the insuperable obstacle to such an idea is that the nature of life and of mind are inneffable, and, as such, it can't be defined. So you can't even know what it is that you're trying to synthesise. — Wayfarer

A possible reply to this is that "ineffable" may be one of Chalmers' "temporary" obstacles, as opposed to a permanent one like biological composition. Even your chatty friend only goes so far as to say "ineffable at least in part." We should acknowledge the possibility that, in the future, this will become effable :smile: . I know that right now "irreducibly first-personal" seems like the end of the road, but let's wait and see.

Another reply is that consciousness will "just kinda happen," along the lines of a sketchy emergent property, if we put together the right ingredients. Therefore we don't need to know what it is or how to synthesize it -- it'll happen on its own.

Both these replies are respectable, but my money is still on the "no consciousness without life" hypothesis. If biologists find a way to create non-carbon-based life -- and can demonstrate beyond doubt that they've done so -- then we might get conscious "silicon systems," but they would be alive.

I don't see what is added by "life," which is not always well defined. — Hanover

Perhaps not always, but children learn at a young age the difference between living and non-living things they encounter, though of course they love to pretend. It seems an important question to me whether a conscious LLM is alive, biologically. Do we then, for instance, have some obligation to interact ethically with it, prevent unnecessary suffering, etc.? Can it die?

just a matter of figuring out how that happens biologically for us to synthesize the process. — Hanover

Oh, is that all?! :wink:

https://philpapers.org/archive/CHACAL-3.pdf

It basically says watch. — Banno

Yes, though as I read it, Chalmers is inclined to grant that an LLM+ could be conscious -- within the next decade, "we may well have systems that are serious candidates for consciousness."

Chalmers says that all the challenges to LLMs being conscious appear to be "temporary rather than permanent," except one: biology. This is worth dwelling on. Chalmers articulates the challenge as "the idea that consciousness requires carbon-based biology. . . [On this view] consciousness requires a certain sort of electrochemical processing that silicon systems lack." Chalmers' opinion is that "silicon is just as apt as carbon as a substrate for consciousness," but we can see why this would represent a permanent barrier to LLM consciousness if it turned out that carbon is required.

What isn't clear to me, reading Chalmers on the biology challenge, is whether he sees this challenge as claiming that the putatively conscious LLM has to be alive. He never uses the words "alive" or "life." Suppose consciousness does not require carbon-based biology, as Chalmers thinks possible. Suppose what he calls a "silicon system" will do just as well. Is the silicon-based system alive? If not, why is it being discussed under the "biology" challenge? Is "silicon-based biology" a candidate?

I can't tell whether Chalmers is trying to discriminate between possible kinds of biology -- any one of which would presumably produce life, not just consciousness -- or only saying that carbon-based biology is biology, period, but there's no reason why a silicon (nonbiological) system can't do the trick.

This matters because I would put the "biology challenge" a little differently myself. I would suggest that the biggest unanswered question here is whether only living things can be conscious.

Also worth noting: Chalmers reminds us that "one major gap in our understanding is that we don't understand consciousness. . . . [We need to] develop better scientific and philosophical theories of consciousness. These theories have come a long way in the last few decades, but much more work is needed."

There is no 'mental' reality that exists apart from the physical. — Philosophim

Oh, OK, so you're assuming this. I thought your post was aiming to demonstrate it.

Mental actions are physical actions. You cannot have a mental action that exists apart from some physical reality like the brain. It is a mistake of category to believe that 'mental' is divorced from physical reality. — Philosophim

But . . . hold on. Let's rearrange.

"You cannot have a mental action that exists apart from some physical reality like the brain."
OK (so far as we know).

"It is a mistake of category to believe that 'mental' is divorced from physical reality."
OK, if "divorced" is a synonym for "exists apart," above.

"Mental actions are physical actions."
Does not follow at all. How do you get an identity statement out of the first two? Compare:

You cannot have a football game that exists apart from the players and the field.
It is a mistake of category to believe that "a football game" is divorced from the players and the field.
Therefore: A football game is the players and the field.

? - I don't think so. At best, you might conclude that the actions comprising a football game are made by players, on a field, but that's not nearly a good enough description.

Or is “cause” the wrong word? — Fire Ologist

This would be a key question when it comes to mental events such as thoughts. Our usage is such a mish-mash that it's difficult to find a place to begin an analysis.

Do I have a reason for thinking X? Let's say the answer is yes. OK, does that mean I have been caused to think X? Well, maybe. Reasons are often referred to as causes of actions, so why not causes of thoughts? But whatever their causative power may be, it isn't much like what happens when a bat strikes a ball -- or so we tend to believe. What the bat does to the ball is going to be seen as necessitating what happens next, and in principle a full account could be given of what the ball's trajectory must be, given the force of the bat's contact. Usually, that's not what we say about the causative power of thoughts, if any. A possible exception is the one I brought up, about modus ponens. Here, it is tempting to say that I'm caused to think the conclusion in much the same way that the ball is caused to do its thing by the bat. But should we resist that temptation?

Yes, we're on the same page. And there are probably a number of even further "outside-art" ways to get in the game, which is good, because we don't want the artworld to become calcified into a list of institutions.

A fair amount of work, but not everyone gets to see their very own pebble in one of London's most prestigious Postmodern Art Galleries. — RussellA

:grin:

It was in an email. — RogueAI

Any chance you could share the relevant parts with us? I'm also going to read the paper @Banno cited.

The idea that there is such a thing as Mental to Mental Causation — I like sushi

I read this as homing in on a special problem within causation-talk: Whether my thoughts of, e.g., "If p then q" and "p" can be said to then cause the thought "q". But perhaps this isn't where you want to focus? You seem to be addressing mental-to-physical causation, or vice versa, not mental-to-mental.

The context of the object is relevant. A pebble on a beach never seen or imagined by anyone cannot be a Postmodern artwork. For someone to take that pebble off the beach, display it in the Whitechapel Gallery, and accompany it with the statement that the pebble represents the anguish of the individual within a capitalist society, then it has become a Postmodern artwork. — RussellA

Good, so we need to consider context. But is your example literally possible? I noted this earlier in the thread, but it's worth repeating: If "someone" does -- or tries to do -- what you're suggesting with the pebble, they would a) probably not get past the security guards, and b) if they succeeded, they would be judged a vandal rather than an artist.

In short, it takes more than "someone" to successfully place a pebble as art in the Whitechapel Gallery. Who else is needed, and what is that context? This is where so-called institutional theories of art start to gain traction, I think.

Postmodernism
It only becomes an artwork if the human responds to the object as a metaphor for social concerns — RussellA

Are you proposing this as context-free? Or does the object need to be presented in some way as to invite such a response? If so, what might be the context?

(I think this question applies to conceptual art as well -- not sure what you're including with "post-modern")

I feel like we might be going off track. I am willing to keep this going elsewhere if need be? — I like sushi

Actually, I'm trying to get an OP together that might be a better place. Let's hold off till then -- thanks!

My view is based on the artists intent, the audience, the effect on people who view and produce art, and looking upon items with an artistic eye. — I like sushi

A one view only perspective is a terrible approach when it comes to understanding anything with any reasonable depth. — I like sushi

If a work is not emotionally moving it is absolutely not art. There is no exception.
— I like sushi

There has to be a line drawn somewhere,
— I like sushi

?

I hope it's clear why the 1st two statements seem to contradict the next two.

Decor serves no pragmatic function, it is perfectly possible to live in an abode with no decor at all. Decor serves only to modulate the emotional state of the inhabitant; this is thoroughly, unproblematically art. — hypericin

I can see it that way. "Pragmatic" can be understood in a variety of senses.

Frankly, Im ready to abandon all this talk of "artworld" entirely, and institutional theories of art. It seems oriented around the question of "what is fine art" rather than "what is art". Perhaps this was the interesting question in Danto's day, but today, to me at least, it seems far too elitist. What separates "fine art" from everyday art frankly doesn't seem as philosophically interesting as what separates art as a whole from non art. — hypericin

This is really interesting to me. I'm going to try to write an OP that will go into some of this in more detail; we've already hijacked @Moliere's thread for too long! Been rereading a lot of Danto and have noticed some nuances in what he's saying that might make sense of the whole "fine art" question. For instance, in his essay "The Art World Revisited" he disavows a strict "institutional theory" interpretation, which he calls "a creative misunderstanding of my work by George Dickie." And he says we need "a set of reasons" for why something is art, not merely a baptizing by some in-group.

I am not at all interested in talking about some abstract Art World. — I like sushi

You raise the same concern here as @hypericin: Are we being too parochial in caring what a designated artworld might think?

In general, I read you as wanting to set up some criteria to divide art from non-art, based on audience response. This is a different strategy from using criteria based on the object itself (what is it made of, who made it, how difficult was it, etc.) but shares the idea that art can be discovered. This idea is what Danto and others question, as do I, but maybe I'll go into that some more in another post.

Hopefully that sketches out roughly what I think about the historical aspect? — I like sushi

Yes, roughly. Is it appropriate for me to ask into some specifics? (You don't have to pursue this with me if it's a pain in the neck.)

The difference in the current era [about where lines are drawn between art and non-art] is likely more about the rate of change due to the numerous factors briefly outlined above. — I like sushi

I'll take "current era" to mean the era in which something like Fountain, or the plant-and-email piece, could be considered art.

Some did see [those lines], some didn't. Some did disregard them, some didn't. — I like sushi

To me, this implies that there's a sort of counter-artworld, or shadow artworld, in which works like Fountain are not considered art. Is that what you mean? My question was meant to focus on consensus, on why conceptual art, understood in the broadest terms, is now accepted by the artworld as an important type of art. On your view, this would have been a mistake. So how did this mistaken consensus carry the day? I guess I'm asking if you could be more specific about "rate of change" and the other factors you mention. What do you think actually happened when, say, Warhol offered his "Brillo Box" as art, and the artworld, at first reluctant, came to agree?

I'm assuming that neither of us would be satisfied with the "My kid could paint that" response. You don't think that gullible gallery owners were hoaxed by mischievous and rapacious loft-dwellers wearing berets -- or so I assume. So what did happen?

I'm hesitant to justify art by its purposes. If anything I think it's entirely useless, and that's sort of the point. — Moliere

Concerning purposes involving other people, I agree that most art doesn't have to be understood that way, though many artists value communication as a goal very much. But "entirely useless"? That seems to say that if I create an artwork, it's useless even to me, even as a process. Do we have to be that rigorous about it?

The difference is that [art] has no pragmatic purpose. Take a piece of purported art, and subtract away the pragmatic purpose: what remains, if anything, is the art. — hypericin

OK, sort of what I meant above about "purposes for other people." And I think it's 99% true. But as always, we can find interesting exceptions. Satie claimed that his "furnishing music" was strictly pragmatic -- it was meant to add to the decor (great quote from him on Wikpedia: "Furnishing music completes one's property"). This sounds like he wanted it understood as non-art, but no one agrees!

I have a large collection of music I wrote but never did anything with. Is it still art, if no one else ever hears it? I think so; despite being unheard, there is an artworld it readily plugs into, were it heard. It would unproblematically be accepted as art (good art is another matter). — hypericin

Yes. This intuitively reasonable position has to be accounted for by an institutional or artworld theory of art, and it's not easy. I think we need some discrimination between the artworld's role in "baptizing" individual works within a recognized tradition, versus its role as a consensus-builder around new approaches and problematic examples, like Fountain. I haven't worked out anything like this, though I think it's on the right track. We want to be able to say confidently that your un-listened-to music doesn't require a listener (or an artworld) for it to count as music -- which already counts as art. The artworld's function here came earlier, so to speak.

Maybe a good question is: Is there a risk of some art being a private language, something only the artist speaks? Or are we just frightening ourselves with extreme hypotheticals?

If a work is not emotionally moving it is absolutely not art. There is no exception. — I like sushi

There has to be a line drawn somewhere, — I like sushi

So do you have a story, or explanation, for what happened to (so-called, in your view) art in the 20th century? Why were the lines not drawn where you clearly see them? Are you suggesting that the artworld did not see those lines, though they were clear, or that they saw them but disregarded them? Just trying to understand how to fit your view into a historical narrative.

There was nothing about a random plant and several printed emails stuck on a wall that I find emotionally moving in any way shape or form. — I like sushi

I would likely have the same reaction, if I saw this work. But are you open to the idea that emotional response is not criteriological? That objects aren't divided into "art" and "non-art" based on whether they are emotionally moving to someone?

I guess this connects with this as well:

Artwork is not primarily focused on the intellect — I like sushi

What I learn from 20th century art is that general, semi-definitional statements like this can't hold water. There's simply too much artwork doing too many different things, in endless combinations of visual, intellectual, conceptual, and emotional dimensions! It's the Wild West! -- and enormous fun.

The only way we can make categorical judgments about what kind of thing can be art, or what kind of experience art must engender, would be to challenge the description I just gave as a description of art. We could declare war, in effect, on the artworld, and offer an explanation for why it has been so misguided for so long in what it deems art. I know there are a few critics willing to try this, but the collateral damage is immense, and I've never found the conception convincing anyway.

Again, none of this is about quality. It seems quite possible to me that the plant-and-email artwork is simply poor art. But I'd have to see it.

a philosophical sortie into the world of Art. — I like sushi

That sounds to me like a new type of art! But I know what you mean. Interestingly, Danto talked a lot in his later writings about art within a particular culture as "discovering its own identity" or meaning. He compares it to Hegel's Spirit. He blurred the line between art and philosophy. For him, a work of art can be a piece of philosophy as well, it can teach us something specifically philosophical -- so a philosophical sortie, if you like.

I've gone to plenty of modern art museums out of curiosity, and some of the installations/videos/etc. really just left me mystified. I was willing to look just to see, but sometimes I sort of just shrugged.

Which usually means I'm missing something -- what is it about this that so many other people like that I'm not seeing? — Moliere

I've had this experience too. Part of me wants to put on my Philistine hat and say, "Enough is enough! This looped video of a woman sucking her toes simply isn't art. The artworld is wrong about this." If I resist that impulse, as I believe I should, I could also say, "Yes, I'm able to engage with this work in the Space of Art, I'm willing to accept the invitation to that special sort of seeing that art requests. Having done so, I judge it to be not very good or interesting art."

At this point, the questions about "What am I missing?" become relevant. Can I honestly say that I know enough, am experienced enough, in the particular milieu or conversation in which this art-object exists, in order to be entitled to an aesthetic judgment? If my answer is yes (as it often will be in an artworld I have a lot more expertise in, such as music or literature), then so much the worse for the art object -- but again, this doesn't jeopardize its status as art. If my answer is no (as is likely with conceptual and other post-modern visual arts), then it's on me to get educated, if I care enough.

And one more factor: Do I like it? This is a dimension where I've really noticed changes over the years. Perhaps because I have tried to better understand and experience some of this unfamiliar artworld, I more and more find that there's a sort of primitive, pre-judgmental delight I feel when exposed to (some) conceptual art. It is not at all the same delight I associate with Monet. But once I get over the "hermeneutics of suspicion," and allow the object to just suggest whatever it suggests -- call it a charitable intepretation! -- it's a lot easier to get a kick out of it.

If you take a Campbell soup can and repeat it 50 times, you are not interested in the retinal image. What interests you is the concept that wants to put 50 Campbell soup cans on a canvas. — Duchamp, 1964

Yes, this is insightful on Duchamp's part.

the story behind the artwork, the motivations around it, the whole context of the chosen/found artwork -- [these] offer the difference between art/not-art. — Moliere

As you say, this sounds like a good expansion of the "artworld" idea. There's room to include the artist themselves, too. As long as we agree that what makes something art is a way of seeing, not a way of making, all these further interpretations can be on the table. (Clearly the main point of contention is: Whose seeing?) And we can further insist that "seeing" retain its metaphorical meaning, that it doesn't have to be retinal, but can instead be the kind of seeing we mean when we say, "Ah, now I see!"

It's that act of judgment that seems to me to differentiate art/not-art -- but, in being an act of judgment, it seems just as conceptual whether I'm asking "Why 50 campbell's soup cans?" or "What does Monet mean by his water lillies?" — Moliere

OK, let's call that special way of seeing an act of judgment. And let's agree that there's no "innocent eye," no "brain-off" way of looking at paintings. Still, we need to explain the important difference Duchamp is pointing to. If I understand him, he's saying that the Warhol exists in order to stimulate thought, whereas the Monet is an object of contemplation in its own right -- or something like that. Now we need a lot of conceptual apparatus to see either of these paintings in the right way; that's not in dispute. But conceptual art uses the image in a way that traditional painting does not. The soup cans have to function as a bridge to the concept, otherwise the artwork fails. Whereas the water lilies don't insist on this kind of move.

Maybe? Just thinking out loud . . .

I think this is precisely because the sunny Popular-Mechanics style realism doesn't fully eliminate teleology or teleonomy; it just sort of lets the issue float out there, unresolved. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure. It's not a "Pop-Mech" kind of question, and we can do science for most practical purposes without having to engage with it.

From this perspective, it is natural to call Duchamp's Fountain non-art. It has deviated so far from the form of art, that it has lost all "art function": it isn't pretty or enjoyable to look at. It required no technical skill, anyone could have done that. It doesn't depict anything beyond what it literally is. — hypericin

This is a great exposition of how and why Fountain was first seen as non-art. Watching how the conversation has evolved on this thread, I want to add something: What turned it from a urinal to one of the most talked-about and influential artworks of the 20th century was not Duchamp's intention alone. By persuading a gallery to grant it what I'd call provisional status as art, he in turn offered Fountain to the larger artworld. This offering was meant to be provocative: I say this can be seen as art. If you disagree, explain why. And as we know, the argument was resolved in his favor. Conclusion: a "ready-made" can be an art object.

Here's a similar example, to reinforce the point I want to make. John Cage's "4' 33'' " makes a similar claim about what counts as music. Beyond the amusing set-up -- "can be performed by any combination of instruments" -- Cage was really asking his audience to reconsider what silence is supposed to be, musically. There's a lot of detail I could go into, but the idea is that silence in traditional music fulfills a structural function only: It's the place where, by agreement, there is no music, such as during a whole-note rest. We're not meant to consider what might in fact be audible in the so-called silence, because that doesn't fall under either the category of "music" or the category of "composer's intention." Cage asked the audience to spend 4 minutes and 33 seconds listening to ambient sound. Seventy years later, the consensus is fairly strong: Such sound, within that "frame," qualifies as art, though perhaps not music, just as Fountain qualifies as art, but perhaps not any previously known category of visual art.

Suppose this "provisional offering" of silence/ambient sound as art had been roundly rejected. And suppose Fountain was laughed out of the gallery. Some on this thread want to say that this would not have changed either work's status as art. Duchamp and Cage knew what they were doing, they considered themselves artists, so it's the artworld's loss if these works were not appreciated as art. I know that's an attractive position, because it privileges one of the traditional components of making art: that art is an individual thing, and expresses something about the maker, and we admire originality and vision. All true. But can art really be a private language, something that only the maker can speak?

How we answer that may depend on a related question: What is/are the purpose(s) of art? On the spectrum between self-expression (personal) and communication (collective), can it "go too far" in one or the other direction? If a poem falls in the forest and there's no one there to read it, is it still a poem?

I'll stop here before I die the death of a thousand profundities! :smile:

Also note, "This crap isn't art in the first place, but if you really insist on asking me to call it art, then it's terrible art." doesn't work in other contexts. "This apple isn't a house in the first place, but if you really insist on asking me to call it a house, then it's a terrible house." No, it's just not a house. — hypericin

Good point. What should we say, then? You go on to note

Since the distinction [between non-art and bad art] is not clear in most people's minds, they can be expected to substitute one for the other. — hypericin

Perhaps that's good enough; the distinction isn't clear, usage-wise, and it's no wonder people use them somewhat interchangeably. We could imagine more and more cases like this, using the "house" example, the closer we get to a comparison that's "in the 'house' neighborhood" -- for instance, "This hovel made of detritus isn't a house in the first place, but if you really insist on asking me to call it a house, then it's a terrible house."

If this isn't good enough (for us philosophers), then we need to recommend a more precise set of terms. I vote for something along the institutional, Danto-esque lines we've been discussing.

But . . .

Is it still art if no one sees it that way (except the creator)?
— J

I think so. It is still an object created for aesthetic, not practical, use. — hypericin

This would be an objection to an "art as consensus" model. I can't remember if Danto addresses it; I'll try to look back at some of his work and see if I can find it.

Maybe it helps if we frame the question like this: Is it possible for me to create (taken as loosely as possible) something for aesthetic use, only to discover that the "we" who generally look at such objects do not consider it art at all? That would be rare, but possible. This gets to the heart of one of the difficulties with the "artworld" model. Exactly how many "I's" does it take before we get a "we"? Presumably "consensus" doesn't have to mean 100%, but what does it mean? Evidently it needs to stop short of "only one person (the artist)," though -- and that's what you're questioning by asking if intent alone is enough to do the baptizing.

Your Rite of Spring example of a change in "community vetting" is also relevant here. And the confusion between non-art and bad art returns: That 1913 audience did not, as far as I know, castigate Stravinsky and Diaghilev for not being artists at all. The audience thought it was outrageously bad art, but they knew it was music and dance. A better example might be the reaction to Duchamp: "You've got be kidding! This is a urinal."

(BTW, there's considerable evidence that a big part of the audience's reaction to the Rite can be explained by its being such a bad performance. That score is well understood and appreciated now, but can you imagine mounting a performance for the first time?! None of the players would have heard, literally, anything like it before. "What is this supposed to sound like?" Very plausible, then, that as a performance it barely held together.)

This [framing the feather] is consistent with art not as some innate ontological status some objects have, but as a social context around some objects. — hypericin

Good, glad you see it that way too. We have to emancipate "creation" from necessarily meaning "moving around physical stuff."

I am inclined to say that art is intentionally created as art by a creator. — hypericin

Is it still art if no one sees it that way (except the creator)? Should we say, "intentionally attempts to create art"?

Also, the verb "create" is very fraught in this circumstance. If we agree that the status of something as an artwork is not dependent on its physical nature, then "creating" an artwork can mean simply a consensus that declares the object to be so. Putting a frame around it, in other words. Are you OK with that construal of "create"?

Thanks for responding. I'm having great difficulty following your thoughts, however. Could you perhaps just begin by saying what you think Williams' position is, regarding an Absolute Conception -- what is the "naive argument"?

I may comment a bit more on the issue of personhood as an instituted status, and what some Supreme Court might or might not be able to rule, since you raised this pertinent question, later on. — Pierre-Normand

I hope you do -- always interested in your thoughts. And about the ontology of chatbots as well.

I wonder if you are understanding the "artworld" as the high or elite art world. I think the idea is that there are multiple artworlds, only partially overlapping. For instance, high art, graffiti art, country music, black metal music, harry potter fan fiction, philosophical essays. Each gatekeep with notions of what belongs and what does not, and what is elevated and what is not.
. — hypericin

Yes, this is right. I was implicitly importing my idea of which "artworld" would be appropriate in a discussion about a possibly-museum-worthy painting. But the thing is not monolithic, as you say, especially when we're talking popular art.

"they", the art elite, who do the baptizing. — hypericin

Troublesome, for sure. Some of my favorite contemporary visual art is so-called "outsider art" or "visionary art." The standards there are very much counter to NY-gallery-type art elites. But it illustrates your point about multiple worlds: There is nonetheless a "we," an artworld, that develops a consensus around outsider art too.

Of course, with any of these, we are always free to disagree with what is canonized as good art. — hypericin

I think this is the saving grace of the whole conception. We can separate out the use of "art" as some kind of honorific or compliment, and just say, "Yeah, this particular artworld has helped us see certain kinds of things as art; now the conversation can begin about how aesthetically valuable it is."

But they are still evaluating it as art, and finding it lacking in some way. That is an artistic judgement. They would never think to do this of a stop sign, for instance. — hypericin

I could go either way on this. And of course the criticism comes in different flavors and strengths. I'm not sure whether we should call such criticism an aesthetic judgment, or a judgment about what is art. Maybe it's got two prongs: "This crap isn't art in the first place, but if you really insist on asking me to call it art, then it's terrible art." No one is offering the stop sign as an art object (usually!), but the critic is upset about the whole concept of "offering" something as art. It's this crazy pretense (from their point of view) that they object to.

someone printing out "Times New Roman" in Times New Roman on 8.5"x11" paper, putting it up in art museum — Moliere

As soon as you put it in a museum, — hypericin

If either of these things happened just as described, it would be vandalism, not art, and the person would presumably be arrested. :smile: Seriously, one individual cannot "put something in a museum." It takes some kind of collective agreement, some "we," in order to do the baptizing.

But with that said, the issue is far from solved, or even well understood. Danto's "artworld" is one way of trying to get a grip on it. The difference you mention between art as category and art as evaluative becomes important here. It's a bit more comfortable to agree that "what the artworld calls art is art" if we're not also being asked to agree that it's good art. The artworld can be wrong about that, on this theory.

So, is a local coffee shop with an interest in painting, part of the artworld? I don't have a strong opinion either way. Is there a clear line between "bad art" and "so meretricious it isn't even art but rather commercialism"? I doubt it.

Even if the reaction is "This is bad because it doesn't look like anything, and my 3 year old could paint it", that is a reaction to art, not to a utilitarian object. — hypericin

Usually, yes, but the reactor often wants to say something more by that remark. They want to say, "This isn't art at all. You're either the victim of a con job, or you're trying to con me." They're reacting from the traditional understanding of art as defined by some combination of terms like "hard to make," "reflects an ability to draw well," "beautiful/sublime/original," "requiring X, Y, Z materials and media," "the result of a single individual's unusual degree of talent," and more.

I sympathize. I like those kinds of art a lot. I think the quality percentage is often higher in the traditional forms. But if we're philosophers trying to understand what art is and what it means, we can't stick with those traditional criteria -- not unless we're also able to make a plausible case that pretty much every innovation in the Western artworld since c. 1919 has been fabulously wrong about what art can be.

The letter you quote from makes an excellent case for why computer programs are not agents in anything like the sense a human is. Do you agree that we should try to avoid using language that appears to reify such programs as 1st-person entities? (or however you might phrase the latter idea)

So other observations would not be “rival” views, in competition — Antony Nickles

Do you mean, they would not be from our point of view, or from the point of view of an Absolute Conception that claims to be able to give an explanation of them?

This is perhaps another way of asking, If we agree to set aside the idea of a legitimate Absolute Conception, how are we going to characterize what an alleged Absolute Conception is saying? Isn't the AC itself now revealed as an error? Is there a way to describe it, more mildly, as merely another "incomplete" view?

Really interesting and helpful, thanks.

Couple of thoughts:

the most salient difference between human beings and chatbots. . .
stems from the fact that—in part because they are not embodied animals, and in part because they do not have instituted statuses like being citizens, business partners, or family members—chatbots aren't persons. — Pierre-Normand

I agree with you, as it happens, about personhood here, but we have to recognize that many proponents of a more liberal interpretation of "person" are going to regard this as mere stipulation. What, they will ask, does being an embodied animal have to do with personhood? etc. We can't very well just reply, "That's how we've always 'played that game.'" The US Supreme Court changed the game, concerning corporations and persons; why couldn't philosophers?

My second thought is: Like just about everyone else who talks about AI, you're accepting the fiction that there is something called a chatbot, that it can be talked about with the same kind of entity-language we used for, e.g., humans. I maintain there is no such thing. What there is, is a computer program, a routine, a series of instructions, that as part of its routine can simulate a 1st-person point of view, giving credence to the idea that it "is ChatGPT." I think we should resist this way of thinking and talking. In Gertrude Stein's immortal words, "There's no there there."

...A better interpretation...
— J
Better for what? Again, no absolute scale is available. — Banno

But as we've been discussing, we don't need an absolute scale in order to compare good and better. I'm saying that a literal interpretation of, e.g., the book of Genesis is not as good an interpretation as one that focuses on its metaphorical, mythical, or psychological meanings. If someone wanted to ask into what's "better" about this, I'd start with pointing out how difficult it is to believe things that couldn't be true.

The idea is that there is a correct interpretation. — Banno

And that what we started with is the key to such an interpretation. I know you're doubtful whether there could be a useful interpretation of holy books, but such an interpretation, if there is one, isn't likely to be the one the author(s) had in mind when they wrote about, e.g., Adam, Eve, floods, tablets of stone, etc. Those events, I suppose were "originally" meant to be accounts of true things. A better interpretation will not accept that.

the idea that we can discern some imagined shared intent amongst the authors of your constitution — Banno

Oh, that. Originalism. What the Framers intended. A bit like a literal reading of the Bible.

I'd like to think that we haven't moved from aesthetics to art history — Moliere

This is a great question, IMO. I'll go out on a limb and say that nothing very interesting can be said about aesthetics without locating what you're saying in some kind of art-making tradition. This means either assuming, or outright providing, some art history. I agree it's not a "move from," but a way of giving aesthetic discussion something to talk about. The two discourses require each other, in order to make sense.

there's something to 1 in differentiating, say, between drawing and painting. — Moliere

Yes, because here we have a question about the actual composition of the object, which Danto showed was not the question concerning art tout court. I should have noted that in my post, thanks.

The problem occurs in the US Supreme Court as well, apparently. — Banno

Which particular piece of poltroonery do you have in mind? Corporations as persons?

It can be used to infer an intent, but does not derive meaning from intent. — Banno

Yes, that needs to remain clear. You read a poem; you derive a meaning; it may or may not be what the poet intended, though it's often reasonable to infer that. You've heard of "the intentional fallacy" in lit-crit, right? Same issue.

Right, but it's still an assertion even if the speaker is mistaken.

Yes, I know! :wink: — MoK

Ah, but then you don't actually "see the cat on the mat" . . . my avatar is a digital entity, to put it generously.

Which doesn't mean you haven't asserted doing so, of course! Assertion doesn't depend on the truth of what is asserted, as we were all taught.