Absolutely. Certain moves almost seem like a wind-up LOL. But there we go - such is discussion of belief and knowledge :) Enjoying it, despite hte headaches.

Not so much. Most common entities without evidence for their existance are in the "I don't believe in it" category not the "well, it's possible" category of most. — LuckyR

I don't see how this is not the same thing, without expressing the same.
Anyone who claims absolutely that unicorns are not possible, is kidding themselves.

But that number is severely diminished in intellectually rigorous circles (such as here). — LuckyR

I am not convinced this is either true, or matters. Not considering something seriously isn't the same as positively affirm disbelief that it is possible.

— OkAy, do you have evidence it is not there though? — Lionino

A good example. The jury is out. Out of hte building. No energy spent on the proposition. But affirmative disbelief is not there. It's merely not engaging.

The harmony is not the vibration. The strings will vibrate whether they are in harmony or not.
The harmony or ratio of frequencies is what causes the vibration of the strings to function in a certain way. — Fooloso4

Sympathetic vibration tells me this isn't the whole story.

Instruments have been designed in a way (John McLaughlin's 13-string guitar when playing with Shakti comes to mind) specifically so that a harmony in the strings played, causes the strings not played to vibrate sympathetically. I believe sitar behaves this wY too.

You're not saying the jury's out on the existance of gods, you're saying in the absence of evidence I don't believe in any gods. — LuckyR

Can you figure how these are different?

IN the absence of evidence, not believing amounts to the jury still being out. But perhaps out of hte building, rather than still in the deliberation room. I can't see any practical difference.

I think not accepting p and not accepting not-p is much more than a fine lin — Ludwig V

They are fundamentally different things. I think one of the sophistical tricks of (perhaps the religious?) some in this thread is to pretend that not accepting p is the same as accepting not-p.

In the former, the subject may not know about p. In the former, the know, and reject it positively. Very, very different situations. The misuse of these words hurts my head, and the weak defenses of their misuses even more so.

The root of our discussion is here, from pg 12, with which I disagree: — Mww

I have not seen you disagree with this, really. You've helped me see where I was misusing words and concepts because I don't understand what I'm doing all that well (which i am extremely appreciative of. This isn't easy LOL) but I can't see that you've disagreed that Kant gives us an unavoidable causal relationship between thing-in-itself and our sensible intuitions. It appears your most recent response (prior to this) laid it out in explicit terms - that you agree with it?

1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity;
2. ????;
3. Something is presented to our sensuous organs; — AmadeusD

The "?????" I think, is the Noumenon of whatever object. At the time, I had entirely misunderstood what the Noumenon is meant to represent, and where it fits in the relationships of thing-in-itself, conception, and intuition. I am now under the impression that 1. The thing-in-itself, somehow, in some unknowable fashion, instigates appearance - but that the Noumenon is that which, in some sense, exists between the two in a sort of semi-focus, as compared to the total blank of the thing-in-itself.

what do you think all that really says, — Mww

Well, I don't think anyone really knows - but its relevance here, is that Kant appears to very directly note that the thing-in-itself is in a causal relationship with our sensible intuitions. There is thing-in-itself, and the phenomenal appearance in intuition - and that there is, unavoidably, a causal relationship between the two - Otherwise, as noted, we are left with intuitions of nothing. Its just unsatisfying because we can never have any knowledge of that which 'causes' the appearance of any object of intuition.
The over-all thesis of that section, i'm yet to parse.

I'm about 90% of the way through this book, and i'd say i grok the overall thesis in a pale reflection, and about 15% of the actual content. Doing my best.

While we cannot conceive of things entirely askance from any empirical intuition, these are merely representations belonging to the internal human system, hence have no concern with external causal conditions, which belong to Nature itself. — Mww

I agree - but this goes to the previous thing we're trying to come to terms on.
That causal relationship is necessary, if unknowable and unconcerning to us in general. But if we have never been caused to undergo the experience of a phenomenon, we can't conceptualise it, i think.

Edited in later, so apologies if missed: It seems really, really clear that most thinkers consider the thing-in-itself noumenal. Can you help me understand how this is the case, with Noumena/on being different from the thing-in-itself? It is just Kant being annoying and confusing"?

You're not even wrong. And that's kind of the problem (though, I would have to remove all the hyperbolic WWII comparisons for this to be acceptable lol).

Hence, I am in no place to make a call.

Yeah, i'm understanding i've gotten the TE wrong - but i also can't work out why it's the way it is.

It makes little sense because it's importing all of the requirements of success into the experiment. I don't see how that matters - the issue, surely, is whether or not a physically identical being would be conscious, or not. So, a p-zombie, to me, should be conceived as physically absolutely identical but not conscious. To me, that's the bullet to bite. I don't really grok how one could, or could not, confirm or deny the potential for a being acting fully conscious, yet not being so. Begs the question, surely.

the governing structure that is intent on the destruction of its neighbor — BitconnectCarlos

It simply isn't that simple, imo Particularly the prolonged nature of dealing with these things. I find it extremely hard to pretend to know what's really going on, or pretend to read the minds of governing collectives (which i find incoherent, anyway).

What must be done to those who vow to murder innocent civilians? They must be killed. — BitconnectCarlos

I also get your position, but it's entirely incompatible with how i see thing in general. This logic leads to killing every person who makes a semi-credible threat of death on anyone (you've deemed innocent). I can't take that seriously, i'm sorry. Again, I understand the position but it appears to me an attempt to signal an emotive position rather than a rational one. We must just disagree... And that's fine :)

Yup - the entire situation is novel. Exactly as i said.

Do you have the actual speech, or just interpolation ;)

None of them were previously President either though - the entire situation is novel.

Absolutely - no ill will whatsoever. I really appreciate the exchanges, and that recognition of same :) Thank you.

As some Muslims are peaceful people some Christians and some Jews are peaceful people, and some of each are the enemies of peace on earth and we need to be honest about this reality. — Athena

The problem, I think aptly identified by Sam Harris, is the ideology, not the people. There are varying degrees of commitment, but the further from a true commitment we get, the less problematic things become. Which is a serious indictment of the ideology, rather than elements of human nature. You can get almost every positive aspect from religion (particularly the Abrahamics) without it, or at least without the type of commitment religion requires.
Conversely, you can't randomly get the type of despicable behaviours we see out of the depths of religion (particularly hte Abrahamics) without that kind of commitment, and in most cases, without that particular ideology.

I've a love/hate (take those words very lightly) relationship with those who 'adhere' to a religion by bastardizing it - they avoid the negatives, but also avoid a genuine commitment.

Its going to be extremely entertaining.

Fair enough; I guess i've misunderstood the TE. Whoops lol.

I don't really see those elements as relevant (at least certainly not necessary) to the Hard problem. For my part, when i consider this TE in the HP context, I imagine a being, physically exactly the same as a typical human but without conscious experience (i.e, that's the only difference) meaning there is no sadness or happiness. They do not have the experience required to inform that. It can't be 'shown' without hte experience. My job is to figure out the difference between the p-zombie i've described, and a human with conscious experience.

I am under the impression that this requires biting the "consciousness is not emergent from neural activity" bullet hard, but nothing else - only serves to preclude a fully physicalist account of consciousness, and all the interesting questions are still in the air (what, where from, how, why etc..) about consciousness.

They wouldn't, of course — RogueAI

No, they wouldn't, but I don't understand how its possible it could be contended that they're 'supposed' to . So, I have no idea where to go with this now :lol:

an Axis victory would have been so much worse. A "lesser of two evils" thing. Am I right? — RogueAI

I simply don't know. Nor could I. Preposterous. We already know exactly what the one option gets us - we are essentially blind to the other, and I wont speculate. Not going to entertain this one again.

You're correct. You did not accuse me. I misread this post

“The unexamined life is not worth living.” — RogueAI

You're asking me to forego the examination of my actual life to examine an impossible life. And in fact, a situation in whcih i am not alive. Ironic in the extreme.

So, behind the veil, you would prefer the Allies won even knowing they killed hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and children in indiscriminate bombing raids? — RogueAI

I wont play 'gotcha' games. Particularly not with someone who accused me of the same.

I just said: I would prefer the Allies won - I didn't try to change the realities of WWII.

But this is a ridiculous thing to imagine and so i place no seriousness on that answer. If you want a "why" you wont get one. It's an intuition. Which is my point.

Don't you think that he's a real threat to society? Not trying to pick a fight, I'm just trying to understand people's attitudes. — Wayfarer

Hmm. Yes, but I don't think that's his fault per se. It's the fault of everyone being so intensely divided and willing to lose huge parts of their humanity in service of an opinion - which is certainly taking opportunity in.
As much as he lies, he's lied about a huge amount too so I find it hard to take it more seriously than any other situation of media-driven horseshit in politics. But, to be clear this post (to you) outlines my position on Trump.

You're unable to prefer any other situation than the one you exist in? Suppose your kids died horribly in a fire. You're telling me it would be impossible for you to prefer an alternate timeline where you died rescuing your kids from the fire? Or suppose you exist and you live in unremitting pain and lack the ability to kill yourself. You couldn't prefer a situation where you were never born? — RogueAI

I bite the bullet. Yes. I am unable to prefer that world.
I also bite that bullet. I am unable to prefer that world.

However, I'm an anti-natalist so I think its best if people weren't born at base anyway. But once alive, that goes out hte window entirely. And i'm trying to restrict myself to the actual - not speculative nonsense about things that cannot possibly happen.

Of course you can. Pretend you're behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance and you're looking at two possible worlds you might find yourself in: one is a world where the Axis won, and one is a world where the Allies won. Which world would you prefer to be in? — RogueAI

Understood, and I'm happy to answer the TE after a disclaimer: We have an actual result here. Any other result (other the course of events leading to this exchange) is utterly preposterous to imagine, for any reason other than fancy, to my mind. The TE isn't an experiment - it's a counterfactual - one which seems to be purely set out for the purpose of trapping someone who is attempting not to take something preposterous seriously.

I would prefer the Allies won. But i am actually IN this world, so I may not have the intellectual capability of truly imagining another.

Maybe from your previous quoted below, you were denying any knowledge of the external world due to the fact the perception happens via perceptual aggregates? — Corvus

I'm not able to read that into the passage quoted - but then, I wrote it with my intention so that makes sense :nerd:

I thought you were saying the empirical world is unknowable, because it is all Thing-in-itself. But that was maybe the claim of RussellA. I must have been confused between you and @RussellA. — Corvus

Ah okay, fair enough. It's also a fairly easy misreading of that passage. But i certainly meant to exclude them from each other, basically.

.......what?

I said reading this thread will be entertaining. Perhaps you meant to reply to someone who mentioned any of that?

I have to say, it will be very entertaining checking in on this thread if and when Trump wins.

That's the scenario we're given. P-zombies are supposed to act exactly like us. We would have no way of knowing that they have no consciousness. So they talk. And they answer questions the same ways we do. — Patterner

That is not how I've ever understood any version of the TE.

p-zombies are physically the same, yet unconscious. No idea why we are assuming they're behaving exactly the same? If i've got that wrong, then I have got that wrong.

Let me then ask you: was is it a good thing that Nazi Germany was stopped? Was the world better off for that happening? — RogueAI

Just as stupid as the previous question. We are actually in the situation where the Allies won, and I exist in it. I am unable to prefer else. It actually doesn't matter what I think about all you're trying to 'gotcha' me with - ironic, as below...

But here we are, having to deconstruct the question you refuse to answer because you think it's some "gotcha — RogueAI

No. I am unable to answer it. If you're not going to accept that, then just stop replying. You're not a psychic and your assumptions betray a lack of humility or even want of a decent exchange. You are exactly looking for a "Gotcha, you're a Nazi supporter".

That you think it wise to project that on to someone who is literally refusing certain propositions, and asking nothing of you, is bizarre.

Did you not say that you cannot conceive or access the empirical world because they are Thing-in-itself? — Corvus

No, not at all. The empirical object is not the thing-in-itself. Not sure where that came from. The 'empirical' world is the world of phenomenal sense perception. The thing-in-itself is beyond this, and entirely unknowable.

TII(unknowable)->Noumenon(merely conceivable)->Phenomenon (actual, as it were)

as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it — AmadeusD

This comports exactly with the above specifically noting that the thing-in-itself is outside the empirical purview. Nowhere in your quote do i indicate a conflation of the empirical and 'thing in itself'.

Let’s tackle this by analogy — Bob Ross

This analogy doesn't map on to the categories of Good and Bad at all.

There’s only one distinction which is valid. — Bob Ross

There isn't, though. You've just decided on a criterion randomly, basically. That appears to me an expression of your emotional reaction to that criterion. That you think it should be the moral benchmark. I remain unconvinced you have objective categories.

a much more reasonable moral realist approach would be to equate normative judgments with our ability to choose and let the moral facts be the categories of the good and bad — Bob Ross

I agree in principle, but as above, those categories themselves don't represent facts other than teleologically (i.e an authority dictating what fits in each category). There also remains the equivocal nature of Good and Bad, even under your view. Another reason your analogy doesn't hold at all.

By 'workable' I mean to say that if each person has differing categories (this seems empirically true) then there's no objective categories between people and is therefore not a useful or helpful framework. I would acknowledge there's probably a 'pregnant middle' of those categories that most do share, but that's immaterial if something like 4/10 instances don't come under that.

Historically, it seems like humanities efforts at ‘the good’ converges at promoting harmony, sovereignty, and unity. Semantically, I think this is what “the good” is implying. — Bob Ross

As has been the case (though, I don't think i've said this necessarily) this is a reasonable assumption to go on. But it's not objective. That's the point.

Because I see the good, and I want to do good. I am not just, in this theory, projecting my own psychology onto others: I am striving towards the good. — Bob Ross

Sure, but these pertain solely to your conception of the Good. And it's a good one by my lights too, generally, but even given that generally agree with the conception, I disagree the categories that result are objective. I also note, again, that your normative system is subjective - so no qualms with that.

Saying that Kant said that you cannot know thing-in-itself, therefore you cannot know all the objects in the empirical world such as cups, trees and books, the bent sticks (claimed by RussellA) sounds not making sense. — Corvus

No one, in any of these comments, has suggested this.

Thing-in-itself is something that you can think about. — Corvus

What are you thinking about when you do this?
Seems entirely incoherent to me.

Why are we assuming language? That seems a conscious ability, whereas we're talking about physically identical, yet non-conscious entities.

How would blacking out be different from sleeping? — Lionino

As I say, I cannot remember how he parses the different states.
An off-the-cuff note, would be that when 'blacked out' memories are not created, and you are not consciously aware. You can do both while sleeping (dreaming and lucid dreaming, particularly).

OK, who do you prefer should have won WW2, the Allies or Axis? — RogueAI

I'm not able to prefer anything other than the current situation, as it is the one in which I exist. Therefore, I prefer the Allies won because it results in my existence.

From a God's-eye view, I would ahve the innate knowledge of which course would have been 'just'. So, there's no reason for these questions or reasonable way to answer them. Which i've insisted on.

What a weird line of thought about this.

A193 doesn’t relate to the paragraph title you gave, which is found at A538. And I couldn’t come up with a reasonable connection between A193, A538 and your hesitations for accepting the differences in things-in-themselves and the empirical representations which regulate human knowledge. — Mww

I am reading the Muller translation of the A version (which was a rookie's mistake) and that's the page it's on... My mistake.
You've got the right section, though, for sure.

hesitations for accepting the differences in things-in-themselves and the empirical representations which regulate human knowledge. — Mww

Unsure how you have figured this, but I am actually insisting on the opposite. They are clearly different and the only thing I am insisting on is that the thing-in-itself causes appearance (hence my dealing with an incorrect use of 'appear'. We can actually speak about hte thing-in-itself, despite Kant's insistence we can't by virtue of its necessity to phenomena.

https://ia800706.us.archive.org/13/items/immanuelkantscri032379mbp/immanuelkantscri032379mbp.pdf This (Kemp Smith) version has a very, very similarly-worded section to the Muller translation at the same place. A relevant passage, for full clarity:

"Now this acting subject would not, in its intelligible character, stand under any conditions of time; time is only a condition of appearances, not of things in themselves. In this subject no action would begin or cease, and it would not, therefore have to conform to the law of the determination of all that is alterable in time, namely, that everything which happens must have its cause in the appearances which precede it. In a word, its causality, so far as it is intelligible, would not have a place in the series of those empirical conditions through which the event is rendered necessary in the world of sense. This intelligible character can never, indeed, be immediately known, for nothing can be perceived except in so far as it appears. It would have to be thought in accordance with the empirical character just as we are constrained to think a transcendental object as underlying appearances, though we know nothing of what it is in itself."

And shortly after at A545...
"In this way the acting subject, as causal phenomenon would be bound up with nature through the indissoluble dependence of all its actions, and only as we ascend from the empirical object to the transcendental should we find that this subject, together with all its causality in the [field of] appearance, has in its noumenon certain conditions which must be regarded as purely intelligible."

things-in-themselves exist and from that we can infer the necessity of a causal lineage from such external existence, to appearance, through perception, sensation, intuition, ending in internal phenomenal representation. — Mww

This has been my insistence. It confirms my position rather than is 'for the record', to my mind.

The claim that the external world is caused by the internal world is wrong, but that has nothing to do with the capacity for conception. — Mww

I'm not convinced. We cannot conceive of things entirely askance from any empirical intuition. They must be derivative, in some sense, best i can tell. I cannot think of something other than as derived from empirical intuition thought under concepts, which, in themselves, are nothing.

For you to suggest that we are unable to access anything in the external world, there must be reason for that, and it seems your definition of "conceiving" and "accessing" might be something different from the ordinary definition of them. — Corvus

I don't think this is a case, and to my mind, on a re-reading i did delineate out what i'm talking about.

In the most simple terms: Sensory perception is not access to the 'real' world. It is data mediated by the sense organs, and relayed to the brain/mind further mediating our access to it. We can only access our sensory data, via sensory perception. Therefore, we do not have any access to the external world. The 'thing-in-itself' is entirely, and necessarily inaccessible to human sensibility, and therefore, the human mind. My contention with Mww was around whether the thing-in-itself stimulates sensory perception, as an unavoidable inference - and i think this is correct, and your recent comments above this one outline that well imo.

In terms of my comment on 'conceiving', as we have literally no empirical indication of the thing-in-itself we can't conceive it. Where would you even start, to conceive of something you have literally no knowledge, and cannot have any knowledge? Assuming that that, per the above, is the case.

he has a view that any true discontinuity in consciousness per se is enough to end an identity. The reestablishment of consciousness is of a different identity inhabiting the same psychological setting. I forget how, but he does somehow parse out blacking out from merely being drunk and sleeping/dreaming. It’s possible I’ve misidentified his view and blacking out is required

yeah that’s a bit of a problem. I wasn’t under the impression that would need accounting for though. I can see the evolution side occurring in roughly the same way it has but I imagine we are still about 250,000 years ago culture-wise(I.e <1 - near zero) and obviously more like several million years ago in terms of actual behavioural capacities. It’s a very different world no doubt and would take some serious storytelling to get going

or murder any of its past inhabitants. — Luke

:lol: I like your faith in humanity, Luke.

does forward time travel necessitate a branch in timelines? — noAxioms

Surely, this is now talking about a "possible future" that you've gone in to - it may not be the actual future of your OG time-line. You being in the future isn't a contradiction here, though, as you're not in the OG timeframe. You just disappeared for a while in the OG one and reappeared at your 'destination' moment in time.
Then, the 'branch' would happen, I would suppose at a point in the OG timeframe that contradicted the future branch you've travelled to. This might create an alternate past, pro-actively (as far back as your moment of travel in the OG timeline) and I haven't considered if that's an issue. It seems unavoidable that there would be a branch, but not logically necessary. Very much happy to have this ripped apart though as i'ts taken me 10 minutes between settlements at work.

Can I, having just made the machine, branch a new line off some other timeline where I never existed in the first place, say some version of 1980 where my parents didn't survive WWII? — noAxioms

Surely this would just create a branch into which you've traveled regardless, leaving the OG timeline without you, or your parents, in it? A timeline into which you traveled and now exist rather than existing prior to the travel.

This doesn't appear to me as an argument against anything but aesthetic implication (it would be weird, no?).

It doesn't seem to address the fact that the Hard Problem and P-zombies are exactly meant to invoke the gap science is trying to fill.
Unless you can fully understand consciousness in physical terms (I do not believe this is hte case, but even if not, we don't ahve that understanding yet) then p-zombies are coherent until we do (and it excludes that possibility). 180 Proof made a similar error earlier in the thread (though, it was years ago). "identical" to a 'conscious being' would be a conscious being. Being "physically identical" is the actual case in the TE.

But i agree with Seth - it's a very weak argument against Physicalism, for sure. It's just that he assumes he's right:

is to consider the capabilities and limitations of a vast network of many billions of neurons and gazillions of synapses (the connections between neurons), not to mention glial cells and neurotransmitter gradients and other neurobiological goodies, all wrapped into a body interacting with a world which includes other brains in other bodies. Can I do this? Can anyone do this? I doubt it. — Seth

This precludes anything but a physicalist account for it to be a decent objection, i think. I also think Seth (among others) overblows the correlation we find between certain parts of hte brain and fairly imprecise conscious experience. If the brain is a receiver, nothing here has any really weight on the question/s. But it would certainly rule out an emergent (from neural activity) account of consciousness

Perhaps the real question of the OP is will America become an authoritarian state, a right wing dictatorship? — Tom Storm

I think this is a far more realistic position to consider. And, while I personally think its super-unlikely, it's way more possible that Fascism coming into play.

Of course for my friends in the Left, America has been an authoritarian state for many years, so even this will evoke a range of interpretations and definitional games. — Tom Storm

And herein lies the problem, right? From any standpoint of intrenched ideology, its almost impossible not to see yourself as the victim of 'the other side' - otherwise your ideology is 'in power' and defeats the point.

Perhaps communication with the general populations is a pipe dream of humble members of the elite who believe they are closer to the average person than the average person is close to an orangutang — and I don't say this as an insult, more as a bitter and unfortunate realisation. — Lionino

My wife and I recently came to this conclusion reluctantly. Most people are either not capable, or lack any inherent interest, in 'thinking further'. Makes life kind of hard when you're aware of it, but it instills a certain sympathy for a huge swathe of previously-irking behaviour. Part of my motivation to find this forum, in fact, was the abject failure to find people who want to discuss these things (or at least, are capable of doing so). Facebook seems to be a great aggregator of Dunning-Kruger effects, to the degree that that's an actual thing.

Orangutan* btw ;)