Would it help if we noticed that Wittgenstein is acknowledging uses of "know" that he subsequently argues are illegitimate? — Banno

No. It is a prompt towards seeking justification - "Can't you see it?. Look closer". — Banno

Wittgenstein takes it as read that knowing requires justification, and hence were there is no proposition to supply the justification, one cannot be properly said to know. — Banno

I have given textual evidence that speaking against the Law is regarded by the accusers as blasphemy. — Fooloso4

To break the Law is blasphemy. — Fooloso4

It is not simply a matter of breaking the Law, as it every offense however minor would be a blasphemous offense. What is at issue destroying or abolishing the Law. — Fooloso4

Again, you make my point. A son of man is a human being. — Fooloso4

and behold, with the clouds of heaven
there came one like a son of man,
and he came to the Ancient of Days
and was presented before him.
And to him was given dominion
and glory and kingdom,
that all peoples, nations, and languages
should serve him;
his dominion is an everlasting dominion,
which shall not pass away,
and his kingdom one
that shall not be destroyed. — Daniel 7, RSV

'One like a human being' receives the kingdom from the 'Ancient One'. Is this second figure a symbol of the nation that will exercise the dominion (the Jewish people), depicted as a human rather than an animal? Or is he a divine figure (such figures represented as in human form, Dan 8:15; 10:5)? If so, is he Michael, who 'stands' for the Jews in 12:1? — The Oxford Bible Commentary, Daniel

Acts, as quoted and referenced, says that Stephen spoke blasphemous words against Moses and against God. To speak blasphemous words against Moses means to speak against the Laws of Moses. — Fooloso4

• Speaking against the Law is blasphemy.
• Therefore, To break the Law is blasphemy.

I tell you, something greater than the temple is here. And if you had known what this means, ‘I desire mercy, and not sacrifice,’ you would not have condemned the guiltless. For the Son of man is lord of the sabbath.” — Matthew 12:6-8

The accusation of blasphemy, according to this story was false. — Fooloso4

Most of the time this neural activity is a response to sensory stimulation of biological sense organs, but sometimes it is a response to other things, whether those be artificial sensory aids, drugs, sleep, or mental illness. — Michael

This would be a neat argument for why colors and percepts are not the same thing. The percept of the ball changed, but its color stayed the same. — Leontiskos

They are seeing in the sense of having a visual experience but not seeing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus — Michael

Okay good, and this is true even if their percepts are identical, yes? Therefore to see an external object is not merely a matter of percepts, yes? — Leontiskos

But other mechanisms such as a cortical visual prosthesis can help. Much like a cochlear implant helps where an ear trumpet can't. — Michael

Of everyone with a brain, there are some blind and deaf people who can be helped by aids to sight or hearing, and others who cannot. To understand the difference between the two is to understand why sight and hearing are not reducible to [the subject]. — Leontiskos

They are seeing in the sense of having a visual experience but not seeing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus, much like the schizophrenic is hearing in the sense of having an auditory experience but not hearing in the sense of responding to and being made aware of some appropriate external stimulus. — Michael

Sleeping pills are not a cure for blindness. — Leontiskos

I'm not confusing myself because I haven't claim that "hearing voices" isn't a euphemism for "hallucinate". — Michael

No one is arguing brains can hear without input of any sort. The argument is that no can hear without a brain. — Hanover

It's not equivocation to say that the schizoprenic hears voices. That's just the ordinary way of describing the phenomenon. — Michael

What distinguishes the dream with the electrode example is the claim "there is a chair" does not correspond with reality in the dream, but it does with the electrode. — Hanover

Why does that matter? It is still normal to describe someone with a cochlear implant as hearing things, and the same for those with an auditory brainstem implant.

If you only want to use the words “see” and “hear” for those with normally functioning sense organs then you do you, but it’s not wrong for the rest of us to be more inclusive with such language. — Michael

That's also false. The blind can't see anything no matter what their brains are doing. — jkop

The blind can see if their brains are directly stimulated. — Hanover

This is due to the uncontroversial scientific fact that perception is created by the brain regardless of whether the stimulus enters the brain through the normal means of sensory organs or whether it is hot wired directly through a probe. — Hanover

I point to sources that support what you claim I made up. — Fooloso4

If you were arguing in good faith you would admit that. — Fooloso4

psychiatrists by comparison are more in the way of witch doctors — tim wood

To break the Law is blasphemy. — Fooloso4

Fourth, related to the others, is the claim to be the Messiah. The Messiah is divine but is not God. — Fooloso4

Psychiatric treatment is model or theory based, which may not work for a particular patient, and may even be just plain wrong for a particular patient — tim wood

You may not like the psychiatric approach to mental illness, but what alternative would you propose? — Leontiskos

it seems to me the best treatment is holistic in approach, providing what is needed: drugs if needed; counseling/therapeutic/custodial support as needed, and likely a mix. — tim wood

There is definitely something wrong, that's not in dispute. — unenlightened

Is there a way to delete private messages? — Leontiskos

I figure Spinoza made short work of this. We deliberate between choices as means to achieve our ends. Whatever is making it possible for this to happen is not a copy of our nature.

If the agency we experience gives us no conception of what is happening, presuming a 'determinism' is not an argument against the reality of deliberation. — Paine

It's a hypothetical example - nuance is to be avoided in making the distinction between the personal psychological analysis and the social relations analysis. — unenlightened

The social diagnosis is that he is suffering from a worldwide recession engineered by financial interests he has zero knowledge of, and what he needs is a new government. — unenlightened

Why do you assume that a natural leader with no people to lead and a slave without a master to serve will inevitably live in isolation. Why cannot they live in society? — Ludwig V

I'm finding this very confusing. I think this would all have been a lot clearer if we could just drop the bit about slavery and talk about leaders and followers. — Ludwig V

I'm all for classlessness. But there's nothing wrong with distinguishing between classes of people when the criterion of membership is relevant. — Ludwig V

A lack of disk capacity caused the site to crash recently, so I've had to remove the ability to upload files, which was a privilege for subscribers. I'm not sure if I'll make this permanent — I would prefer not to upgrade to the next plan, which would give us more space for uploads... — Jamal

I'm glad to hear you're reading Kimhi -- not for the faint of heart! In fact you may find parts of it easier going than I did, due to your background in Aristotle. — J

It may come down to the difference between 'not-X' (negation as an operation within a proposition) and 'It is not the case that (p)' (denial of a proposition) — J

What Kimhi adds to this, in a manner I'm still grappling with, is the unity part: the claim that "the assertion 'p is true' is the same as 'I truly think p'." In general, the role of an act of consciousness in Kimhi's philosophy is what allows him to take a thoroughly monist stance on these matters, but as I've said before, I think he could have done a much clearer job explaining it. — J

[math]\begin{array} {|c|c|}\hline A\,believes\,p. & A\,believes\,p. & A\,believes\,p. \\ \hline p. & Not-p. & A's\,belief\,is\,correct. \\ \hline So\,A's\,belief\,is\,incorrect. & So\,A's\,belief\,is\,correct. & So\,\,p. \\ \hline  \end{array}[/math]

I didn't participate in the thread you refer us to, and I'm not prepared right now to try to take it all in. — J

A similar point can be made with respect to Frege’s use of semantic notions such as “the sense of . . .” and “the reference of . . . ,” namely, insofar as we come to see them as pointing to similarities and differences displayed by the notation, we recognize that they are not predicates, since all predicates are expressible using the notation; hence we come to see them as mere means deployed to communicate the use of the notation to a learner. In the end, the success of this communication requires this realization. One can say, therefore, that Frege’s universalist conception is eliminativist with respect to both semantical and formal-categorical discourse. Note that the very construction of the Begriffsschrift is not in any obvious way internal to the fact-stating discourse, namely, we cannot describe it as the actualization of the capacity of linguistic self-consciousness which is internal to the activity of assertion as such. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 91-2

. . .You are appealing to usage, but the etymology and the historical usage point very clearly to logic as an art of reasoning.

They say that one of the best ways to learn something is to teach it. A few weeks ago I looked at your thread which is intended to teach propositional calculus (link). It's no coincidence that in your third substantial post you were already into truth tables. But even in your first substantial post you said, "What we want to do is to examine the relations between these propositions, rather than their contents." It seems to me that it would have been more apt to say that we want to examine the relations that obtain between these propositions based on their content. Relations hold or fail to hold in light of the content of the relata, and this has everything to do with truth.

Now a pedagogue might choose to introduce the rules of logic before introducing the purpose of logic, much like you could teach a child to kick a ball before introducing them to the game of soccer. Of course I am not convinced that this is sound pedagogy. — Leontiskos

Hence, for example, understanding p as an expression of consciousness depends on understanding the use of p in negation. As such, from this point of view we come to see that no conscious act is displayed or specified by the proposition of the form (p and ~p) and therefore no judgment or assertion is displayed by ~(p and ~p). This means that ~(p and ~p) and (p and ~p) are not genuine propositions. Understanding OPNC [ontological principle of non-contradiction] consists in seeing that the repetition of p in these logical contexts is self-cancelling. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 31

Can anyone think up a real world example where you would point out that A implies both B and not-B — Count Timothy von Icarus

“From the monist point of view, a simple propositional sign displays a possible act of consciousness.” -- the possibility of affirmation or negation. — J

In English we can deny in a manner that does not affirm the negation of any proposition, and this violates the way that propositional logic conceives of the LEM. In fact, going back to flannel’s thread, this shows that a contradiction in English need not take the form (A ^ ~A). In English one can contradict or deny A without affirming ~A. — Leontiskos

(Propositional logic seems to assume, prima facie, not only the commonsensical idea that C is neither A nor B, but also the deeply counterintuitive idea that C is neither ¬A nor ¬B. Usually if C is neither A nor B then it must be both ¬A and ¬B.) — Leontiskos

[For the non-Fregean] The truth-connector is therefore seen as an expression of an operation. In fact, we can speak of truth and falsity operations, which are performed by . . . is true and . . . is false respectively. The assertion “p is true” is the same as “I truly think p.” There is no logical gap between these assertions. By contrast, the assertion “p is false” is not the same as “I truly think not-p.” Thus, truth and falsity operations are not symmetrical. However, they both apply to p and “A thinks p.” It is only in judgments about others that the use of . . . is false is required in addition to negation. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 93

I’ve been working with some ideas in Irad Kimhi’s Thinking and Being. Much of what he talks about concerns the nature of the relationship between predication and truth-assertion. It occurred to me that “Existence is not a predicate” has some obvious parallels with “Truth is not a predication.” That is, neither existence nor truth add anything, conceptually, to what they appear to be predicating ‛existence’ and ‛truth’ of. I can say “A hundred thalers exist” but this adds nothing to the concept ‛a hundred thalers’; I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J

From the Notre Dame review of Irad Khimi's Thinking and Being — RussellA

Again, what you have written shows multiple errors in your understanding of formal logic. — Banno

I'm sorry you can't see how it answers the OP. It is at least a beginning. — Banno

Existence, at least as qualification, ranges over individuals, while truth ranges over propositions. The OP asks about the relation between existence and truth. — Banno

So generally, existence is not a first order predicate; nor is truth. — Banno

I might reply, in kind, that all (true) sentences can be parsed into propositional logic. "p". Therefore all true sentences are "formulable within formalism". — Banno

Claiming that there is no explicit predication of existence or truth in formal logic is ignorant. — Banno

This post will just rattle your cage. That is probably all that can be done until J can formulate a more explicit topic. — Banno

This is simply not true. This is why I pointed to the use of the term son in the Hebrew Bible. It is used many times both in the singular and plural. It often refers to kings and rulers and never means a god. — Fooloso4

The disciples, Paul, and other Jewish followers did not believe that Jesus was a god. — Fooloso4