- Make it three. :monkey:

My edit: "For the classical realist the extramental world can be known in itself precisely through the rational, perspective-grounded mind."

• S(b): The boulder has shape in itself

S(b) can be known. It is known via a contingent and finite perspective. Therefore contingent and finite perspectives do not prevent us from knowing reality in itself.

...So I don't want to reject the idea of a perspective, I just don't think it entails what you think it entails.

The problem there is that you're trying to assume a perspective outside both, in order to arrive at which one of the two is correct. And I don't think that can be done, in this case. — Wayfarer

But does not any decision in favor of one or the other imply an ability to adjudicate, and therefore imply access to an "outside perspective"? I don't think there is any difference between my position and yours, on this score.

(Oh, and Plaque Flag and I go back at least 10 years now. He's a very interesting contributor, although somewhat prone to digression ;-) ) — Wayfarer

Ah, okay. I often tend to the opposite problem: saying too little. :smile:

'No features', is the expression Charles Pinter uses - shape being one. Features correspond to functions of the animal sensorium, but this thesis is developed over several chapters, and not one I can summarise in a few words. — Wayfarer

Oh, I assumed he would do something like that - define 'shape' as a sensory phenomenon. I think it only sidesteps the issue, begging the pertinent question and discarding the colloquial meaning of the word 'shape'. So of course if we define 'shape' to be a sensory phenomenon, then the boulder cannot have shape by definition. But I think we want to move beyond this sort of tautological approach.

Note that my point about the boulder cuts through this redefinition. The boulder must have shape in the colloquial sense, and therefore we have knowledge of the boulder as it is in itself.

I acknowledge at the outset that the universe pre-exists us: 'though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective.'

It's the idea of 'an implicit perspective' that you're calling into question. — Wayfarer

The point that I have been trying to stress is that it is not a difference of whether there is an implicit perspective, or propositions, or "glass", but rather what the nature of those rational entities is. I think all parties agree that there are such things. The disagreement is always over their precise nature. One groups says that the rational entity prevents us from knowing reality as it is in itself; the other group says that it does not. For the classical realist the extramental world can be known in itself precisely through the rational, perspective-grounded mind.

But I'm thinking this might be a good stopping point, especially because @plaque flag can carry it forward.

If he is inquiring into wisdom does that mean he does not know what it is to be wise? If he is not wise can he determine whether others are? If others are not wise what it the value in discussing the opinions we hold about the wise man? — Fooloso4

Your line of approach reminds me of the Meno:

I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater's argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for. — Meno, 80e, (tr. Grube)

- Sounds right; I agree. :up: It seems like we are pretty close, but I'm sure we'll manage to find something to argue about one day. :razz:

Whereas this isn't a problem if mind independent reality can be known. If mind independent reality can be known, than at least in some way, it isn't mind independent. The mind can access it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Earlier in the thread I gestured towards a possible equivocation on "mind-independent reality," but here it is occurring explicitly. Note that if you define "mind-independent reality" in this way, then my hypothesis that "the mind can know mind-independent reality" would be incoherent.

So to be clear, when I am talking about knowing mind-independent reality, I am talking about knowing things whose existence is distinct and unrelated to mind. Your claim that <If a reality can be known, then it is not mind-independent> is therefore neither here nor there. I don't think anyone in the thread has been conceiving of "mind-independent reality" in this way.

Husserl's notion of the transcendence of the object is helpful here. Sartre opens B&N with it (does a great job). The spatial object is never finally or completely given. I'm quite happy to understand the object as some kind of ideal unity of its possible 'adumbrations.' — plaque flag

Okay, sure. I have no truck with this sort of phenomenological approach. Makes sense to me.

Reality is 'horizonal.' I speak too easily of the being of the world when it's better perhaps to stress its fluid endless becoming. I'd say I have a kind of continuous blanket ontology, with all thinks inferentially linked. — plaque flag

:up:

I agree that epistemology is always posterior to metaphysics, so perhaps you have drawn the wrong conclusion from my argument. In your glass analogy, metaphysics would be the discipline by which we understand the glass, which is "being" in general, and of which perspective is a feature. This would lay the grounds for epistemology. — Metaphysician Undercover

...but whatever is your argument for choosing one over the other is a metaphysical argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good, then we agree. I was mistaken. :up:

You say that we cannot "fix" the flaw by understanding our understanding, but this is exactly what we do in practise, to improve ourselves, we repair flaws in our understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, we fix flaws in concrete acts of understanding, but not foundational flaws in the faculty of understanding (the intellect).

In this way, (habituation), the means now determine the ends by crippling our capacity to freely choose our goals. We act in the habitual way, we are satisfied, therefore we do not question the ends and the forms of satisfaction which the habits provide for us. — Metaphysician Undercover

True.

Notice though, that I referred to a special type of goal, the ideal, as perfection. I said that it was the ideal, perfection as a goal, which cannot be obtained by the human intellect. So the goal then is not to "fix" the understanding, but to improve upon it, in relation to the ideal... — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. My point was only that if one accepts the premise that the faculty of the intellect itself is inherently incapable of knowing reality as it is in itself, then no amount of self-reflection or epistemological work will change that fact. I think we are in agreement.

I agree, "matter" is posited by Aristotle for the purpose of accounting for that feature of reality which we cannot grasp, the part of reality which appears as unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. Sorry that I don't have enough time to go into these sorts of topics.

I disagree that Aquinas believed we would "have a body of some kind" in the resurrected state. But of course there would be ambiguity providing different interpretations on this matter because Aquinas often had to stretch his ontology to appear consistent with Church dogma. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well he at least says that we will have a resurrected body in the third part of the Summa Theologiae, questions 53-56, as well as in questions 75-86 of the supplement of that work.

The OP is talking about the fear of criticism that leads people into sophistry and opaque argumentation. — Leontiskos

How about being aware that your posts here might someday be read by, say, an FBI agent or an IRS agent? Or your boss? — baker

Well, is that a "fear of criticism that leads people into sophistry and opaque argumentation"?

Dou you think that posting at a public forum should involve no such fear? — baker

I said:

On the other hand, if an argument is unsound then transparency will only make it easier to see that it is wrong, and no one likes to be wrong. So transparency is a double-edged sword, much like transparent clothing that makes attractive people more attractive and unattractive people more unattractive. — Leontiskos

Courage is the ability to overcome fear. If there were no fear, there could be no courage. We often think about courage as overcoming irrational fears, but in fact there are also rational fears that need to be overcome by courage, and this is one of those.

The OP is talking about the fear of criticism that leads people into sophistry and opaque argumentation. There is also a fear of criticism that that leads us to write write quality posts (checking our spelling, proofreading, considering counterarguments, etc.). That latter kind of fear is healthy and praiseworthy.

I would not agree that Kant thinks our cognitions distort reality. — Janus

And the scare quotes were precisely for you, because of how you responded to my comment in a different thread:

So it's the idea that knowledge of the world is possible, and this knowledge is not automatically contaminated, distorted, or even conditioned by the human subject. — Leontiskos

There you fixated on contamination and distortion, ignoring conditioning. Anti-Realists certainly hold that reality is conditioned by the human subject. Imputation of or fixation on distortion tends to beg the question, but it is ultimately pertinent given that we are considering the possibility of knowing reality as it is in itself. Thus it is a distortion in relation to that counterfactual possibility.

If Aristotle is wise then why artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom? — Fooloso4

I just explained to you why he doesn't do that. You seem to wish he had.

Hello ,

I'm sort of planning an exit strategy so that I can take some time away, and for that reason I'm trying not to initiate a lot of new dialogues. For example, with Wayfarer I have teased at the idea of adjudication, but it would be imprudent for me to go there in full, given my increasing time constraints. So maybe what I will do is just try to situate my view vis-a-vis your own. In general I am unsure about your first unanswered reply (), but I agree with most of your second ().

So for example, in your second unanswered reply you say that, "We see things themselves, not our images of them," but in your first you say that all we can mean by an independent world is "permanent possibilities of perception." I am then led to wonder whether that possibility of perception, when engaged, effects an actualization of perception, such that we are really encountering a perception/image rather than the thing itself. For me the possibility of perception is derivative on the thing that exists in itself. The thing is more than a possibility of perception, even though we always know by means of perception. ...But then given what you say <here> I think we might be on the same page, and I may just be splitting hairs.

Let me go out on a limb and try to characterize our difference, which is probably negligible for the purposes of this thread. I want to say that you are a "direct realist" with an immanent anthropology, whereas I am a "direct realist" with a transcendent anthropology. I am thinking in particular of your claim that, "the subject is world-from-a-point-of-view" (). I want to say that the soul ultimately transcends and encompasses the world, and is not metaphysically co-extensive with it. So the subject is the world from a point of view, but it is at the same time more than that. It is not only world-from-a-point-of-view. Do we even disagree on that? (I am also willing to toy with the idea that intellect is able to obtain a universal or rather quasi-universal point of view, which is I think what much of philosophy and science is interested in.)

Granted, that's a rather tiny difference, so maybe it's not even worth raising. Maybe it will create more problems than it's worth. :sweat:

'We just don't see it as it is.' — Wayfarer

This is precisely what we are disagreeing on. The disagreement is somewhat subtle, so at times I am characterizing it in a somewhat imprecise way to get it to pop out. For example, my imprecision seems to have led you, at some points, to think that I impute to you a belief that external reality does not exist at all. But <again>, I am not saying that. The disagreement is over whether we can know external reality as it is in itself.

Then have a look at Mind and the Cosmic Order, by Charles Pinter. Chapter 1 abstract is: — Wayfarer

Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape...

This is precisely what I argued against, beginning <here>. In that post I explicitly disagreed with Pinter's claim that objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, and you agreed with my argument. We agreed that unobserved boulders have shape. Or rather, so as not to put words in your mouth, you said, "It's safe to assume."

I agree with @plaque flag here:

But you seem (to me) to be flitting from position to position. Either it makes sense to talk about some object apart from all subjectivity or it doesn't. — plaque flag

Compare:

But you seem to be holding to two conflicting principles. Either the mind can know mind-independent reality as it is in itself, or it cannot. — Leontiskos

Note that I am not saying that every mind always knows mind-independent reality as it is in itself. Only that the mind can so know it.

I never used to like this song, but now I can't get enough of it. It's grown on me like the South, and it rings like a Southern belle.

(official video)

I agree with that, assuming that you mean everything should be out in the open and that there should be no hidden or unacknowledged premises at work in philosophical discussions. — Janus

Yes: no concealed premises or motivations, and no lack of clarity about one's position. For example, <this post> was an urging towards transparency.

But my other point is teleological. Sometimes when people engage in argument they are doing the wrong thing or aiming at the wrong thing. Just as the children kneading dough have an ulterior end, so too do those who engage in argument have an ulterior end. Often a lack of transparency pertains to an inappropriate ulterior end, or telos. "If the proper telos of truth is maintained, then the courage for transparent arguments will be ready to hand." I gave some examples of errors in the OP, but a common one is vainglory, where someone will engage in argument for the ulterior end of being praised, or being thought intelligent. In that case transparency is quickly obscured.

The interesting thing is that two instances of argument can reflect entirely different realities. The material fact that someone is engaging in argument is not enough to understand what they are doing. We also need to understand their telos. Oftentimes when two people are arguing with each other, they are each engaged in entirely different acts, even though they might both assume that the other one is engaged in the same act that they are engaged in. This can lead to strange and frustrating encounters.

Transparency can therefore act as a gauge which tells us whether we are going astray. When it is no longer present we have very likely ceased to argue for the sake of truth, and one or more of the conditions for legitimate dialogue noted below have evaporated.

Plato comes at this at one point in the Meno. After brushing aside a bit of eristic, Socrates gives the conditions for philosophical dialogue:

Then, if they are friends as you and I are, and want to discuss with each other, they must answer in a manner more gentle and more proper to discussion. By this I mean that the answers must not only be true, but in terms admittedly known to the questioner. I too will try to speak in these terms. — Meno, 75c-d, (tr. Grube)

That is:

1. Friendliness or goodwill
2. A desire to discuss
3. One's answers must be (believed to be) true
4. One's answers must be given in terms that are able to be understood and accepted by the questioner

Pierre Hadot comments on this:

Training in dialectics was absolutely necessary, insofar as Plato's disciples were destined to play a role in their city. In a civilization where political discourse was central, young people had to be trained to have a perfect mastery of speech and reasoning. Yet, in Plato's eyes, such mastery was dangerous, for it risked making young people believe that any position could be either defended or attacked. That is why Platonic dialectics was not a purely logical exercise. Instead, it was a spiritual exercise which demanded that the interlocutors undergo an askesis, or self-transformation. It was not a matter of a combat between two individuals, in which the more skillful person imposed his point of view, but a joint effort on the part of two interlocutors in accord with the rational demands of reasonable discourse, or the logos. Opposing his method to that of contemporary eristics, which practiced controversy for its own sake, Plato says: "When two friends, like you and me, are in the mood to chat, we have to go about it in a gentler and more dialectical way. By 'more dialectical,' I mean not only that we give real responses, but that we base our responses solely on what the interlocutor admits that he himself knows."

A true dialogue is possible only if the interlocutors want to dialogue. Thanks to this agreement between the interlocutors, which is renewed at each stage of the discussion, neither one of the interlocutors imposes his truth upon the other. On the contrary, dialogue teaches them to put themselves in each other's place and thereby transcend their own point of view. By dint of a sincere effort, the interlocutors discover by themselves, and within themselves, a truth which is independent of them, insofar as they submit to the superior authority of the logos. Here, as in all ancient philosophy, philosophy consists in the movement by which the individual transcends himself toward something which lies beyond him. For Plato, this something was the logos: discourse which implies the demands of rationality and universality. This logos, moreover, did not represent a kind of absolute knowledge; instead, it was equivalent to the agreement which is established between interlocutors who are brought to admit certain positions in common, and by this agreement transcend their particular points of view. — Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy, pp. 62-3 (footnotes omitted)

For example, a personal fault I have is that, when I am getting tired, I will recast proposals as assertions. If I know that my interlocutor disagrees with X I may impatiently say something which means, "X is true!", rather than something which means, "I myself hold/propose X and I am willing to give arguments on its behalf." This can be a very subtle difference and a very subtle fault, but if it occurs frequently enough then tensions will rise and the dialogue will implode. It is a violation of Socrates' fourth condition, and it also happens to involve a lack of transparency of intent.

- Seems right. :up:

(Oh dear, can let this one go by. I've added the qualifiers in square brackets, I trust this is as you intended? ) — Wayfarer

Probably, depending on what you mean by 'empirical realist'.

It doesn't, but that is not the point. Surely the point is how to adjuticate which is correct? Kantian, or empirical realist? If you're supporting the latter, then the case has to be made as to why that is correct, and the Kantian view wrong. — Wayfarer

I haven't said much about adjudication (apart from those quotes from Aquinas). I have only been trying to frame the question, which the image about the glass was supposed to effect. If the question has been framed correctly, then the position you're staking out is an anti-realist position, as is Kant's. Do we agree on this?

I've been wrestling against your alternative framing, where apparently Hume is a kind of anti-realist but Kant is not, nor is your OP.* Or else, that your perspectivalism is devised to resist a scientism which derives from the 17th century.

So the crux is apparently that scientism is realist, and can be resisted by the anti-realism of your OP, but I would prefer resisting scientism by way of an alternative realism.


* For my part I would only say that Hume holds to a stronger anti-realism than Kant.

- :up:

When I came to this forum I was in the process of creating my own philosophy forum, and very nearly did so. For this reason a lot of my thread ideas pertain to pedagogy, how to aid people in philosophy, and how to keep a philosophical community well-oiled, so to speak. This thread is just one product of that sort of thinking, for a lack of transparency in argument leads to a weakening and breakdown of philosophical communities.

...That just scratches the surface of the disagreement between Banno and myself. The differences between his position and my own are often tied to the respective notions of belief that we're working from. — creativesoul

Thank you, creativesoul, that was very helpful. :up:

---

Why can't it be said that S had a propositional attitude towards the clock; namely the belief that it was functioning. — Janus

I tend to agree with you. S holds that, "The clock is functioning," not that, "The broken clock is functioning." "Broken" does not enter into their intentional act. They do not hold a belief regarding a broken clock; they hold a belief regarding a (working) clock. They just happen to be mistaken.

But I am probably not honing in on the exact difference that Banno and creativesoul are meting out.

Well, I do get into arguments about whether metaphysical arguments are truth-apt, and I think it is true that they are not, for the simple reason that their premises cannot be determined to be true or false. — Janus

Right.

I think acceptance or rejection of metaphysical premises cannot but be a matter of taste, and as you say we don't argue about taste. — Janus

And thus, as I said, you do not enter into metaphysical disputes. The closest you get is disputing metaphysics itself.

People believing metaphysical premises are susceptible of truth and falsity and their actually being so are two different things... — Janus

Right, but the former is all that is required for an argument. As long as two people believe that a subject is susceptible of truth and falsity, they can argue about it. And my OP pertains to the arguments that people have. It pertains to empirical arguments and metaphysical arguments and arguments about astrology and homeopathy and alien abductions. The advice given in the OP is meant to aid arguments of all kinds.

Fair enough, I am stretching the conventional meaning of "sound" somewhat to apply to premises as well as arguments. I think it is fair to say that when an argument is claimed to be sound, we mean it is taken to be true, because every part of a sound argument, if it is valid, must be true, that is true premises and true conclusions consistent with those premises. — Janus

The first reason I would resist such a re-naming is because I think it is better for truth and soundness to be separate and distinct, rather than overlapping and superfluous. The second reason is that validity is not reducible to truth, because it has to do with forms and rules (which are necessarily true).

But idiosyncratic terminology aside, I think my point stands; metaphysical arguments cannot be determined to be true or false (or if you prefer, sound or unsound), whereas empirical arguments can be. — Janus

Well, you've asserted that and I've said I am not going to engage it in this thread, and that's still where things stand. :razz: (I hope it wouldn't come as a surprise that I disagree.)

You may not want to engage this take, but I think it is apposite in that you speak of people coming to understand that philosophical arguments are true or false. — Janus

I think it only commits you to the conclusion that metaphysical propositions are not truth-apt. I'm not convinced it is related to this thread.

Now, if all you meant was that people can come to believe that philosophical arguments are true or false, then there would be no problem, but you seemed to be claiming that the truth of philosophical arguments is determinable and that is what I have been taking issue with. — Janus

This thread is about inquiry. It is about transparency as an aid to argument; as an aid to dialogue. So perhaps that is "all I meant," or all I require. I am certainly not claiming that every subject anyone argues about is necessarily determinable.

If you and I are arguing about something, then we must believe that the thing we are arguing about is truth-apt. If you don't believe metaphysics is truth-apt then presumably you don't get into a lot of arguments about metaphysics. Similarly, because we don't believe taste is truth-apt, we don't argue about taste ("de gustibus non disputandum est"). My advice in the OP applies to arguments, and people argue about theses that they believe are susceptible of truth and falsity.

Suppose there were an argument about a piece of glass. One person says that anything perceived through the glass has "an inextricably glassy aspect." Another person disagrees, holding that this piece of glass is perfectly translucent. As far as I can tell, that's analogous to the argument over the intellect between Realists and Anti-Realists. If the former person is right, then nothing viewed through the glass can be seen as it is in itself. If the latter person is right, then things viewed through glass need not have a glassy aspect. — Leontiskos

But I don't see that as a valid analogy for what Kant's idealism says. Kant's view is that we never know [the object] as it is in itself (ding an sich). Instead, we only know [the object] as it appears to us (the phenomena, meaning appearance), and this appearance is inextricably a product of the inherent structures of the mind (the primary intuitions of space and time and the categories of understanding). That is always the case for empirical (or sensory) knowledge. So he mind is not just a passive recipient of sensory data; it actively shapes and structures our experience. It is, I would aver, an agent.

The analogy's issue is that Kant doesn't merely claim the "glass" (our cognitive faculties) is translucent. Instead, Kant argues that our cognitive faculties play an active role in constituting our experience, not merely transmitting it. It's as if the glass doesn't just let us see the world but actively shapes, organizes, and structures what we see based on its inherent properties. So it's better compared to spectacles, which focus light so we can recognise what we're looking at. If your natural vision was poor, then without them you can't see anything but blurs.

That can be extended to argue that Kant's critical project was actually to learn to look AT your spectacles, not just THROUGH them - to turn our attention away from objects of knowledge and direct it towards the conditions that make knowledge possible ('knowing about knowing'). Instead of merely accepting our experiences at apparent value, Kant investigates the faculties and structures that underlie experience. — Wayfarer

Exactly right! I grant everything you say, and it does not invalidate my analogy, it accentuates it! Recall that the central issue here is whether we can know mind-independent reality as it is in itself. The first person in my analogy represents those who say that we cannot, whereas the second represents those who say that we can. I don't think anything you've noted about Kant moves him away from that first group, does it? The "glassy aspect" is merely representative of that which conveys reality in a way other than it is in itself; a "distortion," so to speak.

(Yes there are active aspects to the intellect, and I grant that that is another way the analogy limps, but this too does not move Kant out of the first group.)

I did explicitly discuss that under the second heading. — Wayfarer

Right, that's why I spoke about "following your lead."

I sense we're talking past each other here, so I'm happy to leave it at that, unless you have more issues you'd like to discuss. — Wayfarer

I think we're close to a good stopping point. :up:

Because of this, the only way that we can achieve with certainty any understanding of the external world, is to first produce a thorough understanding of the perceiving body. That is to say that we cannot know with certainty, the nature of the supposed independent world without first knowing with certainty the nature of the perceiving body. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your argument is well-made, but I actually disagree. I actually have a thread drafted on why epistemology is always posterior to metaphysics, but I don't know if it will ever see the light of day.

The extremely truncated argument is that it comes down to which of the two is more known: 1) That we know things (as they are), or 2) That there is a glassy perspective. Whichever is less-known must be funneled through that which is more-known, and the modern assumption is that (2) is more-known and that we must therefore begin with epistemology. I don't think that will work. Will I ever get around to addressing this more fully in its own thread? I don't know. :sweat:

(Another argument is that if our understanding is 'flawed', then our understanding of our understanding will also be 'flawed'. We can't fix (or necessarily perceive) the flaw in our understanding by reflexively applying our understanding to our understanding. Any uncertainty deriving from the faculty of the intellect will color both internal and external objects.)

I come to a slightly different conclusion. It has become evident to me that the human intellect cannot have knowledge of all corporeal things. That is where the problems of quantum physics have led us, there are corporeal things which we as human beings, will never be able to understand. The reason why the human intellect cannot have knowledge of all corporeal things is that as Aristotle indicates, the human intellect is dependent on a corporeal thing, the human body, and this in conjunction with the premise given by Aquinas, that to know all corporeal things requires that the intellect be free from corporeal influence, produces the conclusion that the human intellect cannot know all corporeal things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well for Aristotle and Aquinas the intellect is immaterial for precisely the reason you are outlining. But on the other hand, matter qua matter (or qua singular) is not intelligible on Aristotelianism, but only matter qua property (or qua universal). So Aristotle would not be surprised that something like the quantum realm begins to approach unintelligibility.

The point now, is that the human intellect, as an intellect, is deficient in the sense that it can never know all corporeal things. It is deficient because it is dependent on a corporeal body. Aquinas also argues this point when he discusses man's ability to obtain the knowledge of God. The same problem arises in that a man's intellect cannot properly know God while the man's soul is united to a body. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't begrudge you your conclusion, because it is a reasonable inference. Yet recall that for Aquinas we will know God "perfectly" (as perfectly as we can) not only in the intermediate state, but also in the resurrected state. And in the resurrected state we will have a body of some kind.

Thank you for your thoughtful and cogent post.

How would you differentiate a case where there is a mind involved, from a case where there is not? — Wayfarer

I think the easiest way is to follow your lead and talk about a pre-human age. Or a post-human age. Or if one thinks non-human animals possess knowledge, then a pre-animal age, etc.

I understand "sound or unsound" to be equivalent to "true or untrue". — Janus

Classically, a sound argument is an argument that possess both validity and true premises. An unsound argument lacks one or both.

For example, two metaphysical postulates are "being is fundamentally physical" and "being is fundamentally mental"; these two polemical posits are the basic presuppositions of materialism and idealism respectively. Can we determine which is true? No.

Empirical propositions, and arguments based on them, can be sound or unsound, when their truth is determinable by observation. That's my take, anyway. — Janus

Fair enough. I understand what you are saying. It's a common take. I am not going to engage it here, but I have said one or two things about it in "What is the nature of intuition?"

Given your perspective, I would suggest reading the OP in terms of what you call "empirical propositions" (or "empirical arguments").

I think I understand what you're seeing as a conflict. You think that what I'm saying must necessarily entail that 'the unobserved object doesn't exist'. — Wayfarer

No, I most certainly do not think that, nor does the view that "the mind cannot know mind-independent reality as it is in itself" necessarily entail that anything does not exist.

I said, "If it cannot, then there is always a reason to deny the existence of external objects a la post-Kantian philosophy (thus modern philosophy is intrinsically bound up with solipsism)." What I meant was that it is possible to deny the existence of extramental objects, but not that it is necessary. I do not think it's a coincidence that solipsism is such a common problem in modern philosophy.

Hume and Kant are chalk and cheese. — Wayfarer

Batman and Robin. :wink:

I think that physics has validated Kant's attitude in many respects... — Wayfarer

I don't think so, but some more than others. We would have to examine these in detail to give them a fair hearing.

All due respect, it is not analogous, but is a misreading. — Wayfarer

Well say why in your own words. I give simple examples so that they can be easily interacted with. In my opinion folks too often advert to abstruse quotes from philosophers rather than speaking plainly in their own words.

But regarding your quote from Westacott, it seems premised on your initial idea that I think Kant must dispense with the noumenal altogether, which I do not. I think the glass example should have illustrated that, for surely there is no reason why the person who says that everything viewed through the glass has a glassy aspect is necessarily committed to the position which says that the viewed objects do not exist.

And as I say, all such statements still carry an implicit perspective. — Wayfarer

Haven't we already agreed <that it is likely false> that "boulders will only treat cracks differently than canyons when a mind is involved"? And if so, then is the claim that although boulders will act in the way described even if no minds exist, nevertheless the statement that this is so carries an "implicit perspective"? Because there is some categorical commitment to perspectives?

A statement is the affirmation of a proposition, and propositions require minds, but reality does not require propositions. Whether or not there are propositions and minds, boulders will treat cracks differently than canyons. At some point the perspectivalism becomes either strained or tautological. You could think of my argument about boulders as an argument against perspectivalism.

I want to say that the perspectivalism can only avoid tautology if "perspective" is defined as something beyond "proposition-esque." If all propositions are by definition perspectival then I should think we are lost in tautological thinking. We will at least need a middle term or an argument to connect them.

As soon as you posit such a hypothetical you have created as what phenomenology calls 'the intentional object'*. — Wayfarer

And everything hangs on the nature of that intentional object, which is like the <glass>. For example, you seem to want to claim that every intentional object "carries an implicit perspective." What sort of argument would be required for such a categorical claim?

Presumably the next step is to define 'perspective' and give an argument for why every intentional object must be perspectival.

I'm very interested in pursuing the discussion about Aquinas, but it's a separate topic, and one that I'm preparing further material on. — Wayfarer

Alright, sounds good. I don't know how much longer can sustain this pace, but even if I have to abandon ship I think we've made some headway. :halo:

I just came across this thread, so apologies if I repeat what has already been said. I don't see philosophical arguments as being true or false, but rather valid or invalid; that is consistent with their premises or inconsistent with their premises. — Janus

I agree, although I don't really mind if people predicate truth of arguments. I don't think I've spoken about arguments as true or false anywhere in the OP.

I don't see philosophical arguments as being true or false, but rather valid or invalid — Janus

Can they be sound or unsound? I hold to the common view that they can.

Much as I would like to derive a genuine, non-hypothetical “ought” from “is” here, I don’t think we can. It seems like two responses are possible. — J

Which of the two responses do you prefer?

2) There is actually no choice in the matter at all, since to understand the soundness of an argument is to believe it. This is Nagel’s position, by the way, in regard to logical truth. — J

Yes, I can see it. On my view people should be forced to submit to sound arguments, but experience shows that they can somehow manage to avoid doing so, and so I don't actually think the 'ought' disappears. But as a Christian I see this as bound up in the paradox of evil, where irrationality is a form of evil.

More concretely, we could consider the second-order question, "Ought we strive for sound arguments?" It seems that if (2) is correct, then we ought to strive for sound arguments. For example, we should be cautious in our reasoning, try to avoid fallacies and bias, and avoid drawing conclusions when we are in overly emotional states of mind. Once the teleology of the intellect is granted, it acts as a center of gravity, pulling other facets of life into a "moral" (or normative) orbit, such as this second-order question.

(Another excellent post, by the way.)

Probably a good reason why I now prefer more virtue-based ethics than consequentialism. — Jerry

:up:

While context is pretty much always required when evaluating whether a particular action is just, the idea of "This is bad, unless..." just sounds like making ad hoc excuses for a bad action. — Jerry

Oh, I wouldn't want to go that far. I think there is a lot of legitimate confusion tied up with consequentialism, and not merely ad hoc excuses. Generally speaking the consequentialist elevates a psychological theory to the level of morality. For example, the hedonist assumes that pleasure/pain provide the exhaustive basis for psychological motivation, and they then conclude that morality must be nothing more than appeals to pleasure or pain.

Why the detour into our opinions of the wise man? — Fooloso4

Because he is inquiring into wisdom, and rather than artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom, he looks at what we already mean by it, and who we call 'wise'. In the subsequent section he assesses these widespread opinions about the wise man.

Well, perhaps more than you wanted, but these meta-philosophical questions are deeply engaging for me. — J

This is great stuff, @J, thank you. Bernstein is definitely on my reading list by now, as everything you are bringing up resonates with me. I am not going to try to give a response here, in part because I am short on time and in part because we are getting off-topic for this thread. To be clear, I am not worried about derailing my thread, but I see no use hiding this topic in a thread where people will not be able to find it. I think there is a new thread to be had (or five). :wink: I have bookmarked your post, and will return to it in time.

That said, any new thread(s) would need to be carefully constructed and contained. I am fairly new here, but I haven't seen anyone delve into the complex realities that someone like Habermas was interested in. I haven't seen many threads on these sorts of deep cultural issues.

Hi, Leontiskos — plaque flag

Hello, @plaque flag,

The boulder's shape is independent, in some sense, from this or that individual human perspective. So it transcends the limitations of my eyesight or yours. But it seems to me that what we could even mean by 'shape' depends on an experience that has always been embodied and perspectival. — plaque flag

Yes, we learn about shape through experience. My earlier comment may be worth quoting, "Opposing various forms of idealism, I would claim that reality exists and minds are able to know it. This is not to say that all knowledge is objective, but lots of it is" ().

Speaking as someone who embraces perspectivism and correlationism, I'd would not call the world 'mind-created' or basically mental. But I would insist... — plaque flag

Okay. Can you give a quick overview of what you mean by perspectivism and correlationism? I have seen these words used in different ways. Generally speaking, I am inclined to lump you, Wayfarer, and Mill together. :razz: It seems like you are all saying that reality cannot be known as it is in itself. Or in Wayfarer's words, "Reality has an inextricably mental aspect."

- Yes, I think Berkeley misses the mark, although I am speaking from the perspective of secondary texts. Really, I think modern philosophy tends to be <shades of grey> with respect to this topic, with the possible exception of Husserl and certain figures in his school.

Here is a concise text from Aquinas that @Wayfarer may also want to read. It situates my view and gives an initial outline of the problem:

It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color. Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation per se apart from the body. — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Question 75, Article 2

(The point is not that the power of the intellect is entirely unrelated to the body, but rather that it has an operation which is apart from the body.)

Note that modern philosophers would presumably just disagree with Aquinas that "by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things," but if his point is granted then I believe his conclusion follows, and scientists are liable to grant his point (especially to the degree that they are ignorant of modern philosophy).

Another, related more to Hume but highlighting a relevant danger:

Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood.

This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons.

First, because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [I:84:1].

Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true", and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension. — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Question 85, Article 2

A good introductory resource for classical realism is the first issue of Reality, especially the introduction and initial essays (link).

As I said in the OP ‘there is no need for me to deny that the Universe (or: any object) is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect…’ — Wayfarer

But you seem to be holding to two conflicting principles. Either the mind can know mind-independent reality as it is in itself, or it cannot. If it cannot, then there is always a reason to deny the existence of external objects a la post-Kantian philosophy (thus modern philosophy is intrinsically bound up with solipsism). If it can, then reality does not have an inextricably mental aspect a la western science.

It seems to me that the scientists got tired of the post-Kantians and their solipsism (or quasi-solipsism). The philosophers were preoccupied with trying to figure out whether the external world exists, and the scientists decided to ignore them and build cars so that we could travel from city to city. I'm sympathetic to the scientists, and I'm not very impressed with post-Kantian philosophy. I'm not convinced that any philosophy that takes Hume or Kant's starting point has ever worked, or ever will work, even if that starting error is mitigated as far as possible.

Suppose there were an argument about a piece of glass. One person says that anything perceived through the glass has "an inextricably glassy aspect." Another person disagrees, holding that this piece of glass is perfectly translucent. As far as I can tell, that's analogous to the argument over the intellect between Realists and Anti-Realists. If the former person is right, then nothing viewed through the glass can be seen as it is in itself. If the latter person is right, then things viewed through glass need not have a glassy aspect.

(Note that the analogy limps: glass is material, and therefore inherently imperfect. Hence the classical realist's claim that the intellect is immaterial.)

I was going to also add, that measurements of space and distance are also implicitly perspectival. You could, theoretically, conceive of the distance between two points from a cosmic perspective, against which it is infinitesimally small, and a subatomic perspective, against which it is infinitesimally large. As it happens, all of the units of measurement we utilise, such as years or hours, for time, and meters or parsecs, for space, ultimately derive from the human scale - a year being, for instance, the time taken for the earth to orbit the sun, and so on. Given those parameters, of course it is true that measures hold good independently of any mind, but there was a mind involved in making the measurement at the outset. — Wayfarer

This is the same problem from a different angle. Units of measurement are arbitrary, but this does not prevent comparison of finite objects.

But this need not be inherently human-biased. The point about shape, with boulders and cracks, has to do with the relative size of mind-independent objects, and these relative sizes will hold good whether or not they are measured. It must be so if boulders treat cracks differently than canyons whether or not a mind is involved.

It seems like if it is obligatory to do certain good things, even within your means, then you're almost a slave to the world around you. — Jerry

Historically morality has been concerned first with "Thou shalt not." Prohibitions. Consequentialism obviously takes a different route, and Hedonism is one variety of Consequentialism. What's curious is that Consequentialism seems to preclude absolute prohibitions. Rape and murder, for example, can apparently always be justified on consequentialist systems in one way or another.

Of course, this seems not to be the complete picture, because one could imagine an agent who truly believes in the righteousness of their action, despite it seeming wholly unethical from a different perspective. — Jerry

So I think the first thing to realize is that Consequentialism does not provide prohibitions for unethical acts. The closest Consequentialism ever gets is, "Don't do this unless..." If you think there are unethical acts, then you will have to find a better system than Consequentialism.

Well, Aristotle articulates a kind of non-intentional teleology. However we are again begging questions. The notion that there could be purpose without intention to me is just "autologically unsound." As soon as you allow purposiveness, you have intention. — Pantagruel

For William Paley "teleology" is purposive and intentional, but not for the Aristotelian tradition. Given that you talk about Aristotle in your OP, I didn't think you would be basing your notion of teleology on an 18th century Protestant theologian.

It’s safe to assume not, but then it is an empirical matter isn’t it? — Wayfarer

Well, it's not a directly empirical matter, because it could never be directly empirically studied. But if we can have knowledge about the mind-independent world, then we can have knowledge about this. As you say, "It's safe to assume not."

It's often helpful to place the two things side by side and assess our certainty:

1. Boulders will treat cracks differently than canyons whether or not a mind is involved.
2. Boulders will only treat cracks differently than canyons when a mind is involved.

I'd say we have a great deal more certainty of (1) than (2), and you seem to agree.

I suppose ‘smaller’ and ‘larger’ are a priori categories, though — Wayfarer

We are conceiving of a crack as something much smaller than a boulder and a canyon as something much larger than a boulder. I don't think the definitions are problematic.

Yes and no respectively. — Wayfarer

So again, here's the argument in question:

The second point, regarding shape, is that if a boulder rolls over a small crack it will continue rolling, but if it rolls into a "large crack" (a canyon) then it will fall, decreasing in altitude. This will occur whether or not a mind witnesses it, and this is because shape is a "primary quality." A boulder and a crack need not be perceived by a mind to possess shape. — Leontiskos

So you are saying that boulders will only treat cracks differently than canyons when a mind is involved?

Is ‘shape’ meaningful outside any reference to visual perception? — Wayfarer

Yes, because boulders fall into canyons and do not fall into cracks on account of their shape. Thus shape is meaningful, irrespective of visual perception.

What's the point of specifying a time? — Banno

I haven't worked that out either.

Call me old-fashioned, but I think it would be helpful if @creativesoul provided a compass like, "Banno believes X. I believe Y. X contradicts Y."

I don’t know if I said ‘there are no mind-independent objects’ — Wayfarer

I think you are committed to the idea, or something like it. For example, "By investing the objective domain with a mind-independent status, as if it exists independently of any mind, we absolutize it. We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it." I am not using the word 'object' in any specialized sense. You could replace it with 'thing' if you like.

I feel as though your response is made on the basis of a step after the suppositions that inform mine. You’re saying that given that objects exist - boulders, canyons, and so on - then we can say…. — Wayfarer

I am claiming, "This will occur whether or not a mind witnesses it, [and therefore shape is mind-independent]."

So though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle.’ — Wayfarer

But is my claim about the boulder meaningless and unintelligible outside of any perspective? Does not the idea that a boulder has a shape transcend perspective?

And how does the existence of the universe prior to the evolution of life rely on an implicit perspective? If the universe's existence at that time relied on a perspective, then whose perspective was it relying upon? I would say that the proposition, "The universe exists," relies on a mind, but the existence of the universe does not rely on a mind.* Thus the universe truly exists in a mind-independent way, even though the true proposition, "The universe exists," would not exist without minds. The common meaning of 'existence' does not connote minds or perception.

This is why that additional conclusion, "...and therefore there are no mind-independent objects," is tricky. It is equivocal, having various different meanings.

Opposing various forms of idealism, I would claim that reality exists and minds are able to know it. This is not to say that all knowledge is objective, but lots of it is.


* Presupposing naturalism for the moment.