↪Arcane Sandwich
Yeah, i'm not very good hahahaa. That said, I held me own against Kendall Reusing, which is, while a total cheat, a decent feeling against a multiple-world champion. — AmadeusD

You're rolling with some of the best athletes in the world. And I'm just a blue belt :sad:

No way. Seriously? Jokes aside for a moment, I envy you now.

The problem is people tend to think it's not a joke, and that somehow they have a clear, complete view of an entire continent. Australia is nothing like Texas other than the wide open spaces. It's nothing like most places except NZ. Also, Texas is fantastic. LOL. — AmadeusD

Wait, are you saying that not everyone in Australia is like Crocodile Dundee? I don't believe you. It's clear that you're lying to me. I'll raise a million dollars just to have Craig Jones beat you up in a BJJ match.

Most Theists would not say that they lack good reasons to believe. What you are describing here is something that is irrational: you are saying that one is justified in believing X when they know they are unjustified in believing X. — Bob Ross

Sure. Some philosophers embrace irrationality. Kierkegaard, for example. He didn't claim to have rational knowledge of God. He seemed to have an irrational belief in God. Irrationalism also permeates the work of other (pre)existentialists, such as Nietzsche. There's even some degree of irrationality in Augustine. The irrational belief in God was even a slogan for Tertullian: credo quia absurdum, "I believe because it is absurd".

Most Australians tend to see themselves as sophisticated city folk, urban hipsters, etc, emulating New York and London rather than any hic desert state. — Tom Storm

They need to read more Bush Poet stuff, like Banjo Paterson.

and it is a rhertorical question. So I wasn't asking you anything.

You ask me how I proposed to solve this in practical terms—the only solution (more a dissolution) I am offering was the one at the top of the post you were responding to:

As I said earlier: "If the infinitely many integers are understood to be merely potential as a logical consequence of a conceptual operation—in this case iteration—and are not considered to be actually existent, then the need for a Platonic 'realm' disappears." — Janus


Does that count for you as a practical solution? If you are seeking an empirical solution to such questions, I'd say you are wasting your time. Seems it would be impossible to establish a fact of the matter. — Janus

I'm just asking how you propose to solve the problem of multiple answers to the OP, that's all. Don't jump to conclusions or assume things about me, sweet chicken. If your solution is the correct one, then what do you propose that we do? Should we vote? Should a mod step in and mark you solution as the correct one? What?

Yes. Why would one be justified in holding belief in X if they recognize that they have no good reasons to believe X? — Bob Ross

They wouldn't (they wouldn't be justified). But some people would still believe it. A lot of people believe in God, and they have no good reason for it. I'm an atheist myself, but I'm not going to tell folks that they should stop believing in God just because they can't rationally explain their beliefs to me.

My original and main point in joining this thread despite knowing nothing about the book, is that the ideas expressed in the OP were not directed—ironically—at the book and of which I can provide food-for-thought. It turns out, that the OP is so disorganized—which violates the very guidelines you mentioned—that it gives false impressions. — Bob Ross

It's just a sketch for now. I will edit the OP when this discussion advances a bit. You know what? I might just edit it right now. It's gonna take me a few hours, probably. It probably won't be the definitive version, but it will be an improvement.

My biggest issue is not the informality of the OP (as we’ve all been there) but, rather, that you clearly don’t understand the basic building-block concepts of your own OP; and, as I mentioned before, is the source of a lot of the issues you wish to resolve. I don’t say that to be mean: it is easy to tell when someone is not very familiar with the subject because they give nothing but vague notions and muddied explanations. I suspect you appreciate to some extent what I am saying here; because you say this OP is for “exploration”. — Bob Ross

Let me phrase it like this: the fact that I was born in 1985, according to Meillassoux, is just that: a fact. But, contrary to what tradition says, he argues that facts are not contingent. They are necessary. Everything is contingent, -he argues-, except for the fact that everything is contingent. That is not a fact, it is an absolute necessity. Think of it like this: it's like when someone says "Everything changes". Under normal circumstances, that phrase would be self-refuting. A "Meillassouxsian" answer to that challenge would be to say that everything changes, except for the fact that everything changes. Change itself does not change. By analogy, everything is a fact, and that is not one more fact, it is an absolute necessity.

I don't expect you to understand this. Few people do, if any. But that doesn't matter too much. All that I want to see is if Meillassoux's philosophy holds up. If the claims A and B lead to a contradiction, C, then I don't need to understand what their actual content is: all I need to show is that C is a contradictory conclusion. I don't need to fully understand what factiality is in order to refute such a notion, if it is indeed the case that such a notion leads to a contradiction (no one has been able to prove this, BTW).

I wish the best of luck for you in this thread; and hopefully by the end of it you will actually know what factiality means :wink:

Bob — Bob Ross

Thanks! See you around.

The best joke about Australia that I heard is that Australia is just British Texas.

I guess Argentina would just be Spanish Texas then, or something like that.

Let me help you out with a few tips on etiquette, @Bob Ross. Now, you are of course free do to whatever you want, these are just some recommendations for improving your interactions with me in this thread (and with anyone in general, really). First, allow me to quote a passage from the Site Guidelines:

Types of posters who are welcome here:

Those with a genuine interest in/curiosity about philosophy and the ability to express this in an intelligent way, and those who are willing to give their interlocutors a fair reading and not make unwarranted assumptions about their intentions (i.e. intelligent, interested and charitable posters).

Types of posters who are not welcome here:

Evangelists: Those who must convince everyone that their religion, ideology, political persuasion, or philosophical theory is the only one worth having.

Racists, homophobes, sexists, Nazi sympathisers, etc.: We don't consider your views worthy of debate, and you'll be banned for espousing them.

Advertisers, spammers, self-promoters: No links to personal websites. Instant deletion of post followed by a potential ban.

Trolls: You know who you are. You won't last long

Sockpuppets: You may be banned. The onus is on you to explain to us if you are using the same IP for multiple accounts. — Site Guidelines

Now, as far as I'm concerned, you're not a racist, or a homophobe, or a sexist, or any of those things. You've exhibited no such conduct or behavior, and you've espoused no such ideas. You're not an advertiser or spammer, and you're not sockpuppeting. But, in my opinion, the way that you're responding to me in this thread has a little bit of "evangelism" going on, especially in regards to how philosophy should be done. I'm not saying that you're a full blown evangelist in that regard, just a little bit. You're also being just a little bit trollish. Not too much, just a bit. It seems (and I could be wrong) that you want to get some sort of emotional reaction from me, and I'm just not interested in having a discussion on such sour terms. Hope you get where I'm coming from here.

Understand that if I were to jump in a thread about, I don't know, let's say the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, and I just jumped in without even saying "hello", and I started to throw around comments about how the OP is messy, unclear, vague, etc., I wouldn't exactly get the most welcoming reaction from the author of the OP, even if I was indeed right. One should be courteous even when one is right, and I would add: especially so, in such circumstances. You've shown none of that.

But that's OK, you can still participate here. I didn't flag your comments or anything like that, and I didn't report you for disruptive behavior, even though I could have. If you wish to engage with me, and with this Thead, you would obtain better results if you were genuinely interested and if you were genuinely charitable towards me. Right now, it feels like you're a State Trooper repeatedly asking some stranger if he has a driver's license or not. You can see why that wouldn't be the most productive attitude in the world for the type of discussion that we're having here.

You've said more than once that you haven't read After Finitude. Well, what's stopping you? Lack of interest? But then it kinda makes no sense for you to have such strong opinions about its content, and about me, a humble scholar, if you haven't even read the book. I mean, put yourself in my shoes, for a moment. Imagine if I just barged into a Thread about Thomas Aquinas, told everyone that I didn't read whatever reading material there was to read, and then told the author of the OP that they don't understand Aquinas if they can't explain to me in simple English some notoriously difficult part of his philosophy (such as, for example, his interpretation of Aristotle's concept of the "active intellect").

In short, it doesn't really sound like you're trying to help me. It sounds more like you want to prove some kind of philosophical point. What that might be, I have no idea. All that I can suggest is that if you genuinely care about this OP and this thread, you take the time to familiarize yourself a bit more with After Finitude, so that you can make up your own mind about it. I even offered to give you a crash course on Speculative realism and After Finitude, but you squarely rejected my offer because you wanted to double-down on your questionable attitude towards me. That's not what a charitable, genuinely interested reader does.

Why do you think that I have the obligation to fully understand one of the most complicated philosophical concepts (factiality) that has been advanced in the last 20 years or so? You're not exactly asking me to explain to you why the sky is blue.

I've quoted a dictionary definition of the word "factiality". I've quoted Meillassoux's own definiton in After Finitude. I've also quoted his definition of facticity, with additional text. I've even tried to explain it using my own words. If that's not good enough for you, then the only sensible thing that I can suggest is that you take a look at After Finitude yourself, and that you tell me what you make of it, including the word "factiality".

That's all I got for you, Bob. You're welcome to keep contributing to this Thread, as always. It just so happens that I find you a bit socially awkward, that's all. Try to be more constructive here, show more initiative, instead of incessantly hassling me over this or that, just to see if I snap.

All the best,
- Arcane Sandwich.

I think that one might coherently say that oysters have an identity, sure. They have something that makes them oysters and not stones, for example. Perhaps everything does. For example, one might suggest, as Kripke does, that the essence or identity of gold is having one or more atoms that each have 79 protons in its nucleus. I'm sure that oysters have a distinguishing property, we can call that essence, identity, essential property, etc. And they have that property independently of humans and their languages.

If oysters don't know they are oysters, then is it right to call them oysters? — Corvus

I think so, yes. Because we're the ones calling them "oysters", they don't call themselves that. They can't. But a stone can't call itself a stone either, and it's still a stone nonetheless.

I am going to be honest, I don't think you know what 'The Absolute' means (based off of the fact that you can't explain it at all); and I therefore don't think you have good reasons to believe it exists. No offense meant. — Bob Ross

None taken. Does one have to know or understand something to believe in it? If one does not have good reasons to believe that X exist, does that mean that one should stop believing in X, whatever X might be?

Philosophy is not science. — Bob Ross

The use of hypotheses is not exclusive to science. Philosophers can utilize hypotheses as well. Philosophers don't need to have justified true beliefs about X (in which X is a set of premises) in order to see if X leads to contradictions or tautologies, for example.

Sure, but science requires the scientific method; which, in turn, requires a positive verification of the hypothesis through strict experimentation. — Bob Ross

You're wrong about that, partner. Science does not verify hypotheses, it either corroborates or refutes them (the hypotheses, that is).

We are not doing that in philosophy; and we can’t. — Bob Ross

And I'm supposed to just take your word for that, Bob? It's not possible to do philosophy in other ways? Philosophy can't utilize hypothetical thinking? I think that you, and others who think like that, are simply wrong. There is a place for scientific hypotheses in philosophy.

It sounds like Meilassoux might be claiming that facts are grounded, in part, in the a priori modes by which we cognize; and thusly is taking a Kantian approach.

My problem is that you clearly don’t know what they mean by facticity; because you still haven’t given me a clear (or even vague) definition.

Here, I’ll go first. A fact, by my lights, is a statement about reality which corresponds appropriately to what it references about reality; and thusly I accept a version of correspondence theory of truth. What do you mean by facticity? What does Meilassoux mean by facticity? — Bob Ross

Facticity, as far as Meillassoux is concerned, seems to be what all facts have in common, "what it takes, or what it is, to be a fact." The idea that the forms of the correlation can only be described, not deduced. Facts are not statements: a statement is what refers to a fact. For example, "the cat is on the mat" is a statement. If it is a fact that there is a cat on the mat, then the statement in question is true. If the cat is on the couch instead, for example, then it is false. And if there is no cat, the statement is also false. That is what the correspondence theory of truth is about. I'm also a correspondentist in that sense, and I think that Meillassoux is as well, though I'm not entirely sure. In other writings (not After Finitude) he seems to lean more towards coherentism as a theory of truth.

A personal side note about your character, Bob, if you don't mind. Of course I don't know you, so I can only judge you by what I'm reading here, on this Forum. It seems to me (and I could be wrong) that you struggle a bit to find a healthy middle ground between being sheepishly meek and being as rude as the stereotypical Newyorker, lol.

EDIT: I mean that jokingly, Bob. If you'll allow me a bit more humor, this is what talking to you feels like, lol:

¡Increíble! Qué delicia lo qué acabo de leer y todo lo que estoy aprendiendo contigo hoy. Kusch dejó una excelente frase para la historia. ¿Ves? Otra razón por la cual nos podríamos sentir orgullosos (aunque no creo que esta sea una palabra acertada del todo. No me gustaría sonar fanfarrón) de hablar castellano. Es un gran ejemplo, y seguro que hay otros. De hecho, ahora que estamos tratando las perlas de nuestro idioma, recuerdo que el pasado verano hicieron la siguiente pregunta: provea una sinónimo de ausente.

Me quedé pensando durante horas cuando lo dijeron en la radio. Aseveré qué podría tratarse de "desaparecido", pero ¡no! Busca y verás. Es interesante cómo ausente y desaparecido son distintos y así con muchas palabras. — javi2541997

Es muy extraño, si. A mi una que me dejó pensando una vez, es la siguiente: ¿Qué palabra rima con "reloj"? Creo que ninguna. A lo sumo, la palabra "boj", que se refiere a una especie de arbusto. Pero no rima del todo, porque "reloj" tiene dos sílabas, mientras que "boj" sólo tiene una.

Desafortunadamente, desconozco todo ello que me explicas. Ahora estoy orgulloso y feliz de que tú (vos; si te puedo tutear aunque creo que ya lo he hecho) me enseñes tales conocimientos. En la educación elemental básica española se estudia poquísimo de América. Es un tremendo error. Cuando allí se empezó a fraguar las independencias, aquí había períodos muy convulsos. Bueno, nosotros estudiamos ésto último. La Constitución de 1812, la época de Fernando VII, Isabel II, el trienio liberal.

Así qué con tristeza, admito qué soy ignorante respecto a la historia de Argentina. — javi2541997

Claro que me podés "tutear" (nota: la palabra "tutear" significa usar el "tu" en vez del "usted", o sea hablar informalmente en vez de formalmente, y sí, podés usar la palabra "vos", que es informal. Los angloparlantes ni se plantean estas cosas, porque usan el "you" tanto de manera informal como de manera formal).

La historia argentina es difícil de entender, incluso para los argentinos. Después de esa rivalidad que te comentaba, esa polarización extrema entre españoles criollos y españoles peninsulares (que cristalizó en la Revolución de Mayo), surgió otra rivalidad: patriotas contra realistas. Basicamente, los españoles criollos se convirtieron en patriotas (nacidos en este suelo, en esta patria que hoy en día llamamos "la Argentina), mientras que los españoles peninsulares se convirtieron en realistas, es decir, en defensores de la realeza española y de sus virreinatos, en este caso, del Virreinato del Rio de la Plata. Por supuesto que esto es un poco más complejo, hubo criollos que se identificaban más con el bando realista, a pesar de que nacieron en el suelo de una colonia, no en el suelo de la península. Y también hubo españoles nacidos en el suelo de la península que se identificaban más con el bando patriota. Es complejo. Pero, la idea principal acá, es que la mayoría de los peninsulares eran realistas, mientras que la mayoría de los criollos eran patriotas. Ahí es donde comienza el debate entre Monarquía y República en la Argentina, me parece. Los patriotas eran republicanos, y consecuentemente, anti-monárquicos. ¿Por qué? Bueno, justamente por lo que había sucedido antes: a un criollo no se le permitía ser Virrey, por ejemplo. El virrey tenía que ser de la península. Y como eso no iba a cambiar, entonces los criollos ya no se sentían parte de la monarquía española, ya no creían en la corona española como tal. Creían, en cambio, en las ideas republicanas, que tuvieron tanto éxito en los Estados Unidos en su Guerra de Independencia contra la corona británica. Precisamente, la Independencia Argentina se declaró en 1816, seis años después de la Revolución de Mayo de 1810. Después de la Guerra de la Independencia, que duró varios años, hubo una guerra civil en la Argentina, la guerra de unitarios vs federales. Esa fue una guerra de argentinos contra argentinos, no de argentinos contra españoles, como en la Guerra de la Independencia.

En cuanto a la historia de la bandera argentina, particularmente los colores celeste y blanco, se suele decir que Manuel Belgrano se inspiró en el color del cielo y las nubes. En realidad parece ser que ése es simplemente un cuento. Por lo que estuve investigado, parece ser que los colores de nuestra bandera vienen, inicialmente, de la Orden de Carlos III, pero esto es algo un tanto especulativo, no está comprobado científicamente (es decir, historiográficamente), pero es un punto de discusión entre los especialistas. A eso después se le añadieron otros elementos y otras interpretaciones, como por ejemplo los colores del manto de la Virgen, al menos en algunas de sus versiones, y después por supuesto el cuento de que Belgrano miró al cielo, pero en su raíz creo que los colores de nuestra bandera se originaron con la Orden de Carlos III, aparentemente. El sol amarillo que la bandera tiene en el medio, el Sol de Mayo, es en realidad el símbolo Incaico del sol, llamado "Inti". Es el dios solar de la civilización Inca. ¿Qué tiene que ver con la Orden de Carlos III? Bueno, te dije que la historia argentina es difícil de entender, y poca gente sabe estos detalles. La mayoría simplemente cree que Belgrano miró hacia arriba, vio el sol, el cielo y las nubes y dijo "Voy a fabricar una bandera que tenga esos tres colores". No lo creo, me parece que esa no es la explicación de verdad, mi amigo.

Por ejemplo, este del poeta Antonio Machado:

"En España lo mejor es el pueblo.
Siempre ha sido lo mismo.
En los trances duros, los señoritos invocan la patria y la venden; el pueblo no la nombra siquiera, pero la compra con su sangre y la salva",


Aquí trata de asegurar qué la patria es el pueblo (¿la gente popular?) Y no los señoritos (la burguesía gobernante de siempre). — javi2541997

Personalmente, creo que las cuestiones políticas son más complejas que solamente "clase rica vs clase trabajadora". Hay muchos otros actores y factores en juego: la Realeza española (y las distintas monarquias, como la corona británica, por ejemplo), la iglesia católica (y todas las otras iglesias, como la iglesia anglicana, la iglesia ortodoxa, otras religiones como el budismo, el taoismo, el islam, etc.) la ciencia moderna, el sistema educativo en general, el mundo del espectáculo y del entretenimiento en general, las noticias televisivas e Internet, etc. Es todo muy complejo. La pelea "burgueses versus pueblo humilde" es solamente una de las peleas entre tantas otras que condicionan nuestras vidas cotidianas, me parece.

If you managed to count them, you would know how many. It is not infinity for sure. — Corvus

In that case, I will offer a different example: I have never seen my own heart, but that doesn't mean that I don't have one. An oyster cannot know what it is, but that doesn't mean that it is not an oyster.

¡Ostras! No lo sabía. Es una grata sorpresa, sinceramente. — javi2541997

Claro, Hispanoamérica incluye todos los países que hablan Español (es decir, Castellano), por eso no incluye a Brasil (porque ahí hablan portugués). Tampoco incluye a la Guayana Francesa, o a Surinam (antes conocida como "Guayana Holandesa").

Claro, porque el inglés es una lengua muy simple sinceramente. Qué sea una lengua muy básica tiene como ventaja que sea hablada en todo el mundo y se haya establecido como lengua estándar entre personas qué no comparten un lenguaje común. — javi2541997

Es una lengua muy básica, si. Mucho más básica que el castellano, de eso no hay duda. Pero el inglés tiene sus encantos, me parece. No como los del castellano, pero algunos encantos tiene.

Otro ejemplo más: recuerdo que a los estudiantes de intercambio les costaba distinguir entre ser y estar. Verbigracia: yo soy argentino pero estoy en Madrid de vacaciones.

Porque para ellos sólo existe el verbo "to be". Para los angloparlantes es más que suficiente y no parece que se quieran comer mucho la cabeza en distinguir entre ser y estar. — javi2541997

En la Argentina hubo un filósofo llamado Rodolfo Kusch, fue un pensador muy original, que pensó bastante acerca de esa diferencia que mencionaste, la diferencia entre el ser y el estar. Kusch también se dio cuenta de que el castellano es uno de los pocos idiomas que tiene esa distinción. Como bien dijiste, esa diferencia es imposible de traducir al inglés. Te comparto acá un fragmento de Kusch que quizás te pueda interesar. Es de un libro suyo titulado América Profunda:

Se diría que el idioma castellano es el único idioma que ofrece dos posibilidades de existencia, una es la de ser y otra la de estar. — Rodolfo Kusch

Fijate que no dice "idioma español", dice literalmente "idioma castellano".

Después tiene algunos pasajes más fenomenológicos y existenciales. No tanto en la línea de José Ortega y Gasset, porque Kusch era más joven, me parece. Era de una generación posterior a la de Ortega y Gasset. En la Argentina, el filósofo que sería de la generación de Ortega y Gasset es Carlos Astrada, que fue maestro de Kusch, precisamente. Bueno, comparto otra cita de Kusch acerca del ser y el estar:

De ahí el concepto de estar. Me ha obsedido durante toda mi producción. Se trata del estar como algo anterior al ser y que tiene como significación profunda el acontecer. En el estar se acontece, porque se está en la expectación de una posibilidad que se da en un ámbito pre-óntico, al margen de cualquier necesidad de crear superestructuras a eso que acontece; antes, por lo tanto, de la constitución de los objetos. — Rodolfo Kusch

Y en otra parte, dice:

Creo que no se comprende el mero estar si no se le asigna además un cierto requerimiento implícito de lo absoluto. El estar, en tanto es una instalación o radicación en la realidad, sin embargo trasciende la simple circunstancia, por aquello de que es común a estar vivo o estar muerto, y esto no se explica sino en tanto lo que está, sólo puede hacer esto en absoluto. — Rodolfo Kusch

Bueno, siendo honesto, yo creo que tener una nacionalidad es muy importante, aunque hay qué pasar por trámites burocráticos. — javi2541997

Claro, pienso lo mismo. Pero no es lo mismo nacionalidad que ciudadanía, al menos no para mí. Yo tengo nacionalidad argentina y ciudadanía argentina. Vos tenés nacionalidad española y ciudadanía española. Que yo sepa (y puedo estar equivocado), yo puedo obtener la ciudadanía española, pero no la nacionalidad española. Vos podés obtener la ciudadanía argentina, pero no la nacionalidad argentina. La nacionalidad la determina tu lugar de nacimiento, eso no se puede cambiar. Al menos eso tengo entendido, pero puedo estar equivocado.

¿Puedo ser australiano? ¿Puedo ser japonés? Me temo que no... ni aún con esfuerzo. Habría ciertas cosas de esas nacionalidades que no se ajustarían en mi esencia de ser castellano. Sobretodo en cuanto a la japonesa. Su cultura es de respetar el silencio, todo lo contrario a la mía, que es ruidosa. — javi2541997

Podés obtener (en teoría, al menos) la ciudadanía australiana y la ciudadanía japonesa, pero no la nacionalidad australiana, tampoco la nacionalidad japonesa. Pero no estoy muy seguro de esto que estoy diciendo. Tendría que indagar un poco más al respecto.

Así, a bote pronto, la españolidad está ligado a ser español. Pienso que al formarse las repúblicas en Sudamérica, se perdió todo atisbo de hispanidad o españolidad allí, y empezaron a surgir otra esencia, la cual yo no puedo comprender al encontrarme tan lejos. — javi2541997

En realidad no es así, exactamente. Esa es la versión de Hollywood, podríamos decir. Acá en la Argentina, al menos, sucedio otra cosa, un poco más sutil. Este tema lo investigué cuando tuve que escribir mi Tesina de Licenciatura, y yo elegí como tema: las ideas filosóficas en la Argentina en 1810, particularmente las de Mariano Moreno. Resumiendo muchísimo, la cuestión parece ser la siguiente. Durante el Virreinato del Río de la Plata, comenzó a surgir una rivalidad y una cierta hostilidad entre los españoles nacidos en la Península y los criollos nacidos en el Virreinato del Río de la Plata. Estos criollos eran, en algunos casos (probablemente la mayoría) de "pura cepa española" en cuanto a su ascendencia. La única diferencia es que habían nacido acá en Sudamérica en vez de allá en Europa. Esta rivalidad comenzó a polarizar y a radicalizar a esos dos grupos: los peninsulares y los criollos. Así se los llamaba. Eran idénticos en todo, excepto el lugar de nacimiento.

Bien, parece ser que algunos de los puestos administrativos más importantes del Virreinato sólo podían ser ocupados por los peninsulares. Por ejemplo, el virrey tenía que haber nacido en la península, y lo mismo para algunos otros cargos, me parece. A los criollos les parecía injusto esto, pero lo toleraron de todos modos. El problema más grave comenzó con la captura de Fernando VII. Esto llevó a la formación de Juntas de gobierno en España, y también en Sudamérica. En ese contexto ocurrió la Revolución de Mayo de 1810, y el resto es historia.

El punto que queria destacar era que la Revolución de Mayo, y la "argentinidad" versus la "españolidad", no tuvieron nada que ver, al comienzo, con la périda de la hispanidad o españolidad. Era una rivalidad basada puramente, y exclusivamente, en el lugar de nacimiento: españoles peninsulares (los españoles "de verdad") versus los españoles criollos (los "españoles rioplatenses").

Hay un escrito de Manuel José de Lavardén (1754 - 1809), un escritor virreinal que murió un año antes de la Revolución de Mayo, que dijo lo siguiente respecto del concepto de patria:

Los que tienen por patria el miserable terrón en que casualmente vieron la primera vez la luz del día, escuchan sólo los primeros dictámenes de su amor propio que se interesa hasta en lo que no le toca. La elevada torre de su Parroquia es para ellos un objeto lisonjero de que se jactan sin saber por qué. Ésta es la patria accidental; pues la formal Patria, la Patria a quien debemos sacrificarnos es aquella comunidad que con providencias bien hechoras cuidó de nuestra existencia desde el primer momento. Nacimos al mundo inhábiles para socorrernos, nuestros padres no siempre pueden alimentarnos. Necesitamos después de una educación ventajosa, y pocas familias pueden darla a sus hijos. Y cuando hemos de subsistir a expensas de nuestra industria; ¿cómo nos moveríamos de un lugar a otro sin caminos, sin posadas, sin puertos, y sin barcos? Ocupados en nuestro trabajo, ¿quién nos defiendede las vejaciones del más fuerte de nuestros compatriotas, de las hostilidades extranjeras? Cuando al cabo de una vida laboriosa la fortuna no ha correspondido a nuestros esfuerzos, y llegamos a una vejez decrépita sirviendo de peso a los demás hombres, cargados de enfermedades, sin arbitrio de remediarlas, ¿Quién se duele de nosotros? ¿Quién atiende a nuestra miseria? ¿Quién prolonga nuestros días hasta su término natural? La Patria, la dulce Patria, la Patria anhelosa, y próvida trata de precavernos de toda incomodidad, de todo insulto. Aquella comunidad de hombres, que viven bajo de una potestad, de unas leyes, y bajo unas providencias económicas, ésta es la Patria; el caro objeto de nuestra gratitud. — Manuel José de Lavardén

Ves que tiene un concepto filosófico de la patria, porque está utilizando un vocabulario aristotélico ("patria acccidental" vs "patria formal"). Lo curioso es que no está hablando de la Argentina, porque este escritor, Lavardén, murió antes de la Revolución de Mayo. Cuando habla de "patria", se está refiriendo al Virreinato del Rio de la Plata. Y dice también lo siguiente:

Nuestras leyes, y nuestras ordenanzas se aproximan a nuestra situación, pero son generales a toda la América, y ésta abraza todos los climas, todos los temperamentos, todas las calidades de terrenos; tiene países interiores, y costa; canales abiertos para la comunicación, y tierras empinadas que la dificultan; en una parte hay minas, en otras se buscan en vano; en unas provincias habitan los antiguos dueños, y constituyen la principal población, en otras apenas se conocen. En este laberinto necesitamos que los genios profundos echen a buscar el hilo de Ariadna. La falta de noticias, y de monumentos hace fluctuar las opiniones cuando no tienen un principio fijo de que partir. Acostumbrémonos pues a deducir nuestras consecuencias de antecedentes incontestables. La historia nos provee importantes sucesos de que extraer verdaderos conocimientos y las ciencias están convenidas en certísimos datos, cuya aplicación es el único arbitrio para desenvolver el enredo de ideas, que confunde la variedad de nuestros intereses. El interés de cada uno de nosotros varía numéricamente los juicios, y hará toda disputa, en que se mezcle interminable. — Manuel José de Lavardén

I am pretty sure that oysters don't know they are oysters. — Corvus

They don't. But just because an entity cannot know much (i.e., oysters), that doesn't mean that it doesn't have certain features, which it cannot know. I don't know how many individual hairs I have on my head. That doesn't mean that I don't have hair.

Hola @javi2541997, muchas gracias por tu respuesta.

Hay algo que debo destacar respecto del Inglés y del Castellano, creo que lo habrás notado en algún momento (todos los que hablamos esos dos idiomas lo hemos notado en algún momento, me parece).

En el inglés, sólo existe una palabra para la 2nda persona del singular: "you".

Nosotros (quienes hablamos castellano), en cambio, tenemos las siguientes:

"tu" (informal, castellano en general)
"usted" (formal, castellano en general)
"vos" (informal, castellano rioplatense)

Nosotros (quienes hablamos castellano rioplatense, específicamente) hemos inventado la palabra "vos", creo yo de la siguiente manera. Hemos tomado la palabra "vosotros", que es la 2nda persona del plural, y nos hemos quedado solo con el "vos", convirtiendo esta última en singular. Es que "vosotros" es una palabra extraña. Yo la entiendo de la siguiente manera, como si tuivese dos partes: "vos-otros". Nosotros, los rioplateneses, nos hemos quedado con el "vos", y hemos descartado al "otros", para luego incluso olvidar a esos "otros". Que se yo, esto es pura especulación de mi parte, ni que fuese alguna clase de hipótesis científica. Si esto lo lee una persona de las ciencias sociales, esa persona me diría que estoy diciendo falsedades y disparates.

Yo pienso que el español debería más bien identificarse con el castellano. — javi2541997

Es que de hecho funciona así, no sólo en España, sino en casi toda América Latina. Justamente, es la parte llamada "Hispanoamérica". Sería, además, algo asi como la "Diáspora Hispana", o "Diáspora Castellana", o algo asi. Quizás sea un disparate eso que dije, no lo sé.

qué es "el Español en general", en tanto lenguage, exactamente? — Arcane Sandwich

Fijate esta barbaridad que dije. Escribí "lenguage" en vez de "lenguaje". Y yo no se si discutir esas cosas tiene sentido. Prefiero decir que me equivoqué, en vez de decir "yo me expreso como quiero". Porque uno a veces expresa su ignorancia, aunque no lo sepa.

También incluye al valenciano, balear, aragonés y gallego. En cambio, no sé si incluir el euskera. — javi2541997

Creo que el euskera (vasco) es algo aparte. Nadie sabe de dónde viene ese lenguaje, me parece. Hay otros casos menos difíciles pero no por ello más sencillos: el andaluz, el cordobés, y a esta altura de la historia le diría que quizás existe tal cosa como "el madrileño", o "el barcelonés". O quizás estoy diciendo cualquier disparate.

En verdad, español deriva del país España, pero igualmente tu eres de Argentina y puedes hablar mi mismo idioma. — javi2541997

Porque vos y yo hablamos castellano. Pensalo así: vos y yo tenemos más en común, en tanto castellanos, que vos y un catalán, que no hablan el mismo "dialecto" u "idioma provincial". No se si me entendés.

Por lo tanto, creo que sería más acertado decir que el castellano es la lengua en general y español una nacionalidad. — javi2541997

Hmmm... me parece que no, por lo que dije recién. El castellano es la lengua específica. El español es una nacionalidad, creo que estamos de acuerdo. Sólo que, yo como argentino, no tengo esa nacionalidad. ¿Por qué no? Porque nací en la Argentina, justamente. No nací en España. Bueno, "¿Pero en papeles, cómo sería la cosa?", alguien podría preguntar. Justamente, tengo ciudadania argentina (por haber nacido en la Argentina). No tengo ciudadanía española. ¿Podría obtenerla? Por supuesto. Y quizás debería, pero honestamente no veo para qué tendría que hacer tanta burocracia por un simple papel que, a esta altura de la vida, ya no me sirve de nada.

Volviendo al tema del castellano. ¿Es lo mismo que el idioma español? Yo creo que no. Se lo llama así, pero sigue siendo un idioma provinciano, porque es el idioma de Castilla, en definitiva. La pregunta que yo haría respecto de este punto es la siguiente:

¿Qué es Castilla? ¿Es una región? ¿Un reino? ¿Una provincia? ¿Un estado? ¿Un territorio? ¿Que es?

Quedaría así: tú eres argentino, yo soy español, y ambos hablamos castellano — javi2541997

Claro, absolutamente. ¿Pero entonces qué es lo que nos une? ¿Nos une la hispanidad, o nos une el castellano? Yo creo que vos lo dijiste recién: nos une el castellano, no la "españolidad" o "hispanidad". Pero entonces, ¿qué es la "españolidad", o "hispanidad"? Explicámelo de persona castellana a otra persona castellana.

¿Ves? Ahí hay otro problema: yo no soy castellano, en realidad, porque yo no nací en la región de Castilla. Nací en la Provincia de Buenos Aires, en Argentina. Conozco el idioma castellano, es mi lengua materna, pero técnicamente yo no soy castellano, porque no nací en Castilla. Si Castilla es una provincia (y no digo que lo sea, ya que aparentemente no lo es, simplemente es una región), entonces mi "identidad provincial", por llamarla de algún modo, no es castellana, sino bonaerense. Ése es el término técnico para alguien que nació en la provincia de buenos aires: bonaerense.

Yo soy madrileño y toda mi familia viene de Toledo y otras zonas de Castilla La Mancha. Es evidente que soy totalmente castellano. Pero pienso que mis orígenes se caracterizan por la lengua en la cual me expreso. Estoy convencido de que si fuera Vasco o catalán, daría mucha importancia a mis raíces y a la lengua. Seguro. — javi2541997

Por supuesto. Pero es lo que te decía recién: yo ni siquiera estuve en Europa, ni una sola vez. He estado en América del Norte, pero nunca he estado en Europa. La conozco sólo por las noticias, las películas, y las series de televisión. Al no haber nacido en la región de Castilla, no soy castellano. Solamente hablo el idioma castellano, pero eso no es más que saber un idioma. Se hablar en inglés también, al igual que vos, pero eso no nos convierte en anglosajones.

El concepto "Hispanidad" es deficitario porqué tristemente sólo se observa desde el prisma político. Ni leyendo a Ortega y Gasset he dado con la definición filosófica o metafísica de la hispanidad. — javi2541997

Yo tampoco. Creo que tendríamos más suerte con la definición filosófica o metafísica de la "castellanidad" antes que la de "hispanidad", me parece.

Para mí la hispanidad es la lengua. — javi2541997

Cierto, pero la lengua es el castellano en este caso. En otras palabras, esta es mi teoría, javi: No hay una conexión necesaria entre la lengua castellana y la lengua española. ¿Por que no? Porque la lengua española podría coincidir, en principio, con la lengua catalana, o con el idioma vasco, o con el madrileño, o con el cordobés, etc. Entonces, si la hispanidad es la lengua, entonces la hispanidad es "artificial" en cierto sentido, es algo así como un "invento linguístico". O quizás estoy equivocado. No sé si tuvo mucho sentido eso que dije.

Yo tampoco celebro el día de la Hispanidad. — javi2541997

¿Por qué no? Vos la podés celebrar, porque naciste en Hispania (España). Yo no. Bah, podria celebrarla si quisiera, pero no le veo el sentido. Tendría más sentido para mí celebrar el día de la Castellaneidad en todo caso, y ni siquiera eso. Quizás el "Día de la Aragonicidad", ya que mi apellido es aragonés, pero ahí ya empezamos a decir disparates, me parece. ¿O te parece que estoy diciendo cualquier cosa?

Saludos

Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself. Nothing has an essence, except for facticity. In other words, there is only one essence in the world: it is the one that facticity has, and he wants to call that: "factiality". — Arcane Sandwich

I'll just suppose, if only for the sake of argument, that this is our point of disagreement, @Bob Ross. I'm not saying that it is, I'm just imagining it as a possibility among others. It's a hypothesis, nothing more. That's how science works, Bob. You imagine a hypothesis, which is a claim about some thing or feature of the world, and then you investigate that claim to see if it's true. You don't have to believe the claim yourself. If you did, it wouldn't even be a hypothesis to being with. It would be something else, like justified true belief, for example.

Now, with that in mind, I'm not asking you to believe Meillassoux's claims. Stated differently, I'm not asking you to believe him when he says that factiality is the speculative essence of facticity. I'm just telling you to consider it simply as a hypothesis to be investigated. Why would someone investigate it, you might ask? To see if it's true or not. What more do you expect from philosophy, Bob? Honest question.

Let's proceed. I'm going to quote Meillassoux's definiton of facticity, Bob. Not of factiality, this time we're gonna take a look at what he has to say about facticity, which, so far, seems to be the "metaphysical substrate", if you will, of this other thing that he calls "factiality", which he claims is the "speculative essence" of facticity. I'm not asking you to take his word for it, ok? I'm just saying: entertain the thought, for a moment, if only for the sake of argument, even if you, personally, cannot picture it or cannot understand it. I'm just saying: if he's saying "A", and we know that "not B" is true, can we construct a modus tollens that shows that "A" is false? That's just one question among many that can be reasonably asked at this point. That's the sort of thing that would strike a fatal blow to Meillassoux's Speculative Materialism. The problem is, that no one, so far, it seems, has been able to construct that sort of coup de grâce argument yet, even though many have been attempted (I myself published a few good, decisive critiques of Meillassoux's Speculative Materialism, but nothing of the importance of a modus tollens style refutation of his concept of factiality). That being said, let's take a look at Meillassoux's definition of the word "facticity". He says:

Let us go back to Kant. What is it that distinguishes the Kantian project - that of transcendental idealism - from the Hegelian project - that of speculative idealism? The most decisive difference seems to be the following: Kant maintains that we can only describe the a priori forms of knowledge (space and time as forms of intuition and the twelve categories of the understanding), whereas Hegel insists that it is possible to deduce them. Unlike Hegel then, Kant maintains that it is impossible to derive the forms of thought from a principle or system capable of endowing them with absolute necessity. These forms constitute a 'primary fact' which is only susceptible to description, and not to deduction (in the genetic sense). And if the realm of the in-itself can be distinguished from the phenomenon, this is precisely because of the facticity of these forms, the fact that they can only be described, for if they were deducible, as is the case with Hegel, theirs would be an unconditional necessity that abolishes the possibility of there being an in-itself that could differ from them. — Quentin Meillassoux

The main takeaway there seems to be that facticity is to be understood (Meillassoux suggests) as the fact that the forms in question can only be described (as Kant would have), not deduced (as Hegel would have).

EDIT : Later on, he says:

Let us try to attain a better grasp of the nature of this facticity, since its role in the process of de-absolutization seems to be just as fundamental as that of the correlation. First of all, from the perspective of the strong model, it is essential to distinguish this facticity from the mere perishability of worldly entities. In fact, the facticity of forms has nothing to do with the destructability of a material object, or with vital degeneration. When I maintain that this or that entity or event is contingent, I know something positive about them - know that this house can be destroyed, I know that it would have been physically possible for this person to act differently, etc. Contingency expresses the fact that physical laws remain indifferent as to whether an event occurs or not -they allow an entity to emerge, to subsist, or to perish. But facticity, by way of contrast, pertains to those structural invariants that supposedly govern the world - invariants which may differ from one variant of correlationism to another, but whose function in every case is to provide the minimal organization of representation: principle of causality, forms of perception, logical laws, etc. These structures are fixed - I never experience their variation, and in the case of logical laws, I cannot even represent to myself their modification (thus for example, I cannot represent to myself a being that is contradictory or non self-identical). But although these forms are fixed, they constitute a fact, rather than an absolute, since I cannot ground their necessity - their facticity reveals itself with the realization that they can only be described, not founded. But this is a fact that - contrary to those merely empirical facts whose being-otherwise I can experience - does not provide me with any positive knowledge. For if contingency consists in knowing that worldly things could be otherwise, facticity just consists in not knowing why the correlational structure has to be thus. — Quentin Meillassoux

EDIT 2: He talks about facticity throughout other sections of the book, but the only other "really important" snippet seems to be the following one:

Facticity is the 'un-reason' (the absence of reason) of the given as well as of its invariants. Thus the strong model of correlationism can be summed up in the following thesis: it is unthinkable that the unthinkable be impossible. I cannot provide a rational ground for the absolute impossibility of a contradictory reality, or for the nothingness of all things, even if the meaning of these terms remains indeterminate. Accordingly, facticity entails a specific and rather remarkable consequence: it becomes rationally illegitimate to disqualify irrational discourses about the absolute on the pretext of their irrationality. From the perspective of the strong model, in effect, religious belief has every right to maintain that the world was created out of nothingness from an act of love, or that God's omnipotence allows him to dissolve the apparent contradiction between his complete identity and His difference with his Son. These discourses continue to be meaningful -in a mythological or mystical register - even though they are scientifically and logically meaningless. — Quentin Meillassoux

He wants to refute strong correlationism, and he thinks that Speculative Materialism is the right tool for that task.

I come from a country were military service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women, hence military service is very normal. — ssu

Above all, if the country or nation state doesn't have an imminent outside threat, there's not going to be compulsory service and military service will look like an oddity. — ssu

I don't understand, you lost me here. Is there an inminent outside threat to Suomi (Finland)?

Unfortunately there's not enough Swedes and Finns (or other Nordic people) for a Swedish discussion site. And anyway, Swedish is usually worst for the Finns and the Danes, Norwegians do better. — ssu

I got kicked out of another forum for making a very light-hearted joke about Swedes. The joke that I said was: "Between Sweden, Norway and Finland, Sweden is the worst. Why? Because they're not right in the head. Why not? Because they have the most metal bands per capita, and that's a fact."

Instead of laughing, the Admin of the site banned me for nationalism" (yes, he actually wrote that in the email with the decision to ban me, among other nonsense).

Like, come on, you can't take a metalhead joke from another metalhead?

@Wayfarer

Tomorrow's News will be like: "Is it Ethical for an Australian man to punch a Roo in the face if the roo in question is attempting what can only be described as a front head-lock on a dog? Stay tuned and find out."

I am not familiar enough with what you are referring to by metaphysical conservatism, eliminativism, and permissivism to comment adequately on this one; but I suspect you are addressing a view which has no relevance to substance theory (in the sense of rebuking a position that holds that everything is one concrete entity). — Bob Ross

Hmmm... well, you see, here's where I personally disagree with you (I'm not attacking you, BTW). Here's what I'm saying about that: mereological nihilism is the opinion that composition never occurs. An object A never composes an object B. Does that mean that the objects A and B exist? No, it does not. So what does the nihilist say? She says that only atoms exist ("atoms" in the sense mereological sense, literally "in-dividual", you cannot divide them). And what are those? The elementary particles of contemporary physics. In other words, the nihilist is a realist about physical, elementary particles. She is not a realist about anything else. You, me, these other fine folk, we don't exist, technically speaking. That's what the nihilist says. So, what are we? Well, just a bunch of good ol' particles, and nothing more.

So Bob, you see why these debates are not restricted to formal mereology. There are of interest and relevance to metaphysics, as I've hoped to have shown.

So, I mean that we can describe the type of substrate a substance is to meaningfully discuss things. Idealists accept hat there is a mental substrate; physicalists accept a physical substrate; a substance dualist accepts both; a non-dualist adds a third; etc. — Bob Ross

Maybe, I don't know. Sounds reasonable enough to me, but I'm not sure if I agree with what all of that implies, from a technical standpoint.

Ok, cool. So, then, under your view, is this “Absolute” of a different type of substrate than physical stuff? — Bob Ross

God damn, that's a hard question. What do you want from me, Bob? You just want to "beat the metaphysical truth out of me, whatever that metaphysical truth might happen to be". I mean, it feels like intellectual torture, "mate".

Ok, so are you just noting by “The Absolute” the totality of reality and negation? I know that much about Hegel haha…. — Bob Ross

I have no idea, I'd have to think about it. See my comment above.

No, I don't have a firm grasp of what it is. I don't think anyone does. I don't think Hegel did either, for that matter.


Then why do you believe in it? — Bob Ross

Because I'm a simple peasant from Argentina at the end of the day, mate.

How am I supposed to discuss it with you, if you can't give a basic description of what the word refers to?

You want me to step through the door, when I can't until you tell me the password. — Bob Ross

Ok Bob, let's say that's fair (I don't know if it is, but let's just pretend for a moment). I'll try to be more charitable to you, since you're making (to my mind, at least) a very specific request. You want me to just deliver some information, in an objective but brief way, in such a way that it makes sense to you, so that you can tell me if I'm right or wrong about whatever it is that I'm talking about. So, here's what we'll do:

I will attempt to explain to you (and to myself, BTW) what, if anything, the word "factiality" means for Quentin Meillassoux himself. I hope you can see why this is a tall order from you, Bob, and not "a mere request".

Factiality, to the best of my knowledge, and to the best of my understanding, is a word that the French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, invented. He made it up. Now, his argument (let's see if it's even an argument to begin with) is that the word that he made up, "factiality", should be understood as a technical, philosophical term (comparable, to, say, the word hyle, meaning "wood", which Aristotle takes from the common language of his time and gives it a precise, technical meaning in his own philosophy: it is materia, matter.)

That's how Meillassoux intends the very word "factiality". In short: he want us to take him seriously.

Ok, so what does he mean, by "factiality"? Well, he says that it's "the speculative essence" of facticity. So what are those? The speculative essence, is basically "the essence of facticity". In other words, Meillassoux is an essentialist: he believes that essences are real. Which things have essences? Does an animal have an essence? Does a number have an essence? What is an essence? Is it a soul? Is it the most important property of a thing? In that case, the essence would be identical to the essential property, which means that the essence must be a quality, not a quantity, and certainly not a res in the Medieval Latin sense.

Well, which things have essences, according to Meillassoux? Apparently, just one: facticity itself. Nothing has an essence, except for facticity. In other words, there is only one essence in the world: it is the one that facticity has, and he wants to call that: "factiality".

Are you with me up to here, Bob? Or do you want to interrupt me and say something?

As I said earlier: "If the infinitely many integers are understood to be merely potential as a logical consequence of a conceptual operation—in this case iteration—and are not considered to be actually existent, then the need for a Platonic 'realm' disappears." — Janus

So what are you asking me, @Janus? If your solution is the right answer to the question in the OP? Because there's also @Banno's proposed solution, as well as the one that I proposed myself (mathematical fictionalism). How do you propose to solve this, in practical terms?

Not perplexity, just plain old oddness. I'm not suggesting anything about essences; I think the very idea is problematic. Identity is just an idea. The odd thing is that the "in itself' the very thing which is conceived as having no identity or identifiability for us, is an expression couched in terms of identity. — Janus

Right but then if it's plain old oddness that you want to talk about, I'd say that Mathematical Platonism in general is far more odd than Mathematical Fictionalism. It is less odd to say "infinitesimals are just fictions, which means that they are a series of brain processes" than to say "infinitesimals exist in some sense in the external world, structuring reality itself from outside of spacetime itself in some mysterious way that is incomprehensible to modern science."

The odd thing about the idea of "in itself" is that it is saying "in its identity". Identity suggests integrity. When we eat the oyster, it is broken down, loses its integrity, and thus loses its identity. Once eaten it is "in us" now a part of our identity. We cannot eat the oyster's identity, because the act of eating progressively destroys it—in eating the oyster we do not digest the oyster's identity, but its brokenness. — Janus

But you say that in a very perplexed way, and I'll I'm saying is that it's not that perplexing. What would be the perplexing "thing" about it? The possibility that essences can be destroyed? Why? Who says that essences have to be eternal, or even non-physical? Aristotle already dealt with this problem, way back in the day, so to speak. A small seed turns into a sapling, then into a mighty oak, then a lumberer cuts it down, hands it over to the carpenter, who then makes a table. The tree has lost its essence by that point, it has been destroyed. What exists now, in the form of a wooden table, is not a tree. So why is it so perplexing that the oyster's identity is destroyed once you digest the oyster?

I mean it in the Analytic Philosophy sense of a substrate which bears the properties of things. — Bob Ross

In that case no, there is no such thing (not to my mind, at least). I'll give you three examples why not:

1) From an ordinary point of view (the POV of ordinary life), Reality is not a single, gigantic, homogeneous block. It's a bunch of stuff, it's a plurality of entities. That's just how it seems.
2) And that leads us to the concept of intuition. You simply intuit many things around you, or you simply have the intuition that there are many things around you, like this stone on the floor, or this desk, that table, this computer, and so forth.
3) From a metaphysical point of view (as developed in the Analytic Tradition, particularly in the field known as Metaphysics of Ordinary Objects), it makes more sense to be a metaphysical conservative, than to be a metaphysical eliminativist or a metaphysical permissivist. Likewise, it makes more sense to give a particularist answer to van Inwagen's Special Composition Question, or SCQ for short, than to give an nihilist or a universalist answer.

Ok, so you are a ‘materialist’; so there’s, so far, two types of substrates for you: the physical and the kind that bears the properties of this ‘Absolute’. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that's correct, but I'll just ignore it, for now. Unless you want to make that point clearer, because I didn't understand what you said there.

Are you a bundle theorist? — Bob Ross

No, I am not. There are things that have a metaphysical substrate. It just so happens that not everything does, or even is, a metaphysical substrate to begin with. I don't believe in disembodied universals: there is no redness apart from red things, like this rose or that brick. But there are pseudo-things, if you want to call them that: a pack of six wovles is a pseudo-thing, the pack itself is not a substance, the only substances there are the six individual wolves.

Otherwise, how does things which are of this non-physical (and non-mental) interact with or relate to the stuff which is bore by the physical substrate? The hard problem of interaction seems to plague this theory. — Bob Ross

Everything that is mental is physical, but not everything that is physical is mental. That's what seems the most reasonable thing to say here.

Ok, it isn’t physical. What is it? When you say ‘The Absolute’, I am thinking of just reality as it is in-itself. Why should be posit this thing as being real? — Bob Ross

It isn't. Reality Itself and the Absolute are two different "entities", if you will. They belong to different categories. Reality is what exists, and the Absolute, in the Hegelian sense, is the truth (it is the Ultimate Truth) about that (about Reality itself)

I think you should be able to briefly explain what the Absolute is, conceptually, if you have a firm grasp of what it is. — Bob Ross

No, I don't have a firm grasp of what it is. I don't think anyone does. I don't think Hegel did either, for that matter.

Answer me this (in all honesty): how have you published multiple books on their works and yet cannot give me a simple explanation of what factiality is? — Bob Ross

Because the concept of factiality is a difficult one to understand, since Meillassoux never explained what he means when he speaks of "the speculative essence" of such and such. The best we've got so far (the Meillassoux scholars, that is) is a connection to the "objective ideas" of Fichte, and perhaps Schelling, or maybe even Hegel. Or, one might understand the "speculative essences" as something more or less comparable to Graham Harman's "real qualities", as he distinguishes them from "sensual qualities" in the context of Speculative Realism, of which both Meillassoux and Harman are pioneers and, you could say, "Founding Fathers", together with Ray Brassier and Iain Hamilton Grant.

You have to be able to appreciate my frustration here. I haven't written anything on Transcendental Idealism nor Aristotelianism, and I can give you an in depth (an adequate) explanation of both views. — Bob Ross

So what is it that would want from me at this point? A sort of crash course on Speculative Realism? A crash course on After Finitude? What?

Let me try one more time: what is factiality? What would be mean for there to be non-facts about facts that aren't just non-objective dispositions? — Bob Ross

You have to understand that this is what we're currently investigating here. What is factiality, anyways? Not how the dictionary defines it, not how Meillassoux defines it in After Finitude, but more concretely, what would it be, if it were a "real thing", so to speak? A "real thing" like something that exists in your ordinary life, for example.

↪Arcane Sandwich
I love posting in Spanish with you, yet I think we are not entitled to do so in this thread. It is fine to do it a bit, but the moderators might scold us next time since the forum is an English-speaking site. :smile: — javi2541997

Fair enough, I'll have to stop by the Spanish section of the Forum, then : )

Let me just ask you: are you familiar with the book, or are you using this OP to familiarize yourself with it? — Bob Ross

Hi Bob, thanks for your contributions to this Thread, they will be recognized in the edited version of the OP once we're done with the discussion throughout the Thread.

In response to your question, it is both, at the same time. I am familiar with the book. I have also published 6 or 7 articles about different aspects of Meillassoux's philosophy. I have praised what I felt needed to be praised, I refuted what I believed needed to be refuted. I then published a book about Meillassoux, in Spanish, with the Editorial of a National University of my country (Argentina). So, yes, I am quite familiar with the book. Still, I do not claim to understand all of the theorems (conclusions, if you will) of his axioms (his premises, if you will).

EDIT: If you would like to take a look at my publications about Meillassoux, or any publications of mine in general, about other topics as well, you're free to send me a Private Message, and I'll share some links with you.

Nonetheless, Spain—as the union of Castille and Aragon—is the representative entity of Spaniards, whether Catalans like it or not. — javi2541997

Está bien, buen hombre, entiendo su punto. Y se lo concedo. De hecho, yo mismo lo dije antes que usted. El Reino de Castilla y Aragón, en tanto concepto, en tanto idea, simplemente es mejor que el concepto de Catalunya, o Cataluña, etc. Pues que la discusión está aquí entonces: al nivel del lenguaje. Justamente, le pregunto, javi, ¿Usted preferiría que todo el mundo hable Català en vez de Castellano? Porque yo no. Yo estoy dispuesto a cambiar mi vocabulario y todo eso, como todo ciudadano responsable debería, pero yo no voy a dejar de hablar castellano en mi vida cotidiana sólo por el hecho de que me parece "más correcto" empezar a hablar en Català así nomás. Primero que todo, ni siquiera conozco ese idioma, lo único que conozco es de la serie "Merlí" en Netflix. Y traté de seguir la serie en el idioma original, en Català, sin subtítulos Castellanos, y simplemente no entendí nada.

Bueno, la mentalidad colectiva podría estar relacionada con los valores, costumbres, ideas... Por ejemplo: Creo que la famosa sobremesa española forma parte de nuestra mentalidad colectiva. — javi2541997

Si, no digo que sea imposible, simplemente digo que si existe (y bien podría), no está bien estudiado científicamente. Lo único que hay son teorías sociológicas, psicológicas, biológicas, etc. Pero no tienen mucha cientificidad. No en comparación con la física y la química, por ejemplo.

Thanks, @ToothyMaw. If there's any music video by any band that you would like to share, that has anything to "bring to the table" in terms of philosophical discussion, feel free to do so. In the meantime, I will share another video, since it could give us something to think about, and to talk about.



Here's the Philosophical Exercise that I would propose for that video, I'll post my own answer to this Exercise later.

1) Does everyone have to convert to veganism?
2) If one does not want to be a vegan, is one being selfish?
3) Is it Ethical to be selfish?

Whoever wishes to contribute to this Thread, can freely do so.

Military is an integral and essential part of historical and modern societies, even if we don't admit it. — ssu

Most people don't even recognize it, is what I'm saying. Or they have conspiratorial, deluded thoughts about what the military as an institution actually is. In simpler terms: ordinary people (myself included) simply don't understand some of the most important aspects of the military, and that is by definition, why? Because we're talking about classified documents, whatever those may be in each specific case. A classified document is, by definition, a document that cannot be seen by the general public. That's why many case files have a now infamous caption that says "For your eyes, only".

You cannot seriously tell me that Cataluña is better than El Reino de Aragón y Castilla. — Arcane Sandwich

I expect an answer, @javi2541997. And I'll add one more difficulty: your answer has to be related, in some way, to Australian politics.

Or don't answer : )

-- Alas, an international organisation appears to be insufficient for the most relevant matters. Look at the attitude of the UN towards Palestine, for instance. Furthermore, if Australia would have a dispute with Spain because of the eucalyptus, both nations would resolve it bilaterally. No supranational entity can do anything. — javi2541997

Well, there is one possible solution, among other possible solutions: what I call "continentalism". Continentalism is the "highest stage" of nationalism. For example, if you are a Spanish nationalist, then you can also be a European continentalist, because Spain is part of Europe. If you're an Australian nationalist, then you can be an Oceanic continentalist, because Australia is part of Oceania. If you're an Argentine nationalist, you can be a Southamerican continentalist, because Argentina is part of South America. So, you see javi, the "Hispanicidad" has nothing to do with this part of the discussion. But somehow it does, because we are having this discussion in English, not Spanish (except for a few fragments from you and me).

it is doing its best to get a multi-national peninsula. — javi2541997

Hmmm... But Spain was always a multi-national peninsula, is what they would say in response to that. The most obvious example is the Basque Country. But then there are more subtle cases, like Cataluña. You cannot seriously tell me that Cataluña is better than El Reino de Aragón y Castilla. And so it becomes a very strange thing to talk about, especially in English. Especially in a Thread called "Australian politics". Hmmm... is it correct to talk about this, here? Well, they (the Australians) are part of a monarchy, so I would say yes.

But that's not what we were just talking about, @javi2541997. What you and I were just talking about is Hispanidad, not Royalty vs Republic. Here in Argentina, there is a holiday (I can't remember what type of holiday it is, I don't want to say something barbaric), that is called "Día de la Hispanidad". I do not celebrate it myself. Because you said the following:

Al final, las raíces y la idiosincrasia pesan mucha en el alma y la mentalidad colectiva de cada pueblo. — javi2541997

Yo no siento que la Hispanidad sea parte de mi idiosincrasia. Ni que decir del alma, en la cual no creo. ¿Mentalidad colectiva? ¿Y que sería eso, buen hombre? Que yo sepa, la única mentalidad que tengo es la que está en mi cerebro, disculpe usted mi materialismo. Que existen pueblos, se lo concedo. Es que es una trivialidad decir eso. Ahora, si usted me pregunta "¿Existe la Hispanidad?" Yo que se, buen hombre. Que eso es cosa de poetas, podríamos decir. Que yo sepa, científicamente, ni siquiera está bien definido ese concepto.

Could it be because they are the Kantian oysters? Oysters in themselves are in noumenon. They are not available in the physical world. You can only eat the oysters in phenomenon, which are are brought under the physiological and chemical conditions — Corvus

Exactly. That is the correct answer. You can then add more recent metaphysical theory to that, for example Object-Oriented Ontology, also known as OOO, or simply Triple O.

But folks here don't seem to like Speculative Realism too much for some reason. I blame Alain Badiou for that.