If I discover that there is something that is a ball, whatever reasons I give to support that discovery will be the same reasons needed to show that ‛There is a ball’ is true. There is no further fact I need to learn in order to affirm the truth of the proposition about the ball’s existence. This takes “parallel” extremely close to “identity,”... — J
Truth is being under the aspect of being-known (Aquinas). — Leontiskos
Objection 3. Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. — Aquinas, ST Ia.16.3.ad3 - Whether the true and being are convertible terms?
Objection 3: Things that are related as prior and posterior do not seem to be convertible. But true
seems to be prior to being, since a being is understood only under the notion of the true (sub ratione
veri). Therefore, it seems that they are not convertible.
Reply to objection 3: There are two ways to interpret the claim that a being cannot be
apprehended without the notion of the true (sine ratione veri).
In the first way, it has this sense: ‘A being is not apprehended unless the notion of the true follows
upon the apprehension of the being’. So interpreted, the claim is true.
In the second way, it can be interpreted as follows: ‘A being could not be apprehended unless the
notion of the true were apprehended’. And this is false.
It is the case, however, that something true cannot be apprehended unless the notion of being is
apprehended. For being enters into the definition of true.
It is the same as comparing intelligible to being. For a being cannot be understood unless that
being is intelligible, and yet a being can be understood without its intelligibility being understood.
Similarly, a being as understood is true, but it is not the case that in understanding being, one understands true. — Aquinas, ST Ia.16.3.ad3 - Is 'true' convertible with 'being'?
I am fine with that. But I gave my thoughts on pinprick world. — schopenhauer1
It’s either not suffering as we normally define it — schopenhauer1
It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos
since no one is obligated to bring happiness only prevent suffering in this instance, it can be defended. — schopenhauer1
Put differently, "If we omit the pinprick from (1) then (3) does not follow from (2)." I agree and I have not said otherwise. — Leontiskos
The problem is using Benatar as if he’s purely doing hedonic calculus — schopenhauer1
Either way, Benatar goes out of the way tgat even if you don’t bite the bullet in pinprick scenario, THIS world is not that world... — schopenhauer1
What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to. — Leontiskos
he has a litany of follow-up empirical evidence of how we are often mistaken psychologically and empirically just how bad it is in regards to present pain and pain reflected or projected. — schopenhauer1
Further, I would rather prevent a life of suffering in spite of a future person's preference. There are many people that hurt themselves, and society determines it just to thwart their preference. — Down The Rabbit Hole
My same objection to the happiness poll would apply to the birth preference one though. I don't know how many of those suffering at end of life wish they had never been born. — Down The Rabbit Hole
The consequentialist antinatalist apparently thinks that if we polled everyone on their deathbed and asked them if life was worth living or they wished they had never been born, the vast majority* would wish they had never been born. — Leontiskos
Thanks for this response – it's extremely helpful. — cherryorchard
I suppose what I'm struggling to understand is how exactly we know which sort of term is a 'genus' and which isn't. 'Coffee machine' is quite obviously just a specific example of a 'machine' (so I apologise for the inanity of my example). But then, 'seeing' is perhaps just a specific example of 'perception' or even 'experience', or at least some people could plausibly think so. — cherryorchard
A meaningful word should pick out a particular instance or species (a "non-empty proper subset," as mathematicians would say) from the universe of discourse. — SophistiCat
Sense-data theorists might say something like 'we can feel pain directly, but we can't see material objects directly' – and thus hold that their claim 'we never see directly' still has meaning, because 'seeing' is contrasted with other kinds of 'experience' like feeling pain.
I think the issue is in the particular conjunction of terms. The word 'seeing' has meaningful contrasts, as does a word like 'directly' and a word like 'never'. But the combination of these terms together in the claim 'we never see anything directly' is meaningless because it eliminates the possibility of any contrast. That makes complete sense to me – I'm just still struggling to pinpoint why. Is it because 'seeing' is sui generis, and nothing else is really 'like' it? But is that a subjective judgement? — cherryorchard
'we only ever digest what we consume' — cherryorchard
For instance, is 'we only ever hear sounds' a meaningful statement? — cherryorchard
Of course, there are things we don't hear and things that aren't sounds. But couldn't a sense-data proponent say there are things we don't see and things that aren't indirect? Just no such thing as direct seeing – as there is no such thing as hearing smells. — cherryorchard
I would say Michael, and others, are committed to a particular metaphysical worldview I like to call “The Private Theater.”
...
Doubt creeps in again. But if one thing they can gain comfort in is the certainly that what appears to them in the theater is always certain. — Richard B
I think you’d get a lot out of Kimhi’s book – I certainly have. — J
Minor point: The passage you quote from p. 39 isn’t actually about Frege and Geach. — J
These deep borderline questions are exactly what Kimhi is chasing down, just as you'd expect from a book called Thinking and Being. — J
↪Johnnie Appreciate the references — J
Why? So you can feel particularly righteous? — wonderer1
Yep, I often thought if Wittgenstein wanted to theorize instead of just describe he might have moved in the direction that Searle has. — Richard B
I will have to take your word about Aquinas as I am only familiar with his arguments for the existence of God. — Richard B
Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. . .
...
Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true" [Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5], and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.
Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone"; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species. — Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia.Q85.A2 - Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood?
I little more exposition on Searle's view of colors:
From Seeing Things as They Are:
"...So it is wrong to think of the visual experience as itself colored. Also, to think that visual experiences are colored is almost inevitably to commit the Bad Argument because one has to ask who is seeing the color..."
(The Bad Argument Searle refers to is any argument that attempts to treat the perceptual experience as an actual or possible object of experience.) — Richard B
Austin spends quite a lot of time in 'Sense and Sensibilia' explaining that there is no point in claiming that we only ever see things indirectly, just precisely because, if that is the case, we no longer have any idea what seeing directly would even mean. There would no longer be any such thing as 'seeing directly'. And thus (Austin argues) the term 'seeing indirectly' when used in this way appears to mean something but actually doesn't. — cherryorchard
The challenge would be met with examples like Austin's:
...
(Some ordinary language philosophers leveled a similar criticism against the realism vs nominalism debate.) — SophistiCat
First, to echo Banno's question, what would the correlate to indirect, "direct," mean in the context of your claims? — Leontiskos
But maybe Gellner is right that this doesn't hold. If a child asks me what my coffee machine is for, I will explain that it makes coffee. And this explanation strikes me as perfectly valid, even though it is not possible to imagine any other kind of coffee machine. — cherryorchard
One might well object that this doctrine itself does not appear to have a contrast, that the Contrast Theory itself would require, presumably, that language should sometimes be used to unify and sometimes to separate.
This ability to look at a proposition abstractly while prescinding from its truth value would seem to require the use of truth and falsity as predicates. — Leontiskos
In other words, [for Frege and Geach] a propositional sign manifests, through its symbolic composition, the semantical character of each actual occurrence of the proposition, but not the force character of any [of] those occurrences. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, page 39
1. God is finite, ie we can define it as what it is and what it is not.
2. God is infinite, ie it is everything. We can define it as what it is but can't define what it is not because it is everything. — Haafiz Mohammad Beigh
Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above [...] that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition. — Aquinas, ST Ia.13.1 - Can God be named by us?
What do you mean by 'defending itself'?? How should religious people defend their religion? — boundless
I don't think it unreasonable to determine the majority of people have net bad lives. — Down The Rabbit Hole
This average happiness is potentially overshadowed by life's inevitable suffering - "Nearly 1 in 2 people born in the UK in 1961 will be diagnosed with some form of cancer during their lifetime" — Down The Rabbit Hole
What are you talking about? It’s either effectively the same (a threshold needs to be met... — schopenhauer1
Being an AN is a result of running the calc, and never coming out with 'life' as the winner. Not that its pre-decided. Obviously, that would be stupid. — AmadeusD
And I see this as substantially different from schopenhauer1. This is something like consequentialist antinatalism as opposed to deontological antinatalism, and it does seem more rational and plausible to me. It certainly does not fall victim to the two counterarguments I formulated for schopenhauer1's position. — Leontiskos
This would I would think fall more into those objections... — schopenhauer1
(The Bad Argument Searle refers to is any argument that attempts to treat the perceptual experience as an actual or possible object of experience.) — Richard B
Being an AN is a result of running the calc, and never coming out with 'life' as the winner. Not that its pre-decided. — AmadeusD
It only does so once the calc is run. The statement is not meant to be a position of it's own. It's more "I've run this calc 60,000 times and zero came up on the side of procreation". — AmadeusD
My way of interpreting the balancing is more deontological I think than your approach which is more perhaps consequential — schopenhauer1
But I assume Aristotle did not describe truth as a property that could or could not be predicated; that way of thinking wasn't available to him. — J
Is there something he did say that would be more or less the equivalent of "To say of what is that it is, is not to provide additional knowledge about it"? Or maybe: "To assert of what is that it is, is the same act as identifying the being/existence of what is"? — J
Prima facie, I would say it doesn't tip the scales because other pleasures out weight a pinprick (scratching a decent itch would be enough v a pinprick). — AmadeusD
Ill try to re-word your interp. to see if it gets you anywhere.. — AmadeusD
As a clarifying point, to me, 'other considerations' could be positive experiences, bare pleasure (in an abstract sense), character-building, the achievement of some life-long goal etc.. etc.. — AmadeusD
And I answered you. — schopenhauer1
Although I'll certainly grant that it is common to think that way when one is accustomed to think in the folk psychology terms promoted by a religion. I have faith in your ability to develop a more psychologically informed view though. — wonderer1
I think this is more-or-less the discussion ANs have (and honestly, the one whcih is usually attempted cross-positionally). The type though doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance (ironic, given apokrisis' objections in the other thrad) between suffering and other considerations. The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD
I think the discussion of which sorts of suffering need to be prevented is more or less the discussion that antinatalists have among themselves (and it is also the discussion that others wish to have with antinatalists). The type of suffering doesn't seem that interesting - it's the balance between suffering and other considerations that is interesting. The antinatalist position is that suffering always trumps any other consideration. — Interpretation
the consideration is that there are no people deprived of good and that is not bad — schopenhauer1
It is undisputed that in this world, at least there will be suffering — schopenhauer1
And Lastly, from Seeing Things as They Are by John Searle:
"Question 2 How does the account deal with color constancy and size constancy? I will consider these in order. Imagine that a shadow falls over a portion of the red ball so that part of it is in shadow and part not. Did the part in shadow change its color? Well, obviously not, and it is obviously not seen as having changed its color. All the same, there is a difference in the subjective visual field. The subjective basic perceptual properties have changed. The proof is that if I were drawing a picture of what I now see, I would have to include a darker portion of the part in shadow, even though I know that there has been no change in its actual color. It is extremely misleading to describe this phenomenon as "color constancy", because of course the experienced color is precisely not constant. It is because of my high-level Background capacities that I am able to see it as having the same color even though at the lower level I see it as having in part changed its color. I want to emphasize this point. At the basic level, the color is precisely not constant, neither subjectively nor objectively. It changes. It is just at the higher level that I know, because of my Background abilities, that it still keeps the same color." — Richard B
ANs do the balancing exercise, and suffering tips the scales. — AmadeusD
I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J
I can say “A hundred thalers exist” but this adds nothing to the concept ‛a hundred thalers’; — J
I’m looking for some source help — J
I see it more as sowing seeds. — wonderer1
One cannot do philosophy without giving due consideration to the language with which one does philosophy. — Banno
So I am offering two arguments — schopenhauer1
1) Suffering in Pinprick World isn't "suffering" as we know it — schopenhauer1
2) Since there is no one to miss out on the "good", no obligation was intendent on the missed opportunity. In other words, your world could be COMPLETELY all BLISS.. and if you did not create someone into that world, you are still NOT in the wrong by preventing that birth. — schopenhauer1
The antinatalist will always say that in the case of future people, we have no obligation to add happiness for them, but ALL the obligation to prevent the harm. — schopenhauer1
I think this is more-or-less the discussion ANs have — AmadeusD
it's the balance (ironic, given apokrisis' objections in the other thread) between suffering and other considerations — AmadeusD
The position is that suffering always wins out — AmadeusD
If so, none of that resembles the NATURE OF SUFFERING as it pertains to this world. — schopenhauer1
1. Suppose every living human being is guaranteed a pinprick of pain followed by 80 years of pure happiness.
2. [Insert Benatar's antinatalist argument here]
3. Therefore, we should never procreate — Leontiskos
And I hold that Christianity purports to be an universal religion. What it excludes is hatred, Some folks have not heard the Good News, others have not Yet accepted it, but none are excluded. — unenlightened
Do you see a downside to divisiveness in religions? For example, dividing people into Brahman/Dalit or Muslim/dhimmi?
Is "sheep" vs "goats" any less divisive? — wonderer1
But that is the basic difference I would say. A dualism of transcendence or a triadicism of immanence. — apokrisis