Which to me suggests the question, does the perversity and cruelty of existence negate its worth altogether. — Wayfarer

I hope not. But the point about egregious suffering may well extend to non-human creation too. I was trying to give the Abrahamic God a break by only committing their parental love to humans.

As to the suffering that is due to natural causes - the 2004 tsunami comes to mind as an example - how is that attributable to divine act? — Wayfarer

Not at all, directly. But we have to remember that God is not imagined merely as some actor in the drama, who can be held innocent or guilty of the various plot developments. God set up the whole thing. It seems fantastic to say that it was impossible for God to allow a planet to develop as a home for his beloved children that didn't have tectonic plate shifts. I mean, why not, for goodness' sake? I could've done that! :wink: Must we insist this is the best of all possible worlds?

Don't hold your breath! — Wayfarer

Especially for that last item! (truthful politicians)

I don't have a big stake in any of this modernity stuff. I'm kind of temperamentally allergic to sweeping statements about society, so please forgive me.

So you're basically just repeating the same line: an expectation that if a Creator was truly benevolent, then suffering would not exist. And I think it's a false expectation. — Wayfarer

I agree that some suffering might be unavoidable, of the "my child's necessary operation" variety. What counts against God as a loving parent, I think, is the vast amount of gratuitous suffering, at least as far as we can fathom it. I think it was Kurt Vonnegut who asked, "Can't there just be less of it?" That doesn't strike me as a false or unreasonable expectation . . . if God really does love us.

And yes, the non-human world is full of suffering too, but God isn't supposed to be the loving parent of ants, on the Abrahamic account of things.

Which part of that isn't true? — Wayfarer

I have no idea. :smile: But, with respect, I don't think you do either. Let me turn it around: What would it take to falsify this statement?: "And that mental health crisis is itself due to and engaged with crises in the environment and the political system. And those in turn are immeshed within a deeper cultural historical crisis I call the meaning crisis." What sort of evidence would count decisively for or against this sweeping overview, to the extent that it could be declared simply true or false?

I've had occasion to say this before, but it bears repeating: I really appreciate your willingness to consider these questions with the care and thoroughness that you do.

I realize it would do, from your point of view, but I'm saying that even if one accepted the idea of a genuine, non-subjective sense of "wrong," it doesn't help generate an ought. As it happens, I do think there are objective/intersubjective values, quite apart from my personal opinions about them. But I don't agree with Count Timothy von Icarus and others that this creates a moral obligation simpliciter that can be expressed as "you ought to do X."

Can you explain any derivation of such a "moral ought?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, not as an absolute, non-hypothetical obligation. I don't think that can be done. When I say to you (anyone), "I think you ought to do X," what I mean is, "If you accept the values A, B, C, which you tell me you do, then you ought to do X." A lot of the unclarity around this discussion comes from denying the difference, epistemologically, between knowing what is of value, and knowing what one ought to do. You believe they involve the same process -- rationality, broadly -- and I do not. I think that recognizing moral (and aesthetic) values is non-rational -- people can't be shown them rationally -- and involves techniques that are at base experiential. However, once there is agreement on such values, the question of what one ought to do, given those values, becomes tractable.

Is this any help?

That is, you seem to be saying: "things are not good because they are truly desirable, but rather 'because something is 'morally good' the will has a sui generis 'moral ought' to seek it.'" — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, there's a third alternative, as I tried to outline above. There's nothing sui generis about the moral ought. It's a good old hypothetical imperative.* Where all the confusion comes in, is when we also try to claim that values are transparent to the rational mind in this way. This inevitably leads to the idea that values themselves could be "derived" in some way, from first premises. As I understand the question, they can't -- but that doesn't mean that everyone's perception/intuition/experience of values is equally correct. It's quite possible to perceive incorrectly. This is not a brief for ethical relativism.

Explain why something ought to be sought as an end because it is "morally good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm afraid that the whole set-up with "ends" is part of the rationalist tradition about values which I find suspect. I hold "compassion" to be one of the key virtues. Do I believe that acting compassionately is an end in itself? In a way; it can't be rationally justified, anyway. But does that mean that no further ethical dilemmas can be posed -- that it will always be obvious what the compassionate choice is? Certainly not. So, in your terms, would you want to say that this represents an "end"? I honestly don't know how we should think about that.

I think you should probably take Alasdair MacIntyre's thesis as much more plausible after exchanges like these. Apparently, you think "moral goodness" doesn't necessarily depend on ends and that the will doesn't seek goodness as an appetite (as truly desirable) but rather that "if something is 'morally good,' there is a unique 'moral ought' that denotes that some end should be sought as an end for no reason (e.g. it being desirable) except that it is 'morally good.' — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe I understand you here. But doesn't MacIntyre say that Classical terms like "goodness" have lost their original meanings, in the modern context? And that therefore we shouldn't use them, unless we use them as the Greeks did? But that presupposes that conceptual development is precluded by a fixed vocabulary. Let's say I deny that "the will seeks goodness as an appetite (as truly desirable)." Wouldn't MacIntyre say that I am simply wrong about the will and about goodness, based on the only coherent meanings the words can have, i.e., their Classical roots? I don't find that thesis plausible, no, but I agree with him, and with you, that a thorough understanding of the conceptual development of key philosophical terms is important.


* I'm deliberately ignoring the Kantian categorical imperative in this discussion, since I don't think it represents the kind of "ought" you're interested in. I think there's a lot to be said for the cat. imp., but that's because it is procedural. It doesn't claim to generate the content of ethics. Anyway, a whole other discussion.

the crisis, if there is one . . . — Janus

This way of thinking, meaning no disrespect to @Wayfarer and others who've given it a lot of attention, seems like a litmus test of one's overall conceptual chemistry. The crisis one sees in "modernity" (another litmus-test word: what's that?) will reveal one's own take on how life and society ought to be organized. All I'm prepared to say with any assurance is that there is no crisis resulting directly from some intellectual moves that occurred in Europe in the 17th century. Not even the butterfly effect could make that plausible.

Christianity is not founded on the promise of earthly comfort, but on the fact of the crucifiction —a figure of suffering who shares in, rather than eliminates, the world’s pain. — Wayfarer

I agree, but I don't see how this gets God off the hook, so to speak. Why not have us all, God and Christ included, in a lot less pain?

the modern framing of divine love as analogous to human parental love. That may itself be part of the conceptual difficulty. We naturally imagine a “loving God” as a kind of celestial caregiver who would prevent harm, much as we would do for our own children. — Wayfarer

Jeez, I dunno. An impartial reading of the Gospels seems to show Jesus insisting that his Abba (Aramaic for "Daddy" or "Papa") is very much a loving parent as we would understand such a figure today. Sometimes stern, sure, but heartbroken in the face of suffering. And Jesus himself reproaches his father God for abandoning him on the cross.

I don't think the "modern parent" theory flies.

For Aquinas, suffering and death are not evils in themselves, — Wayfarer

So I understand. I'd file this under "the mysterious ways of God," as above. If being slowly tortured to death, or watching your son or daughter suffer the same fate while the guards laugh at you, is somehow to be justified as not "evil in itself," then clearly Aquinas is using a different and highly eccentric vocabulary, one which I can't pretend to understand.

the presence of suffering in nature is not evidence of divine malice. — Wayfarer

We don't need malice in order to defeat the theodicy. Indifference will do, and if you add in the fact that God designed the whole mess as well, I think "criminal negligence" would also be appropriate.

That amounts to the same thing . . .after a bit of regression — AmadeusD

I realize it would do, from your point of view, but I'm saying that even if one accepted the idea of a genuine, non-subjective sense of "wrong," it doesn't help generate an ought. As it happens, I do think there are objective/intersubjective values, quite apart from my personal opinions about them. But I don't agree with @Count Timothy von Icarus and others that this creates a moral obligation simpliciter that can be expressed as "you ought to do X."

"I felt I had to" would present an issue. Isn't that a more interesting avenue? — AmadeusD

Yes, that's a different case. Is it clear to you that it's even an ethical statement? I'm not sure. It sounds like a psychological description that could apply to many things, ethical or not. But I understand what you're trying to capture -- the sense that doing the right thing feels compelling, at a level below (or above) rational justification. Would an ethical subjectivist need to challenge that, do you think, and argue that the feeling is just that, a feeling, and doesn't point beyond itself?

Let's see what the Count has to say. I'm not sure I've understood him correctly. Then I'll respond to you more fully. But for now . . . I don't think the only other option is to add "because I don't want to" to explain a choice seen as obligatory. Suppose instead I added "because I think it's wrong." Does that generate an ought for anyone but me? In other words, the "ought" problem is bigger even than objective vs. subjective understandings of ethical values. It concerns universalizability.

A just dessert in the desert. — Hanover

Can I steal that line? :grin:

Ends are ordered to other ends. They either go on in an infinite regress, bottom out in irrational desires, or they are ordered to something sought for its own sake (e.g. happiness). — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I may pluck this statement out of its somewhat cantankerous conversational context :wink: . . .

You seem to be saying that, if something is sought for its own sake (by me, let's say), then I ought to seek it -- that this generates the moral ought. Or is it that, if I am seeking it for its own sake, then I ought to continue to seek it? This appears definitionally obvious to you, I'm guessing, but clearly others don't understand why. Nor do I. Why does it follow? Where does the obligation come in?

Let us call this the Hotel Manager Theodicy. It holds God to account for the conditions of the world in the same way one might complain about bad service. — Wayfarer

I like this! A good phrase that captures a major tenet of traditional theocidies.

Besides, nowhere in the sacred texts of East or West is there a promise that the world will be free of suffering. — Wayfarer

But here's the problem. There is a promise, in the Abrahamic religions, that God is a loving God, that God is love, that we may view God as we would a parent. The charge, then, is that this is completely inconsistent with the amount of suffering in the world. Not the fact of suffering as such, perhaps, but the sheer devastating omnipresence of it. And to short-circuit the Free Will Defense at this point, we can simply limit the suffering in question to the so-called natural evils -- disease, earthquake, accident, etc. What loving parent would do this to their children? "After all, life is supposed to be good, right?" No, this is the wrong point. God is supposed to be good.

But does God "do this"?

As others have commented, it makes a difference that God is not merely the manager of the hotel, but the architect and builder. It would require some highly abstract philosophical premises (along the "best of all possible worlds" line) to maintain that God has done the best they could. If that's so, then God's ways are truly mysterious to humanity; we are missing so many pieces of the theological puzzle that we might as well give up trying to understand it at all. Certainly "love" and "goodness" and "possibility" cannot mean the same thing to God as they do to us.

If suffering were to be eliminated, where exactly should the line be drawn? Is it enough that we only suffer head colds, not cancer? That no child is ever harmed, but adults might still endure misfortune? That natural disasters occur, but without casualties? — Wayfarer

The line can be drawn anywhere, to refute the theodicy. Use the parent analogy again. We expect a loving parent to permit suffering that is truly necessary (a painful operation for their child, perhaps) but firmly exclude anything else in their power, especially capricious and pointless pain. So if God could have, say, prevented the development of cancers in humans, but did not, then God is at fault. But likewise, if God could have arranged things so that a single volcano in Sri Lanka in the year 418 did not erupt, yet it did, God is equally at fault. No loving parent would do either one.

By the way, this whole idea of what God "could have arranged" is hard to discuss in reasonably scientific terms. What are we actually asking for? Some difference in the initial conditions, 14 billion years ago, such that eventually the Earth and its inhabitants would have different characteristics? I guess so. With God all things are possible, or at least we have to allow this for the purposes of the theodicy thought-experiment.

There is no longer any axis of salvation, no trajectory of the soul, no higher destiny against which the meaning of suffering might be understood. — Wayfarer

This suggests the only theodicy that I've ever been able to accept: Like Kant, I think we have to postulate an afterlife if we're to make sense of suffering, and God's reasons for creating things as they have. If this life is all there is, I would find the idea of a loving God absurd, and would reject all the theodicies I've ever seen. I would, I suppose, be a Buddhist. But with an "axis of salvation" a "higher destiny" understood literally as "death is not the end," we have additional possibilities.

Oh, yikes, I didn't mean the "fading fast" was a good thing! I'm with you -- public accountability is vital.

I thoroughly agree with everything you say here (until the last paragraph). To go from "each individual must make their own judgments, illuminated by reason and conscience as best they can" to "all individual judgments are equally perspicuous and moral" is the mistake, and a big one. I appreciate too your calling out the difference between inventing values and perceiving them properly. (You may not agree, but I'd consider the deduction of values from some intellectual first premises to be the same as inventing them, for all the defense that can be given of them.) What's needed is vision, noetic perception, self-knowledge, opening of the heart or third eye or [fill in favorite spiritual tradition]. I don't see relying on philosophy for that, though again you may disagree, and think more benevolently of it.

So, the last paragraph: "the authority of the individual is absolute, but the content of what they believe is seen as purely personal." Guess it depends who you're listening to. Among my friends, and based on the non-philosophical stuff I read, I'd say rather that there's a kind of double-mindedness about the whole matter. In one mood, Ben upholds his absolute right, and everybody's, to their own beliefs. In another mood, he's quick to invoke the most time-honored, religiously derived reasons why we should share his beliefs, and is very concerned that we understand and agree, impersonally! I think the need to provide public justification for private beliefs is still very strong, at least in the U.S. (though it may be fading fast), and that's a good thing.

Basically, I view morality as a process, — Dawnstorm

The descriptions you give seem pretty accurate to me, as a kind of sociology of moral behavior. As a philosopher, I'm not really entitled to an opinion about it, as I haven't studied these questions.

. . . and what it's "based" on is a bit chicken/egg. — Dawnstorm

Here, however, we enter philosophical territory, starting with the scare-quotes around "based"! Why the quotes? Do you mean to question whether there is a true basis for moral behavior, apart from social upbringing and norms? A fair question, but say more about the chicken/egg aspect.

Oh, I see. No, when I said that an obviously irrational ethical system would have been "dismissed" long ago, I meant, and perhaps should have said, "dismissed by serious philosophers who understand the conversation." If we require such a system to be dismissed by absolutely everyone, we'll have a long wait!

That said, Divine Command makes an interesting case. Is it irrational, exactly? Should it be dismissed? I could imagine a nuanced version that might pass muster. But if it refers to what some in the States call "God said it, I believe it, that settles it" religion, then no, not intellectually respectable.

Harris allows this too, expanding well-being to "all conscious creatures." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't know that. I think better of him for it.

But are you saying that the basis of virtue ethics is not "fulfilling the human good"? I thought that was the first principle for humans. That's what I doubt can generate the ethical "ought".

You and J both have denied goodness as a possible principle for ethics, — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. Rather, I don't see a way to use "good for human beings" to generate "I ought to do X." That's because I see "good for human beings" as only one dimension of ethics, not the first principle from which all else may be deduced.

Plenty of examples of why this is patently not the case! Divine Command theory being one. — AmadeusD

I actually don't know what that is. Could you explain the context? Thanks.

Yes, agreed, but we were discussing whether it's fair to say that Hume settled for a "hodgepodge stew" when it came to the passions and their relation to action. I don't think that's what you find at all in the Treatise (though I disagree with his conclusions, as do you). But I suppose that's another OP.

I'll try and explain what I meant by subjectivism. It's not as if it's a doctrine or school of thought; only that, for deep questions of value and meaning, as these are not necessarily adjudicable by science, then whatever is held about them, is said to be a personal matter, or a matter for individual judgement. — Wayfarer

Let's make it a little clearer. Deep questions of value and meaning are matters for individual judgment; how could they be otherwise? You can't look them up in a textbook. What you mean, I think, is that subjectivism believes that human judgment has no further court of appeal, where it might receive an answer as to whether the judgment is correct or not. In that sense, these judgments are either based on subjective considerations that don't necessarily hold from one person to the next, or they are unfounded by a first principle of rationality.

Liberalism as I understand it stops with the first statement: From the state's point of view, your individual judgment is just that, and we will not interfere or tell you you are right or wrong. But I certainly see what you mean about a "subjective attitude," if we can call it that, which wants to say all sorts of things about what value judgments are "really" based on. Most of these things, I disagree with, as do you. The ideal liberal state will have none of this.

As he says in the Treatise: "I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Now hold on here! :smile: This is Hume on perception, not the moral ordering of the rational and lower appetites. Read the quote in context.

I might seem to be advocating for religion, but it’s not my intention to evangelise. — Wayfarer

No, I don't take you to be doing that at all. Your approach is fair-minded, and I share your view of the importance of spirituality, if not religion per se.

inevitable subjectivism . . . — Wayfarer

the individual conscience as the final arbiter of value. . . — Wayfarer

preferences are more or less sacrosanct in liberalism (within legal limits.) — Wayfarer

I think this is wrong, but the distinction that needs to be made is a subtle one. And what you say here may help make sense of it:

That's why I'm trying to focus on a philosophy rather than politics. — Wayfarer

In what I'm saying about liberalism, I am focusing on it as a political structure. It's been slow to dawn on me that others on TPF, including yourself to an extent, view "liberalism" as an entire panoply of philosophical and ethical attitudes, intent on various levels of proselytizing. I'm sure this is the sort of "overstepping" you're thinking about. I have almost no interest in this feature of contemporary life, and know little about it. I avoid that level of "political" non-conversation whenever I can. My political convictions are far to the left of all that (I should have been born Swedish!). So I can hardly say you're wrong. No doubt there are many out there who wear the "liberal" hat and who do all that you fear they do. But all I can speak about is what I know of the Rawlsian liberal tradition in political theory, which is a very different matter.

So, from that perspective . . . there really isn't any inevitable subjectivism, nor is the individual conscience consulted about value, nor is anyone's preference sacrosanct. To the extent that a government could espouse such things (by law?!), Rawls would say it did not understand liberalism. The sort of government Rawls envisaged, I think, would have no opinions whatsoever about subjectivism vs. objectivism in personal philosophy, or about how reliable one's conscience might be. Nor would a preference be sacrosanct in the sense of being philosophically unquestionable.

On all these matters, the state is neutral, agnostic. Its attitude is: "You might be right. And you have the right to be wrong. You may do as your conscience dictates, and that may or may not result in ethical truth. It's none of our business. It's not that we think "subjectivism is correct"; it's that we insist that the government must not say the opposite. We are concerned that no one, speaking for the state, attempts to impose their version of objective values other than the procedural values of liberalism itself. That is not because we "don't believe in objective values"; some of us do, some of us don't; it's because the heterogeneity of the polis demands neutrality on the question, just as a matter of tolerance and getting along. The alternative, we think, must inevitably tend toward authoritarianism."

Is this complex and full of flaws? You bet. It isn't even my preferred political structure. I only insist that it's not the same thing as taking a position on subjectivism, or trying to get people to adopt it.

"Asking for reasons" quells existential anxiety (provided you find acceptable answers). You believe in God, you believe in rationality, you believe that people are basically good... anything to preserve the modicum of routine you need. — Dawnstorm

Interestingly, I think this is right -- finding a basis for ethical values does indeed do these things -- but at the same time it can't settle the question. Because . . . if we accept all this and find that our anxiety is indeed quelled, and our routine preserved, we may still find ourselves asking, "But is this enough? Is this what 'doing good' really means?" That the question can be meaningfully asked at all seems to put it in a different category from, say, "OK, I've demonstrated the Pythagorean theorem, but is that enough? Do I really understand what a right triangle is?" I'd say that question was meaningless, but the ethical question doesn't seem to be like that.

I have never had an objectivist say something I considered particularly rational about the basis for such a view. I assume the reverse is true. — AmadeusD

Not for me. If subjectivism or emotivism about ethics were obviously irrational, it would have been dismissed centuries ago. Again, I wish it were that simple.

Better to say, "It was wrong; I shouldn't have done it."
— J

Which expresses that person's personal, internal assessment of their behaviour. There is nothing close to objective about even the assessment mechanism here. — AmadeusD

Well, that might be so. Are you meaning to say that this is characteristic of all 1st-personal judgments? That is, if I say, "My statement was incorrect," that is equally personal and internal, with no pretense to objectivity? I suspect that's not what you mean. Rather, in this case you believe that there cannot be an objective assessment mechanism here, unlike a judgment about, say, accuracy. But that's assuming the conclusion, no?

Perhaps there's a better pair of words to use that reflects the distinction
— J

There must be, as I am not seeing a distinction in your elucidations. — AmadeusD

The pair in question is "prefer" and "choose". The distinction -- which I agree is hard to put in clear terms -- is between an action I actually like, or enjoy, or grok, or whatever other word we use to express a Humean passion, and an action that has none of these characteristics but that I do because I believe I should -- that it's the right thing to do. As above, we have to be careful not to start by assuming that the latter type of action is impossible, on theoretical grounds. I guess, if nothing comes to mind when you ask yourself for a personal example, it might be hard to characterize further. But I would have said that we all know the difference between doing something we really want to do -- have positive feelings about -- versus doing something quite repugnant, yet morally necessary as we see it.

Concerning what "ought to do" means: I wish I could agree with those who believe that we can derive an "ought" from an "is", ethically. This would involve going from a foundational, definitional understanding of what a human being is, to rational deductions about values which carry with them obligations (as opposed to reasons) for action. It would make things much simpler. But I agree with you that the ethical "ought" resists this deductive understanding. For me, one of the most interesting questions in meta-ethics is: Given this basic difference of opinion, is there any way that the two versions of ethics can really talk to each other? Or must we always be talking past each other? I think a real conversation would have to involve a very active curiosity about how to live into the opposite position, a kind of understanding from within.

The kibbutz has been a particularly robust example though, and it's worth noting there that (aside from being grounded more in socialist thought), they have had the benefit of a friendly legal system that has enabled them, rather than one that is broadly hostile to their project. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I most certainly don't want to start a controversy about Israel, but notice what can happen when a "friendly legal system" extends its friendship not just to the admirable concept of a kibbutz, but to the policy that other religiously based social groups should not receive that friendship -- should in fact be seen as opponents on religious/nationalist grounds. Thank goodness, there are many, many Israelis who are opposed to this kind of theocracy.

That may amount to a kind of neutrality, but it effectively brackets deeper conceptions of the Good—not by refuting them, but by rendering them inadmissible in public reasoning. So while liberalism doesn’t deny transcendental values, it often functions as if they were subjective—and that’s the deeper concern. — Wayfarer

Yes. Minor quibble: "inadmissible" shouldn't be taken to mean "unmentionable" or "intellectually disreputable." The point is that they can't play a deliberative role, other than as a statement of what the person believes.

"It often functions as if they were subjective—and that’s the deeper concern."

But what would be the alternative? The key is "as if". Values may or may not be subjective, says the liberal state, but we must proceed as if they are -- or at any rate, as if the matter is not one for government to decide. Should we instead turn our practical deliberations into a forum about whose claim to objective value has the best argument? Or would you rather we adopted a set of transcendental values, and based the polity on them? How would that differ from theocracy? (An alternative, more critical, response here would be: The liberal state does adopt a set of transcendental values, but they are precisely the procedural values of neutrality and impartiality, as @Janus points out.)

The issue being that the supposed ethical neutrality of liberalism is itself based on a worldview, namely, that the ground of values is social or political in nature, in a world that is morally neutral or indifferent. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure that's right, though I agree with you about spirituality. Rawlsian liberalism doesn't have to say -- and indeed it usually does not -- that the world is morally neutral or indifferent. And it's not so much that the ground of values is political. Rather, it's that the only values that belong in the political sphere are process values, more or less Kantian, that emphasize impartiality and universalizability. Is this an artificial and perhaps unworkable division? Maybe. But we should try to understand it on its own terms. Liberalism, as exemplified by Rawls, believed that the job of the state was to establish, to the extent possible, a framework for coexistence among people and groups with diverging opinions and goals. And yes, as I've been discussing with @Joshs, this framework can't be neutral in respect to any values whatsoever. But it can espouse a version of neutrality that at least takes a hands-off approach to differences among religious and/or social groups -- and that's not nothing. It asks for public neutrality, regardless of what any particular member of the polis may personally believe. That is not the same thing as publicly declaring that there are no transcendental values, which the opponents of liberalism often seem to believe is the agenda.

Yep, the quote is from Gallagher’s recent book, Action and Interaction. His notion of justice departs from Rawls in not being grounded in neutrality or fairness. — Joshs

I'll make a point of reading it. I've followed his career with interest. He was quite a bit older than me -- I think he'd just left seminary -- but a really nice, smart guy,

What do you make of the version of neutrality that Axel Honneth and Shaun Gallagher are saddling Rawls with? — Joshs

(Is this quote from Gallagher? I went to grad school with him!)

I think the criticisms in the passage are apt, particularly about Rawls and goods distribution. I'm sure you're familiar with Martha Nussbaum's critiques as well. We could do a whole thread on what's right and wrong with Rawls and the original position. The reason I don't consider myself a Rawlsian is because of his over-reliance on an abstract thought experiment to generate the idea of justice as fairness -- very far from the Habermasian idea of communicative action. That, and his apparent indifference to the role of capitalism in liberalism.

But . . . flawed as it is, the Rawlsian viewpoint is about fairness, understood as neutrality or impartiality. It would be ludicrously wrong to say that Rawls "wasn't trying to be neutral" or "didn't care about fairness." If we could somehow, per impossibile, generate a re-deal of human affairs based on his original position, it would almost certainly be fairer than what we have now -- and more neutral, too.

to realise the other is a person is to realise that I am a person, the realisation of which is unpersonal and objective, and so the motivation towards altruism isn't direct (like say hunger) but derived from abstracted facts. — Dawnstorm

That's fair enough to Nagel. The important thing is that this motivation is 1) also impersonal, in the sense that it provides reasons for anyone to act, not just me; and 2) it can be stated without reference to my (or anyone's) personal feelings or preferences.

So, yeah, if emotivists say that every action is directly motived by an isolatable and easily categorisable desire, and Nagel says that isn't so, then I'm with Nagel. Beyond that, I haven't thought my intuitions through enough to say one way or another how feelings factor in. But take them away, away you're left with... what? Instructions? Elaborate if-then decision trees? — Dawnstorm

That's in part, I believe, why Nagel called his book The Possibility of Altruism. If we do eliminate feelings, even understood very broadly as you do, what could be left? What in the world could motivate me to take an unpleasant, difficult action, at no benefit whatsoever to myself, if not a strong "passion" which tells me I "should"? That is Hume's position, more or less. In contrast, Nagel argues for reasons as motivators -- beliefs, truths, entailments, arguments, the whole deal.

That is what I think myself. Given certain values (which are not generated in this way at all), we then want to know how to apply them. And the answer will be: as your reason dictates. On this view, reasons can create feelings, strong feelings, which can then help us do the right thing. But the reverse is not true. Reasons are either valid or invalid or somewhere in between, without reference to what my personal feelings or inclinations might be. This is of course why it is often so hard to "let reason be your guide."

(And if it worked out so neatly in practice, we'd have no ethical quandaries! Believe me, I know this is not like working a decision-tree.)

I wouldn't expect an appeal during the carrying out of the situation, not as a default. That comes in later, when others ask why you did something, and then the most likely reply is going to be "because he needed X" or some such. — Dawnstorm

Yes, that's all I meant by "appeal" -- theoretical, not in medias res.

But the comfort-flow itself is just there: it's not usually available for legitimisation or reflexion. — Dawnstorm

No doubt true. What we want to know is, what happens when an ethical choice arises that forces us to scrutinize our normal patterns of comfort and legitimization? Is the only tool at our disposal yet another look at the question of comfort? Or can I bypass how I may personally feel (again, taking "feel" in its broadest sense, to include like, prefer, etc.), ask for reasons, and let the comfort chips fall where they may?

The ‘neutral’ is never divorced from some stance or other arising from the messy business of assessing competing claims to validity within a diverse community. — Joshs

Yes, so all the more reason not to saddle Rawlsians with a version of "neutrality" they never claimed to exemplify. Their neutrality is associated with a stance, as is yours, as is Rorty's, as is mine.

Whether you think the Rawlsian approach is a secular offshoot of religious thinking depends on how narrowly you want to define religion. — Joshs

This is true. I think your very broad definition would make absolutely any rationalist, no matter how committed their atheism might be, an "offshoot of religious thinking." We could say that, but is it persuasive?

But then of course he thinks the entire Western philosophical tradition up through Hegel and Nietzsche is ontotheology, — Joshs

Yes, same point. Are these extremely broad generalizations accurate or helpful, past a certain point? Or perhaps it's better to ask, Does such an understanding help us make sense of Rawls or Habermas as philosophers?

I get where you're coming from. I know the case that can be made about religion as the root of all foundationalism, "skyhooks" and all. But deconstruction is not innocent here. If we choose to focus on this aspect of religion (and rationalism), we owe our interlocutors an account of why.

I think Rorty’s lack of sure-footedness in the terrain of post-Cartesianism led him to become too suspicious of philosophy, not recognizing the validity of philosophical concepts pointing beyond metaphysical skyhooks of the sort that Habermas remained wedded to. — Joshs

I don't know if you've read Richard J. Bernstein? Almost alone at the time, he was determined to build bridges between anal. and continental phil. His Beyond Objectivism and Relativism and The New Constellation contain very sharp comparisons and critiques of Habermas vs. Rorty, connecting both of them with Gadamer, Heidegger, Kuhn, and other relevant thinkers. (Since both books were written 40-odd years ago, though, we only get middle-period Habermas in the mix.)

I love the juxtaposition of ‘ought’ and ‘neutral’ here. It illustrates , without recognizing it , that built into the assumption of norms of neutrality, objectivity and non-bias (like Rawls’ veil of ignorance) is a metaphysical ought. — Joshs

I think you're selling the Rawlsian tradition short here. I recognize very well the juxtaposition you point out, and so does the tradition -- I simply don't find it scandalous in the way that you do. You're wanting to read "neutral" in terms that were never intended. It doesn't mean "without oughts." That would be directly counter to what Rawls proposed. It means "without religious doctrines, but attempting to treat each person fairly." It's you, not Rawls, who claims that this carries with it the idea that "such notions of the objective, the equal, the neutral, are secular offshoots of religious thought." If that is indeed true, then perhaps the liberal project was always incoherent. But I see no reason to believe it is true, certainly not on some universal grounds asserting that "objectivity can't be meaningful outside a religious tradition."

I hope I haven't made things worse. — Dawnstorm

Not at all. This is a very thoughtful and responsive post. I'll try to reply in stages.

I can do something that helps you, but out of purely instrumental considerations. Is this altruism? — Dawnstorm

No, not on my understanding (which I should say is very influenced by Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism). Something is altruistic when it is motivated by the belief that the plight of others, all by itself, gives me a reason to act.

the emphasis on duty makes it seem like morals as rule-following. — Dawnstorm

I know. The only word I can think of which is as disreputable as "duty" in the ethical lexicon would be "sin." You'll notice that I didn't in fact use the word "duty," because I hate it too. I prefer "responsibility." But to your point . . . I don't know whether ethics has to involve rule-following, but it probably does have to involve acting on reasons or principles. And these are often in direct conflict with our feelings.

it feels like you view "it's ultimately feelings" as feelings being the envisioned pay off. That's not the only role they have. Feelings are supposed to underly *any* value; therefore also any attachment to duty or responsibility you might have. — Dawnstorm

Yes. It would be unfair to the advocate of "it's ultimately feelings" to construe them as meaning "I expect to feel a certain way after I've helped you." Feelings should be seen as the motivator, not the pay-off, in order to make this view robust. The idea is that, at bottom, I feel a certain way about my responsibility (as I conceive it), and this provides the motivation for my action.

I can't read this line without seeing feelings front and center: "quality of my life"? "What I like"? Take feelings away and liking stuff is impossible, and quality of life becomes irrelevant to your praxis. — Dawnstorm

I agree that "quality of life" is hazy. I'll think more about a better way to talk about the attachment a person feels to a certain self-presentation of their values.

And "like" can also be questioned. Could you say more, though, about why you construe "like" to involve a feeling? Is this based on usage, or are you analyzing what "like" would have to mean, in order for it to say something meaningful?

The label "genuine altruism" is an intrusion here: it doesn't order the field, but adds a semantic problem I can do without. — Dawnstorm

Does using my Nagel-derived concept, above, help any? I think the key point is that altruism takes the other person's situation, all by itself, without any appeal to how the altruist feels, as a reason for action. You may well believe that such a thing is impossible, of course, depending on what role you give reasons in ethical deliberation. If they wouldn't be reasons without some corresponding motivating feelings, then my and Nagel's account wouldn't fly for you.

I haven't followed most of this thread, so perhaps I need to go back and look more closely. It was the mention of Habermas that hooked me! I'm seeing a distinction between what a liberally conceived government can do, and what something called "liberalism" can proselytize for. Liberalism or secularism as a structure of politics ought to be neutral as to whether following a religion is better than not doing so. I suppose there would be other, more argumentative versions of liberalism as a philosophy that see it as a positive theory of what and what not to believe. I was only referring to the first, Rawlsian version.

Do you mean specifically religious teleology or just teleology in general? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Religious teleology. The secular versions aren't really hot issues at the moment, politically. Remember, this conversation Habermas is taking part in concerns a specific moment in European politics. There are of course other ways to think about teleology.

It's not that secular reason "has no use" for teleology or eschatology, it's more that to introduce either dimension into a liberal polity is to immediately desecularize the neutral normative constraints in favor of some religious tradition's view.
— J

Would that be because of the implicit presumption of a normative axis, the implied idea of a true good. — Wayfarer

Do you mean, within a particular religion's description of, say, eschatology? Not sure I understand your thought here. But if that's what you mean, then yes, perhaps it would be impossible to introduce eschatology on its own, without foregrounding a particular tradition and calling into question the neutrality of a liberal, process-oriented polity.

But they cannot be total non-choices, right? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Such acts are "semi-involuntary." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that's how it looks to me.

If this was the case, then we would also say that a man not cheating on his wife was also "semi-involuntary" if his lust is in conflict with his desire to do the right thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is interesting. True, we wouldn't call it "semi-involuntary," but we might very well offer an explanation that deprived the individual of considerable freedom of choice. Depends how much stock you put in deep-psychological explanations that bypass conscious reasons. To my thinking, they're often accurate, but not necessarily, and shouldn't be the default mode of explaining. Yet it's always important to ask, Exactly how much free choice did X have, in a given situation?

it doesn't make sense to collapse the rational and lower appetites into one hodgepodge stew — Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed not. Your talent for a striking phrase can get the better of you sometimes, though! Is this really the best and fairest way to characterize what Humeans and other anti-rationalists are doing? The question is very difficult, and no good philosopher is willing to settle for a hodgepodge, certainly not Hume himself.

Yep, he and Rorty never saw eye to eye. My sympathies are almost entirely with Habermas, who seems to me a much more careful and interesting thinker than Rorty, though the latter's historical importance is unquestionable. Habermas is also at a disadvantage here, because his writing is often turgid, while Rorty was a sparkling stylist.

I suppose the most trenchant criticism one could offer of Rorty is that, despite his sincere efforts, philosophy has not come to end.

Ah, that's more like it. A much clearer picture of Habermas's thinking about religion and secularism -- also see Religion and Rationality (1998) and Between Naturalism and Religion (2008), both excellent.

The result, as Michael Reder, another of Habermas’s interlocutors, observes, is a religion that has been “instrumentalized,” made into something useful for a secular reason that still has no use for its teleological and eschatological underpinnings. Religions, explains Reder, are brought in only “to help to prevent or overcome social disruptions.” Once they have performed this service they go back in their box and don’t trouble us with uncomfortable cosmic demands.

I do think Reder gets Habermas a bit wrong here. It's not that secular reason "has no use" for teleology or eschatology, it's more that to introduce either dimension into a liberal polity is to immediately desecularize the neutral normative constraints in favor of some religious tradition's view. Likewise, "instrumentalize" is too harsh. Secular society need not have much belief in religion, but what Habermas advocates is more than using religion to perform a useful service. He really wants liberal societies to be troubled by the "cosmic demands," and take religious perspectives on values more seriously.