It seems to me that you are mixing phenomenal perception (direct/indirect realism) with processuality (becoming). Direct realism (tables exist independently) and indirect realism (tables in consciousness) concern epistemology - how we know the world - and not the ontology of processuality (being as flow) or substantialism (being as essence). My hypothesis focuses on the ontological perception shaped by language, and not on the epistemological perception of reality. In the example you give, "Socrates seeking truth" remains a "snapshot". The abstract definition of a philosopher ("seeking wisdom") itself is static, since it describes a role, not a dynamic. In my approach, processuality is a continuous becoming, as in Dostoevsky ("to save oneself every moment"), Abai ("science of Zhol") or Buddha (anicca), where being flows and is not fixed even in abstraction. That is, saying that considering the expression "Socrates is a philosopher" implies not only a concrete existence ("from Athens"), but also an abstract process ("seeks wisdom"), you remain within substantialism.

BUT. All that has been said does not in any way diminish the presence of a processual approach and processual understanding in the West. Moreover, I am not saying that the West is necessarily substantial, and the East is necessarily processual. The main hypothesis was that language simply contributes to this. But this does not mean that a philosopher born in London is doomed to substantialism, and one born in Beijing to processualism. As we see, and I emphasized this in the previous answer - the East and the West mutually influence each other and, being in this involvement with each other, they mutually become and continue to do this and right now (in my opinion) we are doing exactly this. This is great

That's a really sharp observation, and it's certainly how it might appear to a non-native speaker at first glance. The reality is a bit more nuanced.
In Russian, constructions often express a state through the subject's experience or the givenness of that state, rather than through possession. When we say "Мне холодно" (literally "To me is cold"), "Мне грустно" (To me is sad), or "Мне весело" (To me is cheerful), we're using adverbs of state. This doesn't mean "cold is attacking me" or "I'm becoming an object of external force." Instead, it describes an internal sensation, answering the question, "How is it for me?" (Or, "How do I feel my current state?"). The subject here is the experiencer, not an active possessor or a passive recipient of impact.
This difference is key:

As you mentioned, in German: I have a state. (Emphasis on possession and control.)
In Russian: A state is given to me / I experience a state. (Emphasis on givenness, experience, and immediate perception.)
Does This Influence Respective Philosophies?
I can't state definitively that it does, but it's certainly thought-provoking. We were recently discussing phenomenology, and this connects quite well. To some extent, this Russian emphasis on givenness (like "мне холодно," "мне кажется" - "it seems to me," or one-word impersonal sentences like "смеркается" - "it's getting dark") resonates strongly with phenomenology without the formal method itself.
What I mean is, quite seriously, when a Russian speaker says "мне холодно," they're subconsciously sharing how they're living through that experience. In fact, I remember studying phenomenology myself, and as a native Russian speaker, it took me a long time to grasp what was fundamentally new about it compared to my everyday experience. Perhaps this contributes to forming a mindset where the focus is on perceiving what's happening rather than on actively owning one's body as property.
I must stress that I can only judge this from my own experience. If you happen to have a native Russian speaker nearby (there are many around these days, thankfully! ), just let them read this and compare their feelings with mine.

I don't know if it's intentional or not, but now you've come to compare Russian and European romanticism in literature, which is even more radical, as you put it, than Dostoevsky's. I provided references to Russian writers and philosophers at your request to support the ideas of processualism. However, I don't want to compare anyone's quality or level. My goal is to offer a new perspective in ontology. This was achieved by highlighting the linguistic differences. If, in the current situation, intelligent people start measuring themselves in terms of literature or philosophy, like the average person, then who will we have to rely on? Politicians measure economies, the military measures the size of missiles, writers measure their works, and philosophers measure their philosophies. I don't think I chose this approach. What if we stop proving and try to have mutual respect? The world is not a snapshot. Being is not a substance. What is impossible today will become commonplace tomorrow.

I agree "is" does not seem to distract from the "what", which is more pure. Whatness. Without distraction. Simply present. Letting the being continue breathing and not packing into a stagnant what through sentence structure. — Fire Ologist

Again, very interesting, congratulations. Of course this is to just tease the meat of the findings, but I find the research/evidence does allow for an astounding perspective, particularly how the classic philosophical framework is seemingly baked into the language. — Antony Nickles

Thank you for your interest and support. I was pleased with both the interest and skepticism of other participants, the approach to further analysis, and the development of ideas. Unfortunately, I did not have time to respond to all the comments, I am only now sorting them out.

Do you think we can discover something new by changing the perspective in this way?

As the article Analytic and Continental Philosophy: 4 Key Differences writes — RussellA

Interesting theory. From the Eastern perspective, continental philosophy looks quite analytical. If you cover the entire Eurasian continent and pave the way from India to Great Britain, you get a spectrum from hot and sensual to cold and analytical.

And yes, I just asked AI:

In Hindi, domes are obligatory, while in Bengali, Odia, Tamil, domes are either absent or optional.

What's even more interesting: Buddha lived in Northern India. At that time, the main languages of the region were Prakrit languages - colloquial dialects derived from Sanskrit, as opposed to the literary Sanskrit used in Vedic texts.
The most likely language that Buddha spoke was Pali or the closely related Prakrit of Magadha. Pali became the language of canonical Buddhist texts (Tripitaka), since it was considered close to the spoken language of Buddha. Magadhi was the main dialect of the region where the Buddha preached.

Copula in Pali:
In Pali, as in other Prakrits, the copula is the verb असति (asati, "to be"), derived from Sanskrit asti. In the present tense, the copula is often used in statements of identity or quality: for example, "सो भिक्खु असति" (so bhikkhu asati, "He is a monk"). However, in colloquial speech and some contexts, the copula could be omitted, especially in descriptive sentences: "सो भिक्खु" (so bhikkhu, "He is a monk"), which is similar to Russian ("Socrates is a philosopher") or Kazakh ("adam aqyldy").
In the past tense, the copula is obligatory: "सो भिक्खु आसि" (so bhikkhu āsi, "He was a monk"), as in Hindi (thā) or Russian ("there was a doctor"). Pali also uses constructions without copula to express states or qualities, especially in philosophical texts: "सब्बं अनिच्चं" (sabbam aniccam, "Everything is impermanent"), where the copula is implied but not explicitly stated.

I know of two cultures which have been claimed as thinking radically differently about being, presence and purpose in comparison with Western approaches. Heidegger singled out pre-Socratic thinkers like Heraclitus and Parmenides as understanding becoming in a fundamental way that was derailed when Socrates, Plato and Aristotle shifted the focus on beings and truth as correctness, and Western thinking has followed suite ever since. It didnt matter to Heidegger whether a language like Russian was missing the present tense copula or not. What mattered was what kind of philosophical and religious literature was produced within those languages without the copula. If the simple absence of the copula in a language predisposes their culture toward modes of thought which avoid the trap of fixing becoming into being, where is the evidence of this in their philosophical writings? — Joshs

I am not aware of any Russian philosophers who directly linked the absence of a copula in the language to a different approach to understanding reality. Perhaps someone has mentioned this, but it is unknown to me. However, I can speak about the distinct approach of Russian philosophers to being. (For them, as for Heidegger, the presence or absence of a copula in language was not significant.)

I will try to explain what this distinction entails in the context of our discussion. This is a very interesting topic, and I would like to start with Dostoevsky, although he was not an academic philosopher, his literary works are considered philosophical.
Dostoevsky viewed human being as a process tied to freedom and moral choice, rather than a static essence. In Notes from Underground (1864), the protagonist—the underground man—rejects rationalistic determinism, symbolized by the “crystal palace,” a utopian idea where human behavior is predictable and subject to the laws of nature. He asserts that human being is defined by free will, even if it leads to irrational or self-destructive actions: “Man needs… only independent volition, whatever it may cost and wherever it may lead.”. "Eh, gentlemen, what kind of free will is there when it comes to arithmetic, when only twice two four is in use? Twice two will be four without my will. Is this what free will is?"
(https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/can-dostoevsky-still-kick-you-in-the-gut)

In The Brothers Karamazov (1880), Elder Zosima teaches that life is a continuous process of spiritual becoming, where each moment of choice brings a person closer to or further from God: “Every moment one must save oneself.” He describes being as a movement through time, shaped by love and responsibility.
For Dostoevsky, being is not a fixed state but a dynamic process of struggle, doubt, and spiritual becoming. Each moment of choice shapes a person, making their existence open and unfinished. This resonates with the idea of “living in becoming,” where being is not a sequence of fixed “snapshots” but a dynamic process tied to will and responsibility.
The Russian-Ukrainian philosopher Grigory Skovoroda, in his work Narcissus, viewed being as a triadic unity of the macrocosm (the universe), the microcosm (the human), and symbolic reality (Holy Scripture). He emphasized that being is a process of uncovering the invisible divine nature, not a static essence.
Nikolai Berdyaev clearly distinguished between “being” and “existence” in works such as The Philosophy of Freedom (1911) and The Meaning of the Creative Act (1916). He argued that being is tied to spiritual freedom and creativity, while existence refers to the material, objective world subject to necessity.
Similarly, the works of Alexei Losev (1893–1988) reveal ideas of the processuality of being. For example, in his multi-volume History of Ancient Aesthetics, Losev reinterprets the Platonic eidos as a dialectical process rather than a static form. He writes: “Eidos is a becoming form, a living dialectic of matter and meaning” (Volume 1, section “Platonic Eidos”). For Losev, being is not a fixed substance but a process of interaction between form, matter, and the subject, where every thing is constantly transformed through its meaning.
Russian philosophy, developing from the 18th century, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, differs from Western philosophy in its emphasis on spirituality, existential questions, and a holistic perception of being. It is often tied to the religious and mystical traditions of Orthodoxy. Unlike Western philosophy, which, starting with Descartes and Kant, focused on rationalism, systematization, and substantialism, Russian thought leans toward processuality, intuitiveness, and ethical reflection. Russian philosophers such as Vladimir Solovyov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Alexei Losev, Grigory Skovoroda, and Fyodor Dostoevsky (as a thinker) often viewed being as a dynamic process tied to freedom, creativity, and spiritual becoming, rather than a static essence.
Undoubtedly, there were other Russian philosophers who thought in the context of substantialism, but those I have listed are studied in universities as having had the greatest influence on Russian philosophy as a whole.

To complete the picture, I will give an example from Kazakh philosophy
Abai Kunanbayev (1845-1904) viewed being as a dynamic process of spiritual and moral improvement. In "Words of Edification" (for example, the 25th word), he emphasizes that a person must constantly develop through reason, labor and morality: "Reason and labor are the main qualities that an ideal person must master." His philosophy emphasizes the continuous movement towards enlightenment, overcoming ignorance and achieving harmony with society and nature. In poems such as "Spring" or "Summer", nature is depicted as a changeable, living force, reflecting the process of becoming a person and society.

For Heidegger, the process of being is an analytical disclosure of Dasein through care, where the subject exists in "abandonment" and is directed towards death. This is a more abstract and universal approach, without drama or ethical passion. The Eastern approach is more emotional, spiritual, connected with personal ethics, with a development that may be erroneous but humane.

Were these works inspired by the absence of a copula in the language? I don’t know. In any case, I am unaware of any works that explicitly state, “We have no copula, therefore we are processualists.” Is my idea speculative? Perhaps. But then what philosophical intuition is non-speculative?

It may be argued that the words used in language are more metaphorical than they are literal, if you get my drift, and it is the nature of the metaphor that there is no essence, statis or fixity of meaning. — RussellA

I also want to say that it's quite possible the very framing of the question, the very premise, might be a kind of speculation or a misunderstanding on my part. This is precisely why I published it here—so that philosophers or simply native speakers could offer guidance, direction, or challenge my ideas.

At the same time, I want to share with you that by starting from this premise, I was able to arrive at something new in the subsequent chapters of my work.

If we stop fixating on essence and separate the concepts of sushchee (existent) and bytie (being), we can arrive at some interesting conclusions. The very notions of bytie and sushchee in Russian are something different. To exist (sushchestvovat’) simply means to be in a state where your attributes do not change by your own will (a stone lying on the ground, a tree growing according to its program, or an AI operating by an algorithm). To be (byt’) is something more than mere existence. It's roughly what happens when something can change its attributes at its own discretion (a prime example is a human, but not necessarily only them).

I write in more detail about the attributes of sushchee in my work. In due time, I will share all of this, so as not to lead the current conversation too far astray. But these intuitions came from the very feeling that byt’ and sushchestvovat’ are two different things.

Being, in my opinion, is not just a snapshot or a sequence of snapshots that can be captured. Yes, it can be done and it can be described to an external observer in this way. And it will be scientific and substantiated and very Western. But being is something more. It is what makes it possible to capture, film or feel. To live in becoming.

I think you're saying phenomenology is a kind of fraud. I think it is in some cases, but ontology is an empty building in my mind. Nobody lives there, and it's fairly important to me that it stay that way. — frank

No, it is not so clear-cut. I believe that phenomenology has given the very possibility of philosophically rethinking the Western approach to understanding the world.

Eastern traditions proceed from the direct experience of being: be it "awakening" in Zen, "liberation" in Vedanta or "the path" in Taoism. This experience can be paradoxical, but it is considered reliable without rational justification.

The Western mind (especially since the New Age) was brought up in the paradigm of rationality, analysis, proof, so phenomenology is like a methodical path back to the intuitive. Through descriptions of intentionality, the "life of consciousness", the horizon of meaning, it makes possible an approach to this Eastern "self-evident".

Phenomenology is like an intellectual bridge, with the help of which the Western mind was able to come to a contemplative, immediate, "Eastern" way of perceiving being. At the same time, it remains Western in its style of thinking: it seeks a path through awareness, not through the rejection of consciousness.

For example:
Husserl: epoche - "removing" attitudes in order to see things as they are. Zen: shikantanza (just sitting) - full presence without analysis.

Heidegger: Gelassenheit - letting go, allowing to be. Dao: wu wei - non-action as a way to correspond to the path.

Wittgenstein emphasized the ambiguity of the verb “to be”. He denied there was such a thing as identity, reasoning that i) to say two things are identical is nonsense and ii) to say one thing is identical with itself is to say nothing.

Frege distinguished different meanings of “is”.
1) Identity – Bachelors are unmarried – have the same meaning
2) Copula – Plato was Greek – one characteristic of the subject
3) Existence - There are cats – some things exist
4) Generic class - A horse is a four-legged animal – several characteristics of the subject — RussellA

I think I understand what you are talking about and it intrigues me.

But here comes a very subtle point: although we imply identity, existence or generic class, nevertheless we kind of fix it in reality, indicating that it IS.

To be honest, I cannot imagine how the copula is thought of by a native speaker who has been using this language (for example, English, German or Greek) since birth, but for me, since English is not my native language, and my native language is Russian, this is perceived as an indication, confirmation, disclosure of content and fixation in reality itself.

For example: The cat is black. In Russian I will say "koshka chernaya", simply adding an adjective to the noun, just two words without IS. In Kazakh it will sound "мысық қара" similar to the Russian language.

The copula Is is added in Russian, but only when talking about tenses: past: "koshka byla chernaya" (the cat was black); in the future: "koshka budet chernaya" (the cat will be black). In the Kazakh language, everything is exactly the same, only the word order changes. "Mysyk Kara Boldy" (the cat was black); in the future: "Mysyk Kara Bolady" (the cat will be black).

I understand your idea, but I am talking about the need for fixation in being in Western languages, which, as I assume, is reflected in the very feeling of the world: Something is possible only when it is fixed. Hence these metaphors about our life being like a film on film (like a series of frames), but each frame separately is as if IT IS, it is fixed.

Probably, I could not express my thought in such a way as to emphasize its content. I did not object to the clarification that Heidegger was not a substantialist. I said that the very attempt to search for who Heidegger was is connected with the search for Heidegger's substance, which we do willingly or unwillingly.

I spoke about as a general property of philosophical discourse, where even attempts to talk about becoming remain within the framework of the substantialist habit.

As for the place of the subject and where the world is heading, I ask you to wait a little, all this will happen, but later. Everyone who responded to my work gave me many new human views, and secondly, hope that what I write about ontology will be interesting to the reader. This discussion is precisely what contributes to my text becoming more academic. And this encourages me to work further.

I was truly thrilled to see how vividly and thoughtfully you all responded to my work, "The Language of Philosophy."

As I read through the comments, I had a thought: they not only added new dimensions to our conversation but, and this is the most amazing part, they affirmed my main idea far more powerfully than I could have imagined!

I wrote about how the grammatical structure of language, especially the verb "to be," pushes us to search for a static, unchanging essence. And here's what I saw in our discussion: when I suggested we move beyond this and think of being as "becoming," we all, time and again, reverted to that familiar logic.

When RussellA and Count Timothy von Icarus cited the Italian verbs "essere" and "stare" or Heraclitus, you weren't, in essence, moving away from the concept of "being," but merely finding its different forms—permanent and temporary. The core ambition remained to define "what is" or "what was."

When Joshs and frank debated whether change is possible without rest, I saw a fascinating, yet ultimately still an attempt to reduce the dynamic of "becoming" to two fundamental, "substantial" categories—rest and change. This is the search for the basic elements that constitute being.

And even when Joshs spoke about Heidegger, who, as he correctly noted, grounded "is" in the event of "unfolding," this was, in essence, an effort to find that very first principle, that "root" of our being.

Our entire discussion, paradoxically, became a living illustration of my work.

We weren't just discussing my idea—we were proving it in practice, involuntarily demonstrating how deeply ingrained our habit is to search for "substance" when we talk about being. This realization struck me so profoundly that I simply had to share it.

My observation is by no means a criticism. Rather, it's about how, without realizing it, we continue to operate within this very paradigm of searching for the primary substance. The very format of our discussion is built on this: "M. said: A is B." "K. replied: Is A really B? For example, philosopher M believes that B consists of D + E, but E cannot be a part of A..." and so on. Substantialism, objectivism—this is a reliable train that has allowed us to travel into space and communicate with each other from thousands of miles away. But have we become happier, more friendly, more joyful? And if we consider what is happening in modern ontology (Object-Oriented Ontology or correlationism) and science (the constant refinement of AI, which is increasingly used as a weapon rather than a friend and assistant, and which is developing at an incredible speed), a doubt arises: is this train heading in the right direction, or is it a direction where there will be no room for the subject?

Your comment highlighted a very interesting point that I wasn't aware of, as I don't speak Italian. With the help of AI, I was able to examine the grammatical constructions using essere and stare, from which I've found that:

Sono arrabbiato (I am angry) vs. Sto arrabbiato (I am in a state of being angry). The first sentence can be perceived as a more fundamental characteristic of a person's identity, while the second is a temporary, transient mood.

In Russian, this is expressed as: «Я злой» (I am angry, i.e., always angry) or «Я злюсь» (I'm getting angry, I am in a state of anger).

Another example: Come sta? (How are you staying/being?) is a standard greeting that focuses attention on the current moment of one's well-being. It is not a question about "who you are" (Chi sei?), but about "how you are situated" (Come stai?).

One might think there's no difference, as English also has the verbs to be and to become. However: To become in English describes the process of transitioning from one state to another. For example, "The caterpillar becomes a butterfly." This is a verb of change, not a verb of being in a state. And the verb to become is not used as a linking verb in just any sentence.

Similarly, English has the present continuous tense (am/is/are + V+ing), which describes an action happening at the moment, not a state or a quality. It is used like this: "I am writing a letter"—this is an action, not a state of being.

BUT! Let's take the greeting, "How are you doing?" Is this an action or a state?

All of this points to the following:

One cannot radicalize the assertion of being as process for the East and being as static for the West.

The existence of such distinctions in the Italian language suggests that it is natural for humans to feel both a certain sense of the processuality of being and its static nature.



As Count Timothy von Icarus correctly observes, there are indeed works in Western philosophy that discuss processuality, and I don't dispute that. I'm arguing that the very act of thinking about processuality requires a conscious effort to break free from the pattern of substantialism.

You're absolutely right to point out those philosophers. However, while processualists existed (and had a significant impact), they were in the minority. The dominant paradigm was, and remains, substantialism. To speak of process, one had to deliberately step outside of this paradigm, and that was not an easy task.

The influence of processualist philosophers is undeniable, but they were working against the current. Philosophers who thought in terms of an unchanging essence and substance had a far greater impact on the broader worldview: Parmenides, Aristotle, for whom substance was the foundation of reality; René Descartes with his ideas of the substances res cogitans and res extensa.

It is this tradition that, I believe, created a pattern of thinking that influenced European languages and, as a result, philosophy itself.



Here is what I write about the hypothesis of linguistic relativity in another chapter of my work:

The previous analysis of the linguistic structures of various cultural traditions revealed a diversity of ways of expressing (or not expressing) being and entities. This diversity, manifested in the grammatical features of languages - from the Indo-European copula "is" to its optional nature in Russian and its absence in Turkic and Chinese languages - emphasizes the variability of ontological perspectives rooted in language. However, this observation requires strict methodological reflection in order to avoid hasty or unfounded conclusions. The assertion of a fundamental difference in ontological attitudes, for example, between Western and Eastern traditions, cannot be accepted without further in-depth analysis. Language, as E. Sapir and B. L. Whorf noted in their hypothesis of linguistic relativity, can influence cognitive and philosophical categories, but the extent of this influence remains a matter of debate. Conclusions about the direct determination of thinking by language require caution, since cultural, historical and social contexts also play a significant role and language changes dynamically. Language is constantly subject to change and formation. It follows that one should not blindly rely only on the “feeling of the word”. Nevertheless, the phenomenological approach to linguistic differences, which presupposes living these differences as a direct experience, opens up new perspectives for the philosophical understanding of being. The very feeling of recognizing the fundamental differences between languages is significant for us. The value of such an approach lies not in establishing universal patterns, but in the possibility of rethinking familiar ontological categories through a change in perspective.

Thank you for your interesting and varied comments! I am glad that my work touched you! Unfortunately, I was unable to participate in the discussion, but I will try to answer everyone as I study your comments.

That is, the life of the body is the actuality of our soul as a spiritual essence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would like to express my full agreement with this approach.

When I think about this, it seems very strange. The tradition that tends most towards literalism ends up also paying the least attention to concrete instantiations of the faith. And yet maybe it makes sense in a certain way. In the Anglophone context, ethics if often thought to be the main substance of the Church. But this is often paired with a view of ethics as sitting entirely outside nature as command. Likewise, a view of God as primarily will, and of notions of nature as a potentially nefarious limit on that will, would tend towards demoting nature in a way. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am a parishioner of the Orthodox Church. But I send my friends who profess Orthodoxy and do not understand it, who just want to pray a little or listen to a sermon, to a Catholic church and they like it there better. Those who have visited a Catholic church then share their impressions of the simplicity and clarity of what is happening. Those who have visited a Catholic church are happy with the lack of pretentiousness, as well as the lack of the need to stand on their feet the entire service, listening to something in an incomprehensible Old Church Slavonic language (inherent in the Orthodox Church).

And they just like it, and personally I think that in religion it is very important that it finds a response in you

Thank you for your profound and inspiring response! I sense that for you, religion is not merely a rational comprehension but also a mystical, intentional experience, which deeply resonates with my own approach.

I’d like to share another idea related to my ontological inquiries, hoping it will pique your interest. Inspired by the ideas of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, I distinguish between existence and being. Existence is a passive state, the boundaries, tension, embodiment, and relatedness to others of which are defined externally: a stone, a tree (following its biological program), or an AI (executing an algorithm). These are “existents,” which simply are. Being (Dasein), on the other hand, is the capacity of an existent to redefine itself autonomously, driven by its inner freedom and aspirations. Being is a gift; it is a unique state of an existent. For instance, a human, through cognition and choice, possesses the ability to redefine all four criteria of existence—boundedness (ограниченность), tension (напряжённость), embodiment (воплощённость), and relatedness to others (причастность к другому)—and the stronger this capacity, the fuller their being.

Applying this to the dualistic concept of the soul, which supposedly leaves the body after death, I ask: where is the being in this? Can such a soul, deprived of a body, redefine itself? Can it even perceive itself? Can it aspire to anything? Based on the texts I’ve studied, the answer seems to be no. A separated soul appears as something that affects neither itself nor the world—akin to a stone. If so, what is its being, and what is the purpose of such an existence?

This question was the starting point for my essay. If this approach intrigues you, could you share your thoughts? How do you view the soul in the context of being and existence?

I apologize in advance for any confusion in terms, as the translator cannot cope with the semantic translation

I would like if we could discuss more things together, especially philosophy! I’m fascinated by your essay and I would like to hear more about your thought process. Would you like to talk sometime? it's alright if you cannot. — Null Noir

Of course, I'm always open to conversation!

I like your approach. Earlier, in the comments, I already referred to Descartes and his pineal gland as an attempt at a simple explanation of everything, which, judging by the popularity of this idea today, sounded simple and clear.

But since I am primarily interested not in theology, but in ontology (as are you, judging by your comments) and phenomenology, I wanted to try to deconstruct the Cartesian approach to human anthropology, to look in the fundamentals. Based on the theses that I outlined in the essay, the comments on this forum, early Christianity was something completely different from what is understood by it today. It was also perhaps something different in relation to the Aristotelian approach to ontology.

Will I be able to grasp this? I do not know, but I would like to get more diverse opinions on this matter, after which I would like to correct my essay.

Astorre, your essay is absolutely amazing. More amazing than any of the answers I have recieved so far. Are you studying theology? — Null Noir

Thank you! I'm studying ontology and phenomenology. This is my first attempt to talk about theology. However, I must admit that I wrote this article based on similar questions that you asked at the beginning of the topic.

I recommend reading my essay on this topic. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/16096/the-origins-and-evolution-of-anthropological-concepts-in-christianity

Thank you for this clarification. I was unaware of the history of this term and in using it I was describing older ideas. "Monism" could have been used with the same success. My questions are not about terminology but rather about ideology. I am not interested in which teaching more accurately conveys the idea or metaphysics of that time. I am interested in the justification or refutation of the idea of monism in Christianity. I am interested in whether dualism, as well as the stories of heaven and hell, are later superstructures.

I had rather thought that Aristotle was the greater influence on Western (Catholic) Christianity due to the rediscovery of his works from the Islamic world. And that Platonism was more of an influence on Orthodox Christianity through Pseudo-Dionysius and other sources. Although it’s true that Plato is writ large in all of this. But I once put this to an Orthodox father and he was in agreement. — Wayfarer

That's the whole point. I don't know why, but the Fathers of the Orthodox Church don't talk about the idea of holism at all in private conversations. They answer questions based on dualism. Maybe it's the influence of Western culture (for example, films or literature), but the idea of dualism (soul + body, with the subsequent separation of the soul after death) seems self-evident to everyone. Personally, I came across the problem that served as the impetus for writing my essay purely by chance, through independent study. As it turned out in the process of writing, my intuition did not fail me and there is something in it.

And what is your personal opinion (not necessarily in the context of Christianity) does a person consist of a soul and a body or is he one?

I think the more developed Eastern theology of the Transfiguration marks a difference in emphasis here too. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thank you all for your insightful and thoughtful comments! Your comments helped me to better understand the topic and to clarify some aspects of the essay. In response to your reflections, especially on the holistic approach in Orthodoxy (Count Timothy von Icarus) and on the balance between dualism and monism (Leontiskos), I would like to share the results of a phenomenological analysis that I conducted while visiting a Catholic and an Orthodox church. My goal is to relate these observations to the discussed topic of anthropology in Christianity.

For my research, I used a phenomenological method (inspired by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) to describe how the liturgical experience in the churches of the two faiths manifests itself through bodily perception, intentionality, temporality, and the world of the senses. Here are my observations:

Catholic church:

Bodily experience: Lightness, a sense of verticality, airiness, “going up.”

Intentionality: Direction towards the transcendental — arrows of arches, light, striving towards the sky.

Givenness of the world: God is perceived as transcendental, calling, luminous.

Temporariness: Striving towards the future, dynamics of movement.

World of feelings: Clarity, cold light, harmony.

Orthodox church:

Bodily experience: Weight, feeling of confinement, “oppressive presence”.

Intentionality: Immersion within, all-consuming presence in the sacred.

Givenness of the world: God as all-present, dense, mysterious.

Temporariness: Stopping time, feeling of eternal present.

World of feelings: Warm shadow, richness of icon painting, sound fullness (singing, ringing of bells).

The purpose of this analysis was not to compare confessions with the aim of favoring one over the other, but to try to understand how liturgical experience shapes human perception, including ideas about soul, body and spirit. These observations, combined with the literature and our discussion, suggest differences in the anthropological approaches of Catholicism and Orthodoxy.

In the Catholic church, the liturgical experience emphasizes transcendence and aspiration to the divine, which may reflect a dualistic understanding: the soul is perceived as separate from the body and directed towards God, and heaven and hell are posthumous states or places. In the Orthodox church, the experience is more immanent, mystical, with an emphasis on the holistic presence of God in the world and man. This corresponds to a holistic approach, where soul, body and spirit are inseparable, and heaven and hell can be understood as states experienced already in earthly life through the body and senses.

These differences may be related to the influence of Platonism on Western Christianity, as we have discussed earlier (e.g. through Augustine), and to the persistence in Orthodoxy of a more monistic anthropology rooted in Eastern Fathers such as Maximus the Confessor or Gregory Palamas. Do you think that these phenomenological intuitions may point to differences in the anthropological views of the confessions? And can such an approach be used to further explore the topic of dualism and monism in Christianity?

Yes, perhaps this is the right word. AI suggests something like "communion." I will simply try to explain it: for a native Russian speaker, "communion" evokes a sense of deep involvement, participation, and almost mystical unity with something. In an Old Slavic context, the word may be associated with a religious or spiritual act (for example, "communion" in Orthodoxy as a connection to the divine).

In general, I identify such features of existence as limitations and Communion. In addition, there are two more features: Embodiment and Tension. I would like to discuss the main work in a consistent manner over time, breaking it down into separate essays on this forum. I hope for your "participation" in the future!

Yes

I wonder if this is at all relatable to Gilles Deleuze idea of the fundamental nature of difference? I only know about it from comments made here on this forum, but it strikes me that there’s a similarity. — Wayfarer

My work generally resonates with the ideas of Whitehead and Deleuze, but I add some additional layers to them. This slightly veers off from the main topic.

For instance, the next characteristic in my ontology is participation. Existence is possible not only through the difference of one from another but also through participation (like a tree with the soil or a beetle with dung)—in other words, difference alone is not enough. I consistently argue that something cannot exist on its own, and participation is precisely an ontological characteristic. Returning to your example—organisms do not merely maintain boundaries but exist through active participation in their environment, without which neither the environment nor the organisms themselves would be possible.

In Russian, I use the term "причастность," which doesn’t fully translate into English as "participation." Unfortunately, I cannot find a perfect English equivalent that captures its complete meaning.

I’ve probably strayed too far from the main topic.

Perhaps you might elaborate on why you think this must be so? (not that I don't agree with you!) — Wayfarer

I’m happy to answer your question, as it’s part of my broader work. I’ll try to describe this idea concisely, avoiding unnecessary elaboration.

My work is grounded in a process-oriented approach to ontology. Instead of seeking a final substance of everything, I’ve aimed to identify the key ontological characteristics of being—that is, the traits that define the existence of something. One such characteristic is limitation (not in the Kantian sense, but ontologically). Something is always distinct from something else; it always exists within certain boundaries. The uniqueness of human being, compared to other entities, lies in the ability to consciously alter some of its boundaries or limits, for example, through knowledge. However, boundaries must always be drawn, even if temporarily. Without boundaries, there is nothing to contain. Something without boundaries becomes nothing (just as a river that loses its banks ceases to be a river, or a planet that loses its limits ceases to be a planet). The same applies to human knowledge. Knowledge inherently requires boundaries. These boundaries must lie somewhere between knowing and not-knowing. Complete knowledge of everything would mean the absence of any boundary to knowledge, and the absence of a boundary implies the absence of being itself.

This is a rather complex explanation of my idea at the ontological level, but I hope you find it interesting.

People continue to live despite the lack of a definitive answer to the question of meaning, finding an irrational impulse that keeps them going. Let's leave it at that

I wonder the same things… — Fire Ologist

Frankly speaking, it seems to me that the idea of the resurrection of a person as a whole looks much more inconsistent to our contemporary than the separation of the soul after death. The soul cannot be measured (although some have tried), it is difficult to prove or disprove the exit of the soul from the body, but the decay of the body looks very clear. It will probably be very difficult to believe that the dust will then rise again. Ordinary people, not interested in theology, with whom I spoke, do not imagine any resurrection after their death at all. They all talk about purgatory and subsequent distribution in heaven or hell. Perhaps the current dualistic or trinitarian approach looks simpler, clearer and more logical to a contemporary.

You pose an interesting question with a well thought out OP. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thank you for your deep and meaningful comments. I admit honestly, this is my first work on a Christian theme in my life, and reading your review I felt like a small fish in the ocean.

Indeed, the idea of resurrection was not new for that time. However, according to my information, it was not the central teaching for all of Judaism as a whole. The revolutionary nature of Christianity consisted in establishing this idea as central to the entire religion. But this is a very valuable remark and I will correct it in the essay.

Regarding the fact that Platonic ideas in that world were already gradually "growing into" the searches of progressive philosophers, I also have no doubt. But still, in my opinion, they were not a mass phenomenon at that time.

Reading your comment on the sanctity of relics, I caught myself thinking that I had not taken this phenomenon into account at all. Based on the main message of my essay, preserving the relics of saints in parts generally looks like depriving the deceased of the opportunity for resurrection.

In general, all the later superstructures of philosophers and theologians, who asked good questions as civilization developed and sought consistent answers to their questions, in my opinion lead to the fact that the basic idea itself is in complete decline. For example, Descartes was so carried away by the search for an interface connecting the soul and body that he proposed the existence of the pineal gland, which magically resolved all questions.

In conclusion, I would like to present you with an idea from the Orthodox confession about holism. Holism is a view of man as a single, inseparable, spiritual-mental-physical personality. There is no opposition of spirit and matter, but their interpenetration and interaction. As light permeates the air, so the soul permeates the body, forming a single whole. Unfortunately, I do not know for what reason, but none of the Orthodox priests I met mentioned this topic until I became familiar with it myself. Can you share with me about this area if you have knowledge on this topic?

I wonder if you would be willing to provide a rough bibliography for your ideas? — Leontiskos

There's a little bit of complexity to that. The fact is that my native language is Russian. I read books in Russian and write in Russian, and then translate with the help of translators or AI. I check the relevance of what was written using the reverse translation from Google. Bibliography is another matter. It is prepared, but in Russian. Below I will give a bibliography as the translator will translate it, but I cannot check the relevance of its translation. I apologize for this complexity but I can recommend using AI to find an analogue in English

1. Bible. Old and New Testament scripture books. Synodal translation. - M.: Russian Bible Society, 2012.

2. Plato. Fedon/State/Laws. Per. from ancient Greece. A. N. Egunova, F. A. Petrovsky and others - M.: Thought, 1994. - (Philosophical Heritage Series).

3. Irenaeus of Lyons. Against heresies. Per. with lat. and Greek N. N. Shevchenko. - St. Petersburg: Oleg Abyshko Publishing House, 2012. - (Church Fathers series).

4. Origen. About beginnings. Per. and entry. Art. I. D. Kuzmina. - M.: Nauka, 2000. - (Monuments of philosophical thought).

5. Clement of Alexandria. Stromates (Carpet patterns). Kn. I–III. Per. A.V. Sidorova. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House "ABC-Classics," 2007.

6. Augustine the Blessed. About the city of God. Per. with lat. A. S. Demina. - St. Petersburg: Amphora/OLMA Media Group, 2008. - (Series "Philosophy of the Middle Ages").

7. Apocalypse of Peter//Apocrypha of ancient Christians. Volume 1. Apocalypses. Per., Entry. Art. and comm. A.V. Mikhailova. - M.: Ladomir, 1997.

8. Gadamer, H.-G. Truth and method. Per. with nem. T.I. Oiserman and Ya. A. Borovoy. - M.: Progress, 1988.

This is a very interesting and fascinating topic for me. In addition to your conclusions, I would like to present some of my views, which I will express briefly.

1. AI does not have its own bodily way of perceiving the world. Everything that AI "knows" about us, about our affairs, it takes from human texts. Returning to the ideas of Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, AI is deprived of temporality and finitude, it is deprived of living experience. Today it is a complex algorithmic calculator.

2. I am convinced that the origins of being, which make a person who he is, cannot be known rationally. But if such knowledge occurs, the meaning of being itself will immediately disappear and it will simply disappear. If we describe the theory of being programmatically and algorithmically, it turns out that the very purpose of being is to execute the algorithm. Finding meaning leads to the loss of meaning.

Хотя я не смотрел видео, — практика

Judging by the answer, you not only did not watch the video, but also did not read what I wrote.

The author criticizes religion for the lack of a uniform approach to such concepts as life after death, achieving it, and also for the fact that in all religions there is a certain superhero who gives the truth.

I suggested a new layer: what if the idea of ​​life after death is, first of all, an attempt to justify ethics. you behave well, after death you get a continuation of life in heaven. the concept of behaving well for different times and societies has different content. hence the different ways to get to "heaven" in different religions.

I only said that as a tool for justifying good behavior, religions do not contradict each other.

For example, the Wheel of Samsara in Hinduism served as one of the ideological justifications for the caste system, explaining social inequality through karma and motivating people to follow caste duties for the sake of a better rebirth. the idea of Valhalla for the Vikings justified courage, heroism and risk for warriors. the idea of humility in the name of heaven in Christianity made it easier for the lowest classes to accept their oppression.

The list goes on and on. The main idea is that the justification through the afterlife (or rebirth) has always served for ethic

I will start off with a couple pro's I see for less gun control. — Samlw

I’d like to revisit the question: “Do citizens need the right to own firearms?” and break down the common arguments for and against gun ownership.

Arguments in favor of gun ownership:

National Security. Some argue that an armed populace could deter foreign invasions. In reality, any aggressor would account for this and likely avoid ground invasions, especially in an era of advanced technology and nuclear threats. The idea that civilians would unite and effectively resist a professional army is more romantic than realistic. History, like Middle Eastern conflicts, shows that armed rebels often cause chaos among civilians rather than successfully oppose organized forces.

Self-Defense. Owning a gun for self-defense sounds reasonable, but its practical effectiveness is questionable. Using a firearm effectively requires training and composure under pressure—skills most civilians lack. For non-professionals (unlike police or security), the risks of losing the weapon, escalating conflicts, or failing to use it in time outweigh the benefits.

Personal Freedom. Claiming that guns ensure personal freedom often boils down to “don’t mess with me, I’m armed.” This isn’t freedom—it’s a threat that can provoke rather than protect. True freedom means living without fear, not brandishing a weapon.

Deterring Tyranny. The notion that armed citizens could resist a tyrannical government is appealing but unrealistic. State security forces are designed to uphold authority, and any resistance would likely be swiftly crushed. In a civil war scenario, widespread gun ownership would fuel chaos, not prevent it.

Arguments against gun ownership:

Weapons in the Wrong Hands. No licensing or mental health screening can fully eliminate human error. A lost, stolen, or misused gun can lead to tragedy—imagine a forgotten pistol ending up with someone unstable.
Increased Mortality. Firearms amplify the consequences of conflicts. An angry or unstable person with a gun can cause catastrophic harm. U.S. statistics (13.7 deaths per 100,000 people) show a clear correlation between gun availability and higher violence rates.
My stance: Ideally, firearms should be limited to those who need them for their profession (military, hunters, high-level security). For most citizens, guns pose more risks than benefits. With over 400 million firearms in the U.S., drastic measures won’t solve the issue overnight, but that’s no excuse for inaction. Gradual steps—stricter licensing, gun amnesties, biometric trigger locks, and harsher penalties for illegal possession—could reduce violence over time. It’s a marathon, not a sprint.

Why Religions Fail — Art48

I watched your video, where it repeats for 10 minutes:
1. No one knows what will happen after death, since:
2. Religions contradict each other
3. All religions are based on superhero stories
4. Science does not contradict itself

I propose another question: for what purpose did humanity ask the question "what will happen after death? . "Was the answer to this question important, or did the answer to this question justify ethics?

I think the man of that time did well, because he would be saved after death. In my opinion, the basis of the search for an answer to the question that after death is the justification of ethics. Of course, good and bad actions in different societies are different actions. Hence, in my opinion, such discrepancies. You say that religions are contradictory, but I think not really: do well and you will be saved, that's what they have in common. Another thing is that a different concept is good everywhere.

By the way, Zaroastrianism (the first monotheistic religion) argued 3 postulates: Good thought. Good word. Good deed. Little has changed in religions since then.

So I wonder if one of the big lies is the popular notion that 'politics doesn’t matter because they’re all corrupt.' It seems to me that this idea disempowers voters by lowering their expectations and participation and ends up empowering the baser opportunists to gain more control. — Tom Storm

From here we get:
Train. You can choose one of the cars, but this will not change the direction of the train. You can also choose not to board the train (denying the performance), but the easier it will be for the driver.

There is also the factor of ‘outrage fatigue’ - norms of truthfulness and decency are broken so often and with so little apparent consequence, that it becomes normalized. — Wayfarer

May I ask you to describe this concept in more detail?

What’s a current example of a big lie? — Tom Storm

Tom Storm, yes, the media has always been divided into reactionary and progressive, as in my example with Trump's tariffs. But the "big lie" today is the illusion of pluralism: Narratives seem diverse but distort facts, polarizing people.
People repeat the discourses of the media, almost no one has their own opinion. The dominance of one opinion over another is ensured by the number of invested resources.

All that worries us about politics is the result of reproducing what we are given. There is no real opinion, we just choose which train car to board, but we do not choose the direction of the train itself.

I’d still need to see this in action to understand your point properly. — Tom Storm

As long as you read more than the headline, the BBC, Sky News, and many established newspaper in my country have a largely objective coverage. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Good. I will try to give a practical example of my conclusions. For analysis, I will choose two major American news outlets Fox News and CNN. I'll analyze the news about Trump's tariffs in early 2025 to show how their filing shapes different emotions among readers. To do this, I use my proposed method of "clearing" news of emotions, followed by comparing narratives
Bare facts:
1.Trump announced tariffs on goods from Mexico, Canada and China.
2.Tariffs on Mexico and Canada covered by USMCA agreement delayed
3.Tariffs have caused volatility in the stock market, and some experts have expressed concern about a possible recession.

Fox News Feed: Positive Tone: Tariffs are described as part of a "Make America Wealthy Again" strategy to bring jobs back to the U.S. Mentioned is "Liberation Day," an emotionally charged title that evokes a sense of patriotism and liberation. Trump support: Trump's quote that the United States will become "so rich that it will not know where to spend money" underscores optimism and confidence. Risk minimization: Although market volatility is mentioned, the emphasis is on Trump's long-term strategy, compared to China's "100-year perspective," which creates the image of a visionary leader.

Emotional effect: Pride in US economic independence, confidence in the success of Trump's policies, minimizing anxiety about economic risks. Readers are likely to feel supported by Trump's actions and optimistic about the future.

CNN feed Negative tone: Tariffs link to consumer and business "angst," as well as "stock market decline." It is mentioned that the cost of tariffs is "passed on to consumers," emphasizing the negative consequences. Skepticism: It is mentioned that Trump "did not rule out a recession," and his statements about US wealth ("let's become so rich") are presented with irony, without emphasis on success. Criticism: It points to "uncertainty" in trade policy and its potential harm, which increases the feeling of instability.

Emotional effect: Anxiety, uncertainty about the future, doubts about Trump's competence. Readers may feel uneasy about the economic impact and distrust of the administration's policies.

Comparison
Fox News is using a patriotic and optimistic narrative to give readers pride and confidence in Trump as a leader who acts in America's best interests. CNN focuses on risks and uncertainty, causing alarm and skepticism. The facts are the same, but the emotional "superstructure" is radically different: Fox News creates the image of a strong leader, CNN - a potential culprit of economic problems.


Perhaps in the first message I vaguely formulated my position. I will try to clarify the points:
1. The news flow today is overwhelming
2. The reader does not have time to compare each news in different sources
3. The media take advantage of this, adding an emotional color to naked facts
4. The reader simply trusts the preferred source, hoping that they should not lie there
5. The media constantly maintains an emotional background when presenting each news
6. Bare facts from the news gradually erode from memory, but the emotional background is remembered
7. When it comes to a citizen's decision (such as who to vote for), they choose feelings over facts.

In conclusion, I would like to mention the "Big Lie" in a report compiled during the war by the US Office of Strategic Services when describing Hitler's psychological portrait:
"His basic rules were: never let society" cool down "; never admit mistakes; never allow thoughts of the presence of positive sides in the enemy; never leave room for an alternative; never admit guilt; each time concentrate on any one enemy and blame him for all troubles; people would rather believe a big lie than a small one; and if you repeat it often enough, sooner or later people will believe in it "

It's well known that different people and outlets cover things differently, even journalists from the same publication might take different angles. Audiences tend to select the outlets that match their values. Which is why old, scared people tend to watch Murdoch's stuff. — Tom Storm

I agree that different publications and people cover events in different ways, and the audience often chooses sources that correspond to their values. This confirms my thought: perception is formed not so much by facts as by the emotional context that these facts accompany. You mentioned "a network of intertwined nonsense and propaganda" - this is a good way to describe how the modern information environment works. But I would argue that the "big lie" doesn't have to be one grand fiction. It can be a sustained narrative that is formed through the repetition of emotionally charged interpretations of facts, gradually creating a belief in people that they accept without deep analysis.

You asked if this is a new problem or just a continuation of the old yellow press methods. I believe social media adds a new dimension, as you said, not because it's fundamentally different, but because of its speed and scale. The emotions caused by the news spread faster and more widely, intensifying the effect. Unlike the traditional yellow press, where influence was limited to circulation or audience, social networks create echo chambers where emotional narratives circulate endlessly, forming perceptions without the need for one "big" lie - many small, emotionally charged distortions are enough.

It is difficult to resist, but possible if you deliberately slow down and separate emotions from facts, as I suggested in a thought experiment. This does not solve the problem completely, but it helps to realize how our opinion is formed not so much by information as by the feelings that it evokes.

To explain the idea on a neutral topic, consider the urban legend about how the father of Alexander Fleming, who discovered penicillin, allegedly saved the young Winston Churchill from drowning, and in gratitude, Churchill's father paid for Fleming's education. This story, full of drama and incredible coincidences, lives on emotions - a sense of gratitude, fatefulness and admiration. People believe in it and retell it, despite its absurdity and lack of evidence, because the emotional charge overpowers common sense. It's a wilfully neutral example, out of political context, to show how emotional narratives take root and spread. You can read more about this legend on Wikipedia.

Do you think it's more likely that social media is the bigger issue? — Tom Storm

We should find time to research the things that are important to us. — Down The Rabbit Hole

The transition from traditional media to social media is not a way out of a vicious circle, but simply a change of players.

The essence of the problem is that we find ourselves between two evils:
On the one hand, there are large media that create and support metanarratives, often driven by financial or political interests.
On the other hand, bloggers who do not create these narratives, but only relay them, selecting facts to confirm their sincere beliefs.

None of these sources are neutral. We simply change who we trust, but do not solve the problem of engagement.

I propose a thought experiment that allows you to see this mechanism in action:
1. Take any news.
2. "Clean" all emotions from it, leaving only a naked fact.
3. Compare how the same fact is presented in different sources: in the official media, among independent bloggers, in the opposition media.

You will see that the fact itself will be the same, but its emotional superstructure - context, intonation, accents - will be radically different. It is this superstructure that shapes our attitude and consolidates opinion. This will confirm or refute the idea that emotions from news are more important than the facts themselves.


P.S. With your permission, I will not refer to specific facts in specific sources, because I can very easily hurt someone's feelings. I propose a focus on the idea itself, leaving the experienced approach to its own discretion

I think the conservatives pander to the working man with the short term gains like diesel price capping, and from what I have been told, greater subsidies for farmers, and things like that but long term I would say not. — unimportant

My intuition is this:
Farming, like heavy production, is such a fundamental process. They are not created in one day or one year and are calculated for a long time. It's painstaking, slow work that doesn't like swings and change. For this category, a dynamically changing world is a challenge.

I will share my experience. Once, I was in a state in which everything can change in one day. I had the opportunity to organize the cultivation of hops. But I gave up on the idea because the horizon was opening up for a decade to come. The lack of solid soil under my feet due to my uncertainty about politics - became the reason that I did not make a choice in favor of farming