1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states.
3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states.
4. Ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their brain states.
5. Therefore, mental states are not identical to brain states.

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states.
3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states.
4. Ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their brain states.
5. Therefore, mental states are not identical to brain states.

I didn't think you would know, perhaps it's best to stick with your Cartesian Dualism, eh? — Vaskane

Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, § 10: — Vaskane

This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors. To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one.

where you inadvertently admitted that a person can use infinity as an adjective — Vaskane

we know you resent me — Vaskane

If it's clear, please tell me, in a nut shell. — Astrophel

Light shines on a red cloth, the red cloth reflects it towards my eyes, my nerves capture the stimulus and my brain produces information. — Lionino

your manifest cognitive abilities issue from a physical brain, but then, it is through these very cognitive abilities that one arrives at brains being there at all — Astrophel

This is absurd — RogueAI

There's nothing about having to solve the problem of other minds asserting that ancient peoples talked meaningfully to each other about how they felt. Of course they did! What could be more obvious? — RogueAI

I won't bother playing with a LLM until, without prompts, it asks (us) interesting questions. — 180 Proof

I think I'm on pretty solid ground asserting that ancient peoples knew full well what a person was talking about when they said "I miss my dead wife" or "There's just been a battle with the Gauls, I'm worried about my son". — RogueAI

Picture two children stranded on a desert island with no education talking coherently about how they feel (i.e., their mental states). Are they talking coherently about brain states or neurological events? No. — RogueAI

This is wrong. Ancient peoples talked incessantly (and coherently) about their mental states. — RogueAI

Just as people do today. — RogueAI

1. Mental states are identical to brain states. (a=b)
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states.
3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states. (M)
4. Ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their brain states. (¬B)
5. Therefore, mental states are not identical to brain states (a=b ↔ (M↔B), but ¬B so a≠b).

Stella Artois for me. And I like it cold, even though it is a superior European product. — BC

And on that note, Reason is constructed by Mind through its "membership" over time. — ENOAH

taking a dim view of what he described as the Wittgensteinian “thought police” (owing to the Orwellian tendency on the part of some Wittgensteinians to suppress dissent by constricting the language, dismissing the stuff that they did not like as inherently meaningless) — SEP on Lakatos

that set of Laws/Dynamics/Process/tools including such as Logic, cause, linear movement, justification used to arrive at and settle upon a belief which is adopted as true — ENOAH

Do you really think God, soul, monad are Real I.e., not constructed by Minds over time? — ENOAH

albeit your periodic table is a human construction; an example not of physical things in Reality, but of how we construct that in human Mind. — ENOAH

What do you mean by the Real world? — ENOAH

Physical things — ENOAH

Is Reason a thing outside the Real World? — ENOAH

What things are real (not as in, accessible to our perception--but ultimately real) and not physical? — ENOAH

I'm suggesting Reason is constructed — ENOAH

how does this causal sequence generate a knowledge between the two, the brain on the receiving end and the sofa on the other? — Astrophel

There you are, there is your lamp or coffee cup; so ask, "how does that get in my head at all so that I know it?" Light waves are not lamps. Nor is brain chemistry. This should be clear. — Astrophel

What I meant by "For something to be true, there must be a reason why it is true" is if something is the case, there is a reason why it is the case, there are causes that took place in the past for the current subject-matter to be true — aside from brute facts. — Lionino

"The cup has a handle" is true if and only if the cup has a handle. — Banno

If you don't believe in free will, then you can't intentionally fulfill your obligation, it's just happenstance — QuixoticAgnostic

but if you truly believe its not your choice, then you can't claim praise or blame — QuixoticAgnostic

the adoption of non-physicalist or supernatural beliefs have been associated with maladaptive coping strategies such as avoidance or escapism, that is, through ‘spiritual bypassing’ (Welwood, J. Toward a Psychology of Spiritual Awakening (Shambhala, 2002)., Masters, R. A. Spiritual Bypassing (North Atlantic Books, 2010)., Kornfield, J. After the Ecstasy, the Laundry (Rider, 2000)., Hayes, S. C. A Liberated Mind (Avery, 2019).)

If free will exists and you don't believe in free will, then you are wrong, and worse, deny your obligations. — QuixoticAgnostic

The problem with utilitarianism is its need to universalize the concept of pleasure. As Hilary Putnam writes of Dewey’s critique of utilitarianism: — Joshs

He says due to the fact it is difficult to translate "aletheia" into the English word "truth" — Corvus

He also points out the word "aletheia" had been used by Heidegger to describe the character of the world. — Corvus

If you believe in an absolute criterion of the true and the real, and the rest of the world fails to be properly guided by your absolute, you won’t consider your blameful condemnation and rejection of that world to be unjustly moralistic, conformist and restrictive. If, on the other hand, you don’t believe in absolutes, you are in a much better position to avoid moralistic condemnation and rejection of others to begin with. — Joshs

Can't be done, simply because there is nothing in the apodictic principle that an event in the world requires a cause that can deliver an "aboutness" in the mind TO an object. — Astrophel

The closest ancient Greek word for truth is "aletheia", which can be analysed etymologically a (negation) + lethe (concealment, forgetfulness, escape) = aletheia.
It doesn't quite reflect a word for truth, does it? — Corvus

So how is it that causality makes for a connection that satisfies the conditions for knowledge? — Astrophel

All one has to do is examine causality for what it is, and it becomes clear that causality doesn't deliver knowledge — Astrophel

has no business simply assuming "P is true" without itself having justification, and this too would require justification, and it never ends — Astrophel

Perhaps when we talk about the strenght of belief we don't have something in absolute terms, like "X is 95% sure" and "Y is 15% sure", but a hierarcy or relation, where the surest propositions (if there are such things) are defined as 100% and the most evidently false (a bachelor is a married man) as 0%, and every other belief is measured in reference to those two. I prefer the latter. — Lionino

A parallel tradition, though never as dominant, holds that degrees of belief are neither so precise, nor as definitely comparable as suggested by Pascal's probabilistic analysis. Keynes (1921) famously proposed that degrees of belief may enjoy only an ordinal structure, which admits of qualitative, but not quantitative, comparison. Keynes even suggests that the strength of some pairs of partial beliefs cannot be compared at all.

Cohen (1980) traces another minority tradition to Francis Bacon's Novum Organum (1620/2000). On the usual probability scale a degree of belief of zero in some proposition implies maximal conviction in its negation. On the Baconian scale, a degree of belief of zero implies no conviction in either the proposition or its negation. Thus, the usual scale runs from “disproof to proof” whereas the Baconian runs from “no evidence, or non-proof to proof.” In the past few decades, Baconian probability has received increasing attention, resulting in theories approaching the maturity and sophistication of those in the Pascalian tradition (Spohn, 2012, Huber, 2019). — SEP

Pretty much exactly that. — Noble Dust

but I've seen enough of these spaces to be quite confident that there are a decent core of people for whom Evola and Guenon are "serious business." — Count Timothy von Icarus

How does that affect an editor's responsibility for deciding what to print and what to avoid? — Vera Mont

major banks and law firms participate in illegal tax evasion — jkop

11 hours later ... Damn dude, that's a lot of time to Google for an answer. — Vaskane