"something of substance". — LuckyR

Yes, i think that's probably true for most :)

This is significant because the comment by the driver was in fact a faux pas where I am from. — Hanover

I find this utterly preposterous, and a symptom of looking for enemies, unfortunately. Thems might be the rules, but they're ridiculous, if so.

My main point is that it's more impartial that a bunch of Senators — Relativist

Thats definitely true - they're allowed to do it in the open!

As a lionizer of Dylan, I do think that was his take outside of true civil reform (MLK for instance).

But those representations in us must have a cause. That which makes an impression on the senses, an appearance, from which follows a sensation, is sufficient cause. But, as already proved, it cannot be the thing-in-itself that causes the impression on the senses, which leaves only the thing of the thing-in-itself. — Mww

I'm not sure i understand this (or, possibly, just understand it to be the case). The impressions must be caused - and things-in-themselves are said to be at the bottom of that causal chain, so to speak. Obvious our impressions are not of the thing, for the reason you state, but cause by our interacting with it, via sense organs, doesn't seem to create any issues and seems to comport with the admittedly insanely hard-to-parse passages about it in CPR. Even if we can never have an impression proper of the thing, we must be actually engaging it somehow to get the impression we do get.

From this idea the the thing-in-itself isnt causal in this chain, I can only be left with things that have no effect on sense, and impressions that come from nowhere/nothing. But i suppose, that is transcendental idealism in some regard.

whereas noumena are nothing but conceptions, having no phenomenal representations at all, hence cannot even be known to exist. — Mww

My understanding is that Noumena are perceptions not found in sensory intuition, so yes, entirely unavailable to us - but not conceptions as such. I suppose though, you might be referring to our ability to conceive them in the understanding, as totally unrelated to what they actually are - which, yes. Fair enough. We can always imagine, as you note.

So if phenomena are the representations given from human sensibility, noumena cannot be either the representations, or the means for the possibility of them. — Mww

Agreed. But, I did admit I was entirely misunderstanding Noumena, and this comports with my updated understanding, in terms of relation to 'us'. They're just not there, even if they 'exist' some'where'

they are very unhelpful. — Mww

They seem to be entirely irrelevant to the system, other than to posit something medial.

And, thank you, so much, for continuing to engage. I did my best to go away for a while before responding so i really hope its not tedious and you turn into 180 Proof on me :P

The point being that some word usage doesn't leave much doubt as to where people stand, and you have to realize that the words you hear are probably modified to your sensibilities until the day you stumble into somewhere you've been misread. — Hanover

I agree with this, and refer to Bill Burr's old bit about the N word, and using it out of earshot of those whom you assume would take umbrage. He's not wrong - but that would be the substantive :)

We told him we were from Atlanta, and he told us he had been there and that it had so many black people he couldn't believe it. — Hanover

he already committed a faux pas — Hanover

I don't see a faux pas in pointing out a demographic unfamilar to you. Doesn't seem to contain any opinion on it - just that it was unusual for that guy. I think in this case, your friend/her husband aren't being reasonable - but this, I think goes to my point. Id want to hear more, in any situation.

P.S have spent some time in Georgia, near the coast. Lovely, flat, welcoming place but its super-creepy to drive past plantation after plantation

Yep, I understand that. But lawyers gonna lawyer, and they are extremely tricky. You're right that the system shouldn't be open to this type of crap, but it seems it is.

This process of competing interests leads to a set of jurors less likely to favor either side. — Relativist

I would refer (though, this is extremely low-brow stuff in terms of the convo we're having) the opening scenes of The Devil's Advocate for a fictional take on how lawyers tend to voir dire. It is a scurrilous process at worst, and cynical at best. Maybe i'm the cynical one :rofl: I deal with these things almost daily and am somewhat disillusioned by the idea that lawyers can't fuck with the process. They are, after all, all humans.

This seems a contradiction from the above. We now know two things about the thing in itself: (1) it is unknowable and (2) it causes intuitions. #1 appears definitionally true, but #2 an empirical statement. If X (the thing in itself) causes me to see a flower, I can say something pretty substantive of X, specifically that it elicits a particular intuition, but I don't think I can say that because it's noumenal. I can only say there are Xs out there and intuituions in here, but I can't say any particular X is consistently responsible for any particular intuition. — Hanover

Having not yet replied to Mww, maybe he's said something relevant, so apologies if i've not seen that yet..

I do not see the issue. We can understand (in Kant, anyway) that intuitions arise from things-in-themselves, of which we know nothing as an empirical deduction. We know for certain that our perceptions are necessarily askance from whatever causes them. So, the need to say 'it's unknowable' arises - but this isn't the noumenal. The noumenal is that which arises in a perception other than sensory perception and so is theoretically knowable, but unattainable for humans. The 'thing-in-itself' as for itself is not available to any intuition, is how i read this. Therefore, we can infer its existence, despite knowing nothing of it, other than it may be hte basis for our intuitions.

I am also shit at Kant, so this is probably way off.

I can abstract out that this is what is ‘good — Bob Ross

I deny this entirely. Without something to ground your conception of hte good outside of empirical sense perception, I cannot see how anything but bias or assumption could lead to judging acts as good or bad. This is kind of my point - what criteria do these acts meet? It seems to be an internal criteria based on intuition(in the colloquial sense) or an arbitrary adherence to some conception of 'flourishing' as commonly posited. I'm not seeing where the induction is validated...

I don’t see why this is the case: I don’t need to posit a platonic form of a triangle to induce a concept of a triangle. — Bob Ross

Because a triangle is analytical. It is a shape with three (tri) angles (angle). "the good" has no such grounding. X is good because of something further(its meeting a criteria/on for instance, held in the subject's mind), which makes it synthetic. In this case, I can't see how an a priori concept can be appealed to unless is some kind of Platonic Form-type thing assumed to be 'correct', as it were. We'd need an innate, defined concept of Good and Bad to accurately judge any act - and this would mean we can be wrong about it, empirically.

Sure it does, something like ‘any act which promotes harmony of alive beings with each other’. — Bob Ross

Sure, this is a concept you, as a subject, can match it to, if you want to use that a criterion. But from whence comes a reason to use that criterion? Given the criterion, I think you're off to the races - but I can't understand why I should accept it without an a priori concept for me to heed.

The good is a category of acts which is equivalent to something like ‘any act which promotes ...’. — Bob Ross

Promotes what, though? I agree, an act must, in some sense, promote something to have a moral valence, but what you choose to append to the quote within your quote is, not arbitrary, but only sensible and analytical. So, using your car example, yes that's true - But it makes the concept of the car directly relate to a subjective definition of the usage of 'car' to refer to what it is in perception (not, as-it-actually-is). It is derived from intuition - and if, as i read it, your theory has our moral 'rules' lets say deriving from intuition, my previous objections seem to comport with that. Somewhat arbitrary to note a conjunction, and just call it 'good' without noting that perhaps this is a result of you realising this particular rule ameliorates some discomfort you have with its opposite, as an eg.

I don’t think the concept of a triangle is a priori itself — Bob Ross

I tend to think if we have these a priori concepts of extension, logic and space in general, we can get a triangle without intuition. But then, im young at that particular mode of thinking so I'll leave that one to be possibly entirely wrong.

That’s the interesting thing with this theory: the good is non-normative. I can tell you what is good, but not what you should do about it. — Bob Ross

This seems to betray to concept of morality, and doesn't really answer my issue. If something (an act) must be objectively noted as good, rejecting it is immoral. Whats the catch? Im unsure how you're going about decoupling 'good' with a moral valence in any act. Though, i very much appreciate that you're avoiding the 'ought' and think this is commendable and honest.

(1) there are blue and red categories of piles and (2) the red belong in the red and the blue in the blue. — Bob Ross

Then I see that these are made up and you're putting things in two bins based on a black/white fallacy instead of extending your system to accomodate things that patently don't fit in them. What if one of the blocks is purple??. It's just not tenable. If I only have two categories, I will put things in the best-suited category. But that might be entirely unable to service what the things I'm categorising actually are/represent. In this case, I think that's true for 'good' and 'bad'. Its a subjective categorisation which allows for no third or fourth or fifth category of moral valence (given that morality is 'the right/wrong' and 'good/bad' judgements humans make).

we have to live, learn, experiment, fail, and keep trying. — Bob Ross

Agree. And this precludes me from ever knowing whether something is Good or Bad, other than according to my own, internal, empirical-derived sense of them. There couldn't be a rule, other than one i make up. If what you mean here, is that everyone, individually, can find these categories and work from there - yes, i guess so. But that's plain and simple subjectivity. All of our biases will play into what falls into which category. Thought, again, I recognize this falls well short of imputing an 'ought'.

Since the good is non-normative, it is not a (normative) stance — Bob Ross

I suppose this goes to my incredulity (my own, not at you) about how you're decoupling the Good from the Moral. If we knew Good and Bad outright, every act could be judged upon those categories as objectively one or the other. If you KNOW the good, and reject it, how is that not Immoral? I'm just not seeing where that one goes...

I would start off with the subjective moral judgment that “one ought to be good” and then the normative judgments will be synthesized with the moral facts (except for that one normative judgment). — Bob Ross

Ok, this is certainly sensible. But i reject any way to factually deduce the Good, so there's that :lol:

But, we don't know much more about time than that, — Metaphysician Undercover

This is what i was looking for. Not as a gotcha, but I now understand I'm looking for answer that isn't there. Currently, I take the 'it only exists in the mind' line anyway, so i was just probing for curiosity/philosophy sake.

However, the explanations I have given show why it is logically necessary to premise that the passage of time is a type of change other than physical change, as the answer to "how can there be physical change". — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is where I just scratch me head. What other change? And I'm intuitively connecting hte first quote to this one. We just dont know :)

Thank you mate.

Out of all the things that could possibly exist, very few actually exist. So something that is merely possible, has a low probability of existing. That's sufficient reason to conclude that a mere possibility doesn't exist: you'll rarely be wrong. — Relativist

Hmm. I do see the point you're getting at, but I just think your conclusion is a leap too far. It's not really the case - though it is practically necessary to deal with life, as it is.

My point is simply that my belief that aliens have not come here is warranted by my belief that it's extremely improbable - so improbable that it's not worth considering. — Relativist

I'm sorry, I'm not seeing how you can get from 'improbably' to 'impossible', which is what a belief would seem to imply your thought is? If not, that's fine and it may just be the same as the previous quote/response.

It's zero. There are no rocks on the moon with the molecular structure of a cabbage. If there were, it would be a cabbage, not a rock. You could loosen the exactness of the required likeness and match any probability you like. So instead, let's consider Russell's teapot: we're warranted in believing there is no teapot orbiting the sun between earth and Mars, even though it's logically possible, but grossly improbable. — Relativist

Yeah. It's not zero. I mentioned shape only. There need not be an exact molecular match (because that would be, as you say, a Cabbage LOL defeating hte point of hte example). But I think you're again, leapfrogging there. It is logically possible the a rock, the surface of which, is an exactly surface-dimensional match is possible. In fact, if we extend this to the universe, it's almost certain it exists somewhere. I don't want to go down this path though - it's logically possible, on my account, because I don't posit what you did here. I think we'd agree - and it would again, come back to practicality as the two above have (as i see them). But it's a fair point you're making in all three instances. Again - i may be mentally unstable for my selective skepticism lol

I simply suggest that if you have no reason to doubt she's human, then you actually DON'T doubt she's human and ergo you believe she's not an alien. We all believe lots of things, even though it's logically possible we're wrong. Believing x does not entail believing ~x is logically impossible. It just means we feel we have sufficient justification. — Relativist

And i do not see sufficient justification without investigation, if we have two logically possible outcomes. Obviously, by inference, I can support a belief that my wife is not an alien - she meets all criteria, prima facie, to be a human. So, in that sense, I don't deny what you're saying - I'm making the point that with no reason one way or the other, belief is unwarranted. That fact is here, i have many, many vicariously-substantiated reasons. But none personal, other than my trust that those reasons are sound. And again, perhaps my doubt here (for both propositions) is a bit schizophrenic. I mind not :)

No. I don't believe God is discoverable. — Relativist

Then you're not a deist. It is defined as a God which is discoverable in empirical observations of nature. I think you're just ignoring the fact that misusing words is a problem. And, i, personally, while understanding your view will no longer even attempt to say you're a deist, because the statement here precludes it. Your take on that is immaterial to me looking at the definition - looking at your positiion - and deducing hte daylight between them.

And yet, you apply that label to me. — Relativist

Im done. I've been over this three times now and you've outright ignored it to ascribe to me a claim which i have not made and the clearly sufficient solution i've posited. If you're willing to ignore specific, direct treatment of a false claim about my view here, im unsure what to do about it. You are wrong. I don't do what you're claiming and have outright, directly rebutted it three times.

I'm giving advice based on MY experience, but I acknowledge that your experience may be that your overwrought assumptions outweigh what others bring to the table. — LuckyR

When i said 'you', read it as the abstract use of 'one'. It was not aimed at you personally - And i do not carry assumptions of this kind (or, more accurate, i immediately, by way of years of habit-forming, jettison my assumptions upon meeting/interacting with someone). I wait until someone actually tells me something of substance, instead of reading into things.

Sort of like Marty (or his picture of his older siblings) beginning to fade as he slowly destroys any possibility of his parents hooking up. Hollywood loves this idea despite the paradox it creates. — noAxioms

Agreed, more or less.

That may be, but it is harder to convince people to worship the god of baffling with bullshit. — wonderer1

This may be the greatest feat Logic has ever achieved :)

Then again, if you had no other frame of reference, its a bit incoherent to think it would be baffling. It just is

Christians typically think that God, being good, wouldn't mislead us. — wonderer1

Although, in this case it wouldn't be Odd. It would be the case, and nothing more. — AmadeusD

:) :) "God works in mysterious ways" and all that... No misleading to be had here, though. Otherwise, we're assuming that 1+1 IS 2, and God is contravening...something. But if God is the almighty Creator of all, that's not what's happening there. It just is the case that 1+1=3.

I could get someone saying it's not always sucessful, but there's no question that the effort is made and the result is better than seating a jury that is knowingly biased. — Relativist

In a criminal case, both sides will actively attempt to choose jurors they deem favourable, or exclude jurors the deem unfavourable during voir dire.

I think, if you're under the impression that council representing a side in a case want impartial jury members, you've not considered the job they are being paid to do.. Win.

Thank you - clear enough for my crude understanding :)

I've read more, thought more, and tried to beat myself up a bit about this.

This is correct. IFF one accepts that the thing that appears to our senses, is the thing of the thing-in-itself. — Mww

I am unsure this is true, or makes sense given immediately prior you quoted the same thing and then just it was wrong, in Kant.
Kant tells us that there are real, material objects 'out there' of which we can know nothing things in themselves. But that these objects cause our intuitions... which are not, as far as we care capable of knowing, anything like hte thing-in-itself..

"On the contrary, the transcendental conception of phenomena in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing which is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made."
---
"They do not, however, reflect that both, without question of their reality as representations, belong only to the genus phenomenon, which has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it, and the nature of which remains for this very reason problematical, the other, the form of our intuition of the object, which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears—which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and necessarily to the phenomenal object."
---
"On the other hand, the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could belong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the phenomenon or appearance of something, and the mode in which we are affected by that appearance; and this receptivity of our faculty of cognition is called sensibility, and remains toto caelo different from the cognition of an object in itself, even though we should examine the content of the phenomenon to the very bottom."
--
"And for this reason, in respect to the form of phenomena, much may be said à priori, whilst of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these phenomena, it is impossible to say anything."
--

"..this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere illusory appearances. For when we speak of things as phenomena, the objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe to them, are looked upon as really given; only that, in so far as this or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in itself. Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to me, or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-consciousness, although I maintain that the properties of space and time, in conformity to which I set both, as the condition of their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves. It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should reckon as phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance."

These seem cautious admissions that the only inference is that things-in-themselves cause us to receive empirical intuitions of them, which are unable to be classed as anything about the thing-in-itself because of hte removal that occurs between the TII causing representation to our cognition.

"I find that the house is not a thing in itself, but only a phenomenon, that is, a representation, the transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown."

The transcendental object, i cannot find as distinguished from the thing-in-itself. If that's the case, then Kant seems to be fairly obviously connecting the two in a causal relationship - albeit, one with entirely unknowable properties.

And yet, there remains some idiotic insistence that noumena and thing-in-themselves are the same thing. Or the same kind of thing. Or can be treated as being the same kind of thing. — Mww

I was absolutely wrong on this, and misunderstood Noumena entirely.

And we can say there are none, even if it is only because we wouldn’t know of it as one if it reached out an bitch-slapped us. — Mww

My current understanding is that this is an incomprehensible hypothetical :P
Noumena cannot appear to us, as we have no non-sensuous intuition. But this just goes to how wrong i wass earlier... So thank you for that.

Going to leave this here, though, as it directly contradicts what I've come to think is what Kant meant:

"The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena"

and then this, which just seems a cop out

"If, therefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena, we must have an intuition different from the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any application beyond the limits of experience. It may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon must be understood by us as such in a negative sense."

This seems to restrict noumena to merely things-in-themselves, as perceived by something other than sensuous intuition. Curious, and unhelpful lol

He just vanishes into thin air? — Luke

This would be the only realistic result, but then it would follow that this means he was never able to come back to kill Young Bob.

So we're still stuck with the 'copy' idea.

This is related to what I pointed out Kastrup showing ignorance about with his claim that the relationship between fluid flowrate and pressure is the same as the relationship between voltage and current expressed by Ohms law. — wonderer1

What's the catch there? I don't really understand the correlation, so I can't pick out the problem.

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say memories of the past exist in minds? — RogueAI

Hmm, a good point prima facie. I'm not sure what a memory is, exactly, so I'm unsure how to couch this, but... It seems it's a representation of something (the past state of affairs being recalled) received as empirical data, in the past, so I can't see the 'real' difference between the past, as experienced, and the memory.

If we're saying the past is mind-independent and that 'the present moment' is what constitutes the physical, in totality, it's a serious issue.

Maybe 'time travel' is confined to an approximation around memory though viz. you could have a 'conscious experience' of the past, such that it is the same, phenomenologically, as the present moment, but is in fact, a pale shadow.

Might it be a bit more palatable to say that the past exists in past minds..? Or does the mind endure?

It sounds like your machine doesn't travel at all then. It manufactures a new world in 2024 that looks like how things were in 1990. It's a new thing, a copy. — noAxioms

I would think, yes, but I think there's more to it. On this view, that 'copy' only began in 1990. It could be reversed to 1990, but no earlier. The original time-line could be reversed to Bob's birth. I'm sure this means something, but I can't grasp what. But, it certainly seems, prima facie, that the time machine in fact replicates the chosen moment (but it is 'real' as such) and then that moment runs forward as-if it were an alternate time-line.

Do you, though? ;)

Baptism. I don't know how it is for converts. But for people baptised as a baby, just that is not enough, you must go through catechism to receive the eucharisty and then confirmation — otherwise you are just a non-practicing Catholic which might as well be apostate — Lionino

This is not my experience of the Catholic view. They are Catholics-in-waiting :P But, fair enough, thank you.

Well in that case you become by thinking, not by saying; non sum quia dico, sed quia cogito. :^) — Lionino

But hte claim is still sound :)

Claiming to be Catholic is not enough to be Catholic. — Lionino

What's the criteria?

Speaking of, is there a single thing that is true in virtue of stating it? — Lionino

Cogito, ergo, sum. LOL

But that is exactly what is being done to the OP :lol: or turn it into a straw man/red herring to debate another point. — schopenhauer1

I guess, I just do not see that. It is a poetical outline and as such is open to criticisms in that light. Can you note something you see to be bad-faith in here? Im just plum not seeing how you're interpreting...

See your fellow OP-bashers to and see for yourself.. — schopenhauer1

You might be right, but I do not see it. I wouldn't have interpreted the thread that way, had i started it.

From the OP's own imagery, what do you think that means? — schopenhauer1

I was trying to figure out what you mean. I have no real opinion, because i can only respond to the passage itself - which I have done, in good faith. Seems to make sweeping statements that indicate the above (directly, in one case) - and i can't work out what it means by that.

Efforts are made to select jurors that will impartially judge the facts — Relativist

Absolutely not.

Nice, there we go. I was not aware of what position would actually bite this bullet. Thank you.

Thank you for engaging me consistently. Please be assured that anything that can be remotely interpreted as short, grumpy or incredulous is merely a mistake on my part. I am thoroughly enjoying this and appreciate you very much.

But no, I'm not saying everything is black and white. There's also gray area, but there need to be reasons to be in the gray area. Mere logical possibility is not enough. Do you disagree? — Relativist

If something is logically possible, but we do not have a good reason to think one way or the other (the Moon Rock would fit here) i remain unconvinced either way. As noted, logical impossibility would be good reason to not believe, but logical possibility I agree is no reason to take something on.

This is a key point: what is needed to warrant belief in something's nonexistence?

It's not true that I have no knowledge. For example, I know:
-the speed of light provides a limit to how far aliens could travel
-our physical characteristics are a product of our evolutionary history, and therefore the chances aliens with human intelligence and appearance is vanishingly small. — Relativist

I don't think it is much possible to warrant a belief in non-existence, unless logically impossible. That would give us sufficient reason to believe that even if we explored every mm of every single thing we could ever possibly access, it would not be possible that the object exists. I would accept that. And this may apply to my wife being an alien. But we have no idea whether the aliens have cryo-stasis technology to overcome time constraints - so if we're entertaining that they exist I don't see why we would believe rather than posit, that they haven't visited Earth. Its logically possible, and we have no reason to entirely discount it. Good reason to take it less seriously, though, for sure. Maybe we're only disagreeing abotu degrees.

Did I misunderstand? I thought you actually believe your wife is human, warranted by your knowledge of her. — Relativist

Ah, i see. No, that was either a misunderstanding or a mis-wording. I meant to point out that i could carry out experiments which would preclude my wife being an alien. I haven't, though, so I can't be sure. I do not believe. I just don't care (for whatever that's worth).

Either she's a human or an alien. Your warrant for believing she's human is also warrant for believing she's not an alien. — Relativist

If i had it I would agree. If she is human, she isn't alien. But that doesn't seem to do much for the exchange we're having. As it is, I have merely no good reason to doubt. But i could not justifiably believe it, as i've never done anything by way of investigation on that. Maybe you find me mentally unstable for that - a bullet i'll bite. But doubting that there are other minds seems a wilder bullet to bite to me(not suggesting it's your view - just solipsism in general).

You seem to be saying that one should deny the existence of a Theistic God if one believes there are no observables (=empirical evidence?) and if it's not falsifiable (through other empirical evidence?) — Relativist

S that rejects there are observables should realise that knowledge is then irrelevant to the proposition. We couldn't possibly know, if there's nothing observable to confirm it. They should rightly call themselves agnostic.
If one believes there are observables, they not be able to refer to themselves as agnostic. That's all. If you believe God is discoverable, then you cannot be agnostic. Deism entails the former, and precludes agnosticism. So...

Of course not. I've been discussing this in terms of approximation. The chances of finding one with the exact shape (down to the molecular level) are zero. — Relativist

They are not zero. It is logically possible.

This means I accept that there can be non-evidential warrant. — Relativist

I do not. If you have no reason, you're mistaken to believe the proposition one way or the other. You're free to, though. This, I think, is the only way Theism can happen, other than being mistaken about facts.

...per your preferred semantics. Notice that despite this, I've been able to describe my positions to you, and you are free to attach whatever label you like, consistent with those positions. — Relativist

This seems to assume your position is what's hard to grasp. it isn't. It does not match the terminology you used.

I could describe myself as an African American and then tell you what i mean is light-skinned, not likely to suffer sickle cell etc... contravening the meaning of African American. Anyone with sense would object and tell me why my usage is wrong. Do you not think this can be done with the terms you're using?

So what's the problem, other than my not being interested in using your terms. — Relativist

That you're using a word wrong, making your label incoherent. It's like saying "A glass table made of wood".

I am open to using different terminology to self-define, other than "agnostic deist", as long as it tells just as much about my position as does this one. I'm not open to using a different term merely to fit a semantics you've devised, particular your insistence that I call myself a "deist" despite the fact that I think it pretty unlikely that there is any kind of deity at all. That would mislead far more people than does "agnostic deist". — Relativist

This has entirely misconstrued my position, and i literally no idea how that could have possibly
happened given my final response below...

Why are you claiming I'm maintaining an "incongruent position"? What's incongruent about considering deism a live possibility, but unlikely? I get that you don't like the label I use, but that has no bearing on what my position is. — Relativist

because if you are committed to using the term 'agnostic deist' the position described by it is contradictory - and your actual position is incongruent with the position it describes.
Bolded: This is the crux of my entire problem. Your position is your position, and it is being misrepresented by the words you're using. I know your position (i think), and I refuse to use incorrect words to describe it.

It's not the definitions, it's that the definition precludes...
Did this come out the way you intended? It's contradictory. — Relativist

My point is that the definition is sound, your position just is precluded by it. Perhaps i mis-typed what i was trying to say, but i read it entirely sensibly.

But I agree that one cannot be both a deist and claim gods are unknowable. But that's why it's inappropriate to call me a deist - so you erred in insisting I should have that label. My label more accurately conveys my position: I'm an "agnostic deist" meaning that I'm agnostic as to deism. — Relativist

The bolded contradict each other. If you agree a Deist cannot claim God/s are unknowable, then that precludes the deist-entertaining from being agnostic, as it is incoherent to the deism concept. Not sure what's being missed here? You say you're open to deism being true - which means you believe that God is discoverable. So, by your own admission you cannot be agnostic toward the Deistic God, despite concluding that here. You can be unmoved by current evidence, but that's not agnosticism.

Secondarily, as noted here

Perfect example is that final sentence I noted - I didn't suggest it was an accurate label. I illustrated that the words we currently use do not capture your position - not because it doesn't fit into the definitions, but because the definitions actively preclude a deist from claiming God is not knowable. I suggested a new set of words to illustrate positions relative to deism, and separately, theism. — AmadeusD

I do not claim you must use that term. I claim your term is wrong, and we/you need a new one for the position you hold. I stick to that.

It exists in the past. Physicalism states that only physical things exist. My the past exists in minds. Therefore, it must actually exist, as an actual physical thing (that it has passed, i suppose is no matter to the principle - either could be argued by whomeveer held the view)

I do not hold to this view. I am not a physicalist, I don't think.

I'm sorry, but what you're doing is mischaracterizing objections to paint them in a certain light. A particularly dismissive, and condescending light.

I can't say that flies with me. There's no bad faith whatsoever - but comparing questions and requests for elucidation as

equivalent of the peasants in a Monty Python sketch hearing the wrong things and giving their misinterpretations in an exaggerated cockney accent — schopenhauer1

is is much closer to that category than the questions you've been receiving.

the past physically exists from a physicalist perspective -- noting a difference between existence and presence. — Moliere

:ok:

shuts down dialogue. If you are open to actually creating an interesting dialogue about that which you comment, let me know. — schopenhauer1

You're free to elucidate why you think humans are special, and lend some credibility to the OP passages. Doesn't seem to appear anywhere - and i think dismissing the objections in teh same fashion might be an issue?

To even begin describing "what's actually happening between A and B" would require a description of the specific features of these two states. — Metaphysician Undercover

I dont see that this the case. Using both your exposition, and my prior understand of 'change', its a notation of observation and nothing like an explanation of what actually takes place.
I agree, that a complete answer would require data about hte object/s changing and the change which has/will take place. But what is happening when a change takes place is totally missed in these descriptions. How do properties of objects change? And i do not mean, 'by what cause', i mean by why 'mechanism', metaphysically, could change occur... How can there be difference between two states?

What does this mean? One might deduce the existence of the moon from the tides... — Banno

Well, your claim is that it is equally to absurd to posit that the Moon does not exist, as that it does. Im asking whether this precludes you from noting anything exists.

Though, I am now seeing it's likely I missed that this is meant to illustrate the position when one is not observing the Moon rather than some metaphysical line.

b-protons and b-neutrons, not sure if that answers though. — NotAristotle

It would, to a large degree - but invokes a sort of 'matter/anti-matter' dichotomy that seems to be more trouble than its worth :snicker:

But it is as absurd to claim it is not there when not observed as it is to say that it is there. — Banno

Does this mean you abstain from deducing existence of anything? If this is way off, just explain yourself - It will not help to just tell me I don't understand. I'm trying to.

Idealism adds the unneeded ontological complexity of things winking into and out of existence, and the logical complexity of a trivalent logic. — Banno

I agree.

Perhaps there are just different kinds of matter (a-matter) and (b-matter). b-matter happens to be able to arrange into conscious brains, a-matter cannot. Nothing is necessarily non-physical in this explanation of consciousness. And I don't see why different kinds of matter is controversial or anti-scientific; after all, if you accept physics you would already believe there to be variations in matter such as protons and neutrons and electrons. — NotAristotle

I like this, and agree there's no real obstacle. But i still want to know what differentiates a-matter from b-matter.

Would this also assume we could not mimic b-matter? If the case is that the difference is in the type of matter, why not just construct the artificial brain from b-matter? What property precludes that?

If someone has determined that gods are irrelevant to their experince, then gods can never be incorporated in any account of any state of affairs. That's all I meant. — Tom Storm

In principle, agreed - conditioned by the ignorance that requires :P Ignorance is harsh, but i'm referring to the lack of consideration. As soon as they begin considering the issues, that would change. So i'm ruffled by 'never' here. But, i agree, the majority of people just do not care. They either take God on or don't.

He is