and the base of the identity is one's own memory of the past — Corvus

So, to you, if someone loses their memory, they simply die and become another person?

The only logical analogy I can come up with is that my soul had existed sometime in the past prior to my birth, and it encountered the places and situations in the images and people in my dreams. The only logical conclusion I could come up with is that all these contents of my imagination and dreams are my recollection of my past lives. If they are not, where else could they be from? — Corvus

Are you actually saying that or this is some figurate speech I am not picking up on?

Anyway, it is here that Descartes (1) equivocates the meanings of substance (ouisia in the Aristotelean terminology) with the everyday sense of the term (a material with uniform properties) — Wayfarer

I don't think Descartes makes such a mistake. He refers to the stone as a substance as res extensa, not a substance as in matter, atoms bond together in three dimensions.

I’d cite the abundance of veridical near death experiences as evidence of the soul and an afterlife. — Captain Homicide

I would say that does not follow logically.

I will also say that I read on an online discussion today, that the mind-body dualism of Descartes makes the problem of consciousness harder than it really is, and writers like Heidegger give us better tools to deal with it. I have never read Heidegger. Is that true?

If one gets into the mindset outlined, and if, for example, here tersely outlined, one chooses to understand space as distance-between identities and time as a duration-between a) causes produced by identities and b) their effects/consequences—further deeming that space and time when thus understood are logically inseparable—then, spatiotemporal continuity is part and parcel of there being coexistent identities (in the plural). No coexistent identities—as is said of Moksha or of Nirvana without remainder or, in the West, of the notion of “the One”—then, and only then, one would derive there being no spacetime. — javra

I see. If I am not mistaken, that is Kant's view, that space and time are relational properties and not something in themselves. Modern science has taken a different direction, where space and time are substances that stand by themselves; but, as with (almost) everything in science, it is not set in stone, and it does not touch the metaphysical by definition.

Here isn’t an issue of which came first or of which is more important but, rather, that coexistent identities logically necessitate spacetime (when understood as just outlined, and not necessarily in a physicalist sense) — javra

Is it not the inverse? Going by the first quote, it seems that space and time arise from objects, so space and time would need objects and not the other way. I feel like this could be a semantic nitpick on the way you phrased the statement; if it is, ignore it.

In parallel, if one as a conscious being experiences a new percept, one as the conscious being addressed will itself continue through time unchanged — javra

That is fair, but, ¿in this view of consciousness, when can we say it starts? And if we have a person as a five year old, is it the same consciousness as the same person 80 years later with advanced dementia (may it not happen)?

This instead of identity consisting of individualized quanta-of-identity that are perpetually obliterated and (re)created over the course of time. — javra

Right, that was what I was thinking of. Now, do you think that, if the nature of time is continuous (and time here would be not relative but an independent substance/dimension within which bodies exist), it would favour a process philosophy view of consciousness, and if it is discrete it would favour quanta-of-identity, or that there is no correlation?

Did you have something else in mind other than the bifurcation of possibilities just specified? — javra

No. You broke it down very well. Thank you for your thoughts, they helped me organise my own.

My affinities are with process philosophy, so to me it is a continuation of ontic being as regards both the ship and one’s consciousness. — javra

Cool, I have a friend who just got his doctorate in Process Philosophy.

Is this another episode of Yankees pretending they are European, when they are the most African country outside of Africa and a few Caribbean islands, and the most Jewish country outside of Israel?
I don't see anything European there, I only see another iteration of when Haitians killed all the French colonists and started wearing their clothes.
Yes, the "West" is Canada, Burgerland, and maybe Australia. But let's not pretend those are European.

The issue here is metaphysical, there is nothing in the physical world, I am quite confident, that will tell us "this is a person's essence". Neurons do not fulfill that task, for reasons such as neuroplasticity and the fact that their material composition does indeed change every time they undergo an electric pulse — like DNA, it does not change as much as our hair, but it does change. The reason why I made this thread is to address whether a metaphysical essence even exists, or whether the question even makes sense.

I say “context-relative” because two different ships will hold the same functionality as ships, but their functionality will not be the same in terms of their immediate spatiotemporal contexts. — javra

So I guess that, beyond functionality (final cause in Aristotelian terms), spatiotemporal continuity is also important?

but if a person were to so drastically change in terms of context-relative functionality, we will often state that they are not the same person they used to be, as is sometimes the case for extreme cases of dementia — javra

Right.

I think that, for everything you said, it addresses a semantic and epistemological side of identity very well. That is, what it means when we call X, X. That is a side that most answers here chose when approaching the question.

One side that has not been exactly addressed so far is the phenomenological, subjective side. Besides any labels or linguistic aspects, are we now going to persist through time to the next second or is our consciousness going to finish and be replaced by another consciousness (someone else) with the appearance of being the same person as before due to memories? Are we gonna die in the next second, or is our conscious experience persisting across time?, is basically what is being asked. Now after thinking I wonder whether that question even makes sense, but maybe someone will bring it to light.

Also, I quite liked your art. The way you use gaps and separation on the canvas is something that I have never seen before.

Something can change continually and still maintain an identity, can't it? In fact, isn't that what every compound being is doing? — Wayfarer

In so far as hammer XYZ remains hammer XYZ and does not become dolphin ABC because we identify it as such because of its material arrangement and spatiotemporal coordinates, maybe yes. Hammer XYZ at time t and hammer XYZ at t+1 (it did not move positions) are only different in that they are at another point in time. If we assume the passing of time does not kill identity, hammer-XYZ(t) and hammer-XYZ(t+1) are the same. But what if it moved? They now have yet another difference, besides temporal distance: spatial difference. Let's say it also does not destroy identity. What keeps identity? Maybe the material composition of the hammer.

Now, if we took "one atom of wood" from the hammer and replaced it with another atom of wood second by second, in such a way that eventually all atoms were replaced. I believe most people would say it is still the same hammer. How is that so? We must find something that makes them the same. I struggle to find one single thing that establishes identity with hammer-XYZ at the beginning and at the end of the atomic replacement. If anything, it must be that both are the object of this action of atomic replacement. But then that would make it no different from another hammer which also undergoes the same process at another place and time. Even if another identical hammer underwent the exact same process in the same space but at another time, they would not be the same hammer if that hammer does not ultimately come from the original hammer. It seems that spatio-temporal continuity is an important part of identity. Moreover, we also identify hammer-XYZ(t) and hammer-XYZ(t+1) as the same because it is useful to do so.

But then we turn the attention to the thing that identifies, the thinking being. It is a common debate whether the person coming out of the teleportation machine is the same as that that walked in or if it is someone else with the exact same memories, as the spatio-temporal continuity is broken. When it comes to consciousness, is it not interrupted temporally (and spatially as well technically) when we go to sleep? You could argue that consciousness does not fully cease once you go to sleep, but only when your brain dies and thus you as well.

Therefore, even if time is discrete/discontinuous, should we believe that the person walking into time t+1 and the person walking out of it are the same? Is there really such a thing as spatio-temporal continuity in discrete time, and is it enough to account for identity?

If Buddhists are asked whether the person who is born as a consequence of past karma is the same as the person in the previous existence that generated said karma, the answer you'll often get is, not the same person, but also not different. Identity is like that. — Wayfarer

A tourist in Malaysia is trying to find the way back to his hotel. He sees a local monk and asks him in the little Malaysian he learned how to get there. The monk starts saying something about a rock and a bird. The tourist demands "How does that help me get back to my hotel?". The monk calmly shakes his head with a smile and walks away.

This is also one of the primary sources of Descartes' ontological argument, is it not? That because he is able to conceive of such a perfect being as God, then it is inconceivable that this God could not exist, as non-existence would be an imperfection. — Wayfarer

If you are asking whether the Third Meditation is the source for one of his ontological arguments, yes, you can find it there. The Meditation itself is titled "That God exists". And though I don't see his proof as being phrased quite like you did (in fact it does not involve perfection as imagined but the causal origin of perfections he finds in himself), it is something along those lines we can say.

That there is or isn't an agent who persists through time, such that he or she sets in motion acts that they will then reap the consequences of at some time in the future. The sense in which this agent is or is not the same from one moment to the next, is the point at issue. — Wayfarer

Yes.

I feel that the argument that the agent is illusory must fail at the first step, as illusions are suffered by conscious agents, who mistake one thing for another. — Wayfarer

I was not quite arguing that the agent is illusory. I think that cogitō ergo sum is perfectly valid and even essential if we are discussing consciousness and personal identity. What I am putting in question is whether the agent at time t is the same as the agent that perfectly proceeds that one temporally and spatially in time t+1.

Like synapse between neurons. — JuanZu

That would be a part of the whole as it is physical.

I never said so. That is what your posts entails. If "consciousness" is semantic nonsense, all the philosophers of mind around the world who treat it as a real metaphysical problem must be confused. You can make the case for that, I myself don't think every academic field is valid, but I am simply wondering if you know that that is what your belief entails.

I have updated the OP to specify what I am looking for.

What relationships? If by relationship you mean the differences between them, I don't see how that factors into identity, since a carbon and a helium are different not in the relationship of their parts but in the number of parts. If by relationship you mean interaction; in a physicalist worldview every interaction is mediated by a physical mean, so that relationship itself would also be a part.

Yep, this excerpt specifically:

And though I were to suppose that I always was as I now am, I should not, on this ground, escape the force of these reasonings, since it would not follow, even on this supposition, that no author of my existence needed to be sought after. For the whole time of my life may be divided into an infinity of parts, each of which is in no way dependent on any other; and, accordingly, because I was in existence a short time ago, it does not follow that I must now exist, unless in this moment some cause create me anew as it were, that is, conserve me. In truth, it is perfectly clear and evident to all who will attentively consider the nature of duration, that the conservation of a substance, in each moment of its duration, requires the same power and act that would be necessary to create it, supposing it were not yet in existence; so that it is manifestly a dictate of the natural light that conservation and creation differ merely in respect of our mode of thinking and not in reality. All that is here required, therefore, is that I interrogate myself to discover whether I possess any power by means of which I can bring it about that I, who now am, shall exist a moment afterward: for, since I am merely a thinking thing (or since, at least, the precise question, in the meantime, is only of that part of myself), if such a power resided in me, I should, without doubt, be conscious of it; but I am conscious of no such power, and thereby I manifestly know that I am dependent upon some being different from myself.

I had in mind self-regulation, homeostasis and metabolism, so my point holds — Janus

And how is metabolism a metaphysically important process while the wooden planks shifting around is not? What makes it special from all the other processes in nature?

Also identical twins are not the same person because they do not inhabit the same space or have the same experiences. — Janus

Right, so then DNA is not the deciding factor then.

He argued that since semites included a broad group of people, not merely Jews, the issue was incoherent, a non- starter. — Tom Storm

The issue is incoherent by definition if you are not talking about discrimination against semites.

I don't bring up the topic of eurocentrism and start talking about Polish nationalism. Even if relevant, it is not the topic of the discussion. I don't how much more clearer I can make this. Again, open a dictionary.

Much of it set out by that Tsarist text, the aforementioned Protocols, which as recently as 2012 were referred to in Greek Parliament as evidence of a structural Jewish conspiracy — Tom Storm

The Greek parliament also has its Zionist and pro-Jew members. Does that mean there is structural Zionism in Greece? You really betray your intentions whe you say the Protocols were used in the "Greek parliament" to prove a Jewish conspiracy. To anyone interested in what Tom is lying about, he is referring to Ilias Kasidiaris, who is basically a pariah of Greek society, not representative of any "structure".

And remains the model for most antisemitism — Tom Storm

Protocols of Elders of Zion does not talk about semites as far as I know, only about Jews, so it would not be the case.

So all the philosophers of mind that research consciousness are simply confused?

I just did skimmed through it, through this link. The definition given here would not exclude the wooden ship from being self-organising, as even sand in a dune would be self-organising.

If all the cells in our bodies, in organisms generally, contain a unique DNA sequence that defines them then that is different than the 'ship of Theseus' — Janus

Not all cells of our body have DNA, such as red blood cells. And some cells have different DNA, such as haploid cells. DNA expression is also different depending on the tissue you are taking the cell from.
DNA can't be used as the essence of a human being, otherwise two perfect twins would be the same person, and Hisashi Ouchi would be a different person after the radiation blast that destroyed the genetic content of the cells in his body, but I doubt that you, or anyone defending personal identity, would agree to that.

I don't think the same criteria for identity that apply to self-organizing systems such as biological organisms are relevant in the case of ships. — Janus

Why is that, if we are both physicalists?
And if it is a relevant part of your argument, I also wonder what defines self-organizing and how it makes something persist through time. Is the a wooden ship also not self-organizing insofar as the wooden planks move and twitch and compress and crack around to make room for the contraction and expansion that is caused by the temperature fluctuations?

A relevant strip from Existential Comics. — wonderer1

Amazing comic. It really captures the spirit of the thread, though maybe for narrative reasons it stops short of dying at every (micro-)second and instead keeps it for everytime sleep happens.

Let's consider one of the many different semitic populations: Jews.
Jews in the United States are: grossly represented in Ivy Leagues (source), overrepresented in Forbes 100 by 1400% (source), in Hollywood by also a lot (source), and many more, including congress and top military positions.
Question: how is there any antisemitic structure when this set-up came to be? Obviously, there is not, as any structural antisemitism in the United States would stop that reality from coming into being. Even if Arabs, the most common semites, were extremely oppressed in the US, Jews would be the proof that there is nothing inherently antisemitic in that society.

Non-response as expected. The core issue is that you do not know what the word "semite" really means. Consider the dictionary.

"Pragamatism" has nothing to do with asking "who cares?" questions. No pragmatist says "stop researching" to theoretical physicists and asks them to become engineers instead. Stop pretending to know about a position you cannot even spell.

Wanting to wipe out Israel does not make you antisemitic, it makes you anti-Israel or maybe anti-Zionist. Israel's population is almost 100% semitic in fact.

The image on the right was taken using film sensitive to reflected (not fluorescent) UV. The other is visible light. — Banno

The image on the right is colour-coded UV data. We are not seeing UV. Just like colour-coded gravitational fields in a computer graph is not the same as seeing gravity. We as humans completely lack the experience of UV, as it does not interact with our senses except sun burns.

I guess my response is another question- What reason should we care about that question? What experiences are you having where this is important? — Tom Storm

If you are not interested in discussing philosophy, I suggest going to Netflix instead.

That is strange, because the Middle East is itself full of semites for the most part. What structures do you see there that would be antisemitic?

On the other hand, are we not distinguishable as the entities that undergo those changes? — Janus

The issue of identifiying something as that which undergoes change is for me a very deep issue that involves, among other things, mereology and semantics.
Because of that, I summon Theseus' ship. I ask you: is it the same ship?

I’m certainly not the same entity I was 20, 30, 50 years ago. I would need a substantive reason to accept some permanent substance/consciousness that persists across the ages, above and beyond personal identity. — Tom Storm

Right. So let's say you are not the same entity as 10 years ago. {That entity from before} and {you now} are separate. We can agree that that entity from 10 years ago is no longer anywhere, it is dead or non-existent. But what stops us from extrapolating those years to days and then to minutes. Are we dying every living second? To quote OP: "what reason do I have to believe in the maintenance of the self as opposed to its constant creation and subsequent destruction and replacement by another self?".

Structural antisemitism? Where? Where are semites singled out for the reason that they are semitic, besides maybe in Iran and India?

To my mind "the hard problem of consciousness" is only "hard" for (Cartesian) philosophers because their aporia is actually still only an underdetermined scientific problem. — 180 Proof

Could you elaborate that further? You seem to be saying that consciouness one day will be fully explained by science. Is that correct?

Philosophy is a tricky subject even with my 2x primary languages (English and Korean) due to the abstract concepts the subject employs. — Corvus

Naturally, which is why the average public often accuses philosophy of being word salad. Most of the times it is not word salad, but it looks like it most of the time.

You say reading in English got comfortable for you. I am not really sure how the philosophical scene is in East Asia or in languages like Japanese or Korean. Thinking that your native language is Korean, don't you think you would benefit from reading in it, even with less material published in it? And for that I will quote Nietzsche like Vaskane did:

But how could the German language, even in the prose of Lessing, imitate the TEMPO of Machiavelli, who in his "Principe" makes us breathe the dry, fine air of Florence, and cannot help presenting the most serious events in a boisterous allegrissimo, perhaps not without a malicious artistic sense of the contrast he ventures to present—long, heavy, difficult, dangerous thoughts, and a TEMPO of the gallop, and of the best, wantonest humour?

Likewise, how could the English language, alien, communicate to you in the same way that Korean, transporting concepts to you since a child, does?

Otherwise, I, like everyone else, also read philosophy articles written in English, as many important scholars of philosophy today write in English on peer-reviewed journals. But when it comes to classics, I believe that Korean has translated more in philosophy (Kant, Plato, Leibniz) than you could ever consume.

If you care to say what languages you speak/understand, I may be able to give some suggestions. If you don't want to for privacy reasons or any other reason, that is fine.

but then I realised English is better language — Corvus

That is a great mistake. English must be among the worst languages to read philosophy in, especially compared to German with its wonderful accuracy. One obvious example being the absence of kennen X wissen distinction. Not to bring up the essential ser X estar in Iberian Latin languages. English depends almost wholly on the abuse and semantic deturpation (an example right here!) of French vocabulary in order to express more complex concepts.

Not at all. There are now in your world, some things you can doubt and some things that it is silly to doubt. I'll count that as progress. — Banno

I see now that you are not interested in having a discussion as you have nothing to contribute yourself besides pretending to be smarter than you really are on an anonymous forum.

So now the question arrises, what to doubt and what to believe? — Banno

I would suggest reading a few philosophy books if you want to come up with philosophical views of your own. I already have mine, I am just not here to discuss them. If the existence of the outside world is such a silly question, write your thesis on how Descartes or Hume were big idiots and you got it figured out and send it to Harvard for your automatic doctor degree.

Good. So, contrary to what you said before, there are things that it makes no sense to doubt. — Banno

Good, you just happened to ignore the phrase that comes after it.

You are under no obligation to participate. — Banno

I am only under the moral obligation of seeing through the hope of this leading anywhere beneficial for me. The hope dies the longer it goes on.

I would be more interested in this conversation if you actually stated a clear argument rather than smirkly saying "I am getting it" by my obviously comedic statement of throwing out philosophy.

In what way can you doubt that you are reading this question? — Banno

I cannot doubt that it appears to me that I am reading the question. I can only doubt whether this question I am reading comes from the real world and not from a projection of my mind à la brain in a vat — that is the whole point of OP.

I am sorry but your post does not justify your comment at all. It is a question that been posited as early as we know (Ancient Greece) and it has had some satisfactory answers to some but not for others. If your criticism is that there is no definitive answer, you might as well throw out most of philosophy.

What grounds do you have to doubt that you are now reading this post? How could such a doubt make any sense?

You hardly need grounds to doubt anything, that is the point of doubting.

If that's the case, though, why purport to think, or believe, otherwise, i.e. contrary to the way in which you actually live your life? — Ciceronianus

It might be the case this answer was already given here — maybe a few times. We act differently from what we believe because it is productive. But though I have no perfect reason to believe there is a truck coming on the other lane, and that my brain is not in a vat, I will still keep driving on my own lane and avoid the incoming truck.

A better example is, even though causation might be just regularity and that there is no guarantee that boiling eggs will make them edible, it is still a good bet to boil my eggs if I want to eat them.

Even if I don't personally believe in the permanence of the self, this belief will lead me nowhere, as I might be wrong and the self does actually stay through time. So I will try not to screw myself by eating junk all day. If I don't act as if I am the same person tomorrow, I won't reap any great benefits now.

To quote someone else, everyone is a realist once they walk out of the door.

Didn't you just say that a closed system is a concept which "makes an approximation of reality"? Why would you now say that a black hole ought to be treated in this way? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because, as I said, a black hole is not a true closed system when you account for Hawking radiation, which is so small that you may consider it as such, approximately.

I am ready for a descriptive explanation, if you care to give it a go. — Metaphysician Undercover

Those two are extremely basic concepts of physics which you could easily look up, why do I have to provide you with education? A concept and a theory are not the same thing at all, that is also extremely basic philosophy of science.

I stand by what I said previously. Almost everybody in this thread is completely unequipped to deal with physics beyond F=ma, especially OP. I will let this thread rest as it is a complete waste of time, even on the philosophy side, as OP is clearly what some corners of the internet call a "schizo".

I would use a dictionary for that :-P

There are energy loses, therefore the system is not truly closed. This is understood under the concept of efficiency. — Metaphysician Undercover

I used it as an example of a closed system, not an isolated system. You don't seem to understand the difference between a closed and an isolated system.

No system has 100% efficiency, therefore energy is always lost from a system. — Metaphysician Undercover

That does not answer the question.

Whether a closed or isolated system are physically possible is irrelevant as it is a concept, not a theory, which, like in everything in physics, makes an approximation of reality. The inside of an average-sized black hole may be treated as a closed system when no matter is entering the event horizon, as the Hawking radiation emitted every second or even year is nothing compared to the billions of billions of tons of mass the BH has.