I would agree with Nietzsche (here, but in few other places) that a great deal of what we fuss over issues from errors conceived out of the imposition thinking has itself created. — Constance

And religion is necessarily not that. At its core it is refuge from that. Religion is turning attention away from our imposition thinking, our knowing, including, God forbid, our Philosophies, and returning it to Truth.

That we identify that Truth as God or Spirit is only a reflection of our intuition that it is something utterly other than our imposition thinking, the place we seem to be ineluctably trapped. Though, so calling it ended up naturally getting carried off by the rapids of imposition thinking, and mythology, ritual, law and dogma surfaced.

But at its core seek Truth, all else is talk.

I think Religion is the victim of prejudice. Its like hating hockey if the NHL has serious issues. That core seeking of Truth exists in many if not all religions. And cannot by definition exist in (Western) philosophy.

When religion is authentically practiced by an individual, they express that core. They loosen, if not abandon, attachment to ego, the Subject to which imposition thinking falsely attaches. And often, they spend a lot of time in meditation or deep prayer. In these states, they are either loosening attachment to imposition thinking all together, or at least, focusing on a single imposition thought, leaving much more "space" for the Truth to naturally become the focus of one's organic aware-ing.

The essence of religion is seek truth; and it holds true in its authentic practice.

Easier said than done, though. — Janus

Totally

That is more like the Sōtō Zen attitude of ‘ordinary mind’. — Wayfarer

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly — Janus

Just sitting in Zazen is Enlightenment. "Ordinary mind," is bodily aware-ing "freed" from the displacement of projecting mind.

That's what I took Janus to mean. And that's why Schopenhauer "failed" when he misapplied some of the projections to the Will (given that the Will, for him, is ultimate reality)

yet I think the idea of the radically transcendent is of great import and meaning in human life, precisely as "the great indeterminable" — Janus

No disagreement from me, to that whole paragraph.

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly and could mean nothing to those who have not experienced it — Janus

Might even be, as in Kierkegaard's knight of faith, imperceptible to those who have not.

I'm saying the things in themselves are thought as real, but of course that for us they are noumenal, that is they are not real but merely thought. — Janus

Yes. Understood

I think it would apply to all noumena, that, if they are real, they are not merely thought, even though they may not be able to be anything but thought for us. — Janus

Ok, and I see this position commonly in various forms. I respect it and desire it. But why? Why is it that "object" referenced as noumena necessarily (if that's what you're
saying) exist beyond thought? And they must, you already accept we cannot know their form. So we are speculating about both their existence and form. We might as well resign ourselves to the fact that idea is as far as we go. If there is a reality it is utterly other than any idea we have.

sorry, last of the choppy replies.

I.e., is Kant not saying noumena, the "idea" of "things" not accessible to the senses, is as far as we go. Anything beyond noumena, any "thing" as it is "in itself" so to speak, independent of our ideas and perceptions, is inaccessible, be that a so called "apple" from the phenomenal "view" or so called God from the noumenal point of view. The limit of knowledge in its pursuit of Truth is idea (of Truth) ?

I'm just interested in your take on this. Same with my second "reply". I agree with you, insofar as the word fits; more like, you're enlightening me to more perspectives

Of course I hope you read what I said under the caveat "for Schopenhauer". I was basically asserting it to be a logical concomitant — Janus

Yes, I was agreeing, and hinting that this necessary conclusion is my problem with Schopenhauer, whether he meant it or not. But I can't believe he fully meant it. Not judging his genius. Obviously. More his context, historical, and otherwise.

not the (unknowable, unthinkable) real things in themselves as such — Janus

I understand. What are the real things in themselves? Are they just that? Real? Is it plural, as you suggested?

If we "designate" the idea of God as noumenal because we cannot know God, is then God, independent of our knowing, Real? And would that apply to all so called noumena?

Is the real not utterly inaccessible to knowledge, and that's why Kant was "right" to keep his distance?

then being must be equated/ confated with Will. — Janus

Confounded, if you ask me. But that's weirdly my limit reached with Schopenhauer. Everything "before" this Will, (that he on some levels "maligns") is Ultimate Reality or Being (because at least K had the decency to bow out), I cam stand behind, albeit with minor modifications. But not that.

If there was no free will, our bodies would run off like criminals and try to take us for a ride. — Barkon

I think, we falsely accuse our Bodies, when it is Mind which both constructed and projects gluttony.

As for running off if there was no free will, again, I think the opposite. Thank god Mind moves on a dynamic incessantly in pursuit of the most functional projection. Gluttons to the extent of criminals are an aberration in the conventional narrative. Thank god there's no free will or Mind would have gone extinct eaons ago.

yes, K. and you wouldn't say my read, though worded idiosyncratically, is inaccurate?

Your post is fascinating and compelled me. I am inspired by it to read Locke, beyond my stumbling through Anthologies. Thanks for that.

My comments are likely unorthodox and perhaps of no interest. I don't need to pursue them. But I reiterate my interest in reading on.

Yet surely leaves are an "innate property of oaks," no? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is it not more simple to recognize this is a problem which only exists in our constructions and applications of the meaning we're trying to discern? Leaves are innate to oaks. That seems to be nothing but innate. However, innate could mean something like the extremely habituated construction, so habituated it seems innate.


See directly below,

we might say that even babies show they understand some seemingly "innate" ideas. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's a place where we can see that what seems innate is just what fits the pre-fab construction. Babies may show they are aware-ing their natural environment. A smile triggers a smile naturally. That response is innate. There is no understanding using concept/idea. There is no idea. But as for once babies start understanding idea, my guess would be they have already assimilated very basic constructions. That is understanding.

If the type of enviornment that allows a human being to survive (or perhaps "develop normally") is of the type that it always produces certain ideas, then it would seem fair to call those ideas innate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am not learned on Locke. But you have definitely inspired me. So far, I agree with Locke.

In our current environment we cannot escape ideas, aware-ing has been displaced by Mind and its constructions. So you might as well call it innate.

But homo sapiens had to exist in our organic condition in evolution but before Mind had "overtaken" it with ideas. There, the truly innate would have been front and center. No preoccupation with idea: everything innate.

Now it's ideas all the way down. But I say Locke is right. They're ideas; thus not innate.

And I don't know if my understanding of innate, as in aware-ing independent of Mind, is reflected as Aristotle's "potency" and his stages of "actuality" being the constructions-then-projections of Mind, but that too is fascinating.

read the paragraphs beginning here. — Wayfarer

Why does it sound to me like K is saying, like the Body is an idea uniquely arising to the Subject, so to is the will; both ultimately, "explanations" a Subject must necessarily construct to make "sense of itself".

That object which was initially unknown became “apple”, hence to say that object is unknowable, is a contradiction. The thing-in-itself, on the other hand, never becomes anything at all, so can be said to be, and remain, unknowable. — Mww

Yes, and I meant "unknowable" as to the "in itself". Though, as you said, Apple "becomes" knowable. It is only in its construction/projection.

The thing-in-itself is not mediated, — Mww

Yes. I'm mixing terminology. It is not mediated. Hence "in itself." What I mean to say is even the noumenal, though they seem to have an existence before or independently of our constructions, are constructions.

because logic cannot be independent of our constructions, — Mww

Yes

This seems to mistreat appearance as “what it looks like” when it should be “when it makes its presence felt”. — Mww

Yes, understood.

key to the 'noumena' issue is Kant's criticism of the rationalists including Liebniz and Descartes, both of whom believed the existence of God could be proven by rational principles. — Wayfarer

Ok. Good to know that context. Makes even more sense.

Viewed in that light, and resisting the urge to 'peek behind', I think it's quite a reasonable idea. — Wayfarer

Yes, I see and agree it is reasonable.

Thank you

If noumena are mediated reality, why do we have phenomena? — Mww

First, this is currently where I'm settled. And it goes without saying, I speak without authority.

We shouldn't have noumena. Noumena, only seemed to Kant et. al. to be unknowable. But their "thing in itself" is as unknowable as that of an apple. Both are known already mediated, and there is no inherent difference in what they are in our experience. Yes, noumena are not apparent to our five (conventional to western) senses, but they are no less representations to our 6th/7th senses, image-ing/inner feeling. Though I will be corrected, loosely, I note, Vedanta based philosophies recognize these.

And regardless, any concept, including logic and reason itself, I think are part of the world mediated/represented (I like constructed/projected). "We" as in the particular form human Mind took, constructed logic no more or less than it constructed apple. And what these two are independent of our constructions are equally not knowable.

This should not reflect the hypothesis, but the best and quickest way to illustrate here is, if it arises in thought or our form of "conscious experience", it is a representation even if there is no corresponding object. So God, Souls, and Meno's triangle, are not unmediated realities that exist independently of our representations. They are "learned" constructions.

Another way to illustrate would be to turn to what is not projected, the "really real," so called because real is already a projection (as is really real, but...). It is necessarily unspeakable. I think whether you're an apple, a soul, or a human, what you really are is meaningless to ask because meaning too is projection. What you are remains in being it; not knowing it. We ask because it enhances the experience of constructing knowledge; not because it brings us anywhere close to uncovering real being.

Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses. — Mww

Is that a settlement he necessarily reaches given his empirical approach? That is, is he saying, What things are, I cannot know, so I can only express positions on them as appearances, and for those representations based upon other than appearance, I will infer only from observing their effects?

Or, is he saying reality is its effects? I.e., even if I could access Truth as knowledge unmediated, I'd say reality was the affecting. If it is this, it sounds more like Schopenhauer's Will being that which drives all activity of being. And perhaps Kant just stayed clear of that (at least in his critique of pure reason).

I could be wrong but, I don’t think Schop makes the distinction between Thing in Itself and noumenal. For schop Will is Thing itself is Noumena… — schopenhauer1

I agree. That was me extrapolating.

How do we distinguish between the unknowable and the really unknowable? — Mww

Fair question. Deliberately, yet recklessly, I created the category "really" unknowable.

My thinking emerges from these very categories I have been grappling with, in some "points" intersecting across philosophers, in other places, divergent only superficially, in still others, clearly divergent.

Currently (admittedly, possibly plain only to me), I see "across the board" the phenomenal/representational as mediated reality; the noumenal as still mediated reality; though posited as unknowable because its constructed source is ambiguous; that which remained unspoken of by Kant, and referred to as The Will by Schopenhauer, as really real (though neither philosopher made compelling arguments for how they described/why they "ignored" it.)

we understand that thing still remains as it is in itself. — Mww

Noumena is a speculative notion that are the "objects-themselves" or the "things-in-themselves" - a reference to the "entity" non-cognized, but as it is "in itself". — schopenhauer1

Does anyone know the historical first instance of this "need" for an "in itself?" Assume it is not intuitive. Was it Plato's forms and/or this anamnesis? Was it pre-socratic? If so, what form did it first take.

It seems to me that this "in itself" is a hinge by which opposing views cannot reconcile which way it closes.


ADDENDUM: I.E., why can't "concept" which have no objective appearance be habituated constructions shared and reconstructed such that initiation into Culture/ Language means input with that data.

the only realism is empirically conditioned, as opposed to that pseudo-realism which is technically only logical validity, — Mww

Direct reality”, then, reduces to a metaphysical non-starter. — Mww

a universal, from which follows that this form of the real, first, belongs to reason rather than sensibility, and second, is real only insofar as without it all a priori cognitions become impossible. — Mww

Ok. Makes sense for Kant. But seems either extremely honest or extremely convenient. I tend to think the former. I.e., noumena is unknowable enough; he won't even touch that which really is unknowable.

Fascinating on a few levels. Thank you!

and yes, I meant parable. But it felt like W. thought he was being Zen "koany"

:up: Much comfort in the Simpsons. A refuge against suffering.

but it's by a great deal more than just 'language', it runs a lot deeper than that. — Wayfarer

Ok, I can see that in his "misuse" of the koan.

Wow. That bad eh? It is funny that I bypassed him. Hah! Maybe there was a reason. Too funny. Anyway dont worry. I'll be grappling with Schopenhauer for centuries!

Witt had it right and we now have to dance around figuring out the right interpretation of the great Prophet" seems to be what's being criticized here.. Or part of it is that... — schopenhauer1

Right. No I was honestly admiring W.s statements, but would never go so far as to stop at W. I was being ironic.

Having said that, ironically, am now inspired to look further into W. I don't know why I very quickly bypassed him in my recent pursuit.

It's an exact parallel — Wayfarer

Do you know if W was being deliberate; as a matter of fact? As "homage"? As a deliberately confusing inside joke?

Hah. Seriously? I genuinely found it compelling. Again, I'm clearly a novice. Explain if you wish. Otherwise I'll keep a more critical eye out.

he had a tendency to use past philosophers simply as leverage for his own thought. Maybe all of these pieces of the puzzle fit together in an obvious way. Maybe he was self-absorbed. — Leontiskos

I know little about W's life; you are likely right he was self absorbed. To produce so much from inner reflection would create a fixation.

Could also be a legitimate way to produce more novel ideas. Since ultimately philosophy is in the activity, it must never conclude. I recognize the advantages of advancing within the restrictions of conventionally accepted pathways. The "problem" with everyone doing that is that it obviously restricts philosophy, an art which must remain active, even its audience must become artists.

Given that (if you accept it generally) if once in a while a philosopher, rather than logically following ideas and expanding upon them, is simply inspired to pursue certain unforseen paths, that might be a blessing to philosophy unattainable in the conventional
ways.

Maybe because no one underdtands (or accepts) — 180 Proof

That was excellent. Wittgenstein answers the question. The rest of us are too busy embarassed by or ignoring the answer.

For Kant, I believe, this could be many objects, a plurality of various objects. However, it cannot be known, what, if any, "being" stands behind empirical understanding. It is "X" for lack of better term for Kant. For Kant as well, it is only a concept that is gotten to by negation. It is the "not-empirical thing". — schopenhauer1

Yes that is clear to me now. Thank you.

For Schopenhauer, he thinks he can go "beyond Kant" by not just proposing that there are "things-in-themselves" behind the empirical, that we can never know (X), but rather, we CAN KNOW and very INTIMATELY what X actually IS.. and that is a monism, Will.. The very fact that we have an "inner being" (subjective experience) is for Schopenhauer proof that Will exists as this double-aspected thing that strives. — schopenhauer1

Yes, and this is also finally clear to me. S. goes beyond K at "disclosing" that "non empirical" with a "higher" status in the scheme of reality. Whereas K settles upon not accessible to knowing; S says it is the Will, the very "drive" of all being(s).

I don't think he is actually identifying the subject as Will. — schopenhauer1

I would be surprised if he was. I would think tge "Subject" belongs to representation, that "double" part of Wills "double aspect."

But finally, is therefore the most ultimate reality for S the Will? Or is there a Being of all Beings which is merely manifesting as the Will?

it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t. — Mww

Ok. Thank you. You have put me on track re Noumena.

Is there a "direct reality" for Kant? Does he even get into that?

Kant was an admitted dualist — Mww

What were the "opposing" "realities" in his dualism?

Freud, who was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, alluded to the ID as the wellspring of desire and arousal. — Shawn

Oh. Would Schopenhauer have seen the Will as Freud's ID?

If so, there is nothing redeeming in us at the root? But where does reason or rationality fit in?

Buddhanature is not any kind of entity or thing, but the latent capacity for enlightenment — Wayfarer

Understood. So for Schopenhauer there is nothing like Brahman or another monistic ultimate reality besides Will which is more like a drive? Sorry, that's what I was wondering.

then how can anything be "projected" as if it proceeds from something — schopenhauer1

Right. Words are inevitably problematic. All the more so when I do not share your knowledge of the technical. Projections is misleading. Here's an oversimpified description of the process. Representations are constructed by the Body to trigger feelings and actions. The feelings and actions are real but we are attuned to the representations as though they are real.
In the spirit of further oversimplifying, one time, hypothetically before thd hypothetical emergence of mind, the brain would construct a representation of a tiger when a certain twig snapped to trigger the Body to run. Mind is a universe of such representations.

it would make more sense that the Noumenal is simply the Representation in its other aspect, one that we cannot know. — schopenhauer1

It might. If I am stretching, then it would. If I am not, that it resolves the cannot know with the answer, well "know" is not a category of truth anyway, that's why it can't be known.

not something S. ever would have encountered even despite what knowledge of Buddhism he had, as it is part of a set of Buddhist doctrines that weren't translated until much later. — Wayfarer

Ok. Ive never considered that for Schopenhauer, yet I sensed he wasn't a Buddhist Scholar or anything even for his time. But maybe from what you've made clear, he was well versed given the resources.

Will' as a philosophical absolute, as a kind of 'blind God' (which sounds more like H P Lovecraft :yikes: ) but more as an inevitable condition of existence, something that drives living beings to continually crave to exist and to continue, without their really understanding why. — Wayfarer

Ok. Yes. You are correct to clarify. I originally "brought" his "will" into a category with Being recognizing I wasn’t being true to Schopenhauer but neglecting to be clear.

If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive?

the ordinary mode is to be caught up in the world of phenomenon, the enlightened person is the least "caught up", though still in the world, as the phenomenal doesn't just disappear altogether. — schopenhauer1

That is definitely the most Reasonable view. You cannot achieve anything outside of the phenomenal because there is no refuge in so called reality. The two are inextricably one. Thus, enlightened necessarily is enlightened as to the predicament, and willing (deliberate use) to carry on as unattached as possible (ironically using that very willing to detach from willing. A problem I see resolved differently).

But we share in the pith of it. Wu Wei.

I think we should continue that discussion. I am not sure how, but if you have ideas, I will hear it out. — schopenhauer1

:up:

it is that it is "double-aspected" — schopenhauer1

And I would see that ("double-aspected") as an "aspect" of the projections, rooted in a primeval structure, difference. Because Mind exploded once difference became habituated into real consciousness*, we have this problem to grapple with in the first place. Not this but that is recognized as the root of the projections (representations) by Vedanta/ Mahayana (I can't speak of Theravada) and Western philosophy.

What is the "nature" of this will/representations dichotomy? Right? You say "double-aspected" which is consistent with Schopenhauer and, I might concede conventional reasoning. It applies the autonomous requirement of difference. Not this but that.

I too necessarily employ the structure difference. I say there is only will, like you, but the second aspect is does not beling tobthe will. The second is Fictional (illusion) because it is projected, and it isn't what anything else is or has ever been. It is truly new and other. But has no enduring structure, just empty signs in motion triggering feeling, action, sky scrapers, nuclear bombs, and this very dialogue.


*(I'll use the language I'm familiar with. Know that I am aware of their "flaws" within the context of this discussion)

Will literally IS the illusions. — schopenhauer1

Hard pill to swallow...hence the squaring of the circle. You may be right, more universally than just this.

still don't know where Denial of Will comes into play. — schopenhauer1

One thing for sure, it can't be accomplished using the tools of the "illusion" no matter how entangled with the will. Right?

also makes no sense to say that Will CAUSED Representation — schopenhauer1

Totally agree. I thought I was framing it in a way conceding to an orthodox view. Causation is misapplied. (But there is the added problem which I concede that this applies not just to applying "cause" to any relationship with Reality, but to everything expressed, rendering all of this moot.)

Whence the illusion? — schopenhauer1

This is a far more serious problem. What resolves it for me, is undoubtedly not Schopenhauerian. A simple answer is best for now. The question may be posed as what makes the projections not just an extension of what is real? The answer is in their structure/nature(?). While the Universe is formed of matter and energy, as are all of the organisms including their brain functions, Mind emerged as something other; it is structured by Representations that now move in accordance with their own laws and mechanics (as opposed to the rest of "us" bound by the laws of nature).

I won't get into the how and wherefore of it. But for me, this epiphenomenom has an affect on our will, our natural selves, to the point of superimposing an "I" upon it. And yet, it is not Real.