Yes, I saw you nudging in that direction. I don't know. I think things get tricky once we realize how important the predispositions of philosophical inquiry are, and then try to manage them. It is there, in the heart of the jungle, where you encounter the most danger and require the most care, and yet after the long and taxing journey care and attention is often lacking when it is most needed. A text like Przywara's Analogia Entis is an attempt to plumb those depths, and the success is always only partial.

Traditionally the difficult question and the cleft/alienation doesn't appear with truth, but rather with falsity and error (and the threads on Kimhi danced around this). We can debate the relation between truth and falsity, but it looks to me that in the long history of epistemology the conundrum is, "What is falsity?" "What is error?" And if the false cannot be known then how can the ship be righted?

(Michael was poking around in this when he earlier said that realism inevitably courts skepticism. The problem is that his idiosyncratically defined "anti-realism" doesn't seem to offer a substantive alternative. The problems posed by skepticism aren't so easily evaded, at least at the theoretical level.)

Yes, that is an interesting idea. It also seems to me that there's a kind of pre-reflexive movement—something like faith or trust—that determines the outcome in a curious way. If you trust him then he turns out to be trustworthy, and if you don't trust him then he turns out to be untrustworthy, and there is no middle ground.

I see this a lot in the analytical stance of trying to achieve that neutral middle ground, a stance which carries within itself commitments that are unseen.

:up:

This is the classical problem of "realism," namely the debate between those espousing some account of universals and those espousing nominalism. Usually on TPF we read about a philosophical issue on SEP like someone who reads about the wetness of water. The benefit of real argument, such as this thread represents, is the same as the benefit of familiarity with water itself, as opposed to encyclopedia descriptions.

Dare We Say, ‘Thanks for Nothing’? — FrankGSterleJr

Sure, if you have nothing. But it's mostly not the people with nothing saying such things.

- Good posts. :up:

Sure, I just think the extreme cases are useful to demonstrate how it is implausible, from the perspective of almost any ethics, that we always benefit most from extending our own lives. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's fair.

The drive of beings to maintain their own form is absolute nowhere in nature. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think self-preservation is a drive of nature.

Nor is the case of dying in this way really sui generis. We often take on all sorts of risk and suffering to accomplish goals. The duties that come with being a parent, learning to ride a bike, learning to read, starting an exercise regime or diet, etc. can all be unpleasant and risky, and yet it seems hard to claim that this entails that they cannot be to our benefit. The daily self-reported "happiness" of parents of young children is significantly lower on average, for years out, but I don't think this makes having children necessarily not to one's benefit. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Isn't is sui generis in the sense that it forces us to conceive of "our benefit" in a non-egoistic manner? After all, egoists don't balk at dieting to lose weight in the way they balk at martyrdom.

I agree that we are mistaken in thinking that egoism is the default or natural position, but it does have a basis in human experience.

It's the demand for a univocal measure of the good that leads towards such rigid pronouncements as "it is never to our benefit to do something that kills us." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but the univocity is determined by egoism and the attendant interpretation of "our benefit." For Peter L. P. Simpson this is perhaps the characteristic moral marker of modernity. It is certainly the prima facie position for 21st century folk.

Kant is an inheritor of that modern way of thinking. He does not challenge it in any significant way. And his fideistic solution is characteristically Protestant.

Well, again, I think the question has to do with cases of heroic virtue. If a 110 year-old sacrifices their life there will almost certainly be less heroic virtue involved than if a 30 year-old sacrifices their life. It is one thing to be willing to accept a mortal cost for the sake of a virtuous act, and another to be circumstantially indifferent to death. So I would want to keep our eyes on cases where the person stands to lose something. You are giving cases where, for one reason or another, the person does not stand to lose much in dying.

- So you won't give an honest answer to the question. Noted.

I wonder however you arrived at this? Name calling too. That's called strange. — Tom Storm

No, it's called true. Saying things you don't believe is lying, whether you like it or not.

You're engaged in a lot of sophistry in this thread. Here's the question:

For example, why do we prohibit cocaine as a society? — Leontiskos

Do you have an honest answer?

- So you're just saying things you don't believe to be true. That's called lying.

- Do you really think cocaine should be legal and prostitution leads to happiness? Or are you just saying things you don't believe to be true?

Because it's generally bad to have one's grandchildren die. The one act, saving the kids, might entail dying. Which is to be preferred? The claim that it is simply impossible to rightly prize any goals more than temporarily extending one's (necessarily finite) mortal life seems like one that it will be very hard to justify. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that is a good argument. :up:
The virtuous person does not value their own life above every other thing.

- The text has a cultural context. It does no good to read "just the text" while ignoring that context.

People ask not to receive medical treatment all the time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, but this isn't really relevant to an argument regarding courage or virtue. The question here is, "Should we be virtuous, even if means dying?" When death is preferable to a burdensome life we are talking about something quite different.

If a grandmother attempts to save her grandchildren, and will die in the process of successfully rescuing them, it hardly seems clear that this cannot be to her benefit either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, but why? How is it to her benefit? J is obviously going to respond by pointing out that one who ceases to exist can no longer positively benefit.

And this might well be true, but it shows that life is not ultimately sought for its own sake, but rather as a prerequisite for other goods. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that life is intrinsically good. It's just not unconditionally good. It does not trump every other consideration. And this is where I would go with Socrates. Indeed, it is where Socrates goes himself.

"They conquered him by the blood of the Lamb and by the word of their testimony; love for life did not deter them from death" (Revelation 12:11).

If J told his followers to go out among the gentiles/the nations and eat what they serve you then I cannot view that as anything other than permission to break Torah law regarding diet. — BitconnectCarlos

Scholars see other possibilities, some of which I already gave:

It could be that, but there are alternative interpretations, namely the avoidance of being fussy when receiving hospitality, and ignoring the additional food laws imposed by the "traditions of the elders." — Leontiskos

But as Count Timothy von Icarus notes by gJohn we have J instructing his followers to dine on his blood and flesh -- clearly prohibited by the Torah. — BitconnectCarlos

Sure, but this goes back to my point about an elevation of the core of the Law. It is also tied up with his divinity. If he isn't divine, then when he says this he is breaking the Law tout court.

Sure, the distinction between pleasure and happiness is alive and relatively well presently, insofar as pleasure is the primary conception of the singular positive feeling, happiness being one of many subsumed under it. Right? Is that what you’re getting at? — Mww

No, I don't think happiness is one species of pleasure. Think of an exchange like this:

• Son: Having sex with prostitutes whenever I please gives me great pleasure.
• Father: But what about happiness? Will it make you happy?

That exchange is as meaningful now as it was 2500 years ago. This constant claim that our word "happiness" primarily means something superficial looks to be simply wrong.

This is a very interesting take, that I would like to explore more. — Bob Ross

:up:

I think you are right here: the firefighter’s duty would be to help put out fires and help people vacant the premises—not necessarily to save everyone. — Bob Ross

Yes, and that seems in line with what I found when looking at firefighter's oaths, i.e. "Protecting people."

So what about the man that watched that woman get kidnapped? It seems like your view leaves no room for moral obligation to help people outside of the strict, institutionalized sense of duty. — Bob Ross

• We must oppose all the immorality that we can.
• We must oppose all the immorality that we should.

On your "can" formulation we must help the woman being raped. What about on my "should" formulation? Is there a reason why we should help her aside from the simple fact that we can? I think so.

Aquinas addresses some of this in the complicated Question 79 of the Secunda Secundae, particularly in Article 1 (on the quasi-integral parts of justice) and Article 3 (on omission).

First:

In fact, wouldn’t it follow that—not only was the man permitted to just stand there and watch but—he was not permitted to stop it since, according to your Thomistic take, he has no jurisdiction to reprimand a fellow unwilling citizen? — Bob Ross

See, in the same Question:

Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.3.ad3

How does this pertain to justice, given that Aquinas is speaking in the context of a section of the Secunda Secundae devoted to justice?

I would point to this:

If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of "all virtue" [Cf. II-II:58:5]. And yet even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.

On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil. — Aquinas, ST II-II.79.1 - Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?

Given that an omission, strictly speaking, is a matter of justice and due (cf. ST II-II.79.3), and omitting aid to the rape victim is an omission of justice in this strict sense, then how is it that the victim is due aid? (If they are not due aid then helping them might be a nice thing to do, but it is not due to them as a kind of duty.)

For Aquinas there are two options. The aid could be due qua the specific virtue of justice, or it could be due according to justice taken in the general sense. If we want to go the route of the specific virtue of justice, then the good of aid must be due to them qua individual (e.g. commutatively). I wouldn't take that route. If we want to go the route of justice taken in a general sense, then the good of aid must be due to them in virtue of their relation to the community or God. I think we could go the route of the community and say that one is acting as a kind of unofficial police officer who has care of the common good. Similar to the way we might pick up litter for the sake of the community, we should also prevent overt injustices such as rape for the sake of the community. This is to assess the person's private good qua common good.

So the rape victim has a right which we must honor in view of their inclusion within our community. Is a person on the other side of the world a member of our community? Classically the answer is 'no', and to say 'yes' is to stretch the meaning of "community" unduly. But if one wants to say that they are a member of the human community and we have a duty to all members of the human community, then it could be said that a duty is owed to them, albeit the thinnest kind of duty.

And then there is the question of their relation to God, especially if we take a revealed aspect of God. This is where it gets tricky, because the Christian has a duty to the victim via God, and our society is by and large a Christian society (and therefore many of the cultural intuitions are Christian intuitions). Thus Aquinas speaks of mercy and beneficence in the context of supernatural charity (ST II-II.30 and II-II.31). For example:

Objection 1. It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.

Reply to Objection 1. Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the faithful. — Aquinas ST II-II.31.2.ad1 - Whether we ought to do good to all?

(Note that for Aristotle this is more straightforward, as we should be beneficent but beneficence is not due in justice.)

And:

I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.

Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways according to these various connections, because we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need. — Aquinas II-II.31.3 - Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us?

And on this principle it should be seen that, in effect, we have no real duties to random strangers on the other side of the world.

True enough. ↪Bob Ross and I understand the symbiosis on the one hand and the conceptual evolution on the other. — Mww

Or devolution? Either way, I think the distinction between pleasure and happiness is still alive in our contemporary lexicon, and it avoids these arguments about happiness vs. happiness.

Two is a false premise — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, but how so? What is a counterexample?

(And note that in following @J's argumentation I perhaps should have italicized "your". He is emphasizing personal gain or benefit.)

In general, it is better to be courageous than reckless or cowardly. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and I agree that our way of doing ethics now puts too much emphasis on exceptional cases, but Socrates' hemlock is still an interesting example. Socrates dies willingly. Fortune does not intervene in an unanticipated way. On the contrary, Socrates probably foresaw his end a long way off.

Plus, I feel like courage is the easiest one to make this sort of example for because it involves our response to danger. It's harder to think of common examples where it would be better to be profligate or avaricious, as opposed to generous, or either gluttonous/lustful or anhedonic/sterile as opposed to temperate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can think of some, but my argument is unique insofar as it involves death. If you could find another virtue that is capable of causing death you could run a similar argument.

My point is that it's the action we judge, not the pleasure derived from it. — Tom Storm

My point is that the prohibition of cocaine (or methamphetamine or whatever you like) has everything to do with the drug use, and that the pleasure is an integral part of that drug use. Your idea that the prohibition of cocaine has nothing to do with the pleasure cocaine provides is what is implausible. If cocaine didn't provide pleasure we wouldn't ban it, because no one would use it.

Whenever I hear this argument, I find it underwhelming. Parsing happiness into "the right kind" and "the wrong kind" seems both futile and subjective. — Tom Storm

Actually the idea that some pleasures are intense but empty strikes me as a unanimous idea in both ethics and psychology. I think it would be hard to find an author on ethics or psychology who does not admit this. In fact, if one denies this idea, then ethics as a science looks to be unnecessary.

For example, why do we prohibit cocaine as a society? Because it is a base pleasure that deprives individuals and groups of deeper fulfillment.

So I’m driving along, in this cool-as-hell ‘67 Cobra, hair flyin’, head-bangin’ to some classic Foghat turned up to 11….happy as a pig in an overturned hotel restaurant dumpster. — Mww

Aristotle would call this pleasure.

To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some reason) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life-that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some reason for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.v, tr. W. D. Ross

(This is quite similar to the discussion @Count Timothy von Icarus and @J are having elsewhere.)

E.g., a firefighter must save all people from burning buildings irregardless of if they feel like it, but they are not violating that duty meaningfully by saving as many as they can if they cannot save everyone. — Bob Ross

We could rephrase my argument for the firefighter:

If one were bound to save every person from fire then they would be bound to do the impossible; but no one is bound to do the impossible; therefore no one is bound to save every person from fire.

You say that a firefighter is bound to save every person from burning buildings. I don't think that is right, and I don't think you will find that idea in a firefighting oath.

Yes, I am not arguing that we must oppose immorality that is out of our power to oppose: I am arguing that, all else being equal, a moral agent opposes all immorality that they can. — Bob Ross

Is a firefighter bound to save every person from fire that he can? No, and although this may sound pedantic, firefighters work on teams, and that means that they are supposed to share the load. This means that a firefighter might be rebuked by his captain for trying to save someone (because it is not always appropriate for him to try to save someone, even when he can).

With regard to common citizens, I don't think a moral agent should "oppose all the immorality that they can." I think they should oppose all the immorality that they should. "Can" is obviously a very loaded word. Let's return to Aquinas' quote:

Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.2

And especially objection 3 and its response:

Objection 3. Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (II-II:32:2). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. — Aquinas, ST II-II.65.2

The question here is whether there are reserved forms of correction. Aquinas thinks there are, and that "chastisement by blows" is one of them.

My claim is that the same distinction regarding jurisdiction applies to nations and cultures. "It is lawful for any nation to impart correction to a willing nation, but to impart it to an unwilling nation belongs to those only who have charge over it."

And then there is the deeper question of open coercion, which applies to things like war. Given the United States' military prowess, it can oppose a great deal of immorality. But I don't think it should, because I don't think it has a duty to do whatever it can.

You often raise this strawman. I don't see anyone thinking that Hitler self-consciously believed himself to be evil. The example of Hitler is often raised for the opposite reason: the self-righteous are not always righteous.

The shooter should spend the rest of his life in jail, but anyone losing sleep over this CEO being gunned down? — RogueAI

That is prima facie contradictory. "This crime deserves a maximum sentence, and also we shouldn't lose any sleep over crimes like this."

I am always amazed at how much attention a suggestion gets. Reading Groups is only slightly different from Primary Sources, and it has the great benefit of already existing, so I think my request has already been met.

There is one consideration for any future forum that affects both Reading Groups and Primary Sources. It is the exclusive nature of a thread, where it must belong to only one category. In systems where categories run on a tagging mechanism, a thread on Plato's Republic could belong to both the Reading Group category and the Political Philosophy category. This could be helpful for combining different categorization schemas. It could also be confusing if posters perusing the Political Philosophy category do not recognize that this Political Philosophy thread is also a Reading Group.

- So do you see it as a mistake to make Reading Groups a category? Would it have instead been better for individuals to simply post individual reading-group threads?

However, it means: "it is to your benefit to be courageous, temperate, prudent, generous, patient, honest, friendly, modest, loving, witty, etc." and "it is better for you to live with people who have these virtues," and "it is better to live in societies that embody and instill these virtues." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here is the counterargument:

1. It is always to your benefit to be courageous. (Supposition)
2. It is never to your benefit to die.
3. Some courageous acts get you killed.
4. Therefore, (1) is false. (Via reductio)

And @J has the same puzzle:

• Socrates was right to drink the hemlock. (Supposition)
• But it is never right to die.
• Therefore, Socrates was not right to drink the hemlock.

I don't see how such a position doesn't require the presupposition that "benefit" means something like "egoistic pursuit of one's own pleasure," or something similar. Good luck building an ethics on that assumption, and good luck justifying it, given how many examples there are of people being ruined by such egoistic pursuits. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is part and parcel of the incoherence of Kantian ethics: right action absent motivation (because all motivation is selfish). @J keeps dancing around that without actually defending it. If he would actually defend his own Kantian position this could be a productive exchange.

Kantian ethics in a nutshell:

1. If something is done for a reason then it isn't moral.
2. Therefore all moral acts are done for no reason.

(The modern egoist uses the same premises, only denying the existence of moral acts.)

And J's argument:

• Suppose (1) is false.
• What reason does Socrates have to drink the hemlock?
• Socrates' act is "right" without being "good." It is an act without a reason, without a motivation, without an intended good/benefit. Reasonable acts are always susceptible to selfishness, and moral acts are not susceptible to selfishness.

---

If we follow J's version of Kant, then it would seem that Kant agrees that Socrates made the correct decision, but he can't figure out how that would be true given the ethical options available to him, so he tries to draw up something new. Kant's ethics makes most sense when considering these acts of extreme virtue or sacrifice.

For example:

I would greatly like to know if there is a Greek word that discriminates here, allowing "beneficial" to break off into these two senses -- roughly, the benefit of personal goods and the benefit of acting well. — J

• Socrates did what was right even though it was not desirable.
• Therefore not everything we should do is desirable.
• Therefore there must be some category of choiceworthy-but-not-desirable.

For the Greeks the kalos is desirable but not base, and it retains its value even in cases of martyrdom. @Count Timothy von Icarus is right when he says that reducing all desirable objects to the base or selfish is the error. Kant seeks a guarantee on the moral character of an act, and that is the problem. It is a bit like trying to guarantee that you avoid gluttony by only eating food that tastes bad. Or more specifically, specifying sensuous taste as a non-moral category.

There is no deeper metaphysics. We say things, we write things, we sign things. There's no need to overthink this. — Michael

That's the avoidance of an answer and the avoidance of philosophy.

• Let's talk about what truth-bearers are.
• Michael: Impossible!

Again, philosophers have been talking about the status of truth-bearers for thousands of years. This is a pretty standard topic, and most everyone responding to you is critical along similar lines, including myself, frank, fdrake, Apustimelogist, and Srap.

- Yep. :up:

- And half of it about that one. :smile:

Methodologically, I think a lot of this comes back to this:

Do any devil's advocate questions demand answers?

On a philosophy forum the question of the OP should probably be phrased, "Why ought one do anything at all?" Or, "Why ought one do any one thing rather than any other thing?"

At that point we can whittle the contributors down to two groups: those who recognize that some things ought to be done, and those who won't. I'd say that only the first group is worth hearing. (And we could have another thread for the second group, which shows that anyone who does things believes that things should be done.)

At that point everyone in the first group can contribute to a productive conversation given the common premise that some things ought be done. — Leontiskos

Which is an example of what I said here:

I like some of the late Thomas Hopko's ideas on this, who I believe was in your Church. One paraphrase is in my bio, "Don't label him; say he's wrong. And don't just say he's wrong; say why. And don't just say why; say what you think is right." — Leontiskos

When people on TPF and elsewhere contradict others for pages on end without giving any alternative account of their own, they are engaged in a dubious practice.

I argued that truth cannot exist without minds. You adapted that by replacing "minds" with "sentences." But then when you were pressed on what a sentence or a linguistic entity is, metaphysically speaking, you threw up your hands as if there is nothing to talk about. And 's response was both witty and important. If you think you get to appeal to "common sense" without any further explanation, then why do you think everyone else has to go further?

- Good points. I was essentially thinking of a space where everyone is mutually on board with paying attention to primary sources, whether or not any strict rules are in place. "Reading groups" seem fairly close to that.

- Yes, I suppose that's pretty much the same thing. :up:

I was assuming that if something is immoral than, ceteris paribus, one would think it should not be done; which, to me, implies some degree of duty merely by acknowledging that. Of course, you are denying the binding of a moral agent to stopping immorality simpliciter; since one may not have a duty, under your view, to stop it even though it is immoral. — Bob Ross

That's right. I don't think that just because something is immoral I therefore have a duty to stop or prevent it. If that were true then I would have a duty to stop every immoral act I have knowledge of, which would be impossible.

If so, then please, if you don't mind, elaborate why or how one could justify doing nothing in this situation; and, more generally, how a moral agent is not bound, qua moral agency, to stop immoral acts all else being equal. — Bob Ross

Let's grant that one has a moral duty to help the woman being raped, even if they do not have a legal duty (and I have never said otherwise). How does your conclusion follow that we have a duty to prevent every immoral act we have knowledge of? I don't think it follows at all.

and, more generally, how a moral agent is not bound, qua moral agency, to stop immoral acts all else being equal. — Bob Ross

If I were bound to stop all immoral acts then I would be bound to do the impossible (by stopping every immoral act I have knowledge of); but no one is bound to do the impossible; therefore I am not bound to stop all immoral acts.

I don't know that your idea of "being bound ceteris paribus" is ultimately coherent. Being "bound" implies necessity, whereas "ceteris paribus" implies non-necessity.

Put differently, if we want to say that we should oppose the immorality that is within our power and competence to oppose, then we have actually contradicted the thesis that we are bound to oppose all immorality we have knowledge of (at least on the presupposition that we have knowledge of immorality that is beyond our power or competence to oppose).

Here is the point of origin for the discussion:

It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara. — Banno

It turns into this: If minds (or else truth-bearers) do not exist, does truth exist? The idea is that the state of affairs is left intact. The focus is on the mind or truth-bearer. You yourself hone in on this exact same thing:

C3. Therefore, if the sentence "there is gold in those hills" does not exist then there is no gold in those hills. — Michael

...you were literally presenting arguments about the existence of sentences, so it is not realistic for you to go on to deny that the metaphysical status of truth-bearers is irrelevant.

(And of course you were presenting this argument as a sort of dilemma for Banno, not for your own position, but the metaphysical status of truth-bearers is nevertheless central to the discussion.)

Metaphysics concerns the nature of truth makers, not truth bearers. — Michael

This whole discussion is directly related to the metaphysical status of truth bearers, and this has been an important question throughout the history of philosophy. Your simple appeal to the idea that truth bearers are linguistic just shuffles the central issues under the rug instead of furthering the investigation.

Sorry, I forgot about this.

I think moral and legal standing are different: the latter is a practical attempt at justice for the community, whereas the former can surpass that sphere of jurisdiction. — Bob Ross

They are the same insofar as moral standing is not infinite. Not everything is our responsibility to rectify.

To deny this, by my lights, is to accept that nothing immoral is happening — Bob Ross

Why? If I don't have a claim to prevent something, then that something cannot be immoral? This is obviously not true in law.

Usually, when we note that a person doesn’t have “duty” to enact justice for another; we tend to be saying that as a pragmatic rule of thumb for two reasons: the first being that it tends to be handled more appropriately by those that are of an institution designed to handle it (e.g., police, first responders, etc.), and secondly because imposing that justice usually has sufficiently negative consequences to the avenger that we would not blame them for avoiding avenging or stopping the attack in the first place.

However, I do think it is commonly accepted that if the negative consequences are sufficiently trivial, that it is immoral to do nothing. — Bob Ross

But what about the first reason you gave? That there are those with a duty? If something is happening on the other side of the world, then the duty generally falls to those who live there.

The problem I have with this line of thinking is that, in principle, we can wipe our hands clean when we avoid doing just things because they are outside of our jurisdiction—jurisdiction is just a pragmatic notion to enact justice. — Bob Ross

I think we both know that the answer to my question is, "No." Or at least, "Generally not."

We are not responsible for everything. That's a fairly important moral and psychological principle, and one that we really struggle with in the West. Your slippery slope concern does not invalidate it.