- Thanks for your service, fdrake. :up:

As you might imagine, I was thinking about the problem of creating a moderation-light forum approach even before you resigned. In general I think Vanilla/Plush is too outdated, and provides the mods with too little leverage to do their job. The ban-or-nothing consequence structure naturally creates a laissez-faire environment. This is the note I jotted down when musing on the question:

It would seem that real life interactions are opt in, not opt out, and that this makes a large part of the difference on internet forums. At least, it is that part of the difference that can actually be managed. So what if on a discussion forum, the person creating the thread had the ability to allow only a specific set of people to comment within the thread. This could be combined with an invitation system in which people could ask permission to be invited into the thread. Uninvitations would not be allowed, except perhaps in rare circumstances. This would create an environment in which those who don’t play nice would not be invited to play at all, and yet which would not need to avoid the anonymous nature of the internet.

Something like this would be one attempt to create a self-managing community which better reflects the way the real world works. The troll who has too much time on their hands and goes around derailing thread after thread is simply not invited to participate in threads by those who make them. This is an example of a feature that could drastically cut down on moderation costs, and also lead to healthier communities where bad actors are naturally disincentivized. Ideally it would help combat the way in which the internet has become a natural home for the anonymous, parasitic rabble-rouser.

In real life it is not taken for granted that someone is worth talking to, or that someone possesses the social competence to be invited into a discussion. Why not extend that to internet forums? Why not create an internal incentive for users to maintain an appreciable level of post quality and social quality?

Banno pretends to talk about things he does not understand, such as the de re/de dicto distinction:

To a large extent this is a modern version of the de re/de dicto distinction. — Banno

But:

I'm not too up on the de dicto/de re distinction — Banno

Or Aristotelian logic:

Aristotelian essentialism apparently does not differentiate analyticity from possibility. — Banno

Or Medieval philosophy:

but we can be much clearer here using modal first order language than was possible in medieval times. — Banno

---

How does possible world semantics restore coherence in the face of referential opacity? — bongo fury

A good question.

---

It appears that the modal logic that Quine was addressing was mostly that prior to what we might be using now. And much, much clearer than Medieval modal logic. — Banno

Quine was as ignorant of Medieval logic as you are. He is not responding to it.

Aristotelian essentialism apparently does not differentiate analyticity from possibility. — Banno

Good resources showing that Aristotelian essentialism is more robust than anything the moderns have stumbled upon are as follows:

If that is right, you may be interested in Gyula Klima's "Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism," where he compares a Kripkean formulation of essentialism to an Aristotelian formulation of essentialism, and includes formal semantics for signification and supposition, which involves the notion of inherence. Paul Vincent Spade also has an informal piece digging into the metaphysical differences between the two conceptions, "The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on Some Big Themes."

Note that Banno's whole logical horizon is bound up with the bare particulars of predicate logic, so I'm not sure it is possible to easily convey an alternative semantics to someone who who has never been exposed to an alternative paradigm. — Leontiskos

Klima spends more time with Kripke and Spade more time with Quine. It's no coincidence that those who do not know the past do not progress beyond it.

Instead, as an atheist, I would deny premise FTI10: It's true that the Big Bang happened, but it's false that God caused it. — Arcane Sandwich

But there is no premise that the Big Bang happened, is there? And FTI11's "If so" is very strange, for it means, < If (If the Big Bang happened, then God caused it) then (if it is a revealed truth that Jesus is God, then Jesus caused the Big Bang) >. And this means that FTI12 is not sufficient for the modus ponens of FTI13.

But we could supply tacit premises that resolve some of this. My question is this: is FTI10 the weakest premise for the atheist? I think the weakest premise for the atheist is FTI12.

I see this argument as unpersuasive, but my difficulty with it is the same difficulty that appears elsewhere, namely the exclusion of the Trinity. That Jesus is divine does not bring with it the conclusion that whatever God does, Jesus does, for God (the Father) begat the Son and yet Jesus did not beget the Son. Further, Jesus was not remotely born when the Big Bang occurred, so how could he have caused it? We could argue that the Son is the Word through which all things were created, but I don't see why a Christian would want to pursue such arguments against an atheist who does not even believe in God at all.

You asked why Christians never argue for Jesus' divinity. I pointed out that they do. But it isn't a great surprise that you are not aware of those arguments. For why would a Christian try to convince someone that Jesus is divine if that person doesn't even believe that God exists? It would be putting the cart before the horse, especially in today's historically critical age.

(Note that the reason Lemaître thought the Big Bang had theological implications was because it so closely paralleled creatio ex nihilo, a revealed doctrine. And note that atheists and non-theists such as Einstein were highly prejudiced against Lemaître's findings because of this same theological reason. Given then that FTI10 was so widely accepted by Christians and non-Christians alike, it must have a fair amount of plausibility. Einstein's reaction was that FTI10 is plausible but the Big Bang could never have occurred, and that there must be something wrong with Lemaître's physics. Ergo: "God did not cause it, therefore it never happened.")

(Out for awhile.)

- This is a good post, but it strikes me as too strongly opposing rationality and signs. I think you are right that argument and rationality are overemphasized in our time, but as I see it the Bible and the tradition present faith and reason as an antinomy. Or in other words, I don't think there is a clear case to be made for the primacy of the will over the primacy of the intellect, as if the will must be regenerated before and independently of the intellect. Still, insofar as our age overemphasizes intellect, an emphasis on the will is meet.

To take but one example, "blindness" to signs is simultaneously an intellectual defect and a volitional defect. Additionally, that some abuse signs does not mean that others do not properly use them, and the Bible is filled with both types. There is even serpentine Ahaz who refuses to ask for a sign for all the wrong reasons, and this captures the way that intellect and will are all mixed together.

(Note though that a sign is altogether different from a demonstration in Aristotle's sense.)

- Thanks for that interesting quote.

It seems like your main objection to the OP is of a methodological nature — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, that's right, in particular the method necessary in order for a true dialogue to take place. Let me say a bit more regarding methodology, because I think it undergirds the metaphysics.

(FTI7) If hyper-Chaos exists, then it's possible that Jesus is God.
(FTI8) Hyper-Chaos exists.
(FTI9) So, it's possible that Jesus is God.

...

(ATI7) If hyper-Chaos does not exist, then it's not possible that Jesus is God.
(ATI8) Hyper-Chaos does not exist.
(ATI9) So, it's not possible that Jesus is God. — Arcane Sandwich

So this is another symmetrical pair of arguments. Note that when two or more people are considering a topic, they will first consider a thesis such as God's existence, and then they will consider an argument for or against that thesis. At that point the discussion must shift to be about the argument and its validity or soundness, not the thesis per se. If one person gives an argument for a conclusion and the second person gives a different argument for the contrary of that conclusion, then they end up talking past each other as I noted in my last post to you. What the second person must instead do is address the argument itself so that the two are talking about the same thing.

The only time I would want to present two diametrically opposed arguments is to say, "Here are two arguments, which do you find more persuasive?" But we should only do this with real, organic arguments; and arguments which are real and organic will hardly ever be mirror opposites. This sort of mirror opposition creates an a priori gulf between the interlocutors, where all common ground and agreement is denied. Without some common ground between interlocutors argument is not possible.

Perhaps to Leontiskos's surprise, I'm not sure if I should accept this non-Christian argument or not. Is it true that it's impossible that Jesus is god, as the conclusion ATI9 says? I'm not sure. — Arcane Sandwich

Relatedly, I don't think this is the right way to assess arguments. We shouldn't look at the conclusion in order to see whether to accept an argument, for such a thing constitutes post hoc rationalization. If we want to take an argument seriously then we must look at the premises, see if they are true, and then see if the inferences from the premises are valid. The conclusion is an after-thought to the analysis of an argument, in that it should not be assessed in isolation from the argument that supports it.

As for myself, I deny premise FTI8: hyper-Chaos does not exist. — Arcane Sandwich

The other difficulty I see is that "hyper-chaos" is more opaque to the average person than God is, and what this means is that your premises are more opaque than your conclusion (and therefore we are failing to move from what is better-known to what is lesser-known). Now perhaps you have an argument elsewhere where the premise(s) are defended, but as I said in my last, the defense of premises is central to an argument. The premises of a three-step argument will tend to be in need of ample support.

I don't have time to move beyond methodological considerations, but in general I think it is helpful when one gives arguments they really believe and that they are really willing to defend. This is related to my thread, "Argument as Transparency."

I am interested in what do we learn from this argument? What is now known or made clearer? — Fire Ologist

may be trying to convey the same idea, namely the difference between arguments and "arguments."

---

- :up:

And another way to critique your FTI1 is to say that essentially no one believes it. At least I don't know of any group that believes God is necessarily identical to Jesus (even ignoring the problematic Trinitarian theology here). Christians themselves do not generally claim that the Incarnation was theologically necessary. Or else think about the fact that everyone without exception would agree that FTI1 was false before Jesus was born, and that if God existed before Jesus of Nazareth was born then strict identity cannot obtain. — Leontiskos

(Note that in the original argument it is FTI1 that denies the antecedent of ATI1, and is hence implausible.)

Hmm, I get trying to mirror the Christian argument — Count Timothy von Icarus

As for me, I don't understand the emphasis on symmetry. ATI4 is the fallacy of denying the antecedent with respect to FTI4. Of course one could set out ATI4 and ATI5, argue for them independently, and achieve a reasonable argument, but I don't see any atheist who would want to make that argument. In fact ATI4 seems uncontroversially false, given that things can be true without being revealed.

I don't see why @Arcane Sandwich keeps giving two contrasting modus ponens arguments, each with a mirrored conditional premise. In a true modus ponens, to argue from a mirrored conditional is just to deny the antecedent. Arcane seems to have biconditionals in mind, given the way that he does not see the conditional premises as controversial. So his arguments all look like this:

1. p ↔ q
2. p (theist's premise)
3. ~p (atheist's premise)
4. ∴q (theist's conclusion)
5. ∴~q (atheist's conclusion)

Now if one likes symmetry then one will like this approach, but unfortunately real arguments are almost never symmetrical in this way. Thus my critique always holds of this sort of symmetry–chasing, namely the critique that, "No one believes that," i.e. no one believes the conditional which is artificially constructed to aid the denial of the antecedent.* Drawing out the biconditional like this helps show why the logic quickly becomes so goofy, for those giving a modus ponens will almost always deny that their conditional premise is biconditional.

In real life a modus ponens gets mirrored by the contrasting modus tollens, not by an artificial conditional which allows one to deny the antecedent. To then go a step further, the deeper mistake here is the idea that one can quickly set out two arguments which will provide equal representation for the theist and the atheist. Such inevitably produces a faux equal representation. In my opinion, if one wants to delve into questions of theism or atheism, then one needs to produce an argument for one position or the other. This then brings us to the deepest critique: one cannot give simplistic "arguments" without defending one's premises (i.e. We should not be forced to surmise what people might argue. Rather, posters should be giving real arguments.)

In any case, this sort of symmetry does not represent the way real arguments work. In the real world where counter arguments are produced by ricochet, this sort of symmetry only occurs when interlocutors are falling into fallacies, such as the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Note well how there are no overlapping premises. The theist and the atheist are basically talking past each other.

* And if we ask the question, "Why did you write this proposition which no one believes?," I think the answer is simply, "Because it's the opposite." ATI4 is the opposite of FTI4 and FTI1 is the opposite of ATI1. ATI4 and FTI1 have no intrinsic plausibility; they are merely the mirror opposites of the conditional premise of two real arguments, and they are written because there is some desire to have symmetrical opposites.

---

To say a bit more, a proof for God's existence will tend to rely on a definition or a quasi definition of God, and this is amenable to a biconditional. But an argument for Jesus' divinity will tend to rely on the idea that Jesus fulfills some condition which is unique to a divine being, and this will be much less amenable to a biconditional given the fact that such an empirical condition will rarely constitute a sine qua non. This is all the more true when we are talking about a revelation, which involves a measure of contingency by its very nature (i.e. FTI4 is not biconditional, and therefore ATI4 does not obtain. If FTI4 were biconditional then it would constitute a necessary truth and not a revealed truth, or at the very least it would represent a theological claim that Arcane is certainly not intending to make.).

- Well here's a good rule of thumb: if the article you are reading says hardly anything at all about the reasons why some decision is being made, then it's probably not objective reporting. If the only motive a story provides for why Trump, Musk, or Rubio are doing what they are doing is that they are evil dictators bent on world domination, then part of the story might be missing.

All of that talk about 'integrity' is a lie and a cover for the actual reality of what happened, which was a violent insurrection aimed at subverting a legal election. — Wayfarer

Hochschild again:

Who attempts to overthrow a government without weapons? Why would the alleged leader of an insurrection authorize military force to protect the government, and why would the alleged insurrection victims countermand that authorization? How do people who listen to speeches about democratic procedures and election integrity in one location transform into enemies of the Constitution after walking a mile and a half to the east? Who believes that interrupting a vote would overturn a government? If there was an attempted insurrection, why would a notoriously creative and aggressive prosecutor fail to find any basis for filing insurrection charges? — Joshua Hochschild, Begging your Pardon

Pretty good points, actually. It's almost as if the eyewitnesses have a more reasonable account than the folks who are hell-bent on making Trump look bad, come hell or high water.

This is the man who’s first official act was to commute the sentences of 1500 people sentence to prison for storming the US Capital on 6th Jan 2021 — Wayfarer

Here's a fun story from Dr. Joshua Hochschild, who you are so fond of:

Pardoning the January 6 protestors in 2025 formally completes the rejection of the manufactured narrative. It permits us to raise questions that have been too long avoided. It should prompt the masses who fell victim to psychological warfare to wonder what made them so vulnerable to manipulation. And it redirects the burden of shame to those—whoever they are—who tried to control a nation by manufacturing an ignoble lie. — Joshua Hochschild, Begging your Pardon

Wayfarer, it looks like you're being brainwashed by the media. I would suggest taking a breather, turning off the computer for a bit, reconnecting with nature and reality, etc. Let the dust settle. Stop jumping to conclusions. Wait and see what the investigation brings, whether USAID is actually shut down, and whether the US ceases its aid programs (Rubio and everyone else have said that this is not going to happen). Don't let these news agencies manipulate your emotions.
In the US the sort of anti-Trump sensationalism you are caught up in has become a bit of a joke:

He seems a decent fellow, but if actually was, he’d resign immediately. — Wayfarer

Ok, Wayfarer. You read an article from WaPo and now you're passing judgment regarding Rubio's resignation? From Australia? :roll:

Why do you think you have any idea what is going on with this highly complicated case, mere days after the story broke? What if it's more complicated than the left-leaning media is telling you? Because that's never happened before! Your facts have been wrong, you are contradicting the most reliable sources we have, and you are randomly posting weird conspiracy theory-esque photos of Trump and Musk. Gossipy sensationalism isn't doing anyone any good.

What is coming out of the USAID investigation are pretty grievous misappropriations of funds, from a country whose national debt far exceeds its GDP. It's no wonder that the USAID employees refused to cooperate with Rubio, the acting administrator of USAID. Folks with a bit more prudence are waiting to see how deep and dark the USAID rabbit hole goes before opining on who needs to resign. Rubio has said that in some cases as little as 17% of the funds were making it to the endpoints that the program was meant to serve. But we can't talk about that because it doesn't paint Musk in a bad light, and that's the goal here, right? :roll:

More from Rubio:

How does one know someone has "the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them"? Apparently by agreeing with them. It is open for the theist to say, of anyone who disagrees with their argument, that they have not spent sufficient time "to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God".

All rather sequestered and distasteful, really. "Mutual understanding" here means "agreeing with me". — Banno

This is precisely the sort of cynicism that is problematic, and which leads to you being written off as an unserious poster. You take this passage from Klima:

So what seems to be required from the theist to understand the atheist in the first place is to realize how the atheist can look at the world without a God and still be able to conceive of God in a non-committed, parasitic manner, as being an object of the theist’s beliefs, but bearing no relevance to his own beliefs. On the other hand, to understand perfectly the theist, the atheist has to be able to think of God as the theist does, as bearing utmost relevance to everything thinkable. But for this, he would have to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 5

...and you reduce it to, "Anyone who disagrees with the argument has not spent sufficient time." :roll: Klima doesn't say that at all. You are projecting your own eristics into the paper and diminishing the thread with these petty imputations of bad motives.

I can understand why you would be frustrated with a stubborn argument like Anselm's, but ad hominem misrepresentation is not a great way to deal with that frustration.

Note how Roark critiques the argument instead of resorting to ad hominem or reading things into the paper that simply are not there.

Klima anticipates your sophistry:

[we] should not seek sheer “winning” in a debate (for that is the concern of sophists) — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 5

Someone like yourself who is motivated primarily by the fear that Klima might "win" a "debate," and who reads everything he writes through that petty, childish lens, simply does not understand philosophy. And I should think you also do a disservice to atheists, who are not all so petty, fearful, and closed-minded.

At this point, I'm told that there are no such arguments, because the thesis that Jesus is God is a revealed truth. My counter-point to that is that the thesis that God exists is also a revealed truth. — Arcane Sandwich

For Catholics neither are purely revealed truths, even though both can be (and have been) revealed (although one could argue with me on whether Jesus' divinity is purely revealed if they wanted to).

In any case, it would be a small minority which does not think natural reason can do a lot of work on such questions. For example, those who met Jesus during his Earthly life and came to believe that he is divine were not working apart from their natural reason.

The concept of belief is foreign to the formal sciences. — Arcane Sandwich

Participation in a philosophy forum is not a formal science. Premises which no one believes, such as FTI1, are useless. Their highest level of function is as a strawman.

Not quite. I haven't started a thread on the topic because I know that the moon is not made of lasagna. So does everyone else. — Arcane Sandwich

But you're skipping around the question. What if you didn't know it is not, but you didn't believe it is. And you knew that no one else believed it is. Would you start a thread on the topic?

(Lack of belief is sufficient; recourse to knowledge is a different issue. The concept of knowledge is arguably as foreign to the formal sciences as the concept of belief.)

- I spoke to the question at some length , namely to the dispute between Roark and Klima on the proper conclusion of the proof.

Beyond that, what I said to you stands.

We could go back to Banno's claim:

This is also very similar to the question-begging atheist:

1. All valid ontological arguments beg the question
2. This is a valid ontological argument
3. Therefore, this begs the question

But how does the inductive (1) get to be so strong? And even beyond that, what is "an ontological argument"? As the very first sentence of Klima's introduction implies, that whole label is anachronistic. Certainly Anselm would wonder how one can know that a whole bundle of loosely-affiliated arguments are known to be faulty a priori. — Leontiskos

Then contrasting Aquinas:

Aquinas’ response to Anselm in the Summa Contra Gentiles is quite interesting. On the one hand, it is of the weaker “question-begging” form that we spoke about earlier, given that it does not directly address Anselm’s proof. On the other hand, it is quite different from the other similarly weaker replies that we have seen. In particular, Aquinas’ approach takes the dialogical nature of the exchange as being fundamental, as opposed to the idea that Anselm has simply transgressed an inferential law (e.g. “no-existence-from-words,” which is reminiscent of “no-ought-from-is”). — Leontiskos

Now one can take Banno's question-begging approach. There's not a great deal of shame in that. But I don't want to do that. The only objection that I might offer is that constitutive reference to God is not possible, at least in the strict sense required for Anselm's definition (and Klima or Aquinas might object in a similar way). But I don't really know that such an objection succeeds. In a more general way the island objection seems like the best readily-available objection.

So given that I don't have any close objections, I am forced to admit that it is sound. But I think Klima's analysis is apt, which is to say that the argument will not be persuasive without the requisite kinds of concept-acquisition. Gaunilo's own retort in section 5 is also quite good (having to do with the way that concepts and assent interrelate).

In one sense this is odd, ergo:

3. Does this mean that Anselm’s proof can be sound for the theist while being unsound for the atheist? — Leontiskos

But on the other hand it is not odd that an argument could be sound in itself but yet inaccessible and therefore unpersuasive to some. The odd thing about this argument is that the further work lies in concept-acquisition rather than the further defense of some premise.

And what about the atheist who agrees with Klima, if that is possible? They would say that the opposite of concept-acquisition is required, namely shearing away the relevant thought object from Anselm's universe of thought objects, which would entail establishing criteria for what counts as an incoherent thought in a way that falls short of contradiction.

What's interesting in any case is how Klima has created commensurability over what is usually seen to be an incommensurable gulf.

---

Edit: It should go without saying that Klima does not see the atheist as irrational, and I agree. But I think we want to ask whether it is unfair that the atheist cannot adequately respond to the proof in the way of a close objection. In the first place, not necessarily, unless we are to say that all sound proofs are unfair to those who dislike their conclusions. In the second place, perhaps, in a way that Gaunilo's point about words could shed light on. If there is a place where John Henry Newman addresses this proof he might have a very worthy objection that develops Gaunilo's thought in section 5.

Yet Einstein's conceptualization of spacetime is based on the development of non-Euclidean geometries, particularly Riemann's ideas. — Arcane Sandwich

But Einstein believed in non-Euclidean geometries, so the premise fails. No one is objecting to Einstein talking about something he believes in, but after all, Einstein did not talk about the moon being made of lasagna.

No, I don't believe FTI1. And even if I did, what I believe (and what anyone else believes) is irrelevant to the truth value of that premise. — Arcane Sandwich

Truths that no one believes are irrelevant to a philosophy forum, for they cannot be spoken of.

It doesn't matter if we believe that the moon is made of lasagna or not. — Arcane Sandwich

Then why haven't you started a thread on the topic? (Hint: it's because the topic is irrelevant. Why? Because it does not bear on anyone's beliefs.)

Note that this is why there are good arguments and bad arguments: because premises which do not touch on someone's beliefs cannot persuade, and it is the job of an argument to persuade.

Yawn. — Banno

Yes, you're lazy. We know. It's written all over.

No one believed in non-Euclidean geometries during the 19th Century, not even their own pioneers. — Arcane Sandwich

And that's why it didn't make any sense to talk about them.

Shorter: math and logic don't care about our beliefs. So we should feel free to explore their uncharted territories, and to do so with whatever beliefs we would like to have in mind while doing so. — Arcane Sandwich

Are you saying that you believe FTI1? Because again, if not and no one else believes it, then it looks to approximate a strawman rather than something fit for discussion.

For example, should we conduct a dialogue on the question of whether the moon is made of lasagna? No, of course not. Why? Because no one believes such a thing. And using "the moon is made of lasagna" as a premise in an argument would be equally pointless, given that it has no bearing on anyone's beliefs.

Interesting reference, I'll try to read it tomorrow. — Arcane Sandwich

No worries. I haven't read it and I don't really plan to. I was just offering an example of how common this sort of argument is.

And here again is the closing off of the argument to critique by those who disagree. — Banno

A great deal of provision is made for disagreements. One disagrees with a proof by showing a premise false or an inference invalid. When one has neither shown a premise false nor an inference invalid, they haven't disagreed except in the manner of begging the question.

It's not an either/or type of deal. — Arcane Sandwich

Right.

Doesn't matter. The way I see it, logic has nothing to do with belief, just as math doesn't have anything to do with belief. The notion of belief is foreign to the formal sciences. Mathematical truths are still truths even if no one believes in them. The same goes for logical truths. — Arcane Sandwich

What use is there in asking people to consider a proposition that no one believes, not even oneself? It seems like putting something on the food menu that isn't edible.

Indeed, but my opinion is that throughout the centuries, Christian philosophers have been solely preoccupied with proving that God exists, without being equally preoccupied with proving that God is Jesus Christ. And they should, because otherwise, what makes them Christian philosophers, instead of theistic philosophers in general? — Arcane Sandwich

I think you'll find that Christians make relevant arguments. In Aquinas' day they argued against Islam, because Islam was popular. In the Enlightenment period they argued against Rationalism. Nowadays there are a lot of people claiming that Jesus was not divine, and so Christians tend to argue in that direction. Here is an example from two days ago.

- Sure, but a different conclusion requires a different argument. There is no single argument that proves both FTI2 and FTI3, considered as propositions. Anselm's is arguing for FTI2.

And another way to critique your FTI1 is to say that essentially no one believes it. At least I don't know of any group that believes God is necessarily identical to Jesus (even ignoring the problematic Trinitarian theology here). Christians themselves do not generally claim that the Incarnation was theologically necessary. Or else think about the fact that everyone without exception would agree that FTI1 was false before Jesus was born, and that if God existed before Jesus of Nazareth was born then strict identity cannot obtain.

The difficulty here is that the existence of God is a very modern preoccupation, whereas the divinity of Jesus has been a perennial question. In a perennial sense the existence of God and the divinity of Jesus are two quite separate questions. No one really thinks that one cannot believe in God's existence without believing in Jesus' divinity, or that one cannot abandon Jesus' divinity without abandoning God's existence.

I'd call it something like "logical reductionism", or something along those lines, something that sounds more "politically correct" but without losing too much bite. — Arcane Sandwich

That's fair. The point for me is that it is one theory among many, which must be expected to compete with other theories without any special privileges.

In any case, I agree that Anselm's argument becomes more difficult to dismiss when one cannot simply appeal to one's own quantificational preferences in a question-begging manner.

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sky_daddy, if preferred. — Banno

Another failure to read, for your own source testifies against you:

Noun
1. (slang) A god, especially (derogatory, offensive) God the Father.
Synonyms: sky fairy; — Wiktionary

You are the one who is posting about me. — Banno

Many others point out the same sorts of problems:

It might help if you would sketch the argument that you take McDowell to be misapprehending. — Pierre-Normand

While I appreciate many of your observations, the arrogance of this remark is not a benefit. — Paine

How about we start by analyzing these completely irrational themes that underlie these sorts of discussions, instead of digging our heels and just blurting out nonsensical accusations such as "You don't really understand Quine's point." — Arcane Sandwich

Treat this as an invitation to engage with the thread topic on its own terms...
If you want to use this style of analysis, and see the thread through its terms entirely, you're going to remain confused. — fdrake

Of course you are not displeased that your trolling has garnered traffick. — Lionino

If you are only interested in arguing that Austin (or Wittgenstein, or anyone else) never advanced this theory, I have already accepted as much. I just want to discuss the theory as it has been described. — cherryorchard

You are falling into yet another ignoratio elenchus, for Klima tells us explicitly that the intentional theory and the causal or historical* theory agree on this: — Leontiskos

This theory agrees with the recent “historical explanation”[19]—as opposed to the Russellian—theory of reference on the fundamental insight that speakers may successfully refer to objects by descriptions that do not apply to these objects. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

(So Banno didn't read the paper. A lesson we have learned too many times by now. What drives him is his fanatical anti-religious creed.)

Again:

Those who have read the paper carefully already recognize Banno’s absurd misrepresentations. I invite them to engage with the paper thoughtfully and to avoid falling into the sort of trolling that Banno's whole persona has been reduced to. Engaging those who are not serious and do not have the capacity to authentically interact with the paper is a waste of time. There is no need to waste our time with such people. Tony Roark is a great example of someone who engaged the paper thoughtfully and with intellectual honesty. He is the sort of person we should imitate. — Leontiskos

So let's make this thread about me, too. What fun. — Banno

Fun indeed. You derail all the threads you participate in to be about you, because you can't engage OPs and topics on their own terms. This has been going on for some time.

Good thing you'd never engage in anything so rude, then. — Banno

Slurs against an entire class of people in order to "cleanse" the forum of their participation and ethos? Nope, I haven't. Digital eugenics isn't my thing. And I'm not seeing what digital eugenicists like yourself add to the forum (apart from the ongoing suppression of philosophical discourse).

Banno has shown with each of his posts that he simply lacks any real skills of reading comprehension. All of his posts are full of weird shit that does not come from Klima or the paper, and when it is pointed out to him over and over, he just buries his head in the sand and moves on as if nothing has occurred. — Leontiskos

To give another example, namely the long tangent regarding Kripke:

You are hung up on that word "description," and you want to say that Kripke differs from Russell on descriptions. Sure, but Klima already noted that. "Description" is a common word. Klima is quite reasonably reading "designator" as a description, given the belief about the semantic referent condition.

So using Kripke's own example that Klima picks up, consider the referent, "Her husband," in the sentence, "Her husband is kind to her." For Kripke the speaker must believe that the man fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator, "Her husband." For Kripke, even though he is mistaken, his reference succeeds in virtue of his belief. Klima riffs on that very same example and shows how one can use parasitic reference even without the belief that Kripke requires. If Klima can say, "'Her husband' happens to be her kind boss," (or Roark can say, "The most significant British composer in history is a hack"), without involving the belief that Kripke claims is required, then obviously the theory of reference is different from Kripke's. And that's the point here: the intentional theory of reference differs from Kripke's theory of reference. — Leontiskos

1. Banno claims that Kripke is being misrepresented
2. Banno is proven wrong, at length over a number of posts by two different users
3. Banno buries his head in the sand

Banno has enough time on his hands to repeat this sort of nonsense ad nauseum. I don't.

but also to see who bites... — Banno

A troll trolling.

The forums periodically suffer a rash of god bothering. — Banno

The troll's emotional needs require excising the forum of any talk of God, and his tools are misrepresentation and slurs. Argument and philosophy are beyond his pay grade.

Maybe we need more plumbers:

You say it yourself. You've got old. Brittle and senescent, to use the technical terms. That you would have Genesis on the turntable, rather than Black Midi or Connan Mockasin, speaks to your reduced capacity to deal with environmental novelty (even if you have the other side of the trade-off in the conviction of your certainties, the wisdom of a lifetime of evermore entrenched habit.) — apokrisis

I'm glad we've all agreed that "sky daddy" is a slur, but the point here is that sophistical dismissals and emotional mis-readings are not a great look for those who want to claim the intellectual high ground.

If someone like Banno is willing to put in the time to understand and then critique an argument in fairness, then they should do that. If they are not willing to put in that time, then they should hold their tongue rather than try to "win" with slurs and aspersions. Time and again we have seen Banno unwilling to put in the time and effort for a fair assessment, but nevertheless running his tongue with slurs and aspersions.

(This is my, "This is why I'm putting Banno back on ignore" speech.)

Calling the Sky Father a Sky "Daddy" is like saying that it's a Sugar Daddy but in the sky — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, and I am heartened to know that even someone who speaks Spanish as their first language sees this. Of course, Banno's "Google AI" is not a source at all for this sort of matter.

The upshot is that understanding the argument as a proof of god's existence requires a commitment to the existence of god. — Banno

Banno has shown with each of his posts that he simply lacks any real skills of reading comprehension. All of his posts are full of weird shit that does not come from Klima or the paper, and when it is pointed out to him over and over, he just buries his head in the sand and moves on as if nothing has occurred. Probably the most absurd case occurred here, but the occurrences are constant:

Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist? — Banno

.. :lol: Anyone who has read Klima's argument knows that this is precisely what (2) does.

Why does Banno persist in this sort of behavior, here and elsewhere? Because he is a troll. He uses the forum to try to address his emotional needs, and here he is emotionally invested in the idea that Klima or his paper must be dismissed. He has engaged in this sort of emotion-driven nonsense from his very first post in the thread. That he has not managed to read or comprehend the paper is no surprise, for reading the paper would get in the way of his emotional needs. Banno is a hack who has no real desire for philosophical discourse or authentic dialogue. He just goes around shitting on everything he fails to understand, and his capacity for said failure is unparalleled.*

After Banno tried to overtly hijack the thread I just put him back on ignore, where he belongs. I have since responded to posts of his that others have picked up, but I think most people on TPF recognize that Banno is in large part a bored troll who is merely engaged in emotional, knee-jerk gainsaying.

Those who have read the paper carefully already recognize Banno’s absurd misrepresentations. I invite them to engage with the paper thoughtfully and to avoid falling into the sort of trolling that Banno's whole persona has been reduced to. Engaging those who are not serious and do not have the capacity to authentically interact with the paper is a waste of time. There is no need to waste our time with such people. Tony Roark is a great example of someone who engaged the paper thoughtfully and with intellectual honesty. He is the sort of person we should imitate.


* And that is the great irony. Klima is trying to build a bridge to mutual understanding, and Banno is intent on destroying the bridge before it is built, lest light come into his solipsistic cave. Banno is the Logical Positivist who refuses to admit that the project has failed, and who closes his eyes tightly whenever anyone presents him with the obvious evidence.

I did intend it as a slur. — Banno

Of course you did. Because it's a slur.

And again to my original point: you resort to that sort of thing because you're too dumb to square off with rationality and argument.

Fair enough. I've been pinned to the matt on that one. — Moliere

:up:

How do you feel about ↪Arcane Sandwich 's term? — Moliere

Sure, particularly if you're speaking of a religion that uses that phrase.

- So you agree it's pejorative, you agree it's insulting. Now go read the definition of slur.

- I don't know, maybe, "Our Father, who art in Heaven"?

Do you literally believe the words coming out of your mouth when you claim that "sky daddy" is not a pejorative slur?

- double post - server stutter -

- The idea that "sky daddy" is not a slur is too dumb for me to argue with. I just don't know what to say at this point.

And yes, of course atheists at the bar will use slurs to speak of religion. That's not strange at all.

It's not a slur because... — Moliere

No, it's a slur. Get real, Moliere. :roll:

- It strikes me as accurate. A handful of 20th century logicians think up a very new (and as it turns out, very bad) way of approaching existence, and they declare that anyone who thinks otherwise is an untouchable. So it is a strange form of imperialism.

As Bunge himself says: — Arcane Sandwich

Hence the atheist will have to propose serious arguments against it [Anselm's argument] instead of the sophistry of the logical imperialist. (...) In short, Anselm was far less wrong than his modern critics would have it. — Bunge (2012: 175)

That sort of "logical imperialist sophistry" is pretty common here on TPF, as the thread on Anselm's proof shows.

But problems happen when folk think they can prove that their sky daddy exists using the ontological argument, and so that anyone who says otherwise is anathema. — Banno

Or does the problem occur when atheist trolls can't manage to refute an argument, so anyone who uses it is anathema? They resort to slurs like "sky daddy" because they are too dumb to mount a coherent argument.

But Dawkins and his ilk are in their 80's and the irrational fad has passed. Once the hangers-on die out completely it will be back to inter-religious dialogue, particularly with the burgeoning forms of neo-paganism.