it's not relying upon the science for its point — Moliere

If it's not relying upon the science then apparently Kripke would have made the exact same argument in 1700, before the science had occurred. Is that your claim?

It's a point about how there are a posteriori necessary truths -- it doesn't say that water is H2O — Moliere

A necessary truth is true. If it is necessarily true—a posteriori—that water is H2O, then it is true that water is H2O.

When you are reading Kripke on this issue, if you don't begin with an interest in developing the notion of rigid designation, then his whole project will be opaque to you. In general you first have to understand what a philosopher is really doing if you are to understand their reasoning. And if you provide a critique of a philosopher which has no relation to what he is really doing then the critique will fall away without anyone taking notice.

(What a philosopher is really doing = that philosopher's proximate telos. It is "What they are really up to." The percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water has nothing to do with Kripke's telos.)

Since faith is the centerpiece of religion... — Hanover

This hasn't been mentioned in the thread, but religious scholars will point out that faith is only central to revealed religion (i.e. revelation-based religion). In non-revealed religion faith is no more central than it is in other traditions or institutions. For example, I would argue that institutions like the military are much more faith-centric than non-revealed religion.

In the West we have a tendency to conflate religion with Christianity (or else Judeo-Christianity), and the notion that religions can be referred to as "faiths" is one symptom of that. This is yet another incentive to get clear on what is actually meant by 'faith'.

...it seems its answer would lie somewhere in a theological discussion that preceded our conversation. — Hanover

...but digressions aside, I agree.

Mostly I think it would be great if we could discuss religious topics without anti-religious evangelization constantly occurring. But that's the way it seems to go on the internet: the atheists require that every religious discussion must be reduced to a discussion (or assertion) about whether God exists.

I don't think he hopes to apply it to reality as much as he's making a point about logic. — Moliere

Er, it is crucial to understand that Kripke's claim is not merely logical. If it were merely logical then it would not be a posteriori at all. That it is not merely logical is much of the point.

I don't think this is a good way to do philosophy, or what most people do in philosophy -- but he wasn't claiming a conspiracy theory as much as speaking a false assumption. — Moliere

Even if that is true, the mountain of quibbles does not actually succeed in showing that water is not H2O. When chemists or philosophers say that water is H2O they are not claiming that every natural body of liquid that anyone labels 'water' is pure, undiluted H2O. :worry:

My example would be Kripke’s attempt to show “water is H2O” is a posteriori necessary truth. This is not a demonstration of something true of realty but a construction of his imagination that he hopes applies to something in reality. — Richard B

The point that Kripke is making is untouched by such quibbles. Kripke is not making any claim about the percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water.

This whole idea “Water is H2O” is a sorry attempt by particular philosophers to gain some credibility from science to demonstrate how their theories have some sort of application to reality. — Richard B

This is a lot of nonsense. <Here's> a primer for you on the scientists involved in 18th and 19th century chemistry who discovered the molecular composition of water. The claim that "water is H2O" is not some philosophical conspiracy theory.

- Fair enough. I think you are getting tripped up on the difference between signification and supposition.

I'm still sensing the same transcendental error though: interpreting others such that they have to mean "x" (in this case x = essence) because else they'd fall into incoherence, and here are the reasons why they really mean "x". — Moliere

If someone thought that water was not H2O before the 19th century then my assumption about them would be wrong. You claim that you think water was not H2O before the 19th century, but to be honest I don't really believe you. My guess is that you think water was not known to be H2O before the 19th century, which is a very different claim. You have switched to talking about signification, which is tangential to the crux of essentialism.

Yes, that's what I think. "water" nor "H2O" -- to use a phrase from your paper that I've only glanced at -- "pick out" what water or H2O is. — Moliere

But you must be able to see the strawman here? You say, ' "Water" does not "pick out" what water is.' But who in the world is saying that "water" "picks out" what water is? As if anyone with the five-letter token w-a-t-e-r would automatically understand what water is?

Again, Klima:

Of course, this move will make ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ have the same signification, that is, synonymous. Yet, this need not imply that whoever knows the signification of ‘water’ would thereby know that water is H2O. For one of course can have perfect possession of the concept of water without having any idea of chemistry whatsoever. What this person does not know is only that the chemical concept, which he or she does not have, picks out the same essence that his or her concept of water does. — Gyula Klima, Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism, 18

When we don't have that level of description -- namely, before chemistry became popular. — Moliere

So water was not H2O before chemistry became popular?

From the set of sources I already gave you, see Gyula Klima's, "Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism." He discusses water and your (very common) objection on the last three pages, especially on the last page.

Cool. I'll be honest in saying I don't think I'll be reading these anytime soon, but she looks interesting to me — Moliere

Glad you're open to reading substantial sources. :up:

I like the notion that the medievals are good or better in various ways, I'm only skeptical because I think the attraction is a Romantic one: for a time that never was. — Moliere

With Klima and most Aristotelians, we move on after finding contemporary philosophy subpar and realizing that there is something better.

I think I can characterize what is meant by an essence, which is why I'm anti-essentialist -- I'm against this particular rendition and various other possible renditions that basically fit. I'd say "essence" is what makes an entity what it is: water can be wet or solid, but it will always be H2O, for instance. — Moliere

So if the essentialist says that water will always be H2O, and you're against essentialism, then what do you say water is? Specifically, if you disagree, then when will water not be H2O?

Sounds to me like a transcendental error -- if they speak in this way, with nouns and such and believe it's true, then they must believe in essences even while proclaiming that they do not. — Moliere

It's no coincidence that none of them can accurately characterize what is meant by an essence.

For both of you: I dropped references to freely accessible works related to this in a different thread. <Here> is the search. Use Ctrl-f on "Klima" and you will find most of the sources. Note that the SEP article on Universals is also Klima's, and that Spade's piece is also on point.

Now you have sources if you want to learn. :wink:

- If you find the places in Aristotle where he develops the concepts you will see him considering and critiquing the alternative theories on offer. I don't say that the idea of substances was entirely foreign to Aristotle's age, but rather that it was much more foreign to that age than to our own. We have been simmering in the Platonic-Aristotelian soup for 2,500 years.

I don't know a lot about Aristotle, but I've gathered that talking to him would be more like talking to a scientist than a philosopher in the contemporary sense. He lived in what some call the "age of essence." So he would just assume that the essences of things are available to us and we talk about them. I think he was foundationless about that? Is that true? — frank

Pretty much backwards. Essence is more familiar to us than it was to Aristotle's age, because we are children of Aristotle. Aristotle was forging something which was in competition with the theories of other ancient philosophers.

Nutty TPFers like to inveigh against essences, but they are all essentialists. They log off and immediately start talking about dogs, trees, cars, water, etc.

Doesn't that amount to demanding that the absurd premise in a reductio be true in order for a reductio to be successful? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. @J does not understand how a reductio works. As I've pointed out before, a reductio does not prove falsity per se. Instead it proves inconsistency or incoherence.

Nevertheless:

But Aristotle reasons:

If the skeptic is right, discursive knowledge is impossible.
But discursive knowledge is possible.
Therefore the skeptic is wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see Aristotle doing that according to the SEP article you cite {supposing this is meant to represent a reductio}. Indeed, I think Aristotle would see this as a sub-optimal response to the "agnostics," one which fails to address the better part of their challenge. More precisely:

A "demonstration" would generally be a syllogism in this context, although obviously there is a sense in which demonstrations can be less formal.

...

Points 1-6 are a discursive demonstration. The skeptic is claiming to have demonstrated that discursive knowledge through demonstration is impossible through the use of discursive demonstration. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In Aristotle's precise sense a demonstration is not merely a syllogism, and the "agnostic" is not giving a demonstration. Therefore they do not fall afoul of the reductio. For Aristotle a mere syllogism or argument has "unsecured" premises, so to speak, whereas a demonstration has premises which are first principles (and are therefore securely known in one way or another—the way is here the point at issue).* This is why a demonstration produces scientia proper - the highest form of knowledge. So when the "agnostic" says, "Therefore, nothing can be demonstrated," they are not excluding forms of knowledge which are weaker than scientia, and their conclusion would be one such example. The Pyrrhonists are doing a similar thing when they distinguish acceptable from inacceptable qualities of certitude.

Note too that it would be very rare for someone like Aristotle or Aquinas to place an argument in their opponent's mouth which is susceptible to a reductio. With rare exceptions, that is bad form, intellectually speaking.

It's worth noting that a quasi-skeptic like @J could probably find allies among the "agnostics" or the Pyrrhonists.

* More precisely, a demonstration is a syllogism or argument whose premises are first principles (and are therefore "securely" known). Thus syllogisms and arguments are not necessarily demonstrations.

I have a certain degree of sympathy for Luther's ideas. If one's Christianity consists primarily in going around and doing good deeds to elevate one's spiritual status, why not just be a Jew (or a Muslim?) Why the need for Jesus? You have your deeds.

Not a good man, but a man who delineated firmly between religious traditions to attempt to reform and preserve his own. — BitconnectCarlos

That's fair and all, but on the other hand, why the need for Jesus if "simul iustus et peccator" is all one anticipates; snow-covered dung?

Interesting thoughts. I would say that Peirce is a significantly unique thinker, in that he defies a lot of the standard categories. He is certainly a mediator between contemporary philosophy and Aristotelian realism. I also tend to see him as transcending the idealism-materialism dichotomy, although here we run into the difficulty of slippery definitions, particularly with respect to idealism.

Lost a long post... :confused:

Basically I think Wayfarer is right in the discussion with Metaphysician Undercover. The Categories supports Wayfarer ('man', 'horse', but no mention of bronze) and Metaphysics Z does not bear on the question, which are the two central places where Aristotle discusses substance. Aristotle takes things like 'man' and 'horse' as the paradigmatic examples of primary substances.

Lol, the hallmark of all religions is the expulsion of dissonant voices. — praxis

A good thread for you: The Myopia of Liberalism

That can be used for a variety of purposes. Shouldn’t there be just one purpose though? — praxis

Unity in plurality, like Tallis' polyphony, is the Christian watermark.

And sacred text are eminently amenable to reinterpretation, unfortunately. — praxis

Unlike Plato, or Sextus Empiricus, or Aquinas, or Descartes, or Kant, or Wittgenstein, or Heidegger, or Adorno? Plurivocity is the sign of a rich text.

according to Boethius, proofs derived from authority are the weakest — Aquinas, ST I.1.8.obi1 - Does sacred doctrine make use of arguments?

Who says Aquinas never jests? :wink:

Were I writing in opposition to myself here, I might be pointing out that faith is one amongst at least a trinity, and that when set in the context of hope and love it shines, and my arguments fall away.

But it would remain that faith by itself can be a source of evil. — Banno

Martin Luther considered removing the book of James from the New Testament, based in large part on passages such as this which went against the grain of his "sola fide":

What does it profit, my brethren, if a man says he has faith but has not works? Can his faith save him? If a brother or sister is ill-clad and in lack of daily food, and one of you says to them, “Go in peace, be warmed and filled,” without giving them the things needed for the body, what does it profit? So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead.

But some one will say, “You have faith and I have works.” Show me your faith apart from your works, and I by my works will show you my faith. You believe that God is one; you do well. Even the demons believe—and shudder. — James 2:14-19 (RSV)

LMAO at the bit. First time hearing it, and I got a good gut laugh out of it. — Moliere

Nice. That performance is one of my favorites of his. :lol:

No point in doing so when they live out their beliefs, I think. They are genuine believers and good people -- I know it's false, but what does that matter? — Moliere

I've noticed that most former Mormons approach it this way, and I think it's because in Mormonism you get a stark divergence of goodness and truth. I.e. Good religion, false beliefs.

The reason many people try to oppose falsehoods in those they love is because they believe that truth and goodness (or fulfillment) go together.

(Incidentally, such a motive (love) tends to rectify the question-begging nature of some approaches to argument. If you really want someone to think otherwise then you try to give them a good reason to do so. But I digress...)

O no. My fam knows. — Moliere

Ah, okay. That makes sense. I totally thought of this bit from John Mulaney. :grin:

but I can criticize these beliefs even though they give meaning to people I care about. — Moliere

So do you criticize your parents' beliefs? Mormonism is very interesting given its wholecloth nature, as you point out.

I have been saying that there seems to be no rational way to argue that revelation should be accepted as truth — Janus

Then how is it that so many people convert and de-convert, in large part on the basis of argument?

You have a tendency to ignore basic questions like this:

Assuming the events of Exodus happened as recorded, would the Hebrews, who saw the sea split for them, the sky raining blood, a pillar of fire following them every night, water come from a stone, etc. still lack any epistemic warrant for believing God exists? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Or if someone saw Jesus raise Lazarus from the dead after four days in the tomb, would they have epistemic warrant for a religious conclusion?

The weird thing in these cases is that the atheist has made their atheism unfalsifiable. They don't seem to even recognize the possibility of counterfactual falsifications. If one's atheism is not to be unfalsifiable then they must be able to say, "Well, I guess if thus-and-such happened then I would be rationally compelled to question my atheism."

I was going to say, "If you can't argue about religion, then Moliere must still be a Mormon." :razz:

This is where I fall into an in-between -- I reject it because I was brought up to believe in it, and yet I don't reject my folks belief. I don't care if they find comfort in it, but I do care that they feel discomfort in my lack of belief. — Moliere

So do you pretend to believe when you are with your family? I'm trying to understand what you mean by falling into an in-between.

Mormonism is a good example. I don't think the Mormon god exists (and I don't think Mormons worship the God of Nicene Christianity). But that doesn't mean Mormon theology falls short of philosophy, nor does it mean that Mormons are irrational. I don't think the Mormon claims are credible, but I don't make my assessment the standard for what counts as rational. Granted, I do think Mormonism is irrational, but I don't think all religions that I disagree with are irrational.

It actually seems to me that a lot of people nowadays are determined to have an opinion on things they do not at all understand. This happens with the anti-religious, but another example comes from the interreligious scholar Francis Clooney who has pointed out that all of the young people are convinced that every religion is equal despite knowing nothing at all about any of the religions.

If all you guys are looking for is a circle jerk I'll gladly dip out. — Janus

So I guess all your talk about intersubjective agreement is just lip service after all. You said a really dumb thing and a bunch of people pointed out that it was dumb. That's a cue.

- :brow:

Not sure. I only have a superficial understanding of his work on this topic. — BitconnectCarlos

I'd be open to discussing it if we have a primary text to look at. Some of @Hanover's early posts in this thread reminded me of Buber.

I wouldn't suggest it is bullshit unless they argued that I should accept it. There seems to be no rational way to argue that when it comes to scripture. — Janus

Religious argument and religious interaction is the most interesting kind. This is because religion is primordially identical to culture. Before the pluralism of secular states there was no difference at all. Religio-cultural encounter is the most interesting kind because it involves the interaction of totalizing forms. Chinese Confucianism meets European Christianity meets Indian Hinduism. That sort of thing is the epitome of human encounter, precisely because you have such maximally full and developed expressions of human life coming into contact with one another.

And I'm sorry, but if you think religion or culture or sacred texts are not amenable to argument and rational interpenetration, then your ignorance of history is massive. On a quantitative scale that sort of argument dwarfs all other kinds.

But the tension still exists. — schopenhauer1

I'm not convinced that there is any possible world in which no tension exists between the classification of information and the free flow of information. Do you have an idea about how to create a system where no piece of information that should be public would ever be classified? I should think errors are inevitable even before corruption enters the picture.

Yes, so if the true "Good" in this situation is purely for knowledge's sake, meaning understanding more about the actual ontology of the universe rather than our externally limited view, then it would seem that this reason is instrumental. The question is, what kinds of instrumental values would override the Good of pure understanding? — schopenhauer1

Well, the other question is whether the government is interested in the good of pure understanding at all. I was saying that our government would probably never fund Star Trek. Our government doesn't aim at that good.

I see that Down The Rabbit Hole said it’s justified when it's for the sake of national security — schopenhauer1

Yes, I think that's a good consideration.

Notice the tension here. You first say that "the people" get to decide — schopenhauer1

Oh, I certainly did not say that. I said, "the people decide who gets to make that decision [about knowledge-access] by electing them." The people don't get to decide what information to declassify, but they do get do decide who makes that decision, namely the persons they elect. I don't see that as a bad form of government, especially if we agree that some information should be classified.

The problem is that authority is not evidence unless it can itself be backed up with evidence. And by evidence I mean anything that an unbiased person would be forced to admit given they can understand it. — Janus

The forum is full of loose ends you have left hanging. Here is a pertinent one:

Do you think witness testimony should be admissable in trials? Or, because it might be based on one person's perceptual experiences, should witness reports and unrecorded confessions be thrown out as lacking in epistemic warrant? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you were right that testimony cannot count as evidence then our whole legal system is kaput. And again, everyone who holds to some authority possesses motives of credibility. There is no magic bullet here. No magic rule like, "Religious stuff doesn't count," or, "Arguments from authority possess no justification," or, "Whatever I think is whatever an unbiased person would think." You have to actually do the real work of arguing a position. You can't just foreclose the whole game from the get-go.

It makes no sense to deny the philosophical import of divine writ. Why would you deny a writing from God himself?

What you mean to say is one shouldn't justify one's belief in a document based upon their false belief it is from God. — Hanover

That's the whole game. Everyone agrees that one should not utilize falsehoods in justifications. Yet the atheist begs the question when they assume that any "theological claim" (whatever that's supposed to mean) is a falsehood. That's why the atheist argues in bad faith: they demand that their atheist presuppositions be taken as true even when their interlocutor disagrees.

So if an atheist is to philosophically engage a believer on the topic of religion (or faith), then they are not philosophically permitted to simply presuppose that religion is irrational. They are not permitted to define the religious act in terms of irrationality. That imposition and begging of the question is precisely what is unphilosophical. Instead they must argue for the conclusion that religion is irrational, using premises that are acceptable to their interlocutor. That this has not occurred in this thread demonstrates the problem and the unseriousness of this form of atheism.

using scripture, revelation or other religious authority in an argument — Banno

These sorts of criteria are not ultimately coherent. Philosophy is not adverse to arguments from authority, so why would it be adverse to arguments from religious authority? And again, what exactly is "religious" supposed to mean? Historically the reified notion of a "religion" does not even exist until the Enlightenment.

What philosophy is adverse to is forcing claims upon one's interlocutor, including claims of authority. So it is not philosophical or reasonable for a Christian to appeal to a religious authority that his interlocutor does not accept, just as in this thread it is not philosophical or reasonable for atheists to beg the question of atheism even when their interlocutor disagrees. The only real principle that supports your claim is the very one you continually transgress. You don't get to exclude an entire class of claims by fiat and pretend that your so doing is philosophical.

Similarly, when two astrologers argue with one another they are still doing philosophy even if you think their premises are false. You don't get to wave your wand and magically determine that no one who is discussing astrology is engaged in philosophy. A good portion of us think your Wittgenstenian premises are hopelessly confused, but we don't have the audacity to claim that anyone who relies on Wittgenstein is not doing philosophy.

Sure, but how would the "will of the people" be discerned if they never even knew about it? It's a bit of a conundrum. — schopenhauer1

It's a conundrum but I don't see it as insuperable. There is a tension between sensitive or classified information and the right to information, but there are ways in which the balance can shift. Basically, as long as the elected leaders have democratic values then they will see transparency as an important part of governance. In democracies a shift in that balance is often occasioned by a whistleblower.

But what's interesting about some of your posts is that they remind me of Star Trek, where exploration and knowledge is the actual goal and therefore the tax-funded exploration initiatives naturally have an epistemic responsibility to the taxpayers. That's a really interesting model given that way that scientific research has become bound up with the funding provided by nation states, but I tend to see that as a corruption of science precisely because the governments do not have the same goals as the Star Trek explorers. Granted, I think it would be great if our governments were more concerned with speculative knowledge.

And I tend to agree with the conception of positive rights here. For example, we can talk about the "right to an education." Why should someone not be deprived of a basic public education? Is it just so they have a chance to function within society and gain resources (though that’s a good reason)? Or is there something about knowledge itself that is simply valuable- something that is just good to know? — schopenhauer1

It's not that I think children lack a "right" to knowledge or education. These are goods proper to the human being. The difficulty is that rights are correlative with duties, and I think it is primarily the parents who bear the duty for providing these liberal and speculative goods. As you say, the government may have an interest in improving citizens' "function within society" but I'm not sure modern governments have an interest in what Aristotle would call contemplative goods (i.e. goods of knowledge or understanding that are not instrumental unto some ulterior end).

Indeed, good questions. Notice that your questions involve parent-child relationships. The idea of a "white lie" comes to mind here. But should adults be deprived of important knowledge in the same way children are? Who gets to make that decision? As stated, it can't be the "will of the people" in this case. — schopenhauer1

In a democratic Republic like the United States I think the people decide who gets to make that decision by electing them. In that sense the will of the people does inform the decision.

Is the President-citizen relationship similar to the parent-child relationship insofar as the former is empowered to decide what sort of information the latter is capable of receiving? I think the two relationships are similar in that way. I think the whole idea of classified information depends on that empowerment.

True. So, do you think this would justify holding back disclosure information, given the potential consequences of ontological shock? — schopenhauer1

I think so. It is a variable that certainly can't be discounted. You say:

Of course, the scenario I describe is a classic case of self-interest versus the greater good. The companies and governments working on recovered craft might want the information securely hidden, while keeping such an extraordinary discovery from the public would deprive people of rightful knowledge about the actual nature of the universe and the science behind it. — schopenhauer1

Is self-interest vs. the greater good the correct polarity? If there were a "pro and con" list for releasing the information, what would that list look like? I do agree that the government has an interest and even a kind of defeasible obligation to tell its citizens the truth, but I don't think that obligation is... well... indefeasible. :nerd:

You’re suggesting that people with a God-shaped hole in their hearts may be desperate enough to gulp down some authentic looking Kool-Aid? — praxis

Nailed it. :eyes:

keeping such an extraordinary discovery from the public would be depriving people of rightful knowledge to the actual ontology of the universe, and the science thereof. — schopenhauer1

People have a right to know the truth regarding something as existentially relevant as other intelligent life in the universe, full stop. If governments have known this and were hiding it, it is a kind of immoral act, whereby people's ontological perspective was not properly informed. People have a right to knowledge of their place in the universe, and the hiding of truth for any purpose would be an incredible act of deception. — schopenhauer1

I'm not really convinced that we have a natural right to any piece of knowledge based merely on its existential or ontological import. I think we might have a positive right to such knowledge, and within a pure democracy that positive right would derive from the will of the people.

But if you want to dial up the notion of "ontological shock" in the context of natural rights to knowledge, then I wonder if the parent-child relationship is more apt. For example, what is the morality involved in telling your child that Santa Claus does not exist? Or that they were adopted? Or that humans do not come from storks? Or that NHIs are real in the way that the OP describes?

The parent has a responsibility to the entire welfare of their child, including its developmental stages. Therefore they have a responsibility to balance the goods of knowledge against the dangers of inappropriate appropriations of that knowledge. In the Orthodox tradition Satan orchestrated the Fall precisely by giving Adam and Eve the knowledge of Good and Evil too early and too quickly. That knowledge was always their inheritance, but to receive one's inheritance in an untimely way can be fatal.

There is a UAP Taskforce in the US House right now regarding it. These are real Congressional panels. A hearing (under oath) was supposed to take place today but was postponed.

...

Here's some source material so you know I am not bullshitting — schopenhauer1

Very interesting! I am not inclined to doubt any of that.

(Edited my previous post a bit)

I would ask how the fiduciary duties of democratically elected officials impinge on these epistemic questions. In some cases there would be an obligation to inform one's constituents. I'm not quite sure what those cases would be.

Getting away from the hypothetical, hasn't Trump leaked or nodded towards some of that classified information? My sense is that there would be a lot of obscurity at each level of the epistemic question of NHI's, such that there would be a significant risk of creating more confusion and disarray if the evidence isn't watertight.* This is especially true in the era of deepfakes. It would basically blow the top off the discussions we have been having on faith and belief on the grounds of another's testimony. :lol:

* Edit: Think about it this way: there is a significant power differential between the rulers of nation states and the common man. For this reason there is a level of distrust and suspicion on the part of the common man, in large part because he knows that he does not know how much more powerful these rulers are than himself, and he nevertheless knows that they are immensely more powerful. That same dynamic would obtain between humans and NHIs, but probably to a much greater degree. Honestly, we who believe in spiritual intelligences (angels, demons, etc.) have been reckoning with these ideas for thousands of years. Cf. Galatians 1:8

- I have also heard that Three-Body Problem is interesting, although I have not seen that one. As with so much of Villeneuve's work, Arrival is great. The plot is closely related to the way you answered that question, but with a few important twists. I won't spoil it for you since I think you would probably enjoy the film.

Good questions. Let's say it's something along the lines of what you're suggesting. — schopenhauer1

Have you seen Villeneuve's film Arrival?