But I don't think I'm being unreasonable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You're not. I think you're giving @J and @Banno far too much credit. They are avoiding the questions being asked and failing to give arguments for their position. They won't even give a clear account of the terms that are being used within their accusations. Still, your charity in the face of that is admirable.

In the past @Srap Tasmaner has been able to lend a hand to a foundering position. Maybe he can do that here. Maybe he can clarify the thesis and the arguments that are supposed to attach to their position.

Yet even an appeal to internal consistency requires some sort of standard. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course it is, and it is a standard that @Moliere has within this thread. The fact that @Banno's championing of coherence clashes with @Moliere's ignoring of coherence is itself proof that those who favor the so-called "dissection" approach to philosophy disagree even among themselves about whether coherence should be applied as a criterion. @Moliere's tack highlights the fact that coherence (internal consistency) is a substantial criterion - at least if we are not to resort to "authoritarianism" in order to dismiss his incoherence.

This is the modus operandi of @J and @Banno. Someone claims that there must be some criteria and in response there is an immediate equivocation between some criteria and specialized or qualified criteria. For example:

If one cannot offer any criteria for making this judgement, then the choice seems arbitrary. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Such a narrative will, we hope, be "reasonable." And it has no strict criteria. — J

@J feels a need to qualify the criteria by adding the word "strict." He also puts "reasonable" in scare quotes.

Banno's approach is to utilize the strawman not of "strict" criteria, but of "final infallible" criteria:

Likewise, that we cannot rank all narratives against some final infallible standard does not entail that... — Banno

Count keeps asking a question about criteria simpliciter. @J and @Banno keep responding to a different question. They are responding to a question about "strict criteria," or a question about, "final infallible" criteria. No such question has been asked.

Why won't @J and @Banno answer the question that is being asked?
Why do they feel the need to answer a question that has not been asked and then pretend that they have answered the question that has been asked?

If I wanted to formalize it a bit, I might say that we're not advocating the abandonment of criteria tout court; useful, meaningful criteria (of value, of truth, et bloody cetera) are both local and modifiable. Local here meaning capturing as much of the context of their application as needed. (A question like "Is this a good car?" has no answer or too many without context.) Modifiable meaning that if your criteria can't evolve or aren't open to challenge or debate, you're doing it wrong.

And I think the counter, the demand for universality, permanence, certainty -- which will attack even what I'm saying here, "Are criteria always and everywhere like this? Then you're contradicting yourself!" -- should just be ignored as juvenile. This is not how serious people think. It's like lecturing Jerome Powell after taking Econ 101. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it is helpful to try to outline the two competing theses, but I'm not sure you're trying very hard. It looks like you attached a vacuous thesis to yourself and an absurd thesis to your opposition, which is pretty common on TPF.

If I'm wrong, then what are the two theses, clearly set out? And it would be helpful to try to be objective by skipping the epithets like "juvenile" and "unserious."

And I think the counter, the demand for universality, permanence, certainty [...] should just be ignored as juvenile. — Srap Tasmaner

But who is making that counter? Doesn't it just sound like a strawman on the face of it? And where in the thread do you find someone arguing for it?

A quick inlet into the problems with @J and @Banno's view is to look at where J argues that mathematics is authoritarian, music is non-authoritarian, and philosophy must be somewhere in between. Note his premise: mathematics is authoritarian!

This is the argument:

To assess a narrative and judge it good or bad requires a standard. To assess a narrative and accept or reject it requires a standard which one takes to be somehow definitive or elevated. If there are no such definitive or elevated standards, then rejection is never permissible. We would never say, "This does not fulfill some (arbitrary) standard, therefore it is to be rejected." To reject something requires judging that it fails to fulfill some definitive or elevated standard. To judge that it is beyond the pale. — Leontiskos

We are talking about judging contributions to some field, namely judging them good or bad.

Consider two normative concepts, the minimal-negative and the maximal-negative. I am calling the maximal-negative, "Beyond the Pale." The minimal-negative would be something like "low quality," or, "sub par." The minimal-negative and the maximal-negative are both judgments of badness.

What is my argument? What is the non-strawman argument? It is that everyone has a substantive minimal-negative and maximal-negative which they deploy, and that any reasonable definitions of "authoritarianism" within this thread generate hypocrisy, given that the one who accuses of "authoritarianism" leverages his own maximal-negative that is, by his own definition, "authoritarian." By "reasonable definition of authoritarianism," I mean something that is actually held and for which there is real evidence. The canard of, "Self-imputed infallibility," is an unreasonable notion of authoritarianism precisely because it is a strawman for which no evidence exists. If @J thinks that someone holds to a self-imputed infallibility despite their protestations to the contrary, then he will have to point to the evidence.

(Note that when you say, "This should just be ignored as juvenile," you are making a negative judgment that is likely a maximal-negative. Your judgment is certainly "authoritarian" according to @J and @Banno's criteria. You are deeming something beyond the pale and rejecting it, without allowing it recourse. That is what it means to ignore. If @Banno were the least bit consistent he would label you "infallible." And I would say that your own utterance involves the hypocrisy I pointed to, given that you must have a high degree of certitude that something is worthless if you are going to dismiss and ignore it as juvenile. It is self-contradictory to eschew certitude before "ignoring something as juvenile.")

The argument of @J and @Banno is quite simple. It is that <There is at least one maximal-negative that is unacceptable, and that maximal-negative is operative within TPF>. I agree that there are unacceptable maximal-negatives, such as those generated by self-imputed infallibility, but I don't see anyone here claiming that they are infallible and that anyone who disagrees with their judgments is eo ipso beyond the pale. What I see are people like @J and @Banno who consistently refuse to engage the arguments proffered, and then get red in the face when this is pointed out to them, resorting to name-calling such as "authoritarian" and "infallible." We're witnessing defensive rhetoric, not philosophical argumentation.


* We could also consider the minimal-positive and the maximal-positive, but that is not what people are interested in in this thread.

---

Modifiable meaning that if your criteria can't evolve or aren't open to challenge or debate, you're doing it wrong. — Srap Tasmaner

Let me elaborate on that parenthetical remark. By "authoritarian" @J means something like a definitive rejection of a view or person. So, "Not open to debate," is one way of getting at that. This creates a threshold at which the maximal-negative crosses over into authoritarianism. If someone's maximal-negative is beyond that threshold, then apparently they are an authoritarian.

But note that when you say, "[It] should be ignored as juvenile," you are engaging in definitive rejection. You are denying the view recourse by ignoring it. And when @J or @Banno ignore all my posts, they are engaging in definitive rejection. It logically follows that the three of you are "authoritarian," given that you engage in definitive rejection. This was actually the premise of my thread, "Beyond the Pale," namely that everyone engages in dismissal and even definitive forms of dismissal.

So the double standard is clearly evident. If the three of you did not engage in definitive rejection and deem certain things beyond debate, then there would be no double standard. Similarly, if I held that we should never deem anything beyond the pale, then I would be engaged in a double standard myself, because I candidly deem some things to be beyond the pale.

(The more robust point is that there are shades of negative judgments, and shades of definitiveness, and that even a minimal-negative involves a shade of definitiveness. Even to deem someone's belief sub-par or false involves a sort of micro-definitive negative. This is precisely why, elsewhere, @J posited the idea that deeming people wrong is itself immoral.)

The OP was a great set up for a for an important question. — Fire Ologist

Well, see:

Let's pretend for a moment that the OP is not another diatribe against your bogey of “monism.”... — Leontiskos

Banno is constantly making threads and posts that amount to, "Monism is authoritarian, and I won't say what I mean by 'monism' or 'authoritarianism'." It's propaganda in that none of it is amenable to argument. Indeed, it positively resists philosophical argument by mischaracterizing all of the views at each point, for example by pretending adversaries are championing "infallibility." Beyond that it likely violates the forum rule against evangelization.

I find this to be a very authoritarian position. Apparently you think that unless someone uses a form from your Great List of Valid Arguments they are creating a "fallacy." This is an inappropriate demand for completeness vis-á-vis argumentation. How can you know the entire list of valid arguments and when they apply in each instance? What's the criterion for this?

Now look, I thoughtfully considered that argument. It's consistent with my habit of practice, which is robust. I know good argument when I see it, and that argument is definitely one of them. Others agree!

You want to impose your One True Standard of Argument on us with your authoritarian List of what is valid, but I think there is a happy mid-point between declaring oneself infallible and in possession of the One True List of Valid Arguments and not allowing just any argument at all. I don't allow just any argument. I don't make just any argument. I try to only accept or make just those arguments that, per the case in question, would be justifiably valid according to my practice. But this is one of those cases. I have been thoughtful. My argument is valid here, not fallacious! — Count Timothy von Icarus

Too good. :lol:

I don't usually read Leon's posts. — Banno

As a sophist it behooves you to avoid them.

When you say something silly and another person points it out, apparently you think you can just rely on a rhetorical flourish, "You're not infallible! I can't believe you think you're infallible!" Failing that, you claim that there is no such thing as a justifiable standard for sophistry or anything else, so obviously you can't be engaged in sophistry!

Just imagine the real philosophy that might occur if not for all of these elementary threads.

↪Banno Tagging Count Timothy von Icarus -- In case you missed it, click on @Banno's post. — Moliere

Elsewhere @Banno considers such behavior to be "talking about others behind their back." What would happen if we held him to his own standards? The question that resonates throughout the thread. :wink:

Likewise, that we cannot rank all narratives against some final infallible standard does not entail that we cannot give good reasons for rejecting this narrative, and accepting that one. — Banno

If you were to remove the words, "final infallible," then you would be offering a real argument instead of a strawman. But I understand why you and @J won't abandon the strawmen. It would put you in a tough spot. It would put you face to face with the arguments being offered, and therefore with the problems of your strange position.

To assess a narrative and judge it good or bad requires a standard. To assess a narrative and accept or reject it requires a standard which one takes to be somehow definitive or elevated. If there are no such definitive or elevated standards, then rejection is never permissible. We would never say, "This does not fulfill some (arbitrary) standard, therefore it is to be rejected." To reject something requires judging that it fails to fulfill some definitive or elevated standard. To judge that it is beyond the pale.

Do we die on the hill of a metaphor? — Moliere

If Banno's categories of "dissector" and "discourser" are just "metaphor," and all dissectors are also discoursers and all discoursers are also dissectors, then what in the world do you think the thread is even about? When I contrast the builder with the destroyer (and you recast that as the builder and the critic), it makes no sense to respond by claiming that the destroyer is a builder. You can't distinguish builders from critics and then turn around and say that there is no difference, because the critics are builders, too. If there is no difference then why in the world would we make the distinction in the first place!?

It is more rigorous to speak this way as a matter of course, even when we are not explicitly comparing and contrasting builders with critics:

A doctor builds a house, not qua doctor, but qua housebuilder, and turns gray, not qua doctor, but qua dark-haired. On the other hand he doctors or fails to doctor qua doctor. But we are using words most appropriately when we say that a doctor does something or undergoes something, or becomes something from being a doctor, if he does, undergoes, or becomes qua doctor. — Aristotle, Physics I.8

Because it isn't. Not sure what else you could want in response to that. — AmadeusD

Really? "Because it isn't," is probably not going to be satisfactory to anyone, anywhere. What everyone, everywhere, will want is a reason why.

Perfect. In your example the state of affairs isn't false (jury is out, as it were, as described) but the belief is clearly false. — AmadeusD

Can you delineate what you mean by "the state of affairs," and what you mean by, "the belief"?

The fellow believes Trump dyed his hair. Is his belief false?

In a logical sense what we say is that his argument for the conclusion that Trump dyed his hair is unsound, but that this does not entail that the conclusion is false. I don't think it is correct to distinguish belief from proposition in that way and say that the belief is false but the proposition is not.

There are three propositions and three beliefs:

1. If *this video* is reliable then Trump dyed his hair
2. *This video* is reliable
3. Therefore, Trump dyed his hair

Belief/proposition (1) is true; belief/proposition (2) is false, and belief/proposition (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) because (2) is false. The belief/proposition, "Trump dyed his hair," is therefore neither known to be true nor known to be false. I don't see what grounds we have to say that the belief in question ("Trump dyed his hair") is false.

- :up:

I'm not quite sure from your reply how much we're on the same page re EKMs. But to clarify, EKMs are an abstract concept. The idea is that in recognition that technocapitalism creates abstract machines (such as media algorithms) that virally “plug into” our cognitive functionality and pathologize it towards habitual mental reflexivity, an EKM is a set of ideas that similarly plug into us but with the contrary intention of catalysing the kind of reflection we need to counteract media machines. This is another way of saying we need virally transmissible and catalytic abstract mechanisms to 1) help us to understand the precarity of our mental independence and 2) create frameworks of understanding that give us the epistemic confidence to act against prevailing cultural norms---to help us realize we're not alone in such "craziness". Less colourfully, we are in desperate need of sets of ideas that inspire people to divorce themselves from a system for whom their mental operations are little more than a substrate for its reproduction. — Baden

Okay thanks. I may have been misunderstanding the EKM to some extent. I guess I am wondering how that abstract metaphor of a "machine" would be thought to function, even metaphorically.

For example, consider this idea:

an EKM is a set of ideas that similarly plug into us but with the contrary intention of catalysing the kind of reflection we need to counteract media machines. — Baden

There is a possible objection here which says that machines by definition cannot do this, since intention and reflection require awareness, but machines diminish awareness (or something like that). If this objection is correct then the metaphor should not be that of a machine which does something for us, because the whole thrust of the desire for greater agency is that we need to do things for ourselves, so to speak. It is the idea that to yield up autonomy to a machine won't ultimately secure greater agency.

But the deeper question is simply asking how we approximate the "EKM" to create positive change. If such an objection is correct then it will inform the manner in which this approximation is achieved. Similarly, if the objection is incorrect then this will also bear on the outcome. One facet of your OP seems to be precisely the consideration that this objection is false (or at least not wholly true). It is to consider whether the enemy can be utilized to fight the enemy. I think there must be ways in which this is possible.

I suppose I am wondering if there are (autopoietic) cultures or systems which are naturally resistant to technocapitalism. Perhaps that is what the EKM is supposed to signify? Because it would be ideal if there were a positive alternative to technocapitalism, which did not require identifying and uprooting the technocapitalistic weeds. "If you have a healthy population of [this] in your garden, the weeds will take care of themselves."

Re capitalism. The last thing I want to do is attack capitalism in general. That’s like throwing a boomerang and then quickly tying your hands so rather than being caught when it returns, it bangs you on the head. Capitalism in a broad sense (including Chinese “communism”) is that very ideology that has made alternatives impossible. However, even within capitalism, technocapitalism and specifically its instantiation in forms of media that monopolize us cognitively can be taken on not only through individual resistance (refusal to engage with such media or severely limiting such engagement etc.), but also through public policy. A good example is Australia’s recent ban on social media for children. But it’s hard because we can understand we are being manipulated and still reproduce the processes of manipulation. So, for example, instead of just using social media blindly, we go on social media and tell everyone how bad it is and everyone agrees and we all have a good time and feel we’ve done something and meanwhile the train rolls on ever faster. — Baden

Good thoughts. I agree.

I think what's particularly bad about technocapitalism is that its suppression of ontological freedoms presents itself as an opening up of freedom through a bait and switch where ontological freedom is substituted by nominal freedoms — Baden

I agree that nominal freedoms can be inimical to ontological freedom, but I am wondering if ontological freedom can exist without nominal freedoms. Do you think we would still have ontological freedom if there were no nominal freedoms? Perhaps this is something of the "pharmacological" phenomenon?

It's not so much that agency and sovereignty are overpowered, it's that they are made invisible to us. We become primarily a set of mental operations that reproduces a bunch of social communications and consider it an important right that we should be allowed to do so and in ever greater variety, the breadth of which obscures the lack of depth. — Baden

Good - that makes sense.

I mentioned technology is "pharamcological", being both a poison and cure, but didn't mention that this idea was taken from Bernard Stiegler via Derrida from Plato's discussion of writing in "Phaedrus" where, though the advantages of writing are mentioned, the danger that a shift towards this technology would harm the human capacity for memory is also discussed. — Baden

This is helpful to me given that I am familiar with that text.

Similarly, the advantages of technology are clear enough and ideologically hammered into us, but the dangers, and particularly the dangers of seemingly benign forms, ought to be kept in mind. — Baden

Right!

I am aware of the problem you are highlighting but I really don't know how to make a dent in it, especially since the advent of AI and LLMs. I'm probably pulling this in a practical direction precisely because I am ignorant of how to address the problem.

Suppose you have a dome, and you need to keep a heavy ball on the dome. The goal requires constant balance, constant attention, and constantly preventing the ball from moving in any direction at all, given that movement in any direction will destabilize the ball.

Now suppose you have a basin (an inverted dome). Everything will find its way to the bottom of the basin, sooner or later. No effort is required to force something to the bottom of the basin, and it will be difficult to prevent such things from moving to the bottom.

The problem feels like the basin image and the solutions feel like the dome image. But maybe this is because the overall topography is technocapitalistic. Obviously the most promising solutions are those that attempt to alter the topography itself, whether for individuals or for society.

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc. A narrative about how to interpret and evaluate Beethoven's music, compared, say, to his contemporary, Hummel's, is going to say some things that are acceptable, true, and valid -- or at least try to. It will appeal to knowledge about the High Classical style, its aesthetic standards, the transition to Romanticism, European cultural history, and much more. — J

As @Fire Ologist aptly points out, what you are doing here is providing a "narrative." Your narrative involves the claim that there are many different criteria for what is to be considered acceptable/true/valid, and each criterion will generate a disparate set of acceptable/true/valid things. Call this, "J's narrative."

Now consider a second narrative, namely the narrative that although there are many different criteria for what is to be considered acceptable/true/valid, nevertheless each criterion will generate the exact same set of acceptable/true/valid things. Call this, "K's narrative."

Now go back to what Count has pointed out:

I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected? — Count Timothy von Icarus

• Either:
  
  • 1) All narratives are acceptable/true/valid
    
    • ...and therefore J's narrative and K's narrative are both equally acceptable/true/valid.
• Or else:
  
  • 2) Not all narratives are acceptable/true/valid
    
    • ...and therefore either J or K's narrative may be less acceptable/true/valid than the other. It may even be the case that both J and K's narrative are unacceptable/false/invalid.

So do you choose (1) or (2)? Must we avoid (2) to avoid "authoritarianism"?

I think you're asking whether the truth of the "Some narratives . . ." statement is beyond debate -- whether it represents something we can be certain of. — J

But this is surely a strawman, given that acceptable/true/valid is not the same as "beyond debate."

Note too that you and @Banno can say that nothing is beyond debate / beyond the pale, but it is obvious that you don't believe that nothing is beyond debate / beyond the pale. When someone such as yourself judges something beyond the pale, you are obviously involved in quality discrimination. When you deem something to be beyond the pale (and beyond debate) you have deemed it to be of excessively low quality. It's more than a little bit ironic that those who are in the very process of carrying out a campaign against that which they deem to be beyond the pale also profess that nothing is beyond debate, and that anyone who thinks things are beyond debate is "authoritarian." "Authoritarianism is beyond debate, and by 'authoritarianism' I mean that which deems things to be beyond debate."

Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty might someday be considered a "mature work." It brings in a lot from the prior texts, and starts to work a lot of these ideas into the framework where the defining feature of modernity is the elevation of potency over actuality (matter over form, etc.). It's a study of notions of liberty in Plato and Aristotle as compared with Locke (and a lesser focus on later thinkers like Kant and Spinoza). I think this is perhaps the biggest thesis because it rings very true and the ramifications have obviously been huge. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for the overview of his works! I think this is the one I will read first, since it looks interesting and may dovetail with Simpson's book on Illiberalism.

I assume J has something in mind, like "we" (i.e. people) make the standards for mathematics (although this seems opposed to the idea that mathematical discoveries were "always there" so maybe not?) Otherwise, wouldn't something like medicine be quintessentially authoritarian? For, either the patient lives, or they don't. Either they end up disabled, or they don't. There is a clear arbiter of success. Likewise, for engineering, the bridge either collapses or it doesn't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think his idea was that for mathematics a high quality answer is true and a low quality answer is false, so it's cut and dried. I don't disagree that these other things are "authoritarian." I think everything (worthwhile) is "authoritarian" in that strange sense, i.e. involving quality discrimination and also the notion of merit.

But the reasoning isn't very tight. For example:

"Is it structured to preclude objection?" And by "structured" I don't necessarily mean "by some agency." — J

"X is structured to preclude objection, and it is not structured to preclude objection by any agency." That's just a contradiction. I think the "systemic" avenue would be more fruitful.

A person who kills their patients through negligence, designs a bridge that collapses on people, or loses a winnable war is blameworthy. How could they not be? Likewise, academic dishonestly, e.g. falsifying data, is also blameworthy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, and this is a huge problem for @J, namely the fact that there are blameworthy acts, and people do carry them out. Thus avoiding all systems that provide the tools to identify blameworthy acts looks like a flight from reality.

But note that, at face value, "A person who designs a bridge that collapses on people is blameworthy," is not true. All bridges will eventually collapse, and therefore this cannot be a sufficient condition for blame (and I think this is also why engineering is not as clear as mathematics). This relates to <this post>, where I similarly pushed back on a point where you imputed blame.

Of course we could read you charitably as saying, "A person who [negligently] designs...," but the broader point is that the phenomenon of fault is pretty tricky to nail down. It requires philosophical skill to nail down, and that skill presupposes a mind that is not prejudiced with respect to blame, either pro or con. I think Aquinas' treatment is excellent, but I also don't think there are four people on TPF who could follow it. My Beyond the Pale thread is a rough introduction to that whole question, and it was intended to generate interest in the fact that we all impute blame even though few of us have an understanding of fault.

-

This is all spot on. — Fire Ologist

I agree. :up:

We could think of a very simple example.

"Trump dyed his hair brown!"
"Why do you say that?"
"Because I saw it on the news, from *this video*."
"That video is a deepfake."
"Oh, okay. I guess _____"

Here are two options for the blank ("_____"):

A. Trump did not dye his hair brown
B. I have no good reason to believe that Trump dyed his hair brown

Good post.

If mathematical findings were "there from the begining" who exactly is the authority that is being "authoritarian" here? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea is apparently that mathematics is systemically authoritarian (in the same way that something might be said to be "systemically racist"). @J is doubtless invested in "anti-racism" as well.

<Anything which systemically favors [accusations of moral deficiency which bear on the deficient person's argumentation] is "authoritarian" in structure> — Leontiskos

Any alternative definition of authoritarianism could be substituted into the [brackets]. The idea seems to be:

1. If a field judges some contributions as being of better quality and others as being of lesser quality, then that field engages in quality discrimination
2. If a field engages in quality discrimination; then some people's contributions will be judged to be worse than others
3. If some people's contributions are judged worse than others, then it is possible to blame them for their inferior contributions
4. A field where it is possible to blame someone for inferior contributions is more systemically authoritarian than a field where it is not possible to do so
5. Therefore, a field is systemically authoritarian insofar as it judges some contributions as being of better quality and others as being of lesser quality
6. (And therefore mathematics is a quintessentially authoritarian field)

Note your argument:

1. Any discipline in which quality is measurable is authoritarian
2. In mathematics the quality of contributions is measurable
3. Therefore, mathematics is authoritarian — Leontiskos

Linguistically empathy implies a lack of differentiation between the two subjects whereas sympathy or compassion implies a retention of the differentiation between the two subjects.

See, for example, The Sin of Empathy, where the basis is considered and yet there is a clear preference for sympathy.

These are the same claims (the two in quotes). P is false. The "solve" you want isn't apt, as far as I'm concerned. P is false at "~R".

The error being that a failure to support one's belief doesn't entail the state of affairs being false. It does, however, directly entail that your belief in the state of affairs is false. — AmadeusD

Why isn't this just the fallacy of denying the antecedent?

Wouldn't that form be a sort of "debunking argument?"

...

A debunking argument will claim to show that the cause of your belief that p is not caused by p (or something that entails p). It is stronger if it also shows you now lack good warrant to believe p, but it can also just show that the relationship isn't direct. In this case, the warrant is undermined, not the conclusion. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think this is what I am talking about. When I said, "They begin [...] Our refutation [...]," I am envisioning a dialogue. The idea is that you convince the person who had held to R that R is false.

The broader idea is this. Let's suppose there is some unfalsifiable proposition UF, and that John holds to UF. Is John's belief therefore irrefutable? Certainly not, for he holds to UF for a reason. If one were to convince John that his reasons do not hold, then he would stop believing UF, even though UF is unfalsifiable. In response to @AmadeusD's ideas, I would say that what is unfalsifiable cannot be falsified, and therefore we lack grounds for deeming it false. Nevertheless, we need not deem it true.

(Even if we say that some of his reasons are unconscious, they are presumably still able to be addressed. Unconscious reasons do not generate irrefutability unless we are unable to affect such unconscious reasons. Granted, at this point we may be talking about something other than "refutation.")

D.C. Schindler might be my favorite philosopher currently putting out regular material (and he puts out a lot). I will say though that he has a tendency to sometimes be a bit too polemical on some issues, which I'm afraid might turn some people off. He also tends to be fairly technical, although I've only found his first book on Von Balthasar to be really slow going. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I was looking at his books. What books or articles would you recommend as a starting point?

But if "not anything goes," then how is one not making a claim to a "true narrative?" Apparently certain narratives can be definitively excluded. In virtue of what are they excluded and why isn't this exclusion hubris?

Second, either all true narratives avoid contradiction or they don't. If they don't contradict each other, then they are, in a sense, one. If they do contradict one another, you need some sort of criteria for when contradiction is allowed (which all serious dialtheists try to provide) because otherwise, if contradiction can occur anywhere, then "everything goes" (and doesn't go). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Clear and important points. :up:

Moreover, if the principles contain moral elements, this will collapse the idea of "being wrong" as mistaken and "being wrong" as immoral, definitely an authoritarian move. — J

Here is a general claim you make:

• <One should not accuse anyone of a moral deficiency which bears on their argumentation>

You see this as "authoritarian," and both of these claims of yours are moral claims.

You also hold to this:

• <Anything which systemically favors [accusations of moral deficiency which bear on the deficient person's argumentation] is "authoritarian" in structure>

The problem here is that, by your own criteria, your own claims are "authoritarian," and therefore you are involved in hypocrisy or performative self-contradiction. You castigate "authoritarians" as suffering from a moral deficiency which bears on their argumentation, and therefore violate your own rule. You say, "You can't accuse the wielder of an argument of immorality," and yet this is precisely what you are doing with your ongoing "authoritarianism" diatribe.

And stretching a point, you can even call this authoritarian: If you say otherwise on a test, the teacher will flunk you! But there's nothing pernicious about any of this. It comes with the territory of an accepted formal system. — J

Is it authoritarian or isn't it? And is authoritarianism pernicious or isn't it? Do you see how you are unable to answer such simple questions?

The other problem here is that, even in the first place, you are not able to say what "authoritarianism" is and why it is bad. This goes directly to my Beyond the Pale thread, where you are confronted with the question, "What is authoritarianism and why is it beyond the pale?"

That juncture between the intellect and the will when it comes to assent is a neuralgic point which seems to underlie a lot of the instability of these discussions. The great boon of a doctrine about how assent relates to both intellect and will, such as the Medieval doctrine, is that it allows us to think more carefully and countenance more honestly those assents of ours which are strongly volitional. — Leontiskos

The intellectually honest person would say to themselves, "Yes, my claims about authoritarianism are moral claims, and moral claims require defense. Therefore I will accede to defending my moral claims."

By this point I fully expect you to continue evading such simple questions and to persist in your incoherence.

The critic criticizes themself. They don't have to learn how to build in order to do that. — Moliere

So the critic is actually a builder? That's your solution? "Critics don't need any builders, because they are builders too!"

You are conceding my point, namely that builders are necessary. You've merely conceded it by magically making the critic a builder. You are not contesting my point that critics cannot exist without builders.

Note too that in the past you have claimed that, "This sentence is false," is an example of a sentence that is both false and true simultaneously. So in that case it fails the criterion of presupposing no truths. If you now want to change your analysis to say that it involves falsity but no truth (and therefore does not violate the LEM after all), then that looks like an ad hoc attempt to try to answer my challenge. The Liar's Sentence can't be true and false when you want to disprove the LEM, and then merely false when you want to object to a claim about the primacy of truth. Changing your mind in this ad hoc way is unprincipled reasoning. — Leontiskos

I don't see it as unprincipled when I'm directly telling you why I'm thinking what I'm thinking. I think we really can use different metrics at different times -- different solutions to the Liar's Paradox are valuable to know. There isn't a single way to respond to the Liar's Paradox as evidenced by the philosophical literature on the Liar's Paradox. There are times when dialethia are appropriate and times when the simple logic of objects is appropraite. — Moliere

This is nonsense, Moliere. :roll:

• Leontiskos on Tuesday: The LEM holds.
• Moliere on Tuesday: No it doesn't, because the Liar's Sentence is both true and false at the same time. So the LEM doesn't hold.
• Leontiskos on Wednesday: Truth has a primacy over falsehood.
• Moliere on Wednesday: No it doesn't, because the Liar's Sentence is false but not true. So truth doesn't have a primacy.
• Leontiskos on Thursday: You just contradicted yourself. The Liar's Sentence can't be true on Tuesday and not-true on Wednesday, depending on what proposition your passions want to contradict.
• Moliere on Thursday: No, I can switch back and forth like that. No big deal!

You are showcasing the incoherence of extreme skepticism, where your goal is just to contradict people, Monty Python-style, with no regard for your own incoherence and self-contradictions. This is a prime example of someone who is not interested in real philosophy; who won't even shy away from the fact that they contradict themselves without shame. You are apparently content to flip-flop back and forth like this for all eternity, so long as you are able to contradict everything at once. Good luck with that approach! Really - it will destroy you.

These are excellent quotes from D. C. Schindler both here and in your previous post. :up:
I will have to look into him more closely.

I don't think these folks understand how completely they are destroying the philosophical enterprise and the things they believe they are saving. On the other hand, there is also a thread of misology that has erected this so-called "epistemic humility" as its god, and cares not what happens.

See also:

The choices are "monism" or "pluralism," where the common individualistic rule is that argument and contention is not permitted. — Leontiskos

What happens is that there is a dichotomy set up between "monism" and "pluralism," where both share the premise that the individual is immune to rational influence. The "monistic" individual is immune via his own "authoritarianism," whereas the "pluralistic" individual is immune via pluralism. They are two sides of the same coin, and both undercut the notion of truth, transcendence, and the ability to influence one another via rational considerations.

- Sure, but is existence a form received by an essence? If existence is a form and an angel receives the form of existence, then the angel must have matter, but I wouldn't really want to describe it that way. This also obscures the position which objects to Aquinas and says that angels do have proper (spiritual) matter.

Aquinas is claiming that an angel does not have matter, and therefore has no material parts, but that it does have a composition of essence + existence, which differentiates it from Pure Act:

Reply to Objection 3. Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was explained above (I:3:4). Hence God alone is pure act. — Aquinas, ST I.50.2.ad3 - Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?

"Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act." I.e.:

• Essence/nature : Potentiality :: Existence : act

So Aquinas posits a potency-act distinction in angels (and every created being), by positing the essence-existence distinction. For Aquinas although the standard sort of potency-act distinction is indeed matter-form, there is nevertheless a second potency-act distinction within substances, namely essence-existence, and this applies not only to material substances but also to immaterial substances.

Remember that we are talking about refuting someone's reason(s) (R) for belief (P). They begin:

• R → P
• R
• ∴ P

Our refutation is a refutation of R:

• R → P
• ~R
• ∴ ?

Solve for '?' Are you saying that the conclusion is, "∴ ~P" ?

The result is that P does not follow, i.e. "P is not (necessarily) true." They have moved from, "P is true," to, "P is not true," without going all the way to, "P is false." Ergo:

Indeed, it is arguable whether, upon convincing someone that their belief is not true, we should have "falsified" their belief. If they move from "true" to "not true" without going all the way to "false," has falsification occurred? — Leontiskos

But I do think that deductive, foundationalist philosophies run a higher risk of being trapped in a method that, for structural reasons, cannot see a different viewpoint as anything other than a deductive mistake or misunderstanding. — J

That's the thesis, and you haven't defended it. You've just imputed bad ("authoritarian") motives wherever you like. I was hoping for more from that post of yours. Note that if you are actually looking for structural phenomena that predispose towards authoritarianism, then mathematics is certainly authoritarian! Do you think mathematics is authoritarian? Because two people can't have different answers and both be correct, or both be mathematically validated?

Now let's take music. Is musical creativity authoritarian? Does it preclude objection? I admit it's not clear just what that might mean, but something like: Is there a right and a wrong way to write music, are some musics intrinsically beautiful, apart from context, and others not? etc. Surely not, because creative work is not deductive. You can't start from some axioms and work out what's going to be great music. — J

This is more strained reasoning. "Surely not"? Almost everyone agrees that some sounds are not music; some music is more musical; some music is more beautiful; and some music is more objectionable. So if we use your own criterion of "intersubjective agreement," then music is "authoritarian" (according to your curious definition). The reason John Williams was given the score for Harry Potter instead of you or I is because John Williams is a better musician, who produces better music. Similarly, anyone with even a vague familiarity with music is capable of creating a shit piece of music, that everyone will agree is shit. So the idea that there are no criteria for good music is obviously false.

Surely not, because creative work is not deductive. — J

"Creative work is not deductive, therefore there is no right or wrong way to make music, and no good or bad music." That's a wild non sequitur.

The whiplash that your post produces occurs because there are no real inferences utilized in order to arrive at your conclusions about "deductive reasoning," or, "authoritarianism." You have some conclusions in search of an argument. Your beginning was promising insofar as you tried to identify an authoritarian pole (mathematics) and a non-authoritarian pole (music), but after that it went downhill.

Note your argument:

1. Any discipline in which quality is measurable is authoritarian
2. In mathematics the quality of contributions is measurable
3. Therefore, mathematics is authoritarian

Both - but our most recent exchange has jaded me on the latter. No hard feelings - just an explanation. — AmadeusD

Well that makes two of us.

Yeah - i found that discussion helpful and pretty decent as it's something I've not thought too much about. — AmadeusD

Okay - good to hear.

But hte conclusion seems to say something other than the discussion concludes with. — AmadeusD

Well how do you answer this question?

Indeed, it is arguable whether, upon convincing someone that their belief is not true, we should have "falsified" their belief. If they move from "true" to "not true" without going all the way to "false," has falsification occurred? — Leontiskos

I do think that James creates criteria to limit the amount the will allows one to create one's own reality, — Hanover

Yes, that's fair and I noticed you pointing that out.

but I do think there is merit to the position that the will is a dominant force in one's life, enough so that it can significantly change one's outlook and perspective. It's especially noticable on website like this, where I often detect an over-riding sense of doom, this idea that if you don't accept a certain pessimism, then you're looked upon as blissfully ignorant. And the point is that it's not ignorance. It's a choice. — Hanover

Interesting. I noticed it when I joined. Now I take it for granted. :grin:

What's not an aside is that everyone's personal beliefs form their worldview, which is what I think the OP doesn't address as closely. What it actually addresses is the fact that there are two ways of philosophizing within the analytic tradition, and some do it rigorously and some do it sloppily.

...

When we truly have different views of the world (i.e. not a shared view), then rejection of the results brought about by the tools of other traditions isn't inconsistent. If my world is not conducive to examination by an atomic microscope, it doesn't bother me what results it might show. — Hanover

I think that's well said.

When I wrote the post you are responding to I had no internet, and was working from memory. When I revisited the actual conversation I realized that your quotes from James were fairly conservative. My impression was that James at times went farther than that, but maybe that is incorrect.

I am wary of bringing up Pascal's Wager, but an argument similar to it could help illustrate a more "pragmatic" option:

"Belief in God will make me happy. Disbelief in God will make me unhappy. Therefore I choose to believe in God."
"Do you believe it is true that God exists?"
"Yes."
"Why?"
"Because it will make me happy." — Option 1

Now compare this to something more conservative:

"I saw that belief in God would make me happy, therefore I investigated the issue and was persuaded, on intellectual grounds, that God truly does exist."
"Do you believe it is true that God exists?"
"Yes."
"Why?"
"Because of sound arguments. But I investigated the arguments in the first place because I was searching for happiness." — Option 2

Now those are merely two approaches, and there are doubtless countless others, including in between.

But the funny thing is that many if not all of us really do seem to hold to assents based on something like option 1. Many if not all of us are involved in assents that, were we to trace back the justificatory structure when asked why we hold them, we would have to admit, "Because it is good to so believe," or, "Because what is believed is good/desirable/choice-worthy." For example, "Do you think the tornado is going to hit your house?," or, "It's late and she hasn't come home yet. Do you think your wife is cheating on you?" It strikes me as implausible that a negative answer to such questions is purely intellectual, and does not strongly involve one's desire for what is good.* ...Eventually we will want to ask what extent of volition is rationally permissible, if any.

(Obviously the Analytic temptation here is to make a distinction between two different senses of the question about the tornado or the adultery, but in reality those two putative senses really do seem merged and melded together.)


* Curiously, Aquinas singles out one form of assent as, "to incline to one side yet with fear of the other." The tornado or adultery questions represent that variety of assent. We could also give examples where there is volition and uncertainty but not necessarily any fear, such as, "Do you think the sun will come out tomorrow?"

One idea here in the medieval context is that, because we only ever encounter finite goods, the will is always underdetermined. Thus, there is always a "choice factor" in our pursuits — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I think that's right.

A closely related point, made by many authors, is that the masses do not reason in the way that philosophers reason. For example, whereas a philosopher would uphold liberalism on intellectual grounds, the masses will tend to uphold liberalism on volitional grounds. They tend to view liberalism as good, not as true (although liberalism may not be the best example since some of the proponents such as Rawls eventually admitted that their own grounds are largely volitional). The same argument could be made for something like the existence of God, and it is worth recognizing how the philosophers—or else those with more direct knowledge—lead the way and the masses follow in their wake.

When push comes to shove, @J is a volitional reasoner. He wonders if we should avoid truth-claims because they are immoral. @Banno is starting to lean in that direction as well, as can be seen by his recent post/diatribe against "authoritarianism." The first thing I would say here is that this is okay, so long as they recognize what they are doing. J has certainly begun to recognize it and he has a less intellectualist bent than Banno, but Banno is more schizophrenic, vacillating between intellectualism and will-based assent.

That juncture between the intellect and the will when it comes to assent is a neuralgic point which seems to underlie a lot of the instability of these discussions. The great boon of a doctrine about how assent relates to both intellect and will, such as the Medieval doctrine, is that it allows us to think more carefully and countenance more honestly those assents of ours which are strongly volitional. So I think @Hanover has put his finger on something important with his William James' quotes.

I think this goes too far. There are at least some things that can be known as good vis-á-vis human nature, particularly ceteris paribus, and if the good is more choice-worthy than the bad, then we have a clear intellectual line to the preferability of at least some habits, i.e., the virtues (intellectual and moral). But I'll certainly grant that this does not apply to every case, and is not without difficulties in particular applications. Nor do I think this suggests the absolute priority of the intellect in the pursuit of virtue, in that the appetite for knowledge, including knowledge about what is truly best, always plays a role. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and when we think about the intellect/volition problem in specifically "moral" terms (in the modern sense), the question immediately arises, "Is the good communicable and universally binding, in the way that the true is?" This is probably a large part of @J's concern. He worries that objective claims of goodness lead to imposition and coercion.

Although I haven't looked at this problem in awhile, it seems clear to me that the intellect and the will are tightly knit, and that the true is good. The difficulty is the reversal, namely the claim that the good is true. Can we say that what is good is also what is true? How does the convertibility in that direction work? Although the mushroom case is interesting, nevertheless the will is only a motive for knowing that truth, not a proper grounds for the truth. Thomists lean towards intellectualism, so it is natural that I have more difficulty with this direction.

the act of understanding closes of critique. — Banno

OK, so where does philosophy fit between these two extremes? — J

This could be an interesting discussion. For now I will only add:

As Spinoza said, "Omnis determinatio est negatio." — Leontiskos

Every determination is a negation, including the determination involved in the act of understanding. If such "closing" is necessarily authoritarian, then mathematics is authoritarian, and we actually have some nutty folk in universities saying precisely that.

In today's climate what is needed is philosophy rather than diatribes, ideology, and virtue signaling — Leontiskos

I think such remarks are self refuting and mischaracterise both mathematics and philosophy by falsely implying that they are separate language games. Indeed, formalism fails to explain the evolution of mathematlcs and logic. There's nothing therapeutic about mischaracterising mathematics as being a closed system of meaning. — sime

It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of what you say here. :up: :fire:

No thanks, C.S. Peirce is my go to American. Pragmaticism, not pragmatism, thank you :grin: — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, but let’s give the devil his due. I think it will be helpful, and it will also afford an opportunity to give an example of how to constructively interact with a thesis rather than dissect it.

"James’s central thesis is that when an option is live, forced and momentous and cannot be settled by intellectual means, one may and must let one’s non-rational nature make the choice. One may believe what one hopes to be true, or what makes one happiest;" — Hanover

There is a very interesting and ubiquitous philosophical problem that is being confronted by Hanover. I touched on it <here>. Consider this argument:

1. Supposition: The only rational assents are those that are entirely derived from the intellect (and not at all derived from the will)
2. But (most) everyone is involved in a great number of assents which are not entirely derived from the intellect
3. Not all of these assents are irrational
4. Therefore, (1) is false

Our most familiar instantiation of this problem is the debate over moral realism, where the anti-realist holds to (1) and claims that moral assents are not rational (because they are derived from the will, whether in the case of ‘oughts’ or values). But we faced another acute instantiation of the problem in the recent <thread on faith>, where we saw that faith-assents are common and rational even though they involve the will. For example:

Such faith is rational, but it is also an act of choice. The evidence, because it is about the trustworthiness of the authority and not about the things the authority says, does not convince the mind of the truth of these things, but only of their trustworthiness. To believe their truth, the mind must be moved to do so by an act of trust. But an act of trust is an act of will. We can, if we like, refuse to believe the doctor or the chemist, however convincing the evidence of their trustworthiness may be. We cannot, by contrast, refuse to believe that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles once we have seen the proof, though we can contradict it in words if we like, for speech is an act of will. — Peter L. P. Simpson, Political Illiberalism, 109

Consider an example of a conservative argument against (1) which does not go so far as William James’ voluntarism:

If someone is starving and they decide to eat a mushroom, knowing that it might be poisonous, then I can see how the act has value and reason. — Leontiskos

The conclusion—whether belief or opinion—that the mushrooms are edible is not motivated purely by the intellect. In fact such a belief would never have been formed if one were not starving and desirous of food. One would never have had occasion to judge the mushrooms edible if not for that hunger. The will is necessary for such an assent, but this does not render the assent irrational.

My guess is that the number of assents which involve the will in such a way is very large. It doesn’t seem to be practicable to avoid all such assents, which is probably why people like so often overreach their own intellectualist criteria. Janus is someone who gives a very idiosyncratic approach to this problem by positing a set of non-rational assents which are justifiable to oneself but not to others. Williams James seems to go too far in collapsing truth into will altogether. Pascal’s Wager represents an especially potent leveraging of the problem. But even after dissecting all of the errors, it is very hard to deny that there must be some rational assents which are not derived entirely from the intellect.

The Medieval answer to this philosophical problem is found in both a robust understanding of the relation between the intellect and the will, and also in the doctrine of the convertibility of the good and the true.

(Given that it is plain to us that there is a form of will which is inimical to intellectual honesty, presumably any thinker worth his salt who rejects (1) must follow Aristotle in distinguishing an upright will from a corrupt will.)

---

Austere criteria for knowledge and reason will result in a truncated philosophical sphere, and this is what @Banno’s view commits him to. He has a relatively narrow view of knowledge, philosophy, and reason, because of his more stringent criteria (with some exceptions). Something like (1) appeals to him, even though he is plagued by the same fact of incompleteness that plagued the Logical Positivists. Like his forebears, he has no principled way to exclude knowledge claims, given that he knows that his own system is incomplete. Such people can say with certainty, “If a rational assent is derived entirely from the intellect, then it is rational,” but they are constantly tempted to affirm the consequent and assert (1).

This austerity is given to dissection in one way, insofar as many knowledge claims will fail the stringent criterion and a tight logical system will be able to show why they are not theorems within the system. But in another way the negative judgments that naturally follow upon dissection are beyond its reach, even though it often deceives itself in denying this. Lacking completeness, the fact that something is not a theorem within the system does not prove that it is not true. Thus the adherent is consigned to the paradox of only being able to dissect and never being able to exclude; of only being able to say, “At least according to my incomplete system, what you say is not valid.” Gödel and reality itself beckons them onward to wider vistas, where the truths which elude them can be seen.

For these reasons I find Hanover’s approach too strong (although at this point he is only quoting James' more mild ideas). The intellect itself is sufficient to show that Banno’s approach is insufficient for the sake of truth.

You're again doing that thing where you ignore the central conversation where you are having the most difficulty:

Sure, but I never contested that and it doesn't intersect with what we were discussing in that line of the conversation. My question to you was literally, "Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize?" Do you have an answer to that question? — Leontiskos

We can't just paper over your invalid objection to my claim that without builders there can be no critics. That is the central and older part of the conversation, and it is the part that an auto-didact will have an easier time with. I focused on it for a reason.

"This sentence is false" seems to fit to me, but I'm not allowed to use it. :D — Moliere

Note too that in the past you have claimed that, "This sentence is false," is an example of a sentence that is both false and true simultaneously. So in that case it fails the criterion of presupposing no truths. If you now want to change your analysis to say that it involves falsity but no truth (and therefore does not violate the LEM after all), then that looks like an ad hoc attempt to try to answer my challenge. The Liar's Sentence can't be true and false when you want to disprove the LEM, and then merely false when you want to object to a claim about the primacy of truth. Changing your mind in this ad hoc way is unprincipled reasoning.

Do you see how it's correct for the critic to still say that they don't know? — Moliere

Sure, but I never contested that and it doesn't intersect with what we were discussing in that line of the conversation. My question to you was literally, "Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize?" Do you have an answer to that question?

So you want a circumstance where bill said some statement is false, and there is no truth that needs to exist in order for Bill to say that the answer is false.

Correct? — Moliere

Yep. I am saying that, "If you claim that something is false, then you must already hold to some truth in order to say so." The counterexample would be, "Here is an example where someone claims that something is false even though they do not hold to any truth in order to say so."

Sorry, I chose it for a reason last time and it's still the one that fits now. — Moliere

If you have to resort to the extremely controversial example of the Liar's Paradox then your answer is going to be highly implausible and controversial. I've already given you my thoughts on the Liar's Paradox and I obviously think your analysis is incorrect.

While they are contrary opposites, on the view of truth as a transcendental property of being, falsity is parasitic on truth for the same reason that evil is parasitic on good—it is an absence. If truth is the adequacy of the intellect to being then its lack is a privation. Likewise, without ends, goods, the entire concept of evil makes no sense, since nothing is sought and so no aims are every frustrated. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that's right, but I think it is even easier for an Analytic to see that falsity presupposes truth by looking at arguments which attempt to demonstrate falsehoods.

I just don’t give analytic dissection the priority. We need to assert, and then dissect. — Fire Ologist

Right. Chronologically and logically, assertion precedes dissection. :up:

If nothing is built there is nothing to criticize. Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize? If the critics are to criticize themselves, they will first need to learn how to build. Hence my point. — Leontiskos

That's not true. Suppose you hire someone to build you a house. You don't know how to build the house, but your criticism is important to how the builder proceeds.

Now the builder could tell you "Look, if that's what you want, I'm telling you you aren't going to get a house, it will collapse" -- but the person would still be justified in their claim that they don't know how to build a house. — Moliere

I asked you what a critic is supposed to criticize if there is no builder, and in response you pointed to a critic who criticizes a builder. Do you see how you failed to answer my question?

This began when I said that if there are no builders then there can be no critics, and you responded by saying that in that case the critics would just criticize themselves. So again, your example of a critic who criticizes a house-builder is in no way an example of critics criticizing themselves, sans builders.

There's one solution to the liar's paradox which says there is no problem -- "This is false" is straightforwardly read as a false sentence, and not true.

For the other I'd point to our previous discussion on the dialetheist's solution to the liar's paradox where the solution is to recognize that the liar's sentence is both true and false.

Now, that's just co-occurrence to demonstrate a dyad between the two to the standards you laid out. But I think that "...is true" and "...is false" presuppose one another to be made sense of. That is, there is no "...is true" simpliciter, but rather its meaning will depend upon the meaning of "...is false", and vice-versa.

So there is no prioritizing one over the other. — Moliere

There is no prioritizing truth over falsity because of some obscure gesturing towards the Liar's Paradox?

I'm just asking you to give me an example of an assertion of falsehood which presupposes no truths. Can you do that?

"John wrote 2+2=5 on his paper. Bill said that his answer was false. But no truth needs to exist in order for Bill to say that the answer is false."

Something like that. Something straightforward. An example.


You seem to be saying that without a counterfactual understanding of falsehood there can be no claims of truth, and without a counterfactual understanding of truth there can be no claims of falsehood. That's fine, but it doesn't establish parity. I am saying that every claim of falsehood presupposes at least one actual truth, but not so with claims of truth. I am saying that if Bill does not know some truth then he cannot say the answer is false. So even if there is parity on the counterfactual consideration, there is still a lack of parity on the consideration I have presented.

The builders can exist without the critics. The critics cannot exist without the builders. — Leontiskos

But the critics can criticize themselves! — Moliere

If nothing is built there is nothing to criticize. Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize? If the critics are to criticize themselves, they will first need to learn how to build. Hence my point.

"This is false" presupposes some truth, whereas, "This is true," does not presuppose any falsehood. — Leontiskos

Though if this be the analogy I'd just say truth and false form a dyad: You don't understand the one without the other. — Moliere

Then provide a response to my argument. Provide an example where "this is false" presupposes no truth, and explain why "this is true" presupposes falsehood.

But I think it's important to maintain the ability to say "I don't know", and reassess our beliefs because of our ability to make errors, or at least miss some things. — Moliere

Sure, but dissection is not the same as saying, "I don't know."

But I find "I don't know" to be a far more productive realization, because it'll lead me to something else. — Moliere

Exactly. It is productive. "I don't know," leads precisely to building. "I know that you are wrong," (dissection) is an opposite of, "I don't know."

Note too that the act of dissecting is an intrinsically negative act, insofar as it is a search for falsehood. The dissector is therefore someone in search of error; a kind of inquisitor who comes to fall in love with the discovery of error in others.

I'd make the case that the builders need the critics -- else you get back arguments. — Moliere

Even on your premises, it remains true that bad arguments are better than nothing at all. The builders can exist without the critics. The critics cannot exist without the builders. So I think my thesis stands.

This is related to what I said to you here:

Okay, interesting. Such negatives are pretty slippery. I won't speak to practical prohibitions, but, "This is false," is an incredibly difficult thing to understand. Usually we require, "This is true" + PNC in order to arrive at a judgment of falsehood. I am not at all convinced that a falsehood can be demonstrated directly. — Leontiskos

Just as the critic lacks parity with the builder, so too does falsehood lack parity with truth. "This is false," presupposes some truth, whereas, "This is true," does not presuppose any falsehood. This is why your fundamental approach to knowledge based on judgments of falsehood is mistaken:

In a lot of ways I think of knowledge as the things I know are false -- don't do this, don't do that, this is false because, this is wrong cuz that... — Moliere

Note too that the act of dissecting is an intrinsically negative act, insofar as it is a search for falsehood. The dissector is therefore someone in search of error; a kind of inquisitor who comes to fall in love with the discovery of error in others.

and I'd say you can't have one without the other, really. — Moliere

Right, which turns out to be a problem for an OP that wants to prefer one over the other.

While world-building is part of philosophy, so is the skeptics. Pyrrho comes to mind here for me as a kind of arch-nitpick, with a moral cause to justify it even so it fits within that ancient mold of philosophy as a life well lived, even. — Moliere

First, I would point back to the twins. Again, one's activity is parasitic and one is not. Philosophy does not exist without those who construct, but it does exist without those who deconstruct. Therefore deconstruction is not as fundamental to philosophy as construction; falsity not as central to philosophy as truth.

Picking-nits is very much part of philosophy, and one need not have a replacement answer -- "I don't know" is one of those pretty standardly acceptable answers in philosophy. Aporetic dialogues having been part of philosophy as well. — Moliere

I don't think it is plausible to combine "nitpicking" with "aporia." Aporia requires more than nitpicking.

I think this thread was partially motivated by my emphasis on something represented in my bio, "And don't just say why [he's wrong]; say what you think is right" (Hopko). I think it is incorrect to try to place nitpicking on a par with providing constructive alternatives. "It takes a plan to beat a plan." The Monty Python argument skit is apropos, where someone engaging in sheer contradiction believes that they are engaging in argument, or in our case, philosophy.

When someone is doing the Monty Python thing their telos is a kind of agonstic opposition, and this is not yet philosophy. Of course, there is a very significant difference between these two options:

• "After dissecting your claims I have found that you are wrong, and I utterly refuse to try to say what I think is alternatively right."
• "After dissecting your claims I have found that you are wrong, and I am open to trying to constructively work out a better option."

"I don't know" could represent the first or the second. The Monty Python thing is a comical instance of the first.