When I mention "facts", I just mean facts related to the treatment of animals and those that indicate we could easily avoid the concomitant suffering by all stopping consuming animal products. So, the "ought" I am talking about is a softer one, as it really only functions in the presence of (what I believe to be reasonable) suppositions consistent with those facts. — ToothyMaw

Perhaps. Could you elaborate further on this point?

You would have to provide one of these arguments, as I can't remember coming across any arguments against veganism that really seemed all that decisive. — ToothyMaw

True. I'll look for one later today, and if I can't find any, I'll just make one up for the sake of argument and for the purposes of this conversation. I don't have one ready at the moment : )

If one can imagine, or grant, that animals can suffer in ways similar to us, then one can rightly compare humans and animals at least insofar as the capacity to suffer is concerned. And if you do that, it kind of follows that we shouldn't, say, throw lobsters into boiling pots of water if they can consciously perceive pain like a human, if at least partially because we wouldn't do that to a human or something else that could consciously perceive pain. That is to say, if the experience of being boiled alive is consistent across animals and humans, we can establish a baseline that indicates which actions are more or less acceptable without dubious comparisons.

So, I'm not saying that animal suffering is as important as human suffering, or that the two are qualitatively identical, but if you grant that animals can suffer, often really intensely, then it should be as obvious that animal suffering is undesirable as it is that human suffering is undesirable. If you accept that and what I wrote above, then I think veganism follows without comparing humans and animals in fallacious ways. — ToothyMaw

I definitely agree that lobsters should not be boiled alive. But in this part of the conversation, another stock character jumps in, I call him the "Lawyer of Ethical killing". What that guy says is that if you kill animals in an ethical way, then it is ethical to consume them. This argument is usually used by "Ethical fishermen". They will tell you that fishing is OK, but that other fishermen are "doing it wrong" when they simply leave a helpless fish to suffocate after successfully catching it. They will say that as soon as you catch a fish, you have to insert a knife into its brain (it's as gruesome as it sounds). That, is ethical killing according to the "Lawyer of Ethical Killing". So (he wants to conclude), the activity of fishing is an ethical activity, which means that fish can be consumed in an ethical way. What would you respond to that character, the "Lawyer of Ethical killing"?

Hi @ToothyMaw, thank you very much for your contributions to this Thread, they are much appreciated.

Disregarding 3), our answers to 1) and 2) are mostly different because you seem to hold some reservations about whether or not universal vegan claims can be made in the presence of skepticism about veganism's true moral correctness. — ToothyMaw

Perhaps, though I'm not sure if I would phrase it like that. Can you elaborate on that point, please?

As for 3), I didn't do any research and just said what came to mind, and I think your answer is better in some ways. — ToothyMaw

Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. I'm not sure. At this point in the conversation, it might be useful to cite other people besides just the two of us. Maybe Peter Singer says something in Practical Ethics, but since I haven't read that book myself, I wouldn't know.

I would view the large number of ethical theories in a similar way. Some are more or less rigorous and plausible, and able to be universalized, even if each of them might resolve the question of what is right and wrong in their own way. So, just because something could resolve the question doesn't make it the best choice, or even one of the best choices. — ToothyMaw

I'm not sure if I understood this. Can you please elaborate?

This seems to indicate that if there is a selfish theory of ethics that is sufficiently supported, then we ought to adhere to it, as it seems wrong to just retreat to other less supported theories because we don't like selfishness. — ToothyMaw

Here is where I disagree. If the evidence in favor of a "selfish ethics" in the style of Ayn Rand is nothing more than Richard Dawkin's book about the selfish gene, then I have the right to ask for two things: a better selfish ethics, and better evidence in support of it. That's just for starters. I then need to see a definitive solution to Hume's is-ought problem. Furthermore, I then need to see why selfish ethics are better for everyone in general (i.e., for society at large) than non-selfish ethics. Finally, I then need to see if selfish ethics are better for non-human animals than non-selfish ethics. Until all of that is delivered, I have no obligation to support an ethics of selfishness, in any way, shape or form.

edit: your reasoning seems more linear than I would expect and appears to be pre-loaded with some ideas, such as the idea that the existence of many ethical theories means one has no obligation to adhere to any one theory due to its merits. — ToothyMaw

Perhaps. Can you please elaborate on this point?

Thanks again for everything, @ToothyMaw!

"New Materialism" wise, I think this latter emphasis is why you can lump Deleuze in with the "correlationist" stereotype, if you read him as another philosopher of total social mediation. — fdrake

Not quite. Meillassoux explicitly says in After Finitude that Deleuze is neither a weak correlationist nor a strong correlationist, his philosophy is instead "subjective metaphysics".

It depends on which brand of New Materialism you prefer.
For ‘negative’ new materialists like Graham Harman (Object Oriented Ontology) and Quentin Meillassoux (Speculative Realism) nature can be thought independently of the sociois, since matter is independent of or withdrawn from thought. — Joshs

Graham Harman is not a materialist, @Joshs, nor is Object Oriented Ontology a kind of materialism. Harman is against materialism. He has an article (which is a really good read, BTW, even if I don't agree with it) called I Am Also of the Opinion that Materialism Must Be Destroyed. He has been an immaterialist ever since his first book, Tool-Being.

Does he need to use those words? — Tom Storm

Yes, he does, because a rigorous, technical author such Kant, who likes to coin specific philosophical terms, or otherwise re-conceptualize technical terms that already existed in his time, needs to be specific when he speaks. Otherwise, he leaves things up to interpretation, which exactly what his scholars have been doing ever since, and which is exactly what we're doing right now.

The moral principle that it is one’s duty to speak the truth, if it were taken singly and
unconditionally, would make all society impossible.

Please understand that Ethics and moral principles are not the same thing, just as Aesthetics and artistic principles are not the same thing. Aesthetics is the branch of philosophy that studies artistic principles (among other artistic topics), and sometimes may even offer some aesthetic principles. What is the difference between an artistic principle and an aesthetic one? The latter is philosophical, while the former is not, or at least not to the same degree. By comparison, Ethics is the branch of philosophy that studies moral principles (among other moral topics), and sometimes may even offer some ethical principles. What is the difference between a moral principle and an ethical principle? The latter is philosophical, while the former is not, or at least not to the same degree.

One's duty to speak the truth is a moral principle. By contrast, the categorical imperative is an ethical principle. To say that one has the duty to speak the truth is to say a mere triviality. To argue for it, to the best of one's philosophical ability, is a daunting task for any philosopher, because morality itself, as we ordinarily understand it, contains some degree of semantic vagueness (at the very least). It is much better to propose a formal Ethical theory, in which the semantic vagueness of ordinary language is reduced. This is a source of potential contradiction between the moral ideas and the ethical ideas of an author who, like Kant, has something to say about what is right and what is wrong, from two different points of view: the point of view of morality, as the common person understands it, and the point of view of ethics, as the philosopher understands it. So perhaps it's no coincidence that Kant does not mention the categorical imperative even once in his On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives

But what do I know? I'm just an anonymous forum person.

But that source doesn't mention the categorical imperative even once.

For people that still don't know what the fuck we're even talking about in this Thread, here's an explanatory video of what Earth Crisis means (well, what it meant, anyways) to the hardcore punk / heavy metal scenes way back in the day.

Recall this? Philosopher Alain de Botton says Brisbane offers 'chaotic ugliness' — Banno

I'll take his word over yours. "Chaotic ugliness" sounds like a fascinating concept.

Yes, directly addressed; yes, hard to read, and it says….don’t lie. Ever. For any reason. IFF your intent is to be a moral agent in possession of rational cognition, and practical reason. Which is…everyone.

“…. To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any expediency….” — Mww

There is not a single mention of the categorical imperative in Kant's On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives. Don't take my word for it, take a look for yourself. Use the search tool and type in "categorical imperative", or even just "imperative", you won't find a single instance of it. Is he alluding to the categorical imperative without mentioning it? That's a different animal of a discussion, I would say.

Furthermore, check out Varden's article from 2010, which begins with the following words:

Kant's example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant's philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it is always wrong to lie—even to a murderer asking for the whereabouts of his victim—and that if one does lie and despite one's good intentions the lie leads to the murderer's capture of the victim, then the liar is partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If this is correct, then Kant's account seems not only to require us to respect the murderer more than the victim, but also that somehow we can be responsible for the consequences of another's wrongdoing. After World War II our spontaneous, negative reaction to this apparently absurd line of argument is made even starker by replacing the murderer at the door with a Nazi officer looking for Jews hidden in people's homes. Does Kant really mean to say that people hiding Jews in their homes should have told the truth to the Nazis, and that if they did lie, they became co-responsible for the heinous acts committed against those Jews who, like Anne Frank, were caught anyway? Because this is clearly what Kant argues, the critics continue, his discussion of lying to the murderer brings out the true, dark side not only of Kant's universalistic moral theory but also of Kant himself. We get the gloomy picture of a stubborn, old academic who refuses to see the inhumane consequences of his theory, and instead grotesquely defends the inhumane by turning it into an a priori, moral command. In this paper, I argue that Kant's discussion of lying to the murderer at the door has been seriously misinterpreted. — Helga Varden

Furthermore, there is Hannah Arendt's refutation of Eichmann's appeal to Kant's categorical imperative. Essentially, Eichmann fails to understand the reciprocity implied in the categorical imperative, which is also what the person who thinks that "you should never lie" also fails to take into account in the scenario in which it is indeed morally correct to lie to someone with murderous intent (i.e., a Nazi soldier) in order to protect potential victims (i.e., civilians who happen to be Jewish).

Pfff. I bet none of you saw the movie Outback Vampires. And you have the nerve to call yourselves Australians.

Well, amongst Australian national products are institutional racism and laziness - we don't need to promote these. — Tom Storm

Oh man, this Thread got really grim all of the sudden. It started out as talk about energy policy. But yeah, I obviously see your point, @Tom Storm

'You're the Voice' would be preferable. — Wayfarer

Yeah, that's not gonna happen. Everything has limits, including my appreciation for Australia's gifts to the world. John Farnham's music is not one of them. A gift, that is. It's more like a curse, I would argue.

For what it's worth, I think that pop music in general is bad. Like, aesthetically, it just seems too low-brow to my mind. I can't see what the redeeming qualities would be in that sort of music.

I'm looking for some recognised expertise, not just an anonymous member of a forum, like us. I want something that I can cite. You seem to be making this all about you and it's actually about Kant. :wink: — Tom Storm

In that case, the best that I can recommend in Arendt's book, Eichmann In Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Because Eichmann himself tried to plead not guilty, by arguing that "he did what he had to do because of Kant's categorial imperative". Those aren't his literal words, but that was his idea. Arendt explains in the book why that is not sound reasoning on Eichmann's part. Most of the discussion about "Kant and the problem of the Nazis" is rooted in Eichmann's trial, and especially in Arendt's report and analysis of it. So, I figure that would be a good place to start. As for an actual consensus about the categorical imperative, scholars still debate to this very day what the underlying concept even is, to say nothing of the meaning of its different formations. In short, there's no universal consensus. There's some good interpretations, and some good arguments in support of those interpretations, nothing more.

these were more exported jokes: "What's the worst thing we can get the those silly pommy bastards to pay for?" — Banno

Careful, mate. You don't know what you're asking when you ask that sort of question. Remember, we have Eucalyptus here, but no Australian fauna, and no Australian people...

...yet.

I’m not looking for a rebuttal, I am looking for some expertise on Kant, perhaps a scholar on this matter. What is the expert consensus (if there is one) on this frequently touted weakness of the CI? — Tom Storm

Well, since it's expertise that you want, I teach Kant's epistemology and ethics to my students at the Uni, though we never have enough time to go over his aesthetics. So, no, I'm not an expert on Kant, by any stretch of the imagination. Have I read some of Kant's books? Yes, I have. Have I understood them? For the most part, I would like to believe. Have I read what some of his scholars have written about his philosophy? Yes, I have, though not to the degree that a specialist in Kant's philosophy would. Can I dismiss that frequently touted, so-called weakness of the categorical imperative, by means of a simple, valid and sound argument, that is supported by the literature on Kant's Ethics, and by what Kant himself has written? Yes, I believe I can, and I believe that I have already done so.

If that's not good enough for ya, I got some more 'roo jokes waiting for you in the Australian politics thread.

Settle down. I will do as I want. — Tom Storm

I am settled in my chair. I will not approach the floor any further. Why are you angry at me?

Conclusion: I think one of the main purposes of Australian politics should be the defence of national products such as Fosters. — javi2541997

Nah. I disagree. As a non-Australian, I believe that Australians should continue to exploit themselves in cinema, if only to fulfill my questionable tastes in entertainment, and I say that as an equally questionable consumer.

Or they should keep discussing their energetic policy in general, I dunno.

I see.

We saw Paul Hogan as pandering to that demographic to make a quick buck. Which he proceeded to do. Many bucks indeed. — Tom Storm

I think that Crocodile Dundee created the stereotype, the one we're jokingly talking about, at least. Or at the very least, it reinforced it.

I prefer to resort to other cinematographic sources for my mistaken beliefs about Australia. Mad Max, in particular.

↪Arcane Sandwich
It's a common critique of Kant. We should ask a Kant expert. — Tom Storm

I offered a good counter-argument to that critique. Why should you fallaciously appeal to the authority of a Kant expert in order to bypass or overrule my counter-argument of that critique?

I'm not a Kant expert. But the categorical imperative - essentially - Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. This famously leads to the principle that if Nazi's are asking you if you have Jews hiding in your attic, you just tell them where they are because lying is wrong. Hence: Do what is right, though the heavens may fall. Adhering to an absolute principle regardless of the situation seems rigid and can lead to tragic outcomes. — Tom Storm

Not quite. That's not exactly what the categorical imperative says that you have to do in that specific case. It's an easy mistake to make, though. Precisely, it was during Eichmann's trial that Eichmann himself made that fallacious appeal to Kant's categorical imperative, as Hannah Arendt argues in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem.

If an action is done out of duty (as indicated by the categorical imperative, not by your superior officer), then the action is good. It is good even if it goes against what your superior officer is telling you to do. This is arguably rooted in common sense, or at least I would make such a case myself. It's basically the following classic problem: "If someone tells you to jump off a cliff, should you do it?" Of course not. Not even if that person is your superior officer. Your sergeant, captain, general or whatever cannot lawfully order you to kill yourself. You may lawfully resist such an order. Likewise, if your superior officer tells you to kill some random person on the street "just because", that is not a lawful order that they can give, because there is no reason to give such an order in the first place. You may lawfully resist such an order.

Killing requires an Ethical justification, in every case. You might tell me that reality does not work like that, but we're talking about the normative aspect of Ethics here, not the descriptive aspect of what people actually do in terms of morality.

In the scenario that you describe, the morally correct thing to do, is to lie to the Nazis. Why? Because it's the rational thing to do. Why? Because you are protecting the lives of the Jewish people that are hiding in your basement. The Nazi officer cannot lawfully order you to be an accessory to murder, or to be an accomplice to a crime in general. And why is lying to the Nazi officer morally good in this case? Because it's what the categorical imperative says that you have to do. Why? Because your duty in this case is being dictated by human reason itself, and the very idea of killing people for religious and/or ethnic motives goes against the very nature of human reason. That is why you should lie to the Nazi, and you are fully justified in doing so.

Think of it like this. In Kantian Ethics, there are three moral values: good, neutral, and bad (or "evil", if you will). If you save the people hiding in your basement just because you want something in return, you action is neither good nor evil. Why not? Because you are indeed saving them, but you are not doing it for the right reason. Your action will be good if you both save them and if you're saving them for the right reason.

At least that's my take on Kantian Ethics.

DeLanda does have an interesting take on assemblages. I read Graham Harman, and came to the conclusion that his approach is a throwback to certain strands of 19th century empiricism. — Joshs

They co-authored a book together, called The Rise of Realism. It's a dialogue on several different topics. Perhaps you're already familiar with it. If not, it's definitely worth checking out.

Among other things, Harman pressed DeLanda on the concept of matter in that book, and I don't think that DeLanda's answer was an adequate one. And I say that as a materialist.

If one perceives there to be an ethical obligation, and this obligation, appropriately supported by the facts, indicates that everyone ought to do it, then shouldn't everyone do it? — ToothyMaw

Should they? The usual philosophical retort here is that we're running into Hume's is-ought problem.

Skepticism with regards to the normative moral status of veganism does not mean that people are not obligated to do it, it means that we just shouldn't take it as a decided issue and acknowledge that it can be discussed. But being able to discuss it does not make it not obligatory for everyone in the absence of decisive arguments against veganism. — ToothyMaw

Here is where critics of veganism say that there are indeed decisive arguments against veganism, and that until vegans can reject those arguments, no one has the ethical obligation to convert to veganism. I'm just playing Devil's Advocate to the best of my ability here.

I mean, no one would say that it isn't wrong to torture and kill other humans merely because some crazy person (or people) might be skeptical of the validity of the position of being against torturing and unjustly killing other humans in pretty much any case, right? I certainly wouldn't, but your reasoning seems to suggest such a thing could actually be undecided. Note that I'm just talking about the reasoning here; I am not disputing that humans should not be tortured and unjustly killed. — ToothyMaw

Critics of veganism will point out that there are insufficient metaphysical and scientific reasons for comparing humans to non-human animals, as far as Ethics and moralities are concerned. What would you respond to them, in that regard?

(edited for clarity)

But who cares, there are many different kinds of assemblage theory, and I’m not suggesting you’re obliged to stick religiously to Deleuze. — Joshs

Manuel DeLanda has the best "post-Deleuzian" assembly theory, IMHO. He takes a few elements from Mario Bunge (specifically, his concept of causality). I don't accept assembly theory myself, I prefer ontologies that are more object-oriented.

Thanks, @ToothyMaw!

Here are my answers to the quiz:

1) Does everyone have to convert to veganism? — Arcane Sandwich

1) No, people are under no Ethical obligation to convert to veganism. Why not? Because veganism might be wrong. That is why it makes sense to discuss it in a philosophical sense and a political sense. I'm not saying that veganism actually is wrong, far from it. For all I know, veganism could be right.

2) If one does not want to be a vegan, is one being selfish? — Arcane Sandwich

2) No, if one does not want to be a vegan, one is not necessarily being selfish. At least not if veganism turns out to be wrong. If it turns out to be right, then that is a different matter.

3) Is it Ethical to be selfish? — Arcane Sandwich

3) Yes, it is Ethical to be selfish, as surprising as that sounds. There are Ethical theories about selfishness, and people sometimes even talk about a "selfish gene", which is the title of a book by Richard Dawkins. However, what I would argue is that there is no single Ethics, there are may different Ethics or ethical theories, or theories about morals, and, since that is the case, then, by definition, I am under no Ethical obligation to embrace some specific Ethics of selfishness, or any general Ethics of selfishness, or even the very concept of selfishness as a positive moral value instead of a neutral moral value, or even a negative moral value.

Does that make sense to you?

EDIT: look at this curious pattern:

Your answers: 1) Yes, 2) Yes, 3) No
My answers: 1) No, 2) No, 3) Yes

Our answers are entirely different, lol. But that doesn't mean that we can't agree on other points.

I know I would sound like an alcoholic, but the first Australian thing that comes to my mind is Foster's beer, not AC/DC. — javi2541997

This is a Thread about Australian politics, I don't think that anyone minds if someone sound like an alcoholic.

(Hey, Craig Jones gets away with jokes about "nose beer" on public television, you folks gotta let me get away with a joke about alcohol).

Nope. I would not conquer Australia — javi2541997

I would. Why not? Australians "conquered" part of Paraguay. Their descendants are Australian Paraguayans.

I am fond of the country and Aussie people, and they are clearly a rightful and straight country. They do not do weird things; either they aren't a threat to the rest of the world. I can't ask them anything but learning from them. — javi2541997

I've been told that they're urban, sophisticated, hip people. They like coffee, they're civilized, they think highly of Henry Lawson, and they're somewhat critical of Banjo Paterson. In short, they're not hicks living in the bush, as if Australia were really British Texas. That's an inaccurate portrayal of what Australians are like. They're more like Londoners, not Dubliners. And, in the coastal cities, they have that Californian, Red Hot Chilli Pepers / Surf Rock Revival vibe going on. Or maybe I'm just saying a few accurate and a lot of inaccurate things about @Banno. I can't exactly make an accurate generalization about Australians on the basis of my ignorant beliefs and limited interactions with them. Though I would love to visit Australia, that's for sure. How could I not? I grew up surrounded by Eucalyptus trees. No roos, though. Not even a few joeys. Though I suppose that I could order one by mail, right? The problem is, where do I keep it once it grows up? Maybe a zoo, but that's cruel, so no. I'm against zoos. I'm against the very concept of a zoo, no matter how well-intended such a concept might be.

Besides, "roo jokes" are really stupid, at least by the humoristic standards of 2025. And I think that most Australians would agree with me on that. Maybe those jokes were funny in like, I don't know, the 1980's. It's been almost fifty years since. Like, tourists are really stupid in that regard, and they make us, non-Australians, look bad. A friend of mine travelled to Australia a few months ago. I told him, in a very serious tone: whatever you do, do not make jokes about kangaroos. Australians are going to think that you're stupid if you make a kangaroo joke. Like, put yourself in their shoes, for a moment. Can you imagine how many times a clueless foreigner just happily drops the "kangaroo thing" in the middle of a casual conversation, as if kangaroos were something to just talk about? Why would you, a foreigner, assume that some random local would have any interest, let alone any knowledge, about the local fauna? Yes, marsupials are fascinating, we all get that. If it's marsupials that you want to talk about with random Australians, maybe you'd get a better reaction if you asked them about the Drop Bear.

Or, you know, just talk to them like a normal person. Try to see if they let you get away with some inappropriate jokes. Don't do that with Swedes though, they'll get angry at you.

EDIT: :

The other option is to accept Pansychism. The general idea would be that everything has a mind. There are many different kinds of panpsychism (for example, depending on what they answer to the One vs Many debate). In the example of the oysters and the stones, a panpsychist who is on the side of the Many, can say that each individual oyster has a mind, and that each individual stone has a mind. We just don't know what those are, currently, in the 21st Century. Maybe it is something for science to discover in the future. As for myself, I don't accept panpsychism. I don't think that inanimate objects have minds. A stone has no mind. With oysters it's complicated. I would say that no, they do not have a mind. Why is the case of oysters complicated? Because currently, vegans (and non-vegans as well) are asking the following question: are oysters Vegan?

The problem with that question, in my opinion, is that it wrongly assumes that vegans do not eat animals because they are animals, and not because they are entities capable of suffering. If it turns out that oysters cannot feel pain, then vegans can eat oysters. For the purposes of veganism, it doesn't matter that they are animals. What matters is that they cannot experience suffering.

EDIT: Another example. Imagine that someone discovers a new species of plant, in the Amazon or somewhere else. And imagine if that plant could feel pain. In that case, it would not be vegan to eat it. Why not, if it's just a plant? Well, it doesn't matter. It would not be vegan to eat it because it can experience suffering.

So, it's complicated.

You are arguing that, somehow, the ample evidence you have for the Sun rising every morning—of the sheer regularity of experience and of nature—is not good evidence that the Sun will rise tomorrow ceteris paribus; and I don’t see why one should believe that. — Bob Ross

So, inductive reasoning (if I understood you correctly) might be a case-by-case thing. Perhaps in the case of the Sun rising the next day we do indeed have good reason to believe such a thing. But there are other examples. The other textbook example is the one about swans. Up until the 1700s, people thought that all swans were white. Their reasoning was arguably inductive: people saw a bunch of individual swans, and all of them were white. At the end of the 1700s (around 1790, more or less) black swans were discovered. So, the statement that "all swans are white" was technically false: some swans are not white. So, if the expectation was, that the next swan to be observed was going to be white, then that expectation was not met when that very next swan turned out to be black.

This is the same problem that gamblers have. Gamblers have to rely on inductive reasoning. Even the blackjack players that can count cards have this problem.

So, I guess my argument is that having the justification for some beliefs is a matter of degrees. In some cases it will be an all or nothing deal, sure. But there are cases in which it doesn't seem to be an "either, or" type of situation.

I don't know, these are difficult philosophical problems.

You just say, oysters are a specie of fish — Corvus

Technically they're mollusks, not fish, but it's an understandable mistake. People call them "shellfish" (literally meaning "fish with a shell"), but they're not fish. Some other people think that whales are fish, for example, but they're not fish either, they're mammals. If these creatures had no identity, if they had no essential property, then we humans would not be able to recognize them as different creatures. There are counter-arguments to what I'm saying, I'm aware of that, but I think that those counter-arguments can be defused.

You never say humans are identical to the human group. — Corvus

Sure you do. Every human is a member of the human species, Homo sapiens. I understand species as groups, not as composite objects. But what is it that allows us to group humans into a single species? It must be something that each human has, some "human essence", if you want to call it that.

The very word "essence" is a very loaded word, and scientists usually avoid it. But I see no reason to avoid it, other than the fact that it has some religious and metaphysical connotations. But if you remove those connotations, it's actually quite a practical term.

Thanks for letting me know! Although I know you think I have not found the appropriate mean between niceness and meanness, the silver-lining to honesty is that you know I really mean it when I compliment you. The OP is much better than before.

I am going to refrain from commenting further on the OP because I do not think we will have any productive conversations in here.

If you ever do figure out what 'factiality' refers to, then let me know: I would be interested to hear what the concept is trying to get at.

I wish you the best of luck,
Bob — Bob Ross

Thanks for all of your help, Bob. See you around!

@javi2541997 Let's conquer Australia and let's decide their politics for them. We'll play AC/DC so that they don't resist our conquest of their country.

I think that Kant is right in the universal context—for me the mistake he makes is transferring that truth to all particular situations as a rigid notion of duty. — Janus


For what it's worth this is my read of Kant too. The old saying, often attributed to Kant - 'Do what is right, though the heavens may fall.' - hints at what the consequences of a rigid consequentialism might be. I sometimes think of this categorical imperative as a kind of blunt scientism of morality, if that makes sense. — Tom Storm

The way I read the categorical imperative (and I might be wrong here) is that it basically boils down to two common sense things:

1) Don't harm others, in the sense that you would expect others not to harm you.
2) Help others in the same sense that you would expect help from them.

For example, if a person is drowning, and you have a rope, the morally correct thing to do is to throw them one end of the rope and save them. Why? Because that is what duty says that you have to do. Why? Because it's the rational thing to do. Why? Because if the situation were reversed, and you were the one drowning, you would expect someone else to throw you a rope.

Is that right?

EDIT: Of course, if you save the person because they owe you money, or because that particular person is one of your loved ones, in neither of these cases is your action morally good. It is simply morally neutral (since you would be acting, in those two cases, out of inclination, not out of duty)

one should hold only justified beliefs (I would say) — Bob Ross

But I have unjustified beliefs, about very ordinary things, and I'd argue that everyone does. For example, the classical problem of induction, that Hume emphasized so much. Can I guarantee that the Sun will rise tomorrow? I'm not entirely sure. I mean, I don't doubt it, I'm quite confident that it will rise tomorrow. But that's inductive reasoning, Hume would say. You're not 100% justified in believing any conclusion that has been induced instead of deduced. What would be your honest answer to that problem?

Wouldn't you agree? — Bob Ross

Well, I can give you a politically correct answer to that question, or I can give you the honest answer. The politically correct answer is that in philosophy, we can doubt everything, yadda yadda. The honest answer is that I've been doing too much philosophy for my own good, sadly, and I've been doing it for too long. This is why, in recent years, I'm moving more and more towards good common sense. Intuition is important, I've no quarrel with that, but I think we need common sense as a complement. Is it infallible? Of course not. But we shouldn't throw common sense in the trash bin just because it's not infallible. Anyways, what do I know.

EDIT: Also, when you speak of Nietzsche, the way he talks about being irrational is really more about 'arationality' than irrationality (viz., being beyond the purview of rationality vs. violating rationality). — Bob Ross

Perhaps.

(edited because apparently I forgot what good grammar is)

No because their parents were not born then. It's an infinite regress of impossibility. — Janus

Perhaps.

@Bob Ross I've updated the OP (and the title of this Thread). You are welcomed to keep pondering these issues, just try to leave a bit your "scorched earth" strategy and tactics at the door. Not all of it, not entirely, just a bit, so that we can have a bit of a positive atmosphere in this Thread, instead of the usual "one of us will die here, and it won't be me" sort of tone.

I agree oysters have properties and essence for being oyster. Likewise stones and golds do too.
But I am not sure if oysters have identity. Having identity sounds like the owner of the identity has some sort of idea of self e.g. arcane sandwich identifies himself as an Argentinian, and also a professional metaphysician. Before arcane sandwich identified himself with the property, no one in the universe knew the identify apart from arcane sandwich himself and the ones who knew him already.

Hence when you say oyster has identity seems to imply that the oysters are self conscious, and know who they are, and also let the world know they are the oysters.

But from empirical observation on oysters, that looks a highly unlikely case. Here lies a contradiction which could be clarified. :) — Corvus

Right, what you're talking about there is something similar to identity politics, but that's not what I was talking about. What I was referring to is something more like the classical Law of Identity, also called the Principle of Identity. It says that every entity is identical to itself, A = A, or in first-order logic, ∀x(x=x). What the Principle of Identity doesn't say, by itself, is if Reality is One or Many (i.e., a single gigantic, indivisible Universe, or a Universe in which there are many different individual things). In that sort of the debate, I'm with the "Many" camp, I think that the Universe is many things, not one gigantic thing that cannot be divided. In that sense, the Principle of Identity, together with the premise that there are Many things, not just one, entails not only that each entity is identical to itself, but also that it is different from other entities. What is it that guarantees that difference? It might be the identity that each entity has, be it a human, an oyster, or a stone. But the identity of each thing doesn't tell us much, it only tells us that this oyster = this oyster, it doesn't tell us how that oyster is different from a stone. Which is why, arguably, you need the concept of an essential property, or an essence. Perhaps there's nothing more to that than the concepts of spacetime and uniqueness: for example, this oyster has a different spatiotemporal location than that other oyster, and each of them is unique in its own way. Otherwise, they would be the same oyster, instead of being two different oysters. However, insofar as both of them belong to the same group (the group of oysters), they presumably have something in common, which differentiates that group from other groups (for example, the group of stones). So, oysters in general, as a group, probably have something that makes them unique and different, and that is what you may call the oyster's essence, essential property, or even identity.

↪Arcane Sandwich
OK, that's cool. But agreement often seems to be a conversation terminator. Where do we go from here? — Janus

Well, sometimes it should be a conversation terminator, I suppose. If you've already solved the problem of the OP, what more is there to talk about, in this Thread? I'd continue the conversation in some other Thread.

It's called a conversation, or at least an attempt at one. — Janus

Ok. Lets converse then. I believe that you have offered a good solution to the question of the Platonistic (sic) existence of infinitesimals.

How would I know? — Janus

Because I said "sweet chicken" at the end? Who says that seriously?

I've solved the OP to my own satisfaction, which no doubt will count for little for others. It's not clear to me that we are arguing about anything. — Janus

Then why are you hassling me, matey-mate?

↪Arcane Sandwich
I have jumped to no assumptions about you. Ironically it seems to be you who is projecting some concerns onto me such as that you seem to think I think my solution is the correct one, or that I'm concerned about having it "certified" somehow. — Janus

It was a joke. You know that, right?

What I present is nothing more than how I look at it—for me the purported problem regarding whether mathematical entities exist in any platonic sense is a non-issue, a collateral result of reificational thinking. — Janus

Have you solved the problem of the OP? If yes, cool. If not, what are we arguing about, you and me? Clue me in, as I've no idea.

Paterson was a romantic. Australians live in the city. Always have. Lawson tells the real story.

The City Bushman now drives an oversized ute with a perversely small tray around the suburbs.

And the city seems to suit you, while you rave about the bush. — Banno

Sounds like the classic "city vs country" type of thing.

The problem is people tend to think it's not a joke, and that somehow they have a clear, complete view of an entire continent. — AmadeusD

So Australia is a continent? I think the continent is Oceania, and Australia is one more country that's a part of the Oceanic continent.

↪Arcane Sandwich
Appreciate it - But i'm a white belt :P I've just gotten lucky (and unlucky - my inability to get graded is a timing issue). — AmadeusD

Dude, if you're training with top-tier athletes like Jones and Reusing, you'll be a black belt before I get my purple belt. I'm seriously jealous :sad:

(Though I'm sure Craig would say that he's not top-tier, he's second-tier. He only sees Silver)

(edited because apparently I forgot how to spell)