I think that there are definitely more parts of philosophy that have more practical value than others. For example, Epistemology, philosophy of science, Ethics, Political Philosophy, etc. would all be much more pragmatic and should continue to be studied.

However that's not to say that the other branches are not important at all. If we want to search for truth, then we can never discount anything.

Philosophy of mind, metaphysics, etc. can all be very useful and help us search for truth.

But no, philosophy in general is no mindless babble, since it is what got us stuff like science. And the claim that philosophy is mindless babble is also philosophy. There's no way around.

I don't actually find the first two arguments in my OP that good. By that I mean that it's still compatible with Direct Realism. I just gave them to see what others would think.

I second Flannel Jesus' question.

Like I have mentioned many times before, Indirect Realism is no more skeptical realism than Direct Realism is.

All skepticism is is the logical possibility that what you experience and what is real do not correspond.

This seems to be as much of an issue for you as it is for me.

So, we will both appeal to the same solutions and answers to skepticism.

I added that assuming they are part because I haven't provided any justification for this belief.

Yet I do believe that I have good reason to think that they do correspond to the external world. My response to skepticism would be no different from yours, I assume.

My point was merely that, assuming that we have adequately dealt with skepticism, Indirect Realism would not cut us off from the external world as much as you seemed to describe it to.

I get your concerns, but ultimately, on Indirect Realism, we’re not wholly cut off from the world.

I disagree with the characterisation. Our perceptions are directly linked to the world(assuming they are), but we are directly linked to our perceptions.

hmm to my understanding the Indirect Realist would say that they are looking at mars, but directly experiencing something that looks like mars, their perception of mars.

But I get your point. I really still don't 100% understand what direct realists mean when they say that they directly experience mars.

I think that consciousness is more than just sensory faculties.

I think it's more apt to say that the mind makes up the consciousness, but even then qualia and intentionality play a big role in them, but a rational agent is needed to be able to consider and think about these qualia.

So, I disagree with you dare.

Unless we want to say that philosophical zombies without the mind[regardless of whether or not it's a physicalistic or dualistic or idealistic mind] are conscious.

I would have to say no to that question, but tentatively.

I think that ultimately we can't know with complete certainty, as it is possible that our memories are erased once we wake up and we really do just stare into the void for an average of 8 hours, for me 3.

But certainty is not necessary for knowledge.

If we go with it from a purely a priori standpoint, it's probably more likely than not that we are not conscious during that time. Just from phenomenological conservatism alone.

If we want to use Ockham's Razor, then we would have to argue whether or not it is more simple that our consciousness ceases or not. If I were to just examine the two claims point-blank, then I would probably say that both are equally complex, so our justification for both would be equal.

Now, I think it's best to appeal to some empirical data here, not that I'm an empiricist, necessarily. And see what the whitecoats have to say about this matter.

Actually, I would like to rephrase what I said.

What we see is the external world, that is, what is represented is the external world. But we do not directly perceive the external world. Not to say that what we perceive is not the external world.

Thanks for the helpful article! I will take a look at it, as part of my reading list.

Ok, so there are a few things I may need clarification on, since I suspect that we agree a lot more than we think.

I assume that cognition means conscious awareness of.

In that case, my view would be very similar to semantic direct realism.

I will say that I don't really know what it means for us to directly perceive external objects, in terms of ontology. I will try to provide a few arguments against this once I properly understand the view.

Once again, thanks for taking the time to respond. I appreciate you helping me learn.

Why do you think a "dream" cannot be a perception of the real thing? — Quk

First, I think that if something is real, it actually exists in the external world. Since things in dreams do not actually exist in the external world, they are not real. So whatever we perceive in dreams cannot be real, as I defined.

Can you describe the properties of such a distinction? Are there different colors, smells, sounds? If so, which ones belong to the real thing? — Quk

I think that this illustrates my point. There isn't any distinction.

Thank you.

I get that this topic is pretty big, so there's going to be many different viwes, and if you ask me, after reading the thoughtful responses given here, I am starting to suspect that this is more of a framing and semantics issue than anything else.

I still think that Indirect Realism is the best way to describe what occurs, but that's probably because of my other epistemological and metaphysical views, like dualism and internalism.

Of course, I will do more reading. Also, I didn't mean to mischaracterise Direct Realism, as some here have pointed out. I understand that it's much more nuanced and far less naive than what I mindlessly typed in the OP.

Thanks for the response. I actually thought that I would slowly take my time to read then give thoughtful replies[not that this reply isn't thoughtful], but your original comment confused me a little bit.

Indirect Realism is not any more skeptical realism than Direct Realism is. I address this in the OP itself.

And Indirect Realism is a form of Representationism. I hold that what we see corresponds to the external world. Just that what we see is not the external world.

There are separate arguments to show why it is much more likely than not that the external world is real.

Thanks for all the responses, everyone! I will do much more reading before writing the article! I will heavily consider and weigh each of your responses and read through your sources.

Also, I was recommended Dr. Mike Huemer's book on Direct Realism as a good defense of it. Would it be profitable to do so?