I don’t agree with much of this.

I have provided where, in Kant, the two concepts are objectively removed from one another. Not sure what else to say, but I very much respect your dedication here.

I understand what you’re getting at, but I’m not able to see secondary sources who disagree with direct statements in the source as valuable personally.

:ok:

But would you say that your claim is the officially accepted interpretation of Nounmena and Thing-in-itself in Kant? — Corvus

I'm unsure what an 'officially accepted' interpretation is, but it seems to be the most common.

Ding-en-sich = The thing, simpliciter
Noumena = that same thing as perceived by something other than Human, spatio-temporal perception
Phenomena(of something) = the same thing in human perception only.

at any rate, the above conceptions work for reading the Critique. Most don't.

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Noumena this page contains a fairly good overview of the disagreement around the concepts - but within Kant, they are kept separate**. Particularly, Palmquist, as a secondary source, I would take, but largely because (as discussed in this article) it is essentially aligned with Kant's actual writing. Not that that's the be-all-end-all, but I tend not to take much secondary material which expressly alters the plain meaning of the OG text on board. Might be something I'll get over. Very much smoething i've learned reading law.

** From CPR:
"if, however, I suppose that there be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali), then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia). (A249)"

and

"But if we understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be the noumenon in a positive sense. (B307)"
(from the SEP Article )

I am not persuaded by Kant's argument. — Lionino

Neither, overall, but...

Some folks seem to believe that the Thing-in-itself exists in the mind. — Corvus

It is defined as otherwise. So thats incoherent.

If you accept the existence of the Kantian Thing-in-itself in Noumena, — Corvus

The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding.

So perhaps it (the argument of Kant) is not being adequately outlined.

One more quote to the now-removed log of your intense bad faith and ability to dehumanize based on your ideology.

Neat that it got removed though. In fact, the entire exchange was removed.
Keeps you going. But I think it is ethically questionable that the Mods (probably you) have removed the evidence of this, in the thread from which it had been collectively taken. Seems modding isn't about improving the forum, in this case.

Nice.

That is a very interesting paper prima facie. However, I have some serious reservations about an hypothesis that posits mental events cannot be reduced to physical events, but still entertains a direct connection between the two. The basis of the argument, though, I already take. I look forward to sitting down with it later today (its 4pm).

A thoguht that struck me to address the OP's actually questions though:

Consider Sean Carroll on stage, providing data/information and eliciting 'WOW!" from some audience members (none of these discreet events matter, particularly).

He is, all at the same time:
Speaking;
Informing;
Performing; and
if taken to an extreme, and related to some previous discussion eliciting certain, lets say, involuntary responses to his speech.

Are all of these acts rolled into the one act?

No one seems to disagree that there's Object -> Sense organ Engagement -> a physical process of electrical impulse through the CNS, which are essentially decoded by the brain and presented to the mind as an experience. No one has presented me any reason to think otherwise and I cannot get on with calling that 'direct'. — AmadeusD

Per above, on my account, there is still going to be this obstacle to establishing a direct link between the experience and the object, in any given case denoted to be 'direct' in a half/half system. So, my issue isn't so much 'what hypothesis is the most workable' and which one gets off the ground.

I think that (your) consideration is a much, much more fruitful one than just knocking heads over and over, so take your frustration with that seriously these days. In lieu of a full-blown critique of both Austin and Kastrup, i'm left with no answer to what/where that 'direct' connection would be. Your medial version reduced hte problematic instances from 'all' to 'some.

It might be better if I were to let you two discuss the topic for a bit. — Banno

It wouldn't. But I cannot force your hand.

may have gone unnoticed — Banno

It had.

ut why not reject the very framing of the argument in those terms — Banno

I essentially had from the outset - but apparently, no one like theories that delineate the senses into different systems that operate differently. But the reason "why not?" is because it flies in the face of physical facts, best I can tell and does not address the issue, because it retains a 'direct realist' notion at some points of experience. No reason to take seriously something that, on the empirical facts, can't be the case. *shrug*.

Ah ok, fair enough. Yeah, effective in that context. Thanks mate.

The people here saying you can't hold the individual population accountable are likely those who hate holding themselves accountable for anything in the first place. — Vaskane

Given that these are two demonstrably different things, morally and actually, how are you equivocating? Genuinely, not like i've written it off and am scoffing.

Hence I call this whole information transfer from object to retina an "indirect" transfer. — Quk

I'm thinking you and I are misusing these terms, as circumstance within Philosophy proper, would dictate. That's why i was a little clearer in the problem I was asking about, to try to avoid those assumptions (of which I would definitely be on the shakier and less helpful side).

Isn't this a homunculus argument? — Banno

It could be..It would be accidental...I'm not trying to making an argument, just trying to find solutions to the problems I see. What argument is required, i assume, would come up as a result of the discussion. But, I also don't see much of an issue with the basic homunculus argument... something is having the experience which isn't touching the wall. So, idk. I probably just haven't adequately engaged with problems it presents.

No one seems to disagree that there's Object -> Sense organ Engagement -> a physical process of electrical impulse through the CNS, which are essentially decoded by the brain and presented to the mind as an experience. No one has presented me any reason to think otherwise and I cannot get on with calling that 'direct'. That's why I wondered if its the Engagement stage you're calling direct. Which i'd agree with.

Perhaps you could attempt to provide what I'm missing - no one seems to want to engage directly with the problem (i.e where is the 'direct' connection between the object at the experience?), rather than assert, cite or dismiss...Which is not to denigrate - I'm probably missing it and need help lol. Tell me where it is!

experience? — Banno

I don't know. That's something that I hope I can have ideas about borne of a good understanding of the questions I've posed. If 'experience' does in fact, consist in brain activity, then yep. But i don't lean that way, so it feels uncomfortable to pretend I 'get it'.

On my extremely pale and inadequate understanding of the Markov blanket concept, I can't really understand it's relevance - but, on the meek connection I can make from that understanding, I think this is getting to concrescence territory and I'm lost in that currently, so no help in either direction

Before I attempt to (because it'll be embarrassing for me lol), could this be (as noted earlier, but a little more specific) that when you say 'direct' you are only referring the physical act of touch, and not the experience of the act? That's certainly something I could be being very imprecise and consequently inaccurate about.

On your framing above, I see that you 'directly' touch the wall in some sense(lol) at least. But, I can't get past the experience of that touch being mediated by, say, electric impulse/CNS activity which is not the thing, ferrying a 'message' of that direct physical touch, to the mind for examination in 'feeling'. It may be that, inadequately examined, I use 'touch' to refer only to the experience because I can't get to anything more, on my account.

I suppose i'm trying to understand where in a situation it''s apt to use something like "because of" or "with" or "through" without that affecting the 'direct' attribution to whatever is being perceived. I don't posit anything here, I'm just struggling to see how that's not a mediation of some kind.

For touch, the middle man (by analogy, rather than "this is my position") is the nervous system, surely?

Folk might well see using or because of photons. But photons are not visible. — Banno

Doesn't this still place a middle man in your 'direct' position? Truly unsure how you'd see that - not arguing against your form of a direct realism per se.

Correct. But I'm unsure what else to say, because I've addressed the delineation between 'putting in mind', 'causing' and lets call it distant(in time/proximity) influence (in this case, the latter... Kant was caused to consider Hume's position and 'solve hte problem. His solution caused the CPR to be written).

I'm not suggesting 'everyone is wrong' i'm suggesting tthis is being described inaccurately, 'this', being hte difference between inspiration and cause. And I understand these are sloppy, underthought and are likely to be wrong. Just trying to be clear when it's not being quite nailed in criticisms.

I don't know what you're trying to say, largely for the reason Lionino has highlighted.

Can you clarify the comment? However, if it's an attempt to say that my deduction (not accusation) that you are lying about the link you provided, because you do not know what it says, probably better leave it - that deduction is patently reasonable and would require your address, if you think it's untrue (that's how discussions work :) ). I was able to show clearly that you did not read your link, and have either lied or willfully ignored several of its statements, a long with a plethora of others empirically verifiable facts you have either ignored or lied about (the basis for Qi, for example).

If it was anything else, feel free to clarify.

Would be glad to come back on it, once it's clear what you're saying.

they are there to argue against the objective truth — L'éléphant

And there's the bumper sticker

Irreligious. Because I don't think religions are a reasonable enterprise in any sense of that word, even as a social institution.

The world is not made of numbers, the way we construct our perceptual interaction with the world produces the concept of number, and this construction emerged out of cultural needs and purposes , such as the desire to keep track objects of value. — Joshs

This seems counter to common sense (other than the first half-line). "enumeration" is an act and you're obviously correct here (just think of roman vs arabic numerals), but "number" is merely the observation of more than one thing at a time. The function of 'maths' is unchanged across any iteration.
The concept of number really isn't different anywhere.

Kant did. — creativesoul

This may speak to where i highlight 'naive conceptions of cause' earlier in Timothy's reply.

I see nothing in Kant which does this, rather I see much that says Kant took Hume to have caused his 'awakening' or more importantly 'discomfort' or 'repulsion' at his conclusions. The cause of the CPR was Kant's need to solve the problem. If you feel there's something from Kant that shows he left off hte middle man in that, please do show me! In this case, I think 'cause' being a few steps behind the proximate cause removes from it that title.

Very tough. I'll probably be another couple of months yet, and that's just the first pass lol.

It was a bad idea to get into this immediately after CPR, though. It upends much of the CPR in terms of conclusions, so difficult for someone fairly new to this stuff. On the other hand, glad to get the toughest stuff out hte way first.

I think i might go to Cicero or Seneca next :lol:

Hey mate,

Unsure I get what you're saying in the first response. Your choice and your act aren't separable. I've made room for inspiration and incitement, which are in some sense both covered by different laws of liability that those which apply to an actor.

On the second, torts require either intention or negligence. Being convinced of an incorrect fact wouldn't raise a claim to that level, I don't think. But, more to the point, I didn't involve any other purpose.

The person was merely honestly mistaken. The results are the same, and no other purpose has been fulfilled. They are not liable as it was neither intended, or a result of negligence.

I guess, as a non-PM-ist, I'd just posit that the various 'numeral' systems all represent the same thing and can be read across multi-directionally (between languages) and that gives us reason to think its not the case that its socially constructed, other than the specifical symbolic system in use.

Sorry, I'm finding it hard to follow what you mean on either of these but nevermind. — Apustimelogist

Its crucial, so I'm not going to nevermind it.

If you do not understand what im saying, you wont udnerstand anything im saying. if the aim of the behaviour is the same in both cases, its determining factor hasn't changed (that being, on whatever account, Biology of some kind). Can you outline why this isn't hitting? I'll try to respond to all else, but if this hasn't become clear, I think the rest may be redundant (as you seem to note hehe).

There's absolutely no reason to bring biology into it. — Apustimelogist

I don't think you're really engaging with the account, which presupposes (and then argues for) biology actually being the reason. If they are causally related then bringing Biology in is the only way to explain it. This seems like a bit of hand waving, to my mind.

Honestly, do we really care about the biological facts beyond them being a possible means to an end which is ultimately in people's wants and desires? — Apustimelogist

Preface: I do understand the point. My account doesn't entail it, so it's left off. Those facts are directly causative of those wants and desires in effect, and so as above, saying this isn't determining of behaviour, and important to note just seems bizarre to me.

it has no political implication. — Apustimelogist

Particularly this type of claim. I fail to see how the basis for human decision making toward determined goals (if they be all biologically determined, in an extreme example) isn't politically relevant. Could you explain?

On the contrary, there's absolutely no reason for me to care about biology if it isn't in line with what I or other people want. — Apustimelogist

Again, you're not actually engaging my account here (whether it holds water or not)... On my account, the bolded is a direct result of the underlined. Call it wrong, sure, if that's your position, but if taken seriously you cannot engage with it while claiming a different set of circumstances applies other than the one the account requires. However, in this way, its entirely possible you're actually talking about biologically determined desires without noting that that's the case because you're trying to remove your conscious intent from determined aims. I'm unsure that can be done, particularly if you reject libertarian free will.

I am not sure I would say it exists in the same way that genes and environmental influences are inextricably entwined. — Apustimelogist

I'm not sure either, but it seems entirely plausible to me. Maybe not highly.

tools are not biological — Apustimelogist

No, but their use may be biologically required to fulfil the organism's aim. But at this point, I would agree, my account gets very weak at any rate at all.

I disagree.... There are no pre-determined goals that biological orgamisms are evolving towards. — Apustimelogist

to survive passes on its genes regardless of how or why it survived — Apustimelogist

Ok. But the 'how or why' is actually what we're discussing, surely. The fact that that is what happens seems inarguable, but how that happens seems determined by hte biology of the organism. I can't really understand how this isn't the case - plenty of behaviours just aren't open to humans, or dogs, or horses respectively, if they are to survive and propagate.

the fact I may want to keep clothes on me and stay warm has everything to do with my desires and nothing about biology — Apustimelogist

This is seems very much unserious to me, and akin to saying "I don't drink water because of biology, i drink water because I want to stay alive". I just can't really take that claim seriously.

The desires of people are the immediate concern. — Apustimelogist

Those desires are biologically informed on this account, and so the behaviours toward them are the same. Again, not sure you're necessarily getting that this is a stark difference, and not a difference in detail between your notion and mine.

I just don't see why you need the distinction — Apustimelogist

Because it is there - something not required to maintain life, or to propagate(again, accepting that those axioms hold) versus something which is. But, i do concede entirely that this maay not actually be relevant to what we're discussing and was more illustrative poetically than anything else, in hindsight.

Another arbitrary distinction. All human technology is "natural" in a similar way. — Apustimelogist

Fire exists without humans. Human technology does not, by definition. There is a patent and inarguable distinction here. Whether you see it as relevant, or whether i could defend as relevant is separate imo.

Just means the difference I was talking about is also spatial as well as temporal. — Apustimelogist

It is empirically a different situation to the one you implied, though? We, in fact, do still have those institutions you relied on no longer being around.

Well it's about where you choose to ignore the differences isn't it. — Apustimelogist

Not to my mind. I think its more important where you arbitrarily assert there are any meaningful ones. If its only a difference of detail, and not of kind, I think this becomes your

something so general as that then it has no political implication — Apustimelogist

Hmm, almost all very reasonable and difficult points.

If you don't want to call is causal it still seems like you'd need to explain the counterfactual. How does B fail to occur without A, and when A occurs, B follows from it through a chain of consequences, but A cannot be said to cause B? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Understand. I guess, as an empirical consideration, sure, that may not have happened otherwise - but there's no reason why it couldn't. Perhaps that doesn't do anything for you - for me, its a fairly stark difference between a truly proximate cause and something which contributed to the event in question. I may be triffling here but I always find it hard to conclude a cause without some very clear, fairly exclusive, reason for the act being caused by whatever is in question. Here, I don't see it.

The question would be, when do we hit the sui generis "cause-like-but-not-cause" phenomena and why is it different? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Im unsure your description is all that accurate. The act itself arises from the mentation of the subject, not the causal train of physically receiving whatever information we're talking about. The empirical causal relationship between lets say utterance in A and thought B cannot be rightly extended to the act, imo. Im unsure i need to answer the question above here.

Even if you want to allow for some form of libertarian free will, it seems like it simply cannot be the case that other people's words or other communicative acts never "put things in mind," or motivate action. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. But motivation is not a cause on my account. Its an invitation or inspiration. I don't think anyone would claim that Kant's CPR was caused by Hume. I distinguish between something being 'put in mind' and an act being 'caused'. It seems you're not? Sorry if i've got that wrong - if i've not got it wrong, it would explain some of the daylight here.

It is — Count Timothy von Icarus

A better example might be promissory estoppel. If its reasonable that someone(B) acted in good faith pursuant to a purported commitment from (A) which was then either ignored or disregarded entirely, it's held that if the commitment caused B to do something (think: promise to buy/sell property where B takes that as commitment and sells their property in order to buy A's property). Here, a law takes your definition of 'cause' wholesale, so I must concede my use of law to defend my point was at best inconsistently applied. That said, I do think there's a significant difference between an 'act' in general and an 'act' as against another person.

More to the point, even if words don't "cause" acts, it seems like their relationship to acts still has to fulfill pretty much all the characteristics of naive conceptions of cause — Count Timothy von Icarus

it seems like their relationship to acts still has to fulfill pretty much all the characteristics of naive conceptions of cause — Count Timothy von Icarus

With this I would agree, and just rest on my emphasis within the above. I think the idea that a fully indirect act, from which there is no connection to the act save for the subject's interpretation, is a proximate cause, is just plainly wrong. No one can reasonably claim that GTA causes similar types of crime as shown in the game, despite someone claiming it did. You'd say no, you're culpable by the fact of your actually having carried out a guilty act. The game has nothing to do, per se, with that act.

A. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. My understanding of both how those laws are written (cross-jurisdictionally) and the case law around them is that it is purely the intent (which matters later) that the person is being charged for. It is not the act of murder. It is the setting-in-motion a chain of events. It does not mitigate the actor's guilt. I am not all that up on US law though, so if you can provide a caase where someone is plainly convicted of 1st Degree Murder, but hte actor isn't, Id be happy to retract all this. I just can't see that ever happening. They both have the mens rea but their actus reus differ. If i'm wrong, i'm wrong.

B. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Important, but a truly held belief that what you did wouldn't cause the consequence in question is a defense to almost any charge. Including rape, which is pertinent here as its an act against another for whom your mindstate has zero mitigating effect. But, if you can successfully argue that you thought there was consent, you're good to go basically.

Likewise, someone who tricks someone into poisoning someone else by telling them cyanide is medicine, etc. is responsible for the murder — Count Timothy von Icarus

I believe this is inducement, by deception, and not 'murder', which is the act of killing someone unlawfully. Again, I could be wrong as i'm not across US law fully. Which speaks to what Im saying - it didn't cause the death, it induced someone to cause the death.

It can't be just intent. If this was the case, some random basement dwelling Chud posting on the Internet about the need to "exterminate the Jews," would be as guilty of "genocide" as top Nazi officials. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is entirely wrong to me. At what point has some internet Chud had any part in a Holocaust? If you can point to one, we will have a discussion about the two cases. Otherwise, this isn't relevant. Internet Chuds get fined and arrested for their intentions regularly (at least in places with Digital communication regulations). Their intent, and not their act, is an actus reus of its own. Going further to the act would be another actus reus for a different charge. If they knew they had some real-world minions carrying it out, they would be. Osama bin Laden is in this camp., but he was cave-dwelling. You seem to note this, but don't note its consequences for the position..

lacks the capability to adequately think through the consequences of actions "put into their mind," by the father. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agreed, but there's a significant difference between adults and children when it comes to culpability, either morally (on almost anyone's account) or legally. Im unsure what this is doing for either side of the discussion. I think a better example would be one between two adults - the second adult is not somehow less culpable because they were told to shoot. That just isn't a move available to them unless they are mentally impaired - which is equivalent, by degree, to being a minor in the law's eye.

Even the harshest hate crime law advocates do not say we should hang people for urging genocide, and yet even people who don't want any hate crime laws see hanging Nazi officials who oversaw the Holocaust as completely justified. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Disagree with the former and the latter just seems to be a emotional position on either party's part. The holocaust was a genocide, so I think they're confused to distinguish too strictly. The Holocaust isn't sufficiently different from genocide as either a definition, or an historical concept, to be held apart imo. Just an extreme example of.

Social context matters. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree here, but it would have us speaking on an entirely case-by-case basis which I don't think either of positions can result in.

the difference lies — Count Timothy von Icarus

in the intended fall out. Not the actual fall out. If you yell Fire in a crowded theater, but are mistaken, you are not culpable since you believed there was a fire. The resulting fracas and potentially injuries are not on your head, if you truly believed there was a fire.

So I come with disabilities. — Tom Storm

Likewise, but this:

They may question whether mathematical concepts truly represent universal truths or if they are constructed within specific cultural contexts. — Tom Storm

struck me as inherently plausible as a PM position, but inherently implausible as a serious position per se. Im not sure how it could be argued that natural numbers, for instance, are culture-bound as a concept.

Very much so. Its quite novel, and seems like a bit of a dead-end in the development of philosophical ideas insofar as no one picked up his threads, from what I know. He essentially tries to reverse Hume and Kant in that they go from Subjective to Objective, he goes hte other way.

His use of 'novelty' as a force for creativity in 'concrescence' is pretty fascinating to me, if a little shaky.

Thanks for that - really interesting delve into pheromonal theory there. All new for me to chew on, and as you note, relates pretty squarely with my proposed hypothesis.

It can't involve both? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It sure can - but on my view it’s not caused by the question. The response is caused by something the person responding. I Can’t grok the causal relationship. Putting someone in mind of something shouldn’t considered causal imo.

I don't think you can have a sexual assault without a sex act. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can, though. A “sex act” could be a text message. So depends how you’re defining it but legally, “sexually assault” doesn’t per se require physical contact. Might just be a bad example as that doesn’t change the premise of what you’re arguing.

et if the murder or sex act does occur, it seems perfectly reasonable to find the person engaged in coercion responsible — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not to me. And apparently not really to the law. Coercion only has a mitigating effect on sentencing for those types or crime. “Under duress” doesn’t remove the charge and responsibility for the act.
The coercive party did not commit the act. The actus Reus differs.

If asking someone to do something cannot cause them to perform an act, there would be no reason why war criminals who order mass executions should be considered criminals in the first place, so long as they don't pull any triggers — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, good. Tricky but my understanding is they are guilty of genocide which is intention-informed and not act-informed. It isn’t murder, basically. It’s another act deemed illegal based on the intent. Conversely, carrying out unjust military acts is illegal qua soldier (as Eg) and if circumstances allow, they’ll be charged with murder or the wartime equivalent of. I think this inversion is more telling - carrying out a killing on the say-so of another doesn’t reduce your culpability for committing the act (minor exceptions when one, or one’s immediate family is in mortal danger in a civilian setting - yet this still only mitigates and a guilty act has still been committed).

Really appreciate the full, thoughtful and in some ways crushing response :lol:

Volume? — Apustimelogist

Explanation by implication being that its a different requirement to feed a million than ten thousand. That type of volume-driven difference.

What do you mean? — Apustimelogist

I mean to say that the aim of the (different) behaviours does not seem appreciably different to me, in these various scenarios, unless purposefully ignored/changed to the societies detriment (noted elsewhere in the comment you quote). And, where that is the case, I don't really understand Humans to be askance from the determining factor simply because it was ignored (on this account.. Im not tied to it).

There is no need to ask "what is in line with biological factors" because what you want is just what is empirically best for that situation — Apustimelogist

"best" reads, to me, on this account, as "what is in line with biological factors(goes to the above response too). The food example was a good one to illustrate that. Hunger Strikes are fine, and have an aim that isn't biological, while over-riding, to the individual's ultimate detriment, the biologically-determined factor of needing sustenance.

You don't think there are big differences between western society now, medieval europe and maybe some prehistoric hunter-gatherer tribe? Sure they may all have some kind of hierarchy in some sense but thats so general its trivial and it isn't even restricted to humans so I don't see how that is useful for anything. — Apustimelogist

Hm, good. I think I disagree that its general, trivial or avoidable in discussion of social development. There are no societies I'm aware of that have developed in contrary forms, and survived (which is where the "determined" would come in, if this ends up holding any water). I see differences of detail, but no appreciable differences of type or kind. The results, in aggregate, are roughly the same. Though, this is an empirical argument, so im stepping on my own toes now..

Most social behaviors are enforced by ideas of norms and deviance in society, to differing extents of stringency. — Apustimelogist

I agree, as enforcement goes - but I would have to bite the bullet that 'hierarchy' (if this view holds any water) is not a purely social phenomenon. I think it would be very hard to argue that co-operation in obtaining food isn't driven by biological need and state-of-affairs (chemical bonding), even though different systems are clearly social in their contrasts. "socially enforced" isnt to imply that there's a conscious intention but that a norm is enforced by the natural (on this view, biologically determined), required behaviour of humans based on their biology in concert with one another toward the organisms aim. Whether that holds weight, who knows. But I'm just wanting to be careful that 'socially enforced' doesn't mean the mechanisms origins are social, but manifest in social relations.

novel — Apustimelogist

Not the type of novelty I was expressing there. Conscious choice v natural development due to biological factors. I think you're describing the latter. But this likely just speaks to my inability to be precise and articulate in my thoughts yet.

The idea of "natural" makes no sense because biology is in flux — Apustimelogist

This is precisely how I make sense of it. Biology being in flux accounts for differences across time, traced to evolutionary origins. The fundamental driving force is the same, in that their is am aim to our organism (though, this is up in the air, i take survival/propagation to be safe assumptions), but the required behaviour may be changing (epigenetics is a spanner in the works) and biology implores us to meet its requirements, regardless. That's the beauty of evolution!

No human can survive outside of the tropics without clothes, a completely "artificial" yet now ubiquitious aspect of human society. — Apustimelogist

So then, to me, it's biologically determined that a lack of clothes outside the tropics would, given enough time, extinct the species. Therefore, its biologically determined that we wear clothes outside the tropics to achieve (or,maintain) the overarching aim of the species (non-extinction, plainly put).

The idea of artificiality is very thin I think in a biological context. — Apustimelogist

I do agree with this, and it presents problems for my language, but I would just, if pushed, define my own terms to delineate between true artificiality and something required by biological function, such as clothes in the example. Although, fire, being a totally natural product, would do the work with the right organisation.

more or less the same — Apustimelogist

Yes. I am in a pretty privileged position, as were many people at that time. But, we absolutely still have serfdom the world over, and in fact more slaves than we've had since the dark ages. Maybe we use the term 'pirate' or 'king' now. But they are ubiquitous, anywhere but the West - and that is arguable. Many believe the working class is in fact a class of serfs. Not entirely dismissable, i think.

Thats totally different. — Apustimelogist

Only in detail. The aim is hte same.

Hmm.. in the B&E example, the assault consists in their act. Not the response to it. So, i see nothing absurd there. Elicit was a better word, but the causal nexus is still totally unclear to me. You're given a choice, not a determined set of choices. We just, by habit, respond with relevance, close in time, usually.

If I ask someone "what is the capital of Florida?" and they respond "Tallahassee," would they have uttered the word Tallahassee if I hadn't asked the question? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Who knows? It was certainly elicited by your invitation in this instance, but had they answered "Albany", could you make that same inference? In your eg, the cause may have actually been their knowledge of the correct answer.

No, but your eliciting a response is an act of yours. Just as your post elicited this reply. I would not have written this were it not for your post, and hence this post is an act resulting from your act. — Banno

This seems an externality and not a result of the act.

Asking a question doesn't determine anything as response to it. Invites? Sure. Does not cause any response, I don't think. But you'd have been free to not respond, response with some irrelevant etc.. etc.. which would then be unconnected to the invitation in large part. But are your acts, entirely.

You read and responded all on your own and at your own leisure. — NOS4A2

I like it.

A tentative comment i'd make, at risk of upsetting some of the more stringently critical here, is that its entirely possible we in fact do have an electrical sense of some kind, and that this would support the view you outline.

People "intuiting" that they are immediately to receive a phone call or text message on their cell phone may be understood by the body 'receiving' the signal ahead of the device (for some, as-yet unknown reason), and subsequently giving a certain sensation(not-yet-articulable) that tells the brain to act as if that is about to occur. I have nothing but anecdote to support this (though, seems widespread - not mine alone) and some Sheldrake work (lol) so, ignore if appropriate. But i find it very interesting, and think it would expand Kantian terms interestingly.

But wouldn't you say that all these examples are very different and societies can live in many different ways? — Apustimelogist

I don't think 'very' is justified here. They only seem to be different by virtue of volume, and not really behaviour. That's an entire study on it's own, though, so understand if that comes across as a bold unsupported claim. I take that on the chin.

Sometimes its more egalitarian, sometimes more strictly hierarchical. — Apustimelogist

Again, agree empirically, but I can't see that there's any appreciable difference in aim (which would be the determined feature, i guess). I think forcefully overcoming a biologically determined state would appear this way, regardless. It's, then, a problem for which situation has required an 'overcoming' of biology, as it were. Though, I'm not really trying to support that, and I'm not arguing that all non-hierachy-driven societies would fail by that light - but I would argue they fail unless constantly maintained from without (and usually, that's a form of hierarchies of society, rather than individuals). That often requires far more force than is typically seen in a hierarchical structure, as positions are accepted, ideally the latter, and in the former they are demanded, or assumed or whatever else is required to make decisions that don't seem obvious.

How does that apply to policy when policies are based on specific situations, cultures, socio-economic climates, not the generality of human biology which itself is diverse and results in a diverse range of societies. — Apustimelogist

I think this is a half-good point. There are plenty of laws that are intended to be universal, and biologically-derived (protections for females in law tend to be universal in absence of an ideological principle that precludes it, but yes, all societies differ in various degrees as to policy - but most policies aren't relevant to anything that would be biologically determined. I've mentioned that some are - so, you make a point worth noting but I think it doesn't do a lot. At best it gets us to the question, again, of which laws are 'counter' to biological factors, and which are 'in line' with them. Couldn't know, on current data. I think either assumption is reasonable, as I can see both arguments fairly clearly.

The fact that some kinds of societies are more common than others too is somewhat incidental. — Apustimelogist

I think its more incidental when societies aren't aligned. Usually, incidental to a prevailing non-empirical ideology (religious, for instance). Most societies develop in the same direction in lieu of over-riding principle-driven resistance. There aren't multiple strains of secular social development, from what I can tell. Just triffling differences in detail - probbaly based on geography, largely.

Is there really an "overriding of impulse" if such conditions naturally led to that kind of society? — Apustimelogist

My argument, in a given case, would be that if the supporting conditions are that of social enforcement, it would hard to argue it was 'natural' versus something more general. A society of homosexuals would be an example (ignoring hte problem of sustenance lol) where the overarching nature of the society is artificial as no where in nature has that ever occurred without the express intention for that novel situation to satisfy specific, individual sensibilities. So, only in humans. That's a very rough example, but I hope the approach is clear, even if the detail is shaky.

Just as say the conditions that change with a progressed humankind have led our hierarchies to change since 1100 AD "naturally"? — Apustimelogist

Could you outline how you feel they have? I don't see a significant difference between 2000BC and now, frankly. Tinkering, and some rights-based progress - but a reduction in intensity of the biological determining factors wouldn't negate them (on an account that accepts them).

Diagnosis, I would think.

rocess and Reality - Alfred North-Whitehead. — AmadeusD

Still working through this. A Doozy if ever there was one.

I think, from spending time in both Muslim and devout Christian communities, I think 'righteousness' is a more apt motivator.

New single out from Pearl Jam. Bit of a return-to-form imo. I have a feeling its a Matt Cameron number, and it goes hard.

Also announced a world tour - looking forward to seeing them again in November :)