Hard to parse that, but you're apparently claiming that the meaningfulness of arguments is what makes a definition meaningful. — noAxioms

So in the first place it's a straightforward biconditional, and should be parsed as such:

"The term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful."

And how does one oppose a biconditional? The same basic way they oppose a conditional: by providing a counterexample of one side obtaining without the other.

Not sure if I can agree — noAxioms

And so if you want to disagree you have to provide that counterexample. You can either show how the term could be meaningful even if arguments over the meaning of existence are not meaningful, or you could show how arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful even if the term is not meaningful.

This is also what @J is required to do if he wishes to answer objections to his claims.

It’s exactly consistent with the ethos of the forum — Mikie

I find 's point more persuasive than your assertion.

and actually saves moderators time. — Mikie

I find 's post more persuasive than your assertion.

-

More evidence continues to emerge from eyewitnesses about the actual events and procedures surrounding January 6. More and more it looks like Hochschild's direct contacts were more reliable than mainstream outlets.

...to be continued — Wayfarer

I think this is a helpful and concise outline of your project, Wayfarer. :up:

In general, though, I am always left with the question of what exactly your thesis is. I would like something clear, like, "Scientism says X, but I say ~X," or, "I say X and Scientism would altogether disagree with me."

Because very often it seems that we are left with a wide-ranging modus tollens. For example:

1. If X is true, then "we ourselves are not part of [the truth we know]."
2. But that can't be right.
3. Therefore, X must be false.

X could be Scientism, or Realism, or some variety of Objectivism; but whatever it is, this overarching argument rebukes it. Now this isn't actually such a bad argument, but most all of your opponents are going to reject (1). I think the key is therefore to find an X such that a proponent of X would not reject (1). On my view this would be a thinker who says that humans are capable of objective knowledge despite the fact that humans possess no special capacity to know truth (e.g. some varieties of eliminative materialism). More simply: that humans are capable of objective knowledge and are no qualitatively different than the lower animals. More generally: that humans are capable of objective knowledge and yet are themselves opaque to investigation. This niche is where I agree with your project, but I disagree when you go farther and make X = Realism.

Let me add that the reason it is not a bad argument is because (2) is persuasive, namely because self-knowledge should be epistemically accessible. But it is worth adding at the same time that self-knowledge is also difficult and elusive, and therefore the fact that X abandons the difficult task is in some ways understandable.

I like the idea of a to this issue, but one-off requests that lack overall consistency with the ethos of the forum, and which create lots of extra work for moderators do not seem like a great option. At some point you're looking for a think tank rather than a philosophy forum.

Do you guys think the thread suggested demands an acceptance that one's ideology is the only one worth having, or do you distinguish it from this rule? — Hanover

This is the right question. :up:

Positions on climate change are ideological. The TPF taboos are also ideological, but whereas a taboo against Holocaust denial is ideological, there are significant differences in the international Overton window with respect to these two issues. I don't see how an international website should impose local taboos on an international user base.

(Note that words like 'ideology' and 'taboo' are here being used in a technical, non-pejorative sense.)

I had to look that one up — noAxioms

The Possibilism-Actualism Debate | SEP

Could you provide links to the resources you consulted before writing your OP? I'm trying to understand where you are coming from.

So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms

I'm not convinced that self-contradiction is a great way to look at it, given that Meinong and his opponents are not usually accused of self-contradiction. A better approach to disputed questions would probably be to present rationale and arguments pro and con, Medieval style.

- Okay. I shouldn't have assumed.

The thesis <There is a living NWR presence on our Earth at some implied moment in time>, which leverages a specific definition of 'exists', and there plenty of alternative definitions, as you seem to point out. So I left the word out of my version of the thesis statement. — noAxioms

So do you agree with my claim that the term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful? I assume we agree that by removing the word “exists” you did not remove the concept of existence from the proposition.

I picked a position where predication does not require existence (with 'exists' not clearly defined). I am looking for a contradiction arising from that premise, a contradiction that does not beg the principle that such cannot be the case. — noAxioms

I agree with you. I don’t think Quinian Actualism is defensible. I haven’t seen anyone who promotes that view other than @J, and I haven't seen him offer real arguments for his position.

The obvious answer being 'yes', so I instinctively look for some definition that allows them to exist in the same way. Both are arguably mental assessments. That's a similarity, but the former is arguably not just that, so I still fail. — noAxioms

Sure, but I would want to remember that we can always think of a definition of "exists" in which that proposition is made either true or false. But if our definitions are arbitrary then it makes no difference, and this seems to prove that not all definitions are on a par. For an example of an arbitrary definition, we could say that "exists" means "able to be conceived," on which definition it is false that <Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist> (given that both are able to be conceived). But again, arbitrary definitions are of no help in resolving real questions.

The thing I'd want most is for people to be able to state a reason why posts are reported. — fdrake

That’s a fairly modest request. :sweat:

In general I think part of the essence of a moderator is the possession of coercive force. Because the average Plush moderator can only delete a post or a thread, their ability to wield coercive force is highly limited, and hence their authority is also quite limited.

As much as this would help remove perceived trolls from discussions, it would also act as a vehicle for trolling. — fdrake

I definitely think the forming of cliques could become a problem, and perhaps also a kind of indirect trolling. I think you would need rules such as, “No quoting or referencing users who are not permitted to post in the thread.” But enforcing that would of course introduce new moderation costs.

For me a philosophy forum is in essence a place where I can go to create or enter a thread on a philosophical topic and earnestly engage with other users on that topic. The feature I proposed would allow one to do such a thing. Bad actors could not derail threads, even if they could still troll from afar. This is but another modest goal, and the feature requires no immediate moderation. To give one prominent example, currently on TPF there is so much anti-religious trolling that a user who wants to create a religious thread is effectively prevented from doing so. The effort would be futile.

On my view if someone wants to have an earnest philosophical discussion, and they have the power to invite others who are interested in the same goal and exclude those who undermine that goal, then earnest philosophical discussions will occur. This is exactly why many of us prefer private message groups or real life groups over conversations in the trollspaces.

I think it's better to ignore sub-discussions that aren't to your interest. — fdrake

In the real-world parallel this would be like saying that one should just ignore the protesters who are yelling during the meeting. It’s possible in theory but not in practice. Granted, the ignore extension is great, and almost every user responds appropriately to being ignored, namely by slowly ceasing to engage with the person who is not responding to them. (Although I agree with you that a native Plush ignore feature would be better.)

The problem of limited moderation is a general problem that the internet needs to think harder about. There are all sorts of societal precedents. A simple one is the very concept of “disturbing the peace,” which is basically, “Conduct and self-moderate your behavior appropriately or else you receive a vague, general, and low-moderation-cost infraction.” A more complex one from older legal systems is, “If you bring a facetious suit against someone, you pay the price you intended to inflict.” Or in forum language, “If you don’t have a damn good reason to report a post, you will be punished for creating an undue burden on the moderators.”* In my proto-forum I drew up a rule where users who make petty reports would simply lose their ability to report posts. Those sorts of rules are intended to protect the moderators’ time, and they are intended to sustain systems with limited legal/moderation resources.

If TPF moves onto a newer forum system I would be happy to help write open source plugins that aim to achieve a lighter moderator load. Indeed, if I host my own forum the software will be chosen primarily according to its ability to leverage user plugins and foster healthy internet environments that are more effective for users and especially moderators. Large forum softwares like Discourse or NodeBB have a large number of contributing developers who can collaboratively spit out features like this at the drop of a dime. Anyway, the point here is that moderator burnout should not be inevitable.

Do you have any thoughts on ways to lighten moderator load to avoid burnout or disillusionment?

* Incidentally, anonymous post-flagging strikes me as an insanely bad feature.

mispost

I think it works well when the teachers are properly trained and prepared, but the danger comes when success is seen in the ideal circumstances, and then those who unprepared jump on the bandwagon. Ideally what needs to happen is that classical teaching approaches need to be integrated into more colleges and universities that offer degrees in K-12 education. An interesting development.

That I can answer with 'no'. Yes, there might be a truth (maybe), but if there is one, is there a way to determine it? I think not since multiple valid interpretations will always be avaliable. The best appeal one can make is to logical consistency and simplicity. — noAxioms

<Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist>

Does that proposition have no truth value? @noAxioms? @J?

In philosophy it is common to confuse oneself by conflating something that is not obvious with something that is impossible. When two philosophers offer two different accounts of existence, it is hard to discern who is correct (if anyone). But if you take from that the idea that no existence claims are truth-apt, then I think you have fallen into all sorts of absurdities.

• "The Northern White Rhino exists."
• "Numbers do not exist in the same way that tables exist."
• "Jimmy Carter no longer exists."

Moving from what is not obvious to a generalization of the impossible would commit us to the absurd claims that these propositions are not truth-apt. It's a bit like saying, "The Riemann Hypothesis has no obvious truth value, therefore mathematical claims are not truth-apt, therefore 2+2=4 is not truth-apt."

(What is likely happening is a form of Empiricism which only permits a narrow form of justification. But those forms of Empiricism are reliably self-defeating. Just because two people are arguing doesn't mean neither one is right.)

- I gave two in the post above with this quote. Click to the thread and links will be included:

If that is right, you may be interested in Gyula Klima's "Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism," where he compares a Kripkean formulation of essentialism to an Aristotelian formulation of essentialism, and includes formal semantics for signification and supposition, which involves the notion of inherence. Paul Vincent Spade also has an informal piece digging into the metaphysical differences between the two conceptions, "The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on Some Big Themes." — Leontiskos

David Oderberg also writes a fair bit on this topic, e.g. "How to Win Essence Back from Essentialists." Banno also has an old thread on a paper of Kit Fine's, which I believe to be too conservative.

Edit: Banno's claim that the Medievals lacked a "modal first order language" betrays a very curious form of ignorance. At bottom is the fact that Medievals were explicitly uncomfortable separating natural language from logic in the way that someone like Frege, Russell, or Quine was wont to do, and therefore they did not arrive at artificial constructs like possible worlds semantics. Such artificial constructs (and their weaknesses) flow from the idea that logic and natural language can be separated. To take one example, modal logic was highly developed by the late Medieval period, but it was not reified into rigidly formal constructs. Cf. "Natural Logic, Medieval Logic and Formal Semantics."

- This thread is obviously an extension of your anti-Medieval tack from my thread on St. Anselm's Proof. An anti-Medieval tack is not problematic in itself, but it needs to be more than posturing. Here is what you said in your penultimate post from that thread:

Again, possible world semantics shows us were we have been led astray. — Banno

If you think that possible world semantics solves some problem that the Medievals could not solve without it, then you have to set out the problem, their solution, and the alternative possible worlds solution. Or as Bongo said in response:

but we can be much clearer here using modal first order language than was possible in medieval times. — Banno

How does possible world semantics restore coherence in the face of referential opacity?

Asking for a friend. — bongo fury

Now it is fairly well established that Quine's understanding of Aristotelian essentialism was highly superficial. But you are welcome to try to do the work that Quine failed to do: set out a robust and well-referenced account of the solution that you find lackluster, and then show how your own possible worlds solution is supposed to be an improvement. As Bongo alludes to, I don't recall Quine seeing possible worlds semantics as being especially promising or advancing. Ironically, much of the recent neo-Aristotelianism flows from a growing dissatisfaction with the artificiality of possible worlds semantics. We are slowly correcting modern errors, first with Kripke's modal form of essentialism, and then moving with Fine and Klima towards more traditional and robust forms of essentialism, that do not rely on the overrated device of possible worlds. You seem to be stuck in positivistic decades that have been largely superseded by a hearkening back to richer philosophical traditions.

-

Quine occupies a curious position in the history of philosophy, with antecedents in Pragmatism but with sympathies very similar to the linguistic philosophy of Russell and Wittgenstein, and an attitude not so far from that of the Vienna Circle. — Banno

No, not the history of philosophy, but rather the history of 20th century Anglo philosophy. Again, one must read books written before 1900 if they are to make claims about the history of philosophy, and this very recent tradition you are immersed in is virtually unknown outside of the English-speaking world. If you have no knowledge of Medieval philosophy it's hard to understand why you make so many claims about it. It's a bit like the cat-lover who has never seen a dog and yet goes around telling everyone how much bigger and better cats are than dogs.

- Yes, that seems fairly accurate to me. :up:

The takeaway is that parasitic reference is possible, that it is based on an intentional theory of reference, that it is different from modern conceptions such as Kripke's, that it helps resolve some of the disputes about possibilism, etc.

- I should point out that your OP is very much related to my recent reading group on parasitic reference, which offers one kind of alternative to Meinong's theory, namely a medieval alternative (i.e. "ampliation"). See also Lukáš Novák's, "Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?"

That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? — J

Suppose two scientists are arguing over whether the Northern White Rhino still exists (which is at least an endangered species). The thesis in question is <The Northern White Rhino exists>.

Now is the term "exists" meaningful within that thesis-proposition? Because I would contend that such a term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful. Specifically, if you want to say that an argument over the meaning of existence is not meaningful or substantial or truth-apt, then I would contend that you must also say that the term "exists" as found within the scientific thesis is unmeaningful.

But perhaps the deeper issue here is your hangup with "metaphysical superglue," as if truth could apply to a term and not a proposition. Term-tokens do not have inherent meaning or truth, and the term-token e-x-i-s-t-e-n-c-e is no exception.

And, clearly, I'm doubtful if my wish can be granted. — J

The difficulty is that you don't seem to be asking a meaningful question at all. Even your claim that some recommendation can be "sensible" and yet "nothing can be said in its favor" looks to lack coherence. I grant your claim that "X exists" is different from "X is a table," but I'm not sure what that claim is supposed to prove.

- Yes, "derailment for thee but not for me." But it's good to know that no one takes your historical claims seriously. Try reading a book written before the 20th century. It will help you understand your very limited and naive perspective.

Can we please have mod attention to this persistent failure on Leon's part to address the topic at hand, and to indulge in personal insults directed at me? — Banno

They should also go back and address all the crap that Banno littered my thread with.

- Thanks for your service, fdrake. :up:

As you might imagine, I was thinking about the problem of creating a moderation-light forum approach even before you resigned. In general I think Vanilla/Plush is too outdated, and provides the mods with too little leverage to do their job. The ban-or-nothing consequence structure naturally creates a laissez-faire environment. This is the note I jotted down when musing on the question:

It would seem that real life interactions are opt in, not opt out, and that this makes a large part of the difference on internet forums. At least, it is that part of the difference that can actually be managed. So what if on a discussion forum, the person creating the thread had the ability to allow only a specific set of people to comment within the thread. This could be combined with an invitation system in which people could ask permission to be invited into the thread. Uninvitations would not be allowed, except perhaps in rare circumstances. This would create an environment in which those who don’t play nice would not be invited to play at all, and yet which would not need to avoid the anonymous nature of the internet.

Something like this would be one attempt to create a self-managing community which better reflects the way the real world works. The troll who has too much time on their hands and goes around derailing thread after thread is simply not invited to participate in threads by those who make them. This is an example of a feature that could drastically cut down on moderation costs, and also lead to healthier communities where bad actors are naturally disincentivized. Ideally it would help combat the way in which the internet has become a natural home for the anonymous, parasitic rabble-rouser.

In real life it is not taken for granted that someone is worth talking to, or that someone possesses the social competence to be invited into a discussion. Why not extend that to internet forums? Why not create an internal incentive for users to maintain an appreciable level of post quality and social quality?

Banno pretends to talk about things he does not understand, such as the de re/de dicto distinction:

To a large extent this is a modern version of the de re/de dicto distinction. — Banno

But:

I'm not too up on the de dicto/de re distinction — Banno

Or Aristotelian logic:

Aristotelian essentialism apparently does not differentiate analyticity from possibility. — Banno

Or Medieval philosophy:

but we can be much clearer here using modal first order language than was possible in medieval times. — Banno

---

How does possible world semantics restore coherence in the face of referential opacity? — bongo fury

A good question.

---

It appears that the modal logic that Quine was addressing was mostly that prior to what we might be using now. And much, much clearer than Medieval modal logic. — Banno

Quine was as ignorant of Medieval logic as you are. He is not responding to it.

Aristotelian essentialism apparently does not differentiate analyticity from possibility. — Banno

Good resources showing that Aristotelian essentialism is more robust than anything the moderns have stumbled upon are as follows:

If that is right, you may be interested in Gyula Klima's "Contemporary 'Essentialism' vs. Aristotelian Essentialism," where he compares a Kripkean formulation of essentialism to an Aristotelian formulation of essentialism, and includes formal semantics for signification and supposition, which involves the notion of inherence. Paul Vincent Spade also has an informal piece digging into the metaphysical differences between the two conceptions, "The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on Some Big Themes."

Note that Banno's whole logical horizon is bound up with the bare particulars of predicate logic, so I'm not sure it is possible to easily convey an alternative semantics to someone who who has never been exposed to an alternative paradigm. — Leontiskos

Klima spends more time with Kripke and Spade more time with Quine. It's no coincidence that those who do not know the past do not progress beyond it.

Instead, as an atheist, I would deny premise FTI10: It's true that the Big Bang happened, but it's false that God caused it. — Arcane Sandwich

But there is no premise that the Big Bang happened, is there? And FTI11's "If so" is very strange, for it means, < If (If the Big Bang happened, then God caused it) then (if it is a revealed truth that Jesus is God, then Jesus caused the Big Bang) >. And this means that FTI12 is not sufficient for the modus ponens of FTI13.

But we could supply tacit premises that resolve some of this. My question is this: is FTI10 the weakest premise for the atheist? I think the weakest premise for the atheist is FTI12.

I see this argument as unpersuasive, but my difficulty with it is the same difficulty that appears elsewhere, namely the exclusion of the Trinity. That Jesus is divine does not bring with it the conclusion that whatever God does, Jesus does, for God (the Father) begat the Son and yet Jesus did not beget the Son. Further, Jesus was not remotely born when the Big Bang occurred, so how could he have caused it? We could argue that the Son is the Word through which all things were created, but I don't see why a Christian would want to pursue such arguments against an atheist who does not even believe in God at all.

You asked why Christians never argue for Jesus' divinity. I pointed out that they do. But it isn't a great surprise that you are not aware of those arguments. For why would a Christian try to convince someone that Jesus is divine if that person doesn't even believe that God exists? It would be putting the cart before the horse, especially in today's historically critical age.

(Note that the reason Lemaître thought the Big Bang had theological implications was because it so closely paralleled creatio ex nihilo, a revealed doctrine. And note that atheists and non-theists such as Einstein were highly prejudiced against Lemaître's findings because of this same theological reason. Given then that FTI10 was so widely accepted by Christians and non-Christians alike, it must have a fair amount of plausibility. Einstein's reaction was that FTI10 is plausible but the Big Bang could never have occurred, and that there must be something wrong with Lemaître's physics. Ergo: "God did not cause it, therefore it never happened.")

(Out for awhile.)

- This is a good post, but it strikes me as too strongly opposing rationality and signs. I think you are right that argument and rationality are overemphasized in our time, but as I see it the Bible and the tradition present faith and reason as an antinomy. Or in other words, I don't think there is a clear case to be made for the primacy of the will over the primacy of the intellect, as if the will must be regenerated before and independently of the intellect. Still, insofar as our age overemphasizes intellect, an emphasis on the will is meet.

To take but one example, "blindness" to signs is simultaneously an intellectual defect and a volitional defect. Additionally, that some abuse signs does not mean that others do not properly use them, and the Bible is filled with both types. There is even serpentine Ahaz who refuses to ask for a sign for all the wrong reasons, and this captures the way that intellect and will are all mixed together.

(Note though that a sign is altogether different from a demonstration in Aristotle's sense.)

- Thanks for that interesting quote.

It seems like your main objection to the OP is of a methodological nature — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, that's right, in particular the method necessary in order for a true dialogue to take place. Let me say a bit more regarding methodology, because I think it undergirds the metaphysics.

(FTI7) If hyper-Chaos exists, then it's possible that Jesus is God.
(FTI8) Hyper-Chaos exists.
(FTI9) So, it's possible that Jesus is God.

...

(ATI7) If hyper-Chaos does not exist, then it's not possible that Jesus is God.
(ATI8) Hyper-Chaos does not exist.
(ATI9) So, it's not possible that Jesus is God. — Arcane Sandwich

So this is another symmetrical pair of arguments. Note that when two or more people are considering a topic, they will first consider a thesis such as God's existence, and then they will consider an argument for or against that thesis. At that point the discussion must shift to be about the argument and its validity or soundness, not the thesis per se. If one person gives an argument for a conclusion and the second person gives a different argument for the contrary of that conclusion, then they end up talking past each other as I noted in my last post to you. What the second person must instead do is address the argument itself so that the two are talking about the same thing.

The only time I would want to present two diametrically opposed arguments is to say, "Here are two arguments, which do you find more persuasive?" But we should only do this with real, organic arguments; and arguments which are real and organic will hardly ever be mirror opposites. This sort of mirror opposition creates an a priori gulf between the interlocutors, where all common ground and agreement is denied. Without some common ground between interlocutors argument is not possible.

Perhaps to Leontiskos's surprise, I'm not sure if I should accept this non-Christian argument or not. Is it true that it's impossible that Jesus is god, as the conclusion ATI9 says? I'm not sure. — Arcane Sandwich

Relatedly, I don't think this is the right way to assess arguments. We shouldn't look at the conclusion in order to see whether to accept an argument, for such a thing constitutes post hoc rationalization. If we want to take an argument seriously then we must look at the premises, see if they are true, and then see if the inferences from the premises are valid. The conclusion is an after-thought to the analysis of an argument, in that it should not be assessed in isolation from the argument that supports it.

As for myself, I deny premise FTI8: hyper-Chaos does not exist. — Arcane Sandwich

The other difficulty I see is that "hyper-chaos" is more opaque to the average person than God is, and what this means is that your premises are more opaque than your conclusion (and therefore we are failing to move from what is better-known to what is lesser-known). Now perhaps you have an argument elsewhere where the premise(s) are defended, but as I said in my last, the defense of premises is central to an argument. The premises of a three-step argument will tend to be in need of ample support.

I don't have time to move beyond methodological considerations, but in general I think it is helpful when one gives arguments they really believe and that they are really willing to defend. This is related to my thread, "Argument as Transparency."

I am interested in what do we learn from this argument? What is now known or made clearer? — Fire Ologist

may be trying to convey the same idea, namely the difference between arguments and "arguments."

---

- :up:

And another way to critique your FTI1 is to say that essentially no one believes it. At least I don't know of any group that believes God is necessarily identical to Jesus (even ignoring the problematic Trinitarian theology here). Christians themselves do not generally claim that the Incarnation was theologically necessary. Or else think about the fact that everyone without exception would agree that FTI1 was false before Jesus was born, and that if God existed before Jesus of Nazareth was born then strict identity cannot obtain. — Leontiskos

(Note that in the original argument it is FTI1 that denies the antecedent of ATI1, and is hence implausible.)

Hmm, I get trying to mirror the Christian argument — Count Timothy von Icarus

As for me, I don't understand the emphasis on symmetry. ATI4 is the fallacy of denying the antecedent with respect to FTI4. Of course one could set out ATI4 and ATI5, argue for them independently, and achieve a reasonable argument, but I don't see any atheist who would want to make that argument. In fact ATI4 seems uncontroversially false, given that things can be true without being revealed.

I don't see why @Arcane Sandwich keeps giving two contrasting modus ponens arguments, each with a mirrored conditional premise. In a true modus ponens, to argue from a mirrored conditional is just to deny the antecedent. Arcane seems to have biconditionals in mind, given the way that he does not see the conditional premises as controversial. So his arguments all look like this:

1. p ↔ q
2. p (theist's premise)
3. ~p (atheist's premise)
4. ∴q (theist's conclusion)
5. ∴~q (atheist's conclusion)

Now if one likes symmetry then one will like this approach, but unfortunately real arguments are almost never symmetrical in this way. Thus my critique always holds of this sort of symmetry–chasing, namely the critique that, "No one believes that," i.e. no one believes the conditional which is artificially constructed to aid the denial of the antecedent.* Drawing out the biconditional like this helps show why the logic quickly becomes so goofy, for those giving a modus ponens will almost always deny that their conditional premise is biconditional.

In real life a modus ponens gets mirrored by the contrasting modus tollens, not by an artificial conditional which allows one to deny the antecedent. To then go a step further, the deeper mistake here is the idea that one can quickly set out two arguments which will provide equal representation for the theist and the atheist. Such inevitably produces a faux equal representation. In my opinion, if one wants to delve into questions of theism or atheism, then one needs to produce an argument for one position or the other. This then brings us to the deepest critique: one cannot give simplistic "arguments" without defending one's premises (i.e. We should not be forced to surmise what people might argue. Rather, posters should be giving real arguments.)

In any case, this sort of symmetry does not represent the way real arguments work. In the real world where counter arguments are produced by ricochet, this sort of symmetry only occurs when interlocutors are falling into fallacies, such as the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Note well how there are no overlapping premises. The theist and the atheist are basically talking past each other.

* And if we ask the question, "Why did you write this proposition which no one believes?," I think the answer is simply, "Because it's the opposite." ATI4 is the opposite of FTI4 and FTI1 is the opposite of ATI1. ATI4 and FTI1 have no intrinsic plausibility; they are merely the mirror opposites of the conditional premise of two real arguments, and they are written because there is some desire to have symmetrical opposites.

---

To say a bit more, a proof for God's existence will tend to rely on a definition or a quasi definition of God, and this is amenable to a biconditional. But an argument for Jesus' divinity will tend to rely on the idea that Jesus fulfills some condition which is unique to a divine being, and this will be much less amenable to a biconditional given the fact that such an empirical condition will rarely constitute a sine qua non. This is all the more true when we are talking about a revelation, which involves a measure of contingency by its very nature (i.e. FTI4 is not biconditional, and therefore ATI4 does not obtain. If FTI4 were biconditional then it would constitute a necessary truth and not a revealed truth, or at the very least it would represent a theological claim that Arcane is certainly not intending to make.).

- Well here's a good rule of thumb: if the article you are reading says hardly anything at all about the reasons why some decision is being made, then it's probably not objective reporting. If the only motive a story provides for why Trump, Musk, or Rubio are doing what they are doing is that they are evil dictators bent on world domination, then part of the story might be missing.

All of that talk about 'integrity' is a lie and a cover for the actual reality of what happened, which was a violent insurrection aimed at subverting a legal election. — Wayfarer

Hochschild again:

Who attempts to overthrow a government without weapons? Why would the alleged leader of an insurrection authorize military force to protect the government, and why would the alleged insurrection victims countermand that authorization? How do people who listen to speeches about democratic procedures and election integrity in one location transform into enemies of the Constitution after walking a mile and a half to the east? Who believes that interrupting a vote would overturn a government? If there was an attempted insurrection, why would a notoriously creative and aggressive prosecutor fail to find any basis for filing insurrection charges? — Joshua Hochschild, Begging your Pardon

Pretty good points, actually. It's almost as if the eyewitnesses have a more reasonable account than the folks who are hell-bent on making Trump look bad, come hell or high water.

This is the man who’s first official act was to commute the sentences of 1500 people sentence to prison for storming the US Capital on 6th Jan 2021 — Wayfarer

Here's a fun story from Dr. Joshua Hochschild, who you are so fond of:

Pardoning the January 6 protestors in 2025 formally completes the rejection of the manufactured narrative. It permits us to raise questions that have been too long avoided. It should prompt the masses who fell victim to psychological warfare to wonder what made them so vulnerable to manipulation. And it redirects the burden of shame to those—whoever they are—who tried to control a nation by manufacturing an ignoble lie. — Joshua Hochschild, Begging your Pardon

Wayfarer, it looks like you're being brainwashed by the media. I would suggest taking a breather, turning off the computer for a bit, reconnecting with nature and reality, etc. Let the dust settle. Stop jumping to conclusions. Wait and see what the investigation brings, whether USAID is actually shut down, and whether the US ceases its aid programs (Rubio and everyone else have said that this is not going to happen). Don't let these news agencies manipulate your emotions.
In the US the sort of anti-Trump sensationalism you are caught up in has become a bit of a joke:

He seems a decent fellow, but if actually was, he’d resign immediately. — Wayfarer

Ok, Wayfarer. You read an article from WaPo and now you're passing judgment regarding Rubio's resignation? From Australia? :roll:

Why do you think you have any idea what is going on with this highly complicated case, mere days after the story broke? What if it's more complicated than the left-leaning media is telling you? Because that's never happened before! Your facts have been wrong, you are contradicting the most reliable sources we have, and you are randomly posting weird conspiracy theory-esque photos of Trump and Musk. Gossipy sensationalism isn't doing anyone any good.

What is coming out of the USAID investigation are pretty grievous misappropriations of funds, from a country whose national debt far exceeds its GDP. It's no wonder that the USAID employees refused to cooperate with Rubio, the acting administrator of USAID. Folks with a bit more prudence are waiting to see how deep and dark the USAID rabbit hole goes before opining on who needs to resign. Rubio has said that in some cases as little as 17% of the funds were making it to the endpoints that the program was meant to serve. But we can't talk about that because it doesn't paint Musk in a bad light, and that's the goal here, right? :roll:

More from Rubio:

How does one know someone has "the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them"? Apparently by agreeing with them. It is open for the theist to say, of anyone who disagrees with their argument, that they have not spent sufficient time "to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God".

All rather sequestered and distasteful, really. "Mutual understanding" here means "agreeing with me". — Banno

This is precisely the sort of cynicism that is problematic, and which leads to you being written off as an unserious poster. You take this passage from Klima:

So what seems to be required from the theist to understand the atheist in the first place is to realize how the atheist can look at the world without a God and still be able to conceive of God in a non-committed, parasitic manner, as being an object of the theist’s beliefs, but bearing no relevance to his own beliefs. On the other hand, to understand perfectly the theist, the atheist has to be able to think of God as the theist does, as bearing utmost relevance to everything thinkable. But for this, he would have to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 5

...and you reduce it to, "Anyone who disagrees with the argument has not spent sufficient time." :roll: Klima doesn't say that at all. You are projecting your own eristics into the paper and diminishing the thread with these petty imputations of bad motives.

I can understand why you would be frustrated with a stubborn argument like Anselm's, but ad hominem misrepresentation is not a great way to deal with that frustration.

Note how Roark critiques the argument instead of resorting to ad hominem or reading things into the paper that simply are not there.

Klima anticipates your sophistry:

[we] should not seek sheer “winning” in a debate (for that is the concern of sophists) — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 5

Someone like yourself who is motivated primarily by the fear that Klima might "win" a "debate," and who reads everything he writes through that petty, childish lens, simply does not understand philosophy. And I should think you also do a disservice to atheists, who are not all so petty, fearful, and closed-minded.

At this point, I'm told that there are no such arguments, because the thesis that Jesus is God is a revealed truth. My counter-point to that is that the thesis that God exists is also a revealed truth. — Arcane Sandwich

For Catholics neither are purely revealed truths, even though both can be (and have been) revealed (although one could argue with me on whether Jesus' divinity is purely revealed if they wanted to).

In any case, it would be a small minority which does not think natural reason can do a lot of work on such questions. For example, those who met Jesus during his Earthly life and came to believe that he is divine were not working apart from their natural reason.

The concept of belief is foreign to the formal sciences. — Arcane Sandwich

Participation in a philosophy forum is not a formal science. Premises which no one believes, such as FTI1, are useless. Their highest level of function is as a strawman.

Not quite. I haven't started a thread on the topic because I know that the moon is not made of lasagna. So does everyone else. — Arcane Sandwich

But you're skipping around the question. What if you didn't know it is not, but you didn't believe it is. And you knew that no one else believed it is. Would you start a thread on the topic?

(Lack of belief is sufficient; recourse to knowledge is a different issue. The concept of knowledge is arguably as foreign to the formal sciences as the concept of belief.)

- I spoke to the question at some length , namely to the dispute between Roark and Klima on the proper conclusion of the proof.

Beyond that, what I said to you stands.

We could go back to Banno's claim:

This is also very similar to the question-begging atheist:

1. All valid ontological arguments beg the question
2. This is a valid ontological argument
3. Therefore, this begs the question

But how does the inductive (1) get to be so strong? And even beyond that, what is "an ontological argument"? As the very first sentence of Klima's introduction implies, that whole label is anachronistic. Certainly Anselm would wonder how one can know that a whole bundle of loosely-affiliated arguments are known to be faulty a priori. — Leontiskos

Then contrasting Aquinas:

Aquinas’ response to Anselm in the Summa Contra Gentiles is quite interesting. On the one hand, it is of the weaker “question-begging” form that we spoke about earlier, given that it does not directly address Anselm’s proof. On the other hand, it is quite different from the other similarly weaker replies that we have seen. In particular, Aquinas’ approach takes the dialogical nature of the exchange as being fundamental, as opposed to the idea that Anselm has simply transgressed an inferential law (e.g. “no-existence-from-words,” which is reminiscent of “no-ought-from-is”). — Leontiskos

Now one can take Banno's question-begging approach. There's not a great deal of shame in that. But I don't want to do that. The only objection that I might offer is that constitutive reference to God is not possible, at least in the strict sense required for Anselm's definition (and Klima or Aquinas might object in a similar way). But I don't really know that such an objection succeeds. In a more general way the island objection seems like the best readily-available objection.

So given that I don't have any close objections, I am forced to admit that it is sound. But I think Klima's analysis is apt, which is to say that the argument will not be persuasive without the requisite kinds of concept-acquisition. Gaunilo's own retort in section 5 is also quite good (having to do with the way that concepts and assent interrelate).

In one sense this is odd, ergo:

3. Does this mean that Anselm’s proof can be sound for the theist while being unsound for the atheist? — Leontiskos

But on the other hand it is not odd that an argument could be sound in itself but yet inaccessible and therefore unpersuasive to some. The odd thing about this argument is that the further work lies in concept-acquisition rather than the further defense of some premise.

And what about the atheist who agrees with Klima, if that is possible? They would say that the opposite of concept-acquisition is required, namely shearing away the relevant thought object from Anselm's universe of thought objects, which would entail establishing criteria for what counts as an incoherent thought in a way that falls short of contradiction.

What's interesting in any case is how Klima has created commensurability over what is usually seen to be an incommensurable gulf.

---

Edit: It should go without saying that Klima does not see the atheist as irrational, and I agree. But I think we want to ask whether it is unfair that the atheist cannot adequately respond to the proof in the way of a close objection. In the first place, not necessarily, unless we are to say that all sound proofs are unfair to those who dislike their conclusions. In the second place, perhaps, in a way that Gaunilo's point about words could shed light on. If there is a place where John Henry Newman addresses this proof he might have a very worthy objection that develops Gaunilo's thought in section 5.

Yet Einstein's conceptualization of spacetime is based on the development of non-Euclidean geometries, particularly Riemann's ideas. — Arcane Sandwich

But Einstein believed in non-Euclidean geometries, so the premise fails. No one is objecting to Einstein talking about something he believes in, but after all, Einstein did not talk about the moon being made of lasagna.

No, I don't believe FTI1. And even if I did, what I believe (and what anyone else believes) is irrelevant to the truth value of that premise. — Arcane Sandwich

Truths that no one believes are irrelevant to a philosophy forum, for they cannot be spoken of.

It doesn't matter if we believe that the moon is made of lasagna or not. — Arcane Sandwich

Then why haven't you started a thread on the topic? (Hint: it's because the topic is irrelevant. Why? Because it does not bear on anyone's beliefs.)

Note that this is why there are good arguments and bad arguments: because premises which do not touch on someone's beliefs cannot persuade, and it is the job of an argument to persuade.

Yawn. — Banno

Yes, you're lazy. We know. It's written all over.

No one believed in non-Euclidean geometries during the 19th Century, not even their own pioneers. — Arcane Sandwich

And that's why it didn't make any sense to talk about them.

Shorter: math and logic don't care about our beliefs. So we should feel free to explore their uncharted territories, and to do so with whatever beliefs we would like to have in mind while doing so. — Arcane Sandwich

Are you saying that you believe FTI1? Because again, if not and no one else believes it, then it looks to approximate a strawman rather than something fit for discussion.

For example, should we conduct a dialogue on the question of whether the moon is made of lasagna? No, of course not. Why? Because no one believes such a thing. And using "the moon is made of lasagna" as a premise in an argument would be equally pointless, given that it has no bearing on anyone's beliefs.

Interesting reference, I'll try to read it tomorrow. — Arcane Sandwich

No worries. I haven't read it and I don't really plan to. I was just offering an example of how common this sort of argument is.

And here again is the closing off of the argument to critique by those who disagree. — Banno

A great deal of provision is made for disagreements. One disagrees with a proof by showing a premise false or an inference invalid. When one has neither shown a premise false nor an inference invalid, they haven't disagreed except in the manner of begging the question.

It's not an either/or type of deal. — Arcane Sandwich

Right.

Doesn't matter. The way I see it, logic has nothing to do with belief, just as math doesn't have anything to do with belief. The notion of belief is foreign to the formal sciences. Mathematical truths are still truths even if no one believes in them. The same goes for logical truths. — Arcane Sandwich

What use is there in asking people to consider a proposition that no one believes, not even oneself? It seems like putting something on the food menu that isn't edible.

Indeed, but my opinion is that throughout the centuries, Christian philosophers have been solely preoccupied with proving that God exists, without being equally preoccupied with proving that God is Jesus Christ. And they should, because otherwise, what makes them Christian philosophers, instead of theistic philosophers in general? — Arcane Sandwich

I think you'll find that Christians make relevant arguments. In Aquinas' day they argued against Islam, because Islam was popular. In the Enlightenment period they argued against Rationalism. Nowadays there are a lot of people claiming that Jesus was not divine, and so Christians tend to argue in that direction. Here is an example from two days ago.

- Sure, but a different conclusion requires a different argument. There is no single argument that proves both FTI2 and FTI3, considered as propositions. Anselm's is arguing for FTI2.

And another way to critique your FTI1 is to say that essentially no one believes it. At least I don't know of any group that believes God is necessarily identical to Jesus (even ignoring the problematic Trinitarian theology here). Christians themselves do not generally claim that the Incarnation was theologically necessary. Or else think about the fact that everyone without exception would agree that FTI1 was false before Jesus was born, and that if God existed before Jesus of Nazareth was born then strict identity cannot obtain.

The difficulty here is that the existence of God is a very modern preoccupation, whereas the divinity of Jesus has been a perennial question. In a perennial sense the existence of God and the divinity of Jesus are two quite separate questions. No one really thinks that one cannot believe in God's existence without believing in Jesus' divinity, or that one cannot abandon Jesus' divinity without abandoning God's existence.

I'd call it something like "logical reductionism", or something along those lines, something that sounds more "politically correct" but without losing too much bite. — Arcane Sandwich

That's fair. The point for me is that it is one theory among many, which must be expected to compete with other theories without any special privileges.

In any case, I agree that Anselm's argument becomes more difficult to dismiss when one cannot simply appeal to one's own quantificational preferences in a question-begging manner.