So, you don't think it is obviously impossible to demonstrate that a speculative metaphysical claim (purportedly) based on reliable intuition is just that rather than something merely imagined? If you believe that, one might ask then why such has not already been demonstrated such that no impartial person could reasonably question its veracity. — Janus

This is one of my perennial favorite philosophical puzzles. If Major Philosophical Position A is obviously correct, how is it that Major Philosophical Positions B, C, and D remain on the table, amongst skilled philosophers? I'm sure you're aware that your question, when applied self-reflexively, yields the same question you're asking about the opposite view: If it is indeed the case that the lack of demonstration of the SMC (speculative metaphysical claim) shows it to be impossible to so demonstrate, why then hasn't everyone agreed that this is so, and closed the book on the question?

I don't have a pat answer to this waiting in the wings. I genuinely believe it's a meta-question about philosophy that deserves much more attention than it gets in analytic-philosophy circles, not just about SMCs but about any longstanding philosophical dispute.

'Reality' is the one word that should always appear in quotation marks. — Vladimir Nabokov

This begins to explain the power of mercy, I think. An impartial, unmerciful judge would treat all of us justly -- and what a terrible fate that would be!
— J
If the punishment prescribed for various crimes is disproportionate, then it is unjust punishment. Mercy doesn't come in to it. — Ludwig V

I think you're missing Hamlet's point. :smile: He was suggesting that just, proportionate punishment is what we all have coming, because we've all missed the mark to varying degrees. But the fact that it's just doesn't make it any less terrible to endure.

Here's another way to think about it: Justice = being given what you deserve. Injustice = being given less than you deserve. Mercy = being given more than you deserve.
— J
Very neat. But you are over-simplifying. — Ludwig V

Definitely. Just working with the idea that "justice" has more than one opposite.

I'm gloomily contemplating the idea that one of the underlying cultural problems around all of this was, in fact, created by Christian culture itself, in that the way it developed inadvertently demolished the idea of the 'scala natura' and the idea of higher truth, that being deemed elitist and in contradiction of the universal salvation offered to all who would believe. — Wayfarer

A fascinating and difficult issue. If philosophy is understood as an ideal form of rationalism, then I do think it "stops at the door" of spiritual or religious forms of life. But you're pointing out that it doesn't have to be understood that way. Philosophy might be a doorway to a higher, non- or super-rational truth. But on this construal, it raises the problem of elitism, just as you say. Or, if "elitism" is a bit worn-out as a term, we could say "privileged access."

It certainly offends most Christian ears that access to the highest and most God-like realities is limited to a few who have walked the difficult path of philosophical knowledge. But this possibility is surely there as far back as the Gospels -- only it's not the intellectual or rational path that is difficult, but the ethical one. When Jesus (in one of his rare moments of humor) tells the rich young man who's done everything right that there's "just one more thing" he has to do -- give all his riches to the poor and join the Jesus followers -- he's making it clear that the kind of "salvation" the young man wants is not for everyone, but only for those who are really willing to go all the way in their lives, not their thoughts. That can't be very many, then or now.

But anyone can quote scripture for their own purposes, and there are plenty of traditional Christian teachings that say the opposite -- "only believe" and you will be saved, etc. And this doesn't touch the specific question of the role philosophy ought to play. Maybe we should just say that the relation of intellect to spiritual insight is vexed, with no clear consensus having emerged.

What puzzles me is that mercy is so often represented as a kind of get-out-of-jail-free card that is handed out more or less at random to those who don't deserve it. How is this a good thing? — Ludwig V

Yes, this is part of the "very deep question" that @Wayfarer points out. Mercy is precisely most admirable when it's undeserved. But consider this from Hamlet:

"Use every man after his desert, and who should 'scape whipping?"

This begins to explain the power of mercy, I think. An impartial, unmerciful judge would treat all of us justly -- and what a terrible fate that would be!

Here's another way to think about it: Justice = being given what you deserve. Injustice = being given less than you deserve. Mercy = being given more than you deserve.

Note that i haven't said that the discovery of universal metaphysical truths via intellectual intuition is obviously impossible, but that it is obviously impossible to demonstrate that what has been purportedly discovered is truly a discovery and not simply an imagining. — Janus

A fair distinction. The individual who claims to have made such a discovery may be in the position of indeed having done so, but being faced with the impossibility of ever demonstrating it. (I still don't think anything here is obvious, but no matter. :smile: )

The principle exists in the NT, ‘as you sow’ - but in Christian doctrine I think it is defrayed by Christ’s atonement. But it’s a very deep question. — Wayfarer

Yes -- the reconciliation of justice with mercy. I may be wrong, but I get a flavor of this in some versions of Buddhism as well. The bodhisattva deserves to be released from the wheel of dharma -- that would be just. But they choose to show mercy on unenlightened beings by returning to help them.

I agree that all of what you cited are fitting problems for philosophy. But I also think that ever since Kant, Hegel notwithstanding, it has been obvious that the traditional idea that one could arrive at metaphysical truths via intellectual intuition is, if not impossible, at least impossible to verify. — Janus

Good. And starting with Kant, and the relation of metaphysics to human knowledge, would be a sensible program. We could take a sounding on what is indeed possible, both to know and/or to verify. My only quibble: If the conclusion here is obvious, as you say, one wonders why the debate has nonetheless gone on with vigor for so long -- i.e., you may be right, but not obviously right.

While this process [of interpreting powerful altered states in metaphysical terms] may indeed be of phenomenological interest, it cannot be held to yield any propositional truth, and so could be of no help for metaphysics. — Janus

Again, this might be true. But whether it's true is a philosophical question. It seems to me that discussing that question is neither apologetics nor phenomenology, but plain old epistemology, wouldn't you say? As such, shouldn't it be a respectable activity for a philosopher?

Perhaps what you're saying is that you believe you have independent and solid grounds for insisting that only propositional truths can be helpful in metaphysics -- and moreover, that religious discourse can't supply them. I bet you can guess what I'm going to say next! :smile: : This may be true, but whether it's true requires . . . more philosophy.

What I can criticize are rational arguments for the existence of God, and weak apologetics...I've examined them all and none of them work. If you are a believer why not accept that, simply believe on the strength of feeling alone. like Kierkegaard's arational "leap of faith" and leave others to their own feelings in the matter? For many reasons I don't think it is an interesting or fitting topic for philosophical discussion. — Janus

As it happens, I agree with you about the rational arguments. I believe religion begins where philosophy ends. And theology, that halfway house, has never interested me much. But let me push back a little on your final sentence, or at least the "fitting" part. Whether it is true -- whether it's fitting for philosophy to examine rational apologetics -- is itself a philosophical question. The arguments themselves may or may not fit comfortably within philosophical practice. But that too is a philosophical question.

I'm pointing out this peculiarity of philosophy: To consider whether something should be ruled in or out of philosophy is . . . to do more philosophy! And I'm sure you're not saying that the meta-question itself is inappropriate.

We have had personal tragedies in my immediate and extended family, but I’ve never felt that it was something God did. The question ‘how could God let this happen?’ never occurred to me. — Wayfarer

Nor me, in quite that way. I was bringing up this example as a contrast with the idea that such grief is experienced as a privation, a lack, not as an indictment of God.

I still feel that what we experience as divine indifference is understandable in the Augustinian framework of the privation (or deprivation) of the good. We experience this as lack or want - lack of health, lack of ease, lack of sustenance, and lack of love — Wayfarer

But I agree, it's a very deep and difficult issue. — Wayfarer

Yes, and I'm under no illusions that anything I propose could settle the issue. But about privation . . . I don't know whether you've had the misfortune of watching a parent suffer the loss of a child. In such a case, I'm fairly sure the experience is not one of lack or want; it's an active and excruciating suffering. And once again, it's hard to put this down to mere divine indifference. Perhaps, if that's all it was, we might manage to see the experience as a lack of the good, misinterpreted by us as a not-caring. But the problem is that God, in the tradition we're discussing, is posited as caring very much. So we need to square that -- the God of love -- with the creator of a natural world which is clearly hostile or indifferent to human beings. Privation? OK, but why so much of it? And why must children and parents suffer the consequences?

The other reason is that no mention of an afterlife is posited for the animals, who also suffer. — Janus

Completely agree. Traditional Christian theology is primitive, in this area. But I think we can "expand the circle of compassion" without necessarily moving out of the Abrahamic traditions entirely. (FWIW, I've been an animal-rights advocate -- and vegan -- for decades.)

So, 'salvation' is an empty word, a cruel hoax on mankind. There has never been such a state, the whole thing is a monstrous lie, foisted on mankind by unscrupulous institutions bent on exploitation. Correct? — Wayfarer

No, definitely not. I'm saying the opposite. It would be a monstrous lie, cruel hoax, etc, if there were indeed no salvation, no possibility of an afterlife. But I believe there is, and not for nothing is this the central metaphysical tenet of traditional Christian theology. I think that when the Western tradition speaks of a god of love and justice, those words mean just what they mean to any ordinary human being. In order for God to truly deserve being described with those qualities, however, this life cannot be the end of the story.

But we can't play games with words and try to maintain that "love" in God's eyes "really" means what humans mean by "cruelty" or "indifference."

It's the turning of the theological backs on human notions of goodness and justice which I find indefensible. — Janus

That's it, in a nutshell. If our human notions of goodness and justice are so far off the mark, from God's point of view, then why call God "really" good or just at all? It's just words, at that point. I think there are ways to "get God off the hook" but this isn't one of them. It's as shameful as a parent whipping a child into the hospital while saying, "But this is just a sign of how much I love you." Yeah, with love like that, who needs hatred?

I think the conversation got away from PSR quite some time ago, but OK! Maybe another time.

Well, sort of. I'm invoking the standard construal of something like "p → q; p; ~q". This would be impossible by virtue of the assigned meanings of the logical connectives -- does that count as a priori? And there are no tensed versions of such a statement; it's meant to be false for all instances in the past and in the future.

I'm interested to know what's caught your attention here. Sometimes the most obvious construals can be wrong, so by all means tell me what you're thinking.

So we have at least three sorts of implication - logical, volitive and physical.

And I dare claim only the first involves what might be called determinism. — Banno

I agree. And "might be called" is a good way of saying it, because logical or semantical determinism is peculiarly arid and sui generis, and doesn't really scare us in the way that the other kinds do -- or at least it never has for me. One more quote from Wallace:

"Taylor was offering a very curious sort of argument: a semantic argument for a metaphysical conclusion. . . . If Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics."

PS -- You could also divide physical determinism into two classes: Things that are necessary/ impossible for everyone under all circumstances, and things that are so only for me. Class one: It's impossible for humans to flap their arms and fly -- no one can. Class two: I can't be in Australia tonight -- but you can. Are these things "determined"? I don't think so, but the question is probably an open one, depending on usage.

Sorry, the "that" was ambiguous. Better to have said, "A logical impossibility is so by virtue of its form. And we know that logical form is unaffected by tense."

See the example I gave @Banno from Wallace.

That's an issue of accessibility, it seems to me. So the day before the battle might occur, the possible world in which it takes place and the possible world in which it does not take place are accessible. If it occurs, then the day after, only the possible world in which it did occur will be accessible. — Banno

Yes, a perfectly good way of putting it.

Strictly logical modalities don't work this way; logical form doesn't occur in physical space/time at all.
— J
Not following that. — Banno

I'll try to put it more precisely. A logical impossibility is so by virtue of its form. That form is unaffected by tense. A physical impossibility, on the other hand, may be so by virtue of a host of stipulations about the physical world, including temporal ones. I found a helpful paraphrase in the Wallace essay:

The "→" acts differently in

1) (Order O → Battle B)

from the way it acts in, say,

2) ((p & q) → p).

The arrow in 2 is the arrow of material implication and expresses what Hume would call mere "relations among ideas" . . . In contrast, though, the arrow in 1 tells us something about the world. There is nothing about the "concept" of my giving order O that contains or logically entails the occurrence of battle B tomorrow. — Wallace, 147

The sea-battle problem, if it is a problem, depends on a variety of stipulations, including tense, about the world in which it occurs. I didn't mean anything more metaphysically dodgy than that.

David Foster Wallace gives a very original analysis of the sea-battle problem in his "Richard Taylor's 'Fatalism' and the semantics of physical modality." (Before he turned to fiction, Wallace was on track to be a professional philosopher.) Wallace uses Taylor's canonical essay “Fatalism” as his target to contest the apparent contradiction in the sea-battle problem. Taylor believes that the logical and semantical premises of the problem do indeed force an acceptance of determinism. But Wallace makes this distinction:

The legitimate conclusion of Taylor’s argument can only be that, given the absence of a battle today, it is not today possible that I did give order O at P1, not that at P1 it was not possible for me to give order O if I chose to do so. — Wallace, in Fate, Time, and Language, 170-71

Wallace constructs an entire toy modality system, based on Kripke and Montague’s work, to demonstrate how this works. He also offers an ordinary-language way of capturing a critical modal difference in how we think about tensed operations:

[If there is no sea-battle, then it] can’t have occurred yesterday, not that it couldn’t occur yesterday. This is an absolutely vital sort of distinction. Compare the following sentences, and think of the kinds of “impossibilities” they really express: “It can’t have rained last night; there are no puddles on the sidewalk this morning” vs. “It couldn’t rain last night; last night a high-pressure ridge was keeping all precipitation-causing clouds out of the area.”

. . . The thing to see is that every properly used physical-modal operator appears, and is to be evaluated as appearing, within the scope of an index-specifying tense operator (or tense-marker); when no tense-/time-operator is explicitly designated, it takes as a default assignment the index “here and now.” [This] actually reflects the way considerations of tense, time and modality are used in our everyday thinking and speech. — Wallace, 171

In the “rain” example, the tense-markers (and concomitant physical conditions) of “last night” vs. “right here now” determine how we evaluate the modal possibilities. And the sea-battle's possibility will change, depending on whether we're looking forward or looking back. Strictly logical modalities don't work this way; logical form doesn't occur in physical space/time at all.

Einstein said once, in dialogue with Tagore, 'I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.' But this overlooks the point that it is something only man can know. It's not a sense object, but an intelligible relationship that can only be discerned by a rational intellect. Like all of physics. The problem with today's understanding is, that it generally forgets to take into account the mind that knows it. — Wayfarer

I agree that taking into account the knowing mind is essential, and that too much physicalist or scientistic thinking refuses to see this.

But actually, it makes a difference whether "the knowing mind" is limited to a human mind. Let's go with your other term, "a rational intellect," instead. What might this include? Other intelligent ET species, certainly. But also the sort of cosmic mind that is often posited in religion. Is there an argument you'd want to make that such a mind is impossible, or hopelessly unlikely? If not, and positing such a mind, then the existence of all intellectual objects of knowledge doesn't require human minds at all. Isn't that exactly the sort of independence we're looking for?

And if you want to get really Western-theistic, not only does this cosmic mind know intellectual objects, but they created them in the first place, arguing for even more independence from human thought.

But . . . even if all this were true, we're still left with the gap between how we represent this relationship of intellectual objects to ourselves, and how the cosmic mind did or does. Any sort of mind-independence calls into question the accuracy of what we can know. It requires further premises and arguments to conclude that the Pythagorean theorem looks the same to you, me, ET, and God.

I do think there are objective/intersubjective values, quite apart from my personal opinions about them.
— J

Could you elucidate? I've been looking for something of that order for two decades. — AmadeusD

That would be a good challenge for me. I'll try. Give me a few days.

:cool:

I whine, I rot. What a relief, I was afraid I'd be diagnosed as a liberal! :smile: We progressives hate that.

Ah well, we'll muddle on then. Your reply isn't quite what I had in mind by "achieving a critical center."

I am referring to AmadeusD's contention that the "good" and "ought" of most ethics is not a true "moral good" or "moral ought" (which you seemed to be agreeing with?), while nonetheless being unable to describe or give examples of what such a "moral good" or "moral ought" would even entail. — Count Timothy von Icarus

OK, this helps. I don't know if I've got @AmadeusD right, but I think the position you're describing would be something like: When we say "ought" in an ethical context, we mean "I ought to do this if I hold certain values and wish to achieve them." I took him to mean that asking for a further, special "moral ought" -- which would be categorical, and which would also specify the values -- is a mistake. If that's what he meant, then clearly he can't give any examples because he thinks there aren't any. Is that absurd? Or am I still not getting it?

Turning to my own thoughts: I don't think you can generate a moral ought from an "is" -- or a definition, or a first premise. I'm not sure how that fits into the situation you describe. Perhaps you think it must be absurd to claim to be a moral realist and yet not base values on rational premises? I don't see that, but please say more about it, if that's what you mean.

It's strange to me that someone would accept facts about values, and facts about human flourishing, but not ethics on the grounds that the aforementioned are not properly "moral." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure they're properly moral. But they don't generate an ought. Being moral is not rationally obligatory.

What's the idea: "There are facts about what is good and evil, but this tells us nothing about what one ought to do?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ought to do if what?

this seems bizarre to me. "This car is better in every way, and cheaper," doesn't provoke the response "ok, so this one is clearly better, but I don't know which I ought to pick, the better or the worse?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm afraid it's still not categorical, because you're assuming a desire for a car. What would be bizarre would be this: "I want a good car, and this car is better in every way, but I don't know which to pick." Again, the difference between a value and an "ought."

Obligation and duty are one reason why it might be good to do something. That you can find no connection between "x is best" and "you should choose x," would seem to lie in this idea you have that any "ought" must be in the context of some sort of command, a "thou shalt." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is good. It's true that a deontological approach will tend to emphasize the obligatory concepts involved in ethics. But I don't think knowing "what is best" in ethics (which, from the standpoint of a non-Aristotelian, doesn't at all resemble knowing what a good car is) can result in the statement, "Therefore, you should do what is best."

Let's stay with your car example. You agree, I'm sure, that it's reasonable for a person to say, "Yes, I quite see that this is the best car, but as I don't want a car, I won't buy it." However, you don't think it's reasonable for a person to say, "Yes, I quite see that this action X is the best thing to do, ethically, but as I'm not interested in the ethical good, I won't do it." That's probably where our conceptions differ. You think that to be a human generates an automatic interest in a single best way to live -- or, perhaps, that it's impossible for a human not to want the best way to live, however misguided they may be. Would that it were so!

One of us has a definition. The Good is "that at at which all things aim." I am not dogmatically rejecting any other definitions (indeed, I asked for them), I am pointing out that the objections in this thread are based on no definitions at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the dogmatism -- though that may be too strong -- lies in your insistence that only "providing a definition" will further the discussion, which in turn implies that the entire subject is capable of such definitions. Some of your interlocutors don't believe it is. I'm not that skeptical, but I do think the "dueling definitions" method is not the only way to approach a deep philosophical subject. For instance, my reply to your request for a definition of capital-G Good would be, "There is no single definition. The term is used in a variety of contexts and intentions, especially within ethics. Let's look at some of them and see what we can learn." Is that really such an illegitimate starting point?

The other issue of dogmatism here -- and forgive me if this is too harsh -- is that I often get the sense that you think any position that contradicts Aristotle or the Scholastics must be wrong -- that this is your starting point. I'm sure you try to be fair, but the (strong) preference is apparent. You believe Aristotle & Co. discovered all the important philosophical truths long ago. But please correct me if this is ungenerous.

Tigers being "aquatic reptiles" might be "absurd," but there is certainly a dialogue to be had about why it is wrong, and why "tigers are large stripped cats" is better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course, as I said. Reasons can always be compared and judged.

This conversation seems more to me like "tigers aren't large striped cats because real tigers are x." And then to the question: "what is this x that real tiger possess?" the answer is: "I don't know, it probably doesn't exist" or "x exists but it is inaccessible to reason." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, the quest for definitions. I really wouldn't approach such a conversation by trying to find some essence that a real tiger possesses. I might say, "Here are the problems I see with your concept of a tiger [if I saw any]. Let's see if we can work our way toward a better understanding."

OK, thanks.

I'll ponder that Mill quote. Thinking about Germany's current policies on Nazi speech . . . perhaps there's such a thing as an entire nation suffering trauma, and being determined not to let it happen again. Anyway, we in the US try to live up to Mill's ideal, in theory. We're allowed to be stupid and wrong in public. Our free-speech problems lie elsewhere, I think: For whom is free speech free, once the legal protection is put in place?

I’m not even sure “cancel culture” is an actual phenomenon, to be honest. — NOS4A2

Thank you! It may be a shadow on the cave wall . . . one of those pictures our media friends like to show us.

Yes. I was appreciating your OP all the way until you got to the part about not tolerating cancel culture etc. What, exactly, would we want to make illegal here? Saying that someone ought not to be given a platform? Trying to deny them one? Succeeding? Not only does this send the speaker into hiding, as @Richard B, says, but it really lowers the bar on what it means to be intolerant. Popper seems to have violent, anti-tolerant (not merely intolerant) rhetoric and behavior in mind, not refusing to screen Woody Allen movies.

We should also remember the distinction between a person and a government. I may want my government to tolerate all manner of crap that I personally wouldn't.

.

Is a definition of "ethics" and "good" that makes it impossible to demonstrate a single example of such an "ethical good" or to even explain under what conditions something could be said to be "ethically good" or a "moral ought" not absurd? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You've alluded to something like this before, but I really don't follow. I believe I've said quite a bit about the ethical good and the moral ought, focusing on the important (to me) epistemological distinction between value and obligation. But I may well be missing what you mean. If you have the patience, could you say more about the absurdity?

you seem to think that in ethical matters "any definition is as good as any other." — Count Timothy von Icarus

But I said just the opposite! "This is not a brief for ethical relativism."

If someone wants to define a tiger as "an aquatic reptile," there would be an impasse so long as the person can defend "tigers are an aquatic reptile" with a straight face and some standard of "rationality." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think I was careful to rule out absurd definitions. There is no standard of rationality that either one of us would acknowledge which could make this straw definition non-absurd.

Realism implies that not all definitions are equal. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course they aren't. That's why I said, "There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition." It might well turn out that one set of reasons is the more convincing.

This last comment suggests some possibly useful paths to explore. I've often had the sense that your (and other neo-Aristotelians') conception of how to arrive at truth is what we might call "armchair" -- an apodictic, or at least deductive, process that one person, using premises believed to be reliable, could carry out completely on their own. There isn't a lively sense that other thinkers and traditions could be useful, could offer reasons and perspectives that would perhaps alter even those bedrock premises fruitfully. The truth is seen as already out there, waiting to be deduced. So perhaps the better phrase is "philosophy as a mathematical process."

Let me try to put this in terms that may be congenial to you. You may be familiar with the Lonergan scholar Michael H. McCarthy. And I'm guessing you admire Lonergan himself very much -- he and MacIntyre are often mentioned in the same contexts. This solo approach to dialectic, according to McCarthy, is what Lonergan called "dogmatic." He deplored "the search for an algorithmic method to eliminate philosophical disagreement." As McCarthy writes (and I'm not sure how much of this paraphrases Lonergan):

Only after a reflective appropriation of the subject is it possible to evaluate philosophical differences in a manner that is neither dogmatic nor skeptical. The goal of dialectical criticism is not the elimination of philosophical conflict, but the achievement of a critical center from which to judge the merits and limitations of the opposing philosophical traditions. — McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy, 294

This seems beautifully put, to me. It's essentially the same process I find Peirce and Habermas recommending. We simply cannot arrive at truth without taking the other's views into consideration. And "to take into consideration" does not mean to argue against them, on the assumption they are probably wrong. That is the dogmatism Lonergan rejected. That does not create "a critical center." As for Habermas, he would probably say something like, "Yes, let's sit down and see if we can understand each other before trying to form a judgment on the issue." With all respect, Timothy, that doesn't involve thinking your interlocutors are on the level of The Big Lebowski. I certainly hope you don't feel that I see you that way.

But, sigh, this is a Philosophy Forum, so I guess that proposing less argument will never be popular.
:smile:

I guess what I don't understand about all this is: What would then allow you to interpret the "Southern preacher" as speaking in simple literalisms? Aren't you supplying a context for them, then saying you can't supply one for yourself?

Just from what you've provided, you're assuming a particular context, specifically a New Testament version of "God" which arguably differs substantially from the OT (as you refernced "Gospel). That places you into a Christian context. — Hanover

Yes. Sorry, I thought that was the context from which you spoke as well. Perhaps I got that wrong.

To give a secular example, if I were to ask what a particular provision of the US Constitution means . . . — Hanover

But a little perspective, please? :wink: This isn't a judicially ambiguous, much-contested provision of a legal document. It's a simple phrase: "God loves you." Definitely some possible divergent ways of understanding this, but is it really capable of the same kind of multiplicity of interpretations, arguing the same case-specific technicalities? Is that what you think Christians would say about it? (I'm trying to picture the disciples scratching their heads and saying, "Now when he said 'love,' do you think he really meant 'love' like my Daddy loves me? Maybe he meant the way I 'love' catching a fish? That could have been it!"). And of particular significance for this thread about theodicy, is it capable of an interpretation that is consistent with our brutal circumstances here on Earth? As I've said earlier in the thread, I think we require the possibility of an afterlife to make sense of that.

And this was my point to Wayfarer (and his point as well), which is that the attack on biblical meaning by using the most unsophisticated exegesis method available is a strawman. — Hanover

I quite agree. I don't agree that asking what "God is love" might mean, in a Christian context, is asking for an unsophisticated exegesis. And you've misunderstood me if you think I'm trying to cast doubt on this picture of God. Just the opposite.

So we have to juggle both the subjective ontology of idea formation, and the objective metaphysics of what is thereby formed. — Fire Ologist

Yes, that was the distinction Frege drew between psychologism and logic.

as they both agree the idea of addition also must exist in each other's minds; it's the same addition each sees separately, in each other's minds, in 2+2 and in 3+17. This is both mind-independent (shared between two different subjects), and only there because of the minds that know addition. — Fire Ologist

OK, but mind-independent only in the sense of "not confined to my mind." It doesn't tell us whether these intersubjective sharings are mind-independent in the sense of "about something that exists regardless of whether either of us has the idea of it."

If you asked for a specific interpretation of those sentences within the context of a particular denomination, you'd get varying answers. — Hanover

Certainly. But I'm asking for your answer, in the context of saying that "simple literalisms" should be avoided when trying to understand religious doctrine. Is this an example of such a literalism? If further context is needed, I can find some Gospel passages, I suppose, but I doubt whether you really need them.

Now that I've seen @Count Timothy von Icarus's reply, I can say a little more. (I hope to hear more from him as well, though he hasn't yet replied to my latest.) What he writes suggests to me that the equation of "valued as an end in itself" with "ought to be done" has two characteristics: It is definitional, and it is universalizable.

To the first, every philosopher is entitled to their own bedrock definitions, if they're not absurd, and this is not. All we can say in response is, That is not how I define the term. There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition.

To the second, I'm not sure what Count T thinks about this. You think what is of personal value cannot be universalized or objectified further. I'm more of the opinion that values can only be known subjectively, but that reasons for action may be presented rationally. And to say that "values can only be known subjectively" is not the same thing as saying "they cannot be misperceived or misunderstood, because they are strictly personal."

the caricature religion one imagines of simple literalism screamed from the pulpits throughout the South. — Hanover

Is "God is love" or "God loves you" simple literalism?

And it also depends on what we take “Father” to mean. Interpreted archetypally, Father is a symbol of creative origination — the generative, principle. — Wayfarer

But read the Gospels. Do you really imagine this is what Jesus meant? He called God Daddy, and begged him not to make him suffer! And when Christians gather every Sunday to proclaim that God is love, do you think they mean this analogically? Or only that they ought to?

But it’s meant analogically, not literally. — Wayfarer

Do you say this because a literal meaning doesn't seem sensible to you? You may be right. But I truly believe that Christian doctrine (and, in large part, Jewish and Islamic doctrine as well) finds it not only sensible but essential. Unless you want to picture a huge divide between "theological Christianity" or "Christology" or whatever, and the plain tradition of Christian teaching, for "unsophisticated" people.

Jesus, after all, was a pretty demanding teacher. 'He who saves his life will lose it, while he who loses his life for my sake will be saved.' There's a moral demand in that, isn't there? It isn't 'do what you like, it will turn OK' — Wayfarer

Oh, definitely. There's nothing there that contradicts my idea of a loving parent. It's the dying-of-loathsome-diseases part that bothers me -- if God loves us.

The argument is, if the existence of suffering is supposed to be an indictment against God, then where do you draw the line between what you would deem a reasonable and an unnacceptabe degree of suffering? — Wayfarer

Sorry for the second post, but I just saw this.

I can reinforce the point I was making above by changing this to:

"If the existence of suffering is supposed to be an indictment against a loving God who is like a parent to us, then where do you draw the line between what you would deem a reasonable and an unnacceptable degree of suffering?"

So this gives us some choices. We can say that God is like a loving parent, but our human idea of a "loving parent" is hopelessly wrong, that true parental love is much more like super-super-super-tough love, necessitating every bit of the (natural) suffering that occurs in the world.

Or we can say that God is not like a loving parent -- their "ontological causality" rains equally on the just and the unjust -- in which case the question of suffering is moot.

Or we can agree that to imagine God as a loving parent is to imagine them more or less like our human idea of such a love, in which case the question of "where to draw the line" is, to me, obvious. We could debate the specifics, I suppose, but if any human parent created an environment for their child that even approached the horrors of what humans experience from nature, that parent would be monstrous. So rather than draw a line and say "right here is where God should have stopped," let's just say, "take your pick, but it should have been drawn WAY closer to compassion and mercy."

Not to be repetitive, but this doesn't represent me trying to tell God how to run the hotel. It's me trying to find some consistency in the way Abrahamic faiths claim God does run the hotel, versus what we actually see. The "should" translates to "should, if these other claims about God's love are true." The problem is not with God, but with the consistency of human descriptions of God.

But this picture, intuitive though it may be to us, is metaphysically confused. It domesticates divinity into a kind of super-personality — and then is shocked when the universe doesn’t live up to the standards we come to expect. — Wayfarer

I don't know if it's metaphysically confused or not, but it is the picture given us by the Abrahamic tradition. "God is love" - "God loves us like a parent loves their children" -- aren't these statements meant to be true? Perhaps they do represent a domestication of divinity. The question is, is such a picture consistent with the state of this world? Most other spiritual traditions don't see it that way, as you point out -- not the Greeks, not the Buddhists, not the Taoists. Nor do many Christian theologians like Tillich, from what I can gather (I haven't read him firsthand). Standard Christian theology, to its credit, recognized that an afterlife is essential in order to make sense of this picture. If you want philosophical reasons for that, Kant offers some excellent ones in CPR.

But this view mistakes what kind of causality is at issue. In the classical world — particularly in Aquinas and the Neoplatonic tradition — God is not a proximate cause operating within the causal order. He is not a being in the world, but the ground of all being, the cause of causes. His causality is not like ours — it is ontological, not mechanical or voluntaristic. — Wayfarer

Here, again, I have no argument with this. I merely ask, does such a God love us?

I could've done that!
— J

Which is key to the whole thing. — Wayfarer

You do know I was kidding, right? I just meant that it doesn't seem like such a big ask, no earthquakes.

I'm sorry, I still don't think that is a fair assessment. It's a very Dawkins style depiction, God as a kind of cosmic film director, staging all of the action. I think it betrays a misunderstanding of the God that Dawkins doesn't believe in. A straw God, so to speak. — Wayfarer

(My own conception of God is not really as a being that "staged all the action.") I'm trying to stay true to the classic framing of a theodicy in the West, which conceives of God as omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent. And I'm adding to that, the standard Abrahamic language of God as loving parent. If all of that is a misunderstanding of God, then the need for theodicy disappears, of course.