Sometimes names do not work. But sometimes they do. Your conclusion that names do not work is odd. I gather I must be misunderstanding your point here. — Banno

Correct me if I'm wrong, but your argument seems to be, <Names pick out things in a definite way; Description does not pick out things in a definite way; Therefore names depend on something more than description>.

The idea is apparently that description is insufficient to account for naming because names are capable of picking out a unique referent whereas descriptions are not. My response is that your first premise is simply mistaken. There is parity between names and quasi-definite descriptions in precisely the way that my account requires. The usage of a name fails precisely when the application of the quasi-definition description, which is attached to the name, fails. I could echo back to you, "Sometimes descriptions do not work. But sometimes they do," so what's the difference between descriptions and names vis-a-vis unique reference?

No, I said the right leaders should use everything available to them to rally people to their cause and instill a sense of duty in them. I might have used the term "manipulate", but that doesn't always mean unscrupulousness - it can just mean controlling something cleverly. — ToothyMaw

In Banno's defense, to speak about duty and to speak about the manipulation of motivation is to speak about two different things. The idea that, "We need good outcomes. X is a strong motivator, therefore X should be manipulated for the sake of good outcomes," in fact has nothing to do with the nature of X. X can be anything you like so long as it is a strong motivator. The idea is more truly about the manipulation of strong motivations for the sake of good outcomes, and is only about X in an incidental way.

Now using duty as a means to an end is rather ironic given that duty is supposed to be intrinsically contrary to such use. If a leader believes that someone has a duty to do something, and he tries to convince them of this, then he is being honest. If a leader believes that someone has no duty to do something, but he tries to convince them that they do, then he is being dishonest. He is being dishonest even if he is lying to them for a good end (good outcome). The dishonesty arises because he uses the word or concept 'duty' in a false sense, and he wishes them to falsely believe that they have a duty so that he can achieve his end, which he considers to be good.

Thus if duty is being recommended independently of what ought to be done (in a rather intrinsic sense), we are on shaky ground. If one is opposed to lying, then they should not attempt to make people believe that they have duties which they do not have. Couching the whole conversation in terms of good outcomes and utilizing duty as a means really runs the risk of this danger (and this equivocation).

Some:

A natural reply to the sceptic's challenge is that S intended to use 'plus' in accordance with certain laws not satisfied by the quus function, i.e., the recursion equations for '+': (x) (x + 0 = x) and (x) ( y) (x + y' = (x + y)'), where the apostrophe indicates successor. This intention of S's, we might propose, constitutes the fact that S meant plus, and not quus, for only addition conforms to these laws. But Kripke opposes this kind of reply on the ground that 'the other signs used in these laws (the universal quantifiers, the equality sign) have been applied in only a finite number of instances, and they can be given non-standard interpretations that will fit non-standard interpretations of "+" ' (p. 17).

Kripke's objection, however, misses its target. For while it is true that S might have given '(x)' or '=' a non-standard interpretation, it is also true that S might give these signs a standard interpretation. Suppose then that S understands the universal quantifier in accordance with the standard interpretation, while intending to use 'plus' in accordance with the above recursion equations. In this case Kripke's objection will not apply. [...]

But, of course, we cannot therefore infer that S can answer the sceptic's challenge to the sceptic's satisfaction. For clearly S's having a certain intention that constitutes his meaning plus does not entail S's being able to establish beyond any doubt that he has (or had) such an intention. [...] Of course, the sceptic might object to S's reliance on non-demonstrative evidence or on memory beliefs in particular. But this kind of objection will give rise to a sterile form of scepticism, as one of the ground rules for any useful exchange between the sceptic and the non-sceptic is that justifying empirical evidence need not be demonstrative evidence. Insisting on such evidence, if only for the sake of argument, S might challenge the sceptic by asking what he means, or intends, by 'quus'. Further, the present sort of objection certainly will not provide us with a new form of philosophical scepticism; at most it will provide a traditional kind of epistemological scepticism to which recent philosophical literature provides some plausible replies. — Paul Moser and Kevin Flannery, Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention without Paradox, pp. 311-12

I still think gave the most apt reply.

Is it possible to act without knowing? — Moliere

Basically, no. Some degree of knowledge is always present. If no knowledge is present then you are not acting in a philosophically relevant way. For example, your knee might move when the doctor hits it, or you might sleepwalk, but these are not volitional actions.

And if you use a hammer then you have some knowledge about what it is, however incomplete. You will know, for example, that it is a physical object which possesses weight. If you use a word then you will have some (nominal) definition of it, however incomplete.

The modern conception where knowledge and action are two entirely different things does not hold for Aristotle (or Aquinas). There is a distinction between speculative knowledge and practical knowledge, but action still involves intellect and reasoning. Hence practical knowledge.

Yes, more good points. I am sure that we would disagree on any number of things, but on this you are preaching to the choir. I like the references to prophets and also to aphoristic writing styles.

I'd also like to posit that logicism and language approaches to solving epistemic and ontological problems do not seem to be a fruitful way of going about it. I think Russell and other early analytics (Meinong, Frege, etc.) ran into trouble because they tried to limit themselves to what can be said via symbolic logic, and lost the forest for the trees. — schopenhauer1

Right. I don't have the expertise to locate the precise problems here, but when logic and language are conceived in a manner that cuts them off from external reality, and are studied in themselves, there is certainly no possibility of addressing epistemic or ontological problems.

I have recently been considering a related problem. Beginning even slightly before the Reformation we see an individualistic streak in intellectual life. There is a desire to break with the past and to carve out one's own niche. This is compounded when insuperable paradoxes moved thinkers to jettison the whole husk that contained the paradoxes and never look back. After that point the return to the older paradigms (realism, Kantianism, etc.) is a non-starter, even when the alternatives are obviously foundering.

A "philosophical schools" approach to philosophy is much different than the modern individualistic approach, and it is one that I prefer. In this case the individual is in some ways subsumed in the school, and philosophical output is intended to be a link in a long chain. Instead of prophets and augurs you have transparent claims and arguments which do not claim any special authority. There are no figureheads or personality cults. The philosophy is at the service of the school, and links past and future in a respectful way. The focus is on steady development and synthesis rather than originality. I think we have strayed a long ways from this sort of approach.

It's an insidious habit, leading to all sorts of problems... — Banno

Yes indeed.

Hear ye, hear ye! :fire: I agree so much! Granted, I can appreciate the 'linguistic' character of much of this forum, especially as it represents recent philosophy in the Anglophone world, but you hit the nail on the head.

So I find a lot of these debates about reference come about because of oddly sticking to this idea of language pointing out individual entities. It is seen in Russell's On Denoting (there exists a unique x such that x is...). It seems to be in early Wittgenstein. I don't get why this emphasis on having to pick out a unique set of properties in an individual and it not just being a class (like it seems Donnellan allows for in attributive notions of reference). Can it just be that this is just debates on wrong initial premises causing confusion? Is there good reason Russell made this move to care for picking out individuals in the world? Is there reason to keep correcting this if that assumption is not even a good basis for names to begin with? — schopenhauer1

Thanks for your interesting posts. If we want to look at Kripke I would probably need to refresh myself on his work, but the irony here is that Kripke may well be committed to the strange theory that is commonly (but mistakenly) identified in Aristotelian essentialism, namely the idea that an essence (or in this case, identity) is discernable apart from accidents and appearances.

More generally, this whole line seems related to modern philosophy's obsession with what I would want to call infallibility. "But how do we know that we are correct?" "But how do we know that a description is truly definite, or that a name truly designates uniquely?" The simple answer is that we don't. At least not with the certainty and precision that modern philosophy seeks.

Sure, he has a description. That description fails to pick Thales from all the other men who lived a long time ago. So I don't see how it helps choose between them, in such a way that the student is talking about Thales... which I had taken to be the point of having a description handy. — Banno

By way of background, I'm pointing to the issue of definite descriptions, claiming that the arguments to the effects that one does not need a definite description in order for reference to function are pretty convincing. — Banno

I would want to say that a name is intended as a unique designator, but that in fact it fulfills this reality no more than a description does. There are humorous stories of identical twins, such as the famous Bryan brothers, whose spouses will spontaneously start identifying and kissing the wrong sibling. The intention of a name pertains to metaphysics, but your point about description pertains to epistemology. Yet the day-to-day use of naming runs into the exact same epistemological problems as the day-to-day use of descriptions.

But if we do not need definite descriptions in order for proper names to work... — Banno

Your argument is valid, but the problem is that names don't work, at least not in the way that you purport. Names work about as well as quasi-definite descriptions work. Even the wife of a twin can fail to make his name work.

Further, you seem now to be saying that we can know which object is being identified from any description, and not just a definite description, which I find quite enigmatic. As if "The fish nearest to Corinth" were adequate to give the essence of Thales. — Banno

As I noted, the two questions are distinct. Of course we can talk about either one.

The point is that in order to arrive at a definite description one must begin with an indefinite description, particularly the novice who wishes to learn. The same sort of thing holds with names. In order to understand the unique referent, one must begin with a description (or a description vis-a-vis a perceptual cue, which includes pointing).

The broader point is that names presuppose description, and the description that they presuppose is supposed to approximate a definite description (because this is where the uniqueness of the referent arises). Again, this does not mean that a name is a description.

Regarding your paper by Donnellan, it leaves me perplexed (I read only the section on Thales). I find his focus on the physical existence of the referent somewhat strange. Supposing Thales never existed, it would not follow that 'Thales' has no referent. The referent in that case would be the person-concept fit to function in the philosophical accounts in question, much like the referent of "Sherlock Holmes" is the fictional person-concept created by Arthur Conan Doyle, and which is fit to function in the fictional accounts in question. Perhaps I am deviating from some modern technical sense of 'name', but deviation from overly technical senses is itself a mark of Aristotelianism. The intentional designations of real-Thales and concept-Thales are, of course, somewhat different, but I don't see this as insuperable. It is not insuperable because the two intentions overlap in the novice's class on ancient philosophy, and the raison d'être of the name is more directly tied to the latter intention.

Not sure how that would help. — Banno

Help what? You said, "A novice who asks 'Who is Thales?' does not have at hand a description of Thales..." I explained why that is wrong. Doesn't that help? :grin:

Again, it is not apparent to me that we need any sort of description to be attached to a name in order for it to function. — Banno

Yes, and you gave an example to demonstrate your claim, and it turned out that your example failed to demonstrate the claim. So now what?

At the very least a name identifies an object, and makes the identification of that object communicable to others. But in order to know which object is being identified, we must have a description of the object. A name is not a description in itself, but it depends upon and presupposes a description, and this is why the act of naming and the act of communicating a name require description.

...I see you edited your post:

Supose the student thought Thales was a Spanish fisherwoman. — Banno

Then his description is partially right and partially wrong, and can be refined and corrected. But note that the novice still has a description. If someone has no description at all then they cannot use the name, for they will have no knowledge that there exists any object to be named.

These are two different questions: Do names presuppose descriptions? Do names presuppose correct descriptions? My understanding is that we have been talking about the first question.

The article is paywalled on the links I found, so I guess we will have to take your word for it. — Banno

Yes, I checked as well. I tried to quote more but the OCR is flawed.

Yep, the generally agreed view is that the problem Kripke posits is not found in Wittgenstein, that Kripke should not be seen as engaged in exegesis. — Banno

But it would be interesting if Wittgenstein had already provided an answer to the challenge that Kripke derived from his work. Granted, I don't know the chronology of when each wrote what.

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This is somewhat interesting but I don't think Kripke is himself engaged in a Hume thing.

A novice who asks "Who is Thales?" does not have at hand a description of Thales, and yet they are asking about Thales. — Banno

But the one who inquires about Thales already has some notion of Thales, and this should count as a description.

[When we learn,] There are two ways in which we must already have knowledge: of some things we must already believe that they are, of others we must grasp what the items spoken about are (and of some things both). — Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.i, tr. Barnes

Contrary to your claim, the novice already has a description of Thales and he wishes it to be filled out. His description involves things like, 'Thales was a man', 'Thales lived a long time ago', etc.

About the coherence of his position, about the claim that there is no fact about S that constitutes S's meaning plus rather than quus, and about the claim that the challenge represents a new form of scepticism.

I was digging through some old articles and I happened upon a paper, "Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention without Paradox," by Paul Moser and Kevin Flannery. In the first half of the paper they give some simple explanations of why Kripke is wrong, but in the second half they actually marshal evidence from Wittgenstein's own works to show that Kripke misunderstands Wittgenstein when it comes to intention.

Admittedly, we have met the sceptical challenge by relying on an as yet undiscussed notion of intention. It should be recalled, however, that Kripke himself introduced this notion as being relevant to the sceptical problem, thereby suggesting that the notion is at least intelligible. Intention, indeed, makes all the difference. For assuming that an intention to use the standard interpretation of addition is present in S's mental history, we can readily admit that no object in the world, no picture in the mind's eye, no formula of any sort determines by itself how S goes on to employ the rules of addition. And we can do this without entertaining any sceptical doubts about his ability to add. Thus, should the sceptic challenge that '(x)', for instance, might mean '(x<h)', S can readily reply, 'But that's not how I intended it'.

This, however is not how Kripke conceives of intention. As a matter of fact, he excludes from the scope of his paradox the things to which Wittgenstein applies the paradox of §201 and he includes the things Wittgenstein would exclude... — Paul Moser and Kevin Flannery, Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention without Paradox

The upshot is that Wittgenstein's understanding of intention "does not fall within the scope of the sceptical paradox."

Edit: Added link

Well, no. I don't see what it does. Why do we need it, if at all? — Banno

I don't think the modal view is correct, either. My point is that if you have no stake in either position of the OP, then Fine's argument won't be very interesting. I want to lure you out of that crevice. :razz:

Sounds like descriptivism to my ear. Surely not? Hence my reference to Thales, a simple case I think pretty convincing. Names do not refer in virtue of some description.

So perhaps you might share what "description will be implicit in the name relation" when we talk of Thales? IS that a way to proceed? — Banno

Sure, so from my last post:

"Yet we could also use 'definition' in a less strict manner, in which we are talking about descriptions more generally. In that case I think the description will be implicit in the name relation. The name will be attached to a perceptible reality,* and that perceptible reality will be susceptible to a description, particularly when one is trying to communicate the name to another. So in that sense I think the description is implicitly or explicitly needed to "pick out" individuals. If I cannot distinguish one candidate from another then I will not be capable of applying the name in the unique way that it is intended."

So perhaps my first question is: If names do not require descriptions, then why are descriptions needed to communicate names? How are we to know which candidate a name picks out if not for descriptions?

Hmm. Not sure how this is going to work. — Banno

Neither am I, and a crucial point here is that dialogue requires compromise. If you are willing to put in the same amount of effort that you expect of me, then the dialogue will have legs. If you aren't, either because you aren't interested in Aristotelianism or because we are too far apart or for some other reason, then we should cut our losses.

The article goes on to proffer a view of essence based on definitions. I gather you think this a better approach, whereas I remain unconvinced. — Banno

Are you committed to the modal view that Fine is addressing?

It seems to me that we do not need definitions in order to "pick out" individuals - the classic case here being Donnellan's Thales. — Banno

I'm not sure what proper names would have to do with definitions. Proper names pick out individuals, whereas (Aristotelian) definitions pick out essences, which belong to species. So naturally a definition of homo sapiens will not help you pick out Socrates from among the species homo sapiens. For an Aristotelian this is uncontroversial.

Yet we could also use 'definition' in a less strict manner, in which we are talking about descriptions more generally. In that case I think the description will be implicit in the name relation. The name will be attached to a perceptible reality,* and that perceptible reality will be susceptible to a description, particularly when one is trying to communicate the name to another. So in that sense I think the description is implicitly or explicitly needed to "pick out" individuals. If I cannot distinguish one candidate from another then I will not be capable of applying the name in the unique way that it is intended.

So taking a bit more care, I am going to say that I do not know of a way of talking about essences that is of much use, and that I am quite confident that we do not need to be able to provide an account of a things essence in order to talk about that thing. — Banno

I am going to say that I do not know of a way of talking about a thing that does not implicitly advert to its "essence" (haecceitas - essence in a sort of individual sense). Whenever we talk about an individual we advert to its haecceity and the description thereof. But strictly speaking haecceity is not an Aristotelian notion, and is quite foreign to the Aristotelian tradition.


* Or in the case of a historical figure like Thales, it will merely be attached to a mental concept.

I should begin by saying that it has been some years since I have worked extensively with Aristotle's primary texts, so a strict Aristotelian may quibble with me on this point or that. Still, I think I will give an accurate account.

My understanding of Aristotle's notion of essence is that it is a given something's definition. — Moliere

An essence is what something is in virtue of itself, and the definition describes the essence. It will also be useful to note that for Aristotle the standard beings are substances: things which exist of themselves and which possess their own mode of being and acting. So hammering would be an act of a substance, in particular an act of a human substance.

The first thing that comes to mind is know-how. I know-how to hammer, regardless of what the hammer is pointed at (or even what the hammer is -- animal, vegetable, mineral, or familiar tool). I don't need to know the essence of a thing in order to manipulate it. And a lot of knowledge is at this level of manipulation rather than at a definitional level. The definitions come later when you're trying to put knowledge into some sort of form which can be shared to assist in spreading the knowledge. — Moliere

A hammer is an artifact, not a substance, but be that as it may, we still need to understand what a hammer is before we use it. For Aristotle definition is not restricted to a means by which one shares knowledge. To understand what something is is to have its definition, and to have partial knowledge about what something is is to have a nominal or partial definition.

So when you approach a hammer for the purpose of manipulation you have already formed a partial definition of it. It is a physical object (which can be manipulated physically). It is graspable by the hand. It possesses a kind of leverage. It has a hard head which can be used to hit things without incurring damage. All of this is part of the definition, and is already implicit in one who manipulates a hammer. For Aristotle it wouldn't make much sense to say that you manipulate a hammer without some understanding of what it is.

Writing about something and providing insight isn’t necessarily the same thing as understanding a fact theoretically. — Joshs

I would say that when Heidegger writes and publishes he is doing theory, not practice, and he is manifesting theoretical wisdom. So long as we maintain that the one who can (theoretically) exposit as Heidegger does is wiser than the one who cannot, Aristotle's point about the relation of theory to wisdom holds. I don't believe your quotes from Heidegger are at odds with this. For example, that Being is not a theory does not invalidate the point I am making. We consider Heidegger wise primarily because of his theoretical exposition. It would not surprise me if Heidegger wished his theory to be non-theory, but it is not. The sort of exposition present in a treatise is inevitably theoretical.

It reminds me of a speech Chimamanda Ngozi Aldichie gave, the Freedom of Speech, in the Reith Lecture, where she stressed the importance of allowing ourselves to say something wrong and warned people of the danger of self-censorship. — Hailey

This sounds interesting. I found a link to it <here>. I will have to check it out when I get a chance.

Apart from arguing that people, especially youngsters should engage more in conversations, she also pointed out the damage that cancel culture would do to the society, which would all impair transparency of arguments and hinder the freedom of speech. — Hailey

Exactly. :up:

...neither concealing our own ignorance nor keeping silent to avoid conflicts would do anything good. — Hailey

Right. Perhaps social media has raised vanity to such a pitch that it has become exceptionally difficult to overcome. We are often more concerned with how others will react and view us than with whether our contribution will further the conversation.

- Sure thing: <link to new post in other thread>.

...discussion transplanted from "Belief" at Banno's request.

You must be familiar with Kripke's point, that we do not need to know the essence of some individual in order to refer to that individual? — Banno

I am probably as unfamiliar with Kripke as you are with Aristotle, but I am willing to explain Aristotle if you are willing to explain Kripke. In school we covered some of his contributions, such as rigid designators, but I don't remember covering this idea. Do you have a link or an explanation?

That you ask this perhaps shows how badly we are talking past each other. — Banno

Okay, that seems probable.

I had a tree fern in the front garden... and my apologies to those who have heard this story. Now you suppose that knowing how to correctly use the word "tree" requires that one knows what a tree is
That's just not true. We use words correctly without ever setting out exact definitions. — Banno

The problem with this argument is that, just because one uses a word without setting out an exact definition, does not mean that they use the word without knowing what a tree is.

Learning what a tree is, is no more than learning how to use the word "tree". — Banno

If the word didn't signify any determinate thing then it wouldn't be useful to us. For Aristotelians words are primarily about things, and things have a determinate form. To talk about the difference between two things, such as zebras and horses, is just to talk about the difference between the essence of a zebra and the essence of a horse. The reason we don't use the word 'essence' is because we are Aristotle's children, and it is implied. We believe there are real substances with stable, determinate forms, or at the very least this is the received view. There aren't many heirs of Parmenides or Heraclitus running around.

Fuzzy borders, such as those between trees and shrubs, reminds me of the Sorites paradox, and I don't see it as a debilitating difficulty. You would have to flesh out your argument if you think it presents a true problem for the Aristotelian.

Now, if you have a definition of "essence" that gets around the issues spoken of hereabouts, please set it out. — Banno

I think this is a good place to start:

"what belongs to a thing in respect of itself belongs to it in its essence (en tôi ti esti)" — SEP | Substance and Essence

The first argument is that some properties are not essential. The color brown does not belong to the essence of 'horse', because not all horses are brown, and a thing need not be brown in order to be a horse.

A second argument relates to the Humean notion of contiguity. Just because two things are contiguous does not mean that one enters into the definition of the other. That you were born in Pisces does not mean that the celestial bodies entered into the definition of your birth, nor that they bear some essential relation to your being.

- See:

A pacifist could around armed, presumably to scare off attackers. They just won't actually use the weapon on someone. — RogueAI

So then you think it is moral to threaten to do things that you believe to be immoral, which is a difficult position to maintain.

Yes, Jesus has a temper tantrum and tosses some money-changers out. That doesn't negate all his other teachings on non-violence. That's the human side of him coming out. — RogueAI

There is nothing in the text to support your thesis that this event indicates a failure or moment of weakness on Jesus' part. On the contrary.

More "live by the sword die by the sword". If you beat people, you'll come to a violent end. — RogueAI

Except if you understand these parables you will understand that "the master" is the God of Israel, and therefore the violence is not only approved but it is also a foretelling (or at the very least, a severe warning about what may happen).

Jesus is using the imagery of a particularly nasty death to make a point. — RogueAI

No, the point is that what awaits him will be much worse than this particularly nasty way to die, and Jesus approves both of what awaits him and of that which he proposes.

Pacifists don't talk this way. The examples I gave only scratch the surface.

My point is that simple, ready-made interpretations of Jesus almost always fudge the evidence. It seems to me that at the very least Jesus was a deeply complex figure, and that simple interpretations therefore cannot stand.

He must've intended for them to turn them into plowshares because... — Average

If we disregard all of the evidence that contradicts a pacifistic interpretation then our self-fulfilling prophecy will indubitably be fulfilled.

But if you are familiar with the four canonical gospels then you must be aware of when Jesus instructed his disciples to sell their cloaks to buy swords (Luke 22:36); or when Jesus made a whip out of cords to drive the money changers out of the Temple (John 2:15-17); or when Jesus foretold that, "the master of that slave will come on a day when he does not expect him and at an hour that he does not know, and will cut him in pieces, and put him with the unfaithful" (Luke 12:46, NRSV); or when Jesus, speaking about a grievous sinner, says, "it would be better for him if a great millstone were hung round his neck and he were thrown into the sea" (Mark 9:42).

I could go on.

- Jesus' teachings according to which documents? Which documents are you purporting to be familiar with?

Perhaps christians should remember when they recite the lords prayer and repeat the words "on earth as it is in heaven" that there was war in heaven once upon a time. — Average

The book of Revelation involves the idea that the fight will eventually be brought to Earth. If you are thinking in terms of the traditional Christian canon then that book will be a helpful key, but also the other eschatological writings in the New Testament (and Old).

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I don't know how you can read Jesus's teachings as anything other than total pacifism. He couldn't have been any clearer on the subject. — RogueAI

Serious question for you: have you ever read the New Testament in its entirety? I find that those who make such claims have almost invariably never read the New Testament.

Our culture presents a very strange and lopsided version of Jesus, and it seems that such claims are more influenced by the culture than by the Bible or by historical Christianity.

The first quote you give does not seem to involve any direct claim about wisdom. The second does speak about wisdom, but if not for its Heideggerian lingo it could easily be from an Aristotelian. For Aristotle ethical wisdom is manifested in doing, not in discursive knowing. Of course Aristotle would not consider ethical wisdom the highest form of wisdom, so if that is Varela's claim then it is somewhat at odds with Aristotle. But the first sentence (and thesis) of that quote is in perfect accord with an ancient Aristotelian approach to ethics and ethical wisdom.

So perhaps there is a postmodern shift insofar as the ethical takes center stage, but I think the Heideggerian and the Aristotelian concepts of ethical wisdom are very similar.

Returning to that first quote, if skillful navigation of the world represents the "most basic" form of understanding, then I think wisdom involves more than this. The foundation must be properly laid, but the wise person will have a deep understanding of the fact of skillful navigation, along with how it works and comes about. That is, they will be able to write about it and provide insight into it. This is why Heidegger is considered wise, because he is able to do these things, and his exposition is a theoretical form of knowledge.

It is true that some views are held uncritically or unreflectively, but oftentimes the most interesting philosophy occurs precisely at the point when these views come under question:

One very basic and concrete way towards transparency is replacing assertions with arguments, especially when an assertion has been questioned or has become contentious. — Leontiskos

So I think @Jack Cummins makes a good point when he talks about "going beyond one's philosophical blindspots."

We all have certain views that we suppose do not need justification (and often they may not need justification). But the crucial thing is the ability to pivot and justify these views when they come into question.

Good stuff.

I especially like the connection between vulnerability and transparency: forthrightness can be a boast, but if you're really at your limit of certainty then it's a good idea to let go of the desire for certainty — Moliere

Thanks! Yes, I very much agree with this as well. Last year I wrote a thread on this topic on a different forum, "The Philosophical Virtue of Certitude Shifting." I hadn't thought about the way it is related to transparency until you brought it up.

I think some of these points seem obvious, and they probably are obvious, but at least for me it is helpful to have reminders from time to time.

Transparency, though, is a way to subject yourself to the criticism of philosophy. — Moliere

Yep, and I also think of it as a means to the common good of truth, knowledge, wisdom, etc. When there is transparency there is a better chance that everyone involved will enjoy these benefits.

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Transparency is important in argumentation because it leads to truth and is an example of the virtue of courage. — NotAristotle

Additionally, transparent argumentation makes for a more productive argument because one's views will be more clearly presented and because the actual beliefs of the individuals will be honestly assessed. — NotAristotle

Yes, that's just how I would put it @NotAristotle. :up:

The concept of Logos is problematic not only for its spiritual connotations and connotations of intentionality (the idea that nature is not teleological is a bit of a dogma in naturalism today) but even moreso because it implies that any order in nature is enforced externally, say by eternal "laws of nature," that exist outside nature. This isn't popular due to Hume's "problem of induction" and Kripke's essentialist response. We generally now think that nature has the properties of order that it does because of what nature is, or because of what natural entities are. That is, the "logic" of state progression in nature is intrinsic, not extrinsic. But this in no way means that the order doesn't exist outside the mind, it simply means that such an order is inherit to nature because of what nature is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, I think that's accurate.

I think the Logos idea has to do with the whole, whereas the idea that you've been focusing on has to do with subsets of the whole, "isomorphisms between how members of these sets relate to one another" (). Then there is the other question of the <isomorphisms between mind and reality>.

So let's look at how Merriam-Webster defines logic:

• 1a
  
  • (1): a science that deals with the principles and criteria of validity of inference and demonstration : the science of the formal principles of reasoning
    
    • a professor of logic
  • (2): a branch or variety of logic
    
    • modal logic
    • boolean logic
  • (3): a branch of semiotics
    
    • especially: Syntactics
  • (4): the formal principles of a branch of knowledge
    
    • the logic of grammar
• 1b
  
  • (1): a particular mode of reasoning viewed as valid or faulty
    
    • She spent a long time explaining the situation, but he failed to see her logic.
  • (2): Relevance, Propriety
    
    • could not understand the logic of such an action
• 1c: Interrelation or sequence of facts or events when seen as inevitable or predictable
  
  • By the logic of events, anarchy leads to dictatorship.
• 1d: the arrangement of circuit elements (as in a computer) needed for computation
  
  • also: the circuits themselves
• 2: something that forces a decision apart from or in opposition to reason
  
  • the logic of war

Now let's subdivide your third definition:

3. Logic is a principle at work in the world, its overall order. Stoic Logos, although perhaps disenchanted. — Count Timothy von Icarus

• 3(a). Logic is a principle at work in the world, its overall order. Stoic Logos, although perhaps disenchanted.
• 3(b). Logic is a principle at work in the world, in the order of subsets of the whole. "The logic of natural selection."

Interestingly, there is no correlate in Merriam-Webster (MW) for 3(a). I think this is right. Logos and logike are two different things. 3(b) maps to MW-1c. I think the idea about isomorphisms between mind and reality is implicitly related to MW-1a(1), MW-1a(4), and MW-1b(1). This idea is implicit in science and phusis, especially Aristotle's "form or source of motion" vis-a-vis phusis. To speak about the "logic" of natural selection is to speak about the nature (phusis) of natural selection.

The other central question is the question of what exactly you are asking or aiming to do in the OP. Apparently you are trying to understand how the various different usages relate to one another, no? We must inevitably ask what methodology is being presupposed in responding to this inquiry. But I will leave this for another post.

It seems to me that a general difficulty here is that the third account of 'logic' that you give has not yet been shown to be coherent. It seems to piggyback on the Stoic or Christian idea, but "disenchanted," as you say. It is not the anima mundi of the Stoics nor the divine Word of the Christians, but it attempts to inherit and "naturalize" that concept. But again, is this really coherent? Do naturalists really speak this way when they are being rigorous and are not engaging in loose and poetic metaphor?

The crux is that there is an age-old connection between Logos and mind or spirit, and its not clear that one can take one and leave the other. What is in fact occurring, I aver, is that an entirely new concept is being introduced under an already-established word. This results in a sort of equivocation, where a new concept gets disguised in the garb of an old word, and an attempt is made to pass it off under the old concept. Those promoting such a thing perhaps do not understand how radical is their break with the traditional and established meaning.

Or the act of the other builder bringing a slab such that the initiate sees what a slab is without an essence. — Moliere

I'm not sure what it would mean to know something without knowing the essence, and I am not sure what people have in mind when they talk about knowing something without an essence. Hume ridiculed the idea of essences, but Hume hardly read any Aristotle. I think most moderns are following Hume in ridiculing something they do not understand.

Here is one possible introduction: Essential vs. Accidental Properties (SEP)

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No, he doesn't. He thinks that we would be better served considering use rather than essence. — Banno

You will have to say what you mean by 'essence' at some point. At this point I'm not convinced you have the slightest idea of what you mean by it.

It's almost exactly like when you <dismiss the logic of the middle ages>, yet clearly know absolutely nothing about the practice of logic in the middle ages. It doesn't often go well when one criticizes things they are perfectly ignorant of.

He's saying hat the structure of beliefs is not well reflected in the predicate form B(a,p).

Nothing here supports your claims. He's saying belief is not a relation. He doesn't appear to be saying anything about normativity, determinism or "real" definitions, whatever they are and whatever they might mean in this context. — Banno

I have already addressed this <here>, and you continue to ignore the points at hand. "If there is no such thing as a belief-relation (and it has no essence), then neither P1 nor Searle's claim can hold. If the belief-relation you have in mind is not a determinate and normative concept, then the 'inferior' of P1 falls to pieces," etc.

Searle makes strong claims about what belief is and what belief is not. He is clearly committed to the position that there is a definition of belief and an essence of belief. If there were neither then such claims would be nonsense. If beliefs had no more of an essence than an artifact like a scissors then Searle wouldn't be able to make sweeping claims about the damage done to philosophy.

(NB: To say, "they are mistaken about X," is to imply that there is something normative about X. If there were nothing normative about X then one could not be mistaken with respect to it.)

What Wayfarer captured is a classical Greek notion of wisdom carried over into the Enlightenment. What I am depicting is a postmodern notion of wisdom (Later Wittgenstein, Deleuze, Foucault, Rorty, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche). — Joshs

I am not convinced that even the postmodern vision of wisdom is based in practicality. Do you have any quotes or sources that would support this thesis?

Isn’t wisdom the ability to make pragmatic sense (what works) of an aspect of the world, — Joshs

I don't think so, but if you have a source in mind I would be willing to look into it. I think captured it well.

Here is another quote from Aristotle:

We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art and science and the other kindred faculties; but the point of our present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things. This is why, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any perception whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the master-worker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive. Clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain causes and principles.

Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge of which is wisdom. If we were to take the notions we have about the wise man, this might perhaps make the answer more evident. We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things, as far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them individually; secondly, that he who can learn things that are difficult, and not easy for man to know, is wise (sense-perception is common to all, and therefore easy and no mark of wisdom); again, he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; and of the sciences, also, that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him. — Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I (Tr. Ross)

Specifically, "and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive." For example, we would not call the effective businessman wise. He may be crafty, or clever, or intelligent, or efficient, or administratively gifted, but it would be uncommon to call him wise.

But I am also in complete support in having an Artificial Intelligence write a good portion of my code. — Bret Bernhoft

If good code is wisdom and artificial intelligence is a shortcut, then your claim would make some sense. Trouble is, I'm not convinced that good code is wisdom (or is comparable to wisdom). Neither would I want to call wisdom "what works, what is effective." Usually when we talk about wisdom we are talking about something more than that, and that something is not particularly susceptible to shortcuts. Maybe another way to say, "Beware of unearned wisdom," is, "Don't make the mistake of confusing that bumper sticker with wisdom." "Do not believe that you are wise because you have read lots of bumper stickers, or because you spend a good deal of time on Facebook."

Indeed! That's an odd mix up on Wayback Machine.