existent, given that no one has a strong sense of the bindingness of rationality or of their own arguments.

Rule 3 is merely a limit case which illustrates the asymptote. If someone prefers that everyone have a low ERB, and there are no limiting factors on that preference, then they will prefer rule 3. But there will of course be values that are in competition with that preference:

I am saying that if something is incoherent, then there must be two parts that can be shown to fail to cohere. — Leontiskos

So if someone wants a world with low ERBs, but they also want a world where people reason together, then the asymptote of rule 3 will not be ideal. (This is literally one of the fundamental conflicts in @J's thought).

But the reason I don't think much of what you said conflicted with what I said, is because the motivations that you identify are largely all consistent with the motive for a low overall ERB. For example, the desire for there being, "No way to exclude anyone," is, "different from the desire for excluding reasons," but it is not inconsistent with the desire for excluding reasons, and both are bound up with the desire for a low overall ERB.

The wrinkle in what I am saying is that the desire for a low overall ERB is not an end in itself, and therefore it must be instrumental to some further end. Nevertheless, this is part of the problem with @J's approach, namely that it conflates means and ends, and is not able to identify its own ends. Further, the democratic paradigm seems obvious and invasive. I would want to say that the atomization and the restrictions on reason are part and parcel of that democratic paradigm, and are not opposed to it.

Moliere has given us the best example here. If falsifying your data and lying isn't always bad discourse, but only bad on a case by case basis, then the response to "you just faked that data," can plausibly be: "sure, so what?" So to for "your premises are false," or "your argument is not logically valid." And yet, if there are no general principles, these would presumably have to be appropriate in at least some cases.

But I do not think J and @Banno are likely to agree on that one. I have to imagine that "it isn't ok to just make up fake evidence to support your claims," is going to be something most people can agree upon, granted that, on the anti-realist view that good argument is simply that which gets agreement, and all knowledge claims are simply power battles, it's hard to see how justify this since it would seem that faking data is fine just so long as it works. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good point. @Banno would agree that falsifying data is impermissible, and is not good practice vis-á-vis inquiry. I'm not sure whether @J would agree. He would doubtless avoid giving a clear answer. He would certainly not disagree, as @Moliere did.

But in reality anyone who holds to a firm rational standard such as this is evincing a high ERB with respect to that standard in question. So a clear and consistent @J would say, "We must strive for low ERBs, with the exception of things like the falsification of data." This is parallel to Popper's idea that, "We need to be tolerant except for when we don't." What is occurring is a clash of two different values or standards, and what is required is an attempt at reconciling the two conflicting values. In this thread we have seen a refusal to try to reconcile the two values or even recognize them, and this makes it easy to vacillate between the two (or three, or four...) in an ad hoc way.

Thoughts? — tom111

Good post.

I would add that logic is ineluctable, to a certain extent. If someone tries to be altogether illogical they will fail. Their unconscious mind is logical, and often moreso than their conscious mind. This is part of why emotions and intuitions posses an intrinsic logic, and can be unraveled.

There is no need for appeals to authority because the answer can be made obvious. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I muse, I want to say that for @J and the intersubjectivists/democrats, knowledge is conceived as a kind of democratic vote. These are the rules for how knowledge is generated:

1. We ask a question.
2. Everyone gets one vote, and only one vote.
3. One must simply vote. It is not permitted to give reasons alongside one's vote.
4. Whichever position wins the most votes wins the "knowledge election."

Obviously on this democratic view everyone is perfectly equal, and therefore there is absolutely no "authoritarianism." Rule 3 may seem odd at first, but I think someone like @J or @Moliere actually sees reason-giving or argument-giving as illegal, because it gives one person more power than the others. After all, if one reason or argument is more compelling than others, then the person wielding that reason or argument will effectively have a greater say over the final outcome. They would have "more votes" to cast, so to speak, and this would make the process undemocratic. This inequality would be inimical to intersubjective agreement conceived in a democratic fashion.

This would explain why @J is so particularly opposed to demonstrations, i.e. arguments from foundational premises. Demonstrations are characteristically strong arguments, and therefore create even more inequality than a mere argument. The point more generally is that rule 3 can be more grievously or less grievously transgressed. A demonstration is a grievous transgression of rule 3. A simple argument is less grievous. A mere opinion less grievous still. Least grievous of all would be the waffling claim:

I think maybe position Z could possibly be a slight bit better than the other positions on offer, even though all the positions are very beautiful and very true and very thoughtful. All the positions are equal, but I just have an inkling of a sensation that position Z might be more equal than the other positions. ...In my ever so very humble opinion!

...we might even be able to allow this sort of waffling assertion, given that it is such a mild transgression of rule 3.

On this view mathematics is not a problem, not because it trades in objective arguments, but rather because everyone agrees when it comes to mathematics. We only look at the votes, and the mathematical vote is unanimous. Thus we don't really care whether people give arguments for mathematical positions, given that it isn't a close race. That some people are effectively "casting more votes" than others isn't a big concern given that a few votes won't sway the election.

Contrariwise, on @J's subjectivist view music is also not a problem, because it is a matter of taste. It is not a matter of knowledge and therefore no vote needs to be taken, and we know that it is not a matter of knowledge because if a vote were taken there would be no clear winner (petitio principii).

The real problem for @J comes in fields where the vote is contested, and this is precisely what we would expect from a theory of intersubjective-democratic knowledge. It is the same problem that most besets democracies. For example, in the field of ethics there are strong coalitions and substantial pluralities, and what this means is that the race is close. In mathematics the race is not close so we don't need to worry about cheaters who violate rule 3. In ethics the race is close and we really do need to keep an eye on cheaters who violate rule 3. Thus particular attention and effort must be expended to make sure that no one gives arguments—much less persuasive or strong arguments!—when it comes to fields like ethics, politics, etc. It is precisely in those areas that we must put a particular emphasis on the democratic dogma, "All positions are intrinsically equal. We will vote to decide, but it is impermissible give arguments alongside one's vote. The giving of arguments presupposes that not all positions are intrinsically equal."

(Obviously this whole conception ignores the reason mathematics generates more consensus than matters of taste do, but I think this sort of reasoning really is at play in @J's worldview.)

Making everyone equal does not prevent learning. — Moliere

You don't give any arguments for that assertion. Be that as it may, I will give you another argument for my own position.

If I am to learn something from another person, then I must see that that person knows something that I do not know. If someone knows something that I do not know, then we are not equal. He knows more than me, and therefore has more knowledge than I do. Our knowledge is not equal, particularly on the matter under consideration.

You are probably wanting to appeal to this:

We can't "make everyone equal" in the factual sense, but we can treat everyone equally in the evaluative sense. — Moliere

This is incoherent, although it is hard for the Western liberal to understand. Suppose I gave you two pieces of wood and said, "Make them equal, not in the factual sense, but in the evaluative sense." This is just hand-waving.

If I see that someone has knowledge that I do not have, then they are not my equal (with respect to the knowledge in question). They might be my equal in some other way. They might be the same height as I am, for instance. But they are not my equal in knowledge, which is precisely what we are talking about. My inferiors might possess knowledge that I do not have, but they will be less likely to possess it on any given occasion than my superiors. That is why I pay more attention to my superiors.

Here I'd be frustrating and say both/and — Moliere

Then you've contradicted yourself again. You've said it's true but not truer than anything else, so to speak.

Eventually we'll disagree again on this. — Moliere

So do you think it is coherent to say, "X is good, Y is bad, and X is not superior to Y"?

Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false. — Leontiskos

That's a good example, but not one I'm ready to go into in this thread. I'll concede that knowledge is true for the most part. It's that "for the most part" that I imagine we'll disagree. But I also think that so far out there that it'd take us so far astray as to start a new thread of thought. — Moliere

I said, "Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false." Apparently you think that sometimes, "Knowledge is supposed to be false and not true." I think that's crazy, but we can leave it for another day, as you say.

We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. — Leontiskos

I know this is a standard way of looking at the world, especially as a teacher. — Moliere

I gave an argument and you basically appealed to your "equality doctrine" and classed it as, "A standard way of looking at the world" - that as a way of dismissing or marginalizing it. What you should do instead is address the argument.

<If we view everyone as equal then we are prevented from learning, because we are prevented from seeing that someone else knows something we do not.>

I have to accept that I must be a student in order to learn from a teacher here. In the extreme: If I did not do so then every post would be part of my belief system. I think that's the sort of thing you've been noting as bad: where the standards are so loose that you can say anything at all to anyone at all at anytime for whatever reason.

Hopefully, in this description, you see I agree that's a problem. — Moliere

Okay, but is it true to view it as a problem or is such a view merely, "A standard way of looking at the world"?

Oh, I have no problem with people wanting to differentiate between the good and the bad. We have to at some point, right? Else we'll get stuck in paralysis. — Moliere

Okay good, this is precisely the point. "Superior" and "inferior" are relative terms for "good" and "bad." It is literally impossible to differentiate between good and bad without differentiating between superior and inferior.

I only think that in so deciding we don't express something so universal as "Standards of knowledge for all time and space and thinkers" -- seems a stretch now. A tempting stretch, but a stretch nonetheless. — Moliere

It's actually pretty obvious that there are universal standards for knowledge. Like truth, for instance. Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false. That's a standard for knowledge. What is the dogma that militates against such obvious facts?

Earlier I said something about the teacher-student relationship -- mostly to note that on TPF we have to start at a position of equality even if you know you know more than the interloctor.

We are all equal here, and have to build ways of learning/teaching from that paradigm, rather than the usual paradigm. — Moliere

Let me repeat this:

If one does not recognize that not every position is equally correct, then they cannot learn anything, they cannot know anything, and they are by definition not teachable. — Leontiskos

If we do not admit that knowledge exists, that some things are right, and that some things are wrong, then we have banished ourselves to ignorance.

We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. Democratic culture balks at the words "inferior" and "superior," but they are apt and useful words. Some of my philosophical superiors on TPF would include Paine, apokrisis, and Pierre-Normand. If you look at my discussions with them you will see that I am very deferential and open-minded; that I am much more careful and precise in my reasoning. That discrimination between superiors, inferiors, and equals is very important if one is to progress. This is why @J discriminates between professional philosophers and non-professional philosophers. He sees that the former have more to teach him than the latter, and hence demand a more docile and teachable disposition.

Note too that if @Count Timothy von Icarus and I were either "monists" or pluralists, then would be unable to accept my criticism and improve his paper. He could not have learned anything new if he hadn't presupposed that not everything is equally correct. In that case his paper would never be able to increase or decrease in quality. One sentence would be as good as any other. Recognizing the fact of intellectual inequality is indispensable for everyone who is interested in the intellectual life. Those near the bottom of the totem pole are most tempted to reject this fact, and this is why such people are in special need of humility.

(I've made this reasoning more precise in previous posts, such as <this one>.)

That'd be a rule which I agree with that I wouldn't want to do. That is, I'd say putting yourself on a pedestal is a bad thing -- where I somehow gain immunity to criticism and you somehow are more vulnerable to criticism. — Moliere

That you grant yourself the ability to contradict yourself while denying others the ability to contradict themselves would be one example.

What instruction do I require? What would that do, other than make me agree with you? — Moliere

These are the words of every headstrong student to their teacher. This mindset is precisely what precludes learning and knowledge.

I require instruction, and there are many places I can go for it. If one does not recognize that not every position is equally correct, then they cannot learn anything, they cannot know anything, and they are by definition not teachable.

Does foundationalism and completeness lead to authoritarianism? I've considered that it might be precisely the opposite. Consider that one almost never sees appeals to authority in basic arithmetic. If there is disagreement, it is almost always over ambiguous notation. But one never needs to appeal to one's job title, involvement in practice, virtues, etc. in justifying the answer to 6 × 87 or 112 ÷ 8. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No one tries to control what they know cannot be controlled. Thus a tyrant will generally not try to control mathematics, given that mathematics is so hard to manipulate. Granted, we see the tyrants of Critical Theory trying to do precisely that, but the move is still uncommon. Along the same lines, we saw the Soviet Communists try to do similar things in relation to dialectical materialism.

But on the whole a tyrant will limit themselves to manipulating what can be manipulated, and fields with clear and transparent standards are more difficult to manipulate. So I think your thesis here is basically correct. This is closely related to what I said here:

This is a broader problem, in that, on TPF, discussions of ethics or politics or metaphysics are usually wholesale irrational. The current state of philosophy is incapable of addressing such topics in a rational manner. That's why the threads on logic or mathematics or reference are so popular: because they represent that small slice of reality where the Western mind can still manage to engage in rational thought. — Leontiskos

For example, engaging earnestly in moral philosophy requires being willing to change one's behavior, but given that few are willing to change their behavior and question their status quo, it follows that few are able to truly engage in moral philosophy. More simply: the tyrannous passions within us make it difficult to do moral philosophy objectively.

Does foundationalism and completeness lead to authoritarianism? I've considered that it might be precisely the opposite. Consider that one almost never sees appeals to authority in basic arithmetic. If there is disagreement, it is almost always over ambiguous notation. But one never needs to appeal to one's job title, involvement in practice, virtues, etc. in justifying the answer to 6 × 87 or 112 ÷ 8. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, good. This is why I wouldn't have used the word "authority" in sentences like this one:

But to suppose that metaphysics, ethics, politics, etc. is not like engineering, medicine, military science, etc., i.e. that it has no proper authority, or that its measure is man and not the subject matter, is extremely consequential. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The more generic term would be rule or criterion, where an authority is one type of criterion.

There is no need for appeals to authority because the answer can be made obvious. You can, if you really want, separate 112 beans into groups of 8. It is clear when the emperor wears no clothes. Whereas appeals to standing practice and consensus open to door to authoritarianism precisely because authority can manufacture both of these. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is a notion floating about that authoritarianism has to do with appeals to authority. I don't think that's right. I think authoritarianism has to do with tyranny, as @Fire Ologist pointed out. An appeal to authority is a form of argumentation. Tyrants do not care about argumentation.

Whereas appeals to standing practice and consensus open to door to authoritarianism precisely because authority can manufacture both of these. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hmm. There is circular reasoning here. If appeals to consensus lead to authoritarianism, and authorities manufacture appeals to consensus, then the authority must have existed even before the appeal to consensus occurred. We can't say that the first causes the second and the second causes the first. Even if we posit a spiraling up, it has to start somewhere. I think you need to replace "authority" with "power."

More directly, as Aristotle says, a democracy can be tyrannous. Appeal to consensus can be tyrannous ("authoritarian") when the consensus absolutizes itself. This is closely related to the subset of arguments from authority that are fallacious.

Note that when @J or @Janus ground truth in intersubjective agreement they are absolutizing consensus in precisely this way.

I think you're rather missing my point, but this is quite common for you -- if you can't understand why someone would say something then you conclude that they must be incoherent.

But it could be that you just don't understand someone, and they only appear incoherent to you. — Moliere

No, your position is by definition incoherent. I outlined it <here>.

Let me be frank. The fundamental problem for you and @J is that you overestimate yourselves. You put yourselves on a pedestal when in fact you require instruction. The student who fashions himself a teacher is a huge liability both to himself and to others. He would do better to doubt his own ability, recognize that he does not understand and is unable to answer the questions being posed to him, and then don the habit of the novice. Instead of appealing to contradictory senses of the Liar's Paradox every time he finds himself in trouble, he should say, "I don't know. I don't have a good answer to your question. But I recognize the question and will think about it. I see how it creates problems for the position I laid out. I am not going to give a superficial and reactionary response in three seconds."

This is at the bottom of @J's tirade about authoritarianism. He doesn't want us to take professional philosophers seriously; he wants us to take himself seriously. He wants recognition and respect without doing the work of earning it, and his various threads on Kimhi and Rodl have stymied his achievement of that recognition. So after everyone agreed that so many of those threads went nowhere and were not worthwhile, @J pivots to the general rule for the sake of his own particularity, "We have to take everyone seriously! We have to deem every position worthwhile!"

The irony here is that people see the positions of novices as worthwhile, as long as the person recognizes that their own position is that of a novice. But if a novice who constantly contradicts themselves, fails to respond to objections, fails to correctly interpret texts, etc., is also arrogant and demanding of respect, then obviously their positions are not deemed worthwhile. Superficiality with a potency for improvement is deemed worthwhile; prideful superficiality which is incapable of self-critique and self-knowledge is not.

This is all true even though the tu quoque will inevitably come. It will be said that this all applies to me. I admit that I am not a "professional" philosopher, but the spectrum still holds. I have a degree in philosophy and I have done graduate work in philosophy. I am intermediate. Most crucially, I accept that I cannot contradict myself and I respond to questions and objections as stated. And it is worth noting that I do not group @Banno with @Moliere and @J. Banno really is not a novice in that way.

Here come the tu quoque replies.

They are logically questionable. They attack the person, not the claim. They shift focus from argument to biography. But mostly, tu quoque's a continuation of that very authoritarianism — Banno

Not only is this a misunderstanding of tu quoque, it is an invidious attempt to pre-invalidate any replies that might come.

You are being lazy. You are avoiding philosophical argumentation. You answer @Count Timothy von Icarus with one-sentence posts and you don't even attempt to try to answer me. You'd rather share short quips in your echo chamber, with those who agreed with you before the thread even started. There are a half-dozen posts in the last few pages that you haven't even attempted to address.

So falsifying your data so that you can gain fame and wealth is can sometimes good practice vis-á-vis good inquiry? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yup. Only sometimes. — Moliere

*Sigh*

But at least you're willing to be consistent in the position and bite bullets.

I’d be allowed to treat the witness as hostile to the court.

And then the Judge would force you to answer “are all narratives acceptable or not?” The most liberal progressive judge would demand, “in my court, on my record, nothing proceeds until you answer, or the charge that you say ‘all narratives may be true’ stands. You swore to tell the truth in my court and now we see you can still say anything you want, possibly giving no meaning to the ‘truth’ you swore, since you won’t answer the question and think it doesn’t matter.” — Fire Ologist

It is very gratifying to see this. There has been an unfortunate level of gaslighting in this thread, where the tyrannous accuse others of tyranny, and those who are not willing to engage in argumentation accuse others of irrationality. That's how it always goes, but it is still unfortunate to see @Count Timothy von Icarus, who is a hallmark of earnest engagement, saying things like this while consulting ChatGPT:

But I don't think I'm being unreasonable. If you throw J's epistemic position into Chat GPT it identifies all the same issues I did, plus some others (although these seem ancillary to me). I don't think it is biased towards "foundationalism" or "infallibility"... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Moral of the story: when the guy accusing you of authoritarianism is not willing to offer answers to questions repeatedly asked, you don't have to worry about his accusations. The charges of authoritarianism in this thread are little more than an attempt to get what one wants without engaging in any reasoning or argument at all.

As a lawyer, at work in the real world... — Fire Ologist

This is so interesting! Naivete among those who work in the real world, such as yourself, is very rare.

Answer the simple question. Whatever the answer is, I’m not seeing it, and neither is Count or Leon.

If the answer is, “there is no truth, we know nothing absolutely, so the context in which every opinion sits can never be certified or ultimately proven certain, and so the value of every opinion is as arbitrary as the next one,” then so be it. Tell me that. That’s what I am paying for. Something that hangs together that we can try to apply and show the value of in the real world. — Fire Ologist

:up: :fire:

Who is behaving like a tyrant, answering to no one in this debate? — Fire Ologist

I have been thinking the same thing. If "authoritarianism" is naturally interpreted as "tyranny," then the ones who are refusing to answer questions and refusing provide argumentation are clearly engaged in a form of tyranny. Imposing a thesis on others without rational substantiation, and without addressing their concerns, could be the definition of tyranny.

I would have an easy time convincing a majority of people that you and Banno are dodging the issues and questions.

I’d be allowed to treat the witness as hostile to the court. — Fire Ologist

It's true. A respect for charity cannot prevent us from seeing reality, from acknowledging that evasive dodging does happen, and that it is happening left and right in this thread.

Non-arbitrariness should now be the anchor (or unknown “X” we keep in mind). We are all trying to say how non-arbitrariness is a possibility, because we all agree and have said in one way or another, arbitrariness is bad. — Fire Ologist

A good common cause. :up:


That was an enlightening post. I had been thinking to myself for some time, "@Fire Ologist seems like he is somewhat new to philosophy. I don't think he has studied it formally or anything like that. Still, he has a remarkable knack for getting things right and seeing through the smokescreens, even on a forum where lots of people are blowing smoke. That's pretty difficult to do. I wonder how he does it? I wonder if he can maintain it?"

Now I see the answers to the questions I was asking in my head. :wink:

CC: @Count Timothy von Icarus

Seems like “in context” is meant to do the same work as “in truth, or absolutely”, all of these to avoid arbitrariness.

But we can ask of the context type limiter, “by virtue of what did you determine the context”, or “can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)?” Context identification immediately begs these questions. Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, we are still in a world of arbitrariness. (Which I believe is basically what Count, Leon and I are saying). — Fire Ologist

Good point. We could say, "If the contexts are just gerrymandered..." — Leontiskos

I think @Fire Ologist's notion of context carving or gerrymandering is apt and insightful. This sort of thing seems central to @J's argumentation.

This is the analogue of gerrymandering:

• @J: Everyone in this geographical area voted for John.
• @Objector: But what about all the people in that area who voted for Jane?
• @J: I am arbitrarily limiting my domain to that part of the geographical area with high concentrations of John-voters.
• @Objector: But that's gerrymandering. You had your conclusion ahead of time, and then you hand-picked a methodology that would validate your pre-determined conclusion. This is post hoc rationalization, not good philosophy.

Here are some concrete ways @J relies on gerrymandering:

• @J: We have to take everyone's claims seriously.
• @Objector: But not everyone is serious. Some people are unserious. Your thesis does not account for the fact that not everyone is serious.
• @J: Well I am arbitrarily limiting my domain to serious people, like professional philosophers.
• @Objector: If all you were saying is that we should take serious people seriously then it is nothing more than a tautology. Your initial claim was not a tautology: it was about everyone, not just serious people.

• @J: There is no right and wrong, good and bad, when it comes to music.
• @Objector: But everyone admits that some music is good and some music is bad, and that some noises are music while others are not.
• @J: Well I am arbitrarily limiting my domain to music that is good. For example, I want to compare Beethoven to Hummel. I don't want to talk about that horrendous singer from American Idol.
• @Objector: This is gerrymandering. If you want to arrive at the conclusion that all music is on a par, then it makes sense that you would scout ahead and sweep all of the bad music under the rug, so that no one can see any counterexamples to your thesis. But this is bad philosophy. It is jury rigging a sample to fit your predetermined conclusion.

@J does the same thing with other concepts, such as "reasonable," "valid," "equally true," etc.

Put differently, there are two theses:

1. Every professional philosopher [deserves a hearing].
2. Everyone [deserves a hearing] (including everyone on TPF).

Which thesis is J's? He keeps equivocating and vacillating between (1) and (2). He begins with (2), and then switches over to (1) when he fails to justify (2), and then after justifying (1) he switches back, pretending as if he has succeeded in justifying (2).

Note that [deserves a hearing] could be replaced with any of the other normative concepts under consideration. Whatever the normative concept, @J's equivocal arguments are the same. — Leontiskos

I don't think it's a coincidence that Tim and Leon are so adamantly disagreeing with the idea that one can coherently maintain an agnostic position. — Banno

Neither of us have said that. The strawman has been chugging for so long that it must be rather bored by now. :lol:

Nevertheless:

I thinks the questions can be separated. — J

Banno is partially right, perhaps only by accident.

In order to posit overarching relations between a set of things, that set of things must have some common ground. The theistic notion of God represents a common cause, which establishes common ground among all (created) things. In other words, only if you have a reason to posit some form of common ground between all things do you have warrant to draw all things together under certain notions, relations, truths, etc. God would provide one way to do that, among others.

This is why, for instance, Newman argued that theology is the central discipline within a university (and historically it was). It is the overarching thing that relates to all other things, because it studies The One who unites all things under one heading. Without that central gravitational body the disciplines will fly off into space, unconnected and unconcerned with one another, each in their own self-contained and insular boxes. Without that central gravitational pull you end up with all specialists and no generalists, where the specialists become unable to talk to anyone outside their field.

Expertise is demonstrable within the sciences and practical matters in general. How could expertise of a purported religious authority be demonstrated? — Janus

Don't we have lots of threads where this question would be more on topic? It doesn't seem related to the things that have been discussed here.

Edit: It seems like your brain is still in the "What is faith" thread, where you were concerned with these exact same issues.

You said that if a statement is ruled out, it is denied. — Banno

And that seems right. Are you claiming that we could simultaneously claim that a statement is both undecided and ruled out? It seems odd to say that an undecided statement should be ruled out.

and thirdly sometimes we can say that we don't know it's truth value, and that doing so does not, as your statement quoted above implies, lead immediately to "anything goes". — Banno

I don't see @Count Timothy von Icarus saying, "If someone says that they don't know the truth value of a statement, then anything goes."

Note the quote you identify:

Well, in ruling out, "anything goes," you are denying some positions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And note your interpretation:

You said that if a statement is ruled out, it is denied. — Banno

I don't understand that interpretation (even though I think the content of it is true). What @Count Timothy von Icarus said in that quote was, "If not just anything goes, then some things are denied." Or in the second person, "If you agree that we cannot say that anything goes, then you must be denying some positions." This is back to the Square of Opposition, namely:

• Not (Every S is P)
• Therefore, (Some S is not P)

Or specifically and literally:

• Not (Every thing goes)
• Therefore, (Some things do not go)

@Count Timothy von Icarus is correct. If you deny <every thing goes>, then you must admit that <some things do not go>. This is different from saying, "if a statement is ruled out, it is denied," although that seems obvious enough. It is also different from saying, "If someone says that they don't know the truth value of a statement, then anything goes."

I see the focus on undecided propositions as needlessly complicating the picture. Even so, it introduces modal notions. What I would say is that affirming some proposition as undecided is not enough to allow you to deny <every thing goes>. If I deny <every thing goes>, then I must have decided that some thing does not go.

The only thing I can see against Count's quote is a quibble. It is that, "I might say that there are things that do not go, but that no one engages in those things, and therefore I do not deny any live positions even while denying possible positions."

That said, here with Tim and Leon, we seem to be dealing with arguments for authority. Could such arguments stand without also allowing arguments from authority to stand? — Janus

Lots of false inferences going on here. With that said:

Is not the 'argument from authority' generally (and rightly) considered to be a fallacious argument in philosophy, or at least contemporary philosophy? — Janus

See:

9. The ad verecundiam fallacy concerns appeals to authority or expertise. Fundamentally, the fallacy involves accepting as evidence for a proposition the pronouncement of someone who is taken to be an authority but is either not really an authority or a relevant authority. This can happen when non-experts parade as experts in fields in which they have no special competence—when, for example, celebrities endorse commercial products or social movements. Similarly, when there is controversy, and authorities are divided, it is an error to base one’s view on the authority of just some of them. — The Core Fallacies | SEP

(Note too that by appealing to SEP I am already using an argument from authority, namely SEP's authority.)

That the dissectors disagree with themselves is only consistent with dissection and disagreement and difference :D — Moliere

But only up to a point, because if two people have very little in common by way of approach, then they are not doing the same thing. Banno has made clear that he is interested in coherence:

My aim, in writing on these forums, and in applying the analytic tools we have at hand, is to achieve some measure of coherence. — Banno

In that sense, coherence—not completeness—is my measure of success. — Banno

Mysticism presents as a desire to leap from the aporia to a conclusion, to complete the dialogue.

But it does so at the risk of losing coherence. — Banno

So again, we might prefer coherence to completeness. — Banno

So if @Moliere contradicts/"dissects" despite his own incoherence, and @Banno contradicts/dissects for the sake of coherence, then I would say that the two of you are doing significantly different things.

-

- The errors of liberalism would eventually come to light right alongside the errors of the OP, namely as a one-sided and myopic approach. In fact folks of all different persuasions are able to recognize the one-sided individualism of liberalism (as the recent essay contest shows). But the thread isn't there yet, and championing liberalism before the thread naturally arrives at the topic would surely be premature.

But we can ask of the context type limiter, “by virtue of what did you determine the context”, or “can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)?” Context identification immediately begs these questions. Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, we are still in a world of arbitrariness. (Which I believe is basically what Count, Leon and I are saying). — Fire Ologist

Good point. We could say, "If the contexts are just gerrymandered, then why think their various modes of practice are respectable or coherent?" If the contexts are not merely gerrymandered, then there must be some reason why one context requires one mode of practice and another context requires another mode of practice.

But really, if we are all agreeing with each other that arbitrariness is bad, and arguing over whether that which prevents arbitrariness is better framed as either ‘an absolute’ or ‘a context’, maybe we should pause on the distinction between absolute truth and context, and not keep trying to distinguish what happens to arbitrariness as between context defined statements versus absolutely defined statements. — Fire Ologist

Similarly: Is arbitrariness bad in every context, or only in some contexts? This whole conversation is shot through with overarching context-predications. "Arbitrariness" is one such example.

However, to me, the first step in solving a problem is admitting it. Arbitrariness is no use to anyone - how do we avoid it? — Fire Ologist

If we all agree that arbitrariness is beyond the pale, then it looks like we're all "authoritarians" who ultimately deny arbitrariness a hearing.

I like your framing of "arbitrariness," though, because it's really not something we need to worry about, IMO. — J

It's no coincidence that @J thinks we "do not need to worry about" all of the crucial parts of the discussion. He should ask himself if arbitrary explanations are considered bad in all disciplines, or only in some. He should ask himself whether his dictum, "We must always recognize that we could be wrong," is true in all disciplines or only in some. If there are no overarching standards, then surely it is false to say that we must always recognize that we could be wrong.

The first question is, "Granted these (allegedly) different sorts of criteria, is there something in virtue of which they are the good/appropriate criteria in each case?" I think the answer is yes and no. There is not "something" -- presumably on a meta-level of discourse -- that allows us to say that any given criterion is qualified to function. — J

But there are such criteria,* and you have already identified one. You have identified the criterion of good/appropriate. "Good" is precisely a "meta-criterion," if you like. And again, if 'good' has no meaning then your first sentence is nonsensical.

There are characteristics that every discourse has in common, and one is the notion of goodness and badness of contributions (which is also why your mathematics-authoritarianism is incoherent). Every discourse utilizes this notion of what is good and bad, and the meaning of 'good' from one discourse to another is not entirely equivocal. If it were entirely equivocal then we would not be able to use the same word in each discipline.

Much of this may go back to your quandary about the elusive meaning of 'good'.

• @J: "I don't think there is one normative criterion that can be applied to each discourse."
• "Don't you think that every discourse has certain things in common? Like that they are comprised of humans trying to do stuff?"
• @J: "Sure, but I don't see how that gives us a single normative criterion."
• "Well there is common normative ground among every human who tries to do stuff. Namely that they call success at what they are trying to do 'good' and failure 'bad'."
• @J: "Sure, and it is true that every discourse utilizes the notions of good and bad, but those notions are too unspecific to serve as common criteria."
• "Why are they too unspecific? They are normative criteria and they are common to all disciplines. It looks like they must be common criteria. Unless you want to say that anything which could count as common criteria by definition cannot be sufficiently specific. But what are your grounds and rationale for what is to count as "sufficiently specific"? It looks like you are begging the question by ruling out any possible common criteria by fiat. Common criteria will by definition be unspecific. To look for common criteria that are specific is to look for a contradiction. It is to look for a genus qua genus that is a species qua species. It is to look for something that is at the same time and in the same way both general and specific.

* They are precisely the Medieval convertibles.

Either OJ Simpson really killed his wife or he didn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That'll do. If we allow it to remain undecided, does a contradiction follow? — Banno

Note here that Banno is offering a binary. "Either a contradiction follows or else a contradiction does not follow."

Now if I were Banno I might , "[Why think it is a binary?] Why should it be up to us to demonstrate that the binary does not hold, and not up to you to demonstrate that it does?"

But I'm not Banno, so what I say is, "A contradiction does not follow." Supposing I were undecided about OJ Simpson's guilt, a contradiction would not follow.

---

He is providing examples of where the binary does not hold. That is different to pointing to places where there is a third option. See ↪J. Note ↪Srap Tasmaner's response. Consider what it is they are agreeing on. — Banno

I read that post carefully, even before you referenced it. I don't see him doing that. Can't you spell it out in your own words? What is the putative binary and what is the reason why it does not hold?

I don't see how what you say here forms an argument. I do not see why Tim's statement implies anything about burden of proof. — Banno

Above you make the implicit claim, "Either a contradiction follows or else it doesn't." Is it more reasonable that I accept that this is a binary, or that you must provide an argument for why it is a binary? Who has the burden of proof here with respect to the question of whether your statement represents a binary? After all, if your putative binary is not a real binary then it represents a false dichotomy.

That's not how it looks to me. It looks more as if you have reached a conclusion and are looking for an argument that will hit it. — Banno

I concede that if we are doing that then we are engaging in post hoc rationalization, which is impermissible. So now we have our agreed and negotiated rule, namely, "Post hoc rationalization is impermissible." This is a kind of target insofar as we are jointly aiming away from post hoc rationalization. We are agreeing that post hoc rationalization is bad, and we have placed post hoc rationalization "beyond the pale" or "beyond debate." Without doing this sort of thing we will not be able to progress at all.

In this case we have a common rule and two different aims. Or one aim that is shared and two aims that are not shared. But there is a second shared aim, namely the aim of determining whether I have or have not in fact committed a post hoc rationalization. So here is a map of these aims, considered as sets:

• Banno's aims: {to demonstrate that Leontiskos is involved in post hoc rationalization; to determine whether Leontiskos is engaged in post hoc rationalization; to abide by the rule which says that post hoc rationalization is impermissible}
• Leontiskos' aims: {to demonstrate that Leontiskos is not involved in post hoc rationalization; to determine whether Leontiskos is engaged in post hoc rationalization; to abide by the rule which says that post hoc rationalization is impermissible}

Without a shared aim we cannot truly be doing something together, and all aims have some level of determinateness. In this micro-case that shared determinateness is represented by the second and third elements of each set, which are of course shared elements. (Note that we could still engage the practice without that third element, but in that case we would merely be pursuing speculative knowledge rather than also pursuing practical knowledge. The current sets are practical precisely because if Banno were to succeed in his demonstration, then by the agreed rules Leontiskos would be required to abandon his post hoc rationalization. The conclusion bears on the future actions that Leontiskos will be bound to.).

(Note too that we are truly involved in these three aims, even if we are not going to devote an entire or separate discussion to them. These three aims are ingredient in what we are doing right now, in this thread.)

In any case, my point was that having a target and shooting an arrow into the bullseye are two different things. To have a target is not to have succeeded. It is not to have finished. It is to have begun.

Not my experience in curriculum development or in building co-design. Indeed it seems to me that the cases in which we share a "target", beyond a vague agreement as to the direction we might head, are rare. — Banno

A vague agreement is a target. Understanding this is crucial in order to understand the position of myself and @Count Timothy von Icarus.

That’s a different model—less like archery, more like building without a blueprint. — Banno

"We are going to build something," is also a target. In that case the target is building something. When my nephew takes out his wooden blocks he already has a vague target, even if he doesn't know what he will build. He knows he wants to build something.

Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."... — Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

That makes sense. I was thinking "binary" in terms of 2, because this seems to be the objection. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That makes sense.

I might add:

5. If one claims standards are wholly unique in every instance then one cannot keep arbitrariness out. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, good. If a standard is not generalizable then it is not a standard at all. This relates to the connection between a particular and a universal.

That's a little trickier. But 5 is obviously false as a descriptive claim. To use the example of economics given earlier, it is not the case that economists use different epistemic standards for every question. They do not complete peer review by judging each submission by entirely different standards. And so too for philosophy of science and epistemology.

This gets at one of the unaddressed issues, which is identifying pseudoscience.

And the idea that standards are wholly different in each instance is at odds with the idea that authoritarianism is always inappropriate in epistemology or that only reasonable narratives need be considered. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is all eminently true. I would say that there are so many problems with @J's view that it is a veritable cornucopia of error. Given this, it is important to start with one or two things, and to keep them simple.

If one really wants to try to engage a sophist, it becomes important to establish and then continually re-establish the ground rules. You effectively have to say, "Would you like to play a game?" "Sure." "How about basketball?" "Okay." "And do you accept that we are allowed to dribble when playing basketball?" "Sure, I will agree to that." "That we are allowed to pass?" "Okay." "And to shoot?" "Yes, I suppose I will agree to that."

• "Do you want to engage in a discussion where we ask each other questions, and then answer those questions honestly and to the best of our ability?"
• "Do you want to engage in a discussion where we don't contradict ourselves, and where we do not renege on past claims without informing our interlocutor that we have reneged?"

For @J this would be a pertinent ground rule:

• "Do you want to engage in a discussion where we ask each other questions, and then we honestly answer the questions that are being asked rather than answering questions that have not been asked? And that if we refuse to answer a question, then we must be forthright and tell our interlocutor that we refuse to answer the question, and why we refuse to answer the question?"

It seems to me that @J does not want to engage in that sort of discussion.


This sort of thing can save a lot of time and energy, even though it shouldn't be necessary for those who are "serious." For example, I could have substituted these three lines for my entire conversation with @Moliere earlier in the thread:

"Do you want to engage in a discussion where we are not allowed to happily contradict ourselves?"
"No, I don't."
"Okay. Thanks for letting me know ahead of time. :up:"

I see determinate things and indeterminate things, so there is a quality to each and they are more like poles. Like determinacy and indeterminacy are properties of some thing before it is known and during which we inquire about it (like wisdom). — Fire Ologist

Sure, and that way of viewing it is understandable. I probably should have avoided the words "determinate" and "indeterminate," given that @Count Timothy von Icarus did not make that distinction.

And the Aristotle example is helpful. We must be aiming at some thing, but to the extent we are not sure what that thing is, or don’t know all there is to know about that thing, that thing has some indeterminacy to it.

But Banno is wrong because we can’t even identify or determine something specific, like “wisdom”, if it does not have something determinate to it. Count is right to say that, from the very start of the target practice, wisdom must have something determinate to it or we may as well be talking about “stupidity” or “my shoes”. There must be some determinacy before we make any meaningful move toward some particular or something specific and not vacuous. — Fire Ologist

Yes, that's right. "Possessing some determinacy vs. possessing no determinacy," is an either/or, not a matter of poles, and this is surely what Count was saying.

The fact that we switch from one analogy to you better analogy before expressly agreeing on the value of the first analogy, shows you trying to frame things, like you don’t like the framing. Why is that? Why do we need a better analogy? — Fire Ologist

Yes, this is a very good question. And I would add that (p ∨ ~p) is in no way a controversial claim, nor is it controversial that this represents a binary. When one's interlocutors are particularly stubborn one is forced to appeal to very uncontroversial premises. When they deny even these very uncontroversial premises, there is very little else that can be done.

See above. I never said it was a binary. I said that if one claims that one's epistemology is not "anything goes," then not all narratives can be equally correct. But if not all narratives are equally correct then in virtue of what is this judgement made? Nothing about that requires a binary, claims of infallibilism, etc., it simply requires the observation that if one can give no reasons for their standards then their standards are open to arbitrariness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A terminological point...

There are "binaries" involved in your approach. Namely, disjunctions utilizing a contradictory pair. I feel as if we almost need to return to Aristotle's explanation of the difference between a contradictory pair and a contrary pair...

[1] Either every narrative is correct, or else every narrative is incorrect.

[2] Every narrative is either correct or incorrect

[3] Either all narratives are equally correct, or else not all narratives are equally correct

[3a] Either all narratives are equally correct, or else some narratives are unequally correct

[4] Either one can give reasons for their standards, or else their standards are open to arbitrariness

[3], [3a], and (arguably) [4] utilize contradictory pairs, and they are the binaries that @Count Timothy von Icarus is reliant upon. [1] and (arguably) [2] utilize contrary pairs, and they are the strawmen that @J is reliant upon. But all five are presented as binaries, namely as two-place disjunctions with an exclusive-or. We need to avoid letting the word "binary" become yet another pejorative term conveying emotion rather than substance. Or if that's all it has become, then we should not use it if we want to do real philosophy.

See: Square of Opposition

We're 14 pages into the thread and Count Timothy von Icarus has tried to do little more than present the most elementary disjunctive syllogism:

Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc., or else not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
It is not true that all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
Therefore, not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
(Therefore, some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.) — Leontiskos

Note that @J's response is to continually try to restrict the domain to so-called " narratives":

Likewise, I simply can't imagine a serious scholar or thinker saying... — J

And in general, the people who carry on these debates are smart, professional, and entirely deserving of a respectful hearing. — J

Instead of acknowledging @Count Timothy von Icarus' obvious point that, "Some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.," @J time and again says, "No, because everyone who deserves a hearing deserves a hearing." Or else, "No, because every narrative within the subset of reasonable narratives must be deemed reasonable."

@J continually fails to answer the questions, fails to stay on topic, and instead recites tautologies. The obvious answer to @J is, "Yes, everyone who deserves a hearing deserves a hearing. But not everyone deserves a hearing, and you yourself do not grant everyone a hearing."

Put differently, there are two theses:

• 1. Every professional philosopher [deserves a hearing].
• 2. Everyone [deserves a hearing] (including everyone on TPF).

Which thesis is @J's? He keeps equivocating and vacillating between (1) and (2). He begins with (2), and then switches over to (1) when he fails to justify (2), and then after justifying (1) he switches back, pretending as if he has succeeded in justifying (2).

Note that [deserves a hearing] could be replaced with any of the other normative concepts under consideration. Whatever the normative concept, @J's equivocal arguments are the same.

I think the form of Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. Namely his ↪statement, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." That form reliably signifies a binary. — Leontiskos

Stating that all statements are binary does not show that all statements are binary, nor assign a burden to those whop deny that all statements are binary. — Banno

I will come back to the rest of your post, but dude, really? You think that when says, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't," he is saying that all statements are binary? How does that follow in the least? This strikes me as an unbelievable level of mischaracterization. If I say, "Either all X is Y, or else not all X is Y, and this statement is a binary," I am not therefore claiming that every statement is a binary.

You are still reading it as, "Either all narratives are [negative contrary/pole], or else all narratives are [positive contrary/pole]," despite the fact that this has been clarified multiple times. To say, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't," is the same as saying, "Either all narratives are [X], or else some narratives are not [X]." Anyone who accepts the PNC must accept that as a binary.

We're 14 pages into the thread and @Count Timothy von Icarus has tried to do little more than present the most elementary disjunctive syllogism:

• Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc., or else not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
• It is not true that all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
• Therefore, not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/etc.
• (Therefore, some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.)

He has been stonewalled by you and @J, not for any logical missteps, but rather because his first premise is, “all or nothing,” and apparently according to some special rule he is not allowed such a premise (despite the fact that the premise is nothing more than an application of the principle of non-contradiction - it is not "all or none," but rather, "some or none"). The stonewalling is moral and rhetorical in nature, “I can’t believe that you would engage in this all-or-nothing sort of reasoning!”

It’s a bit like going to a basketball game, and as soon as the first team team tries to dribble the second team cries “foul!” Then for the next twenty minutes the second team argues that dribbling is not allowed. The kicker is that the first team is accused of being “uncharitable” for trying to dribble the ball. On the contrary, I would submit that the level of patience and charity that Count Timothy has with you guys is mind-boggling! :yikes:

Are you going to allow his argument a hearing, or not? Is (p ∨ ~p) a permissible premise? Because if @Count Timothy von Icarus is not allowed to use (p ∨ ~p), then I can’t imagine what will happen when he says something controversial. If he is not allowed to dribble, then I can’t imagine what will happen when he tries to shoot. :zip:

This is why I effectively , "There is very little evidence that @Banno and @J are interested in playing basketball at all."

That is, J has been providing examples of where the binary does not hold — Banno

Okay. I would love for someone to point me to the place where @J provided a third option.

Further, why should it be up to us to demonstrate that the binary does not hold, and not up to you to demonstrate that it does? — Banno

I think the form of @Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. Namely his , "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." That form reliably signifies a binary.

A step back. Look at your example of this discussion being like shooting an arrow - to shoot well, you need a target. But that assumes that there is a target, that we already have the conclusion. — Banno

It assumes we have some kind of target, but it does not assume that we have the conclusion. If that were true then the archer having a target would be the same as the archer having a bullseye.

Perhaps a better analogy would be were we are working together on a construction, but do not agree as to the final result. — Banno

But I think we must have a target for our construction. We must have some aim at what we are intending to construct, however vague.

We might reach agreement on fitting this bit you made in with the bit I made, and work together towards something satisfactory to us both. — Banno

We could negotiate in deciding what to aim for and what to construct. That's pretty common. We'd still have a target, individually and jointly.

Why need we presume the conclusion? — Banno

To presume the conclusion is post hoc rationalization. An aim and a bullseye are not the same thing.

Sure. And in setting this up as a binary, he already forecloses on the possibility of it not being a binary. He presumes what was to be shown. That's why J fairly suggests he account is uncharitable. — Banno

Again:

Why does J continually fail to answer such questions? Does he want to argue for some third option? Does he think the animal doesn't have eyes, and it also doesn't not have eyes? — Leontiskos

This form looks like a binary: "Either some X is Y or else no X is Y." If you or @J think that @Count Timothy von Icarus is setting up a false binary (a false dilemma), then you have to provide an argument for why the binary does not hold. Specifically, you have to demonstrate the third option. Surely you agree that some logical distinctions are in fact binary? That not everything is non-binary?

You yourself appeal to contradictory binaries at times:

"Qualia" are either a something about which can share nothing, or they are the subject of the common terms we already use to talk about our experiences. — Banno

(and yes, I admit I hit you back first. ) — Banno

Saw this edit. Appreciate that. :up:
Allow me then to say that I was quick on the trigger at the beginning of this thread. Of course, I feel like we've been around this merry-go-round too many times by now. I anticipated it moving in this very direction, namely "monism."

So, can we agree that sometimes determinate/indeterminate are not contradictories? — Banno

All words have a semantic range. The question asks how the words are being used within a context or argument. @Count Timothy von Icarus's "some determinate content" vs. "no determinate content" is clearly a binary. Don't you agree? Or do you think it is impossible for him to make that distinction between some and none?

And maybe, that wisdom might sometimes not have a determinate content? — Banno

Again, the equivocation looms. Wisdom never has no determinate content. It may have semi-determinate content, but semi-determinate content involves some determinate content.


This is how the conversation might have been expected to proceed:

• @Count Timothy von Icarus: Do you think the term wisdom has some determinate content, or do you think it doesn't have any determinate content?
• @Banno: I would of course admit that it has some determinate content.
• Count Timothy von Icarus: So what determinate content do you believe it has?
• Banno: Regardless of what I think, I could be wrong, for I am not infallible.
• Count Timothy von Icarus: I agree, but that's beside my point. If you agree that it has determinate content then what determinate content do you think it has? In your opinion?
• ...

See if you can reply to these examples, rather than indulging in personal insults. — Banno

Like calling someone obsessive, like this?:

Others have an obsession with the same. — Banno

It's impressive how you squeeze hypocrisy into even the smallest posts. :wink:

Determinate/indeterminate is not a contradictory pair. Many things are partially determined. Borderline concepts - "baldness"; — Banno

Determinate/indeterminate could be read as a contradictory pair or a contrary pair. The point is that @Count Timothy von Icarus was obviously using it as a contradictory pair, which he even clarified. To be fair, @Fire Ologist introduced the determinate/indeterminate pair, not Count. Here is an example of what Count said:

Which is just to say, the term wisdom has to have some determinant content or else... — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Some" determinate content. So your examples of things which are "partially determined" all count as having some determinate content.

The vegan will ask, "Are there some animal products in this food, or not?" It's fairly clear that there are only two options here. This comes with the territory of the word, "some."

This is the thesis that post was responding to:

Logic is about language, not about the world itself. — ChatteringMonkey

Since you disagreed with the person who disagreed with this thesis, I am assuming that you affirm the thesis. Please correct me if you do not affirm the thesis.

[2] and [3] have the same logical structure as [1]. They are the same logical statements. — SophistiCat

They don't and they aren't, but leaving that aside, are you gainsaying the thesis that logic is about something other than language?

Logic is only about something insofar as we make it to be. It can be something perfectly sensible, like [1], or frivolous, like [2], or even nothing in particular, like [3]. — SophistiCat

Which of them do you say is about nothing other than language?

Exactly!

Thanks for your help. :lol: — Banno

Some here seem to have a prejudice against the very notion of contradictory pairs. For example:

There's clearly something in this all-or-nothing position that seems incontrovertible to you. I will keep trying to understand it, but no luck so far. — J

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Either the animal has eyes or else it doesn't."

This is not "all or nothing reasoning." It is called the principle of non-contradiction. Why does @J continually fail to answer such questions? Does he want to argue for some third option? Does he think the animal doesn't have eyes, and it also doesn't not have eyes?