The point is, you blustery gust, is that your philosophy doesn't mean shit when we are discussing Nietzsche's philosophy. :wink:

You're silly, an interpretation doesn't mean taking something to not even a legitimate bastardization, and then declaring what people think of Nietzsche's will to power is a misnomer because it doesn't fit your flavor.

There are good interpretations and bad. Your interpretation is terrible.

That would be like me saying the word German word Kaufhaus in English is a building of free charity. Get real.

I really didn't want to do this, but the reply feels relatively indignant especially with that dogshit you wrote at the end there attempting to insult my intelligence with the whole dogshit on sensible interpretation. So, we're going to axe that notion right here. And we will discuss why you're full of nonsense.

Your biggest mistake is trying to assume that your perspective is Nietzsche's own. You're taking your concepts and putting them into Nietzsche's as if what you think is what Nietzsche own thoughts were, as if Nietzsche said it... No, thats your wrong understanding of him. Instead of attempting to understand Nietzsche's perspective you let your own process of reification ruin it by distortion of his thoughts into something you can understand. Massive No No.

For Nietzsche the wiil is something that drives, it is a multiplicity of several drives. A drive isn't something we control, it's not exactly a desire, though a desire can form from not fulfilling a drive. So first and foremost, we can see the will to something is already a sensation.

So let us for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical": let us say that in all willing there is firstly a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition "AWAY FROM WHICH we go," the sensation of the condition "TOWARDS WHICH we go," — Nietzsche, from BGE § 19

Secondly we can see that in his first few aphorisms of BGE Nietzsche talks about the will to truth, or the will to delusion, thus there are a multiplicity of drives/wills and thus we can represent this Will to X. In your little dream world you equate Life and Pleasure to Power. And for Nietzsche this is an absolutely grotesque equation that he himself would despise as a hedonistic lastman nihilist. For the Last man has the WILL TO LIFE as his greatest drive. And the Hedonist has the Will to Pleasure as his greatest drive.

Make no mistake, Nietzsche's greatest examples of highest men are the beasts of prey who live life dangerously...

Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman—a rope over an abyss.

A dangerous crossing, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous trembling and halting...

...The man looked up distrustfully. “If thou speakest the truth,” said he, “I lose nothing when I lose my life. I am not much more than an animal which hath been taught to dance by blows and scanty fare.”

“Not at all,” said Zarathustra, “thou hast made danger thy calling; therein there is nothing contemptible. Now thou perishest by thy calling: therefore will I bury thee with mine own hands.” ...

...For to-day have the petty people become master: they all preach submission and humility and policy and diligence and consideration and the long et cetera of petty virtues.

Whatever is of the effeminate type, whatever originateth from the servile type, and especially the populace-mishmash:—THAT wisheth now to be master of all human destiny—O disgust! Disgust! Disgust!

THAT asketh and asketh and never tireth: “How is man to maintain himself best, longest, most pleasantly?” Thereby—are they the masters of to-day.

These masters of to-day—surpass them, O my brethren—these petty people: THEY are the Superman’s greatest danger!

Surpass, ye higher men, the petty virtues, the petty policy, the sand-grain considerateness, the ant-hill trumpery, the pitiable comfortableness, the “happiness of the greatest number”—! — Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Do not bother attempting to ever correct me on Nietzsche again, especially since you think he was calling for Nihilistic Hedonism... No, that is your own will. Your misnomer of Nietzsche's will to power is his greatest disgust...

Another failure in consideration is that the beast of prey to be incited to the heights must overcome themselves in their opposite... So they temper their destructive capacity with the opposite extremes.

People have never asked me as they should have done, what the name of Zarathustra precisely meant in my mouth, in the mouth of the first immoralist;...
...Have I made myself clear? ... The overcoming of morality by itself, through truthfulness, the moralist's overcoming of himself in his opposite—in me—that is what the name Zarathustra means in my mouth. — Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Fatality, 3

From there we move to BGE 200:

The man of an age of dissolution...
...the finest examples of which are Alcibiades and Caesar (with whom I should like to associate the FIRST of Europeans according to my taste, the Hohenstaufen, Frederick the Second), and among artists, perhaps Leonardo da Vinci. They appear precisely in the same periods when that weaker type, with its longing for repose, comes to the front; the two types are complementary to each other, and spring from the same causes. — Nietzsche BGE § 200

... so let's back up a bit...
The will is a sensation...
So what is the SENSATION OF POWER?
THAT ELECTRIC FEELING OF EXCITEMENT...
The lightning that runs down your spine.

All of this aligns with Nietzsche's thought...
yours is indeed the massive lack of sensible interpretation.

Here's what Quine says about it in Pursuit of Truth Chapter 3 Meaning § 20:

"The difference between taking a sentence holophrastically as a seamless whole or by taking a sentence analytically term by term proved crucial in value matters. It is crucial also to translation. Taken analytically, the indeterminancy of translation is trivial and indisputable. It was factually illustrated in ontological relativity by the Japanese classifiers and more abstractly above by the proxy functions. It is the unsurprising reflection that the divergent interpretation of the words in the sentence can so offset one another to sustain an identical translation of the sentence as a whole it is what I call inscrutability of reference."

Basically meaning isn't tied to words, but the interplay of terms within the whole structure of the sentence. Hence there can be multiple valid translations all with the same final meaning (because the way the words reference each on in the structure of their translations equate to the same)...hence reference is inscrutable... because it's always changing.

I literally just used what you taught me in conversation... someone throwing a red herring in a debate because I mispoke on an accusation but didn't change the outcome of the conclusion either way...

Guy tried to say
"It's hard to have basic consistency with you, I'll be Kantian by the time I'm done."

I responded with "You're throwing out red herrings because you're afraid of answering the question cause you'll invariably have to use what I said originally and you tried to refute... and I had a discussion today that allows me to smh at your perception of Kant..."
And proceeded to dunk on him some more with what I mentioned on Berkeley and what you mentioned about Kant. That was a lot of fun ty!

He was, but I'm not very read on him, so it was an interesting insight. I'll be getting around to writing a large piece about Nietzsche here soon that will actually break down some of his trains of thought on certain topics in a pretty straight forward fashion.

I appreciate that answer as it gives quite an informative reference towards Nietzsche's "Will to Power," and what he had been considering.

So, while it is an empirical fact that universe pre-existed conscious beings, the way in which it exists outside of, or before, conscious beings is unknowable as a matter of principle, as the knowledge we have of it, which is considerable, is still held within that intellectual framework. — Wayfarer

What does this imply about the body then?

No, it comes from the Samuel Johnson anecdote, which is described in the OP. — Wayfarer

I was referring to that event in the OP. Apologies for the poor clarity there.

You're doing it, right here, right now...
There is no right or wrong approach to it truthfully.

The inherent limitations of logic allow for it to collapse inwards upon itself forming a self-referential (fractal, more or less) cave (Godel). I'm of the mind Berkeley was a bit of a fan of Heraclitus and his doctrine of opposites.

Logic can't produce evidence but it can rationalize it. Immaterialism is a practice of the mind's ability to rationalize. For Berkeley, this was more of a way to do mental push ups to strengthen his ability with empirisism. Berkeley doesn't consider the external world any less real. The people who take it that far and get frustrated by it fall in to his little mental game/exercise and I could rightly see him chuckling to himself in a fit similar to a mischievous child pranking the minds who perceived his works on immaterialism too literally. Berkeley's immaterialism was an exercise in overcoming of oneself in their opposite in my opinion. Much like Nietzsche and Zarathustra...

Have I made myself clear? ... The overcoming of morality by itself, through truthfulness, the moralist's overcoming of himself in his opposite—in me—that is what the name Zarathustra means in my mouth — Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Why I am a Fatality § 3

.

Isn't this where the colloquial "go kick rocks" comes from? We say it to those who don't "get the picture" in otherwords. Absolutely hilarious to me picturing Berkeley in his jamjams muttering and cackling to himself "go kick rocks..." as he's writing down some ideas he knows will put a twist in someone's britches...

Though, interesting to me is that it seems Berkeley focused heavily on the opposite ends of the Apollonian spectrum. Where as Nietzsche's balance was between the Apollonian and Dionysian.

The point of the original post is we can be 100% certain of the sensations we experience but we can not be 100% certain of the cause of the sensations. — Art48

Have you tried analytic philosophy? A good deal of it is about overcoming this very notion which means very very little in the grand scheme of things. Fact is you cannot be 100% certain wtf is in your mind is your own either...

To assume so, just means you're a solipsist as per Wittgenstein's account of solipsism.

Cause thoughts come when they want and not when you wish they do. Which means something can be feeding you everything including fake experiences.

More or less, the mind isn't the end all be all. "I can't be certain this tree is a tree." Okay well, when you figure it out let me know mate.

The whole matrix solipsism thing is just like... "were really still discussing this ?" / simulation theory

Such a boring scifi gimmick imo.

And Newtonian mechanics are true, btw. His work isn't something you just get to toss aside cause you're a solipsist. You're quite bound by the mechanics he points out. Try going against them, you may not find yourself living very long...

But isn't "life and pleasure" far better than FELLING of power? Without life, there is no power, no sensation. Just nothing and blankness forever. That can't have anything to do with feeling of power or Good. What about pleasure? Isn't it what life is all about? — Corvus

Hey, just cause Nietzsche details his values doesn't mean you can't hold life and pleasure at a higher value. Nietzsche equates life to the will to power. So for him, it's like saying "Life" but "Life" in those moments when you get that sensation of lightning.

Nietzsche's a tricky little bietzche like that.

Renaming the apple.

We can start with Thus Spoke Zarathustra Prologue Section 3 that expresses the sensation caused by the "Lightning" through reification we can empathize with the notion of a "lick of electricity" if you've ever been electrocuted even from the slightest bit such as licking a D Battery:

Wo ist doch der Blitz, der euch mit seiner Zunge lecke?

From there we can move to something like The Antichrist Aphorism 2 what is good? Everything that is the FEELING of power.

2.

Was ist gut? – Alles, was das Gefühl der Macht, den Willen zur Macht, die Macht selbst im Menschen erhöht.

Then we can simply ask ourselves what is will? A desire, a potential, a stimulus within us, a sensation of something prejudged within us something we can predicate ourselves in.

Ah, very well, please permit me the time to produce a detailed (but straight forward) account for you, if you would. This way I give a more complete picture rather than leave you with questions since you're eager to challenge me for them.

I happen to find that comment hilarious cause its precisely the type of reification Quine is talking in the Inscrutibility of Reference. Through incipient reification you created a wedge into understanding Quine from your own bias.

The electrical sensation of that often comes in pleasure and life affirming activities. That sensation that runs down your spine when you feel empowered. That doesn't mean idolize a will to live a "long life of pleasure...", the last man seeks a long life of meaningless pleasures. This is why Nietzsche doesn't object to tyranny and especially self tyranny, to build a discipline, is but an art form to Nietzsche.

No, actually the will to power is a sensation above all, and certainly suggesting it is "Will to Life and pleasure," is the misnomer...



More than just one man wrote basically more or less that same notion, the question is why are you looking for it?

My girlfriend's sock was pulled off her foot in such a way that it looks like the head of a dead pig. I'd reckon there's more philosophy there, than in this entire post...

Perhaps the question ought to be who really has the time to "love" so many people if one is successful in loving one's own self?

Nice assist, appreciated.

Not necessarily. And just repeating the same argument just repeats the same fallacy. *shrug* I don't need to repeat the same rebuttal, as it still stands.

Of course it is, it suffers from the is-ought leap of logic, you'd need an additional premise that connects the initial descriptive with the final prescriptive. "We should increase existence" is not logically supported by the premise.

Except the argument you made is from presupposition on "what is good" among quite a few others. Which if we're going into logic ... well, let's not forget that fallacy.

Opinions change overtime, and well, could you imagine a time where there is too much existence?

I read the OP. I find it a suitable adaptation of "Selflessness is Selfishness." People that don't enjoy it probably just don't like the idea of "Objective Morality."

The question here is are some philosophies "more true" (objective) than others? — Benj96

Fact is: the populace determines how "objective" something is in reality.

Is existence good? — Benj96

That's subjective. Which for Philosophim, it is. All philosophies are the prejudice of the philosopher who creates them, and although this isn't a philosophy, it could be the root of one. All philosophies are "wrong" in a sense that they are produced out of a limitation of life experiences beheld by its creators.

Fair enough, but I suppose the biggest issue with all philosophy is that any philosophy is the prejudice of the philosopher who admits them. Therefore every philosophy is not "right" or "wrong" in this regard as they end up building a world view for themselves. The strength of any interpretation comes from how closely it follows the philosopher's own point of view on these prejudices. Even the interpretation that occurs from the text to the reader in the text's native tongue.

Philosophies are all just modes of thinking that other people tend to adopt. Especially when a certain mode resonates with their own experiences and prejudices.

More than one person has come here suggesting this post is you projecting your difficulty with the material upon others. That's probably worth noting.

Basically if I wanted to understand from Wittgenstein's point of view, wouldn't I stay within Wittgenstein's framework? Rather than assuming from some point external to Wittgenstein's framework?

For example, in the "Was Schopenhauer Right" thread or whatever the full name is, people are using Schopenhauer quotes to clarify Schopenhauer's position... Even @schopenhauer1 is guilty of clarifying Schopenhauer with Schopenhauer, which seemingly makes him the butt of his own criticism? It's okay for him to do but not others. This whole thread seems like a pointless argument to establish "Superiority."

Is it not the same with nearly any philosopher? If I wanted to clarify Schopenhauer's position, would I quote Plato's or Descartes'?

At a glance I can tell it will be an interesting read. But I must run along and chase my wild hounds elsewhere at the moment! I'll be back, but I see why you directed me here "existences."

If existence is inherently good then that would mean, as something fundamental to existence, perspective is also good, which means the only objective morality must be to respect the subjective over the objective, which means one must build many bridges.

I cannot remember a single time in Nietzsche's work where he references a pluralist idea or notion of truth. Not a single time; in fact, he thought it was nonsense (just like pretty much every other philosopher out there). — Bob Ross

I'm sorry that you feel that way, but here, allow me to demonstrate a few times that he does:

Ecce Homo;

first section of Why I Write Such Excellent Books:

I am one thing, my creations are another... But I should regard it as a complete contradiction of myself, if I expected to find ears and eyes for my truths to-day: the fact that no one listens to me, that no one knows how to receive at my hands to-day, is not only comprehensible, it seems to me quite the proper thing. I do not wish to be mistaken for another—and to this end I must not mistake myself. — Nietzsche

first section of Why I am a Fatality:

I refuse to be a saint; ... But my truth is terrible: for hitherto lies have been called truth. The Transvaluation of all Values, this is my formula for mankind's greatest step towards coming to its senses—a step which in me became flesh and genius... — Nietzsche

Beyond Good and Evil section 231:

In view of this liberal compliment which I have just paid myself, permission will perhaps be more readily allowed me to utter some truths about "woman as she is," provided that it is known at the outset how literally they are merely—MY truths. — Nietzsche

I like to use the metaphor "everyone dies alone" as a thought experiment that can aid in the clarity, and it informs upon Amor Fati too. The metaphor "everyone dies alone," implies that dying, despite any physical presence of others, is an inherently solitary experience. Noone can truly share or fully partake and understand another person's death experience. The metaphor emphasizes the idea of existential isolation, which reflects a broader existential reality of our individual lives: that we too are truly isolated, no matter how close we may feel to another, we can never truly understand all of another's life experiences that has lead them to who they are at a given moment in time.

This is one of the reasons why Nietzsche says "what is great in man is that he is a bridge."

And since Existential Isolation is a topic spoken about by several philosophers, I'm doubtful that you're capable of seeing beyond your bias without someone prying it open. So I bid you and your objective world good day for I've not come here to suffer from THAT old wives' tale.

“my truth”, “your truth”, “their truth”, etc. is patently incoherent; and no legitimate philosopher will back that kind of idea because they know it is nonsense. — Bob Ross

We are just different, you and I, I find Nietzsche to be a legitimate philosopher. Though he is quite a complexity I suppose.

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross

Again you're not explicitly framing the statements in the context of moral subjectivism. Moral subjectivism holds that moral propositions have no objective truth values independent of individual belief. So my subjective belief doesn't mean I believe it's a universal value. You see you're stuck in this objective "True" or "False" mode. There isn't a "True" or "False" to a subjective moralist. You have your way I have my way, but as for the right and correct way, that does not exist.

They're all the same argument, or it seems that way to me, and that's why I was getting at your bias definition for belief and truth. I'm not suggesting that having a bias is bad, but there's not an inconsistency in moral subjectivism once you get beyond the notion of "True" and "False." If I came to you and said your belief is false because it's not my truth, then I'm being objective.

Why take that sick child to a hospital if you know that God can make him whole? — Vera Mont

Why did Kevin Kostner crawl away from his medical treatment in the beginning of Dances with Wolves?

Yes but from your bias on truth being objective, you're conflating that a moral subjectivist would conflate their truth as objective fact with #2 hence you find it inconsistent. You're equating Moral Subjectivity to Moral Objectivity which a person who is a morally subjective wouldn't do.

Ironically, Dawkins still made God the center of his universe ... but this isn't the case for all Atheist.