Science is not trying to give an account of what the universe would be like were there no observers. It is trying to give an account of what the universe is like for any observer. — Banno
They are not seeking to remove perspective, but to give an account that works from as many perspectives as possible. — Banno
Sort of, but that would be immune to the strongest part of my argument; which involves the children. We could dispute plausbly either way if, for example, there were any healthy adults which could be held to be an Amalekite proper and I am willing to concede, given the seemingly identity relation between being an Amalekate and a part of the cult, that there weren't any. — Bob Ross
At the end of the day, I emphasize the children, although I understand you are setting that aspect of it aside for a second, because it is really implausible in my mind that there were no Amalekate children and it seems like they would be a part of the ban. — Bob Ross
1. The God of the OT commanded Saul to put the Amalekites under the ban
2. There were innocent children among the Amalekites
3. Therefore, the God of the OT commanded the killing of the innocent
4. The killing of the innocent is unjust
5. Therefore, the God of the OT is unjust — Leontiskos
If so, then how do you explain the fact that God punished Saul for sparing some animals? Doesn't that suggest that God was including everything that lived in the City itself? — Bob Ross
Talmud helps us apply Torah, but Torah is the holier, more primary text. — BitconnectCarlos
What's the reasoning here:
P1: Any phrase could be used as a password.
P2: ????
C: Therefore there are no language to learn and linguistic conventions don't determine what words mean. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes. No work can be done or progress made if one believes “equal rationality” applies to both sides of any dispute.
Rationality may exist on both sides, but how “equal”? The inequality of the rationality is what constitutes any dispute, whether one side (or both) are making invalid arguments and/or using unfounded facts. — Fire Ologist
The moral of the story is that if someone takes up Chakravartty's stance voluntarism, then they must give up their ability to "encourage others... to see things our way." By definition, the stance voluntarist has no reasons for why someone should "see things his way." — Leontiskos
The problem is that while "we all" can indeed make intelligible and rational claims in support of a given framework, another group of "us all" can dispute them, with equal rationality. — J
Kimhi may be correct that Frege's assumption that the unasserted proposition and the assertion are "on a par," so to speak, is the source of many problems.* It is certainly occurring in this thread. Taxonomical thinking is occluding linguistic realities. — Leontiskos
(It is even plausible to claim that the division itself is not a posit of theory, but is itself found in nature -- right up until you hit the exception at quantum scale.) — Srap Tasmaner
What's the reasoning here:
P1: Any phrase could be used as a password.
P2: ????
C: Therefore there are no language to learn and linguistic conventions don't determine what words mean.
Prima facie, that's a ridiculous claim unless one runs back from the motte to the bailey in order to massively caveat it so as to make it an entirely different claim. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Oh, I see what you're saying. Yeah fair enough - didn't quite grok the subtext, sorry. I do now. — AmadeusD
Election is always of some people by some people, but everything depends on who chooses whom and how. The fundamental options (to follow Aristotle) are that all may choose from all or from some or from both; or some may choose from all or from some or from both; or all and some may choose from all or from some or from both. When all choose from all, the election may be called democratic; when some from some, oligarchic; when mixed, aristocratic or political. — Peter L. P. Simpson, Political Illiberalism, p. 30
...One might conclude from this analysis that the system of elections in the United States would, by this classification, count as aristocratic or political. With respect to form, it may be so. With respect to practice, it is not. For an element of political sophistry here intervenes, since there are at least two ways of understanding what is meant by election. We mean by elections choosing between candidates whose names are on the ballot and who have, before the election, been going about soliciting people for their votes. Others, by contrast, have meant choosing from among candidates who are not named on any ballot and who have not been going about soliciting votes. — Peter L. P. Simpson, Political Illiberalism, p. 31
the act and the performing of it as distinct things. — bongo fury
Whatever narrower psychological sense of "perform" or "assert" makes us disqualify an otherwise appropriate sound event from being a performance or an assertion string from being an assertion. (Is what I feared was being reified.) — bongo fury
Additional criteria would be completeness (encompassing all variables and outcomes); infallibility or predictability; being right without being responsible; ensuring agreement, being only either true or false, etc. It seems we are taking abstraction from context or an individual (or human fallibility, limitation) as the criteria for “certainty”. I’m trying to point out how forced this is by differentiating topics and claiming that their individual criteria and their appropriate contexts are necessary and sufficient for being accepted (that we can all assert intelligible and rational claims about their “framework”). That this does not ensure agreement is philosophy’s (and morality’s) lack of power (which Fire Ologistpoints out correctly) which science claims (though as easily ignored it appears). But this a categorical difference (it works differently) not a relegation to individual persuasion, opinion, belief, rhetoric (“locality”). — Antony Nickles
They mean different things whether asserted or not. — Michael
My point is, there you almost go... reifying the act and the performing of it as distinct things. — bongo fury
I believe if God voluntarily creates a world, then He will always have to (1) create the best possible world and (2) freely will to incarnate Himself through hypostatic union as a representative member of the species of any that are persons to save them. I think, and Leontiskos can correct me on this, this would be a heresy for Christianity of God being forced to always pick the best. — Bob Ross
This is how the concept is used in law. It's a bit more complicated than this, but essentially its the "if but for..." rule. — AmadeusD
The one who controls the pre-selection of the candidates would lose enormous amounts of power and control if they were to yield up that prerogative. — Leontiskos
and who is that? — AmadeusD
The question boggles me, too. Thoughts and verbal or written expressions are perhaps the least consequential and harmless actions a person can make in his life time. So it is a conundrum why people get so worked up about beliefs and words and often respond with some very consequential and harmful actions, like censorship, ostracization, or even violence.
Can such an inconsequential act, like the imperceptible movements of the brain and making articulated sounds from the mouth, be evil? I don’t think so. I believe the reactions to acts of speech, though, undoubtedly are, and represent some sort of superstition of language, though I no argument for it yet. — NOS4A2
Sorry, I forgot about this reply.
For my part, I am not convinced that speech is an inconsequential act. This is why free speech always becomes a difficult issue. If speech were inconsequential then no one would worry about free speech and we would need no civil right to free speech.
To give a very blasé example, suppose the captain orders his troops to kill the women and children. That is a consequential speech act, albeit a command. Its causal power is manifest. Other acts of speech, such as persuasive speech, can also be consequential. If someone traveled back in time to kill Hitler, they may very well aim to off him before he starts giving his big speeches, given what a powerful orator he was. — Leontiskos
It's the literalism that is unworkable. — Hanover
I think if you begin with an immovable preconceived notion of what God is (love, etc.) and you encounter a tradition inconsistent with that, you are left with either judgmentally or non-judgmentally responding to it. Non-judgmentally, you'd recognize it academically and consider yourself educated. Judgmentally, you'd tell the other side they were worshipping a false god. — Hanover
Both at extremes are not virtuous [...]
The problem is in taking these stories too literally. — Hanover
The point is this is a mythological story about responding to evil and the consequences of misplaced sympathy. I don't think a Christian should find that notion objectionable. It's the literalism that is unworkable. — Hanover
I was not aware of that, and that’s fine as long as we agree then that:
1. Not all people who lived in the culture of the Amalekites were Amalekites, since an Amalekite is a religious affiliation and those who lack the capacity or choose not to engage in it were not be properly affiliated. — Bob Ross
I find it implausible that no one in an entire city [...] [was] a person that disagrees with the cult but lacks the means to escape... — Bob Ross
No. It’s just regular old everyday knowledge. — T Clark
Okay, well these are clearly two different claims:
1. The cat is on the mat
2. I think that the cat is on the mat
(2) can be true even if (1) is false. — Michael
I think this is an argument I could probably make. Not so much that philosophers don’t have knowledge, but that philosophy does not involve knowledge. Certainly metaphysics doesn’t. Neither do aesthetics or morals. — T Clark
You said it's heresy. — Hanover
But, assuming we don't care about that, I'd say it's perfectly fine to say the OT and NT are incompatible and you've got to choose one, the other, or neither. — Hanover
But to declare which must be chosen because it's the correct one is simply to declare your God the true God and all other believers wrong — Hanover
1. The God of the OT commanded Saul to put the Amalekites under the ban
2. There were innocent children among the Amalekites
3. Therefore, the God of the OT commanded the killing of the innocent
4. The killing of the innocent is unjust
5. Therefore, the God of the OT is unjust — Leontiskos
I can’t help think it must be something like gnosis or one of its cognates - subject of that rather arcane term 'gnoseology' which is comparable to 'epistemology' but with rather more gnostic overtones. In any case, it is knowledge of the kind which conveys a kind of apodictic sense, although that is a good deal easier to write about than to actually attain. — Wayfarer
That is philosophy’s claim*, but it neither claims it “absolutely”, nor “locally”, as these are predetermined, created standards. — Antony Nickles
(* the claim is: "as long as I don't claim knowledge about what the [absolute] conception is, my talk about it can remain "local.")
I was with you all the way, until this. Maybe I'm not understanding you. Let's grant that both "absolute" and "local" are predetermined, created standards. How does this exempt philosophy from nonetheless speaking from one or the other? What would be the third alternative? — J
I do think Bob has clarified. He did say he didn't think the OT God was consistent with what he knew God was. And I do see why a Christian would need to sort out what is pretty clearly a change from OT to NT if there is a commitment they are the same. — Hanover
Marcion preached that the benevolent God of the Gospel who sent Jesus into the world as the savior was the true Supreme Being, different and opposed to the malevolent deity, the Demiurge or creator deity, identified with Yahweh in the Hebrew Bible. — Marcionism | Wikipedia
If your hermeneutic leads to inconsistency, you either (1) live with the inconsistency as not overly relevant, (2) declare humility and lack of grasp of the mystery, or (3) change your hermeneutic. — Hanover
God didn't write the Bible, so inconsistency should be expected and I choose a very non-literalist interpretation. — Hanover
My objection was to the suggestion of an a priori knowledge of God as being consistent with the NT and a declaration of invalidity to all other beliefs in God.
That is, an option 4 was being chosen. The OT was being rejected as invalid. That's the equivalent of me saying the simple solution is to reject the NT. That would work too. — Hanover
Honestly, you're coming across as kind of clueless. — frank
This isn't my position. It's Bob Ross's. He said the OT description of God wasn't God, and I said if it's not, the he saying those who do accept it as God don't believe in God. — Hanover
I never did. I've been consistenly open to other interpretations. I've only pointed out that if one claims to know what the true God is and then you claim others don't adhere to it, then you're just telling me your religion is right and mine wrong. — Hanover
It seems like God in the OT is not really God. — Bob Ross
is where you present Christianity as The truth. If one is Christian, they'll say Amen, if not, then not. — Hanover
not everyone who relies on the Bible relies solely on the Bible for all direction — Hanover
Does this help with the puzzles of how and why and whether they ought? — bongo fury
The vertical part of the symbol is not just signifying some act of judgment it seems, rather “the judgment stroke contains the act of assertion”(I3). This raises the question whether the judgment stroke is a sign signifying an act or whether writing it actually effects the assertion. — Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke, by Floor Rombout, 11
The issue here is that we reason discursively, and we do not (strictly speaking) ever simultaneously engage in more than one judgment. So when <I judge that I judge that a is F> there is at least a temporal distinction between the two instances of judgment, and in this case there is also a logical priority issue, i.e. one of the two judgments must be logically prior to the other.
So if Rodl wants to read that proposition as a non-temporal angelic intellection, it won't make any sense. That is, if we try to make both instances of 'judge' temporally and logically identical, it won't make any sense.
One way for Rodl to dispute true recursivity would be to say that the only way to interpret <I judge that I judge that a is F> in a non-vacuous way is to interpret it as <I judge that I have judged that a is F>. — Leontiskos
Added: Just to be clear the Kimhi quote is against writing ⊢(⊢p → ⊢q), not ⊢⊢(p→q). — Banno
Instead of writing the whole inference, consisting of the three assertions “ ⊢ p”, “ ⊢ (p ⊃ q)” and “ ⊢ q” , Russell and Whitehead propose an abbreviation containing the assertions of the two atomic propositions connected by an implication: “ ⊢ p ⊃⊢ q”. Frege would consider this a category mistake; in the Begriffsschrift it is not possible to have a judgment stroke within the scope of a conditional.
...
A reason why Russell and Whitehead consider this abbreviation acceptable can be found in their explanation of syllogisms... — Rombout, 44-5
But I don’t get it. I can’t even figure out what the question on the table is. — T Clark
I agree with that assessment so far. It's the killing of innocents that my OP is objecting to: I recognize that the Canaanites were doing horrible things and a war against them is justified. However, that doesn't justify purposely attempting to genocide the people in their entirety. — Bob Ross
