This doesn't follow, unless by "limited" you mean just that: being limited by something else. — SophistiCat

By limited I mean restricted in size. Think of spacetime for example. If spacetime is restricted in size then we can reach its edges by moving in straight lines (of course if spacetime is not a closed manifold). The problem is what is beyond the edges. It cannot be nothing since nothing does not have any geometry and occupies no room. So, whatever is the beyond edges of spacetime is something. Therefore, what I said follows.

The problem I'm seeing with your approach is that you don't identify the whole as a concept. Its origin is a mental abstraction. — Mark Nyquist

By the whole, I mean whatever that exists, spacetime, material, etc.

Limits are mental definitions. — Mark Nyquist

No, it can be physical as well.

If you apply limits to infinity you no longer have infinity. — Mark Nyquist

Correct. But what is the implication of this to my argument?

I covered this in my Universal Form post not long ago if you want to understand why I object to your method. — Mark Nyquist

Could I have a link to your post?

If the whole is limitless it has no bounds. Then you introduce bounds and impose limits. What?
Maybe I can get it on a second try but why?

Nope, not getting it. W1 is no longer the whole you started with. — Mark Nyquist

What I am trying to show is that there are two cases where what you consider as the whole is either limited or limitless. If $W_1$ is limitless we reach our goal otherwise $W_1$ is limited and it is bounded by something else, let's call it $B_1$. Etc.

No, we are dealing with an infinite regress in cases where we have to posit an infinite number of past causes for something. E.g., X began because of Y and Y began because of Z and Z began because of... etc. The statement that "X exists without begining or end," does not require an infinite regress because X never begins to exist. There is nothing to regress to. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I should have said that we are dealing with an infinite regress in time if something exists eternally ("in time" was missing). By infinite regress in time I mean for any chosen time, t, there exists another time, t', where t' is before t.

This is precisely why Aristotle decides that the world must be eternal, and why so many cosmologists, even those embracing versions of the "Big Bang," theory nonetheless claim that elements of the universe must be eternal. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To the best of my knowledge, there are two arguments against the eternal universe: (1) Infinite regress in time and (2) Heat death which is the unavoidable ultimate fate of the universe if the universe is old enough.

You might attack to coherence of something existing "without begining or end," but it doesn't require a regress of explanations.

For example, you might consider the following proposition: Given we accept Euclid's axioms, it follows that all triangles will have angles that sum to two right angles (180 degrees).

Did this fact have a begining in time? Did it start to exist when Euclid developed his postulates? Or did it not exist until he had completed a proof for this proposition for each type of triangle? If the latter, and Euclid completed the proof of right triangles first, is it a true statement that at that time "given Euclid's axioms, it is the case that right triangles, but not other triangles have angles that sum to two right angles."?

Or, prior to Euclid, when earlier mathematicians empirically observed this fact about triangles, did the fact begin to exist then, even though Euclid's axioms has never been written down?

The problem here is that it seems like it will always be true that, given Euclid's axioms, this fact holds. It never begins to be true and under no conditions does it seem to become false.

Maybe we might think Euclid's axioms are rubbish, but it won't change the status of facts of the sort of "If A and I → B," where A is a set of axioms and I are inference rules, and B is a conclusion that follows from A and I.

Things like "if A = B and B = C, then A = C," do not seem to require any sort of infinite causal regress. Being logical truths, they do not require an infinite series of deductions either. Circularity is not infinite regress, we are not always going back to new reasons, but looping. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To me, the truth is objective, by objective I mean it does not depend on the mind so mathematical theorems are valid even if there is no man who could deduce or know them.

What's the alternative? An infinite past? That has its own problems. If the past is infinite then as of now an infinite period of time has completed, which seems nonsensical. — Michael

Correct. The infinite past makes no sense.

So I think that the past must be finite. — Michael

Correct.

I'm unsure if that entails that something came from nothing or if something "already" existed when time started – but then how did time start? — Michael

Spacetime simply has existed since its beginning. Spacetime could not begin to exist. That is true since otherwise we are dealing with nothing to spacetime. Nothing to spacetime is a change. Spacetime is needed for any change. Therefore, spacetime is needed for nothing to spacetime. This leads to an infinite regress.

You need the beginning of spacetime for the Big Bang to happen, I think.

You think there was spacetime before the Big Bang? — Quk

The beginning of spacetime lay either before or at the Big Bang. The material either popped into existence after or at the beginning of time or it was caused or simply existed.

Either there was never a time when there was nothing, or there was nothing and something came into existence uncaused. — Patterner

Nothing to something is impossible. This is discussed here. There are two arguments for this one from Bob Ross and another from myself.

Bob Ross's argument:

P1: If an entity is the pure negation of all possible existence, then it cannot be subjected to temporality.
P2: ‘Nothing’ is the pure negation of all possible existence.
C1: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.

P3: Change requires temporality.
P4: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.
C2: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.

P5: ‘Nothing’ becoming ‘something’ requires change.
P6: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.
C3: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to becoming (something).

My argument:

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1)

Time is treated differently in these arguments, in my argument time is a substance whereas in Bob Ross's argument is not.

Neither seems possible, but at least one is the case. — Patterner

There is another case in which spacetime exists and then either things pop into existence or thing is caused by an agent, the so-called God.

I think this topic has nothing to do with logic but with causality. To think that every event has to have a cause is just a human intuition, in my opinion, or, according to Kant, a category "a priori". Space and time are another "a priori" category. Our senses cannot detect space and time, nor causality. Our senses can just detect things. Space and time, and causality are not things. — Quk

Causality is not a thing. Whether spacetime is a thing or not is still subject to debate. You might like to read this article.

They are the prerequisite in our own transcendental mind that makes the detection of things possible for us. Just because this is the case here and now, doesn't mean that causality is everywhere all the time. Aside from that, there are acausal events in quantum physics. — Quk

I think you are talking about virtual particles. Virtual particles however pop into existence from the quantum vacuum. Quantum vacuum is different from nothing.

Also, assuming the big bang theory is correct, the bang occured without a cause as there wasn't even a time period before it. — Quk

You need spacetime for the Big Bang to happen.

Agreed, nothing cannot create anything. Nothing is nothing. It is not a 'thing'. There is a question of whether something can be uncaused, a topic I cover here if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1 — Philosophim

Oh, thanks for the reference to your thread. I will read it shortly.

Hmm, interesting hypothesis.

However, I do believe something can come from nothing in quantum physics (believe it is called the Schwinger effect, but I'm no physicist). That would mean there is a possibility of creation out of nothing. I can't logically explain why, but in rare cases something just is, without a cause (or maybe without a cause yet or without a cause knowable by us). — Double H

I think you are talking about virtual particles that pop into existence from the quantum vacuum. The quantum vacuum refers to space that is devoid of matter whereas nothing is a condition that there is no thing, no spacetime, no material,...

We have had a great many threads on this topic. In general, I think your line of reasoning works. However, proponents of uncaused existence generally argue that they do not need to claim that something ever "came from nothing." Rather, they must simply posit that something began to exist, or if positing eternal entities, that "something exists (without beginning or end)." — Count Timothy von Icarus

We are dealing with an infinite regress if something exists eternally. Infinite regress is not acceptable. Therefore something cannot exist eternally.

Beginning to exist, uncaused, does not imply "coming" from nothing. It implies that something began to exist, and that prior to its existence it did not exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, this statement is valid if spacetime exists.

Yes, you were misunderstanding. Your conception of spacetime is metaphysical, but what I was trying to explain is it is more than metaphysical -- in fact, we should start with Einstein's spacetime continuum, which consists of the three dimensions of space and the fourth dimension which is time. He posits that spacetime can shift shape.

So with that under consideration, space and time are, in fact, a physical reality. My starting point that human cognition is temporal (as well as spatial) is well within the dimensions of spacetime. — L'éléphant

It can be shown that we are living in a block universe once we accept the special relativity. You might be interested to read this.

Naturally. If your definition of nothing includes that it has no property, there are only two scenarios, it either stays as nothing (no change), or acquires a property (change), becoming something (creation ex nihilo). The first possibility is analytic because it purely follows from your definition. — Lionino

Nothing stays as nothing. But we need to show this. Bob Ross elegantly put this in an argument:

P1: If an entity is the pure negation of all possible existence, then it cannot be subjected to temporality.
P2: ‘Nothing’ is the pure negation of all possible existence.
C1: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.

P3: Change requires temporality.
P4: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.
C2: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.

P5: ‘Nothing’ becoming ‘something’ requires change.
P6: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.
C3: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to becoming (something).

Now your argument is morphing from "nothing to something is impossible" to "spacetime cannot begin to exist", which would be an argument for eternalism of spacetime. — Lionino

Spacetime has a beginning for two reasons, the current state of the universe is not heat death and infinite regress in spacetime is not acceptable. Spacetime however as you said cannot begin to exist.

P1 was just my best guess at what you were trying to convey in the OP—but it may not be. The reasoning behind P1 would be that something that is the pure negation of all possible existence would be, as per its nature, NOT something that exists and time only affects things that exist; therefore, if there is nothing, which is the negation of all possible things (hence the ‘no’ + ‘thing’), then there isn’t anything to be subjected to time. — Bob Ross

I see what you mean and I agree with you. Time simply relates different states of affairs temporarily when there is something. I think the rest of your argument follows then.

Oh, well, then, your argument would need to clarify your metaphysical position on time and space; which sounds a bit like you believe (1) time and space are substances (which I deny), that (2) they are united (which I deny), and that (3) nothing be subject to space-time (which I agree with if I grant the previous two).

The problem, though, is that this doesn’t negate the possibility of things that ‘pop into’ existence with no reason behind it. This just implies that there isn’t anything a part of nothing. — Bob Ross

Well, that is the subject of debate to the best of my understanding. So let's put it aside for now as your argument follows so we don't need my old argument.

That is fair. I would say, more generally, that there’s nothing incoherent with positing the actual temporal sequences of things as simply the form or mode by which one experiences and thusly they are not substances in reality. — Bob Ross

I see.

Then I don’t see how your argument holds: a change from nothing but not a change in nothing does not violate that “there is no spacetime in nothing” because the change is ‘outside of’, or ‘beyond’, the nothing—it is in something that the change occurs: there exists something in which there is no X, and then X poofs into existence out of thin air. — Bob Ross

Correct. I agree with you.

Yeah, it’s a real pickle. Honestly, I lean back and forth between block universe and transcendental idealism style nihilism on time and space; and both are subjected to your worry here.

If we are representing reality to ourselves via our representative faculties, then doesn’t that imply a temporal process? I would say no, and this leads me to a much stronger agnosticism on the ontology of reality than I would suspect you are willing to accept.

Take traditional transcendental idealism (i.e., Kantianism): if space and time are purely the modes by which we intuit and cognize objects, then it necessarily follows that however we are representing, truly as it is in-itself, objects to ourselves is completely unknown to us other than indirectly via our [human] understanding of that process (which is inevitably in the form of space and time). — Bob Ross

I see. Thanks for the elaboration.

Just for background on this topic:

Mathematical theories are supported by mathematical proofs.

Physical theories are support by the preponderance of the physical evidence and are subject to revision.

I'm just pointing out a tricky situation you need to think about. The known end point is that physical matter does exist (now). So does some start point of nothing existing have any basis in physical evidence?

As I said, as mathematical objects something does not equal nothing. — Mark Nyquist

As I discussed this before considering that something exists right now implements that the initial condition cannot be nothing. One however needs to prove change in nothing is not possible as I did. We also can conclude that nothing to something is not possible as well once we conclude that change in nothing is not possible.

Let me phrase it this way: Nothing to something involves spacetime. Spacetime is the result of nothing to something. Spacetime is there, so a change occurred. The only way I can see this not making sense if you want there to be spacetime before a change can happen. But that wasn't your premise. You can change it now if you would like, but then you have to prove that spacetime cannot come from nothing. And as I noted, I don't see either of us having any proof of this, and I think I put forward some decent logic why this doesn't fit with the rest of your premises either. — Philosophim

Well, to show that we are dealing with an infinite regress I just need my premise: Spacetime is needed for any change.

And that's fine. At this point you've made your points, I've made my counterpoints, and there is nothing left to add. Its been a nice discussion on this. :) But I think we've made up our own minds so all that's left is to agree to disagree. See you around elsewhere on the forums Mok! — Philosophim

That is alright to me. I am not here to change peoples' minds but to argue what I think is correct and enhance my thinking. :wink: I hope to see you elsewhere in this forum.

And what is change? When something loses, gains, or changes a property. Everything with a property is something. By your definition of nothing, it cannot undergo change. The argument then becomes analytic, which is uninformative. — Lionino

Well, that is correct that we normally use the term change when the properties of something change. The condition that there is nothing is however different from the condition that there is something. I don't know what other term I can use if not change.

If you grant that nothing somehow undergoes change, a property is attached onto a substance that was not there previously and thus we have creation ex nihilo, which is counter to your original argument that nothing can't become something. — Lionino

No. The creation ex nihilo is not possible. That is true since we are dealing with a change, nothing to something due to the creation, and we need spacetime for this change. Spacetime does not exist in nothing. So we need spacetime in the first place. But the creation of spacetime from nothing is not possible as well since in this case, we are dealing with an infinite regress. That is true since spacetime is needed for the creation of spacetime.

So we either have an analytic statement or a refutation of your thesis. — Lionino

Neither.

Ah, ok. I think you missed this point I made before, so I'll point it out again.

You never said we need spacetime BEFORE a change can occur.
You said we need spacetime FOR a change to occur. — Philosophim

Yes, I never said before but for.

Nothing, then a change to space time, has spacetime. — Philosophim

What do you mean? I believe something is missing in this statement.

Saying you need something before you have it is a contradiction. Cake must exist before cake can happen for example. :) I wish I could have my breakfast before I make it, but sadly, that is not life. — Philosophim

Correct. :)

Then we've invalidated the conclusion that a change cannot happen from nothing. Let me break it down.

A. Spacetime has a beginning.
B. Spacetime is required for change
C. Since no change can happen if spacetime is not involved, there was nothing before spacetime.
Conclusion: A change in which there was nothing, then spacetime, had to have happened. — Philosophim

We have been through this. I disagree with C.

Okay, but I think it's an open question if physical nothing is possible and your own conclusion argues against it. — Mark Nyquist

Considering that something exists right now then it follows that nothing is not the initial condition if that is what you are trying to say.

Where is the infinite regress? If we don't need spacetime before spacetime (as this sentence doesn't make any sense), and go from nothing to spacetime, how is that infinitely regressive? — Philosophim

We need one thing in here, nothing to spacetime needs spacetime. We start from nothing and ask ourselves how we could have spacetime (let's call this spacetime ST1). This requires the existence of another spacetime (let's call this spacetime ST2) since we agreed that nothing to spacetime requires spacetime. So we cannot have ST1 without having ST2. In the same manner, we cannot have ST2 if we don't have ST3, etc.

And if this is the case, then what was around if spacetime did not exist? Nothing. — Philosophim

Yes, if we don't have spacetime we simply have nothing. Why? Because physical entities or things occupy space.

Since you stated that you have to have spacetime for change to happen, there must have been nothing before spacetime. — Philosophim

This we already discussed it. There cannot be nothing before spacetime since it leads to a contradiction.

In 13.8 billion years of the universe there has never been a time when a physical nothing has ever existed. Is that right? — Mark Nyquist

Correct.

Are there special cases? — Mark Nyquist

No.

Mentally we can conceive of nothing but that is the only place it ever comes up.

So in the logic of nothing to something you are dealing with two mental abstractions only. Isn't that the only scenario? — Mark Nyquist

No, nothing could exist as a physical condition where there is no thing. It however follows that nothing comes from nothing as wisely stated by Parmenides.

P1) Time is needed for any change
P2) There is no time in nothing
C) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible

Is logic expected to work the the same way on mental abstractions as it does on theories of physical matter? — Mark Nyquist

I think the physical theories must respect the logic.

Is there a way to resolve this? — Mark Nyquist

What do you mean?

Right. I never agreed that we need spacetime before a change can happen. I agreed that we need spacetime for a change to happen. — Philosophim

Correct. But the only thing that I need to show that nothing to spacetime leads to an infinite regress is that we need spacetime for any change to happen.

Mok, go over the sentence again carefully. You're saying it cannot begin to exist, but it has a beginning. That doesn't make any sense. Can you get what you intend without making a contradiction like this? — Philosophim

Well, I have to elaborate on what I mean by begin to exist then. By this, I mean that spacetime didn't exist and then exists.

No, but spacetime happened after there being nothing, so we have a change, and we have spacetime. In your case we have the start of spacetime. — Philosophim

You agreed that nothing to spacetime is a change. Don't we need spacetime for this change? If yes, then we need spacetime for nothing to spacetime. This leads to infinite regress though.

But there is spacetime. Nothing, then spacetime. A change has occurred and it involves the start of spacetime. Unless you're saying spacetime cannot start? If spacetime cannot start, then it has always existed. But that contradicts your previous statement that an infinite amount of spacetime cannot have existed previously to our own time. How should we resolve this? — Philosophim

Sure there is spacetime. Spacetime cannot begin to exist though. Spacetime simply exists, in this sense is fundamental, and has a beginning.

Currently what should be said is: "That point is a point in spacetime for two reasons: It is a point (point in a variable) and it is before the beginning of spacetime."

As you can see, the above contradicts itself. I cannot be both a point in spacetime, and before spacetime. — Philosophim

Yes, it is a contradiction. See below.

This is a contradiction. Something cannot both be a beginning and not a beginning.

Keep trying! Lets see if these contradictions can be resolved. — Philosophim

Yes, that is a contradiction and that is my point. I was trying hard to take you to the point that you see the contradiction. It is improper to talk about a point before the beginning of spacetime since that point is again a point in spacetime and therefore is the beginning of time.

That is correct but a more direct way to prove this would be to show that "nothing" (nothingness) is already not possible logically anyway. If I think that nothingness exists, I still think it, so there's at least a thought, not nothing. And if I think that "nothingness exists when I stop thinking about it", then this statement is purely unverifiable. — LFranc

I would be happy to see an argument for nothing is illogical physically.

Yes, and I made two points you'll have to consider.

1. We have nothing, then spacetime. — Philosophim

Yes, but you have to wait for it. I am trying to counter this simply by saying that nothing to spacetime is a change.

Change happened with spacetime. — Philosophim

Sure, but there is no spacetime in nothing therefore change from nothing is not possible.

2. There is nothing in your argument that proves nothing cannot come before spacetime. — Philosophim

Sure there is. Nothing to spacetime is a change (you agree with this). Any change requires spacetime (you agree with this too). Therefore, we need spacetime to have nothing to spacetime.

Before the beginning of spacetime? Lets assume yes for the argument. — Philosophim

That point is a point in spacetime for two reasons: It is a point (point in a variable) and it is before the beginning of time. Simply there is a temporal change from that point to the beginning of time. This means what we call the beginning of time is not really the beginning of time but the point that we agree on its existence is the beginning of time. This is however problematic. If that point refers to a condition that there is nothing then we agreed that there is no spacetime in nothing so we have a problem here since that point is the beginning of spacetime.

Now (1) in the OP is

P1) Time is needed for any change

can be adjusted by simply specifying that the topic of discourse is change over time. — Banno

Yes. I can adjust the premise to Time is needed for any temporal change. Thanks for the correction and the contribution.

but then what of (2)?
P2) Nothing to something is a change
— MoK
Needn't someone simply say that the change from nothing to something is then not in the topic of discourse - that it does not occur over time? — Banno

This premise is the second premise of the old argument. I don't need that anymore unless I want to make a reductio ad absurdum argument. Here is my second argument which has one hidden premise (HP)

P1) Time is needed for any temporal change
P2) Nothing to something needs a temporal change in nothing (HP)
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, temporal change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1)

Please note that Bob Ross also developing another argument.

Seems this needs addressing. Arguably, the beginning of time is not a change over time. — Banno

I cannot follow you here. What do you mean by "the beginning of time is not a change over time."?

I see. Here’s my understanding of it in syllogisms (and let me know if I am misunderstanding): — Bob Ross

Thank you very much for your input and the discussion which was very informative for me.

P1: If an entity is the pure negation of all possible existence, then it cannot be subjected to temporality.
P2: ‘Nothing’ is the pure negation of all possible existence.
C1: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.

P3: Change requires temporality.
P4: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to temporality.
C2: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.

P5: ‘Nothing’ becoming ‘something’ requires change.
P6: ‘Nothing’ cannot be subjected to change.
C3: Therefore, ‘nothing’ cannot be subjected to becoming (something).

Firstly, I underlined ‘entity’ in P1 to denote that this sort of entity is not something but must be analyzed as if it were: it is the incoherent positing of something which is itself nothing—and there is no way, in language, to say it otherwise. Analyzing ‘nothing’ is a tricky endeavor. — Bob Ross

I see what you mean. I however have a problem with this premise. I don't see how "then it cannot be subjected to temporality" follows. Do you mind elaborating?

The way I conclude that was based on two assumptions, spacetime is a substance and there is no spacetime in nothing.

Secondly, this whole argument rests on time (i.e., temporality) being identical to motion—which I have my doubts. I don’t see anything incoherent with positing that literally movement/motion is only a biproduct of how we represent the world and not something that is happening in the world as it is in-itself. — Bob Ross

Well, to me motion is a sort of change in which the position of an object changes so to me motion is not identical to time.

Thirdly, the crux of the argument is that in order for nothing to become something, nothing must change. I am fine with this, as long as you define nothing like P2. — Bob Ross

I would say that there must be a change from nothing rather than nothing must change.

Fourthly, and most importantly, none of this proves that it is logically impossible for nothing to become something. — Bob Ross

I see what you mean.

This is what I just spoke of with respect to time being identical to motion (in the sense of actual movement). I personally would go for a metaphysic of time where the temporal ordering of things is real (i.e., exists in reality mind-independently) but that the motion we experience is just a biproduct of the modes by which we intuit and cognize objects. In other words, I literally envision reality in-itself as a motionless web of relations, of which one of those relations is temporal ordering, and our brains-in-themselves are interpreting them, from the standpoint motionlessness, into motion. As odd as that may seem prima facie, I think there’s sufficient philosophical and scientific reasons to believe this. My point is just to give you a counter position to digest and chew on. — Bob Ross

I think you are talking about the block universe (correct me if I am wrong). I however have a problem with the way you describe motion from a motionless thing. Mainly our brains are parts of the universe so how can we perceive any change considering that everything in the universe, including our brains, is changeless?

(1) Time is needed for any change and (2) Time is a substance.

I reject 2.
2) According to general relativity, time is a component of spacetime. Spacetime is a substance though. By substance, I mean something that exists and has a set of properties. Spacetime's property is its curvature. Two phenomena confirm that spacetime is a substance or in other words confirm general relativity, namely gravitational wave and gravitational lens.

I think general relativitiy works fine without that metaphysical assumption. One can posit that temporal relations are real but that they exist as a giant block (a time block) (or even a space/time block) and, as such, the literal motion you experience is no where to be found—but the relations governing that motion are real.

If one goes the #2 route, then either (1) everything is in motion and extension or (2) space and time, as substances, exist in a void. #1 is less parsimonious than positing what I said above, and #2 is absurd. — Bob Ross

Well, there is extensive literature on the nature of spacetime and whether it is a substance or not. You may like this article.

But if spacetime appears, we have spacetime. If you're saying we need spacetime before spacetime, that doesn't make any sense. The only thing you've noted is that we need spacetime for other changes besides spacetime itself. You have not proven, only asserted, that spacetime cannot come from nothing. That doesn't work. Prove it, and you have an argument. If not, you're stuck. — Philosophim

I already argue that spacetime is needed for any change and you agreed with it. What is left is whether we can agree that nothing to spacetime is a change or not.

Its not an assumption, its a logical conclusion based on your point. If you say spacetime has a beginning, and spacetime is the only way for other things to change, there can only have been nothing before spacetime. You can't win on this one Mok. If you say, "Begin" that implies there was something before. If there was not something before, then nothing was before. And if you say something was before, then it looks like something can cause spacetime to appear. And if that's the case, what is that something? So either way, you cannot prove that something cannot come from nothing with your current set up. — Philosophim

Could we agree that there is no point before the beginning of time? Yes or no.

Well, this has proved to be a contentious issue, which is to me somewhat puzzling. There are plenty of folk hereabouts who will agree with you, but I am not one. I see no reason not to say that changes can occur across distances, as well as times. And I think the mathematics and physics back up this approach, since we can calculate change over distance (Δx/Δy) for various things, and we have the physics of statics, Hook's law and so on.

I'd be interested in why you think this to be the case. — Banno

You are correct. We could have changes in a thing in space such as temperature, pressure, and the like. By change here I mean temporal change rather than spatial change.

The argument seems valid. The issue is that many premises are doubtable. Is it even possible — or rational — to talk nothingness about and what properties it has? "There is no time in nothing" seems to mean absolutely nothing without further elaboration. — Lionino

To me, nothing is a condition that there is no thing, no spacetime, no material,... There is no thing in nothing therefore nothing does not have any property. I don't know how I could elaborate further on nothing. I can answer other questions however if you have any.

None of this is new to me, but you have still failed to provide a link to backup your claim that spacetime is a substance. That is what I would like a link to. — Sir2u

To me, spacetime is a substance because it affects the motion of other objects and light. It also carries energy in the form of gravitational waves. There is extensive debate and literature about the nature of spacetime and whether it is a substance or not. Perhaps you enjoy this. I studied this article a long time ago and had a hard time grasping all its content. I hope you do better than me.

Please note that I renewed my argument because of a hidden premise (HP). Please find the new argument in the following:

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing (HP)
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1)

Yes. :) And the above still applies. — Philosophim

Well, if nothing to spacetime is a change then we need spacetime for it! That is true since spacetime is necessary for any change.

If there is no point prior to spacetime (remember, you noted earlier time cannot exist alone, its a property of spacetime) then there is nothing. — Philosophim

No, please see below.

But spacetime is a substance, and has the property of time. You can't say spacetime existed before time. — Philosophim

True, and that is the problem. Saying that nothing exists before the beginning of time assumes that there is a point at which nothing exists at that point.

Right, but as its been noted, that's your conclusion. If you assume the conclusion is true, you haven't proven the conclusion is true. Its just a belief at that point.

With how you've defined everything, you've worked yourself into a corner. You can't have something before spacetime, which means that nothing was before spacetime. And you can't have infinite amount of time that has passed prior to now, which means spacetime couldn't have always existed. But keep trying! — Philosophim

Let's see how our debate proceeds in regards to nothing to something is impossible.

No, I don't think so because what you've concluded is that we need spacetime for other changes besides spacetime. You haven't proven that spacetime itself cannot come from nothing. We could also say change must involve spacetime. Nothing to something is a change, and it involves spacetime. — Philosophim

We have to agree whether nothing to spacetime is a change or not. Yes or no?

This is assuming the conclusion is assuming the conclusion is true. This is classical logical fallacy called "Begging the question". If the only way your premises work is if you assume the conclusion is true, then nothing has been proven.

I think it was a good start, but you've reached the logical end with the premises and definitions you've put forth. I'm not saying you shouldn't keep trying, but at this point you'll need a new tact. Either new definitions, or a revision of premises is required. — Philosophim

Actually, I have two strategies to argue that it is improper to say what is before the beginning of time: (1) There is no point before the beginning of time. If there was such a point then it means that spacetime exists before the beginning of time so what we assume as the beginning of time is not the beginning of time and (2) Nothing to something is impossible which is the subject of discussion.

Please provide a link to this information. As far as I know it is nothing but a concept used to refer to points in time in space. But I an interested in viewing anything you have to further my knowledge. — Sir2u

Well, that is a lot of reading but here you go (what I quote and write may be enough):

1) Introduction to general relativity

General relativity is a theory of gravitation developed by Albert Einstein between 1907 and 1915. The theory of general relativity says that the observed gravitational effect between masses results from their warping of spacetime.

2) This, gravitational lens, explains how a massive object bends light from a distant source as it travels toward an observer.

3) Gravitational wave

Gravitational waves were later predicted in 1916 by Albert Einstein on the basis of his general theory of relativity as ripples in spacetime. Gravitational waves transport energy as gravitational radiation, a form of radiant energy similar to electromagnetic radiation.

Trying to throw in some extra vocabulary doesn't solve the issue. Lord knows its a common tactic among many on the forums. :D We should be able to explain everything in simple terms. Simply put, if your conclusion is part of your premises "that something cannot emerge within nothing" then its not a viable argument. Remember as well, time cannot exist on its own, so we always have to be referencing spacetime as well. Spacetime is a substance, not emergent. — Philosophim

Ok, I can simplify this even further. I think we can agree that spacetime is necessary for change. I think we can agree that nothing to spacetime is a change as well. This means that we need spacetime for this change, nothing to spacetime. But there is no spacetime in nothing therefore nothing to spacetime is not possible.

Again, the added vocabulary and sentence structure does not negate the simple fact. There was either something, or nothing. If you claim we cannot reference before spacetime, that means there was nothing before spacetime. If you claim spacetime always existed, then we have an infinite regress. There is no third option, just a desire that we not pick one of the two. 'Nothing' and 'something' are binaries. If there is not something, there is nothing. If there is not nothing, there is something. — Philosophim

Well, non. :) I said before that nothing to something and nothing is before the beginning of time are sides of a coin. If we accept that there is nothing before the beginning of time then it follows that nothing to something is possible. That is what I am trying to prove, nothing to something is not possible. So if we agree that nothing to something is not possible then it follows that it is improper to say that there was nothing before the beginning of time.

We don't usually write the implication backwards. C ⊃ T.

But, in the absence of further clarification, I Understand ↪MoK to be making the claim that time is necessary and sufficient for change, hence T ≡ C. — Banno

I think the correct statement is that time is necessary for change. By this, I mean that there cannot be any change if there is no time.

I think this an incorrect assumption, and that time can pass without change. — Banno

You are correct. Time can pass without any change (for example in the state of heat death).

But again, I think the whole framing of this issue here is misguided. Logic does not allow us to derive anything that is not in the assumptions, and hence logic alone cannot deduce the existence of god or of a first cause or of something never coming from nothing. A logic does not have ontological implications outside of whatever presumptions that logic makes.

Logic is just a way of talking clearly. — Banno

Thanks. I get your point. I couldn't argue anything without those premises.

Nothing to something is F, change is C, nothing is n, time is t.
P1) ∀x(C(x) → t)
P2 is a repetition of P1. — Lionino

I see what you mean.

P3) ∀x(F(x) → C(x))
P4) n → ¬t
C1)
C2) ¬∃x(F(x))

This the best that I managed after a few tries, but I can't write C1, so C2 is likely troublesome too. — Lionino

Thank you very much for putting in the effort to convert my pseudo-syllogism into a syllogism.

So my argument looks like this after your correction:

P1) Time is needed for change
P2) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1)

I can define nothing as a condition that there is no thing, no spacetime, no material,...