- All of the arguments you have offered for why we cannot make inferences from group statistics to individual cases have turned out to be invalid. Your red herring that knowledge of a group is not as predictive as direct knowledge of an individual within that group in no way justifies your claim that inferences to individuals from group data are unacceptable or otiose.

Let's address the sophistic claim again:

Arguing whether inferior [group] data is of no benefit, marginal benefit or minimal benefit is a perfect example of a distinction without a (practical) difference. — LuckyR

There are so many problems with this sort of claim, so it's hard to know where to start. Perhaps we should just start with the fact that group statistics are enormously powerful and influential in modern life. They are of great benefit. But the question of whether they have predictive power is of course a distinction with a practical difference. Your counterargument is, "Ah, but if we had data for each individual in the group, then that data would supersede the group data for understanding individuals." Sure, but the fact is that we don't have data for each individual in the group, and that's why we use the group data. You should look up "random sampling" to understand how group data is generated, for it is the key to understanding how the generalization occurs and why it is useful and powerful.

You've merely quoted a definition and implied this somehow fits what occurred without explaining how. — Relativist

At least I didn't pull a strawman definition out of thin air without citing any source at all. :lol:
That's not a great look when your sole argument has been an appeal to your own authority.

That's very different from claiming the procedure... — Relativist

Listen man, these dick measuring contests are fun and all, but if you have a complaint with the sources I've provided you can go ahead and provide that critique. I've been waiting for quite awhile now. If not and you're just going to keep making unsubstantiated assertions and begging the question, then I think we're done.

Here's a definition of "Kangaroo court":

an unofficial court held by a group of people in order to try someone regarded, especially without good evidence, as guilty of a crime or misdemeanor. — Relativist

I would suggest using a reputable dictionary and citing your source.

Here is Merriam-Webster:

2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures

I was not in favor of prosecuting it [...] because it was trivial, and technically nuanced. — Relativist

Which is much my point.

If so, then this demonstrates that indeed you have not done adequate research to form your judgement. — Relativist

We can just wait and see if the appeals result in a reversal. At this point it looks like everything was for show, prosecution and defense alike.

(Reading along vaguely - I have not visited Przywara's text in some time)

You don't understand the legal technicalities, so you have no rational basis to judge this a "kangaroo court". — Relativist

I think you are simply mistaken about the level of research needed to confirm that this was a kangaroo court. It's not so hard to see. If you think those articles and/or the video grossly misrepresent the case, feel free to give your argument.

[1] If you kill someone, then you are not treating them as an end (unless it is mercy killing).

[2] If you let someone die when you could save them, the same is true.

[...]

...the principle that we should treat people as ends rather than just as means (which I shall label EP)... — Herg

Similar to what has said, I don't think (1) or (2) violate EP. (1) and (2) fail to treat someone as an end, but they do not treat that person as a means. EP requires that we "treat people as ends rather than just as means." (1) and (2) violate the separate principle that we must always treat everyone as an end, which is not a commonly accepted moral principle.

Surely the point here is that if let Hitler live, he will continue to fail to treat millions of people as ends by murdering them; and our only way of treating those people as ends is to fail to treat Hitler, and unfortunately the janitor, as ends. So we either fail to treat two people as ends, or we are complicit in the failure to treat millions as ends. — Herg

This is the same equivocation between EP and the separate principle. Kantian morality does not admit of perplexity, where there are cases where we must decide who to treat as an end. It is not true that "our only way of treating those people as ends is to [treat Hitler and the janitor as mere means]."

The reason I edited my last substantial post to you is because I went back and read more of your posts (). I am not sure how well Benthamite utilitarianism mixes with the second formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative. It is a bit of an odd mixture, and this movement from (Kant's) EP to the separate principle is a case in point. As I see it, the difficulty is that EP can't really fit the role of a "subordinate end," to use Bentham's language. Bentham's approach seems opposed to Kant's, and Kant seems directly opposed to consequentialism.

At best, your points seemed to be contextual. That's why I responded with some contextual points of my own. — Relativist

Well, no. All of my points had to do with the original question I asked, and they were relevant to the way that you failed to address that question.

Understand that I never thought this indictment should have been made. — Relativist

That's fair. I don't have any interest in delving into all of the legal details. I will do that with some Supreme Court cases, but I have no intrinsic interest in the details of a kangaroo court.

I had been uninterested in the Trump case, but eventually I got pulled in due to the fact that various acquaintances and friends had provided me with different accounts of what Trump had done. One said he had interfered in the election, one said he had falsified business records, one said he had paid Daniels out of campaign contributions, etc. So I looked at sources like AP and found the same ambiguity. It seemed (and seems) that no one knows what Trump was convicted for.

So I went over to reason.com (as I often do for legal matters that libertarians have no direct stake in) and I found that a misdemeanor outside the statute of limitations is being raised to a felony and charged 34 times. Trump was convicted for falsifying business records (which requires an intent to defraud, which is not in evidence). Raising the misdemeanor to a felony requires the "intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof." That "other crime" is said to be a form of election conspiracy, which in turn requires unlawful means. The prosecution never settled on a theory of unlawful means, and Judge Merchan presented the jury with three theories of unlawful means: excessive campaign contribution, tax fraud (which resulted in higher taxes!), or the falsification of other business records. The judge said that the jury did not have to agree, as long as they all thought one of the three things was in effect. See "A Jumble of Legal Theories Failed To Give Trump 'Fair Notice' of the New York Charges Against Him," along with the articles linked therein.

So what did Trump do? No one has any idea, and everyone is providing a different story. No one seems to know or agree, including the judge, the jury, the prosecution, the American people, and even Trump himself. At the same time, everyone knows what the case is about. Everyone knows why the statute of limitations was not respected and the case was brought in an election year. Everyone knows why sentencing was delayed until the week before the Republican convention. It is not, as you say, that Trump is immoral. It is that the left is afraid Trump will win the election. A non-disclosure agreement is obviously not election interference, but disregarding the rule of law and using the court system to attack a political rival in an election year obviously is. The logical impossibilities involved in some of those attempts were a particularly stark example of the chicanery.

Just you saying so does not make it so. — Tobias

Amadeus has been trying to work out the difference between an assertion and an argument for some time now.

Good post.

It is an ideal insofar as it is an idea about how reality should be. — Bob Ross

A problem with that definition actually manifests here:

Not quite. The per se intention would be the ideal which you are trying to actualize, and any means of achieving it would be accidental. — Bob Ross

Here you seem to confuse an intention with an ideal. An intention is not "the ideal which you are trying to actualize." This is a common slip given the way you defined an intention. It is like saying, "A hamburger is the thing which you are trying to eat." To put it starkly, 'intend' is a verb whereas 'ideal' is a noun. When we talk about an intention we are really talking about something that is being intended. Intention therefore needs to be centrally defined in terms of intending, in terms of acting, in terms of verbs. It is the difference between eating-a-hamburger and a hamburger. Your construal here makes the specific noun, 'ideal', the grammatical subject of the clause, and this gives the impression that what is at stake is a noun with some accidental properties. The problem is that the "doingness" of intention is not accidental, it is central. Ideally I would want to talk about what it means to intend, not what it means to have an intention. Everything depends on what it means to intend, as this is the more fundamental reality.

My essential or per se intention is that which adheres most closely to the aim that my will has formed. — Leontiskos

That which adheres most closely to that aim is just a means that adheres most closely to that aim—and so it is accidental, not per se. — Bob Ross

The idea with that detour metaphor was that intention of the end must be understood in relation to the power of will/volition, and intention of the means must be understood in relation to the intention of the end, and foreseen effects must be understood in relation to the intention of the means. Each stage is more accidental/per accidens, but it must simultaneously be recognized that within each stage there are differences between what is more essential or more accidental. An intention of the end can be more or less essential depending on how it relates to my telos and my will; an intention of the means can be more or less essential depending on how it relates to my intended end, etc.

Getting groceries is the per se intention; and the fastest and using the most efficient route to the grocery store is the per accidens intention.

I think we are distinguishing per se and per accidens differently, perhaps? — Bob Ross

Yes, you are using them as if they are strict logical categories, which is what I opposed in my last post. Essentialism always has a muddy boundary between what is essential and what is accidental, and we essentialists think of this as a feature rather than a bug. An essential property vs. an accidental property is not quite the same as a necessary property vs. a non-necessary (contingent) property, although there is some overlap here. The basis of this is the idea that the forms of natural things are not logically circumscribable in that strict manner. We are trying to understand the whatness of intention rather than to merely enumerate its properties or define its boundaries.

I would say a means is NOT an intention; but means can be intentional. — Bob Ross

So if you intend to quench your thirst and you begin filling your glass at the faucet, you would say that you did not intend to fill your glass? Filling your glass is a means.

But a means is not identical to an intention: there are means which one doesn’t not [sic] intend (e.g., they are not aware of them). The intention towards walking in the kitchen is a separate intention from quenching my thirst, but they are closely connected: the latter is the essence of what I am intending to do, whereas the former is just an accidental means towards it. I still intend both, just differently.

Likewise, if I did not intend the former, it would not change the fact that it is a means to the latter. — Bob Ross

First, we agree that you "intend both" (the means and the end).

Second is this problem of appropriation. You are claiming that an unappropriated means is a means. You are claiming that the nearby cup of water that you are not aware of is a means to your end of quenching thirst.

Colloquial we use "means" in two related senses: actual means and potential means. Suppose I am about to play a tennis match and I have three racquets in my bag. Each racquet is a potential means to playing tennis. But once I choose the Wilson racquet it becomes an actual means (or an appropriated means, a means that is intended). I have been using the word 'means' to mean 'actual means', and I think this is the more primary and precise sense of the word. You have been using the word ambiguously to refer to either actual or potential means.

Not in the sense as I defined it. I guess, what is your definition of a ‘means’? It can’t be how I defined it, because that definition does not preclude unintentional means. — Bob Ross

I think we agree that an actual means is intended whereas a potential means is not. In my last post I was referring to an actual means as "a (chosen) means."

So we have it that a (chosen) means becomes a part of the intention of the end, and the foreseen effects of a (chosen) means become a part of the intention of the end. But the same crucial question that I asked earlier arises here: do they become equal parts in the intention of the end? — Leontiskos

Not in the sense that I think you mean it. I only intend to walk to the kitchen because I intend to quench my thirst. — Bob Ross

Walking into the kitchen is an actual means, and quenching your thirst is an end, and both are intended. I was asking about the relation between the actual means and the foreseen effect, not the relation between the end and the actual means.

Part of the difficulty is that you are tying up foreseen effects with potential means. A foreseen effect is a potential end, and that which causes the foreseen effect is a potential means to that potential end; but because the foreseen effect is not an actual end that which causes the foreseen effect is not an actual means (to that end). What follows is that a foreseen effect is the effect of a potential means, but not an actual means.

A is a means to Q because A is useful for facilitating Q—even if one accidentally intends or doesn’t intend at all Q.

You are right that Q is a foreseen effect; but that doesn’t absolve A from being a means toward that effect. — Bob Ross

A is a potential means but not an actual means to Q. Because A is not an actual means to Q, A is not intended vis-a-vis Q. A means is only intended if it is being used to achieve some intended end, and therefore A is not an actual means to Q because Q is not an intended end.

I can appreciate what you are going for: he “means” to achieve P and not Q in the sense that P is the main, primary goal and Q is not at all. But this does not absolve him, in this scenario, from intending Q; because a foreseen effect of a chosen means is intentional. — Bob Ross

I would not say, "a foreseen effect of a chosen means is intentional," although this is true. The problem is that you are falsely implying that A is an actual means to Q. I would rather say, "a foreseen effect of a chosen act is indirectly intentional." Aquinas would say that Q is not intended, but that Q does fall under the agent's intention (as an accidental part of that intention). Q is not intended because only means and ends are intended, and Q is neither. Nevertheless, Q falls under the agent's intention because it is accepted as a known consequence of his action. But sticking with Brock's language, we can simply say that Q is indirectly intended.

It seems like, then, you are agreeing with me with different words: Q is, in this example, intentional—but indirectly. Then it is not true that “He means only to achieve P”: he means to achieve P, and this requires him to achieve Q as well (simply because A is a means towards both and never one or the other). — Bob Ross

We agree that Q is indirectly intended, but I would not say that he means to bring about Q, nor that he is required to achieve Q. I would not say the first because A is not an (actual) means to Q, and I would not say the second because it is not an accurate use of the word 'achieve'. I would say that he is required to accept Q, not achieve Q.

It is useful for achieving Q—which has not direct relation to any intention. There could be no intention towards Q, and it would still follow that Q can be facilitated by way of A. — Bob Ross

It is useful for achieving Q but it is not being used to achieve Q, and therefore it is not being used as a means to Q. It is not an actual means to Q, but it is a potential means to Q.

It is appropriated via intention if one accepts my premise that “if one foresees an effect (Q) of a means (A) and chooses to use that means (A) to achieve their intention towards another effect (P), then they thereby intend Q”. — Bob Ross

A key problem is your idea that the word "means" does not indicate a relation. To talk about a means only makes sense in relation to some end, and therefore a means always involves a relation to an end. You are saying that A is a means and then you are equivocating on the end. A is a means qua P but A is not a means qua Q.* This is subtle, but Q is not an effect of a means, it is an effect of an act. A is simultaneously an act and a means, but it is only a means in relation to P. We should not say, "Q is the effect of a means," we should say, "Q is the effect of an act," or, "Q is the effect of a cause." Similarly, we should not say, "P is the effect of a means," but rather, "P is the end of a means," or, "P is the goal of a means."

This is why I was wary to call it “per accidens”, because I am NOT referring to a colloquial usage of the term “accident”: the latter is used commonly to refer to something someone didn’t intend to do. Manslaughter is when someone unintentionally kills someone: having a per accidens intention to kill someone for the sake of a per se intention to save someone else is NOT an unintentional killing.

The accidental aspect I am referring to, is the part of the intention, which is still an intention, that is required in the specific circumstances to achieve the original, per se, intention. Both are intentional, even if they are intended in different ways. That’s not how manslaughter works. — Bob Ross

Indirect intention does involve a kind of absence of intention. Involuntary manslaughter does work that way. Negligence is a form of indirect intention. The trolley lever-puller might be charged with involuntary manslaughter, but they would not be charged with murder.

So the first wall of your castle was the idea that a necessary condition indicates a means, and we have overcome that wall. The second wall is the idea that A is a means to Q, and I think we are close to overcoming that wall. The third wall is now in play, which is the idea that A is impermissible because Q is indirectly intended.

Regarding this third wall, suppose there is an evil and it is morally impermissible to directly intend this evil. Does it follow that it is impermissible to indirectly intend this evil?

I think not. Take the matter of the especially bad car emissions due to a faulty exhaust system. Is it impermissible to directly intend those emissions? For example, to allow your car to idle for the sake of the emissions? I think so. Does it follow that it is impermissible to get groceries in the car, even when you know it will produce those emissions? No, I don't think so.

* Or if you like: A is an actual means qua P but A is only a potential means qua Q. The point is that a potential means has no effect qua means, for it is not actualized as a means.

- Stop fooling around. Your conclusion has always been an opposition to judgments based on group statistics. Your whole point about the superiority of individual data is to undermine group data:

Arguing whether inferior [group] data is of no benefit, marginal benefit or minimal benefit is a perfect example of a distinction without a (practical) difference. — LuckyR

You seem to agree that individuals being judged on their own merits (individual data) is superior to judging individuals based on their being a member of a group (group data). That's my main point (which I predicted above that "you knew already").

Arguing whether inferior data is of no benefit, marginal benefit or minimal benefit is a perfect example of a distinction without a (practical) difference. — LuckyR

The false premise in your thinking is the idea that we always have access to superior individual data, and therefore never have need of recourse to group statistical data. If everyone were omniscient your argument would be valid. There would be no need for statistical generalization. Given that we are not omniscient, your argument fails.

You seem to be suggesting some sort of moralitocracy (a word I just made up), that is akin to a theocracy in that it posits that the ultimate goal of a society is to be as moral as possible. — Hanover

Well, if you have followed my posts on morality you will know that I view modern approaches to morality as flat-footed, so I think you've started off your journey in the wrong direction here (e.g. "The Breadth of the Moral Sphere").

I apologize if I've over-extrapolated your position from what you've said, but this analysis follows from the suggestion that the democracy must set it's objectives due to some some higher good that stands above the democracy dictating what is good. — Hanover

When you yourself say, "I don't think that a democracy always gets it right," you are already subordinating democratic decision-making to some higher good: in this case "rightness." You are saying that the purpose of democracy is, at least in part, to try to get it right.

That is, why can't Society A decide gender equality is its highest good and then set policy from there without having to contend with objections from a small minority who believe that military might is the highest good? The measure of Society A's policy would not be whether it effectively promoted military might (as that is not it's goal), but whether it effectively promoted gender equality. — Hanover

You cannot consistently claim both that democracy might "get it right" and that there is nothing to be gotten right. If you sit on that fence then you will be able to play both sides, just as you did in our discussion on determinism vs. free will in the thread Fate v. Determinism.

Either there is a correct proportion between gender equality and military effectiveness or there is not.

To erase the ideosycratic desires of a society in exchange for some type of objective ideal that must be obtained seems problematic to me. . It would suggest that if the democratic belief were 99% in favor of allowing its citizens to choose their gender and then to compete athletically with members of their chosen gender it couldn't do that because the minorities' viewpoint, even though microscopic in terms of acceptance, is correct, so, as a matter of inalienable right, the minority viewpoint would need to be imposed upon society. — Hanover

This is really the question of whether democracy is the best form of rule. Obviously a minority viewpoint does not hold sway within a democracy.

And this isn't to suggest there aren't rights and that minorities don't receive protection from majority rule, but it also doesn't take the polar opposite extreme to suggest everything is a matter of right. — Hanover

That strikes me as an odd dichotomy. We seem to conceive of rights as free-floating things, like celestial bodies that might crash into each other at any given moment. I don't know if that is a great way to think about rights.

My view is that female identifying XYs shouldn't compete athletically with XXs because I don't believe that equality is a virtue worth pursuing. I don't think society is better off if we think men and women the same. I do think XXs should be provided their own bathrooms and their own playing fields, free from the athletically superior XYs. I see no value in blurring the male and female distinctions. — Hanover

I agree, but the question here is whether you think that you are right. Whether you think your answer is the right answer, and that if the democratic process arrives at the opposite answer then it has arrived at the wrong answer. Of course one could claim that the democratic process arrived at the wrong decision while at the same time abiding by the decision, but there is a difference between democratic relativism and democratic objectivism.

I also don't think I have the right to be king of Hanoveria and dictate that my vote prevails because it's right. I'm just one guy with one vote with all sorts of reasons I hold dear, and so I cast my ballot and watch things unfold. But, again, that's not to say that there are no rights at all. They just don't extend all the way down the line to where an XX has the god given right to compete only against XXs. Let the nuts in San Fran do as they will and let the right thinking folks in my neck of the woods do as they do. — Hanover

The question of inalienable rights is an interesting one, which I believe will become more pressing as secularization continues. In my opinion inalienable rights have very little to do with democracy, and are in important ways anti-democratic.

- I don't neglect certain truths for the sake of my own personal agenda. I try not to be ideological. That we should not neglect the facts of statistics does not mean that statistical prediction should play a disproportionate role in our thinking - that would be the opposite error of what the progressive falls into. Your posts are filled with rhetoric and a lack of balance. You are trying to paint statistics and discrimination as evil. Well, good luck with that sort of propaganda.

You will note I said views not the current argument brought about by said views. — Outlander

And again, I see no evidence of that.

This is the point of contention: "on average." As it stands, your statement of fact is correct. However one is best to bear in mind that that is all that it is: a statement. — Outlander

No, you just contradicted yourself. It is not just a statement, it is a correct statement. It is a true statement. There is quite a large difference.

Not a particularly great example but sufficient for the moment. Perhaps this prospective room has a magnificent view overlooking the sea (representing the increasing opportunity for positive and lasting change for group X) that is not present in said snapshot (your sampling data of group X). Or, of course, perhaps there is a rather unpleasant occupancy of bed bugs (representing the ingrained habitual patterns and, yes your "likelihood" of regression and perpetuation of said undesirable outcomes) also not present in said snapshot. As you can see, this "snapshot" or "current sampling of available data" is a fickle indicator, whether it be positive or negative, for what the future truly beholds and as a result the best choice of action to take. — Outlander

Whether a truth can be incorporated into your hotel will of course depend on how amenable your hotel is to truth. Maybe your hotel can't handle the truth, and maybe the truth is not welcome. Maybe you have to lock and bar the doors lest certain kinds of truths come 'round, looking for lodging. I suspect you will need a healthy helping of discrimination in deciding which kinds of truths are acceptable and which are not. :wink:

As I've said, progressives lock and bar their doors against certain truths of the mathematical variety, and it looks like you are up to the same thing with the aid of some flowery rhetoric. This is more or less the definition of ideology: sacrificing truth to one's agenda. Brainwashing out the truths that do not suit the agenda. Such is always a house of cards and a matter of time.

You have a lot of good points, but I am, to be honest, losing track of the course of this conversation. So I am going to take your advice and wipe the slate clean. I am going to attempt to provide a more clear and robust analysis of what I am trying to argue: consider anything in here that is contradictory to what I have previously said as a concession. — Bob Ross

Okay, fair enough, and this is a good post. I will offer a few more posts, but I don't know how long I will stick around. I was limiting myself to the "means" question in large part because I don't have time to get drawn into all of the other related topics.

An intention is an ideal meant to be actualized. — Bob Ross

Somewhat, but I would not call it "an ideal." That has connotations of optimality. We could say that an intention is an action or effect meant to be actualized, or that it is something that one plans to bring about, or something that one aims to bring about. So if I intend to build a computer, then I plan or aim to bring about a computer. Looking now at Merriam-Webster's 'intend', it gives, "to have in mind as a purpose or goal : Plan."

An intention can have two aspects: what is essential and what is accidental.

The accidental aspect of an intention is the part of the ideal which is only in virtue of the particular circumstances in which it is being actualized.

The essential aspect of an intention is the part of the ideal which is not dependent on the circumstances whatsoever; and comprises the essence of it. — Bob Ross

I think it is right to distinguish essential (per se) intention from accidental (per accidens) intention, but in all such cases we want the essential/per se to be primary (whereas you made the per se definition parasitic on the per accidens definition).

On an Aristotelian view intention is something like the force by which will/volition has an effect on things. It is how volitional beings exercise their volition. Because of this the essence of intention has to do with what is most central to the will/volition of such a being. So if I will the end of getting groceries, then it is natural to me to plan or aim to bring about the getting of groceries, namely to intend it. Once this intention is formed the first step in the execution of my will has been formed, and as Aquinas says, "The end is first in the order of intention; the means is first in the order of execution." After recognizing my will to eat, I first intend to get groceries (end), and then I think of driving my car to the grocery store (means). The end precedes the means in the order of intention. But in executing my plan I begin with the means by getting into my car, and finish with the end by purchasing the groceries. The means precedes the end in the order of execution. This structure is divisible: for example, I must turn the key in order to drive my car (and this is a means to the end of driving the car, which is a means to the end of getting groceries); and I must collect my key in order to start the car, etc. The intermediate ends are also a means, and each means is a means to each subsequent end.

My essential or per se intention is that which adheres most closely to the aim that my will has formed. As a metaphor, the fastest and most efficient route to the grocery store adheres most closely to my end, my intention to get groceries. A circuitous route to the grocery store does not adhere as closely to my end, my intention to get groceries. Thus if a road is closed and I am forced to take a detour, then although I intend to take the detour for the sake of my end, the taking of the detour falls under my intention in an accidental manner. The accidental part of my intention is that which falls away or fails to closely adhere to my proper intention (end). As you recognize, accounting for accidental or per accidens intention requires the explanation of something that is circumstantial in one way or another. It is worth noting that essential and accidental intention differ by way of a spectrum, and are not black and white logical categories (i.e. they are contraries rather than strict contradictories).

The course of action chosen in a situation to actualize the intention is a part of the accidental aspect of it. E.g., if I intend to quench my thirst and I decide that I should walk into the kitchen to get a water bottle (or fill up a glass with water), then doing so is something I intend to do but merely because in the particular circumstances it is best for actualizing the essential aspect of my intention (which is to quench my thirst).

A means is something useful for an intention. — Bob Ross

The danger here is attaching intention too strongly to ends such that it becomes unattached to means. It is true that intention is most perfectly found in the end, and that all means are "accidental" to one degree or another. Nevertheless, we do intend the means to an end. You have an intention to quench your thirst but you also end up forming an intention to walk into the kitchen. The obtaining of the water bottle is also something you plan or aim to bring about, even though it is subordinated to your aim to bring about the quenching of your thirst. Both are intended, but the force of will that intention serves is always stronger and more direct in the case of the end, and therefore the quenching of thirst is more fully intended than the obtaining of the water bottle.

A means is something useful for an intention. — Bob Ross

Means and ends are both kinds of intentions, and both must be appropriated by an agent. There may be a cup of water sitting nearby that you are not aware of. This cup of water is "something useful for [the intention of quenching thirst]," but it is in no way an actual means to that end if you are not aware of it. This is tricky, because we can talk about means and ends apart from appropriation by an agent, for example, "You could aim at that end. You could achieve that end by such-and-such a means," but what is being proposed is the possibility of appropriation; the possibility of intentionally using the means in order to achieve the end. We could say that an unknown means is a kind of per accidens intention ("he would intend to use it if he knew about it"), and in relation to this a known means is a kind of per se intention. But it is simultaneously true that, in relation to one another, the end is a per se intention and the (chosen) means is a per accidens intention.

This is part of the subtlety of Aristotle's thought: that essential/accidental constitute a relational dyad more than two distinct and clear-cut categories. Intention is one of those things that modern modal logic can't really capture, for example:

A means is not necessarily necessary. — Bob Ross

Yes, exactly, and what this means is that the nature of a means is neither necessary nor merely possible. It is not modally representable. It is the actuation of a tendency or final cause; to intend is a kind of tending towards, not a merely logical reality.

A means that is utilized for an intention always becomes a part of that intention. E.g., if I have the intention of getting groceries and I can use my bike or car and I choose to use my car, then using my car becomes a part of the ideal (but as an accidental aspect of it). — Bob Ross

Yes, but:

The foreseen consequences of a means always become a part of the intention which utilizes that means. E.g., if I have the intention of getting groceries and I choose to use my car of which I know will pollute the atmosphere, then my car polluting the atmosphere is a part of the ideal (but an accidental aspect of it). — Bob Ross

So we have it that a (chosen) means becomes a part of the intention of the end, and the foreseen effects of a (chosen) means become a part of the intention of the end. But the same crucial question that I asked earlier arises here: do they become equal parts in the intention of the end? Do they become parts in the same way? They do not, because whereas the means is a kind of accident of the end, the foreseen effect is a kind of accident of an accident of the end (i.e. it is an accident of the means). What follows is that the foreseen effect does not adhere as closely to the formal intention (the intention of the end) as the means does, and therefore the foreseen effect and the means fall under the intention of the end in different ways. (Aquinas talks about the essence/accidents of the intention as well as the matter/form of the intention, which provides some additional resolution).

This is what Brock means by direct intention vs. indirect intention. A means is directly intended whereas a foreseen effect is only indirectly intended.

It follows that in the V diagram, Q is not a means towards P; and P is not a means towards Q. A is a means towards Q and P. — Bob Ross

A is a (chosen) means to P, and Q is a foreseen effect of A, but does it follow that A is a means to Q? Are all causes means to their foreseen effects? With respect to Q, A is the cause of an effect, not the means to an end. Only with respect to P is A a means to an end. This is where it becomes important to recognize that a means must be appropriated by a volitional subject in order to truly be a means. Consider the question, "Why did he cause A?" There are two main answers on offer:

1. "He means to achieve P"
2. "He means to achieve Q"
3. (both)

I would say the correct answer is (1). If Q is merely a foreseen effect then he neither means to achieve Q, nor does he mean to not-achieve Q. The fact that he does not mean to achieve it shows that it is not directly intended (in Brock's language). The fact that he does not mean to not-achieve it shows that it is indirectly intended on the presumption that he chooses/intends A. If he means to not-achieve Q then he would not choose/intend A. As I said above, "Supposing !(A → Q), would I still choose A?"

But the same sort of conclusion would seem to follow on your own definition:

A means is something useful for an intention. — Bob Ross

If A were a means to Q, then you would say that A is useful for some intention (with respect to Q). But what intention is that? The intended end is P, and A is only intended because it is a means to P.

A is "a means" to Q in the abstract sense, but it is not a means that you appropriate via intention. A is a cause of Q, not a means to Q. If we intend an end, we also directly intend any (chosen) means to that end; but if we are using A as a means to P, it does not follow that we are also using A as a means to Q. The intention of an end flows into the means, but the intention of a means does not flow into all of its various effects. Q is indirectly intended given A, but we are not using A as a means to Q.

It follows that swerving to kill two people to save two other people is a means towards saving the two people; but that the killing of the two people was not a means to saving the two people but, rather, an effect of swerving. — Bob Ross

Throughout you have been making dozens of very minor mistakes which I overlook for the sake of time. Here is an example of that. Your first clause is technically true, but the description is inaccurate. Action A (swerving) is not done "to kill two people to save two other people." This is like the claim that driving to the grocery store is done to emit pollution to get groceries. The bolded "to" indicates that Q is a means to P, which is exactly what you deny in your second clause. That "to" should attach to "swerving," and, "to kill two people" should be omitted altogether. One is swerving to save two people, not to kill two people to save two people. Throughout this thread you have been committing these minor infelicities which subtly bolster your position.

A driver could do what you represent here, but if I were the driver I would not do it that way. My actions would only be properly represented if those four words were omitted. A is a means to the intended end, and that intended end is P, not Q. A is done for the sake of P, not for the sake of Q. Therefore I am "swerving [for the sake of] saving people," not for the sake of killing people. A is a means to saving, not killing. Only if I intend Q would A be a means to killing people, and in that case I would be committing murder. In that case I would be using A as a means to my intended end of Q. If I were the driver I could perhaps be charged with manslaughter, but not murder. Your approach can't seem to distinguish the two.

It follows that the effects of swerving are twofold: killing two people and saving two people; and that both are intentional, because the foreseen consequences of a means (which, in this case, is swerving) are always intentional (albeit a part of the accidental aspect). — Bob Ross

So the whole point of my conversation with you is to demonstrate that a means and a foreseen effect are both intended, but in different ways! As Brock says, the means is directly intended and the foreseen effect is indirectly intended. If a foreseen effect were a means then there would be no difference between a means and a foreseen effect. For insight into the import of this, see the most recent quote from Brock that I provided.

It is always wrong to intentionally kill innocent people; so utilizing a means which has a foreseen consequence of killing an innocent person (thereby making it a part of the accidental aspect of the intention) is wrong. — Bob Ross

Is it always wrong to accidentally-intentionally kill innocent people? More precisely, is it always wrong to indirectly intend to kill innocent people? Is voluntary "manslaughter" always negligent? Those are the questions that need to be answered.

P.S. Another thing that we haven't directly delved into is the difference between causal necessity and logical necessity. For example, in the trolley case we can think of two logical propositions, 1) If I pull the lever then the track will shift, and 2) If I pull the lever then the one will die (A → Q). (1) is causal and (2) is merely stipulative. Because the lever is physically connected to the track, to pull the lever is to shift the track. The movement of the lever has a per se causal ordination to the shifting of the track. Track-levers always shift tracks. (An even more direct and per se cause is that to pull the lever is to cause the lever to move spatially.) But (2) does not have a per se causal ordination to the death of an individual. (2) is merely a per accidens cause, and this is why it needs to be stipulated within the problem itself (i.e. we need no explanation that track-levers shift tracks, but we do require an explanation for why pulling a track-lever would result in someone's death). This relates to intention because indirect intentions and per accidens causality tend to go hand in hand. The closer to per se causality an act approaches, the less plausible is the idea that the effect was not directly intended. For example, it makes some sense to say that you pulled the lever without (directly) intending to cause the person's death, but it makes no sense at all to say that you pulled the lever without intending to switch the track. Pulling the lever and switching the track are very nearly the same thing.

That I believe is the disconnect between the opposing views present in this exchange. — Outlander

No, I see no evidence of that. Here is the statement that Lucky has attempted to disagree with:

But it is reasonable. If group X has Y percentage chance of committing action Z, then—all things being equal—someone belonging to group X has Y percentage chance of committing action Z on average. Progressives have a difficult time recognizing the simple fact that there are rationally sound inferences which move from group data to individual data. — Leontiskos

Note that this has nothing to do with a present/future distinction.

Your commentary would make logical sense in cases where individual data doesn't exist (all you have to go on is group data). — LuckyR

It is valid to make inferences from group data to individuals regardless of whether we have the individual data that produced the group data. Whenever we aggregate the data of individuals into group data we are doing so in order to use the group data, and that group data can provide us with information that was not available at the individual level. Hence the whole point of sampling.

However, no thinking person would use group "probabilities" preferencially over individual data. — LuckyR

No one said they would.

Of course, you know all of this already, hence my surprise why I'm forced to to review the obvious. — LuckyR

I think the reason you are forced to offer strawmen is because you won't admit that you are wrong. You are wrong in claiming that it is always invalid to make inferences about individuals based on their statistical group data. Your point was false, "My point was it isn't reasonable when group statistics are used on individuals" (). The inability to admit that it is not necessarily unreasonable to make inferences about individuals on the basis of group statistics is a form of irrationality that accompanies progressivism.

I would like those responding to suggest how principles could be used to ground morality and gives potential examples of such. — Ourora Aureis

One way to see the problem with your view is to understand how we experience morality via principle. For example, when someone is accused (by themselves or by others) if they repel the accusation they will make a universalizable excuse, i.e. an excuse based on a principle. "You are on a diet, why are you eating a cookie!?" "Every dieter deserves an off-day once a week."

This is because the rationality that underlies thinking and speech always involves universal or categorical premises, or principles. Paying attention to experience shows us that rationality and principles are part of experience.

A "means" is asymmetrical. If A is a means to B, then B cannot be a means to A. Two things cannot be a means to one another. — Leontiskos

Sure, that’s fine: maybe I misunderstood what you were originally saying. I am saying is that Q is a means towards A, and A is an intention towards P. Q is intentional then, if one accepts that Q is intentional if it is a means towards A (that is being actualized). — Bob Ross

Egads. A is not an intention and has never been an intention. It is an action. In the trolley case it is to pull the lever, in the car case it is to swerve, etc. A is carried out for the sake of the end, P, but A is not an intention. It is an intended means to P. Similarly, your claim that “Q is a means towards A” makes no sense. It is not true in the trolley case that, “Killing the one is a means towards pulling the lever,” or in the car case that, “Killing the two is a means towards swerving” (even though both of these really would follow on your dubious claim that anything which is conditionally necessary is a means).

Now you still haven’t managed to recognize, “The other absurdity that results from your view is that Q is a means to P and P is a means to Q, which is of course impossible” (). For example, take your claim:

Q is a means to P, because one cannot achieve P without Q. Q is a necessary, utility towards P. — Bob Ross

As I have noted multiple times, (P ↔ Q). We cannot achieve P without Q and we cannot achieve Q without P. Again, therefore on your own reasoning, P must be a means to Q and Q must be a means to P, which is utterly impossible.

I gave the logic for this earlier: "In other words: (A → (P ^ Q)) → (A → (P ↔ Q))" ().

Feel free to check it to make sure that it is valid (link).

No I am not. P does not entail Q nor does Q entail P in the car example: A → P & Q. — Bob Ross

This premise is false in the examples we have given: A entailing P and Q does not imply that A entails that P entails Q — Bob Ross

Again, (A → (P ^ Q)) → (A → (P ↔ Q))

Note that contained within this is, for example, "2. (A → (P ^ Q)) → (A → (P → Q))" ().

At this point you are committing formal logical contradictions. You are affirming the antecedent and denying the consequent of a tautology.

Note too that given (A → (P ^ Q)) → ((A → P) ^ (A → Q)), your strange theory would have it that P and Q are both a means to A, as well as being a means to one another. This is yet another absurdity of your view.

In the car example, one cannot achieve P without Q, so Q is a means to achieving P because a means is something useful to a desired end, and Q is useful towards the end P. — Bob Ross

How is “hit two people” useful or helpful to the desired end of “avoid hitting all four people”? Or in the trolley case, how is the death of the one useful or helpful to the desired end of saving the five? Again, I would suggest you try to actually respond to ’s excellent analysis.

This is the central point for our debate whether or not, in our examples, the person is intentionally killing anyone; but it is not the central point for our debate about whether or not letting a person die is always immoral. — Bob Ross

You have all sorts of different, overdetermined arguments for your conclusion, like a castle with multiple walls. Whenever one suffers a defeat you silently switch to another. One has to do with intention via means, one has to do with direct intention, one has to do with omissions, etc. I am only interested in the question of intention via means, namely determining whether Q is a means to P. Your persistence even in the midst of formal logical contradiction makes me think that it will be a miracle if we ever settle that simple question.

Like I said before, the V diagram is an incomplete representation of the examples we have had. Let’s take the car example: Q is required for P in this specific scenario S, although Q is not required to bring about P all else being equal (let’s call it E).

In S, one can represent it with the V diagram but with Q and P being both required for A; and one cannot remove Q without removing P. — Bob Ross

Diagram “V” only makes sense relative to diagram “7”. Diagram “7” represents Q as a means between A and P, whereas diagram “V” represents Q as a non-means effect of A.

We can use a temporal argument to give another reason why Q_v is not a means. In the trolley example as soon as I switch the track the five people are saved, and yet the one person does not die until the trolley eventually runs over them. Now Q cannot be a means to P if P occurs before Q in time, and yet that is precisely what happens in the trolley scenario. By the time Q occurs, P has already been accomplished and completed. How could anything be “helpful or useful” to a desired end that has already occurred?

I reject “P<ndiv>”. Why should one accept that? — Bob Ross

I was hoping the grocery case would help illustrate why. As I said:

Suppose an act has two effects: I press the accelerator and two things happen: my speed accelerates and my fuel is consumed. Do you think Aquinas is right, and it is possible to intend one effect without the other? When I press the accelerator do I intend to accelerate and do I intend to diminish my fuel? And even if so, do I intend them in the same way? Is the word "intend" being used in the same way for both of these effects? — Leontiskos

Again, “Do I intend them in the same way?” That was the key question I was asking.

Secondly, intending to consume fuel to get groceries does not result in the purpose being uncompleted if fuel didn’t end up getting consumed: consuming fuel was the means to the end (i.e., purpose) and not the purpose itself. — Bob Ross

If the intention were, “Consume fuel to get groceries,” then the purpose would be uncompleted if fuel didn’t end up getting consumed. Then I would get back home, look at the fuel gauge, and say, “Crap! I didn’t manage to complete my intention of consuming fuel to get groceries! I got the groceries but I didn’t consume any fuel. What a failure of a trip!” The very absurdity of such a thing shows that the intention was not, as you say, “Consume fuel to get groceries.” But I grant that the fact that fuel is a causal means complicates the example, and that is why I didn’t press it when you ignored it. What it shows is that even known causal means can be indirectly intended, and this is probably too subtle.

A better example than fuel consumption might be emissions, in the case where my exhaust system is broken and therefore my car emits especially harmful pollution. If the direct intention before was not accurately captured by, “Consume fuel to get groceries,” then the direct intention now is certainly not captured by, “Emit pollution to get groceries.” The emission of pollution and the getting of groceries are not intended in the same way, and you are in need of a theory which accounts for this fact.

But if you want to see how Brock elaborates a bit, here is what he says:

The above account of indirect objects of intention seems to correspond to what Chisholm calls the principles of the ‘diffusiveness’ and ‘non-divisiveness’ of intention. The principle of the diffusiveness of intention is that if someone intends p, knowing that p entails q, then he intends the conjunction p and q. For instance, if a man intends to drive off in a car parked nearby, knowing that it belongs to someone else, then he intends this: to drive off in a car parked nearby that belongs to someone else. The principle of the non-divisiveness of intention is that if someone intends the conjunction p and q, he does not necessarily intend q by itself. The man may not intend just this: to drive off in a car that belongs to someone else.22

That is, he may not be doing what he is doing because it will deprive someone else of a car, but only because it will provide him with the quickest means of getting to his destination. Again, this is the difference between direct and indirect objects of intention: only the former are explanations of the action that fulfills the intention. But despite this difference, if the man knows that the car belongs to someone else, it would be ridiculous to say that he positively meant not to drive off in someone else’s car.

The point is subtle. Many authors disagree with the diffusiveness of intention principle.23 Donagan, following Bratman, while not explicitly addressing Chisholm, uses this example: ‘If you intend to run a marathon and believe that you will thereby wear down your sneakers, it does not in the least follow that you intend to wear down your sneakers.’24 This example is similar to one used by St Thomas. ‘If someone often or always gets his feet wet when he goes to a muddy place, then granted that he does not intend this, nevertheless it is not said to be by [bad] luck.’25 But what Aquinas means is that although he does not intend simply to get his feet wet, this still falls under his intention. What Chisholm’s critics seem to ignore is the other principle, the non-divisiveness of intention.26 When taken together with it, the principle of the diffusiveness of intention appears to fit very well with the doctrine that actions are individuals, i.e. that one and the same action may admit many true descriptions whose combination is logically contingent. — Stephen L. Brock, Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, Ch. 5: Praeter Intentionem, p. 204-5

Also relevant:

Consider the frequent objection to the moral significance of the question of the directness or indirectness of some result, e.g. someone’s death. If what you do kills him anyway, what difference does it make whether or not you were aiming at his very death? It makes at least this much difference: if you did not aim at his very death, then, provided that you do succeed in bringing about what you did aim at, you will not mind if something happens to prevent him from dying after all.47 That is, even if his death is a nearly certain result of your succeeding in what you are doing, it is not you who are making certain of it. Of the things that might happen to thwart the killing of someone, at least some are things that someone bent on killing him would take into consideration and try to stop, while someone not having that aim would not. At any rate, his death cannot be as certain, on the supposition of your accomplishing your aim, as it would be if it were your aim, again on the supposition of your accomplishing your aim. The certainty of your getting what you aim at, if you get what you aim at, is plainly greater than the certainty of the occurrence of something other than what you aim at, if you get what you aim at. Still, this difference, which is only one of degree of certainty, is perhaps not very significant morally. At any rate the fact that you are not directly aiming at anyone’s death does not at all entail that no matter what you do, you cannot be guilty of murder.48 — Stephen L. Brock, Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, Ch. 5: Praeter Intentionem, p. 210

"Supposing !(A → Q), would I still choose A?" — Leontiskos

What you are noting is the original intention, stripped of the necessary means towards A in the application of A in scenario S. That’s fine, but you can’t stop there — Bob Ross

Sure I can, because this is what it means for Q to not be directly intended.

So at this point in the conversation I am guessing you will have the good sense to reject your claim that "1. (P → Q) → (Q is a means to P)" (). Remember that earlier in our conversation you doubled-down against my proof and decided to reject our mutual principle instead of your false (1). The mutual principle was, "<If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q>. (the idea here is that P is clearly intended)" (). Now that you presumably understand that (1) is false, there is no reason for you to reject this principle. What you ought to do now is start from scratch and try to figure out what it means for Q to be a means to P, for it most certainly does not mean that (P → Q) (i.e. "You can't get P without Q").

No it is not: letting someone die is not an intentional killing—killing is an action. By “cause”, we could be saying that one’s action or inaction caused the person’s death. — Bob Ross

Then I would say that you need to refine what you mean by a cause.

Do you not agree that “killing” is an action which results in the death of a living being? If you do, then it should be very apparent to you that letting someone die is not a killing — Bob Ross

Sure, but I would hold that if I have not killed them then I have not caused their death. In general you are lacking distinctions regarding causation and intention. You are making these things more black and white than they are.

This is either the biggest straw-man of my position I have had yet (to-date); or you have not grasped what I have been arguing. Letting someone die is morally permissible IF one cannot save them without committing an immoral act. — Bob Ross

Okay that's fair, I retract and apologize for the claim that you think "letting happen" is morally indifferent.

If the objective in your example is to equalize the treatment of men and women at the cost of additional death, then the egalitarian dictate makes sense. What you're simply pointing out is that decisions are made without thinking through the consequences and not properly prioritizing objectives. — Hanover

Yes, this is a large part of it.

If, at the end of the day, the left's military results in some military losses and greater deaths but greater domestic equality among the sexes, then the final question as to whether that result is better than more military wins and less gender equality, that can be answered by the democratic vote. — Hanover

This is precisely where I take you to be mistaken, here and in previous posts. The democratic vote does not determine whether gender equality is better than less military deaths. Perhaps simply pointing it out is sufficient for you to see that? If Plato is right then the democratic vote will tell us much the opposite.

In a democracy we determine whether to implement that form of gender equality by a democratic vote or process. Such is the reason for the decision, not the measure of the decision. Presumably you will now want to argue that democratic procedure produces optimal decisions.

I'm voting for the more military wins, but I don't know that makes me more rational. It just makes me someone who prioritizes safety over domestic equality. Obviously if the left's military is so weakened by their desire to create gender equality that it cannot protect itself from foreign invaders, then it would be irrational, but as long as the plan is to give more people the opportunity for military advancement without overly weakening the military, then it could be rational. From my perspective, sacrificing people for an objective of equality is a stupid idea because I do not consider equality a social virtue. — Hanover

I agree very much, but my point was that, "This is a problem beyond the instrumentalization of reason, and goes to the fact that many of our taboos do not have rational grounds. It is that something can even be moral and irrational."

For someone like (and very many otherwise rational progressives), being moral means that I cannot admit the mathematical fact that group data provides statistical information about individuals in that group. They will deny the legitimacy of "profiling" even to the degree of denying mathematical facts. This is more an individual issue, but it creeps into law and policy as well. Now you might say that it is not necessarily irrational to prefer death to inequality (in the military), but is it irrational to deny mathematical facts?

Huh? Philosophy degrees need a statistics requirement. — LuckyR

Yes indeed!

If I tell you that the Atlanta Braves team batting average in 2024 is .244 (the median in MLB), what does that tell someone about Marcell Ozuna's batting average in 2024? Nothing. He's got the 5th highest average in baseball. — LuckyR

You don't think the team batting average of the Braves tells us anything about the batting averages of Braves players? Pray tell, where do you think "team batting average of the Braves" comes from? It comes from the individual members of the team! It tells us, for example, that any player on the Braves will probably have a higher batting average than any player on a team with a lower team batting average. Your counterexample fails because the logic does not tell us exact data about each player on the Braves. "Ozuna's batting average is not .244, therefore the team batting average tells us nothing about individual players' averages," is a fallacious argument. The group statistic informs us of probabilities, and we are constantly using probabilities to make decisions.

- Okay, I finally caught up in this thread. I think you are talking past me a bit. This is how I see it:

• Leontiskos: You said, "I agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive in how the practice is conceived" (link). How you would go about opposing this Rorty-esque approach to philosophy?
• Paine: Gerson incorrectly lumps Rorty and Rosenberg together.

I'm not sure what you wrote in your post addresses my question. If you agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive, then what sort of corrective would you provide to Rorty?

[Gerson] then says:

"What I aim to show is that Rorty (and probably Rosenberg) are right in identifying Platonism with philosophy and that, therefore, the rejection of the one necessarily means the rejection of the other."

In presenting this statement, there is more than a little sleight of hand in play with Gerson joining Rorty and Rosenberg together as fellow "anti-Platonists": — Paine

Has Gerson said that Rorty and Rosenberg are fellow anti-Platonists, or has he merely said that they are right in identifying Platonism with philosophy? It seems to me that he has said the latter, and it does not follow that both are anti-Platonists (or that both are anti-Platonists in the same sense).

[Rorty and Rosenberg are different] — Paine

I agree that they are different, and I don't see that Gerson has claimed they are not. Still, I am curious what corrective you would offer to "this Rorty-esque approach to philosophy" ().

That is a very sharp either/or. I don't know what that does not exclude from the pursuit of natural causes. — Paine

I think it will not exclude a pursuit of natural causes in line with Gerson's five points of Ur-Platonism.

2) Whether you think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of thing in their own day? — Leontiskos

This is where I think Gerson should not quit his day job before becoming a philosopher of history. He establishes himself in that role but not in a way that can be compared with other attempts. That is why I had to agree with your observation about the futility of comparing Ur-Platonism with Heidegger. — Paine

So I take it you don't think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of naturalism in their own day?

- Well, you brought up the payment to Daniels, not me. You brought it up because it happened prior to the election, and it is at least temporally possible that something that occurred before the election influenced the election. Then I asked if he was charged for the payment, and you started sprinkling red herrings all about. The article asks how actions taken in 2017 could have influenced an election in 2016. If you're abandoning the payment to Daniels as the action taken, then what action influenced the election? It should go without saying that the action should be related to the charge.

That there are reasons to do something doesn't mean it ought be done. — Hanover

Sure, but we are discussing whether it is reasonable, not whether it ought to be done.

That it might increase profits to be racist doesn't force a conclusion that one should be racist. — Hanover

The lurking question here is, "Is racism irrational?" Or also, "What is racism?"

For Aquinas that which is immoral is always also irrational. For us something can be immoral and rational. This is a problem beyond the instrumentalization of reason, and goes to the fact that many of our taboos do not have rational grounds. It is that something can even be moral and irrational. For example, our colloquial definition of racism would seem to be, "Discriminating on the basis of race without having any good reason to discriminate on the basis of race," and this verges on psychological impossibility. Or closer to this thread, sexism would be, "Discriminating on the basis of sex without having any good reason to discriminate on the basis of sex." This looks like liberal-egalitarian dogma. "Don't do it even if you think you have a good reason to do it."

So now just making up an example, suppose I am in a combat situation in the military, and our liberal-democratic dogmas have prescribed that women must be admitted to the military on equal footing with men. I am paired with a woman in combat; I go down; she is not strong enough to carry me out; I die. Why did I die? Because the liberal-egalitarian legislation irrationally created a suboptimal situation on the basis of the falsehood that women are equal to men in strength. Irrational failure to discriminate can have real consequences.

To the extent though anyone actually argues that cis and trans folks can't be meaningfully distinguished, that is stupid. I don't think people really do that, but the definition games often get played in a way that it pretends there is some confusion there. — Hanover

But of course people do this, and the reason is transparent. Discrimination (or "distinction") leads to unequal treatment, therefore it cannot be allowed. For example, should I be able to filter trans folks out of my eHarmony search? Many would say 'no'.

Every time I engage in an act of discrimination I do so in order to act on that discrimination, either in thought or in outward action. So if I discriminate the white from the black chess pieces, I do so in order to determine which pieces to move. Discrimination is logically necessary, discrimination always results in unequal treatment, and sometimes unequal treatment is illegitimate. So the question is always whether to err on the side of free discrimination or to err on the side of opposing unequal treatment.

Trump is no statesman; he's a fraudster, of which this particular (trivial) crime is just the latest example. — Relativist

Yes, and in the video I linked it is construed, "Trump is crimey, therefore he must have committed a crime." This is the basic thinking. And he may have committed a misdemeanor. Hard to tell.

But the broader context is the inherent immorality of the acts. Trump supporters tend to gloss over this, as if everything is fine as long as it's not illegal. — Relativist

Trump made it important by flagrantly disrespecting the rule of law — Relativist

The conviction seems to be a flagrant disrespect of the rule of law, and it seems that the only interesting question is whether this kangaroo court will significantly harm our rule of law. Courts are for legal matters, not non-legal moral matters. You yourself are showing a disregard for the rule of law in construing his conviction as a moral matter rather than a legal matter.

Trump is immoral, but were he especially criminal I would expect that a clear crime could be found! No one even knows what he is supposed to have done. The jury itself couldn't even agree on that.

You claim that the antinatalist is secretly religious... — schopenhauer1

No, I am saying that antinatalism is non-naturalistic. I wrote out responses to all of your claims, but then I shelved that post because it was so long. Instead I focused on the simple argument () and the foundational Gnosticism ().

Regarding the simple argument, I will ask you a simple question: Is it true that we should not procreate in a world where everyone receives one pinprick of pain followed by 80 years of pure happiness? Yes or no? Presumably some have ambitions of achieving such a world someday.

Here is an easier way to envision the foundational Gnosticism problem. The evolutionary naturalist says:

1. Reasoning, including moral reasoning, is a result of evolutionary adaptation
2. Evolutionary adaptation is ordered to survival
3. Therefore, moral reasoning is ordered to survival
4. The argument which says we should cease procreating would lead to extinction
5. Therefore this argument is unsound; contrary to evolutionary adaptation ordered to survival

This argument is a microcosm of the anti-Gnosticism argument, for the Gnostic must reject naturalistic premises akin to (1). For the naturalist, antinatalism is by definition irrational, as it is directly contrary to nature. Your arguments are all dubious, but one of the fundamental reasons they are all dubious is because you are essentially importing knowledge from a different "god," a god that is foreign to our nature, culture, religions, etc. In denying moral naturalism you must necessarily be appealing to some form of supernaturalism. Think of it in terms of the microcosm: if your ethic is directly contrary to evolutionary survival, then it must be coming from something above and beyond evolutionary survival.

My point was it isn't reasonable when group statistics are used on individuals. — LuckyR

But it is reasonable. If group X has Y percentage chance of committing action Z, then—all things being equal—someone belonging to group X has Y percentage chance of committing action Z on average. Progressives have a difficult time recognizing the simple fact that there are rationally sound inferences which move from group data to individual data.

Yes. The payment to Stormy was made before the election, and it was made to kill the story (interfering with the election). — Relativist

1. Was Trump charged with paying Daniels?
2. Were the actions he was charged with performed before or after the election?
3. Was a payment to Daniels illegal?
4. Is withholding information election interference?

I am late to the game, but the Libertarians seem correct: the logical and legal reasoning involved here is remarkably bad. "Jungle juice" jurisprudence:

Ok, good points.

By “means”, I mean “a necessary utility expended to produce an desired outcome”.
By “intention”, I mean “a purposeful or deliberate course of action”.

Because I accept the premise that “if I cannot achieve A without causing B, then I cannot intend A without intending to cause B”, I reject the premise I previously accepted (that “If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q”). — Bob Ross

Okay, so you are doubling-down and rejecting the premise.

Now I should say again that your definition of a "means" is not a good definition. I understand the word itself better than I understand the word-salad definition you are giving. Because your definition is less clear than the word, it is a bad definition. If you don't like 's definition then I suggest we take Merriam-Webster as a point of departure, "something useful or helpful to a desired end."

Correct; and I like your diagrams for explaining it. I understand that, from your perspective, P is not a means to Q in V because if one removes P from A then Q is still connected to A. The problem is that when Q and P are necessary utilities for bringing about A, then A cannot exist without being connected to Q and P: you cannot remove P and keep Q connected to A—A disappears. — Bob Ross

One of the fundamental problems here is that your account is unable to distinguish between the "V" and the "7" in my diagram. So then either 1) There are no relevant moral differences between "V" situations and "7" situations, and therefore your inability to distinguish them is unimportant, or 2) There are relevant moral differences between "V" situations and "7" situations, and therefore your inability to distinguish them is problematic. Note that in both "V" and "7" Q is conditionally necessary for P (i.e. P → Q).

I understand that, from your perspective, P is not a means to Q in V because if one removes P from A then Q is still connected to A. — Bob Ross

Yes, but let's continue referring to P as the good effect and Q as the bad effect. So it would instead be, "Q is not a means to P in 'V' because if one disconnects Q from A then P is still connected to A." Note that Q is not a means because it does not mediate A and P.

The problem is that when Q and P are necessary utilities for bringing about A, then A cannot exist without being connected to Q and P: you cannot remove P and keep Q connected to A—A disappears. — Bob Ross

Let's get back to fundamentals again. There are two basic principles in conflict:

• P_dfs: The principle of the diffusiveness of intention
• P_ndiv: The principle of the non-divisiveness of intention

The above account of indirect objects of intention seems to correspond to what Chisholm calls the principles of the ‘diffusiveness’ and ‘non-divisiveness’ of intention. The principle of the diffusiveness of intention is that if someone intends p, knowing that p entails q, then he intends the conjunction p and q. For instance, if a man intends to drive off in a car parked nearby, knowing that it belongs to someone else, then he intends this: to drive off in a car parked nearby that belongs to someone else. The principle of the non-divisiveness of intention is that if someone intends the conjunction p and q, he does not necessarily intend q by itself. The man may not intend just this: to drive off in a car that belongs to someone else.[22]

[22]: Roderick Chisholm, "The Structure of Intention." — Stephen L. Brock, Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action, Ch. 5: Praeter Intentionem, p. 204

(I take it that Chisholm's contemporary approach will be more accessible.)

You have a good grasp of P_dfs but you are letting it override P_ndiv. Let's go back to my example that you did not respond to:

Suppose an act has two effects: I press the accelerator and two things happen: my speed accelerates and my fuel is consumed. Do you think Aquinas is right, and it is possible to intend one effect without the other? When I press the accelerator do I intend to accelerate and do I intend to diminish my fuel? And even if so, do I intend them in the same way? Is the word "intend" being used in the same way for both of these effects? — Leontiskos

You seem to be committed to the position which says that when I drive to the grocery store I am intending to consume fuel. This isn't correct. I intend to get groceries, and the consumption of fuel is a side-effect that I would prefer not occur. I only assent to it because I don't know how to get to the grocery store without consuming fuel.

Brock uses the terms "direct intention" and "indirect intention." I directly intend to get to the grocery store; I indirectly intend to consume fuel. Key here is the relation of each to my purpose: if my direct intention does not come about then my purpose has not been achieved, but if my indirect intention does not come about it does not follow that my purpose has not been achieved. If for some reason fuel is not consumed during my trip, the trip is successful all the same. If I get back to my home and see that the fuel has not been diminished, I do not say, "Oh no, my purpose was not achieved!" Yet I do precisely this if I get home and realize that I have no groceries in the car. Direct and indirect intention are different, and any theory that cannot make sense of their difference is inadequate as a theory.

I would suggest reading Aristotle's account of the sailors who throw cargo overboard in Book III, Ch. 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics (link). It is very often referred to in this area of philosophy. A key element of that story is that the cargo is thrown into the sea even though doing so is undesirable and not directly intended.

P ← A → Q

The problem is that this doesn’t completely represent the relationship whereof Q and P are necessary for A. I don’t know how to represent it this way, but in logic it would be “A → (P & Q)”: you can’t say that A → P is true when Q is false given “A → (P & Q)”. — Bob Ross

Right: this is the antecedent of (2) of the argument I gave: < 2. (A → (P ^ Q)) → (A → (P → Q)) >.

This premise is false in the examples we have given: A entailing P and Q does not imply that A entails that P entails Q—you are thinking in terms of the 7 diagram instead of a reciprocated V diagram (where A cannot exist without being connected to both Q and P). — Bob Ross

On the contrary, the premise is tautological, and is therefore always true. It is nearly the logical representation of what you said just above, "you can’t say that A → P is true when Q is false given 'A → (P & Q)'." The point is that you cannot say that (P → Q) is false when (P ^ Q) (i.e. given A, both follow). Remember that the key is the relation between P and Q.

Take the car example, I am actually saying (as opposed to this premise 2):

{A → (P ^ Q)} → {![(A → P) && !(A → Q)]} — Bob Ross

Sure, that's fine. It is true that (A → (P ^ Q)) → ((A → P) ^ (A → Q)). But again, to know whether Q is a means to P we must understand the relation between P and Q, and the conditional necessity that you are betting all your chips on is represented by (P → Q).

Now, an easy way to understand the flaw in your reasoning is to reflect on your 7 diagram; because it implies that if you were to remove P that Q is still connected to A, which is not true, for example, in the case of the car swerving example. If A is “swerving to save four people” and P is “saving four people” and Q is “hitting two innocent bystanders”, then removing P does not result in A → Q. Viz, if the intention is to save four people, then the effect of hitting two innocent bystanders is no longer connected with the intention in the event that there are no four people to save. — Bob Ross

So first, A is not "swerving to save four people." Saving four people is impossible, and we do not intend the impossible. Here is what I already said:

A: Swerve right
P: Avoid hitting all four people
Q: Hit the two people on the right — Leontiskos

Now if we are aiming at Q then we don't need to achieve P (although we could). So we can remove P without removing Q. But in fact we are not aiming at Q; we are aiming at P, and Q is not a means to P as so helpfully demonstrated.

Fair enough--except for the killing part: it is not a killing. Yes, from what I have said, and I did not catch it on my last response, it follows that letting the second person die is a means towards saving the first person: I accept this. — Bob Ross

Okay, and I addressed your claim about "killing" in my post above. As I said, that seems to be a tangent. The central point has to do with whether Q is a means to P. If you want to say that Q is still intentional killing even in the "V" case then that is a separate argument from the claim that Q is a means to P.

The other absurdity that results from your view is that Q is a means to P and P is a means to Q, which is of course impossible. This is because in (2) (P ^ Q) is interchangeable with (Q ^ P), and what this means is that A leads both to the conclusion that Q is a means to P and to the conclusion that P is a means to Q. In other words: (A → (P ^ Q)) → (A → (P ↔ Q)). — Leontiskos

That’s exactly what it means for a thing to be dependent on two other things that are independent of each other. Operating this computer with two screens requires two different monitors. Monitor 1 and Monitor 2 are independent of each other analogous to the V diagram, but A (which is the operation of the computer with two screens) requires both. If you remove 1 or 2, then you cannot operate the computer with two screens (A); and it is not like the 7 diagram either: the monitors are independent of each other and mutually required for A. — Bob Ross

No, not at all. Some points:

• A "means" is asymmetrical. If A is a means to B, then B cannot be a means to A. Two things cannot be a means to one another.
• Monitor 1 and Monitor 2 are not a means to one another, nor is either one a means to the other.
• The operation of the computer does not require two screens.

Now you want to make A "Operation with two screens." Erm, okay, but then this would be the "two birds with one stone" scenario, not the (Car → (Groceries ^ Gas)) scenario. Remember that we are talking about double effect, where P is a good effect and Q is a bad effect. You are talking about a different thing, where there are two good effects (two effects directly intended). The computer scenario and the car scenario are both "V" scenarios, but the crucial point is that the intention is different in each of them. Your desire to have a second monitor is not parallel to my desire to consume fuel. You want a second monitor and I don't want to consume fuel.

The question of a means can be represented by a particular sort of counterfactual, "Supposing !(A → Q), would I still choose A?" On "7" scenarios the answer is no, whereas on "V" scenarios the answer is yes. Again, this is not to deny that (A → Q) might dissuade me from choosing A, but it does mean that whenever I answer 'yes' to the counterfactual it follows that Q is not a means to P.

I would prefer we just refer to it as intentional killing vs. killing: that is the most clear way of presenting it. — Bob Ross

Yes of course you would, for that would aid your position. Likewise, I would prefer if we just refer to it as killing vs. non-intentional killing. So again, I suggest we not use the word "killing" without a prefix.

- Good post.

The point is that not turning the wheel is just as much a choice as turning it. — Herg

This is exactly right. As I said:

The problem with this analysis is that to discretely decide to continue sitting is an act. It is a decision to omit standing. If someone decides to omit an act then they have acted, by deciding to continue in the course they were already in. But again, I am going to leave this omission vs. commission question for another day. — Leontiskos

Now I would say that a decision is an act, but the larger point is that we are responsible for our decisions, and therefore we are responsible even for decisions that do not terminate in (external/transitive) "acts."

NO! You lack a distinction between letting something bad happen and doing something bad. My action was to give the first person water to save them; and the simultaneous deprivation of water (from that act) of the second person is an inaction: it is a negative counter-part to a positive. You do not seem to have fully fleshed out this kind of distinction, and instead insist on everything being an action.

I intentionally let, in this example, the second person die: I did not kill them. This is morally permissible because (presumably) there was no morally permissible way to save them. — Bob Ross

Strictly speaking I admit a distinction between commissions and omissions, but I would say your theory simply cannot support this distinction in our current context. This is because your only tool of analysis is conditional necessity. "I let them die," is (arguably) equally applicable to all of our other cases. For example the lever-puller will say that they merely let the single person die in order to save the five. If we analyze these cases according to conditional necessity, then each case is the same insofar as you perform an action in which you "intend" and "cause" the necessary death of someone (according to your own claims). To intend and cause the death of someone is to intentionally kill them. It makes no sense for you to say that you intend and cause their necessary death but you do not kill them. Some of this will hopefully clear up when I respond to your full post.

Please see me and Leontisk conversation which I am responding to here as well. I addressed this with their diagrams above. — Bob Ross

Herg's analysis was quite good, and should be addressed. He is making the same claim I am making but doing it in a more natural way. As he says, "whether Alan and Betty are present has no bearing on whether the car can swerve and hence save the lives of Charles and Dora."

Edit: If Bob Ross were right, then one would have a magic get-out-of-jail-free card for any moral quandary: just do nothing! For example, if a pilot (like Sully) found himself in a difficult situation, then he would just do nothing and apparently on Bob's theory he could never be blamed. This is incorrect because it is often wrong to do nothing (and the choice to do nothing is often the wrong choice to make).

- Thanks Paine, I will try to offer a response sometime in the next few days.

Oh, discrimination is not only not a negative, it's essential to human existance. Since in it's absence we'd treat each other identically ie we'd never learn from experience. — LuckyR

I agree. :up:

Of course, there is a key difference between discrimination between groups and individuals. For example it is more than reasonable for an insurance company to charge more for all businesses in a neighborhood (that happens to be majority Black) that experiences more vandalism. It's completely unreasonable to charge a business that happens to be own by a Black man but located in a neighborhood with average vandalism, a high premium. — LuckyR

Well, if the insured businesses are more likely to be vandalized then it is reasonable for the insurance company to charge higher premiums, regardless of whether groups or individuals are involved.

I already explicated this in my response: Q is not intended if Q is not a means towards P and P was intended. — Bob Ross

No, you have not already explicated that. You gave a case when Q is not necessarily intended, and this is different from giving a case where it is not intended.

So now you say <If Q is not a means to the intended P then Q is not intended>. Okay, it is good that you answered, even though your answer is false. If A is throwing a stone, P is hitting bird 1, and Q is hitting bird 2, then Q is intended even though it is not a means to P. This is the “two birds with one stone” case that I already gave, which is the same as the “V” circuit where vertex P and vertex Q are both intended.

But what you have failed to do over and over again is to tell us when Q is the means and when Q is not the means. You have been begging the question by repeating, “Q is a means in the trolley/plane/car case!” Herg and I have been providing analyses of when something is a means and when it is not, and we have been trying to lure you into a real analysis of what it is for something to be a means. Of course you have now provided an analysis in terms of conditional necessity.

What I am going to do is focus on the water case, because that is the sole case where you claim that Q is not a means to P. If it is shown that your claim fails there according to your own analysis of what it is to be a means, then it will become more apparent that you have offered no substantial analysis of what it is for something to be a means. For parity let us assume that the water is necessary to live:

• A: Give water to the first person
• P: The first person lives (because of the water)
• Q: The second person dies (for lack of water)

If we look at the quotes from your previous post, we find that you must hold that Q is intentional killing, because you must hold that Q is a means to P:

1. Q is intended in this case because it is a means towards P. Without hitting the two people, one cannot avoid hitting the four people—that’s exactly what it means to use something as a means — Bob Ross

In the water case, without the second person dying for lack of water, one cannot avoid the death of the first person. P cannot be achieved without Q. Therefore on your reasoning, Q is a means to P, and is therefore intended.

3. Hitting the two people to save the five is an action which results in the deaths of the two; which is thereby an act of killing (as opposed to letting them die). — Bob Ross

In the water case, depriving the second person to save the first is an action which results in the death of the second person. On your reasoning, this is an act of intentional killing, where P cannot be achieved without Q.

6... does NOT takeaway from the fact that one cannot in this scenario achieve the end without X. — Bob Ross

One cannot achieve P without Q, therefore on your reasoning Q was a means to P.

Your error in all of this is conflating conditional necessity with the presence of a means. You are trying to say, “If in causing P I necessarily cause Q, then Q was a means to P.” This is actually contrary to our mutual premise that <If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q>. The presupposition behind this premise is that P is a good effect and Q is a bad effect, and that there are cases where we cannot get P without also getting Q. That is the whole point of the rider: even when I know that A causes Q. You are more or less just denying that rider by claiming that whenever A is known to cause Q, Q is automatically a “means” to P. If P were possible without Q then A would not cause both P and Q.

Or else, go study the diagram I drew up, paying particular attention to the “V” shape. If we are aiming to provide current to vertex P, then we must apply current to vertex A, and this will necessarily result in current flowing to vertex Q, but it does not follow that the current flowing to Q is a means to the current flowing to P! A will supply current to P whether or not Q exists, and this is completely different from the “7” shape.

It’s not so hard to logically demonstrate the contradiction:

1. (P $\to$ Q) $\to$ (Q is a means to P)
2. (A $\to$ (P ^ Q)) $\to$ (A $\to$ (P $\to$ Q))
3. A $\to$ (P ^ Q)
4. ∴ A $\to$ (Q is a means to P)
5. Contradiction with respect to our agreed premise: <If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q>

(If (4) were true then Q is necessarily intended given that P is intended.)

Your error is (1). It does not follow from the conditional necessity of Q that Q is a means. Note that, "One cannot achieve P without Q," is the same as (P $\to$ Q).

The other absurdity that results from your view is that Q is a means to P and P is a means to Q, which is of course impossible. This is because in (2) (P ^ Q) is interchangeable with (Q ^ P), and what this means is that A leads both to the conclusion that Q is a means to P and to the conclusion that P is a means to Q. In other words: (A $\to$ (P ^ Q)) $\to$ (A $\to$ (P $\leftrightarrow$ Q)).

By “murder” do you mean an unlawful, premeditated, killing OR an immoral, deliberate, killing? I am going to straight up reject the former (legal) definition if that is what you meant; because it is going to derail the conversation substantially. — Bob Ross

By murder I mean intentional killing, and by “causing death” I mean killing that is not necessarily intentional. The simple word, “killing,” is completely inadequate to our purposes given its ambiguity with respect to intention. I suggest we avoid using that word unless we prefix it with “intentional” or “non-intentional.”

I agree that “if I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q even when I know A causes Q” and I agree that “Q is intended when it is a means by which P is achieved. — Bob Ross

Okay good, but the key thing you need to do is explain the case in which Q is not intended. Are you saying that it is not intended whenever it is not a means to P?

However, here’s what I think you are missing: letting something happen is not the same as doing something: the former is inaction which has its consequences (due to its absence), whereas the latter is action which has its consequences (due to its presence). — Bob Ross

So as I said, "I think what is happening here is that you are hoping that the deaths that occur via the pilot's omission are better than the deaths that occur via the pilot's commission, even if more people end up dying on the omission." What is at stake is a distinction between a commission and an omission.

I didn’t explicate this very clearly before, because quite frankly I am having to dive in deeper into this (conversing with you) than I have before, but letting an innocent person die is not necessarily immoral; whereas killing an innocent person is. This is the relevant difference in your examples. — Bob Ross

Okay, fair enough, and I agree with that, although you would apparently disagree with my opinion that killing a person must necessarily involve an intention to kill them.

To determine whether or not one is killing an innocent person or letting them die, one needs to determine if an action which they committed is responsible for their death—viz., “if action A from P1 results in P2’s death, then P1 killed P2”. This is separate from whether or not a person intentionally kills or lets them die; and what we are discussing is the combination of one killing (i.e., taking action which results in a death) in conjunction with one’s actions being deliberate (or having knowledge which would implicate them). — Bob Ross

This business about judging one's responsibility for an omission vs. a commission comes from my charge that the pilot's omission of ceasing to fly the plane is a culpable omission. I am going to set aside that question for the time being given that it places too many dishes on our plate.

• A: Some action done by P1
• P: Some effect
• Q: P2's death

Did P1 kill P2? Or to be more precise, did P1 intentionally kill P2, or else did P1's action merely cause P2's death? "Kill" is ambiguous as to whether intent is involved. So I propose we avoid the verb "kill" altogether, and talk about murder vs. causing death. "Murder" isn't a perfect word, but it's better than anything else I can think of.

1. Q is intended in this case because it is a means towards P. Without hitting the two people, one cannot avoid hitting the four people—that’s exactly what it means to use something as a means (i.e., it is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome). This is no different than the case where one steals the water to quench someone’s thirst. — Bob Ross

Your argument is that <A means is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome; Q is a necessarily utility expended to produce an desired outcome; Therefore Q is a means>.

This is unwieldy. I like @Herg's definition better:

A means is something that facilitates or enables the performance of some action. — Herg

You responded:

Killing one person to save the five is what enables the person to save the five. Without being able to kill the one person, they cannot save the five. — Bob Ross

Now Herg's point was that pulling the lever is what enabled the person to save the five, and killing the one person is not what enabled the person to save the five, and I agree with him.

A point that Herg and I have both made is that a clear case of using one as a means to save five occurs in the hypothetical where one person is killed so that their organs can be transferred to five people in dire need of an organ transplant. When this case is compared to the trolley case, it is clear that the death of the one is a means in the transplant case but not in the trolley case.

I gave two cases of intent: "two birds with one stone," and "the basketball bank shot." Consider the metaphor of passing an electrical current through the shape of the letter "V" and the number "7". We feed current into the bottom vertex and our goal is to get current to the upper left vertex ("P"), as can be seen at <this link>.

Now Q_v is not a means to P_v, but Q₇ is a means to P₇. Do you see the difference? In the language of one way of expressing double effect, P_v and Q_v both follow immediately from A_v, but P₇ follows Q₇ mediately from A₇. Because P_v and Q_v follow immediately from A_v, Q_v cannot be a means to P_v.

Every second I am just sitting there is not another action of sitting in the chair—to continue sitting there is not an action: it is inaction. — Bob Ross

The problem with this analysis is that to discretely decide to continue sitting is an act. It is a decision to omit standing. If someone decides to omit an act then they have acted, by deciding to continue in the course they were already in. But again, I am going to leave this omission vs. commission question for another day.

I actually have to run, so I am going to post what I have so far and return to this tomorrow. Most of what you say relates to the omission vs. commission question, which I think is better left for later. Still, I will try to revisit anything I have missed in your post. Hopefully what I say here will be enough to go forward.

However, I'm not sure that this means that I can agree with you that — Herg

Sure - I edited up that post after I realized this, but it looks like you began replying before my edit went through.

I don't believe, even if there were such a thing as moral guilt, that this would make him morally guilty, because I believe his moral responsibility would be to minimise the number of people who are going to be killed, and killing the single person intentionally is unavoidable if he is to do this. — Herg

Sure, I can see that point of view.

That fairly points to the limits of my thought experiment. — Paine

Okay, so from the "Aristotle's Metaphysics" thread:

Before going into the details of what Aristotle said or did not say, I would like to think about Rorty as the poster child for what Gerson militates against. Rorty is baldly "historicist" in his description of the 'end of philosophy'. I agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive in how the practice is conceived. But is Rorty the best exemplar of what Gerson opposes? I have been questioning the unity imparted by Gerson upon classical texts in previous discussions. The assumed unity of what is being opposed by Gerson needs some consideration. — Paine

From this I am led to believe that you agree with Gerson's larger project, but disagree regarding his specific means. So I am wondering 1) How you would go about opposing this Rorty-esque approach to philosophy, and 2) Whether you think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of thing in their own day?

Actually I think Bob is taking the straightforward position that it is always wrong to deliberately kill an innocent person. — Herg

It seems to me that the question at hand asks what it means to deliberately/intentionally/purposefully kill. Although you and I may disagree on a great deal, we do agree that to pull the lever is not to use the death of the one as a means. My claim is that if his death is not intended as a means and it is not intended as an end, then it is not intended, and he has not been intentionally killed.* Bob Ross has his foot in the door insofar as he has admitted that not every effect of an act is intentional, even if it is known that it will occur.

Good posts, by the way. :up:

* I think it would be helpful for Ross to understand that if the trolley scenario were changed so that instead of one person there were ten people on the second track, then the doctrine of double effect would not permit switching the trolley to the second track, even though doing so is not necessarily to intentionally kill the ten. One cannot intend to kill, but even when one is not intending to kill it does not follow that their act will be moral.

But then, there are more rigorous, more fundamental ways of grounding truth and meaning than by means of identity and rationality. — Joshs

I don't think so, and I don't think it's a coincidence that your sentence reads like a necessary falsehood. Apart from very odd and idiosyncratic definitions of "rational," something less rational or less plausible is not more robust.

Far too often, we seem to read the modern rationalist vs empiricist debate back into Plato and Aristotle, which misses their deep connections. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Very true, just as, in an even more extreme way, many of the Wittgenstenians in these parts assume that if you disagree with them you must be following Russell.

Interestingly, he points to Ockham and Scotus as the end of the classical metaphysical tradition and the birth of "subject/object" thinking and "problems of knowledge"... — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is probably a complementarity here between Gerson and Perl given the way Gerson will identify those later themes in earlier thinkers (e.g. materialism in the atomists).

I think I see a bit of the confusion and mistakes on my end; so let me explicate it more clearly. — Bob Ross

Okay.

I was originally thinking that: if a person knows A is an (reasonable and probable or certain) implication of B and they intend B; then they intend A. This is not true: an intention is a purposeful course of action; and sometimes the purposeful course of action can have consequences which are not in the purposeful plan (of action) one had. — Bob Ross

First, I don't know how helpful this is given the fact that "intent" and "purpose" are synonyms. Now you've just said all the same things you were saying before, but with the word "purpose" instead of the word "intent." This is apparently only a superficial shift of which word is being used.

So the principle we now agree on is: <If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q>. (the idea here is that P is clearly intended)

Now I have claimed that Q is intended when it is the means by which P is achieved, or else when it is willed as an end. For example, when I shoot a "bank" shot in basketball (off the backboard) I intend the ball to ricochet off the backboard into the basket. In this case the ball hitting the backboard is Q and the ball going into the basket is P, and the very fact that Q is a means to P shows that I intend the occurrence of Q. For the second example, if I try to hit two birds with one stone, then I am intending both P and Q (hitting bird 1 and hitting bird 2) as ends. Only in these types of cases do I intend Q.

You haven't given any explanation of when Q is intended. You just said, "It's not always intended," and then you went on to give your exact same opinions with the word "purpose" instead of "intent." To take your fourth case:

3. The Pilot Example: I would say the same as the train operator example. The pilot is not intentionally killing the group of people by continuing to fly until the plane naturally crashes because their purposeful action is to try to save lives without committing any immoral acts—their intentions does not include killing people but, rather, their purposeful course of action is to avoid doing immoral acts.

4. The Car Example: Ditto. — Bob Ross

So for the car:

• A: Swerve right
• P: Avoid hitting all four people
• Q: Hit the two people on the right

Remember that we agreed on the principle, <If I intend A and A causes effects P and Q, then I do not necessarily intend Q, even when I know that A causes Q>. You are claiming that although one does not necessarily intend Q, they do intend Q in this case. But why is that? We have agreed that, "Because they know it will happen," is an insufficient answer.

Or the trolley:

1. Standard 1 vs. 5 Trolley Problem: the person who pulls the lever to save the five is purposefully taking a course of action of sacrificing one as a means to save the five. This is immoral. — Bob Ross

• A: Pull lever
• P: The trolley misses the five people
• Q: The trolley hits the one person

Why would one think that the lever-puller is intending or purposing to kill the one person?

5. The Water Example: I agree that if one has water and has to choose between quenching the thirst of one person or another and they intend to quench one person’s thirst, then they are not intending to deprive the other of water. This is because their purposeful course of action does not include depriving them of water; whereas in my original example, it did. — Bob Ross

• A: Give water to the first person
• P: The thirst of the first person is quenched
• Q: The second person is deprived of water

Now how is this any different from the other scenarios? To merely assert that their purpose/intent does not include Q is to beg the question. If I can not-intend this Q, then why can't I not-intend the other Q's?

3. The Pilot Example: I would say the same as the train operator example. The pilot is not intentionally killing the group of people by continuing to fly until the plane naturally crashes because their purposeful action is to try to save lives without committing any immoral acts—their intentions does not include killing people but, rather, their purposeful course of action is to avoid doing immoral acts. — Bob Ross

Here you are actually responding to my counterclaim that if the pilot ceases to fly the plane he intentionally kills:

• A: Cease flying the plane
• P: Avoid actively killing anyone
• Q: People will die

Why isn't the pilot responsible for Q? He knows Q will occur if he stops flying the plane, so on your reasoning it seems that he intends Q.

I think what is happening here is that you are hoping that the deaths that occur via the pilot's omission are better than the deaths that occur via the pilot's commission, even if more people end up dying on the omission. But Q still occurs on the omission, it does not go away.

I would also like to add that sometimes knowledge of B implying A and intending B does implicate one in intending A... — Bob Ross

I agree, along with Aquinas.

I would say that they don’t intend it in different ways, because both have the purposeful course of action of sacrificing one person for the sake of others. — Bob Ross

Again, this is just an assertion. I could do the same thing if I said regarding case 5, "He intends/purposes to sacrifice the second person for the sake of the first person." This is not to reason or explain; it is merely to assert.

I genuinely believe that the police officer would say you intended to sacrifice the person for the other people; and I am surprised that is controversial to say. If your purposeful course of action is to save the people you are about to run into and you know the only way to do so is to sacrifice someone else, then the full course of action that you are purposefully taking is using one person as a means towards saving the other people. No? — Bob Ross

I suppose we could look up some cases like this to see if they are convicted of murder, if you actually believe they would be so convicted.

Since they know that pulling the lever necessarily results in killing one person and that this is the only way for them to save the five; then they are intending to sacrifice the one to save the five. — Bob Ross

Herg’s point is that the death of the one is not a means to the saving of the five, and we know this because something could happen where the one frees himself from the track and the five would be saved all the same. This is completely different from the transplant case. In that case if the one frees himself and does not die then the five do die. In one case the bad effect is a means, whereas in the other case it is not.