I suppose it would be any verified suspension of the known laws of physics/nature in service of a biblical claim. Obviously I would be predisposed to doubt, which is an issue… but as with Thomas, I imagine this would not be an issue at the time of realisation

No one's claiming it's an authority. It spit out the scientific facts of our sight system.

My claim remains, and is entirely untouched by what you've presented (which is fine, i'm not claiming AI is an authority on anything but presenting established information, such as how our sight system works).

was to demonstrate prevarication on its part, not to elicit an argument for Direct Realism. — Banno

Understood. I disagree what it did was prevaricate, though. Its entirely sensible, given the claim it is addressing. Massaged inputs are probably worse than open-ended questions.

But your point (and its a fair one, generally) equally applies to old philosophers. Including Austin, who, if he is taken at his word(according to your representations), isn't even addressing this distinction correctly, given he's not talking about the difference 'direct' and 'indirect' actually captures wrt realism. However, I've yet to read S&S so refrain from committing to any comment like that. Its just illustrating the same problem you see with using AI for x purpose.

The crux remains unascended.

HI Banno,

I think rather, it makes more sense to suggest that you not pretend to be quite that silly, and read the piece itself..

When light enters our eyes, it passes through the cornea, then the pupil, and is focused by the lens onto the retina at the back of the eye. The retina contains cells called photoreceptors, which convert the light into electrical signals that are sent to the brain via the optic nerve. The brain then interprets these signals as images.
This process allows us to see objects directly in front of us. — DeepAI

This is a completely different claim.

Unneeded.

I don't think it makes sense to say that "I see such a representation." At best I only vaguely imagine such a representation. — wonderer1

Hmm, fair comment.

How would you think about a 'representation' if it isn't available to the mind in experience? I guess, what do you take a 'representation' within this framework of 'sight' to actually be?

I feel exactly the same way :smirk:

From DeepAI in response to 'Is human sight indirect?'

"Yes, human sight is considered indirect because light rays must reflect off of objects before entering the eyes and being processed by the brain to form an image. It is not a direct connection between the eyes and the object being viewed."

No amount of prevarication can make that a direct process.

As pointed out, depends if you mean 'every day philosophy' which is certainly not idle - it is the basis on whcih people act, day-to-day. But it is certainly imprecise, largely flies in the face of facts, and ultimately isn't going to 'progress' the person without some further investigation into their 'philosophy'.

Academic philosophy? 50/50. Philosophy Twitter is a society of PhDs who are absolutely f-ing morons and can't construct a simple sentence to get across an idea that they already know is bunk.

But if you speak to faculties and policy gurus who are trained in philosophy, it's so bloody interesting its hard to take it as anythign but fundamentally important (though, that's an emotional response lol).

Yes, I think this is happening more than I've noticed, causing a lot of 'wtf' in me, wrt responses i get sometimes. To be absolutely clear:

That 'account' (equivalent to say we see 'seeings') is not the Direct Realist account. But that is actually exactly what it requires. Because to ignore the mediating effect of our sight system results in pretending you are 'seeing' a 'sight' which is in fact, a representation. So, yeah, direct realism does entail this, in some way or another.

I was not suggesting this is is consciously owned by direct realists. It is, though, the exact basis for the claim made of 'seeing the world directly', which is the explicit claim of at least some DRs. It couldn't be another way, without plum ignoring the empirical reality of the human system of sight.

However, if we're going to amend these accounts of words to incorporate useful delineations, then we 'perceive' directly the representations which we are 'seeing' indirectly, as a result of 'looking at' a object. This seems to cover all three positions presented, and doesn't disturb the empirical facts. An Indirect Realist would see themselves in this, as would a Direct Realist in the way Banno is putting forward that 'seeing' is, in fact, an indirect activity of hte mind regarding an object, and no of an object. I'm quite happy with this, personally, pending any substantial problems being pointed out.

definitely agree with you here (final para) and apply to many other ideologies

it wasn’t posited as either so I’ll just leave that.

Not, I hope, too dissimilar to the OP, which gave a neat rendering of the arguments, which I addressed. — Banno

I agree. I liked that particular synthesis.

I was referring, though, to the 'crux' i previously referred to as a bumper sticker (previously offered by myself, in this thread).

that seeing a thing consists in constructing a representation of that thing. — Banno

b-b-b-b-b-bingo. I am fully understanding you now. Need to think.

Can you give an example of something which is physically direct, and explain what you would mean by "direct" in that context? — Janus

Sure, but first, as to your next reply to Banno (as per my above): :ok:

I think Banno noted something I've not explored, but seems to rise to this distinction:
Touch.
Actually touching something isn't the same as 'actually seeing' something (removing delusive elements) : "to touch" something can occur whether or not you have an experience of consequence of touch - the conscious experience of texture, heat, wetness etc...
Sight doesn't operate that way. It is, plainly, mediated. You cannot be conscious of 'sight' other than in conscious experience of sight. You can be aware that you 'touched' or 'are touching' something via other senses. So, while i understand that the underlying 'gotcha' in this avenue is valid inasmuchas this is still 'indirect experience' the physical act of touching is a 1:1 type of interaction which is not mediated. Sight just doesn't do that. It only consists in the resulting experience of some film-in-consciousness derived from electrical signals.

see representations is equivalent to saying we see seeings — Janus

Yet, this is exactly what is intimated by the claims of direct realists, who fail to address the entire problem of sight being plainly physically indirect. The conclusion of those positions is that "seeing" is an act of hte mind.... and the eyes... without a difference. Banno nearly conceded this isn't the case in the commnet we're both discussing.. and redefined 'seeing' from what's been its usual use, to one which actually captures his position.

Which is why I've tried, at length, elsewhere, to delineate between "to look", "to see" and "experience"
You look at something with your eyes, experience a representation, which is seen in the mind.

All topics are dead ends on every philosophy forum. — flannel jesus

I have no basis for comparison, unfortunately. ONly real life philosophy groups and professionals :nerd:

No — Lionino

Interesting.

Is the objection that reading Hume or Aristotle didn't necessitate Kant's work? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and as seems standard around these parts, no one's noticing that, as is standard in philosophical discourse, I am parsing phrases and using words in manners that make them make sense instead of less-sensible ways they've been used before - and I cop to that, given this isn't a piece of academic writing. But, I notice others doing this all the time and respond as such, so Im not sure what's missing fro my writing that prevents others from noticing this. The term 'cause' doesn't make sense if it also includes distant influences, and not proximate causes only.

Hume (the Treatise, particularly) is/was necessary, but not sufficient, as a cause for the CPR - would be my position here, and I can't use the word 'cause' to represent something which it doesn't represent, to my mind. If others are using it that way, my position is they are hurting themselves by doing so. I don't understand repeatedly using words in ways that make them impossible to adequately use in detailed discussions. These are personal, developing methods of interacting with these ideas. I see an issue - i address it.

So where is the absence of any causal link? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is the opposite of a reasonable enquiry. Show me one? Given my previous explanation of why i'm still using 'cause' here, I imagine this isn't a reasonable request. But that's the point. It cannot be shown.

"x uniquely determines y," and "x plays a causal role in y." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Oh, yes, I absolutely agree, and this is largely the reason im rejecting some uses of 'cause'. 'a cause', to me, is a discreet and necessarily traceable relationship. That can't be done adequately for 'causal influence' for eg. It is inferred or assumed loosely (or, when you're actually told by the source that X was a distance influence on work II), whereas a 'cause' is (read: should be, under my use) capable of immediate recognition given, essentially, two pieces of information (the purported cause, and the purported effect per se coupled with their spatio-temporal relationship per se (i.e "Did it occur before, or after?").

I do not find this to be quibbling, either. The distinction you make is baked into my use of the word. I haven't got an adequate singular for 'distant causal influence' on foot, though. Perhaps this is just a needed refinement.

And you don't see that this is fallacious, and unwieldy at best, and complete irrelevant at worst>

That's fair, prima facie, but it's very clear to me. I get the exact same feeling as when some has misheard a word, when i read a lot of the replies attempting to address it.

That doesn't mean its hitting the same for others. I have essentially boiled it down to a bumper sticker a couple of times.

Without Hume there would have been no CPR. — Lionino

This is the worst piece of reasoning ive seen along this line. "if but for" is not the same as 'cause'. Without Aristotle, there would be CPR either.

Wonder when the pin will drop..

So, the whole argument is undecidable in any absolute sense and is thus really a non-starter, another confusing artefact of thinking dualistically. — Janus

Perhaps. I would say it’s undecidable because of the linguistic issues. But I also reject entirely that something odd means a position is wrong. Nothing you’ve said presents any issues unless you don’t like the implications.

Banno, for all his words, hasn’t addressed the issue at all. Nothing he has said establishes anything direct about perception. I’ve nailed down the crux multiple times and all I get back are vague questions about implications he doesn’t like.

No one else has done better. *shrug* I guess people think that perception, which is physically indirect, is direct in discussion. Seems like this may be a dead end on TPF. I mean, almost all of these takes rely on a 1:1 match between experience and object. Which is incoherent on its face - they aren’t even the same dimension.

I don’t agree with much of this.

I have provided where, in Kant, the two concepts are objectively removed from one another. Not sure what else to say, but I very much respect your dedication here.

I understand what you’re getting at, but I’m not able to see secondary sources who disagree with direct statements in the source as valuable personally.

:ok:

But would you say that your claim is the officially accepted interpretation of Nounmena and Thing-in-itself in Kant? — Corvus

I'm unsure what an 'officially accepted' interpretation is, but it seems to be the most common.

Ding-en-sich = The thing, simpliciter
Noumena = that same thing as perceived by something other than Human, spatio-temporal perception
Phenomena(of something) = the same thing in human perception only.

at any rate, the above conceptions work for reading the Critique. Most don't.

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Noumena this page contains a fairly good overview of the disagreement around the concepts - but within Kant, they are kept separate**. Particularly, Palmquist, as a secondary source, I would take, but largely because (as discussed in this article) it is essentially aligned with Kant's actual writing. Not that that's the be-all-end-all, but I tend not to take much secondary material which expressly alters the plain meaning of the OG text on board. Might be something I'll get over. Very much smoething i've learned reading law.

** From CPR:
"if, however, I suppose that there be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali), then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia). (A249)"

and

"But if we understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be the noumenon in a positive sense. (B307)"
(from the SEP Article )

I am not persuaded by Kant's argument. — Lionino

Neither, overall, but...

Some folks seem to believe that the Thing-in-itself exists in the mind. — Corvus

It is defined as otherwise. So thats incoherent.

If you accept the existence of the Kantian Thing-in-itself in Noumena, — Corvus

The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding.

So perhaps it (the argument of Kant) is not being adequately outlined.

One more quote to the now-removed log of your intense bad faith and ability to dehumanize based on your ideology.

Neat that it got removed though. In fact, the entire exchange was removed.
Keeps you going. But I think it is ethically questionable that the Mods (probably you) have removed the evidence of this, in the thread from which it had been collectively taken. Seems modding isn't about improving the forum, in this case.

Nice.

That is a very interesting paper prima facie. However, I have some serious reservations about an hypothesis that posits mental events cannot be reduced to physical events, but still entertains a direct connection between the two. The basis of the argument, though, I already take. I look forward to sitting down with it later today (its 4pm).

A thoguht that struck me to address the OP's actually questions though:

Consider Sean Carroll on stage, providing data/information and eliciting 'WOW!" from some audience members (none of these discreet events matter, particularly).

He is, all at the same time:
Speaking;
Informing;
Performing; and
if taken to an extreme, and related to some previous discussion eliciting certain, lets say, involuntary responses to his speech.

Are all of these acts rolled into the one act?

No one seems to disagree that there's Object -> Sense organ Engagement -> a physical process of electrical impulse through the CNS, which are essentially decoded by the brain and presented to the mind as an experience. No one has presented me any reason to think otherwise and I cannot get on with calling that 'direct'. — AmadeusD

Per above, on my account, there is still going to be this obstacle to establishing a direct link between the experience and the object, in any given case denoted to be 'direct' in a half/half system. So, my issue isn't so much 'what hypothesis is the most workable' and which one gets off the ground.

I think that (your) consideration is a much, much more fruitful one than just knocking heads over and over, so take your frustration with that seriously these days. In lieu of a full-blown critique of both Austin and Kastrup, i'm left with no answer to what/where that 'direct' connection would be. Your medial version reduced hte problematic instances from 'all' to 'some.

It might be better if I were to let you two discuss the topic for a bit. — Banno

It wouldn't. But I cannot force your hand.

may have gone unnoticed — Banno

It had.

ut why not reject the very framing of the argument in those terms — Banno

I essentially had from the outset - but apparently, no one like theories that delineate the senses into different systems that operate differently. But the reason "why not?" is because it flies in the face of physical facts, best I can tell and does not address the issue, because it retains a 'direct realist' notion at some points of experience. No reason to take seriously something that, on the empirical facts, can't be the case. *shrug*.

Ah ok, fair enough. Yeah, effective in that context. Thanks mate.

The people here saying you can't hold the individual population accountable are likely those who hate holding themselves accountable for anything in the first place. — Vaskane

Given that these are two demonstrably different things, morally and actually, how are you equivocating? Genuinely, not like i've written it off and am scoffing.

Hence I call this whole information transfer from object to retina an "indirect" transfer. — Quk

I'm thinking you and I are misusing these terms, as circumstance within Philosophy proper, would dictate. That's why i was a little clearer in the problem I was asking about, to try to avoid those assumptions (of which I would definitely be on the shakier and less helpful side).

Isn't this a homunculus argument? — Banno

It could be..It would be accidental...I'm not trying to making an argument, just trying to find solutions to the problems I see. What argument is required, i assume, would come up as a result of the discussion. But, I also don't see much of an issue with the basic homunculus argument... something is having the experience which isn't touching the wall. So, idk. I probably just haven't adequately engaged with problems it presents.

No one seems to disagree that there's Object -> Sense organ Engagement -> a physical process of electrical impulse through the CNS, which are essentially decoded by the brain and presented to the mind as an experience. No one has presented me any reason to think otherwise and I cannot get on with calling that 'direct'. That's why I wondered if its the Engagement stage you're calling direct. Which i'd agree with.

Perhaps you could attempt to provide what I'm missing - no one seems to want to engage directly with the problem (i.e where is the 'direct' connection between the object at the experience?), rather than assert, cite or dismiss...Which is not to denigrate - I'm probably missing it and need help lol. Tell me where it is!

experience? — Banno

I don't know. That's something that I hope I can have ideas about borne of a good understanding of the questions I've posed. If 'experience' does in fact, consist in brain activity, then yep. But i don't lean that way, so it feels uncomfortable to pretend I 'get it'.

On my extremely pale and inadequate understanding of the Markov blanket concept, I can't really understand it's relevance - but, on the meek connection I can make from that understanding, I think this is getting to concrescence territory and I'm lost in that currently, so no help in either direction

Before I attempt to (because it'll be embarrassing for me lol), could this be (as noted earlier, but a little more specific) that when you say 'direct' you are only referring the physical act of touch, and not the experience of the act? That's certainly something I could be being very imprecise and consequently inaccurate about.

On your framing above, I see that you 'directly' touch the wall in some sense(lol) at least. But, I can't get past the experience of that touch being mediated by, say, electric impulse/CNS activity which is not the thing, ferrying a 'message' of that direct physical touch, to the mind for examination in 'feeling'. It may be that, inadequately examined, I use 'touch' to refer only to the experience because I can't get to anything more, on my account.

I suppose i'm trying to understand where in a situation it''s apt to use something like "because of" or "with" or "through" without that affecting the 'direct' attribution to whatever is being perceived. I don't posit anything here, I'm just struggling to see how that's not a mediation of some kind.

For touch, the middle man (by analogy, rather than "this is my position") is the nervous system, surely?

Folk might well see using or because of photons. But photons are not visible. — Banno

Doesn't this still place a middle man in your 'direct' position? Truly unsure how you'd see that - not arguing against your form of a direct realism per se.

Correct. But I'm unsure what else to say, because I've addressed the delineation between 'putting in mind', 'causing' and lets call it distant(in time/proximity) influence (in this case, the latter... Kant was caused to consider Hume's position and 'solve hte problem. His solution caused the CPR to be written).

I'm not suggesting 'everyone is wrong' i'm suggesting tthis is being described inaccurately, 'this', being hte difference between inspiration and cause. And I understand these are sloppy, underthought and are likely to be wrong. Just trying to be clear when it's not being quite nailed in criticisms.

I don't know what you're trying to say, largely for the reason Lionino has highlighted.

Can you clarify the comment? However, if it's an attempt to say that my deduction (not accusation) that you are lying about the link you provided, because you do not know what it says, probably better leave it - that deduction is patently reasonable and would require your address, if you think it's untrue (that's how discussions work :) ). I was able to show clearly that you did not read your link, and have either lied or willfully ignored several of its statements, a long with a plethora of others empirically verifiable facts you have either ignored or lied about (the basis for Qi, for example).

If it was anything else, feel free to clarify.

Would be glad to come back on it, once it's clear what you're saying.

they are there to argue against the objective truth — L'éléphant

And there's the bumper sticker

Irreligious. Because I don't think religions are a reasonable enterprise in any sense of that word, even as a social institution.

The world is not made of numbers, the way we construct our perceptual interaction with the world produces the concept of number, and this construction emerged out of cultural needs and purposes , such as the desire to keep track objects of value. — Joshs

This seems counter to common sense (other than the first half-line). "enumeration" is an act and you're obviously correct here (just think of roman vs arabic numerals), but "number" is merely the observation of more than one thing at a time. The function of 'maths' is unchanged across any iteration.
The concept of number really isn't different anywhere.

Kant did. — creativesoul

This may speak to where i highlight 'naive conceptions of cause' earlier in Timothy's reply.

I see nothing in Kant which does this, rather I see much that says Kant took Hume to have caused his 'awakening' or more importantly 'discomfort' or 'repulsion' at his conclusions. The cause of the CPR was Kant's need to solve the problem. If you feel there's something from Kant that shows he left off hte middle man in that, please do show me! In this case, I think 'cause' being a few steps behind the proximate cause removes from it that title.

Very tough. I'll probably be another couple of months yet, and that's just the first pass lol.

It was a bad idea to get into this immediately after CPR, though. It upends much of the CPR in terms of conclusions, so difficult for someone fairly new to this stuff. On the other hand, glad to get the toughest stuff out hte way first.

I think i might go to Cicero or Seneca next :lol:

Hey mate,

Unsure I get what you're saying in the first response. Your choice and your act aren't separable. I've made room for inspiration and incitement, which are in some sense both covered by different laws of liability that those which apply to an actor.

On the second, torts require either intention or negligence. Being convinced of an incorrect fact wouldn't raise a claim to that level, I don't think. But, more to the point, I didn't involve any other purpose.

The person was merely honestly mistaken. The results are the same, and no other purpose has been fulfilled. They are not liable as it was neither intended, or a result of negligence.

I guess, as a non-PM-ist, I'd just posit that the various 'numeral' systems all represent the same thing and can be read across multi-directionally (between languages) and that gives us reason to think its not the case that its socially constructed, other than the specifical symbolic system in use.