How does one know someone has "the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them"? Apparently by agreeing with them. It is open for the theist to say, of anyone who disagrees with their argument, that they have not spent sufficient time "to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God".
All rather sequestered and distasteful, really. "Mutual understanding" here means "agreeing with me". — Banno
So what seems to be required from the theist to understand the atheist in the first place is to realize how the atheist can look at the world without a God and still be able to conceive of God in a non-committed, parasitic manner, as being an object of the theist’s beliefs, but bearing no relevance to his own beliefs. On the other hand, to understand perfectly the theist, the atheist has to be able to think of God as the theist does, as bearing utmost relevance to everything thinkable. But for this, he would have to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 5
[we] should not seek sheer “winning” in a debate (for that is the concern of sophists) — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 5
At this point, I'm told that there are no such arguments, because the thesis that Jesus is God is a revealed truth. My counter-point to that is that the thesis that God exists is also a revealed truth. — Arcane Sandwich
The concept of belief is foreign to the formal sciences. — Arcane Sandwich
Not quite. I haven't started a thread on the topic because I know that the moon is not made of lasagna. So does everyone else. — Arcane Sandwich
This is also very similar to the question-begging atheist:
1. All valid ontological arguments beg the question
2. This is a valid ontological argument
3. Therefore, this begs the question
But how does the inductive (1) get to be so strong? And even beyond that, what is "an ontological argument"? As the very first sentence of Klima's introduction implies, that whole label is anachronistic. Certainly Anselm would wonder how one can know that a whole bundle of loosely-affiliated arguments are known to be faulty a priori. — Leontiskos
Aquinas’ response to Anselm in the Summa Contra Gentiles is quite interesting. On the one hand, it is of the weaker “question-begging” form that we spoke about earlier, given that it does not directly address Anselm’s proof. On the other hand, it is quite different from the other similarly weaker replies that we have seen. In particular, Aquinas’ approach takes the dialogical nature of the exchange as being fundamental, as opposed to the idea that Anselm has simply transgressed an inferential law (e.g. “no-existence-from-words,” which is reminiscent of “no-ought-from-is”). — Leontiskos
3. Does this mean that Anselm’s proof can be sound for the theist while being unsound for the atheist? — Leontiskos
Yet Einstein's conceptualization of spacetime is based on the development of non-Euclidean geometries, particularly Riemann's ideas. — Arcane Sandwich
No, I don't believe FTI1. And even if I did, what I believe (and what anyone else believes) is irrelevant to the truth value of that premise. — Arcane Sandwich
It doesn't matter if we believe that the moon is made of lasagna or not. — Arcane Sandwich
Yawn. — Banno
No one believed in non-Euclidean geometries during the 19th Century, not even their own pioneers. — Arcane Sandwich
Shorter: math and logic don't care about our beliefs. So we should feel free to explore their uncharted territories, and to do so with whatever beliefs we would like to have in mind while doing so. — Arcane Sandwich
Interesting reference, I'll try to read it tomorrow. — Arcane Sandwich
And here again is the closing off of the argument to critique by those who disagree. — Banno
It's not an either/or type of deal. — Arcane Sandwich
Doesn't matter. The way I see it, logic has nothing to do with belief, just as math doesn't have anything to do with belief. The notion of belief is foreign to the formal sciences. Mathematical truths are still truths even if no one believes in them. The same goes for logical truths. — Arcane Sandwich
Indeed, but my opinion is that throughout the centuries, Christian philosophers have been solely preoccupied with proving that God exists, without being equally preoccupied with proving that God is Jesus Christ. And they should, because otherwise, what makes them Christian philosophers, instead of theistic philosophers in general? — Arcane Sandwich
I'd call it something like "logical reductionism", or something along those lines, something that sounds more "politically correct" but without losing too much bite. — Arcane Sandwich
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sky_daddy, if preferred. — Banno
Noun
1. (slang) A god, especially (derogatory, offensive) God the Father.
Synonyms: sky fairy; — Wiktionary
You are the one who is posting about me. — Banno
It might help if you would sketch the argument that you take McDowell to be misapprehending. — Pierre-Normand
While I appreciate many of your observations, the arrogance of this remark is not a benefit. — Paine
How about we start by analyzing these completely irrational themes that underlie these sorts of discussions, instead of digging our heels and just blurting out nonsensical accusations such as "You don't really understand Quine's point." — Arcane Sandwich
Treat this as an invitation to engage with the thread topic on its own terms...
If you want to use this style of analysis, and see the thread through its terms entirely, you're going to remain confused. — fdrake
Of course you are not displeased that your trolling has garnered traffick. — Lionino
If you are only interested in arguing that Austin (or Wittgenstein, or anyone else) never advanced this theory, I have already accepted as much. I just want to discuss the theory as it has been described. — cherryorchard
You are falling into yet another ignoratio elenchus, for Klima tells us explicitly that the intentional theory and the causal or historical* theory agree on this: — Leontiskos
This theory agrees with the recent “historical explanation”[19]—as opposed to the Russellian—theory of reference on the fundamental insight that speakers may successfully refer to objects by descriptions that do not apply to these objects. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4
Those who have read the paper carefully already recognize Banno’s absurd misrepresentations. I invite them to engage with the paper thoughtfully and to avoid falling into the sort of trolling that Banno's whole persona has been reduced to. Engaging those who are not serious and do not have the capacity to authentically interact with the paper is a waste of time. There is no need to waste our time with such people. Tony Roark is a great example of someone who engaged the paper thoughtfully and with intellectual honesty. He is the sort of person we should imitate. — Leontiskos
So let's make this thread about me, too. What fun. — Banno
Good thing you'd never engage in anything so rude, then. — Banno
Banno has shown with each of his posts that he simply lacks any real skills of reading comprehension. All of his posts are full of weird shit that does not come from Klima or the paper, and when it is pointed out to him over and over, he just buries his head in the sand and moves on as if nothing has occurred. — Leontiskos
You are hung up on that word "description," and you want to say that Kripke differs from Russell on descriptions. Sure, but Klima already noted that. "Description" is a common word. Klima is quite reasonably reading "designator" as a description, given the belief about the semantic referent condition.
So using Kripke's own example that Klima picks up, consider the referent, "Her husband," in the sentence, "Her husband is kind to her." For Kripke the speaker must believe that the man fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator, "Her husband." For Kripke, even though he is mistaken, his reference succeeds in virtue of his belief. Klima riffs on that very same example and shows how one can use parasitic reference even without the belief that Kripke requires. If Klima can say, "'Her husband' happens to be her kind boss," (or Roark can say, "The most significant British composer in history is a hack"), without involving the belief that Kripke claims is required, then obviously the theory of reference is different from Kripke's. And that's the point here: the intentional theory of reference differs from Kripke's theory of reference. — Leontiskos
but also to see who bites... — Banno
The forums periodically suffer a rash of god bothering. — Banno
You say it yourself. You've got old. Brittle and senescent, to use the technical terms. That you would have Genesis on the turntable, rather than Black Midi or Connan Mockasin, speaks to your reduced capacity to deal with environmental novelty (even if you have the other side of the trade-off in the conviction of your certainties, the wisdom of a lifetime of evermore entrenched habit.) — apokrisis
Calling the Sky Father a Sky "Daddy" is like saying that it's a Sugar Daddy but in the sky — Arcane Sandwich
The upshot is that understanding the argument as a proof of god's existence requires a commitment to the existence of god. — Banno
Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist? — Banno
I did intend it as a slur. — Banno
As Bunge himself says: — Arcane Sandwich
Hence the atheist will have to propose serious arguments against it [Anselm's argument] instead of the sophistry of the logical imperialist. (...) In short, Anselm was far less wrong than his modern critics would have it. — Bunge (2012: 175)
But problems happen when folk think they can prove that their sky daddy exists using the ontological argument, and so that anyone who says otherwise is anathema. — Banno
I’m referring to a situation where a system of values becomes the foundation for large-scale political struggle. — Number2018
Laclau’s concept of the empty signifier refers to a vague and transient, yet potent and dynamic, sense of solidarity. — Number2018
MAGA is not just about concentrating executive power. But the logic behind its implementation takes on a dynamic of its own, one that eludes pre-existing discursive or ideological frameworks. Take, for example, the latest executive orders on tariffs that the Trump administration is set to impose on Canada and Mexico. — Number2018
Biden had more popular votes than Trump and a bigger mandate — BC
But Rubio was confirmed as Secretary of State. — Wayfarer
As an official component of U.S. foreign policy, USAID operates subject to the guidance of the president, secretary of state, and the National Security Council. — USAID | Wikipedia
And you're OK with that? — Wayfarer
So, your opinion piece says one thing — Wayfarer
Right - cuts are perfectly understandable. Had the debate been had, USAID been informed that it was to be merged with State, staff told that it was happened and had a chance to respond and wind up operations, it wouldn't be a story, and I wouldn't be complaining about it. — Wayfarer
And the whole point of Inspectors General is that they're not political appointees — Wayfarer
Two of my grandchildren are American. Their father is a dual citizen. — Wayfarer
An illegal appointment. — Wayfarer
Or does it? Trump summarily fired a dozen Inspectors general 10 days ago. That also was illegal as each act requires approval by Congress and 30 days notice. — Wayfarer
So, question: do you support the right of Trump to act illegally in such cases, and the right of the Executive to ignore Congress and established law? — Wayfarer
Put yourself in the position of a USAID staffer — Wayfarer
