There is definitely something wrong, that's not in dispute. — unenlightened

Is there a way to delete private messages? — Leontiskos

I figure Spinoza made short work of this. We deliberate between choices as means to achieve our ends. Whatever is making it possible for this to happen is not a copy of our nature.

If the agency we experience gives us no conception of what is happening, presuming a 'determinism' is not an argument against the reality of deliberation. — Paine

It's a hypothetical example - nuance is to be avoided in making the distinction between the personal psychological analysis and the social relations analysis. — unenlightened

The social diagnosis is that he is suffering from a worldwide recession engineered by financial interests he has zero knowledge of, and what he needs is a new government. — unenlightened

Why do you assume that a natural leader with no people to lead and a slave without a master to serve will inevitably live in isolation. Why cannot they live in society? — Ludwig V

I'm finding this very confusing. I think this would all have been a lot clearer if we could just drop the bit about slavery and talk about leaders and followers. — Ludwig V

I'm all for classlessness. But there's nothing wrong with distinguishing between classes of people when the criterion of membership is relevant. — Ludwig V

A lack of disk capacity caused the site to crash recently, so I've had to remove the ability to upload files, which was a privilege for subscribers. I'm not sure if I'll make this permanent — I would prefer not to upgrade to the next plan, which would give us more space for uploads... — Jamal

I'm glad to hear you're reading Kimhi -- not for the faint of heart! In fact you may find parts of it easier going than I did, due to your background in Aristotle. — J

It may come down to the difference between 'not-X' (negation as an operation within a proposition) and 'It is not the case that (p)' (denial of a proposition) — J

What Kimhi adds to this, in a manner I'm still grappling with, is the unity part: the claim that "the assertion 'p is true' is the same as 'I truly think p'." In general, the role of an act of consciousness in Kimhi's philosophy is what allows him to take a thoroughly monist stance on these matters, but as I've said before, I think he could have done a much clearer job explaining it. — J

[math]\begin{array} {|c|c|}\hline A\,believes\,p. & A\,believes\,p. & A\,believes\,p. \\ \hline p. & Not-p. & A's\,belief\,is\,correct. \\ \hline So\,A's\,belief\,is\,incorrect. & So\,A's\,belief\,is\,correct. & So\,\,p. \\ \hline  \end{array}[/math]

I didn't participate in the thread you refer us to, and I'm not prepared right now to try to take it all in. — J

A similar point can be made with respect to Frege’s use of semantic notions such as “the sense of . . .” and “the reference of . . . ,” namely, insofar as we come to see them as pointing to similarities and differences displayed by the notation, we recognize that they are not predicates, since all predicates are expressible using the notation; hence we come to see them as mere means deployed to communicate the use of the notation to a learner. In the end, the success of this communication requires this realization. One can say, therefore, that Frege’s universalist conception is eliminativist with respect to both semantical and formal-categorical discourse. Note that the very construction of the Begriffsschrift is not in any obvious way internal to the fact-stating discourse, namely, we cannot describe it as the actualization of the capacity of linguistic self-consciousness which is internal to the activity of assertion as such. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 91-2

. . .You are appealing to usage, but the etymology and the historical usage point very clearly to logic as an art of reasoning.

They say that one of the best ways to learn something is to teach it. A few weeks ago I looked at your thread which is intended to teach propositional calculus (link). It's no coincidence that in your third substantial post you were already into truth tables. But even in your first substantial post you said, "What we want to do is to examine the relations between these propositions, rather than their contents." It seems to me that it would have been more apt to say that we want to examine the relations that obtain between these propositions based on their content. Relations hold or fail to hold in light of the content of the relata, and this has everything to do with truth.

Now a pedagogue might choose to introduce the rules of logic before introducing the purpose of logic, much like you could teach a child to kick a ball before introducing them to the game of soccer. Of course I am not convinced that this is sound pedagogy. — Leontiskos

Hence, for example, understanding p as an expression of consciousness depends on understanding the use of p in negation. As such, from this point of view we come to see that no conscious act is displayed or specified by the proposition of the form (p and ~p) and therefore no judgment or assertion is displayed by ~(p and ~p). This means that ~(p and ~p) and (p and ~p) are not genuine propositions. Understanding OPNC [ontological principle of non-contradiction] consists in seeing that the repetition of p in these logical contexts is self-cancelling. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 31

Can anyone think up a real world example where you would point out that A implies both B and not-B — Count Timothy von Icarus

“From the monist point of view, a simple propositional sign displays a possible act of consciousness.” -- the possibility of affirmation or negation. — J

In English we can deny in a manner that does not affirm the negation of any proposition, and this violates the way that propositional logic conceives of the LEM. In fact, going back to flannel’s thread, this shows that a contradiction in English need not take the form (A ^ ~A). In English one can contradict or deny A without affirming ~A. — Leontiskos

(Propositional logic seems to assume, prima facie, not only the commonsensical idea that C is neither A nor B, but also the deeply counterintuitive idea that C is neither ¬A nor ¬B. Usually if C is neither A nor B then it must be both ¬A and ¬B.) — Leontiskos

[For the non-Fregean] The truth-connector is therefore seen as an expression of an operation. In fact, we can speak of truth and falsity operations, which are performed by . . . is true and . . . is false respectively. The assertion “p is true” is the same as “I truly think p.” There is no logical gap between these assertions. By contrast, the assertion “p is false” is not the same as “I truly think not-p.” Thus, truth and falsity operations are not symmetrical. However, they both apply to p and “A thinks p.” It is only in judgments about others that the use of . . . is false is required in addition to negation. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 93

I’ve been working with some ideas in Irad Kimhi’s Thinking and Being. Much of what he talks about concerns the nature of the relationship between predication and truth-assertion. It occurred to me that “Existence is not a predicate” has some obvious parallels with “Truth is not a predication.” That is, neither existence nor truth add anything, conceptually, to what they appear to be predicating ‛existence’ and ‛truth’ of. I can say “A hundred thalers exist” but this adds nothing to the concept ‛a hundred thalers’; I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J

From the Notre Dame review of Irad Khimi's Thinking and Being — RussellA

Again, what you have written shows multiple errors in your understanding of formal logic. — Banno

I'm sorry you can't see how it answers the OP. It is at least a beginning. — Banno

Existence, at least as qualification, ranges over individuals, while truth ranges over propositions. The OP asks about the relation between existence and truth. — Banno

So generally, existence is not a first order predicate; nor is truth. — Banno

I might reply, in kind, that all (true) sentences can be parsed into propositional logic. "p". Therefore all true sentences are "formulable within formalism". — Banno

Claiming that there is no explicit predication of existence or truth in formal logic is ignorant. — Banno

This post will just rattle your cage. That is probably all that can be done until J can formulate a more explicit topic. — Banno

This is simply not true. This is why I pointed to the use of the term son in the Hebrew Bible. It is used many times both in the singular and plural. It often refers to kings and rulers and never means a god. — Fooloso4

The disciples, Paul, and other Jewish followers did not believe that Jesus was a god. — Fooloso4

This is the topic at hand, and it is addressed to christians. — unenlightened

It includes the question of whether certain assumptions should be regarded as true. — Fooloso4

It seems to me that the only way to justify self-defense is to either (1) abandon stipulation #1 or (2) reject #3. — Bob Ross

There is a difference between deliberating and rule following. — Fooloso4

It is not a matter of inquiring into the rationale for justified self-defense but, as the OP makes clear, of self-defense under the constriction of certain stipulated moral principles. — Fooloso4

You are right, Aristotle's slavery is not a sufficient condition of forcible enslavement. — Ludwig V

I left with just two questions. How do natural slaves who have no master live? How do natural rulers who have no people to rule live? — Ludwig V

Does the master not require the slave to flourish? Mutual dependency, common good. Positively inspiring! — Ludwig V

Perhaps. He may well not be. He probably doesn't have the time, what with running the whole show. — Ludwig V

I understand that some people think that Aristotle's argument demonstrates that universal human equality is nonsense. It is indeed nonsense if it means that everyone is the same. But Aristotle's argument demonstrates what it does mean. For the motivating assumption of the argument is that everyone should be treated in the way that is appropriate to them. Irrelevant circumstances (such as Hecuba's birth - Simpson p. 12) should not come into play. The only issue is what is appropriate to who. — Ludwig V

That's what universal equality means. — Ludwig V

In this case, what is shown is that there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing. That seems a direct answer to the OP. — Banno

I was curious to learn more about what philosophers have said concerning the parallels between "truth" and "existence" as predicates... — J

The classical solution was, roughly, that an extensional understanding of logic is preferable simply because it is simpler. — Banno

But there are intensional logics... — Banno

He is clear that he opposes what he calls “psycho / logical dualism”: “a theory of judgment as involving a subjective act and a truth-evaluable content – the unity and complexity of which is external to the judging subject.” In short, he doesn’t accept the Fregean picture that assertoric force is separate from whatever semantic content will determine truth value. — J

But the “psycho / logical monism” that he does accept is (for me) very difficult to understand. I’ll take my best guess and say that, unlike Aquinas, Kimhi sees the “fundamental act of consciousness” as either affirmation or denial – what he calls a two-way capacity, borrowing from Aristotle. Propositions are affirmed or denied by acts of consciousness, not by predications – a kind of “full context principle.” — J

He also has this interesting observation, which harks back to the QV discussion, and to banno’s reminders here about logical form and ontological commitment: Kimhi calls Frege’s logic a functionalist logic, and says moreover that it’s extensionalist, “insofar as the truth-value of a proposition depends only on the extensional identity of its components and the manner of composition. Among other things, that means that logical principles are not about propositions (thoughts) but about what gets quantified.” (my italics) This is a pretty concise way of framing the problem. Because if you oppose this view of logic, as Kimhi does, then you seem to be saying that “propositions (thoughts)” can be the subject of logical thinking without committing to “what gets quantified,” which in turn would mean that existence can – would have to be – more than just “the value of a bound variable.” I dunno, maybe I’m reading too much into it, but that’s what it says to me. — J

I think this would be toying with language a little too freely. In English at least, we don't 'drive' our bodies, we 'move' them. And in fact, we usually don't even 'move our bodies' – we just 'move'. The body is the subject, not the object. — cherryorchard

But I don't understand the leap from these clearly acceptable claims to the claim that we don't see material things at all. Where does the 'sense-data' come from, if not from the world outside? And if it does come from the world outside, what are we arguing about? — cherryorchard

From your posts, I'm starting to think that what I really need to do is read Aristotle's Metaphysics... — cherryorchard

There are no words in the theory that lack an antithesis. But Gellner seems to suggest here that the theory requires not only that words have antitheses, but also that all theories have meaningful exceptions. Why should it require that? I can't see how it follows logically. — cherryorchard

Your "opponent" is being misled by the common philosophical tendency to assume that every noun denotes an object. — Ludwig V

(In fact, 'bachelors are unmarried' does sound like something you might really say to someone who wasn't sure what the word 'bachelor' meant – a child or a language learner, e.g.). — cherryorchard

It should be obvious to anyone who understands what phronesis is that it involves thinking through ethical questions. Thinking through ethical questions, however, does not mean the attempt to find abstract, universalizable, one size fits all answers that can be appealed to in lieu of moral deliberation. — Fooloso4

If by “bracket” you mean “declare them out of bounds when discussing predication,” then yes, there wouldn’t be much left to say about whether predication might reveal parallels between existence and truth. — J

But I think it’s fine to get clear on what the standard commitments are, and why they’re so useful. Particularly useful for those of us like me who hated actually doing logic. — J

“It’s the end of analytic philosophy as we know it, and I feel fine!”* — J

Part of what’s confusing in Kimhi is that he often uses ‛I think p’ to mean ‛I judge that p’, as you can see in the above passage. But of course ‛I judge that p’ is even closer to what you’re calling “the notion of the true,” and Kimhi is certainly pointing to a second act of the intellect which makes self-conscious what has been initially thought or judged. — J

It is, as Plato and Aristotle knew, a matter of phronesis, of good judgment. — Fooloso4

It seems to me pure nonsense to say 'we only ever see indirectly', because it draws on the image of 'direct seeing' only to deny that such a thing exists. — cherryorchard

It's a little like saying 'we only ever drive cars indirectly, because we use the pedals and the steering wheel' – that is what driving a car consists of. 'Indirect' (or indeed 'direct') doesn't enter into it, unless there are two varieties of driving (real or imagined) that can actually be classified using those words. — cherryorchard

But let's say I have a friend who is a sense-data proponent. He says that his terminology is perfectly meaningful. There are direct experiences (mental and physical sensations, feelings, thoughts) and indirect experiences of the outer world (sights, smells) that come to us through 'sense-data'. He says this contrast between direct and indirect makes those words perfectly valid and useful. I don't agree with him. But I still feel I'm losing the argument. — cherryorchard

(Oh, and just for future reference, though I realise it's hardly relevant to our discussion – I am a 'she' rather than a 'he'!) — cherryorchard

Just a reminder... — wonderer1

But I've got that off my chest now, so carry on. — wonderer1

Why? So you can feel particularly righteous? — wonderer1

It seems that many here are under the mistaken impression that Christianity is and always was monolithic. — Fooloso4

What is his argument? What is the problem with "the contrast theory of meaning"? — Banno

If I discover that there is something that is a ball, whatever reasons I give to support that discovery will be the same reasons needed to show that ‛There is a ball’ is true. There is no further fact I need to learn in order to affirm the truth of the proposition about the ball’s existence. This takes “parallel” extremely close to “identity,”... — J

Truth is being under the aspect of being-known (Aquinas). — Leontiskos

Objection 3. Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.

Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. — Aquinas, ST Ia.16.3.ad3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?

Objection 3: Things that are related as prior and posterior do not seem to be convertible. But true
seems to be prior to being, since a being is understood only under the notion of the true (sub ratione
veri). Therefore, it seems that they are not convertible.

Reply to objection 3: There are two ways to interpret the claim that a being cannot be
apprehended without the notion of the true (sine ratione veri).
In the first way, it has this sense: ‘A being is not apprehended unless the notion of the true follows
upon the apprehension of the being’. So interpreted, the claim is true.
In the second way, it can be interpreted as follows: ‘A being could not be apprehended unless the
notion of the true were apprehended’. And this is false.
It is the case, however, that something true cannot be apprehended unless the notion of being is
apprehended. For being enters into the definition of true.
It is the same as comparing intelligible to being. For a being cannot be understood unless that
being is intelligible, and yet a being can be understood without its intelligibility being understood.
Similarly, a being as understood is true, but it is not the case that in understanding being, one understands true. — Aquinas, ST Ia.16.3.ad3 - Is 'true' convertible with 'being'?

I am fine with that. But I gave my thoughts on pinprick world. — schopenhauer1

It’s either not suffering as we normally define it — schopenhauer1

It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos

since no one is obligated to bring happiness only prevent suffering in this instance, it can be defended. — schopenhauer1

Put differently, "If we omit the pinprick from (1) then (3) does not follow from (2)." I agree and I have not said otherwise. — Leontiskos

The problem is using Benatar as if he’s purely doing hedonic calculus — schopenhauer1

Either way, Benatar goes out of the way tgat even if you don’t bite the bullet in pinprick scenario, THIS world is not that world... — schopenhauer1

What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to. — Leontiskos

he has a litany of follow-up empirical evidence of how we are often mistaken psychologically and empirically just how bad it is in regards to present pain and pain reflected or projected. — schopenhauer1

Further, I would rather prevent a life of suffering in spite of a future person's preference. There are many people that hurt themselves, and society determines it just to thwart their preference. — Down The Rabbit Hole

My same objection to the happiness poll would apply to the birth preference one though. I don't know how many of those suffering at end of life wish they had never been born. — Down The Rabbit Hole

The consequentialist antinatalist apparently thinks that if we polled everyone on their deathbed and asked them if life was worth living or they wished they had never been born, the vast majority* would wish they had never been born. — Leontiskos