It is, but I dislike using shorthand. — Tobias
Fair - i suppose I was looking toward a situation where you'd have just outlined your personal position with reference. But in any case, it looks like we saw that similarly.
I think that is a metaphysical assumption that one need not make. — Tobias
Hmm. I really appreciate the clarity this seems to be granting me. Things don't need to be mind-independent to exist (im further down the concepts-exist-in-reality line than Banno, eg), true. But some things do. Such as, the authority in the previous element of the discussion. That exists. It's authority exists (perhaps by consent, so it's some levels above the mechanics of an interpersonal obligation) and is arbitrarily enforced to the
emotional contentedness of the majority of it's subjects and little, if anything else, is involved. In this case, I can't quite see how you could then still claim obligations exist.
The same can be said of an "obligation". It's an empty space between commitment and expectation. But there is nothing there. I guess, while this example is pretty parochial in terms of what concepts its engaging:
Person A promises;
Person B that they will attend X event on date Y specifically to accompany/support. Meaning B being present is crucial.
Person B, unfortunately, perishes on date V (i.e prior to the maturity of the 'promise').
Person A feels their promise is unfulfilled.
Person B is ... dead. There is nothing to oblige. They couldn't feel one way or the other. There is no obligation.
I think you would be wrong in all conceivable respects to claim that the obligation still exists (this is worded as if momentarily granting the idea that an obligation can exist besides the two or more brain states involved).
The situation has not changed for person A. They mentally/emotionally feel their 'obligation'. This is all they had before, too. But Person B is dead. Given that there is
no material difference whatsoever to Person A prior to, and after person B's death with regard to the 'obligation' (i.e it exists in their head as a commitment) either:
1. Obligations do not exist. People with commitments and expectations exist; or
2. Obligations can exist
in a positivist sense only.
Now, that gets messy - the kinds of 'authority' vary, and the enforceability varies etc.. etc.. etc. etc.. but the overall point seems clear to me: the obligation only exists
as an instrument of authority and does not obtain without it. However, I now anticipate some type of "well, your emotional reaction is a kind of authority". Yes, it is. But it is not an obligation. It's an enforcement mechanism. So, "obligation" is the wrong word, I'm just trying to be least-confusing.
I think that is a metaphysical assumption that one need not make. — Tobias
Fair enough, but per the above I think it's required in this case - otherwise, "obligation" can only obtain within descriptions of
other things. "thing" not needing to be physically extant, here.
It needs no logical compass. It simply needs a society in which one expect from one another that one fulfills his promises. — Tobias
Seems to me here you've inadvertently dropped your point here, and picked up mine? I'm only hearing, as conclusions to these points "It leaves a bad taste" or "It would hurt the relationship between entity X and entity Y". Yep. Not an obligation? Onward...
The fact that some concept is dependent on our societal interaction doesn't make it any less real. — Tobias
It does. But that aside, what you seem to be saying is that IFF your society has the concept promises, that magics them into existence as actual things (or, to be a bit arcane - choses). This is plainly not true?
We live in a world with doors, similarly, we live in a world with marriages — Tobias
A marriage is not at all analogous to a door. Forgive if my next response is a little glib. The above is really difficult to parse...
it is also different from: "rules made by a competent authority" — Tobias
That is, by your own description, exactly what it is. A society with the same collective concept, but not enforcing authority simply doesn't have marriages the way we think of them. Which is literally, a legal instrument
evidencing a commitment and expectation enforceable by the relevant authority. Telling someone you wont cheat, that you'll raise kids right, always take care of htem etc.. is meaningless to a marriage. That's just being nice to each other.
Than indeed, there is no marriage anymore. — Tobias
So, your position here is that if
anyone
knows about hte purported marriage, then it obtains? Yikes. That is extremely confused to me. And it also violates your entire position - if one must
know of the thing for it to exist, then we're back at rejecting that reasoning and having no basis for invoking an obligation separate to the individual brain states involved. Banno's entire point is that we can accept things exist without
knowing. You seem to be saying if no one knows about it, it doesn't exist - which is plainly wrong, too.
At what time does it exist then? — Tobias
The decision exists at the moment the decision is made (or thereabouts). It doesn't create anything further. It is a decision made. That's all.
I think one would prefer a theory — Tobias
This is not relevant. What one prefers is a road to the end of rational discourse.
The decision can be undone at any time? If it cannot and you are still bound to the decision, what is it then that binds? — Tobias
You're getting it.
It is not Banno that holds Banno accountable. — Tobias
It is (and this is directly in response to the questions in the quote immediately above this. It is Banno. If he doesn't care what hte other side of the "obligation" does in response, he couldn't care less whether he fulfills the promise. If he does care about their response, he will likely do it (assuming it causes
that response that he wants) because it makes him comfortable with himself. However,
I recognise in your addendum here ("it is others") you are essentially invoking just authority. It is on the authority of the other's expectation Banno should be accountable for his promise. Sure. That has been accepted. It does not mean an "obligation" exists. It means someone expects something, and Banno doesn't want that smoke. These are, put plainly, hold-over tactics masquerading as some moral concept of "obligation". And, while i take your earlier point - these are culturally embedded and for the most part, agreeable, forms of interaction - they
are arbitrary. There is no objective benchmark, or divine reason for them. It's just how we best-get-on. And that is all we can hope for, surely?
I would really not know why one would hold a position that cannot make sense of obligations. — Tobias
It can, though. The problem is you want something to exist which doesn't - and so the position seems incomprehensible (wrt obligations, anyway). To me (and, i guess Michael and Frank) we see no issue. The obligations simply don't obtain. Other, relevant and important things obtain which give the same appearance you're trying to explain with 'obligation'. We see no issue, because we don't take that position. You already took that position, and so the theory seems torturous. Understandable. I just htink you're wrong, and you think I (we) are. Fair.
yes. You're getting it (maybe
;) )
My position comes down to what I know as 'interactionism' — Tobias
This explains a whole lot about your responses around Marriage, but this just makes it all the more obvious there exists a
legal obligation and where there is no enforcing authority, there is no obligation. And, here, "obligation" actually just means "threat of consequence".
ou need to hold on to all kinds of obscure positions, namely that a promise exists one moment and stops existing the next or that a promise should really be conceived of as a brain state or that an obligation only reaches as far as I am willing to be bound to the promise. — Tobias
Bold: Not my position. I was actually really, really clear to try to avoid this charge. The promise
happens. It is an
action not something which "obtains" in the "thing" sense. A promise can be made the same way an explanation can be "made". Its more "made out" or "enunciated". It doesn't come into existence. I would suggest thinking here of someone making a false promise again. The actions are the same. Only hte brainstate changes, and (in this story) only for the promissor.
Italics: Not only is this plainly true (to me), this is probably one of hte better descriptions i've seen. Maybe its uncomfortable? But yeah, the obligation isn't there if you don't attend to it. If you, personally, jettison your promise you have no obligation. Even if we're going to grant the obligation "thing" status, its collapsed because you pulled your support out from it.
Michael apparently thinks it does not matter whether one is ordered by a gang of robbers or whether one is taxed by legitimate authorities. — Tobias
It doesn't. One is simply "legitimate authority". The behaviour is the same (i touched on this earlier in this post, funnily enough). What could possibly be said to be different?
"Do this or I'll break your legs" - Dealer
"Do this or I'll take your kids and give them to another set of parents temporarily" - Gov'munt
I may prefer my legs broken, personally. But that aside, there are given rules, and given consequences to not following them. The "culturally embedded" concept of promise functions the same in both of the above scenarios. In fact, I would argue that both of these scenarios exist
precisely because the obligation itself is no where to be found. Enforcement solves that.
reality ;) of legal principles — Tobias
Purely on a legal mind-to-legal mind basis, what do you mean here? Is the assertion that there is some kind of legal principle which actually transcends human minds? I have never been able to get on board with anything remotely close to "natural law" type arguments so Im really curious.
You know it is rational to invoke your landlord's promise, and you would do so in real life — Leontiskos
Because legal support exists. Otherwise, no one in their right mind would go to a landlord and try to hold them to their word. This is intensely naive to the history of commerce.
You could do the exact same thing with "do flowers exist." — Count Timothy von Icarus
No. You could not. And you did not. I shall illustrate why not:
A. Nope. You haven't explained what a flower is at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This doesn't appear to be relevant at all to the discussion. WHAT an obligation is, can be gleaned clearly from the descriptions given.
"where is it?" is the question, and flowers are demonstrably extant as "whatever it is we call flowers". This cannot be done for an obligation or promise (i use that word alittle differently, but I take yours/tobias/bannos use here). You have to describe
something else. It's a shadow, at best.