Are there any introductory textbooks that talk about the principle of explosion? — NotAristotle
It's not a matter of what I "regard" to be the case. — TonesInDeepFreeze
What textbook says that. If you can cite that statement I'll sell the farm. — NotAristotle
I think that is right, it is arbitrary. Although I would say that an argument can have inconsistent premises and still be valid as long as those premises do not do any "work" in the argument — NotAristotle
It is simply an a priori fact that from “p and not p” one can derive any conclusion, and so any argument with “p” and “not p” as premises is valid. — Michael
TonesInDeepFreeze thinks that any argument with inconsistent premises is valid, and that the principle of explosion does not need to be presupposed in order to say this. Michael disagrees. He thinks that any argument with inconsistent premises is valid, and that the principle of explosion does need to be presupposed in order to say this. — Leontiskos
The rule is: If P v Q is on a line, and ~P is on a line, then infer Q.
The rule is NOT: If P v Q is on a line, and ~P is on a line, and P is not on a line, then infer Q. — TonesInDeepFreeze
But that doesn't work if A and not-A are both true. That's my point. The proof doesn't work. The proof only works if you ignore that A is also true. — NotAristotle
In cases of inconsistent premises what happens is that the person arguing arbitrarily makes use of some premises while conveniently ignoring others. For example:... — Leontiskos
I don’t know what you mean by “presupposing” the principle of explosion. — Michael
No I'm not. — Michael
No I'm not. — Michael
So you think it is literally impossible to give argument 2 without implying argument 1? — Leontiskos
Yes. — Michael
The issue is that if realism is true then supposition (1) is true. — Michael
What I would be saying, analogously, is that we have taken the "you-do-you while I-do-me" principle too far: if your friend decides to go out and rape someone, then you have a duty to forceably impose your values on them insofar as they shouldn't be doing that. Similarly, a society has a duty to take over or at least subjugate another society to their values when the latter gets too immoral.
...
and [coercion] seems to be a valid resort to stop societal structures that are really immoral; and this entails some version of imperialism — Bob Ross
Even if the negative consequences were very low (or non-existent), are you saying that the West would not be justified in taking over North Korea by force? — Bob Ross
I posted to make clear that a particular quote of him is correct and not inconsistent with anything I've said — TonesInDeepFreeze
You cited me in your disputes (and without linking my name). So I exercised the prerogative to make clear that that particular argument is not incompatible with anything I've said. — TonesInDeepFreeze
There are a lot of things to untangle in a discussion. I didn't purport to vindicate everything the poster has said. I mentioned one particular thing he posted and I said it is correct. — TonesInDeepFreeze
That is what I said is correct. — TonesInDeepFreeze
You came in and said, "Michael's argument is valid," but you haven't at all reckoned with what was really said. I invite you to do that. NotAristotle made an observation about your construal of validity, and Michael defended your construal of validity with recourse to the principle of explosion. Reckon with that. — Leontiskos
if an argument's conclusion follows from its premises using the rules of inference then they will name this type of argument "valid". — Michael
It's not a definition of validty! It's not supposed to be definition of validity! — TonesInDeepFreeze
That ((P→Q)∧Q), therefore P is not valid, whereas ((A∧¬A)∧(P→Q)∧Q), therefore P is valid, does seem strange to me. Inconsistent premises don't seem to have anything to do with whether the argument "follows." Although I have a feeling that Tones will have something to say about that. — NotAristotle
The argument is valid; the conclusion follows from the premise. We can show this in four parts... — Michael
We have a definition of validity. Then we show that that definition entails the principle of explosion. — TonesInDeepFreeze
If you link to my quote, time permitting I will address it. — TonesInDeepFreeze
I haven't said anything about 'presuppose'. Rather, I have shown that the definition of validity entails the principle of explosion. — TonesInDeepFreeze
And the definition is not based on the principle of explosion. Rather, the definition implies the defintion of explosion. You have what I said backward. — TonesInDeepFreeze
I am saying no such thing. — TonesInDeepFreeze
I submit to you, that you should accept a sense of nationalism in two respects. The first, in the sense that whatever nation you belong to you must have a vested interest in its flourishing and protection against other nations—or move to a different one (if you can). The second, in the sense that, if your country has substantially better politics than other ones, you should have a pride in it and want to expand its values to the more inferior ones (which leads to imperialism).
For those who are upset at my rhetoric (and perhaps the lens by which I am analyzing this), I challenge you to try to justify, in your response to this OP, e.g., why Western, democratic values should not be forcibly imposed on obviously degenerate, inferior societies at least in principle—like Talibanian Afghanistan, North Korea, Iran, China, India, etc. Some societies are so obviously structured in a way antithetical to the human good, that it is virtually impossible to justify leaving them be in the name of anti-imperialism. E.g., if we could take over North Korea right now without grave consequences (such as nuclear war), then it is obviously in our duty to do so—and this is a form of imperialism. Why would you not be a Western supremacist? — Bob Ross
Some societies are so obviously structured in a way antithetical to the human good, that it is virtually impossible to justify leaving them be in the name of anti-imperialism. — Bob Ross
Michael's reasoning is correct there and doesn't contradict anything I've said.
The definition of validity entails that the principle of explosion is valid. — TonesInDeepFreeze
So explosion and "any argument with an inconsistent set of premises is valid" are similar. — TonesInDeepFreeze
There's also the IEP article I quoted here. Although in that specific case they consider the proposition "I am a brain in a vat" rather than the proposition "the cat is in the box". — Michael
1. If metaphysical realism is true, then global skepticism is possible
2. If global skepticism is possible, then we can be brains in a vat
3. But we cannot be brains in a vat
4. Thus, metaphysical realism is false (1,2,3) — Brain in a Vat Argument | IEP
↪Leontiskos It's in that post above. There's Hart, McGinn, Mackie, and Routley. And of course Fitch himself. — Michael
Mackie (1980) and Routley (1981), among others at the time, point to difficulties with this general position but ultimately agree that Fitch’s result is a refutation of the claim that all truths are knowable, and that various forms of verificationism are imperiled for related reasons. — SEP
↪Leontiskos So you don't think unjustifiable truths are unjustified? How odd.
Or is that just pedantry in the service of your confusion? — Banno
Or, "...then a proposition not being justified is not a good reason to reject it." There is an equivocation here on 'reject'. If 'reject' means falsify, then this strikes me as uncontroversial. If 'reject' means "abstain from affirming," then the consequent is false but it does not in fact follow from your premises. — Leontiskos
That there are "unjustified" truths is pretty obvious. — Banno
You ask me for an example and then complain that it's just one example? — Michael
It's right there, explicitly saying "the realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle." — Michael