Agreed, but it would certainly put in question some of his swing-voters who might return to Patriotism™ as their guiding light

I think the plausible account is that we have access to external objects insofar as they can appear to us via our senses, but no access to understanding their natures beyond that. — Janus

Ok, fair enough. I would then assume this:

Could your account be coming down to a position that the External Object and the cognition of it are adequately the same as queried above? If so, I can accept that account - but I just can't find good reason to believe it other than shared cognitions (i.e, an apple looks like an apple to 99.9% of people). — AmadeusD

Is a fair, if rough-and-ready, way to say that I can't really disagree, but i see the degree of mediation(provided by the senses) as enough to say we don't have access to the External Objects.

If you would care to state which relationship you mean more explicitly, I will re-answer. — Chet Hawkins

I literally quoted your assertion that Happiness is evidence for Morality. That is a relationship. I asked you to express how you're actually making that connection. It is patently not objective, in any case.

So, no, your attempt to answer your own Q is dead wrong matey :)

I never made that claim so who's claim are you referring to? You are about to burn a strawman. — Chet Hawkins

Very much no, unless you intend to disabuse me of your previous claim (dealt with above).

Morality is objective. — Chet Hawkins

No it isn't. *shrug*.

Objective moral truth does not inflict unhappiness upon you like some petulant tyrant. — Chet Hawkins

It doesn't even exist. My entire point is you've said absolutely nothing that could possibly support this contention (hence, questioning the relationship between Happiness being evidence for Morality. That's both subjective, and nothing to do with proving morality is objective. I've yet to see something to support that contention in this exchange.

And don't you go misunderstanding again! I am watching you! ..... You did that via free will. Jump off cliffs, sure, by all means, but don't then claim to be a 'victim' of gravity. Gravity did not change at any point. Some chooser wants a scapegoat for immoral (dysfunctional) observation and immoral (dysfunctional) desire. Self-termination is your right, but own it! — Chet Hawkins

I can't really make heads of tails of this paragraph (beyond responding as above). It doesn't seem to ahve anythign to do with what i've said. It assumes objective morality, and further assumes that this can both be known by humans, and humans have the capacity to 'choose otherwise' as they say. Not seeing anything establishing those, though, so again - no heads or tails for me.

But our interpretation of what happened is never objective at all. — Chet Hawkins

Well then, conversation is at an end. Objective morality can't obtain if we are never aware of any objective facts.

So what happiness actually happened is objective or not a matter of opinion, at all. — Chet Hawkins

If i'm reading you right, you contend that you (given the right information, short of mind-reading) could literally tell someone else they aren't happy, despite their claim to the contrary? (or, obviously, any equation where you're positing something other than the claimed mental state). If i'm not, please do clarify!

So, no, wrong, I am not talking about what happened subjectively. I am referring to the objective happening, truth, the mystery of the universe we are here to discover, it would seem. — Chet Hawkins

This seems too glib for the conversation i'm trying to have. Nothing in this part seems to address the issues, other than denying you're relying on a subjective account - but you only claim that what happens is objective, and not the morality(hint: that's an interpretation, whcih you've admitted is subjective). It would seem you're attempting to equate "moral" with "factually correct" whcih is totally counter to any use of 'moral' i've ever heard of outside of academic honesty conversations.

How can we first measure/judge intents in others(always in error) and then match that with subjectively observed (always in error) consequences and expect to glean some iota of objective moral truth (or even propose it exists)? It's a sticky wicket to be sure and our bowlers this year are real punters. Look at them go. Someone fix that wicket please so we can continue with the game! — Chet Hawkins

Its utterly impossible, in fact.

Tomorrow I still hit.... will never change ...). — Chet Hawkins

Same as previous "6th Contention" No idea what you're getting at.. But it does seem you're 'mucking around' so maybe that's the point :smirk:

EQ? What is EI? — Chet Hawkins

Emotional Intelligence and Spatial Intelligence (not sure why you've said EQ lol).

But, caution, more awareness is needed. That is because if you increase the facility/ body automation ... with moral agency you add more potential for good aiming and more potential for evil-aiming at the same time. Awareness and judgment (virtues) must be ... good ... to proceed in the correct direction of less unnecessary suffering. — Chet Hawkins

This seems totally incoherent and not relevant to establishing an objective morality. I leave that there.

You missed it. — Chet Hawkins

I did not, and in fact quoted it, addressing it. Which you replied to. Something weird is going on here...

objective nature of moral truth, to the GOOD. — Chet Hawkins

But this is false, and you've not said anything that could possibly establish same. I'm still wondering how you are establishing it? I did ask in my reply and you've not addressed it.

Giddiness in general is an excellent red flag. Giddiness is like foam on the top of the thing, happiness. It is shedding off the consciousness of the person experiencing it precisely because they cannot integrate it. It shows immoral addiction, rather than genuine happiness. This is just one tiny example of what I am referring to. — Chet Hawkins

I would, in this case, suggest you are perhaps less-than-adequately across psychological data and understandings of behaviours. But I'm also no expert, so I'll also leave that one by just saying "I think thats bizarre and unsupportable" :P

I will re-quote what i really want you to do for me:

How are you grounding objective morality? Nothing, so far, does this for you in your replies. Very keen to get that in view.

In cognition or perception, we encounter things which appear to be external to our bodies. For examples, we see animals, trees, mountains, clouds we don;t see sensations. We infer that these things are presented to us via sensations, but we are conscious only of the things, not of the sensations that we infer preoduced our awareness of the things, — Janus

Very much disagree with this(other than the bolded) but I thin its possible terms are getting muddled. So, up top let me say the "object" is two things on my accout - the External Object (whcih i use in this reply) and the object of our cognition.
I don't think there is an arguable case that the 'tree' you are experiencing the view of is "the tree" in an External Object. It's your mind projecting its interpretation of (assumably - key) external data into whatever arena our consciousness gets its visuals from. I don't think it can be another way... Which has some heavy lifting to do further down my reply.. I've just thought of a potentially helpful metaphor..

When you put a DVD into a DVD player you're not looking at a DVD. You're looking at data interpreted by the machine, projected in such a way that you can cognise it. You are not looking at an actual *insert movie scene description*, or a plastic disc with magnetic stripping on it. Merely interpreted data. I see our sense organs as the Laser Disc Reader, and our mind as the Television producing the 'film' that you watch. Obviously, the pre-recorded nature diminishes the helpfulness of hte metaphor somewhat, but hopefully it illuminates what im saying somewhat too.

not of the sensations that we infer preoduced our awareness of the things, — Janus

Now, I can, at the least, not object to this. But the 'things' are you talking about aren't external objects. Nor could they be (as above, though, that's my contention - not an absolute claim). They are the objects that result from your brain/mind interpreting the data which (assumably - again, key) is derived from actual external objects interacting with sense organs.

Again, my view is that we are presented with objects, not with "sensuous data", the latter idea is an after the fact interpretation, so I don't think we are agreeing. — Janus

Well, maybe to make clearer why I thought were agreeing there, as a semi-visual rep i'm trying to post:
1. External Thing --> 2. ET interacts with sense organ --> sense organ conveys sensuous data to the brain/mind complex --> the brain/mind complex spits out a visual/smell/feeling whatever as a result of interpreting the data. The External Thing is never, and can never be, present to the mind. If you don't agree, fair enough, I got that wrong. I'm guess here you would think the underlined are the same thing?

I think all our experience makes plausible the idea that our perceptions are caused by the actions of things and environmental conditions on our senses. — Janus

I agree with this (and was the basis of claiming, tepidly, agreement between us earlier in the piece).

The actions themselves never appear to us in vivo — Janus

I agree with this (but as far as I'm concerned, it wouldn't be possible for the objects and not the actions to appear to us).

the external objects do — Janus

Again, I don't think this is a possible claim. How are you accounting for the mediation our sense organs provide between the object an our idea/cognition of it? I can't see away to reverse through that mediation to the object, without losing either the object, or at least seriously fidelity.

Could your account be coming down to a position that the External Object and the cognition of it are adequately the same as queried above? If so, I can accept that account - but I just can't find good reason to believe it other than shared cognitions (i.e, an apple looks like an apple to 99.9% of people).

how it is we could have an idea of an external world/ external objects if we had "zero access to them"? — Janus

Because we can assume we wouldn't get any cognition of objects without their being 'actual' objects, given how we understand our sense organs to work. We can't get cognitions out of nowhere.. so we infer (and, rightly, imo) that there simply must be something 'out there' bumping against our sense organs to produce the data which is interpreted to give us our cognitions.

No need to apologize, we are both just presenting ideas. — Janus

Appreciate that. Not always the way it goes :)

The same way, like a magician, you are trying to convince me that, in calculating that the eggs are four, your brain has done nothing! Who decided that they are four then? — Angelo Cannata

I didn't even mention that process, and in any case its your brain. I don't think this discussion is to go anywhere worth going.

:smirk:

Appreciate you continuing to engage - It's a weird position, I know.

Under the notion that a fish experiences the universe through the water it swims in. — wonderer1

This seems bizarre and untrue to me. It experiences the water it swims in, along with a number of other discreet elements of it's world (plankton, sharks, coral, whatever..). But, that's a digression and another thing to talk about. Is the idea here that anything within the Universe 'experiences the Universe'? I can't understand that, if so, and that might be the issue.

Again, I'm finding it really, really hard to connect these objections (that I don't out-right disagree with, though i have comments) with my contention so I'm refraining from responding in that vein. I understand this probably comes across as a smug "You just don't get it" which I don't intend at all. Here's an attempt to clarify: it seems to me as if you're both conflating these two

A. Experience of the entire universe (requires being everywhere all at once - which is plainly not open to humans)

B. Experiencing the universe in it's entirety (having any empirical concept of the total scale and dimension of the Universe as an object - which is plainly not open to humans)

It seems to me that both of your sets of objections have to do with (A.). I am not suggesting that (A.) is a problem (though, it is clearly impossible). I am arguing that the lack of (B.)'s possibility is the problem for us in so far as we cannot 'experience' the Universe. I am not seeing any objections playing with this notion, and rather all of them appear to be playing with (A.). Though, I should probably at this stage point out that the Universe mattering isn't something I'm particularly hung-up on. I don't think it does, or can, but that's not like an important follow-on from the above position. It was partly a throwaway and partly while, I do actually think that, It's never occurred to me that anyone would claim otherwise.

Not the point.

Who establishes that it is not an opinion?
Saying that logic is not an opinion implies that you can validate its correctness without using your brain. — Angelo Cannata

I don't feel that's the case at all. Logic is discovered fact of our world/universe/whatever you want to call it. We didn't event logic. We invented language.

Can you give evidence that 2+2=4 without using your brain — Angelo Cannata

If i put two eggs in front of you. Indicate that you need to focus on these two eggs. Then put another two eggs infront of you, additional to those two eggs, you will see four eggs. So, that's not my brain doing anything.

Who guarantees that the final conclusion made by our brain is correct? — Angelo Cannata

This is a worth-while point to some degree - But only if you're a true sceptic. Though, again, I imagine this is service to theological ends, so i'm unsure how best to approach that fact. Perhaps your idea of 'guarantee' is something I don't need.

No, and no - that's a perplexing and genuinely odd response.

I can't see how either of these questions have anything to do with what i'm positing. Having an understanding of, let's say, gravitational laws that can be (pretty much accurately) extrapolated to other , particular and specific, parts of hte Universe which we can observe - has nothing to do with whether or not we can empirically have any grasp of the 'entire Universe'. Which is it plain and simply the case that we can't. I really don't understand what's going on in these objections... You can't experience a concept. Experience informs concepts with content - content you simply do not have to argue that your experience is of the Universe.

Under what notion are you suggesting we can experience the Universe? Gigantic eyes? ectoplasmic Universe-sized hands? Have you ever seen the Universe? Grasped it? Conceived of it's dimensions? Or are you necessarily restricted to an extremely, pathetically small sliver of potential experience which precludes you from anything in the above which might constitute 'experiencing'? Because I can't connect what either you or Beverley are saying to anything i've said - I thought it might be worth understanding what you actually contend challenges my contention

it makes all the difference. — Vera Mont

Not to humans, for whom the distinction is somewhat useless :P

If accepting logic is ultimately up to you, then logic is just an opinion. — Angelo Cannata

No. This is a completely incoherent sentence/claim.

The opinion is whether or not I want to use logic. Logic, is not an opinion. That's a really, really strange take (particularly given it arose from something i said whcih doesn't indicate this).

This seems to confirm my idea that philosophy is, or should be, art. — Angelo Cannata

This is very much a good explanation for your position. But i have a nagging/sinnking/growing suspicion that this is in service of defending the indefensible propositions of Catholicism (logically speaking) and turning History and 'the external world' into malleable ideas that can fit any damn thing into them. Far be it from me..

This way logic is just a particular way of expressing and sharing our subjective, artistic, emotions and feelings. — Angelo Cannata

Comports with the above, for sure. So that's good, i suppose.

I don’t see how. The appearances are what you’re talking about

Objecting? I'm not objecting at all. We are not in a court of law! lol I don't see this as a competition or something. — Beverley

An objection is just how philosophers discuss ideas. It's not a competition or anything. Its just a term used for when you 'push back' on a theory or position (sorry if that comes across condescending - the link will do a better job :) ) You've been pushing back quite adequately, to my mind, and that's a good thing! Objections are how we sort these things out.

It is my fault for not speaking clearly. — Beverley

It is more likely that one of us is making an error somewhere either in our position, or our responses. I don't think you are being unclear, other than using words with fairly mysterious meaning. Keep in mind:

It is entirely possible to speak clearly, concisely, and be wrong.

Thank you; good objections.

I agree that the evidence seems to indicate that we are precognitively affected by the external world, — Janus

I don't think 'precognitively' is accurate. We aren't affected by anything but sensation. The sensation is not the things in the external world. The effect the external world is having isn't on our mental faculties - Its on our physical sense organs. We are only cognizant of that, not the 'external' object, as it were. Is my understanding...

Your idea that something is presented "within the mind" — Janus

As I conclude, that isn't my idea. I don't think i've said that, either. If so, apologies. Presented to the mind. But only sensuous data is presented - not objects. (having come back to add this, I think we're probably agreeing there?)

But it is tendentious to think of our perceptions and judgements as being somehow separated from those precognitive processes — Janus

Is this to say that there is, in fact, a direct link between our impressions and whatsoever caused them? I think that can be inferred, because otherwise we couldn't have cognition on this account. But, that isn't to say there's anything superficially the same about htem. I think that's the issue i'm trying to zoom in on. The 'external' object never appears to us, in any way.

which, as far as we can tell, are both within and without us — Janus

I don't think that's the case. Whatever it is (we seem to agree, mechanically, for lack of a better word here) that causes our impressions can be entirely removed from any consciousness of it. How our sense organs pick something out of hte external world to convey to the mind, is where the issue lies - what governs that, seems mysterious to me (though, that's on this account - so i could just be wrong).

It does not follow from the fact that we can consciously know only that which appears to us, that it is illegitimate to say that there is a world of existents external to our bodies. — Janus

Oh. I'm really sorry if it's come across that I'm denying an external world/external objects. It just requires that we have zero access to them and cannot gain access to them. My account requires them to exist, though. I think that covers the remainder of your post lol.

The problem is that the only way we have to check the reliability of reason and logic is to use them on themselves. — Angelo Cannata

This doesn't...really... seem to be the case to me, though I understand this fairly well-worn objection (Godel and all). Logic, being (in the context Im taking it) a closed system, doesn't need to be 'checked'. Its either accepted or not, to my mind. Obviously,. something can be logically consistent and false, which is why we use empirical data to check our reasoning as a matter of possibility. I suppose I don't feel an issue exists here, but plenty of much, MUCH smarter people do So i could just plainly be wrong.

Hi Beverley :) Thanks a lot for this exchange.

What I've been trying to demonstrate in different ways is that... then everything turns very odd and nothing seems to make sense — Beverley

(underlined is my edit) And i have disagreed, in the form of the below response..

we cannot experience the entire of anything, or the fact that nothing appears to matter, or that, if we take the total of the universe, nothing exists — Beverley

These simply don't follow from my assertion. I can't actually see how the any of these follow from each other. How would not experiencing the entire of anything mean nothing matters? That wasn't the position. The position was that we can't experience the Universe in it's entirety, and therefore is isn't even 'a thing' to us, and so cannot matter. That, to me, is not the same as what you're objecting to - though, i admit freely I f'd up in a previous post misusing that phrase so apologies.

It's quite hard to understand the other objections, in this light, to respond to - but I will try!

As a very simplified example — Beverley

I'm sorry, I'm really not seeing how this example has anything, whatsoever, to do with 'experiencing the Universe'. You have pointed out that an Apple can be grasped, if adequately proximal, everywhere in the universe. Barring some weirdness yet to be discovered, I agree with that - seems fairly clear.
This says nothing about my contention. Which is about experiencing the Universe, not an apple. The rules are not the same. They couldn't possibly be the same. Because we cannot 'grasp' the Universe, in any sense of the word. That said, let me try to illustrate why they are not even comparable, let alone the same:

The Apple is an object, graspable, in some sense. Some people can't grasp apples. Some can.

Absolutely no one, of any kind, can 'grasp' the Universe. It isn't possible. It's not even conceivable. It's not an object in the way an Apple is. How could we assume the same principles apply? Fwiw, I wouldn't say an apple 'matters'. Its functional, as far as humans are concerned imo. but that's a digression.

The reason is because we can see the laws of the universe playing out here on earth, and this allows us to know, or experience, what is happening out there as well. — Beverley

To me, no it doesn't, and I can't grasp how your getting there.

the essence of the universe, — Beverley

This one just has me scratching my head. Can't understand what you're trying to say because 'essence of the universe' is meaningless in and of itself. What are you saying with that phrase?

Maybe that is why the universe matters so much because it relates ultimately to everything we know and everything we are. — Beverley

Again, it doesn't matter. It can't matter (on my account). I have to say, quite a bit of this response seems to be a bit mystical. Is that how you are writing?

They do not rely on empirical considerations, which at the very least, removes the problem of my own judgement mattering. I guess I could still be worried that, despite logical consistency, my judgement is wrong - but that seems to be not all that possible unless im being dishonest - which is another mater.

Though, having had a peruse of your book I would assume you have an objection to that somehow...

How could there be an internal world if there were no external world? — Janus

Here i'm using 'internal' to mean "confined to mentation" I guess. I personally take there be an external world. I wasn't meant to be an actual descriptor.. just trying to use the common words.

We know the external world as it appears to us — Janus

It doesn't appear to us. It appears to our sense organs. Our sense organs then present something which is not the external world to our mind. We don't know the external world.

we cannot know the nature of what might exist beyond our capacity to sense as appearance. — Janus

Exactly why the above is true. I'm not seeing an objection other than the issue of my, probably, illegitimately using 'internal' there.

we do not mean the exact same, identical thing — Leontiskos

Correct. Unsure that it follows that communication is impossible. Its imprecise, for sure.

endlessly misunderstanding each other. — Leontiskos

Yep. And our efforts in communication are to minimize the misunderstanding.

If identity cannot be partial, then you must have no persistent identity. — Leontiskos

Correct. And this question (of personal identity, what it might mean, and how it might obtain/what it might consist in) is actually the exact mission of my (about to get underway) philosophical career. It's possible that some form of special pleading has to accepted for the term "personal identity" to have any meaning.

Weird - this was a post in response to Leontiskos which he has quoted below. I have no idea how i mucked up bad enough to delete it, but there we are.

This means that we have no idea about reality, mirrors, mirroring, being; we have no idea about anything and we cannot escape this conclusion. — Angelo Cannata

I simply don't see how this is the case, unless you are restricting this claim to sensible 'idea's. The 'external world' hypothesis, in any reasonable form, to my mind is based on acknowledging that fact and using reason and logic to get past the obstacle of sensory perception. The hypothesis wouldn't be required if we didn't understand that we can never conclude, from sense, one way or the other.

It comes from The Doors Of Perception and Heaven and Hell (one book, two essays) but its essentially trip reports from a Mescaline experience or two.

Apparently, it goes to C.D Broad's Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy which im unfamiliar with.

My conception of it is derived from a Huxleyean type of idea of brain-as-receiver. Its (as you'll probably quickly note) used by Huxley to understand apparently inexplicable psychedelic experiences. So, that's where I found it too but i feel it, at least allows, if not encourages, a non-reductionist view of Mind/Consciousness without having to reject any of hte physical/bodily/neural indications of consciousness.

My only retort, in jest, as seems the case, would be that If you can alert me to a Radio signal without hte use of a receiver, i'll be interested in the technique ;)

Thank you mate - appreciate the response. While I'm not as dire, I feel roughly the same.

My only comment is that I think you'd get a huge amount of pushback on Pacifica, as this would be seen as an aggressive appropriation of Pasifika :)

Ah, i see, cool, thank you. While I don't intend a debate about it, for closure, I agree that dualism is probably a bad conception, but I am unconvinced the mind arises from the body (rather than appears through the lens of the body - in some sense).

The first: I don't disagree (including, and I can't see why this needs pointing out, but there we go, the internal part of our body).

The second: I'm unsure I necessarily get what you're trying to reject. There is obviously an internal world, and it seem empirically true that our internal world (sense) can't access the external. Are you able to pinpoint what about that you're rejecting?

I don't think that's true - muscle memory is still an activity of hte brain with extremely low processing time. Its more like a pre-record in the mind.

It is my 1st assertion that happiness along its entire continuum is evidence for morality. — Chet Hawkins

How? Noting that, as far as I can tell, the rest of the paragraph states your opinion, not an argument for this relationship being absolute.

Further it is my 2nd contention that morality is only one thing, objective. — Chet Hawkins

morality is only one thing, objective. — Chet Hawkins

This could only make sense to me if you could justify the former claim (that Morality is = Happiness up or down).

My 3rd contention is that there is such a thing as genuine happiness and delusional, fake, or partial happiness — Chet Hawkins

This seems to be true. But the next lines seem to betray a certain kind of moral self-reference. I'm unsure you could support your first contention while maintaining this position. It reduces happiness to an opinion in solely your mind, in sorting out what is virtuous/moral or 'happiness-inducing'.

My 5th contention is that wisdom is only properly described as a collective virtue which must include all virtues. — Chet Hawkins

I don't really disagree here, but as with above, I don't think you can support an 'objective' account, when it seems to be relying on subjective aggregates of opinion or use. If 'virtue' is just what people, in aggregate, take to be virtuous, given people actually differ in degree (i.e what constitutes a virtuous intelligence? Hard pressed to find agreement across the globe there i'd say) and kind (i.e some think EI is the only measure of Wisdom (further complicating your account) and some SI, etc...) it seems that you have a patent obstacle to your first couple of assertions on empirical grounds. What are you grounding the objectivity in? I can't find that in your exposition.

My 6th contention — Chet Hawkins

I found this whole assertion incoherent. Probably just me not getting it, but wanted to note why I haven't commented on it reasonably. I just don't get wth is going on there :sweat:

Entirely related to any previous comments (well, with any intent anyway!):

I understand that most 'evidence's for physicalism amount to mainly evidence that mental states are 'intertwined' with, or 'closely related to' neural activity.

Is this not, though, a slippery way to state that evidence? If it only presents correlation of close relationship, this seems to leave most positions except Absolute Idealism alive?

Can you anticipate your response (in regard to the above, not your immediate visceral response) to a Trump win? I'm merely curious.

For if one is unable to know anything about the external world, then one can not make any claims about it at all – even claiming that knowledge about it is impossible, because that too is knowing something about the external world – namely, that it is unknowable. — Thales

This strikes me as entirely a claim about the mind, and not about the external world. It's, in fact, rejecting any notion(as in any.. not any particular, but any) of an external world on the basis of a claim about our mind. "The external world is unknowable" is better formulated as "Our minds are unable to directly interact with the external world, and therefore, our minds cannot know anything about hte external world" which says nothing about the external world, to me, but entirely something about our mind's limitation in relation to it. Its unknowable to our mind, not in and of itself.

Fair enough - It certainly seemed like the implication was that a particular disagreement isn't possible and that it must be at a 'higher' level i.e what Good is, or what X is rather than whether its 1 or 2 (good, or bad). Sorry for misunderstanding.

"You can have peace and prosperity, rights and safety, or you can have war. We're better at war than you are; why don't we try peace?" But alas, I do not think the Palestinians are at the moment, and maybe for another generation, able to give a competent answer. — tim wood

Competency, for the actual ethnic group 'Palestinian' in the face of such a suggestion would be
'Fuck off' - Just without violence this time.

The point here is that if two people disagree with respect to a predication, "X is good," then they are either disagreeing about what good is or else they are disagreeing about what X is. Your Arabic case is just another example of this — Leontiskos

Hey dude :)

It seems to me disagreeing about what comes under the category 'good' can obviously be a particular disagreement.

I often (as a pretty centrist person) have discussions that begin with establishing what is considered 'good'. A case in point is transwomen in women's sport.

Generally, I establish that we both (the interlocutor's position doesn't matter to this idea) are after the same thing - reduction of suffering, and general respect for people with different views and presentations. So we have a categorical way to assess each of our claims, and whether they come under this agreed definition (in the particular case).

We then discuss the differing opinion, with recourse to the agreed 'Good'. In this case, I do no think transwomen should be competing in female sports (at elite levels), and the other, lets assume, does think they should.

They believe it is a method for achieving the Good we agreed on. But I disagree. It isn't. It's a bad method.

The details and positions are, again, not important. I don't think we could be wrong, because we already agreed on what 'Good' is. There's no daylight. The disagreement is what can come under that label. Not the X, not the Good... The categorisation.

The Good, however, as an ideal, can never be constructed in accordance with a conception, hence remains a different kind of judgement. — Mww

:ok:

I see no point in continuing to comment on this issue — Philosophim

:ok: And not at all ironic. I agree fully, whether I'm wrong or not :)

How about if we think of god as beyond our comprehension instead of a person with supernatural powers? — Athena

I understand what you're getting at, but that category is far too broad to have a name. What aspect of 'beyond our comprehension' are you pointing to? Anything beyond our comprehension? Seems a bit of a McGuffin.

We must stay awake to learn the logos, the reason why things are as they are and can we change this or not — Athena

Isn't this the entire thrust of philosophical thinking? What's the special occasion in this case?

You are a pleasure because you make me think about what I think and because you do so without putting me on the defensive — Athena

I am very glad to hear that - I feel the same. Being wrong is really helpful for me, too!

Remember the question is the most important thing. With the question of why acupuncture works,a second system of pain messages was discovered and with that chi was proven. Here is an explanation of chi. — Athena

I truly, seriously do not think there is anything to support this position.

Could you please present me with unbiased, peer-reviewed work that shows that 'chi' is real? Having been ensconsed in new-age groups and thinking for a decade or more, I did look into Qi very deeply because i 'bought' it at the time. It seems to me there is literally nothing, anywhere at all, that can be trusted to legitimate that concept. Would be very much open to something which shows - without ideological investment - something reaosnable about it. While I'm, not ale to run the video right now (at work) from what I know of him, Jesse Enkamp is a typical McDojo internet talking head with very little in the way of sensible takes. Have run in to him/his work around Jiu Jitsu many times over the last few years and its routinely been shown as nonsense designed to make money.

If not, my bad.

But imo a risk that must be accepted and taken. — tim wood

This is astounding level of honesty - I often see an inability to note that these risks actually exist in many areas - so, refreshing.

Tbf, any person at least five years younger than Trump is probably a better option. Though, that gives them room to prove me wrong :lol:

In no real order, other than to make the conclusion sensible:

THIS is condescending. — Philosophim

It really, truly is not. I have noted exactly why it is a legitimate avenue to take. I'm unsure, again, how its possible you are still pretending that you're pointing out a flaw here.

I appreciate the discussion, but lets let him weigh in now if he chooses. — Philosophim

I see he has, and I shall (below) defer.

That's just ego talking, not an addressing of the points. — Philosophim

This is what I, and he, see you doing. Please, don't have such a blindness that you cannot apply this exact same thing to yourself. Because, the only evidence you have is in that direction.

I'm not interested in talking to a guy who after I've already pointed out he agrees with me on issues of the OP — Philosophim

He doesn't. Which he has explicitly stated, multiple times. I'm really, genuinely convinced you are way deep in a sunk-cost fallacy here.

There's one major difference. We're discussing the OP, not his theory. — Philosophim

*his objections. It is clear to me you are not open to an honest discussion of what's going on here and I don't think you're doing it on purpose, so no guff. But, I have done my part - I shall retreat. Good luck to both on not missing what could be a great discussion :)