The root of our discussion is here, from pg 12, with which I disagree: — Mww
I have not seen you disagree with this, really. You've helped me see where I was misusing words and concepts because I don't understand what I'm doing all that well (which i am extremely appreciative of. This isn't easy LOL) but I can't see that you've disagreed that Kant gives us an unavoidable causal relationship between thing-in-itself and our sensible intuitions. It appears your most recent response (prior to this) laid it out in explicit terms - that you agree with it?
1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity;
2. ????;
3. Something is presented to our sensuous organs; — AmadeusD
The "?????" I think, is the Noumenon of whatever object. At the time, I had entirely misunderstood what the Noumenon is meant to represent, and where it fits in the relationships of thing-in-itself, conception, and intuition. I am now under the impression that 1. The thing-in-itself, somehow, in some unknowable fashion, instigates appearance - but that the Noumenon is that which, in some sense, exists between the two in a sort of semi-focus, as compared to the total blank of the thing-in-itself.
what do you think all that really says, — Mww
Well, I don't think anyone really knows - but its relevance here, is that Kant appears to very directly note that the thing-in-itself is in a causal relationship with our sensible intuitions. There is thing-in-itself, and the phenomenal appearance in intuition - and that there is, unavoidably, a causal relationship between the two - Otherwise, as noted, we are left with intuitions of nothing. Its just unsatisfying because we can never have any knowledge of that which 'causes' the appearance of any object of intuition.
The over-all thesis of that section, i'm yet to parse.
I'm about 90% of the way through this book, and i'd say i grok the overall thesis in a pale reflection, and about 15% of the actual content. Doing my best.
While we cannot conceive of things entirely askance from any empirical intuition, these are merely representations belonging to the internal human system, hence have no concern with external causal conditions, which belong to Nature itself. — Mww
I agree - but this goes to the previous thing we're trying to come to terms on.
That causal relationship is necessary, if unknowable and unconcerning to us in general. But if we have never been caused to undergo the experience of a phenomenon, we can't conceptualise it, i think.
Edited in later, so apologies if missed: It seems really, really clear that most thinkers consider the thing-in-itself noumenal. Can you help me understand how this is the case, with Noumena/on being different from the thing-in-itself? It is just Kant being annoying and confusing"?