Words like “faith” are notoriously slippery and context-dependent, and reducing them to a single formula (like “faith is trust in authority”) oversimplifies the richness of how people actually use them — Areeb Salim

This, interestingly, is very similar to the point I made about "metaphysics," over on the "Hotel Manager" thread, where we began discussing whether "a wrangle over definitions" is usually useful or not. Trying to pin down a definition does, as you say, ignore what might be learned from a variety of usages. But anyway, the underlying assumption is dodgy at best: That one of these definitions is correct. We can stipulate a definition for the purposes of a discussion, or we can talk about how "faith" or "metaphysics" was defined and used in a particular tradition, or by a particular philosopher, but beyond that . . .?

Another possible way to characterize the difference: PWS avoids fatalism because it doesn't allow semantics to determine what will be ontologically true. Aristotle's formulation, it seems to me, wants to hold "the future" fixed, ontologically, and monkey with the laws of logic as he understood them in order to avoid fatalism. As Wallace puts it:

[Richard] Taylor's claim [in "Fatalism," following Aristotle] was never really that fatalism was actually "true," only that it was forced upon us by a proof from certain basic logical and semantic principles. — Fate, Time and Language, 212

Good questions and thoughts here. Just to address one thing quickly:

. Do you mean are there any cases where I feel absolutely certain that something I intuit to be true, but which cannot in any way be tested, is really the case? — Janus

No, I think "absolute certainty" as a synonym for "knowledge" is way too high a bar. I have in mind the same criteria for knowledge we'd use in the ordinary cases. "I know the sun is shining." "Are you absolutely certain?" "Not absolutely. Memory and perception can be false at times. But I'm happy to insist that I know this fact nonetheless."

If we ground our logic in self-evidence or in intuition, . . . — Banno

I think we should preserve @Janus' distinction between self-evidence and intuition. The standard logical forms are arguably self-evident in the way you describe: "To understand the operator "⊃", is to understand that if p and p⊃q, then q. Asserting p and p⊃q counts as asserting q." Let's say that this is so, and that "self-evidence" is a good-enough way to describe this. Then we want "intuition" to mean something else, something that is not "contained in the premises" or "understanding a language game."

But this, I would say, is no longer a matter of grounding logic. I agree with everything you say about the necessity of grounding logic in shareable, normative principles. (And this also agrees with your claim that "[Intuitions are] a pretty poor grounding for the whole of rationality.") But this seems very different from saying, "I intuit that so-and-so is a good job candidate" or "I intuit that my interpretation of my dream is correct." "Intuition" may be an awkward stand-in for some other process, but at any rate it's not the same thing as pointing to logical self-evidence or unquestionable first principles of rationality.

So, you [@Tom Storm] have rightly drawn attention to the fact that intuition is not one simple kind of thing at all. — Janus

Right, but how we want to discriminate them and evaluate them is not obvious. The suggestion here seems to draw the line between some ordinary accumulation of experience which is shareable, more or less, with others, versus an esoteric metaphysical/religious insight which isn't produced by any kind of accumulation of experience, but is strictly personal. In short:

Intuitions which are based on accumulated experiences and prior processes of reasoning are different than intuitions about gods or metaphysical ideas. — Janus

Devotees of various religious traditions and practices would certainly find this odd. The whole point about such ways of life is that they are based on accumulated experiences, both personal and collective. But I won't try to argue for that here.

They may even feel that what they intuitively know is an absolute or objective truth, but none of this can be anything more than faith-based, and as such not susceptible of rational justification. This seems to be very hard to accept for those who think this way. — Janus

The key phrase here is "not susceptible of rational justification." That is so. But see above. What allows us to insist that rational justification, based on self-evident principles perhaps, is the only legitimate means to achieve intersubjective agreement? Two things about this: First, it's a preference that is deeply rooted in doing philosophy at all, and one that I share. I like things to be rational and intersubjectively justifiable! Most of what I philosophize about falls into this category. But it is not the entire compass of knowledge. Second, it is surely true that dogmatic folks get annoyed when others don't accept their intuitions, especially if they believe they can give a good rational account of them. So much the worse for dogmatism. But it's equally true that many folks (lo, even on TPF :wink: ) find it very hard to accept the idea that rational justification is not necessarily the only gate to wisdom.

This gets us to the problem of how an intuition, no matter how firmly held by the individual, might be justified intersubjectively. I'll pick a low-voltage example, one that doesn't raise hackles about religion or metaphysics. Last night, let's say, I dreamt about crashing my car, which in the dream was an Aston Martin. I've never owned such a car. Upon awakening, it isn't immediately clear what the dream signifies. I'm aware, though, that I frequently use cars, both waking and dreaming, as a symbol for "my life" or "my life direction." And now I experience a flash of insight, an "intuition." Many years ago, I was married to a British woman and looked forward to moving there with her, and restarting my life there. But the dream, and the marriage, failed, to my great sadness. So the crashing of the Aston Martin was a concise image for the death of this particular hope, which my psyche has yet to fully accept. (Please pardon the dash of autobiography.)

So . . . what is the status of the truth claims involved in this intuition? For my part, I know this interpretation is correct. (I'm not absolutely certain, though, as explained above.). The knowledge relies on the idea that a dream may indeed be interpreted correctly. I think that if someone wanted to challenge my intuition, they'd want to do it at that level, by questioning the idea of interpretation tout court. But if it's granted that dreams have meanings, then my intersubjective audience is likely to also grant me my knowledge of what the dream means to me. So let's call this an example of intuitive knowledge. There is no rational process, no empirical investigation, no analysis of self-evidence -- I simply know.

Now obviously I wouldn't try to convince you that, if you had this dream, it would mean the same thing to you. But I do want to convince you that you should trust my interpretation of my own dream. But wait -- it isn't intersubjectively verifiable, and my access to the dream itself is privileged. Why, then, am I unlikely to get an argument about this (except, as I said, at the level of interpretation per se)? Because, if I'm perceived as a trustworthy, sensible, and self-reflective person, you'll take my word for it. This is a meager result for a longish argument, but I really do think it gets to the heart of it. We accept the cogency and validity of intuitions to the extent that we trust the person who has them.

This is not the end of the argument, by a long shot, because the stakes involved in dreams versus faith in a god are enormously different. But that's enough out of me for now.

I put stock in my own intuitions — Janus

Yes, I was going to suggest that it would be good, at this point, to examine what we actually say about our own intuitions. You say you put stock in them. Am I right in thinking that this means you trust them to be accurate, all things equal, but wouldn't claim knowledge about their objects? You rightly contrast this with trying to convince someone else to accept what you intuit, but is there ever a case when you do know, for yourself, that something you've intuited is true? Can the object of intuition ever be as solidly known as our rational and perceptual objects? (please take "object" loosely, of course)

I think there are such cases, in my own experience, and that they carry some intersubjective weight. I'll try to get back to this soon. . . a long day away from the computer lies ahead.

"Considerations on Representative Government," — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for this reference, I wasn't aware of it. Sigh, even Mill . . . racism runs deep.

Looking over the historical moments you cite, all I can do is repeat that such a picture would have us believe that some monolithic thing called liberalism never gave a damn about morals or justice or good government, caring only for individual freedoms no matter the cost, tearing down whatever was necessary to achieve them, etc., etc. That is very far from what I see in Rawls, the liberal theorist whose work I know best, and what I know of modern history (though I am not a historian). Meaning no disrespect, have you actually read A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism? There's much in both books that would interest you, I think.

I maintain that Western Civilization has been in serious decline since the death of Marcus Aurelius and the ascension of his son to the purple! :cool: :rofl: — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, that Commodus was a severe disappointment . . . downhill ever since.

it seems absurd to me to call this cherry picking when all the major liberal states engaged in absolutely massive colonial projects that they justified in the terms of liberalism, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, we're just at cross-purposes in terms of what we're referring to as "liberal." I call citing such views cherry-picking because they are (far) outliers in terms of liberal philosophical theory. (And are you sure about Mill and "enslavement"? He says the opposite in "The Negro Question.") To put it mildly, this isn't what we study when we study Locke and Mill, any more than we give time to Kant's racism or Heidegger's Nazi nonsense. It's too easy to pick the worst things Philosopher X said, and claim you've characterized their views fairly.

Whether there is such a thing as "major liberal states" justifying bad actions in terms of a benighted understanding of philosophical liberalism, I leave to you. And of course the atrocious colonialism of European nations is the opposite of rare; you and I agree there, no cherry-picking involved. I just think blaming it on liberal political theory is too easy.

the rather titanic problems of liberalism in the current moment, — Count Timothy von Icarus

OK, as long as we don't equate these alleged problems with "the apocalyptic decline of Western civilization"!

I think Locke and Mill's justification of enslaving populations by force to "liberate them from indolence," is a prime example. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of liberal political theory? Extreme cherry-picking, wouldn't you say? :smile:

Cold War colonial war rhetoric is also a good example. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, of rhetoric, not liberal political philosophy.

An ideal society maximizes liberty for individuals as individuals — Count Timothy von Icarus

This I would accept as a traditional liberal political tenet, but set on its own, it sounds as if there has never been an issue about what kind of maximization is appropriate or possible, nor how social identity may further individual flourishing. We both know that isn't so. Not for nothing is Rawls' book called A Theory of Justice, not A Theory of Liberty.

The "veil of ignorance" is all about the individual for instance, and indeed the individual as initially abstracted from all community and common goods or social identity. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But it needn't be, as Rawls makes clear. If common goods and social identity are part of what you want the ideal state to value, then you'll choose accordingly from behind the veil, even though you may not know your own status. This isn't to say that the original-position thought experiment isn't rife with problems. Perhaps for that very reason, it's proved enduringly useful, as philosophers like Nussbaum work to clarify and improve it.

Intuition and self-evidence are two very different things ̶ — Janus

I agree this distinction is important, and your description of what counts as self-evident seems fine. But I think you've begged the question a bit against what "intuition" might refer to. Does it have to be a feeling? Can something "ring true" on other grounds? Part of the problem is that we lack a decent vocabulary for intuitions, and so we range from the cozy ("feelings", "ring true") to the theoretical ("noetic understanding", "direct intelligibility"). And naturally this makes us wonder whether there's really anything to it at all, if clear descriptions are so hard to come up with.

You also say:

with intuitions you don't know whether they are true — Janus

but that's precisely the issue. The claim about intuitions is that we do know. And the debate is about whether such self-credentialing knowledge, absent either self-evidence or rational argument, is possible. I think what you meant was, "We can't know whether they are true, given the usual philosophical understanding of what 'knowing to be true' means." But this is exactly what the intuitionist wants to challenge. They may be entirely misguided, of course.

Hence, I would say liberalism is the highest principle. "Freedom over all else," with freedom obviously being the ideal of freedom in the liberal tradition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't understand this. Is there a particular liberal philosopher you have in mind, who says this? I'm trying to associate "Freedom over all else" with, say, Rawls, and it doesn't fit at all. Once again I have the feeling that there's a whole conversation, largely polemical in nature, about "liberalism" going on that I've never followed. To me, liberalism is epitomized by Political Liberalism by Rawls, not by what is amusingly called "liberalism" in the US.

So what's the claim then, that all of the advancements you've listed were primarily caused by liberalism and would simply be unachievable without it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't have liberalism as such in mind at all -- though perhaps I should have, but I forgot the name of the thread! I was adding my voice to @Joshs's doubt about the apocalyptic view of history, in which things have gotten noticeably worse and we need to do something quite radical about it. I would be dubious about such a view no matter whether it was voiced with a left or a right accent. Au contraire, the evidence of historical/ethical progress in Western democracies is to me overwhelming -- again with a grim caveat about the looming environmental disaster.

I'm happy you agree that they are advancements, though.

Can we say that "there can be no 'physical order' without an intelligible order by which things are what they are"? We simply don't know. - J

This skepticism . . . — Count Timothy von Icarus

It wasn't meant as skepticism, but as a literal statement: We don't know. Better to say, "I don't"? But I hadn't thought you were claiming to know such a thing either.

what justifications can philosophy of science offer for them?"
— J

Totally other thread - but it’s along the lines I suggested. Early modern science and philosophy - Galileo, Newton, Descartes - the division of mind from matter, primary attributes from secondary, the exclusion of factors not considered amenable to quantification. — Wayfarer

the positivist spirit is still powerful - ‘all that can be known, can be known by science’. — Wayfarer

Yes, these are the assumptions we're talking about, but I'm asking for the justifications for them, as they would have been put forward by early modern scientists, and perhaps some philosophers of science today -- assuming you agree that the assumptions are far from arbitrary, but reflect a powerful (if mistaken) worldview. But maybe it does require a new thread.

Much more to say but family duties call for a couple of hours. — Wayfarer

Unacceptable, but if you must . . . :wink:

I have never bought into the apocalyptic narrative, the ‘things have gone terribly wrong and we need a whole new approach’ kind of thinking. — Joshs

Just to highlight this: I agree, and too often, in authoritarian hands, it turns into "Make X Great Again!" with results we can all observe daily. We, meaning Western democracies, in fact have taken a whole new approach, in roughly the last century, and as a result things are vastly better off for women, poor countries we used to exploit, working people, people of color, and people with illnesses and disabilities. (Not nearly good enough, but a lot better.) Now if we can only stop killing the planet, we might actually get somewhere. I guess the "things" that are supposed to have gone terribly wrong are certain European intellectual arguments about virtue. Hmm. On balance, surely this is less important than eradicating polio? Anyway, people seem about as virtuous, taken one by one, as they ever were.

There is nothing wrong with wrangling about definitions IMO, it's a time honored tradition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

God knows you're right about that! :smile: I just think that, too often, the wranglers actually believe someone must be correct, which, when it comes to definitions of abstracta, or terms that appear in different contexts in different traditions, is rarely possible. This leads to a lot of wasted effort, not to mention ire. Better to say, "OK, for purposes of this discussion, let's say 'metaphysics' means X, and we'll both know what we're referring to, at least. It's that piece on the board." (The game metaphor here is, I hope, inoffensive: It doesn't matter whether you call the piece a rook or a castle, as long as everyone knows it's the one that moves in straight lines.)

Another reason I'm in favor of being more self-conscious about terminological wrangles is that we can learn something, in the process, about what can be usefully defined. That poor tiger we talk so much about can in fact be given a definition which admits of being accurate or inaccurate. It may not be the "only way to define a tiger," but it allows us to sort them out with near-perfect success, and accords with a naming tradition (biology) that has won universal acceptance. Such is not the case, sadly, for putative definitions of love, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to name three. So . . . what is the difference? Plenty of food for philosophical thought here.

Lastly, as I've often said, I don't think we should encourage a view of philosophy that says, in effect, "You pit your definition/position/viewpoint against mine; these positions include differences in the 'rules' each of us thinks we should follow in this agon, so we'll never agree; but nonetheless, let the games begin and may the strongest argument win!" I mean, huh? How often is this really a good way to philosophize? And yet so many wrangles about definitions seem to assume this model. The problem goes all the way back to what I believe is a misunderstanding of Socratic dialogue.

I'm not sure I follow what it is you are after here. The idea of applying the criticism of transcendental arguments to modus ponens is interesting - is that what you are doing? — Banno

Yes, but the first bit was a different reply to a different comment, sorry. The point about metaphysics as an investigation of structure was separate from my head-scratching about transcendental arguments.

It's rather than if we accept modus ponens, and a few other rules, then this will be the consequence; we might well do otherwise, with different and usually less appetising consequences. In particular, we are not obligated to accept modus ponens by some overarching authority - what could that look like? — Banno

I was all set to reply, and then saw the qualifications and objections you yourself posted. (Hat tip to your ability to see many sides here.)

Logic might be transcendentally necessary for meaningful discourse. — Banno

This is the one with the most force, I think. We say, "There is meaningful discourse. What, therefore, must be the case in order for this to be true? Answer: logic." On this construal, the idea that we "might well do otherwise," might "not play the game," becomes, if not incoherent, then at least hard to make out. I think you're right that there is no physical or ethical compulsion here that could count as an "overarching authority" -- but is there any sphere of intellectual endeavor in which we encounter such an authority? Surely that's asking for too much, and I doubt that the proponents of a more objective or certain basis for modus ponens want that. The idea as I understand it is that, to think at all, you're going to need modus ponens.

The other interesting question is about whether "to understand p and p⊃q" is to accept q. This strikes me as a version of the question, provoked by Kant, about whether arithmetic is analytic or synthetic. Have we learned anything new when we learn that 'q' follows from the first two premises? In this simple case, it may seem obvious that 'q' is somehow contained in those premises, but more complex logical conclusions have the ring of revelation, of genuine discovery, which is what Kant claimed was the case even for simple additions. What we want to know here is whether it's coherent to say (and let's imagine a more complicated set of premises), "Yes, I understand these premises, but I don't acknowledge that the conclusion must follow." Is this person refusing to play the game? I'm frankly not sure how to describe such a situation, other than to say that "refusing" seems too strong.

It seems then that you are redefining metaphysics as philosophy and not as merely one domain of philosophy. If metaphysics is philosophy then of course you can't do philosophy without doing metaphysics; you have simply stipulated that by your definition. I'm not going to agree because I don't think philosophy is all, or even mostly, metaphysics — Janus

And that's fair enough. All the more reason not to worry about what's metaphysics and what isn't! I like your move toward asking about "assumptions" instead.

I'm not familiar with Sider. . . . So I would see it as semantics, not metaphysics. — Janus

Sider is a good contrast with Wittgenstein, since Sider believes that most of the traditional metaphysical questions that Witt rejected are reformulable, and to a degree resolvable, using the apparatus of formal logic. He thinks they're good questions. But once again, while you may well be right that this winds up as semantics rather than what many call "metaphysics" . . . need we care? Let's read Sider and see what he actually says about the issues, not the vocabulary. (And BTW, Writing the Book of the World is one of the best works of contemporary philosophy I've ever read.)

To repeat, for me doing metaphysics means holding to a particular position regarding the fundamental nature of reality. — Janus

But this, I must admit, is interesting. What if we did reserve the term "metaphysics" for the stance you're describing? To me that's a referendum on "holding a particular position," not on "the fundamental nature of reality." If I understand you, you're saying that there's nothing intellectually shoddy about speculations on fundamental reality, whether in the form of philosophy or fantasy. That is, you don't think the very idea of a fundamental reality is incoherent. But you do think that holding a particular position about it is unacceptable. Would you want to say more about why that is so? Is the difference to do with degrees of certainty?

We find the world to be comprehensible, so I don't see a need for any assumptions in that matter. — Janus

So back to "assumptions" . . . This is a bit brisk, no? Surely the world is to varying degrees comprehensible, not tout court, and the "we" for whom it is comprehensible is also going to vary a great deal. Maybe we should put it this way: When I find the world (or some aspect of it) comprehensible, is it true that this involves no assumptions?

So, when I say we obviously comprehend the world, I'm only speaking in an everyday sense, a sense in which I would include science as an augmentation of the everyday. — Janus

OK, this is from your reply to @Tom Storm. I don't mean to impugn your everyday experience -- or Witt's, which must have been much the same -- but it isn't mine. I seem to walk around in more or less constant puzzlement about how my experiences connect with the world that appears before me. This is particularly acute when I try to examine the experiences themselves, self-reflexively, including the question of why the idea of "comprehensibility" is so powerful. But all this is only to say that I think "like a philosopher" -- or more accurately, like the muddle-headed type of philosopher who Witt believed needed therapeutic release!

I think it's nonsense to say that science doesn't require or imply a metaphysic. — Wayfarer

Let's try rephrasing along the line of Janus's "assumptions": "It's nonsense to say that science doesn't require or imply any assumptions." OK, "nonsense" is kinda harsh, but I agree that it's implausible. What, then, are these assumptions? What are scientists assuming when they do science? Probably no one would say they're arbitrary -- that scientists just like scientific method -- so what justifications can philosophy of science offer for them?

The metaphysic of early modern science was: no metaphysics. — Wayfarer

More evidence that "metaphysics" as a term may only muddy the waters. Presumably the early modern scientists meant "metaphysics" in one way, and the cultural historians that you cite meant it in another way, such that someone who denies having any metaphysics may nonetheless be convicted of having them after all. But all this demonstrates, surely, is that the word is equivocal.

I may be pushing this too far, but how about if we said: "Early modern science assumed a clear and knowable division between matter and mind, between so-called objective and secondary qualities, and conceived it the duty of science to investigate the former, not the latter." This phrasing allow us to ask a number of interesting questions about the degree to which any of this might be justified.

EDIT - switched "latter" and "former," above, eeech.

Count T and I, in contrast, want to use "metaphysics" more broadly, to mean any framework that results in a philosophical position about "the world as we find it." On this usage, it looks impossible to do without metaphysics, since philosophy presupposes it.
— J
I agree. — Gnomon

Sure, it's perfectly good way to use the word, and my own preference. But I hope you also agree with me that "how to use the word correctly" (assuming this could even be determined) is much less important than understanding the issues various philosophers are raising when they talk about being, truth, structure, logic, et al. Who knows, it might turn out that the word is dispensable entirely, but the questions raised under its banner won't therefore go away. We might just need more perspicuous ways of talking about them.

I don't think I followed this. This would seem to indicate that what is true is a facet of the logical premises one chooses to adopt. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not exactly. The question, remember, is about the intuitive truth of the LNC, not truth per se. I'm suggesting that, in the described case, we couldn't be said to intuit the truth of the LNC as regards the non-logical, physical world. We would claim to know (by intuition, if you like) that LNC holds for propositions, but its value as a way of understanding the world would require a further connection. Again, that's why the position that thinking and being must be somehow identical is so appealing. It provides the missing bridge.

And as to that . . .

LNC is part of the intelligibility by which anything is anything at all. It is a precondition for finite being's existence as "this" or "that." If the number one can also be the number three, and a circle also a square, then there is no this or that. So the physical order, to be a physical order at all, requires a higher metaphysical order. There can be no "physical order" without an intelligible order by which things are what they are and not anything else — Count Timothy von Icarus

The most important phrase, perhaps, is the first, since it links intelligibility with "anything being anything" -- thinking with being, in other words. I believe this is probably true, as a description of consciousness in the world. And that may be good enough, since philosophy doesn't pretend to tell us what philosophy (thinking) would be like, if no one were doing it! It does, however, often try to talk about what the world is like, unmediated by the experience of human consciousness. From that perspective, can we say that "there can be no 'physical order' without an intelligible order by which things are what they are"? We simply don't know. Could the intelligibility part survive translation into some kind of "pure," unmediated physicality? I'm willing to call this a "metaphysical speculation" in the somewhat pejorative sense, since I don't know what the evidence for or against this would look like. For better or worse, we can't seem to frame good questions about "the world" without reference to the fact of framing them, which requires, among other things, the LNC.

But I'm still drawn to the much more accessible puzzle about the objects of the LNC and other logical principles. Kimhi and Rödl again: when we say "Not (P & ~P)", what can replace 'P'? Objects? Propositions? Both? Is it about both? In the same way?

Probably "blue and not-blue" would work better as an example, and "without qualification or equivocation." I'm sure you know that — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but you're right, we shouldn't assume that everyone can fill in the ceteris-paribus qualifications.

It just is" isn't the only possibility here, nor is a direct noetic perception.

Such as? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This connects with the question about the grounding of the logical and real-world versions of the LNC. If it could be shown to be the case that "Not (A & ~A)" and "My mouse can't be both blue and not-blue at once" are what I'm calling "intuitions of the same thing", then it might follow that the only way to know this is by direct intuition or noetic perception. Indeed, it would go a long way toward answering some vexed questions about mind and the world. But that has to be determined first. Otherwise, the grounding of one or the other will provide information about why the LNC carries such apparent inviolability. For instance, if the "mouse" version depends on the "logical version", then the fact that a thing can't be both A and not-A would be a consequence of the logical premise, not an intuition or an inductive law about the world. And the reverse: if the logical version depends on the mouse version, then we have a law of thought based upon the operations of the physical world.

I'm guessing that you favor the "intuition of the same thing" approach, which I agree leads to the most plausible picture of self-evidence or direct intuition. How would you make the case for the two versions of the LNC being about the same thing? (This, as you probably remember, was a case that Irad Kimhi was also very concerned to make, in Thinking and Being.)

You're attempting to ground logic itself in a notion of what is "logically compatible." This is circular without intuition. This is just an appeal to LNC as being intuitive. This seems like: "no intuition is required because the LNC is self-evident." I agree it is self-evident. However, this is the definition of an intuition, perhaps the prime example of it historically. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm with you up to a point, but this leaves out the entire difficult conversation about what might make the LNC intuitive, or self-evident. "It just is" isn't the only possibility here, nor is a direct noetic perception. The big question is how the LNC, as a description of an ideal logical intuition, corresponds to how we describe the world. "Not (A & ~A)" vs. "My mouse can't be both blue and pink at once" -- are these intuitions of the same thing? Or if not, which grounds which?

I think all three are true to varying degrees. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hence my recommendation that we turn away from worrying about how to use "metaphysics" in true statements.

I think it should be uncontroversial that parts of what are generally deemed to be "metaphysics" come into play on the sciences at every turn — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps it should be, but nevertheless it isn't ... Why invite a wrangle about it? Let's talk instead about what the philosophers are saying, regardless of who calls it "metaphysics" and who doesn't. But that does involve accepting that we can talk about concepts divorced from traditional assignments of certain words to those concepts.

Wouldn't we class questions "about structure -- about how the world hangs together", as physics, rather than as metaphysics? — Banno

Only if "the world" is pre-limited (is that a word?) to the physical. Questions about structure ought to include questions about language, about thoughts, about abstracta. How do these phenomena connect with each other, and with the physical world? What grounds what? Moreover, it doesn't appear that the disciplines that study these phenomena -- math, for instance, in the case of abstracta -- can offer us what we want. We don't expect a mathematician to know how numbers relate to the physical world, or to have an opinion about whether this is a sensible question. Mathematicians do math, not philosophy.

I don't see modus ponens (or other bits of logic) as reliant on such a transcendental argument. It's more that what we mean by P⊃Q just is that if P it true, then Q is true. — Banno

I think the question is whether "just is" can be reformulated as a transcendental argument. "Just is" is, more or less, what I meant by "impossible to imagine otherwise," so I think we're talking about the same thing here. So, call P⊃Q 'w':

'w'
The only way that 'w' can be valid is if 'z'
Therefore, 'z'

But to what does 'z' refer? What makes 'w' valid? Could 'z' mean "the validity of logical form" or does this take us in a circle? The paraphrase would be, "The only way P⊃Q can be valid is if it's an instance of a valid logical form. Since it is valid, therefore it's an instance of a valid logical form."

Hmmm. There seems to be something both right and wrong about this. The part that's right is that there is no other way for any arrangement of logical symbols to be valid. If it doesn't instantiate a valid logical form, it has to be invalid (with the usual ceteris-paribus stipulations).

The part that seems wrong, though, is the circularity involved in using "valid" or "validity" this way. This can best be seen by contrasting it with the original example of "platonic form." In that example, the question was whether "the way things are" can only be explained by the premise that "forms are real." You pointed out, correctly, that we could imagine other explanations; the minor premise might not be correct. In this new case, however, we've seen that the minor premise appears to be solid: There doesn't seem to be any other way for 'w' to be valid. But is this because we have defined it thus? Aren't we importing a concept of validity that simply reduces it to "being an instance of a valid logical form"? This isn't very informative. But it may correspond to your thought that, in fact, none of this is about transcendental arguments at all. The "just is" here may not translate into an argument.

I'm uncertain about this, but maybe you have some insights.

EDIT -- I've realized that 'w' should really be 'modus ponens', not 'P⊃Q', but you probably knew what I meant.

This discussion is shaping up -- no surprise -- as a terminological dispute about what counts as "metaphysics." Janus conceives of metaphysics as an addition to the common-sense approach to what we can see, what is uncontroversially the case, etc. Thus, as they so clearly put it:

I see accepting that basic human situation, accepting the world as we find it, as eschewing metaphysical speculation not as assuming any metaphysical framework — Janus

Count T and I, in contrast, want to use "metaphysics" more broadly, to mean any framework that results in a philosophical position about "the world as we find it." On this usage, it looks impossible to do without metaphysics, since philosophy presupposes it.

I'm going to make a familiar move here, though I know many don't agree with it. I'm going to suggest that we set aside the terminological wrangle (who is "right" about the word "metaphysics"?) and instead focus on the underlying issue. There is clearly a difference between looking at the world as Wittgenstein does, and as, e.g., Ted Sider does. Is someone "doing metaphysics" here? Let's not worry about it. Instead, let's ask into what these two ways of looking consist of, and what they would entail. Perhaps, after this very difficult subject is thoroughly understood, we might then feel we had reason to circle back and offer a (now ameliorative) definition of "metaphysics" -- or perhaps not.

To ask "Should all metaphysical questions be dissolved rather than (if possible) resolved?" is to ask a very metaphysical question. — J

Would that not be more an epistemological question? Why must we make any metaphysical assumptions at all? — Janus

Yes, epistemology strictly speaking, but isn't epistemology a sub-inquiry under metaphysics? Is it possible to frame a question about what we can know, without an explicit or assumed metaphysical framework? I don't think so.

The larger question about metaphysical assumptions, regardless of their connection with epistemology, is interesting. We can, as you say, simply accept the world as it appears to us. Are you also saying that to do so would free us from any metaphysical assumption? I don't quite see how. Common-sense realism is full of (perhaps unspoken) premises about what the world/life/reality consists of.

I also think we don't so much find answers as new ways of looking at and thinking about things. — Janus

Yes. That was what I had in mind about new questions rather than definitive answers.

That said, I have some sympathy for those, like Wittgenstein, who want to use (a version of) philosophy to free us from metaphysical fly-bottles.
— J

I do too, and I think the thrust of that project was to show that such questions are to be dissolved rather than resolved. — Janus

Ah, but which ones are the fly-bottles? :wink: Problem is, to ask "Should all metaphysical questions be dissolved rather than (if possible) resolved?" is to ask a very metaphysical question. Witt's answers, whatever their merit, also depend on evident metaphysical premises.

It is the state of radical acceptance that I see as being the essence of enlightenment, and not imagined knowings of the answers to the great questions, which have never been, and I think arguably never can be, answered definitively. So "crossing the threshold" for me is a metaphor for a radical shift in our total disposition to life. — Janus

I appreciate any point of view, such as this one, which recognizes that "answering philosophical questions correctly" may not (shock! horror!) actually be the purpose of doing philosophy. Where do we go next, with this insight? Should we conclude that the answers to such questions will never be forthcoming? Or simply never forthcoming within rational philosophy? I think philosophy has to question itself -- its own nature, its own "radical self-acceptance" -- in much the same way you recommend that individual philosophers question themselves. And I'll say again that one of the great clues to the direction of this philosophical self-examination is out there in plain sight: Why can't philosophy generate a body of knowledge, as science does, or settle for a canon of "beautiful" ideas, as art does? What are we really doing when we ask philosophical questions?

As to ego as impediment: certainly true in my ethical life. Probably in my intellectual life as well, since like anyone else I enjoy being correct about things, and get seduced by this pleasure into believing that there is no end to the topics about which I could be correct . . . see above.

Couple of things:

What exactly is the phenomenon that metaphysics is addressing? If it’s something like the surprise that there is something rather than nothing, why should we treat that surprise as indicating a real problem? — Banno

Honestly, that never occurred to me as a core problem in metaphysics. In any case, it doesn't surprise me at all. No, I think metaphysics wants to know about structure -- about how the world (including us) hangs together, what grounds what, and what can and can't be known about it. Something like that . . .

I wonder if the more-or-less-Wittgensteinian dismissal of metaphysical problems is trying to capture what we so often hear from non-philosophers: "You make problems, or try to, where there aren't any. What exactly is unclear or confusing about our conceptions of the world? How does any of this affect our daily lives? Philosophy should just leave the world, and life, alone!" And from this we would get "Philosophy leaves everything as it is."

There's a logical gap between “I can’t imagine it being otherwise” and “this must be how it is” that's found in transcendental arguments of all sorts.

It's a transcendental argument because it goes: things are thus-and-so; the only way (“I can’t imagine it being otherwise") they can be thus-and-so is if forms are real. Hence, forms are real. The minor premise is the problem - how you can be sure it's the only way? — Banno

This is interesting. What happens when we apply it, with some tinkering, to logical form? (in the noncontroversial, not Platonic, sense) "Modus ponens is 'how it is'; the only way this can be 'how it is' is if logical forms are necessarily valid. Hence, logical forms are necessarily valid." Is the minor premise still a problem? One wants to reply, "Yes, I am sure it's the only way. It's not simply that I can't imagine how modus ponens (given the usual stipulations) could be invalid, it's that such a thing would be like imagining a square circle." Notice that this can be said without invoking what's real and what isn't.

That’s why in classical and ancient thought, the line between philosophy and religion was so often porous: philosophy led you to the threshold, but what lay beyond it required something other than reason alone — Wayfarer

Yes.

But despite earnest efforts I never made much headway with the 'path of seeing' - more like fragmentary glimpses briefly illumined by lightning, so to speak (although leaving an enduring trace). — Wayfarer

Same here. Emphasis on "enduring."

We have, he writes on one occasion, “lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity.” That is, in order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort. — Obituary for Josef Pieper, Thomistic Philosopher

I'm not crazy about the "purity" theme, but this certainly sets out the problem concisely: What sort of person must I be, or become, in order to pass across that threshold? We all know the usual suspects: "I must become intellectually accomplished (good at philosophy)." "I must become ethically good." "I must make a certain profession of belief in an avatar." "There is no threshold; shut up and calculate."

In part it's a self-reflexive problem: If we knew how to choose among those standard answers, we would presumably also be demonstrating, in so choosing, why our answer is true or wise. Can that be done without going in circles?

. . . there would seem to be no new data to work with. . . . Metaphysical ideas seem to be, to repeat loosely something I remember reading somewhere that Hegel said: "the same old stew reheated". I would add to that and say "the same old ancient stew reheated". — Janus

Yes, there's a lot to this. A great deal may depend on the idea of "data." Are questions considered to be data? It looks to me like the questions that philosophy poses keep changing, era to era and tradition to tradition. And yes, the data that philosophers then appeal to in order to answer those questions tend to be more or less the same -- with a big exception for current advances in cognitive science. So is philosophy in the question-answering business, or the question-proposing business? I think, usually, the latter. The inability, thus far, to answer the question about SMCs may be because the question is badly framed. It's not new data we need, but new insight. The hell of it is, part of the "new insight" we so badly want would involve a new way to understand the relation of rationality to philosophy.

That said, I have some sympathy for those, like Wittgenstein, who want to use (a version of) philosophy to free us from metaphysical fly-bottles.

And the origin of the question was, how we know that an object really is what it seems to be? — Wayfarer

I read Wayfarer as giving a context, as you suggest: In his formulation, "real" is stipulated to mean "as opposed to illusory or misleading". But I think he's doing a little more than that, as well. His stipulation is meant to appeal to an originating situation in which the question first came up. His stipulation for "real" isn't arbitrary -- in a way, it's ameliorative, in that he's suggesting we ought to adopt it as being philosophically clear and useful.

But even if I'm right -- and I hope Wayfarer will tell us -- the fact remains that "real" does need a context of use in order for it to have any meaning at all. It doesn't identify a metaphysical feature all by itself.

So, you don't think it is obviously impossible to demonstrate that a speculative metaphysical claim (purportedly) based on reliable intuition is just that rather than something merely imagined? If you believe that, one might ask then why such has not already been demonstrated such that no impartial person could reasonably question its veracity. — Janus

This is one of my perennial favorite philosophical puzzles. If Major Philosophical Position A is obviously correct, how is it that Major Philosophical Positions B, C, and D remain on the table, amongst skilled philosophers? I'm sure you're aware that your question, when applied self-reflexively, yields the same question you're asking about the opposite view: If it is indeed the case that the lack of demonstration of the SMC (speculative metaphysical claim) shows it to be impossible to so demonstrate, why then hasn't everyone agreed that this is so, and closed the book on the question?

I don't have a pat answer to this waiting in the wings. I genuinely believe it's a meta-question about philosophy that deserves much more attention than it gets in analytic-philosophy circles, not just about SMCs but about any longstanding philosophical dispute.

'Reality' is the one word that should always appear in quotation marks. — Vladimir Nabokov

This begins to explain the power of mercy, I think. An impartial, unmerciful judge would treat all of us justly -- and what a terrible fate that would be!
— J
If the punishment prescribed for various crimes is disproportionate, then it is unjust punishment. Mercy doesn't come in to it. — Ludwig V

I think you're missing Hamlet's point. :smile: He was suggesting that just, proportionate punishment is what we all have coming, because we've all missed the mark to varying degrees. But the fact that it's just doesn't make it any less terrible to endure.

Here's another way to think about it: Justice = being given what you deserve. Injustice = being given less than you deserve. Mercy = being given more than you deserve.
— J
Very neat. But you are over-simplifying. — Ludwig V

Definitely. Just working with the idea that "justice" has more than one opposite.

I'm gloomily contemplating the idea that one of the underlying cultural problems around all of this was, in fact, created by Christian culture itself, in that the way it developed inadvertently demolished the idea of the 'scala natura' and the idea of higher truth, that being deemed elitist and in contradiction of the universal salvation offered to all who would believe. — Wayfarer

A fascinating and difficult issue. If philosophy is understood as an ideal form of rationalism, then I do think it "stops at the door" of spiritual or religious forms of life. But you're pointing out that it doesn't have to be understood that way. Philosophy might be a doorway to a higher, non- or super-rational truth. But on this construal, it raises the problem of elitism, just as you say. Or, if "elitism" is a bit worn-out as a term, we could say "privileged access."

It certainly offends most Christian ears that access to the highest and most God-like realities is limited to a few who have walked the difficult path of philosophical knowledge. But this possibility is surely there as far back as the Gospels -- only it's not the intellectual or rational path that is difficult, but the ethical one. When Jesus (in one of his rare moments of humor) tells the rich young man who's done everything right that there's "just one more thing" he has to do -- give all his riches to the poor and join the Jesus followers -- he's making it clear that the kind of "salvation" the young man wants is not for everyone, but only for those who are really willing to go all the way in their lives, not their thoughts. That can't be very many, then or now.

But anyone can quote scripture for their own purposes, and there are plenty of traditional Christian teachings that say the opposite -- "only believe" and you will be saved, etc. And this doesn't touch the specific question of the role philosophy ought to play. Maybe we should just say that the relation of intellect to spiritual insight is vexed, with no clear consensus having emerged.

What puzzles me is that mercy is so often represented as a kind of get-out-of-jail-free card that is handed out more or less at random to those who don't deserve it. How is this a good thing? — Ludwig V

Yes, this is part of the "very deep question" that @Wayfarer points out. Mercy is precisely most admirable when it's undeserved. But consider this from Hamlet:

"Use every man after his desert, and who should 'scape whipping?"

This begins to explain the power of mercy, I think. An impartial, unmerciful judge would treat all of us justly -- and what a terrible fate that would be!

Here's another way to think about it: Justice = being given what you deserve. Injustice = being given less than you deserve. Mercy = being given more than you deserve.

Note that i haven't said that the discovery of universal metaphysical truths via intellectual intuition is obviously impossible, but that it is obviously impossible to demonstrate that what has been purportedly discovered is truly a discovery and not simply an imagining. — Janus

A fair distinction. The individual who claims to have made such a discovery may be in the position of indeed having done so, but being faced with the impossibility of ever demonstrating it. (I still don't think anything here is obvious, but no matter. :smile: )

The principle exists in the NT, ‘as you sow’ - but in Christian doctrine I think it is defrayed by Christ’s atonement. But it’s a very deep question. — Wayfarer

Yes -- the reconciliation of justice with mercy. I may be wrong, but I get a flavor of this in some versions of Buddhism as well. The bodhisattva deserves to be released from the wheel of dharma -- that would be just. But they choose to show mercy on unenlightened beings by returning to help them.

I agree that all of what you cited are fitting problems for philosophy. But I also think that ever since Kant, Hegel notwithstanding, it has been obvious that the traditional idea that one could arrive at metaphysical truths via intellectual intuition is, if not impossible, at least impossible to verify. — Janus

Good. And starting with Kant, and the relation of metaphysics to human knowledge, would be a sensible program. We could take a sounding on what is indeed possible, both to know and/or to verify. My only quibble: If the conclusion here is obvious, as you say, one wonders why the debate has nonetheless gone on with vigor for so long -- i.e., you may be right, but not obviously right.

While this process [of interpreting powerful altered states in metaphysical terms] may indeed be of phenomenological interest, it cannot be held to yield any propositional truth, and so could be of no help for metaphysics. — Janus

Again, this might be true. But whether it's true is a philosophical question. It seems to me that discussing that question is neither apologetics nor phenomenology, but plain old epistemology, wouldn't you say? As such, shouldn't it be a respectable activity for a philosopher?

Perhaps what you're saying is that you believe you have independent and solid grounds for insisting that only propositional truths can be helpful in metaphysics -- and moreover, that religious discourse can't supply them. I bet you can guess what I'm going to say next! :smile: : This may be true, but whether it's true requires . . . more philosophy.

What I can criticize are rational arguments for the existence of God, and weak apologetics...I've examined them all and none of them work. If you are a believer why not accept that, simply believe on the strength of feeling alone. like Kierkegaard's arational "leap of faith" and leave others to their own feelings in the matter? For many reasons I don't think it is an interesting or fitting topic for philosophical discussion. — Janus

As it happens, I agree with you about the rational arguments. I believe religion begins where philosophy ends. And theology, that halfway house, has never interested me much. But let me push back a little on your final sentence, or at least the "fitting" part. Whether it is true -- whether it's fitting for philosophy to examine rational apologetics -- is itself a philosophical question. The arguments themselves may or may not fit comfortably within philosophical practice. But that too is a philosophical question.

I'm pointing out this peculiarity of philosophy: To consider whether something should be ruled in or out of philosophy is . . . to do more philosophy! And I'm sure you're not saying that the meta-question itself is inappropriate.

We have had personal tragedies in my immediate and extended family, but I’ve never felt that it was something God did. The question ‘how could God let this happen?’ never occurred to me. — Wayfarer

Nor me, in quite that way. I was bringing up this example as a contrast with the idea that such grief is experienced as a privation, a lack, not as an indictment of God.

I still feel that what we experience as divine indifference is understandable in the Augustinian framework of the privation (or deprivation) of the good. We experience this as lack or want - lack of health, lack of ease, lack of sustenance, and lack of love — Wayfarer

But I agree, it's a very deep and difficult issue. — Wayfarer

Yes, and I'm under no illusions that anything I propose could settle the issue. But about privation . . . I don't know whether you've had the misfortune of watching a parent suffer the loss of a child. In such a case, I'm fairly sure the experience is not one of lack or want; it's an active and excruciating suffering. And once again, it's hard to put this down to mere divine indifference. Perhaps, if that's all it was, we might manage to see the experience as a lack of the good, misinterpreted by us as a not-caring. But the problem is that God, in the tradition we're discussing, is posited as caring very much. So we need to square that -- the God of love -- with the creator of a natural world which is clearly hostile or indifferent to human beings. Privation? OK, but why so much of it? And why must children and parents suffer the consequences?