If "studying the highest good" is going into a monastic life in order to improve oneself and happens to include reading texts then I think I can understand the motivation for the assertion. — Moliere

I think this is a good example. Presumably axiology functions like temporary monasticism in relation to the highest good. For example, St. Ignatius of Loyola fashioned his 30-day silent retreat (in large part) to help people make the most important decisions in their life—to make "an election". Now supposing that this temporary 'monastic' retreat succeeds in allowing the person to make such a decision, does it follow that the retreat is higher than the decision that it made possible? I want to say that the decision is more important than the retreat, because the retreat exists for the purpose of the decision. If the retreat were more important than the decision then the person should just have become a permanent monk and forgotten about their decision altogether!

Yeah, I agree. One can, by analogy, go to a nutritionist and follow their advice to be nutritious.

[...]

The study of nutritious certainly helps us be nutritious, but eating the right foods and not the wrong ones is what makes one healthy. — Moliere

Yes, exactly. The study of nutrition is good as far as it goes, but one could literally die of starvation while becoming obsessed with the study of nutrition. :wink:

I don't know how much study is important at all to the good at a personal level, but I recognize its importance as a discipline. I think that's getting me hung up a bit -- are we meaning the study of value is the highest good for the academic type philosophy, or the medical type philosophy? — Moliere

Axiology is a formal discipline, but I want to say that folks dip their toes into axiology whenever they reflect on a decision. "Is this really the best thing to do in my circumstance?" "Is this really the right decision to make?" So even in this non-academic sense one could compare the weighing of goods and choices with the subsequent adherence to a chosen good. Axiology helps us weigh goods, but the point (to so speak) is buying goods, not simply weighing them.

The merit of academic axiology is admittedly all the less plausible. :lol:

but usually people get by with goods just fine without studying axiology — Moliere

Yes, and the further question asks whether the highest good is the highest good or the study of value (axiology). Even supposing that we have to enter into the study of value to determine the highest good, does it then follow that the study of value is the highest good? It seems to me like saying that the study of nutrition is the most nutritious thing.

I would say that one must study good (or value) in an abstract way, but that this abstraction or reification is not itself the highest good. It seems that it simply cannot be the highest good by the very fact that it is a means to an end.

(I leave aside the probable thesis that the study of value is not the same as the study of good)

That's the thesis, but where's the reason for it? — Moliere

A good question. :up:

Many people are inclined to say "it is wrong to torture babies" is a (1) proposition and (2) its truth is relative to beliefs; however, they then proceed to re-write it, to make it valid, as "I believe it is wrong to torture babies" which is not the original proposition. — Bob Ross

Yes, exactly.

The proposition "I believe <...>" is NOT true or false relative to a belief. I can't say "oh, well, 'I believe X' is true because I believe that 'I believe X' is true". — Bob Ross

• P: "I believe that aliens exist"
• P2: "I believe that I believe that aliens exist"

I would say that the truth of P is relative to a belief, namely my belief regarding aliens. However, I think you are right in saying that it is not necessarily relative to the belief expressed by P2.

The main point is that even though some propositions depend on beliefs, ethical propositions such as <Do not torture babies> do not depend on beliefs, and are therefore not made true or false in virtue of a belief.

I have no clue what a "moral decision" is supposed to be, it's a term you brought up but isn't defined in the OP. I explained my assumption so it can be corrected. — Judaka

You are the one who introduced that term, hence my point.

Suit yourself. — Judaka

And my point was that you should provide an example, even though that example does not need to adhere to the financial parallel you have tried to set up.

We don't consider acts moral/immoral, we consider principles moral/immoral and acts with no relevance to any moral principles are non-moral. Is that not your experience as well? — Judaka

The OP asks you to spell out the difference between a moral principle and a non-moral principle. The contention is that you will not be able to do this, and because of this your moral theory will fail.

- Good OP. :up:

Going back to the example, “2 + 2 = 4” is a mathematical proposition. Imagine that one held that (1) mathematical propositions exist, (2) they are true or false relative to beliefs, and (3) the belief is contained in the mathematical proposition (as described in the rectification section for moral propositions): it is clear that by accepting #3 (which is the rectification to the internal inconsistency) the original mathematical proposition must be transformed into “I believe 2 + 2 = 4” and that this proposition is not mathematical. In fact, since every mathematical proposition would have to be transformed in this manner, there would be no mathematical propositions anymore—they would get transformed away. — Bob Ross

Yes, good.

1. "2+2=4"
2. "I believe that 2+2=4"

1. "Aliens exist"
2. "I believe that aliens exist"

Although (1) and (2) are quite different, folk on this forum like to equivocate between (1) and (2). When we do philosophy we are usually concerned with statements of type (1), not of type (2). (2) represents a more specialized inquiry which should not be conflated with (1). Nevertheless, (2) is a proposition, it is just an unusual proposition because it depends on beliefs. The question is whether ethics concerns statements of type (1) or type (2). When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter, and is not about peoples beliefs. An ethical proposition is no more made true by beliefs than a mathematical proposition is made true by beliefs.

• A: "It is wrong to torture babies."
• B: "I believe it is wrong to torture babies."

The moral subjectivist is liable to redefine ethics such that it is about statements of type (2) rather than statements of type (1); they wish to talk about B rather than A. The first problem with this is that it is simply not what ethics is, historically speaking. The second problem is that if ethics were only about things like B and in no way about things like A, then ethics would not be a science or field of inquiry except in the most insubstantial sense. Ethics would then reduce to irrational claims like, "I believe it is wrong to torture babies, and I have no rational grounds for so believing."

Yes, it's complex. I keep thinking, though, that a "sincere dictator" isn't impossible. Consider two scenarios: 1. A rational egoist of some stripe enters into dialogue and lays out a case for an essentially first-personal approach to ethics. In the process of doing this, it becomes clear that a consequence of their case is that there's nothing irrational about trying to get people to do what you want. This puts the dictator in performative contradiction, but it doesn't mean that their sincerity breaks down. The dictator sincerely believes that using duplicitous arguments is OK. 2. The first-person dictator isn't intelligent enough to understand the implications of their theory. The dictator sincerely believes that there's no contradiction, but that's wrong. When it's pointed out, the dictator doesn't understand, and persists in trying to make the case. Here the dictator is in contradiction and perhaps revealed as not much of a philosopher, but again, is their sincerity really in doubt? — J

I would say that case (1) need not involve "duplicitous arguments," and therefore it is not clear that a rational egoist is a dictator. The key is that egoism as a doctrine need not engage in duplicity, and the effect is that interactions between individuals will be interactions between self-consciously egoist individuals, such that all are "playing by the same rules." On egoism either no one is engaged in communicative action, or else everyone is partially engaged to the same extent. The person in case (2) does not seem to be a dictator, both because they are merely making an innocuous mistake, and because they remain within communicative/egalitarian action, trying to convince and persuade their interlocutors.

To summarize, you keep picturing the dictator as wily and manipulative, fully aware of what they're doing, but that may be giving them too much credit, in a way. — J

As above, they need only be negligent, not malicious. The point as I see it is that someone is either a dictator or else they are not a dictator, and part of being a dictator is insincerity vis-a-vis egalitarian values. At every point you give a mixture, someone who is part dictator and part non-dictator. For example, in case (2) the person is a dictator insofar as they are privileging their own perspective over that of the other participants, failing to give equal consideration. Yet they are not a dictator insofar as they "persist in trying to make the case," because someone who believes that they are obligated to argue and convince others is granting those others a quasi-equal status. Their sincerity doesn't make them a sincere dictator, it makes them a non-dictator (if the sincerity is sufficient). Let me put it this way: no one can be fully dictatorial while being at the same time fully sincere vis-a-vis communicative action. Sincerity of this kind always impairs dictatorship.

OK, I understand now. And this would be different from how the referee makes his judgments in a basketball game, I presume. Maybe we need to soften words like "inscrutable" and "incorrigible" (as in "the truth which the judgment discerns will presumably be 'incorrigible'"). Rather than "inscrutable," I think your description that disavows "any guaranteed decision-procedure, any ready-made method" is much closer to the mark. And I don't see incorrigibility as really obtaining here. Communicative action is meant to be reliable, resilient, ethical, useful, truth-discovering, etc., but these results are neither certain nor incorrigible -- at least that's my reading of Habermas. — J

First, I would say that the referee's judgments are inscrutable in the same way. He makes a definitive decision in himself. Even if he gets fired later his decision will stand. Second, the whole point here is that the necessary definitive decision goes beyond Habermas' communicative action. Habermas does not want incorrigibility to obtain, and yet it must obtain if rationality is to prevail over democratic consensus.

At some point a decision must be made for oneself. Adverting to my thread, communicative action relies on a variety of hypothetical ought-judgments vis-a-vis other participants. But at the end of the day a definitive judgment must be made: a non-hypothetical ought-judgment. The President can deliberate with his cabinet as much as he likes, but when all is said and done he must render a decision, and he is the one responsible for the decision rendered.

In a 2008 address, Pope Benedict XVI makes mention of Rawls and Habermas:

. . .I find it significant that Habermas speaks of sensibility to the truth as a necessary element in the process of political argument, thereby reintroducing the concept of truth into philosophical and political debate.

At this point, though, Pilate’s question becomes unavoidable: What is truth? And how can it be recognized? If in our search for an answer we have recourse to “public reason”, as Rawls does, then further questions necessarily follow: What is reasonable? How is reason shown to be true?. . . — La Sapienza (Science, Technology, and Faith), by Pope Benedict XVI

The point I would make is that immanentism is harmful to truth/rationality, whether it occurs in authoritarian or democratic forms. Intersubjective or contextualist (democratic) ethics/politics is not simply the remedy to tyranny; it becomes its own form of tyranny when it is divorced from a "sensibility to the truth." It seems like Habermas is at least aware of this problem, whether or not his theory ultimately accounts for it.

Good questions, and I wonder about them too. It's all very well to oppose a Habermasian "actually carried out discourse" with something more abstract, like the Original Position, but what is Habermas really picturing here? Who calls the meeting into session (seriously)? What sort of time commitments are the participants imagined as having? Is there a kind of pre-nup that specifies the normative commitments? My only experience with an "actually carried out discourse" that resembles this somewhat is Quaker governance at my college. — J

Right, and some of it does smell like idealistic democratization, or perhaps an unfettered democratic principle. As Ratzinger (Benedict XVI) has often pointed out, the democratic principle and the rational principle are not the same thing, and are therefore liable to come into tension. I still see Habermas as trying construct a democratic (egalitarian) rationality, and as Aristotle points out, there is a kind of rationality proper to democratic regimes, but this is not the highest form of rationality.

After reading Number2018's posts more closely I read a bit on Habermas. I had mistakenly assumed that Habermas was explicitly restricting communicative action to "constative utterance." I didn't realize that his theory was meant to be so broad, undergirding society itself.

Which is why I support philosophy as a fundamental pillar of education. And yet many nations or education systems do not offer philosophy as a primary or secondary level module. If it were up to me it would be mandatory and fostered from an early age. — Benj96

A somewhat interesting, recent article on the topic: "Who Should Study Philosophy"?

I agree that there is a kind of circle happening here, or perhaps better, there are two possible paths toward understanding what the dictator is doing, and we keep going down first one, then the other. Down the first path, Dictator 1 remains in communication with others, and tries to justify himself. He attempts (with what sincerity we can't say) to stay within communicative rationality. According to Habermas, this is a performative contradiction because the dictator can't rationally do this. Like it or not, whether he acknowledges it or not, his performative contradiction takes him outside communicative action. — J

I would want to say that if he sincerely attempts to stay within communicative rationality then he isn't a dictator; and that a dictator is precisely someone who does not sincerely attempt to stay within communicative rationality. If someone is sincerely attempting to stay within communicative rationality, then they could not be engaged in performative contradiction, right? If this is right, then to say that his sincerity is unknown is also to say that his status as dictator is unknown. This is a large part of what is tripping me up. Additionally, assuming that he is not sincerely attempting to engage in communicative action, then it would seem that for our purposes he is in the same boat as Dictator 2.

(For Aquinas this relates to the subtle question of when one becomes culpable for a rational omission - it relates to the question of negligence. In this way the dictator is someone who is culpable for their irrationality, and this culpability would represent a sort of second-order irrationality.
It is the second-order irrationality that presumably concerns Habermas, for it is this that constitutes an intentional (or negligent) deviation from the rules of reason themselves.)

Down the other path, Dictator 2 makes no attempt to justify himself -- or perhaps, his justifications make no use of rational argument. Here we want to say that this person has never even entered the arena of communicative action. He might just as well refuse to respond at all (another type of Habermasian irrationality, as we know). — J

To reiterate, if the crucial question is whether one is truly engaging in communicative action, and Dictator 1 is not sincere, then both Dictator 1 and Dictator 2 fall on the same side of that question. It's just that Dictator 1 is more skillful or persuasive in his sophistry (given that Dictator 2 is giving irrational arguments, he is also trying to be persuasive to some extent).

I think we do have definitions, or at least descriptions, of what "rational" and "irrational" mean. We just have to constantly bear in mind that for Habermas, communicative rationality is not the same thing as standard strategic or goal-oriented rationality -- but nor does it replace it. It's an expansion of what it means to be rational. — J

Okay, that makes sense.

But I see a difference between trying to make a case for first-person dictatorship, and simply trying to be one. What I don't know is what kind of difference -- that is, whether the distinction is trivial or irrelevant to the overall conception. — J

Okay. I think the difference is interesting in the sense that it seems that the sincere Dictator 1 is on one side of Dictator 2, and the insincere Dictator 1 is on the other side. Or: | Sincere Dictator 1 > Dictator 2 > Insincere Dictator 1 | ...but again, I'm not sure someone who is sincerely engaged in communicative action can be called a dictator.

Can you say more? I'm not quite following. — J

Well, if you consider your "apophatic approach" above, it seems that his judgment will be to a large extent inscrutable. It surely cannot be arrived at by any guaranteed decision-procedure, any ready-made method.

(again, with what sincerity we can't say; see the discussion with Number2018 above) — J

Yes, it seems that things could get a lot more complicated in this case. I think some of what I am saying does get at 's points about verification procedures.

If Aquinas is right then we can talk about the ontology of the "dictator's" intention or negligence without committing ourselves to the possibility of verifying it epistemologically, and I have been taking this for granted. Intention and negligence are, of course, in principle capable of infinite recursion, and this is why they are not reducible to "naturalistic" decision procedures.

I alluded above to their different conceptions of how practical reason operates. Habermas opposes what he calls "monological" reasoning toward universality. He claims that Kant (and Rawls) do this. Instead, he favors actual dialogue, not thought experiments, an "actually carried out discourse." He wants, for instance, a genuine attempt to learn what exchanging roles would mean when we discuss fairness or justice, not merely the Rawlsian imagining of an Original Position. I would call this an improvement because it truly opens the discussion to the unexpected, and thus emphasizes the equality (not egalitarianism) of communicative action. — J

I find this interesting but engaging it may lead us too far astray. If we were to engage it the first question I would ask is whether Rawls could be seen as providing the first move in a dialogical exchange; or on the other hand, whether a dialogical exchange will always require a Rawlsian- (or Kantian-) like argument to set it into motion; or finally, whether a dialogical exchange will always ultimately conclude in a Rawlsian- (or Kantian-) like argument. Again, feel free to ignore this if it is too far off topic.

(I wanted to squeeze this in, for now I will be offline until Friday.)

Despite spending time on the forum, you’ve chosen to make your reply rather late. The weekend has now passed, and I now have real world duties in need of tending. — javra

Yes, I forgot and should have responded earlier. Sorry about that.

You are again freely strawmanning, inventing truths, putting words into my mouth that I've never spoken, spinning realities, whatever terminology best gets the point across. In this case, I only said that violence is a wrong in an ultimate sense from an ultimate vantage-point, but never that it is "prohibited". And I have neither the time nor the inclination to correct every strawman you've so far made.

[...]

… Which I can’t help but find intellectually dishonest. — javra

Ad hominem is what one often resorts to when they find themselves unable to address the arguments at hand. Clearly you've devolved into this state with abandon. You were doing much better towards the beginning of our conversation. Granted, the absurd things you claimed, which I have highlighted and specifically asked you to address, are indefensible, and so it's no coincidence that you refuse to defend them. But the intellectually honest person would simply retract such statements instead of playing the victim.

In your primary counter, you are conflating the end aimed at of “the Good”, however you prefer to imperfectly exemplify it (you’ve so far alluded to it being an unobtainable utopia of no real consequence), with the means toward approaching it (this assuming one deems the Good as their primary purpose to begin with) as though the Good were somehow already obtained. — javra

You keep rewriting your system without admitting it. My response to your first rewrite should suffice, "Now if you rewrite your system and say that you're only trying to..." ().

And again, Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" is not without consequence. It is meant to aid the moral actor's imagination in understanding how to act in the here and now, in approximately the exact opposite way that you utilize it. It is not meant to justify using other people as a means in order to arrive at the Kingdom. Kant does not fall into such contradictions.

In your equating of right/good action to necessary action you, for example, remove all choice from the equation — javra

Yours is the strawman. To say that "resorting to violence is necessary," is not to say that it is logically necessary in itself. That would be a very silly and incoherent claim. As context should have made abundantly clear, it means that violence is necessary in order to achieve the end, in this case the end of survival.

And you have chosen to ignore both of the following — javra

To the first: I am arguing with you, not with Kant, and if you can't even respond to the points I make in dialogue do not expect me to respond to the random papers you are Googling to try to support a strange thesis. If ignoring parts of posts is intellectually dishonest, then you would seem to be in a great deal of trouble. To the second: to my knowledge this was added in an edit, and was not ignored. Regardless, my answer is simple enough:

I am not a Kantian — Leontiskos

Good luck, then.

But here the point is that really, reading everything from a phone, tablet or computer is at least for me very uncomfortable. — ssu

I agree with your thesis in general, but I have found that e-ink devices do the trick (Kindle, Nook, etc.). I still buy books and prefer them in certain ways, but as notes, there is a difference between the eclipse of paper books and the eclipse of reading.

I think the real problem is if people simply don't learn to read a lot of books. They surely can read, but to read long books is the challenge. — ssu

I think books are the highest intellectual medium, and that as they begin to go by the wayside there will be a more homogenous intellectual landscape. But if you look at the stuff that the average person reads, this has already been happening for a very long time. Magazines, radio, television, and the internet have all cut into the real estate of books.

To give one example, in the 19th century John Henry Newman initially published his Apologia Pro Vita Sua in installments as a series of pamphlets (opposite Charles Kingslry, who opposed him). The general public ate it up. Granted, it was juicy and appealing in its own way, but it was also extremely high English prose, which most modern-day English speakers would simply be unable to read. Don't even get me started on "literacy." Ironically, I don't think we any longer know what the word even means.

Whether this somehow benefits the universe in any way other than it possibly leading to you directly benefiting other proximal beings and/ or your environment, remains obscure to me. — Janus

I think "cosmic philosophies" turn on interdependence and symbiosis. The common example is the violinist in the orchestra who is contributing a small part to a beautiful whole, a whole which depends on each of the small, interdependent parts. For the ancients this was usually captured in the balanced, cyclical motions of the heavens.

I marked them for you. — Banno

Do you think that the meaning of the word "purpose" entails that all purpose is bestowed by human intention? Yes or no?

I find that you, inadvertently or not, have often strawmanned the arguments I've make. Which makes this conversation with you quite unpleasant. For example, I don't recall every saying "it is necessary to resort to violence" but only that the use of violence within certain contexts can be the right/good thing to do as a means of optimally approaching the Good - "necessity" having nothing to do with it. — javra

First, consider this quote:

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. — javra

You use the word "must." <In order to follow the rule "Do not commit violence," there must be agents present which do not commit violence; therefore we must commit violence against those who would threaten our survival>. "Must" indicates necessity.

Beyond that, there is little difference, morally speaking, between saying, "It is necessary to commit violence," and, "It is right to commit violence" (in some circumstance). I don't see how this is a strawman given that if I used the term "morally right" instead of "necessary" all of my arguments would hold just the same.

I am furthermore not in this thread regurgitating Kant's thoughts. But have instead made reasoned argument for oughts and ought nots given an intended proximity to the Good as ultimate end, for which Kant's notion of the Kingdom of Ends was intended to serve only as one possible example among others. — javra

Good. Then I'm not sure why we are so interested in Kant. It is your theory that I am critiquing, not Kant's.

To address this first point you make that Kant's notion of a Kingdom of Ends is only (an inconsequential?) ideal — javra

I don't say it is inconsequential; I say it does not support the sort of things you have in mind. I think there is a good reason why Kant always qualified it as an "ideal."

At this point the conversation is dotted with unanswered counterexamples that I have given. Let's just revisit one of those instead of needlessly exegeting Kant:

Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:

1. Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2. Survive as a community

These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."

But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"? Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2).

Secondly, in light of (2) does (1) need to be revised to (1a): "Do not commit violence except in extremis"? It seems like this is the rule that is actually in play, although there is simultaneously a desire or telos towards (1). — Leontiskos

"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. So I again find the presented dichotomy of ends to be inappropriate.

Aside from which, as stated (1) gives the impression of an absolute commandment. ... Whose goodness or rightness as such would be itself justified in which manner?

Moreover, the "strict pacifism" mentioned would leave all peace aspiring people to die at the hands of violent people, thereby resulting in nothing but violence-loving people to populate the world in its entirety. How might this bring about or else be in the service of a "Kingdom of Ends"? — javra

On this reading you must think that the pacifist could not agree to the rule, "Do not commit violence," which is of course strange to say the least. "Do not commit violence" simply does not mean, "Do not commit violence unless your survival is threatened." People do not generally say, "In order to not-commit violence we must be alive, so therefore in order to obey the rule 'Do not commit violence' we must use violence against this aggressor who is trying to kill us." I don't think this is plausible at all. It strikes me as common sense that use of violence will be contrary to a rule against violence.

[...]

It was not absolute. The rationale was provided: "because violence requires treating the object as a means." The idea was <We are not to treat others as a means; violence treats others as a means; therefore we are not to use violence>. — Leontiskos

The point I made is that in order to accomplish (2), it may be necessary (or "morally right") to transgress (1) by using violence in self-defense. Hence the contradiction and the perplexity.

And in response you said something like, <Well there are not two ends; there is only one end; and therefore there can be no contradiction. The rule to commit-violence-in-extremis is implicitly contained within the rule to not-commit-violence>. Again, you have said that violence is prohibited because it treats another person as a means. My last, unanswered response, quoted here, explains why your response is inadequate. You never responded. If I am right and your response is inadequate then your account will involve contradiction and perplexity. If you wish to defend your account from contradictions, then you should answer the argument I gave to that effect.

- Good post. :up:

- The proper human purpose is a relation to God, but there are other stepping stones for those who cannot countenance such a thing. If you get married and have kids you will tend to find purpose, because this is bound up with the human end. If you develop deep friendships or find a stewardship role in creation you will tend to find purpose, etc.

- Ah, so you don't know the difference between a noun and a verb. It's fun watching Wittgenstenians flub linguistics. Apparently the tired claim has now morphed into, "Purpose is use."

So, in answer to your title, purpose is the use to which something is put, and comes from our intent. It is grounded in our intentional explanations for our actions, and has worth only in terms of those intentions and actions. — Banno

"Proper function for which something exists" (EtymOnline). Linguistically 'purpose' does not imply something that is human-intention-derived. The purpose of a knife is to cut because humans made knives, and they made them to cut. It doesn't follow that the purpose of a human life "has worth only in terms of [human] intentions and actions." Your linguistic analysis is off and your logical inferences are faulty, and of course your conclusion is unsound.

"Ultimate underlying meaning and significance" is found in use. — Banno

Only for the anthropocentric.

Good point, well said! But if not boot-strapped, then from what? Religion? Faith? Belief? Knowledge? Hope? Reason? That is, I disagree, and "finding" one of the great deceptions, often from those selling something. Purpose, then, has to be made, but no easy way to figure out how, or exactly what. . Ex nihilo because there is no other possible source - or do you know of such a source? — tim wood

I think the fact that it cannot be made is what makes it elusive. If purpose could be made then it would make sense to ask for the recipe.

Please make your case. Or, of your certainty, such as it is, if it is, may I have some? Or if you mean psychologically, then, absent further argument, I don't think it's a useful point. — tim wood

Haven't I offered just as much "further argument" as you have? My primary point was that your claim flies in the face of general consensus. Claims that do that require more "further argument" than claims that don't.

What I would say, though, is that if you talk to anyone who is reputed to know about purpose, and how to help people find purpose, they will not follow your lead of "bootstrapping" or conjuring up purpose ex nihilo. The phrase itself is informative, "I am having trouble finding purpose," not, "I am having trouble making purpose."

I'm sorry if I wasn't clear about the difference between the two. Dictator 1 makes a genuine argument for his ethical stance -- he tries to show why it's rational to get others to do what he wants -- and in the course of making that argument, he mentions (not uses) the shabby pseudo-arguments that are part of his tactics, and perhaps explains why there's nothing wrong with using such rhetoric in service of his rational ends. Dictator 2 merely deploys the bad arguments. Does that help? I'm trying to highlight the difference between making a rational case for using irrational arguments, and actually using them. One could be quite sincere in the first case, but never in the second. — J

Okay, thanks for clarifying that. I suppose they flow together insofar as, if the rational case for using irrational arguments turns out to be successful, then the arguments cannot be said to be irrational. Similarly, it is perhaps more truly said to be, "the difference between making an irrational case for using irrational arguments, and [using irrational arguments]," but in both cases irrational arguments are being used. Would we say that Thrasymachus begins by giving irrational arguments, and then after being called out he moves into the meta-space where he tries to defend his use of those arguments? Even if this is not what we think happens in the case of Thrasymachus, it would be a natural progression.

But what happens next? That's the "enforcement" part, I suppose. What you say about the dangers of not enforcing rules is no doubt true, but it's a bit outside the scope of what Habermas is arguing for. To carry that thought further, I think we would need to get more precise about what sort of group is engaged in this communicative action. — J

I don't see a great deal of difference between invoking a rule and enforcing a rule, as invocation seems to be a form of enforcement. But you are right that more aggressive things would also be forms of enforcement. My point is that Habermas does not even seem capable of invoking the rule:

Two answers suggest themselves. The first is, Yes, of course he can. That is exactly what a performative contradiction is -- a violation of the rules. — J

But didn't we agree that it is not at all clear that the first-person dictator is engaged in communicative action? (See: and your response). In that case he couldn't be engaged in performative contradiction.

I suppose this brings us back to the same question of what the "first-person dictator" even is, and it feels like we are going in circles. I think the problem is that we have no definition of what 'rational' and 'irrational' are supposed to mean, or else that there are two different kinds of irrationality at play.

Let me explain why I don't think the first-person dictator is involved in communicative action. Communicative action seems to involve egalitarian cooperation. Whatever the first-person dictator is doing, he is not interested in egalitarian cooperation. He is unwilling to put himself on equal footing with the other participants, and in fact he thinks that they should bend to his will in one way or another. So when Habermas says that the dictator has obligations if he is involved in communicative action, I would say that he isn't involved in communicative action (and therefore does not necessarily have obligations).

Now you keep raising the possibility that the dictator rationally justify his actions. The problem is that if his actions are rationally justified then he isn't a dictator, he's just a smart guy who we should listen to (perhaps a philosopher king). But your implicit premise is that rationality is itself bound up with communicative action, such that they cannot be separated. If this premise is correct then the dictator could never be rationally justified (in his claims which prescind from egalitarian cooperation or communicative action).

Habermasian communicative rationality begins from the intersubjective origins or constraints of rationality itself. — J

(Rationality is itself bound up with communicative action, or vice versa.)

Habermasian communicative rationality begins from the intersubjective origins or constraints of rationality itself. So Ref Habermas, in appealing to rules like "no performative contradiction," isn't appealing to something that transcends intersubjectivity itself. Nor is it something he could have discovered by himself, in solitary transcendental reflection (that would be missing the pragmatic turn). But nor is he saying, "Well, you guys decide and we'll go with the majority opinion." If "definitive" can describe this, then I think a Habermasian judgment can be definitive. — J

I think what you are saying is that Habermasian judgment is bound up with transcendental reason itself. Your account actually looks a lot like negative (apophatic) theology, where we list all the things that God is not and the implication is that God is therefore some inaccessible transcending of all of these things that he is not. The implication here would be that the first-person dictator is fundamentally irrational, and that therefore his use of reason is really a faux-use of reason; a performative contradiction.

Personally I think Habermas is more or less correct in this, but the Kantian approach seems more straightforward, and I am still unclear about how Habermas is supposed to have improved on Kant.* Still, there is no way to pragmatically test whether a "Habermasian definitive judgment" is true. This doesn't bother me, but I suspect it might bother you, given that the truth which the judgment discerns will presumably be 'incorrigible'.

In virtue of the dictator's desire, if they have one, to be rational. This sounds weak, but we have to remember that Habermas doesn't think you can just remove yourself from dialogue. That too is, for him, unreasonable. Stephen K. White puts it well: "A refusal by the first-person dictator or the free rider to justify himself requires a systematic renunciation of communicative action which throws his rationality radically into question." — J

In this case we would have an ethical principle derived from reason alone, and then the secondary question would arise of whether one is obliged to "desire to be rational." At least in principle I am on board with such derivations and obligations.


* More precisely, I think Habermas is right that a tyrant is corrupt (and irrational), but I don't think "communicative action" maps to rationality itself, because I don't think that rationality is equally distributed in the egalitarian sense. As an Aristotelian I am not as democratic as Habermas. I think the philosopher king and the tyrant will both balk at "communicative action," but I only think one of them is irrational. Democratic (or egalitarian) rationality is rational in a certain sense, but it is inferior to the practical reason of the higher forms of government or association.

And purpose comes with – or is invented by – mind. Bottom line, purpose is boot-strapped. — tim wood

I think we can say with some certainty that whatever purpose is, it is not bootstrapped. It is something that precedes and goes before us; something that transcends us; something that beckons to us; something we participate in. It is not something we invent or produce; it is something we discover or encounter.

Perhaps that us the crux if the issue itself. — Benj96

On my view philosophy is twofold: disposition and competence. The philosophical disposition has to do with wonder and inquiry, and this can be inculcated even from a very young age. Philosophical competence has to do with the intellectual virtues and the knowledge that they then make possible. In oneself, it has to do with the ability to learn new knowledge, and both extend and transcend one's philosophical framework(s). In relation to others, it has to do with the ability to engage and bridge different paradigms, and to cooperate, challenge, and act as midwife. This competence requires more maturity and cannot be achieved in any substantial way at a young age.

The disposition precedes the competence, but we find individuals of all different kinds. Some lack both disposition and competence; some have both; some have only one or the other (to various degrees). Critical thinking is but one part of philosophical competence, as is logic.

Philosophical disposition and philosophical competence are vaguely related to Pierre Hadot's ideas of philosophical praxis and philosophical discourse, but disposition is meta-praxis and competence is meta-discourse, in the sense that they are not restricted to a single school of philosophy.

If we say that a "moral decision" is one based on what is right and wrong, moral or immoral... — Judaka

To say that a moral decision is based on what is moral or immoral is tautological, and does not tell us anything. Beyond that, it simply ignores the way in which a moral act or a moral judgment is understood in the OP.

By "non-moral decision", I take you to mean the parallel of a "non-financial decision" to buy a phone, so, a "non-moral decision" which leads to a "moral judgement" being made. — Judaka

No, that is not even necessary, for I take it that the example is so disanalogous that even a decision which is non-moral simpliciter would suffice.

I would suggest sticking with Thesis 1 and leaving Thesis 2 to the side for the time being. There is of course an interesting question about whether the person who sits down on a bus without intending to render justice acts justly. If this truly interests you then have a look at Objection 4, where I provided a point of departure for an answer.

While I'm waiting for your reply: This quote addresses means, but not the stipulated end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" which, as end pursued, would be more properly expressed as "a state of being wherein harm is minimal, if at all yet present, and harmony is maximal, if not ubiquitously applicable". An idealized future state of being as that intended which, by my best appraisals of your previous statements, you deem to be different in nature to that state of being Kant terms "the Kingdom of Ends". * — javra

Sure, but this doesn't change the point I've made. I recognize that you are aiming for an end-state. I was not intending to say otherwise.

But again, I'm waiting to discern what you interpret Kant to mean by the term "Kingdom of Ends" ... such that it, as realm of being, is not equivalent to a realm wherein minimal harm and maximal harmony is actualized. — javra

The main problem with your interpretation is that none of the texts that you have provided support it, and this is because Kant is explicit that the "Kingdom of Ends" is only an ideal, or in your quote, "merely possible." If it were more than an ideal and it were—as you seem to conceive it—an actualizable utopia, then all of the problems I have pointed out would come to bear. In that case the utopian end-state would be liable to justify the sort of violence you have in mind, all in order to achieve it. That you think it is actualizable is obvious from the fact that you think we are required to resort to violence to bring it about (when that violence is a form of self-defense). You have even gone so far as to claim that "do not commit violence" entails using violence to ensure that there exist agents to not-commit violence ().

I actually don't see anything in Kant's ethical writings that tracks your idea. For Kant the Kingdom of Ends is an ideal, and where he probes its actuality he moves into theology and eschatology (which is a standard Christian move regarding such ideal realities). I grant that such a notion is, in a sense, teleological, but it is not meant by Kant to be the sort of end or goal that justifies things like acts of violence.

My main point to these quickly produced references being, what you have taken to be "my view" is neither idiosyncratic nor original in its analysis of Kantian ethics. — javra

According to your source such interpretations are certainly atypical, deviating from the received view. Still, none of the sources you cite are promoting your view that it is necessary to resort to violence to bring about a Kingdom of Ends. That strikes me as a grievous departure from Kant.

I would be interested to know how Kant justifies punishment or capital punishment or defensive war, but I can guarantee that it is not by appealing to a utopian end. He will inevitably say that such punishments do not fail to treat the individual as an end in themselves.

But philosophy did not stop at Aristotle, or even Aquinas. They are interesting, even fun, but not necessary. — Banno

Do you think there are philosophers who are more necessary than Plato and Aristotle?

It's interesting to me that you often complain (with Midgley) about the sorry state of philosophy, but I'm not sure you have a remedy to hand. Now, I've no doubt that folks like Hare and Wittgenstein are better at resisting the problems than their contemporaries, but they are at the same time enmeshed in the same sorts of problems that tend to plague 20th century English-speaking philosophy.

But teaching this stuff formally, as part of the curriculum, is unnecessary and probably counterproductive. Only some folk will have the stomach for it. The rest will reject it. — Banno

As an analogy, a society without cabinetmakers will tend to be comparatively lacking in all that relates to quality cabinets. Sure - others can fill in the gaps. General carpenters and those who specialize in other disciplines can manage to throw together a cabinet in a pinch, and these cabinets will be more or less passable. But without the specialization and its outflow into the society a lacuna will form.

Actually in our age of hyper-specialization overarching disciplines like philosophy become especially important. I think you are over-associating philosophy with logic, but even in the case of logic the analogy holds. For example, Scientism is full of scientists who "throw together logic in a pinch," and it's not so much that their logic is incorrect, but rather that it's incomplete, and they end up mistaking logic for scientific logic. When those disciplines which anchor all disciplines—such as logic—become unmoored and conflated with sub-disciplines, then all of the sub-disciplines that rely on the anchor suffer.

For the sake of argument: Why couldn’t the dictator genuinely believe that it’s rational to advocate dominance over others? In that case, he’d be offering what he perceives to be genuine arguments in his favor. The other case is the one you’re imagining: The dictator tries to get the better of others by using rhetoric, specious arguments, etc.

In fact, the more I think about it, the more I think Habermas wants us to imagine the first, “genuine” type of dictator. Remember, the key point is the rationality of the position. Anyone can try to dominate others by false rhetorical tactics, and those tactics needn’t be rational in the least. What we want to know is, if the dictator is willing to argue for his actual ethical stance, and claim that his use of shabby, irrational pseudo-arguments is a completely rational means to his ends, could he do it without contradiction? — J

You place on the one hand the dictator who "tries to get the better of others by using rhetoric, specious arguments," and on the other hand the dictator who uses, "shabby, irrational pseudo-arguments [as] a completely rational means to his ends." They seem like the same thing, not two different things.

More precisely, I would say that the one who is willing to argue for his position in good faith is not a dictator or a sophist. But then there is Thrasymachus:

This would be the dissimulating type, above. But consider Thrasymachus again – is he dissimulating? (He’s not a sophist, of course.) I read his arguments as entirely sincere. Indeed, if he’d thought about them more carefully, and taken a better measure of Socrates, he’d have either kept silent or come up with another plan to get his own way (or show off his rhetorical chops!); being sincere didn't work. I’m not too comfortable saying that Socrates reveals a performative contradiction in Thrasymachus’ position, but he certainly reveals that position as undefendable, at least by Thrasymachus, and even causes him to blush with shame. — J

Thrasymachus begins by dissimulating, but he gets called out. He is the sophist who proves unsuccessful in the face of Socrates' strength, and what occurs is a partial reformation (with the blushing and whatnot). Also, at 344d the group self-polices Thrasymachus' sophistry, and this is one of the things that injures the sophistic tactics. By pushing Thrasymachus into the defense of sophistry (a kind of meta-sophistry) Socrates ends up achieving a small victory. But sophists don't usually meet such skillful or generous interlocutors.

The end of self-flattery and the end of manipulation are both injurious to the end of the love of wisdom, and are therefore contrary to ethical discourse. For Thrasymachus the manipulation gets opposed and cut short, but I think it is clear that it would normally be in play.

Very interesting. For me, this raises a characteristically modern ethical problem: To what extent is this kind of judgment possible? The analogy with a basketball game places the referee above the intersubjective system (the game), but is this really the case? In one sense, he’s the judge, and his call on a particular play is authoritative; he doesn’t require everyone to agree with him. But in another sense, the referee is completely at the mercy of the rules, to the extent that he’s an accurate and fair judge. — J

Well that's just it: the sophist is not an accurate or fair judge. He permits himself to do what is impermissible, and unless others are able to shift into the role of the referee the game will dissolve. When sophistry reigns unchecked entire nations can be swallowed up in corruption and strife. The rules need to be enforced, else they may as well not exist.

Habermas wants the rules of his “game” to arise from “transcendental/pragmatic” intersubjective agreement. The transcendental part is important. This isn’t just a matter of consensus. We’re supposed to understand communicative rationality as invoking certain background conditions that are necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) for rationality to exist. It then becomes pragmatic, because we agree on ways to apply such rationality in our time, in our circumstances. — J

I would welcome the idea that Habermas is open to transcending intersubjectivity and/or consensus, but it remains true that if Habermas is not able to definitively judge someone like the first-person dictator then I don't see how the transcendental part will help him. The transcendental part must be brought to bear, and Kant does bring it to bear in his prohibition on lying. Kant gives a valid argument for why the sophist cannot lie (whether or not it is sound). That sort of thing is what is required. And so the question recurs, "In virtue of what does Habermas' obligation apply to the dictator?"

What is the difference between the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" and Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra

As I have pointed out numerous times, Kant has no "Kingdom of Ends" in the way that you use that term. Kant is not a utopian who thinks that we need to resort to violence to bring about his utopia. This is, again, the opposite of what Kant thinks. Therefore your question makes no sense to me. You are taking a consequentialist maxim and trying to make it Kantian.

And how do you view this stipulated end as differing from Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra

It is the end that you stipulated. To minimize harm and maximize harmony is obviously not the same as treating everyone as an end in themselves.

Again, your "Kingdom of Ends" seems to be internally contradictory. You want to have a kingdom of ends in which not everyone is treated as an end. If you really think this is Kantian you will have to provide the quote from Kant, for it is prima facie implausible to think that Kant would hold that a "Kingdom of Ends" can justify the means of, say, violence. Kant's whole system is based on the idea that the end does not justify the means. Your whole system is based on the idea that the end justifies the means.

- Means toward the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony."

(I added an edit to my last post to try to more directly address your question about contradictions.)

Perplexity does not equate to the occurrence of contradictions — javra

Sure it does. "An agent is perplexed if she is unable to avoid acting immorally" (). It is to find oneself in the situation where what is right and what is wrong converge into one thing, and given that "right" and "wrong" are mutually exclusive this produces a contradiction. The very fact that your system results in perplexity shows that it involves contradictory principles.

Yet an affirmation of X does not of itself justify X being true. — javra

On the contrary, to affirm X is to say that X is true.

And I so far find no contradictions in what I’ve previously stated: Again, given the exact same distal intent of, say, minimizing harm and maximizing harmony, the use of violence as means of obtaining this very same distal intent can be simultaneously right in proximal application (wherein far greater harm/disharmony is thereby avoided) and yet remain wrong in distal terms (for an absolute harmony cannot be of itself produced via violence); therefore being simultaneously right and wrong but in different respects. — javra

You have two ends: to survive, and to not-use violence. To use violence as a means to survival is to contradict your second end.

Now if you rewrite your system and say that you're only trying to "minimize harm and maximize harmony," then these two things which were formally ends now become means. You are of course free to retract your earlier system and do this, but on your earlier system you claimed that do-not-use-others-as-a-means was an ultimate end. Given that you transgressed this ultimate end (with violence), you were contradicting yourself. Note too that the rewriting dissolves the perplexity along with the contradictions.

Am I mistaken in understanding the quote to conclude that my arguments make use of contradictions? And does not a contradiction require that incongruent givens simultaneously occur in the same respect? — javra

To never-use-violence and to use-violence-as-a-means contradict one another in the same respect. If they don't then I would suggest that on your view such contradiction is logically impossible, and could not occur in any circumstance. Similarly, the perplexity-contradiction is a contradiction of non-hypothetical ought-judgments, and two contradictory non-hypothetical ought-judgments contradict one another "in the same respect."

If we agree that indeed, wanting to buy a phone for non-financial reasons may lead to the financial decision of buying a phone, then we can apply that to "moral judgements" defined in the OP. "Moral judgements" are non-hypothetical ought-judgements, and would parallel with the financial decision of buying a phone. If we non-financial motivations can lead to a financial decision, can't non-moral motivations lead to us making a "moral judgement"? — Judaka

The question at hand is whether your analogy is apt. Perhaps you should attempt to give an example of a non-moral decision.

I more or less agree with this, though as I say, I don't know if I'm agreeing on Habermas's behalf or not. — J

Right, and I have more familiarity with your own thinking than Habermas, although I recognize that it was formed by Habermas.

But only some, unless we take a very cynical view of "reaching an understanding." — J

Right.

Also, the term "first-person dictator" can be a little misleading. The dictator is not imagined as doing what real-life dictators mostly do, which is, as you say, commanding and threatening. The first-person dictator position is an ethical stance, which claims that it's perfectly rational for me to try to get other people to do what I want, as far as possible. This desire needn't be fulfilled only by standard dictatorial tactics. In part this is why I think it's plausible that Habermas might be picturing the first-person dictator as being willing to stay engaged in communicative action. — J

Good. Yes, I understand this, and I think my points apply to this more specific kind of dictator, but I wanted you to enunciate the more specific kind. I take it that this more specific kind of dictator is a sophist or propagandist, engaged in duplicity or dissimulation, which are often included as a form of lying.

Staying with Plato, Thrasymachus could be said to espouse the first-person dictator position. It's often been asked, Why does Thrasymachus, given his views, bother talking in the agora at all? (Pride in his rhetorical skills, perhaps.). For Habermas, I think Thrasymachus is an example of a first-person dictator who wants to convince others that his views are correct, but is in performative contradiction by doing so. — J

Yes, but I think the motive you gave is more substantial: "To get other people to do what I want." Of course in Plato's time the two came together: the sophist got what they wanted (money) by way of teaching "philosophy" (rhetoric).

The difficulty with the sophist is that they are slippery, namely because they wish to appear to be engaging in "communicative action," when in fact they are not, and thus their modus operandi is dissimulation. Their very words are a kind of Trojan Horse capable of undermining ethical discourse.

On my view the democratic man holds intersubjectivity as the democratic virtue par excellence, and Habermas is a democratic man (and there are important ways that Kant is not a democratic man). The democratic man is thus concerned with fair, cooperative play. But what the democratic man has difficulty accessing is The Judge, and this relates to "the paradox in ethics" I gestured towards above. Now, if ethical discourse is a game of basketball, then while the democratic man will be zealous that everyone should follow the rules, his worldview gives him no power to enforce the rules. Enforcement requires a judge who is above the intersubjective system (a referee) and whose judgments are not accountable to the canons of intersubjectivity.*

Without a judge the sophist can play to the crowd, generate an intersubjective "understanding" (in the cynical sense), and have The Philosopher executed. Obviously Aristotle, and especially Plato, are good at pointing to the shortcomings of democracy. Note too that the judge need not be externalized. The participants can self-police, but it remains true that the act of policing or judgment is categorically different from an act of communicative action. In effect, communicative action depends for its existence on the non-communicative action of judging (in both the sense of policing and in the broader sense of judging truth-claims; judging intent and judging assertions). The integrity of the intersubjective project will paradoxically depend on the ability of participants to make definitive—and to that extent non-communicative—judgments. This is basically Kierkegaard's distinction between the crowd and the church in his Attack upon Christendom.


* Adverting to our private conversation, the judge's assertion is the assertion of an individual apart from an intersubjective consensus, and thus requires an internalist epistemology. The intersubjective participants are accountable to The Judge, and the judge is accountable to internal criteria of truth, such as justification. This is also the case whenever an individual engages in everyday judgments, even though they use a common language to form those judgments.

Facts are not skills. Which is why I support philosophy as a fundamental pillar of education. And yet many nations or education systems do not offer philosophy as a primary or secondary level module. If it were up to me it would be mandatory and fostered from an early age.

I think the issue is that many assessments are based on an objective points based system. If "Fact X,Y or Z" is mentioned then assign 1, 2 or 3 points to said exam response.

This is not learning, it's a memory test. — Benj96

I do think the U.S. is too opposed to philosophy, but the problem with your proposal is that "philosophy" is an incredibly elusive term. I would follow Lloyd Gerson in defining it in terms of Plato's wake, but many would disagree with me. So perhaps philosophy is a prophylaxis against propaganda; it's just that we will never be able to agree on what "philosophy" should mean.

At the risk of being deemed Godless thus evil (or, far worse, a socialist), I strongly feel that the wellbeing and health of all children needs to be of genuine importance to us all. — FrankGSterleJr

I don't know that anyone would disagree with you. It is always a question of how to achieve such a goal.

Yes, this is similar to the first point that White raises when he pushes back on Habermas's communicative action schema: "Is the obligation to provide justification really a necessary one (does it have to follow from the idea of communicative action itself)?" I think you're pointing to an ambiguity in Habermas (or Habermas as I've been presenting him; I may be the one who doesn't read him clearly). It's this: Are we being asked to imagine the dictator, say, simply stating their position and then refusing further discussion? Or are we supposed to imagine this person arguing for the position? This would seem to make a big difference along the lines you're wondering about. At what point does the schema begin? If I say, "I am not making a claim within the context of communicative action," have I already performatively contradicted myself, according to Habermas? — J

I am thinking of something even more basic:

• Communicative action is "speech-action oriented to reaching an understanding among participants in a dialogue..."
• The dictator is not engaged in any speech-action oriented to reaching an understanding among participants...
• Therefore, the dictator is not engaged in communicative action, and does not bear the obligations that communicative action incurs.

To advert to Plato, the tyrant or the sophist does not "play by the same rules" as the others. The very word, "dictator," belies something foreign to Habermas' presuppositions. To dictate is not to dialogue or argue, and so if communicative action has to do with dialogue then it seems that the dictator is not interested. In virtue of what does Habermas' obligation apply to the dictator? Does Habermas believe that the dictator's use of language to command or threaten, rather than to dialogue, is a legitimate use of language?

(What's curious to me in the phrasing of the OP is not so much that Habermas' ethical principle seems to lack teeth, but rather that it doesn't even seem to self-consistently apply to the dictator. In order to apply to the dictator it would need to apply to speech-acts which are not self-consciously communicative/dialogical acts, and this is precisely what it cannot do. Kant's ethical principle against lying is relevant precisely because it manages to logically apply to the dictator, and this is because the genus to which Kant applies his principle is 'statements', which in no way depend on the speaker intending a "communicative action." Crucially, Kant is willing to appeal to a higher order than intersubjectivity, and he is willing to invoke a higher moral theory than intentionalism. Because the dictator is only required to state or assert, and a lie is a statement, therefore it follows (on Kant's logic) that the dictator's lies are impermissible regardless of intention. Habermas seems to be coming up short against the paradox in ethics whereby prohibitions would seem to be unethical insofar as they tend to go beyond their own seemingly-absolute rules. Namely, to enforce or even assert the obligation that Habermas wishes to assert is, in some sense, to already have gone beyond communicative action (and intersubjectivity/intentionalism). I would suggest that this is a significant problem, and one which leads to an undue "softness." Note that this also represents a practical problem on TPF insofar as moderators must decide what is beyond the pale, and who should be banned.)

If someone had constant thoughts and fantasies about raping, torturing, killing etc people that they may or may not enjoy but were perfectly moral in the real world (either for its own sake or from fear of consequences of acting on said fantasies) is it reasonable to describe such thoughts as evil? — Captain Homicide

Classically one becomes culpable for an evil thought to the extent that one wills it. So a thought of rape that is in no way willed or assented to is not an evil act, but to assent or intend such thoughts is an evil act. Even on materialism, although the evil act does not harm another, it does harm oneself and inclines oneself towards acts of rape.

Interesting thread, . I am not overly familiar with Habermas, although I understand some of this broad themes.

This is because, as Habermas writes, there is a “speech-act-immanent obligation to provide justification” for any claim raised within the context of communicative action. — J

I am wondering what reason we have to think that the first-person dictator and the free rider are engaged in what Habermas calls "communicative action."* It seems to me that such persons are explicitly intending to not participate in "communicative action." They wish to be uncooperative, not cooperative. Therefore they don't seem to have the obligation you speak of. They would say, "I am not raising a claim within the context of communicative action, and therefore I have no such obligation."

Coming at this from a different angle, I am curious to see an argument you would give in favor of the Habermasian position, and I am specifically interested to see how (if at all) it deviates from Kantianism. For example, Kant's justification for the impermissibility of lies seems to be nothing more than an appeal to "communicative action."

* You define communicative action as, "speech-action oriented to reaching an understanding among participants in a dialogue concerning practical or prudential ends."

Say I've got the option to buy a new phone to replace my old one, but don't wish to, and claim "It's not due to financial reasons". Though the act of buying a phone is clearly related to my finances and would be a financial decision, I'd have meant that my decision was motivated instead by other factors. — Judaka

The question is then whether one can say that, "My decision was instead motivated by non-moral factors," which according to the OP would entail that it involves no non-hypothetical ought-judgment.

To keep things short, I don't find that my account of ethics would make any sense whatsoever were it to in fact incorporate "contradictions", which I do not find my account to incorporate: At no juncture in my account can there ever be something that is both right and wrong at the same time and in the same respect. — javra

Here is what I said:

The problem is that your system contains internal contradictions, and framing Kantianism in terms of consequence-ends is already a contradiction that Kant would not have accepted. These contradictions are producing further contradictions, such as the idea that violence is compatible with a "Kingdom of Ends." — Leontiskos

So, for example, on your scheme violence is simultaneously right and wrong. It is right qua survival and it is wrong qua using-another-as-a-means. The problem is that your principles are not necessarily in sync, and in certain cases they oppose one another (and lead to perplexity). So you could do what most perplexity-views do and weight your principles, but before that you would need to admit that you have two principles in the first place (i.e. that "survival" is distinct from a prohibition on violence).

It doesn't matter that something is not right and wrong in the same respect; such is not needed to produce perplexity. It only matters that something be simultaneously right and wrong.