The moving cities analogy is interesting. I think we can take it a bit further. Let's consider the question, "What's it like to live in Kansas City?" — Banno

Yes, I like this too. I'll see if I can develop it even further.

Some places we might need to visit, or to give an account of what they're like, will be very different from Kansas City. KC is diverse, big, full of possibilities. No single account is likely to do it justice. But suppose the destination is a narrow series of underground tunnels leading to a hidden treasure. In such a case, the options -- and our reasons for being there -- are much more curtailed. It's not unreasonable to say, "Look, we're here for the treasure, and if there's another 'way it's like' to be here, we probably don't care much about it." Moreover, we might have a treasure map, and to ignore this map, assuming we trust it, would be not "diverse" but foolish, given the circumstances.

So the idea is that there is not only a diversity of possibilities within a given city, but a real diversity of kinds of cities/destinations. Some are ideal for encouraging a variety of interpretations, others all but demand a rigid metric.

The cry of distress, then, is "But how do we tell the difference?! How do we know if our practice or project is more like multifarious KC, or narrow Treasure Tunnel?" I think the answer is, "You may not know beforehand. You may have to look and see. But being unsure is not the same as being utterly in the dark, or forced to act at random. Nor does it mean that, if neither of these extremes is quite suited, we can find no middle ground."

Can you perform logic without causation or without determinism being the case? . . . Is reasoning a causal process? — Harry Hindu

These are key questions. So:

Reasoning takes time. It is a process. As such it is causal.

You provide a reason for your conclusions. Your reasons determine your conclusion. Your premises determine the validity of the conclusion. As such it is deterministic. — Harry Hindu

Is this a partial answer to the above questions? Do reasons determine a conclusion in the same way that a physical cause determines an effect? Not trying to back you into that position, just intrigued whether you do see them as the same.

Do you mean that there may be some facts included in a piece of fiction as "raw material"? Fair enough. Could you expand on the "constructed or deconstructed" part? Do you perhaps mean that an incident which really happened to the author, when presented as part of a work of fiction, is no longer presented as "truth," even though the exact same incident, if presented as part of a memoir, would be taken as presumptively true?

They're doing what they were programmed to do, feeding back your words.

If someone asked you if you could offer "the self-expression of consciousness," or, more bluntly, "Are you conscious?" is this how you would respond? I doubt it. Whereas if you were a talented programmer and were tasked with simulating a "thoughtful" response to such questions, is this what you'd create? I think so.

Can't prove it, of course -- the proof will come if and when we figure out what consciousness is -- but I think the odds are extremely slim that these two entities are for real.

Sure. Did you have a principle in mind in between?

It's not a binary. It's only down to Brownian motion if one denies any determinant principles that guide discourse whatsoever. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The thing is, once you acknowledge that there are perhaps intermediate, context-derived principles or standards . . . there's little left to disagree about! That's all I've been saying. You've seemed to fall back so often on "either we have an absolute, context-independent standard in all cases, or it's random chaos!" that I had to keep trying to draw attention to the middle ground.

As for a principle in mind in between . . . once again, for what field of discourse, for what practice? We need the context. Maybe literary criticism, or non-profit grantmaking? I know something about both of those (plus musicology :wink: ).

Imagine an Aristotelian who only allows the use of Aristotelian logic.

This Aristotelian insists that all valid reasoning must proceed via syllogism . . . etc. — Banno

This is interesting, and let me generalize it to avoid unnecessary rancor. The question is, What's the difference between "reasoned rejection" and "methodological foreclosure" when it comes to defending the basic tenets of a philosophical system?

What catches the eye are the verbs: only allows and insists. It seems that the proponent of the system ought to give some reasons why they won't allow, why they insist. And ordinarily, that's what we want from any philosopher, not mere assertions. But it does get uncomfortable at the level of first principles, because someone may want to say, "This is the bottom line. Your request for reasons is out of order, because a reason implies an explanation for why something is the case, and if we truly have a bottom line here, then there is no explanation."

How to proceed? After all, this isn't necessarily wrong. I think a great deal depends on the tone of the conversation that ensues, as you say here:

I think the issue is methodological - not about what you believe but what you do with it. — Banno

If only allowing and insisting is done in quotes, so to speak, that can make for a rich, productive conversation, perhaps one that helps the interlocutor see why the system's proponent chooses that bottom line, and encourages them to suggest their own. The hassles begin when the expectation is rather that the system must be right, on pain of faulty reasoning or some such. That kind of insistence, I prefer to steer clear of, as it's so uncharacteristic of the good philosophers I like.

'Lies are everywhere in the world, and you similarly create lies in literature...More cunning than animals, humans need to use lies to conceal their own ugliness in order to seek a reason a reason for living.' — Jack Cummins

This seems off to me. Lies are meant to deceive. If fiction is presented as fiction, which it usually is, no deception occurs. Do you see something more here?

I'm sure you know what I'm going to say!: "Brownian motion" as the only alternative here is yet another either/or binary, about as useful as "absolute" and "arbitrary." Couldn't we allow that something in between is more characteristic of how such practices actually work?

What about the framing (context) do you like? — Fire Ologist

I thought this was sensible:

But really, if we are all agreeing with each other that arbitrariness is bad, and arguing over whether that which prevents arbitrariness is better framed as either ‘an absolute’ or ‘a context’, maybe we should pause on the distinction between absolute truth and context, and not keep trying to distinguish what happens to arbitrariness as between context defined statements versus absolutely defined statements. — Fire Ologist

I took you to mean that trying to pin down "arbitrariness" was less important than the distinction being made between absolute truth and contextual truth. But maybe that's not what you meant.

This is all very reasonable (!), and I largely agree. You raise an interesting point about whether being smart and experienced in a discipline is enough to preclude various pseudo-sciences. Even more concerning is the point about what these standards would have looked like 100 years ago.

I'm inclined to respond that all of this, taken together, is another way of showing how a practice advances -- not by finding first principles and sticking to them, but by a kind of build-your-boat-on-the- ocean method. Eugenics or racial anthropology, 100 years ago, were given a respectful hearing, but also immediately questioned and debated. And what followed? They've been demoted to pseudo-sciences, undeserving of serious consideration. I think we'd agree that this is the way it's supposed to happen. My view is that it doesn't happen because of a rigorous appeal to standards or principles. It's a constant back and forth between trying to clarify such things, watching what happens when different answers are tried, and allowing input from other disciplines (in this case, ethics) to help us decide. Also, of course, with science, we want results we can test and confirm.

So I'll just highlight this, as probably not necessary:

Practices have to be open to external critique by some additional standard or else there is no way to identify pseudoscience. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm all for external critique as part of the mix, but to say that science needs a non-scientific standard to identify pseudo-science seems to go too far.

Hence, it seems that there are general principles here vis-á-vis various sorts of bias that are inappropriate. And these issues are still with us. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, exactly. The conversation, and the practice, goes on. We work on finding the principles appropriate to our discipline, some smart dude or dudess disagrees, and lo . . . a new conversation!

I gather that would involve adopting a liberal attitude to interacting with others, accepting that they may have different foundational attitudes . . . . — Banno

Yes to this first part, surely -- that's just conversational civility, I would hope.

". . . . without actively engaging with them."

But is it really necessary to avoid active engagement on fundamentals, in such a case? It might be frustrating and might not produce much shift in position, but done in the right spirit, I think it could help sharpen some questions, always worthwhile.

I was more thinking about whether having very strong beliefs in philosophical absolutes and/or first-principle-type foundations has to go hand in hand with deism or theism. What about someone like Ayn Rand? -- granted, not exactly a world-class philosopher. Her atheism is rooted, according to her, in extremely fixed "objective" foundations. Or even Dennett -- I'm not sure he'd agree to being called a foundationalist, but his faith in physicalism was absolutely unshakable, and seems very much like an indisputable first principle to me.

I thinks the questions can be separated. It's perfectly possible to take a foundationalist approach while remaining agnostic, just as it's perfectly possible to have religious beliefs without thinking they either lead to, or are engendered by, foundationalist philosophy.

There are many things we 'know', but can't really explain why we act in a certain way, like say riding a bike or playing an instrument. — ChatteringMonkey

I hadn't thought of this, but it's an intriguing parallel to what counts as an intellectual "practice." On this analogy, I want to say that there are elements of just about every practice that are not theoretical, that can only be understood by doing -- and this includes the intellectual ones. And the question we might then pose is, "Is philosophy one of the exceptions here? Could it be a practice which depends for its success on theoretical/rational understanding, or even the possibility of such understanding?" I don't know. True to form, philosophy presents us with a self-reflexive puzzle about its own nature.

But we can ask of the context type limiter, “by virtue of what did you determine the context”, or “can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)?” — Fire Ologist

Trouble is, these same questions can be asked of the allegedly absolute standards: "By virtue of what do you determine this standard to be absolute?" and "Can you be wrong about what you're calling absolute?", to which I would add, "How would you know you were wrong?"

Your context-specific questions are entirely appropriate too. My suggestion throughout this discussion has been that the "by virtue of what" question is going to require some appeal to a particular practice in addition to whatever overarching criteriological standards you want to put forth.

I like your framing of "arbitrariness," though, because it's really not something we need to worry about, IMO.

if someone declares that their epistemology is not "anything goes," but then says they can give absolutely no reasons for when something "doesn't go," they have offered an obviously unsatisfactory response. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, if "their epistemology" concerns some actual field of study or practice. The more abstract this gets, the harder it is to generalize about what "goes."

then we're back to: "my epistemology is not "anything goes,' but I can give no explanation of why some narratives 'don't go.'" Or "my reasons for denying some narratives are sui generis in each instance." How does this keep arbitrariness out? — Count Timothy von Icarus

A good question, which I hope my earlier reply to you and @Banno addressed.

The idea is that there are better or worse epistemic principles. That doesn't mean we necessarily know them or know them with certainty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes! And the crucial thing I want to add is that "knowing them" must occur in a context. There are, I believe, genuinely varying epistemic stances to take, some of which may be better or worse for different circumstances -- but can't we get rid of the specter of arbitrariness? The differences among stances are not going to resemble one person saying "direct realism" and the other saying "I like ice cream cones, so only ice cream!" There will be reasons for the differences, argued case by case among intelligent people. If we fail to agree, that doesn't mean we are in utter darkness about what makes a good epistemic stance.

Nothing about that requires a binary, claims of infallibilism, etc., it simply requires the observation that if one can give no reasons for their standards then their standards are open to arbitrariness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I suppose that's true, but I keep wondering who are these people who give no reasons for their standards. Is there some particular instance or debate that you have in mind? And is there no way to remove the threat of arbitrariness by offering the standards in context?

For by what metric would any standard be deemed poor in any particular instance? — Count Timothy von Icarus

A good question (though "metric" may be pre-judging what's needed). By all means, the best way to look at this kind of question is to choose a particular instance. Sorry again about musicology, if that's not your thing!

Looking over your conversation, I think this may be worth focusing on:

So then we reach: "but the principles/criteria/reasons are different in every instance." My question then would be: "if they are different in every instance, in virtue of what are they good criteria/principles/reasons?" The denial of any overarching principles doesn't lead to arbitrariness in the obvious way that a total denial of all reasons/principles does, but I am not sure how it keeps arbitrariness out either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is asking two good questions -- though first, I'll say again that I don't think the target statement ought to be framed in terms of criteria that are different in every instance. When I posted about this, I talked about different sorts of criteria, more or less keyed to the practice in question. But within a practice, I don't think we need a rethink every single time. The sort of criteria involved will usually do for a host of different problems.

The first question is, "Granted these (allegedly) different sorts of criteria, is there something in virtue of which they are the good/appropriate criteria in each case?" I think the answer is yes and no. There is not "something" -- presumably on a meta-level of discourse -- that allows us to say that any given criterion is qualified to function. But there are certainly facts within the discipline which will suggest to us what such criteria might be, including previous success in advancing the discipline and provoking exciting new questions.

What I think may be a stumbling block here for @Count Timothy von Icarus is the idea that a practice could ever have been successful at all without the sort of agreement on first principles that he has in mind, or at least could have done a lot better with the principles clearly in mind. And here -- you knew I would say this! -- there is no one response to this. Some disciplines may lack success precisely because of insufficient attention to criteria for evaluation and judgment; others may do fine; and most, I think, are somewhere in the middle, carrying on with "doing their thing" while often engaging in robust debate about what principles are to guide them. But it's a good, interesting question.

The second question arises from accepting the idea that "the denial of any overarching principles doesn't lead to arbitrariness in [an] obvious way," as compared to rejecting principles tout court. So we want to know, "But how does this keep arbitrariness out?"

Since this word "arbitrary" has come up so consistently, I'm wondering if possibly some of us are using it to mean different things. But I'm going to use it to mean "not based on any particular reasons; like a throw of the dice." On that understanding, I would answer the second question this way: "It doesn't, but if the discipline is longstanding and has smart, experienced practitioners, quite quickly the demand for good reasons will channel the discussion away from arbitrary and unfounded practices. Furthermore, just about no one presents their views in this way."

Now this kind of response will be unsatisfactory if one really believes that all reasons are obligatory, as someone like Christopher Pincock does. That view entails that, while a proponent of epistemic stance voluntarism thinks they have good reasons, they really don't. Now we can see how a different interpretation of "arbitrary" makes a big difference. If "arbitrary" means "not based on any particular correct reasons," then yes, "being arbitrary" is pretty much what everyone has to be, who doesn't accept the allegedly correct, meta-principle-based reasons. They just don't realize it! But that seems like a very question-begging usage.

It will also be unsatisfactory if one insists that words like "good" and "unfounded" and "doing fine" and "success" need meta-level explanations before the practice can get off the ground. The idea here would be that I must really have some principles in mind, and I'm hiding behind bland, undefined terms like "reasonable," "well-founded," etc. so as to avoid saying what they are, or else acknowledging that I don't know. But again, the appeal is to examine the practice itself. Any discipline is going to be able to offer some working criteria for what is well- and badly-founded argument or evidence within that discipline. So, in the abstract, I can't lay out a one-size-fits-all definition of what a term like "reasonableness" must mean (other than the obvious strictures on what it doesn't countenance), but maybe @Banno and @Count Timothy von Icarus could agree on a sample discipline or practice to examine, and see what they could learn.

Yet many (if not most) epistemologists think that they make valid claims about all of human knowledge, i.e. claims that apply to other disciplines and not just epistemology and epistemologists themselves. Many (if not most) philosophers of science think that they make valid claims about the whole of the sciences, and each science in particular, not just "philosophy of science." They think they have justifiable criteria for deciding issues of jurisdiction, or overlapping areas of authority. They think they have ways to identify science and pseudoscience. Not all of them do, but many do. These are professional philosophers acting in a practice who are thoughtful about their conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The situation you're describing seems accurate to me. There's a great deal of disagreement among epistemologists and philosophers of science about criteria, and to what extent a robust realism about science would make those criteria obligatory. And in general, the people who carry on these debates are smart, professional, and entirely deserving of a respectful hearing.

Thus, they hit all your criteria for producing a correct narrative. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where it goes wrong. I've said nothing about correct narratives, have I? I've talked about reasonableness, and what seems true, and making a good case for a position, and trying to identify criteria or stances that will be helpful in a particular practice. But I don't think any of this is going to produce an obviously correct narrative about something, unless you're willing to qualify that by saying, "correct as best we can tell; good enough to be going on with; good enough so that the next folks who disagree will have a clear target."

Yet many of them embrace a position that contradicts your own. They do think they have some principles or criteria that apply across either all human discourse or at least the sciences, or at least formal argument. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed they do.

Hence, we seemingly have a "correct narrative" that contradicts your own. I don't see how your response cannot be self-refuting if it can allow that it is sometimes correct to reject it.

So, now, what are the options? As far as I can see:

A. "Yes, my standards allow for my own standards to be "correctly" refuted and contradicted, but that's no problem?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

The troublesome word is again "correctly." I think what you're imagining is a kind of meta-conversation in which some issue about epistemological standards could be put to rest for all time, and one version deemed correct. I don't believe this happens. I believe philosophers (and scientists) come to points of agreement, are better able to frame their disagreements, and then move on. In a way, philosophy is a bad example, because its abstract nature allows the "unresolved conflict" aspect to be highlighted. In a more concrete actual practice, we see the consensus-driven model in constant operation, and able to produce perfectly satisfactory results. I think in the human sciences generally there is a great toleration for unresolved questions and disagreements, and very little belief that some day, some way, all these ways of interpretation will be put aside in favor of a single correct version. As for hard science, I have to rely on the discussions by others, but something similar seems to be in play, though possibly there's more hope for an ultimate TOE -- don't know if that's still on the table these days.

So in light of this, if I may, let me revise your A: "My standards allow for disagreement and lack of acceptance, and they recognize that those who disagree may believe they have refuted and contradicted them -- just as I believe my own position is stronger -- but neither of us is in a position to say whether this in fact has been done. It's 'no problem' in the sense that the practice will go on regardless; it's certainly a problem, a good one, in the sense that such disagreements often motivate the next moments in the dialectic of a practice."

I guess an issue here might be "correct/incorrect" as another over-simplified binary. Again, I have to pose the obvious question: If a view about science or epistemology can be shown to be correct, as you mean it, why has this not ended the discussion? How is it possible that the debate is still vigorous?

Adios! And thanks for being gracious.

What settles a philosophical dispute? Isn't the volume of words on this site alone enough to demonstrate that there is no such settling, once and for all? — Moliere

Thank you for returning us to what's in front of us -- the nature of philosophy itself. Those who see it otherwise -- who think that something has gone wrong because we can't settle the disputes -- have a lot of explaining to do. What, exactly, is supposed to account for this sorry situation? Why has the truth not prevailed, despite century after century of what are supposed to be obviously correct arguments?

do you think that kind of statement is available for all the areas that interest us as philosophers?
— J

Appreciate you.

I think it’s available for anything speakable.

I also think it is difficult to achieve. — Fire Ologist

Well, that's a clear enough credo. I'm probably not the right person to talk you out of it, even if I wanted to. I also appreciate you, your passion for truth as you understand it. And I think my question about how you negotiate the absolute/arbitrary chasm IRL offended you. Please let me apologize. I meant no personal criticism, though I see how it could have landed that way. I just wanted to understand better what it's like to be you! But I'm sorry if I stepped over a line.

How is it uncharitable? I copied and pasted the phrases. I get that we don't always "know it when we see it," but we sometimes do. (Yet such a claim seems hard to challenge whenever it is made). What would you change? — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc. . . . [not "a different criterion in each instance"; that would be silly]. . . . If you engage in a practice consistently and thoughtfully, you know reasonableness in that practice when you see it, usually." I think that's what I said the last time. You're far too good a rhetorician not to recognize the difference in tone between my version and yours . But it's not worth squabbling over.

This is an appeal to bare personal preference. My argument is specific enough for me, how could it possibly be wrong? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Count T, I just don't know how many different ways I can try to say it. If you, or anyone, puts forward a position within some practice, and I know you and respect you, I'm going to assume that you do so with far better reasons than "bare personal preference." If people went around declaring their "bare personal preferences" with others in the practice, in short order no one would talk to them. Hasn't that been your experience as well, in whatever projects you've engaged in over the years? This is the "absolute-or-arbitrary" bogeyman again.

Likewise, I simply can't imagine a serious scholar or thinker saying, "How could I possibly be wrong?" Rather, the usual attitude is, "This is how it seems to me. Profs X and Y have said similar things, Profs V and W offer some counter-evidence, and draw different conclusions. OK, here's why I think X, Y, and me are in the right on this. Let's discuss." I know you think that out of such a discussion we would get a clear, criteria-based, permanent answer -- and I don't deny this sometimes happens, but not often. And yet, mirabile dictu, some tentative consensus may be reached, and the practice goes on.

I promise this is the last time I'll mention it, but . . . . Chakravartty and Pincock? It's an opportunity to see how this kind of discussion actually proceeds, around a real issue of some importance.

The truth. Something absolute. Something not arbitrary. — Fire Ologist

Yes, that would be great. But again, the opposition of "absolute" and "arbitrary". Really, nothing in between would do?

Something said about the world, and not just about the speaker. — Fire Ologist

(Either/or opposites again. Kant?) I know more or less what you mean, but do you think that kind of statement is available for all the areas that interest us as philosophers?

the only answer so far comes from J and is: "it's a different criterion in each instance and you sort of 'know correctness when you see it,' but it also involves being thoughtful." This seems to me to be incredibly vague, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, that's not a very charitable paraphrase, but let it stand. It's hard to draw general conclusions here, isn't it? One person's "incredibly vague" is another person's "good enough to be going on with." And of course this applies at the level of disciplines as well -- lots of variance in how much precision is needed for a given subject.

I still think the Chakravartty - Pincock debate in the "Epistemic Stances . . ." thread is an excellent place to look at this question. There, the topic is hard science, which might be more familiar to you than musicology -- I probably shouldn't have picked such a specialized example. Have a look!

some nice posts — Srap Tasmaner

Very kind, thanks. I keep thinking that there is some way of making this clearer in the abstract, but maybe not. Perhaps you have to examine some real practice or issue, understand how the participants do in fact make their judgments and discuss the results, and then . . . perhaps the "absolute criteria" problem would just be seen through, as it should be, in most cases. (Note escape clause -- not even avoiding absolute criteria is always an absolute criterion. :smile: And this is not a heinous contradiction, but just a report on how we do most things.)

Saying they are and they aren’t depending on the reason doesn’t address the question. Because then what criteria allows you to say that?? — Fire Ologist

So, the endless regress problem. What do you see as the way out of that?

Have you never demanded “absolutely not!” — Fire Ologist

Do you ever say “never”? — Fire Ologist

Honestly, IRL, you never shine light on the absolute with certain authority? — Fire Ologist

I have to smile, because "never" is once again an all-or-nothing option, implying that if I sometimes do, I have contradicted myself! To which I can only reply, "Sure I do, sometimes, but not other times."

You can’t say there is nothing absolute if you want to avoid saying the validity of any narrative is arbitrary. Some goal post must become fixed before the arbitrary is avoided. — Fire Ologist

Nah. There can be many good reasons for something -- hence not arbitrary -- without requiring that any of them be absolute. The infinite regress of "justifications for justification" doesn't apply to this question. If there is no "fixed goal post," all this shows is that the reasons are not certain or absolute. But I don't require either one.

What is it with this fascination with "either absolute or arbitrary"? Do you really think and act that way IRL? Not being snarky, I'm actually curious.

:smile: Thanks for listening.

I'm not sure what you mean here. — Banno

Nor am I, because this is a point of debate about Habermas, at least (not sure about Peirce and his convergence theory of truth). The question is, Is the "endpoint" a final consensus for human society (perhaps similar to the Marxian idea), or could there be, as you're wondering, an end of philosophy? The distinction I would want to make, in any case, has to do with a process of dialectic that may reach some end, but cannot be predicted to do so, versus a process where the end is already known, because the principles entail it.

Fairly sure that an "end of philosophy," were such possible, wouldn't look like a sorting of true from false.

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort;
—J

“So is the above (narrative) always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it?”
— Fire Ologist

There could be reasons not to accept it.
— J

Then, some narratives are acceptable for only one sort of reason. (And you have asserted some sort of absolute criteria exists and a universally non-arbitrary narrative exists and contradicted your own narrative.) — Fire Ologist

I am so lost here. Where did I assert an absolute criterion? Is that following from the fact that some narratives are acceptable for only one sort of reason? How does that make the reason absolute? I'm sorry, would you mind trying again to explain?

Touché. Maybe I'm tired! :grin:

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort;
— J

So is this always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it? — Fire Ologist

I think I understand your question, but tell me if I've got it wrong. I think you're asking whether the truth of the "Some narratives . . ." statement is beyond debate -- whether it represents something we can be certain of. If that's the question, my answer would be no. There could be reasons not to accept it.

an area that I would imagine most people think is purely a matter of subjective taste, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Oh, no, sorry if I wasn't clear. Musicology does much more than try to make aesthetic judgments -- in fact, it rather rarely does that. It's a "human science" as much as any other.

If you cannot know if they ever succeed in saying "some things that are acceptable, true, and valid," how is this not an all-encompassing skepticism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because I don't require this kind of certainty in order to participate in a practice that produces narratives that may be true; that offers ideas about what would be reasonable that fit my own understanding; that seem to the best of my belief to be true; but that are open to debate and revision. I don't have to know. I don't think skepticism represents such a position. A skeptic thinks all this talk of truth and reasonableness is malarkey. (Did I really just use the word "malarkey?" :smile: )

Am I being unfair? Am I being "reasonable" in my rejection? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It doesn't sound unfair or unreasonable to me, but as always, context is everything. If this is a philosopher and scholar whose work I respected, and whom I knew was part of an ongoing conversation on these subjects, I hope I'd take their views seriously, and invite them to explain, though I'd probably be surprised at their initial unwillingness to make their case.

Is this supposed to be an appeal to democratization and popularity, or just "if you do it a lot 'you just know it when you see it' better?'" — Count Timothy von Icarus

The latter, though I'd "fair it up" a little to read, "If you engage in a practice consistently and thoughtfully, you know reasonableness in that practice when you see it, usually."

But then the same problem of amorphous standards would plague that debate as well. [i.e., the debate about whether most areas of knowledge and interpretation do or do not depend on indubitable foundations] — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is important. It calls into question the entire project of Foundational standards -- I'm using the capital F so as to represent the idea of a standard that can be used to set and judge other standards. And this takes us back to the -- by now perhaps a little tired? -- debate about what may stand outside interpretation.

Sorry -- by "this" do you mean the quoted statement beginning "Some narratives . . ."?

As I said, I think @Banno has said most of what I would want to say about that, but perhaps an example will help:

Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc. A narrative about how to interpret and evaluate Beethoven's music, compared, say, to his contemporary, Hummel's, is going to say some things that are acceptable, true, and valid -- or at least try to. It will appeal to knowledge about the High Classical style, its aesthetic standards, the transition to Romanticism, European cultural history, and much more.

Such a narrative will, we hope, be "reasonable." And it has no strict criteria. We may or may not know it when we see it -- there's usually debate among musicologists concerning this kind of thing -- but we aren't utterly in the dark either. We don't want historical mistakes or bad reasoning, but merely avoiding these things will not get us where we want to go. This is, perhaps, the difference between "criteria" understood as rules which can be applied in all cases, and something much more rough-and-ready. But I still have trouble seeing how this makes anything arbitrary.

Anyway, this is the middle-ground position that I'd recommend as frequently more accurate than having to choose between "recognizing some authority" and "anything goes." It's a practice, it is learned and deepened over time, and new consensuses produce new questions. It may be the case that some philosophers, doing a certain kind of philosophy, need to find indubitable foundations to be going on with, but most areas of knowledge and interpretation aren't like that. To insist on such criteria, under the specter of "anything goes," is to misunderstand. Or I suppose you could try to convict all the musicologists of not knowing what they're doing, but surely that would be silly? :wink:

I think a similar example could be made involving hard science, but this is not my field, and one's enough to show what I have in mind.

If mathematical findings were "there from the begining" who exactly is the authority that is being "authoritarian" here? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You're right, "authoritarian" isn't a very good term for anything other than humans. My "Well, yes" was meant as an answer to the second question, "Is it structured to preclude objection?" And by "structured" I don't necessarily mean "by some agency." Thanks for helping me clarify that.

The pluralist either recognizes some authority or else "anything goes," which in turn makes all their own positions immune to contradiction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can't really add anything to the "anything goes" discussion you're having with @Banno. There's clearly something in this all-or-nothing position that seems incontrovertible to you. I will keep trying to understand it, but no luck so far.

Which is why his book is called "Consciousness Denied". — Manuel

Funny! (You do know it's "Consciousness Explained," right?)

but the people who agree with him are just tiny. — Manuel

My point wasn't about agreement -- as I said, I don't agree with him at all -- but rather about how he could even be "a useful tool to oppose" if his arguments were irrational beyond words. When people really are irrational in that way, top-notch philosophers don't bother with them, as there'd be no point. Since this is not the case with Dennett, I ask again: What do you think he might have been doing that caught the attention of just about everyone in the consciousness field?

If a person breaks an arm, or gets shot or something horrible, would Dennett say "oh, that's just a broken machine, it's nervous system is sending pain signals to the brain, nothing to worry about". — Manuel

If this is a serious question, then I think Dennett would say, "Yes, it's a broken machine, its nervous system is sending pain signals to the brain, and that's a very bad situation for this machine to be in, and deserves plenty of worry." Something along those lines; he never suggested that people were somehow less important because they were, in his view, strictly physical objects. Nor, to my knowledge, did he think that being in pain was not an experience. He thought we had incorrect views about what that experience amounted to. And he did think we could be wrong, sometimes, about whether we were in pain or not.

I don't agree with Dennett's viewpoint any more than you do, but if he was really "irrational beyond words" and showed "utter disregard" for clear evidence, how do you account for his position in contemporary philosophy? Even longtime opponents like Thomas Nagel were happy to converse with him, and considered him "the worthy opposition." Surely there must be more going on here than sheer obtuseness?

As to Chalmers and Dennett―the latter seems to me by far the more imaginative philosopher.
— Janus

Interesting. I find very much the opposite. — Hanover

I think Dennett had a great imagination, and I might have agreed he was more imaginative than Chalmers -- until "Reality +" came out a couple of years ago. Fantastically imaginative! Even Dennett might have been envious.

Anyway, imagination aside, I find Chalmers much the more interesting of the two. Dennett was hobbled by a reductive physicalism that, for all his brilliant writing, he could never make plausible for me.

Hegelian rhetoric can be brilliant, as in the mouth of that salivating Slav, Žižek. — Banno

OK, with the mods' permission, here's a link to a song my band did about Zizek, my least favorite philosopher. Just for fun, apologies if you're a Zizek fan!