There is no working definition of freedom accepted by all in philosophy. Moreover the word freedom is bandied about by all and everyone in different ways. We see a likeness in the usage, but not at all a common usage accepted by all as in the word table for instance or doorknob.

Can someone tell Garrett Travers that just because he states there is some sort of definition that does not make it the case? Philosophy does not do dictionary. Maybe it is just your objectivist leanings, but not in any tradition worth its salt is a concept such as freedom off limits because there is some sort of definition of it.

"well, Garrett, what fallacy could you be talking about, given you're so pompous as to assert such a thing about a respected philosopher?" — Garrett Travers

No I I would not ask such a question because it is of no interest to me in the least. I am actually not asking you any questions, nor am I engaging with any of the points you made in the thread accept those directed at me, because I am not seeing anything in there that are remotely worth my time. Perhaps a discussion of whether your definition is viable might be interesting in itself, but I have to admit I find Arendt's approach a lot more interesting then the analysis of some kind of definition.

And the topic of that essay, and by extension the topic of this discussion - as described by the title of this discussion - is on the nature of freedom, sovereignty, and by ambiguous extention, purposely asserted in the essay, will and it's associated degrees of freedom. I changed no terms, I merely have upheld them. — Garrett Travers

Indeed those are the topics of the essay, apart from free will, which in my opinion is not. However, you refuse to engage with the essay because it does not play by your rules aka your working definition of freedom. However, no one gave you any authority to set those rules.

Never said to take my word for, but now that you bring it up, trust me, take my word for it, you'll thank me, there are far more interesting and less destructive people who have graced the field of philosophy; a lot more interesting, too. — Garrett Travers

The way you do philosophy, actually the way you not do philosophy, gives me no incentive to trust you on just about anything remotely related to the subject.

Please o lord deliver us from evil....

Yes, I do, in fact. It's called the working definition: the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint/absence of subjection to foreign domination or despotic government/the state of not being imprisoned or enslaved — Garrett Travers

There is no such thing as 'the working definition'. Philosophy is not an excercise in dictionary writing. There might be working definitions of philosopher x or y, or in the context of Kantianianism, utilitarianism and so on. Arendt opens the discussion on what freedom is, then telling her, here I have 'the working defintion, does not make any sense.

To say, "I don't care," doesn't make sense within the context of this specific conversation. We are having a discussion ABOUT that. — Garrett Travers

No, we are having a conversation about Arendt's essay. You have a tendency to want to set the terms. However, why would I be playing along? You also have a tendency for using capital letters I see.

That kind of does the trick. It's a bit like reading Lenin; sure, it's interesting, but was it woth the bodies? Many more interesting philosophers than both. — Garrett Travers

I see it as totally unrelated. What they argued about philosophy is for me removed from their politics. A good argument is a good argument irrespective of the political views of the one who brings it forth. It may be a warning and invites thorough investigation of the work in question to see if any ideas within it prefigured mass murder. If anything it is a reason to read both very carefully, something I doubt you both have done. And no, I am not taking your word for it that there are more interesting philosophers. Why would I?

I'm under the impression that she speaks of "individual freedom" or "inner freedom" as if it's a kind of "sovereignty" over oneself, which it would seem is consistent with what appears, to me, to be a tendency on her part to believe in a kind of inner dialogue or conflict between one me and another me, one me being the will, one being desire, another me being acting-me, yet another being acted-upon-me; I don't know, it gets confusing (not enough mees in me to comprehend this, perhaps). But I may be wrong. I find it difficult to follow her thought, distracted as I am by the names she so relentlessly drops throughout the article. — Ciceronianus

I do not think that that is what she is after. I rather think that this is what she considers freedom defined in the Justinian and Christian tradition, amounts to. We find it playing in the history of philosophy as well. There is a dychotomy between will and knowledge where knowledge is supposed to be in control of will, or, one has to will in accordance with knowledge. That would be rather Kantian. It all makes freedom an inner experience, one aligns one's knowledge and one's will and is free from desire. (remember the old Gala song?) Her point is that freedom is not an individual experience, but a political category. One is free within a certain system. I read in the essay a more communitarian critique of a liberal conception of freedom, but I might be wrong of course. Streelight seems to have a different take on it.

I rejoice in any criticism of Heidegger, but frankly wish he had spent far more time "in conversation with himself" than he did. — Ciceronianus

:rofl: I do know he is a national socialist and that is, of course, uncomely. However, I do wonder why you always react so strongly to him. He is also a very interesting thinker. He really is, despite his unwelcome affiliation with some of the most heinous villains in history.

How is this so? Freedom is dependent only on the non-advance of univited interaction between peoples. Meaning, respected sovereignty between people is tantamount to freedom for all those participating in the respect of boundaries. Where does the unfreedom of others come in? I suspect you're going to introduce one of a number of different perceptions of freedom to explain this, that have nothing to do with the working definitions of the word that I have published here in this thread. But, in the importance of being fair to you, I shall give you the benefit you need to properly answer that question, if you so choose to freely. — Garrett Travers

I do not care what you have published in the thread Garrett, I was reading Arendt. You are already working with some kind of definition of freedom. Apparently the non-invited interaction between peoples. God knows why, but you might have a reason for it. However, I am reading Arendt's genealogy of freedom and was commenting on what she tried to do. I do not need any benefit from you to answer any question you might have. Out of my sight, shu.

"Free" will, doesn't exist. 99% of our cognition is subconscious. — Garrett Travers

As if that explains something....

But, we do have executive function that works in tandem with cingulate cortex, amygdala, basal ganglia, and the hippocumpus to form the emotion processing network. — Garrett Travers

Ohh great we have a medical doctor in the room. I am doing philosophy not neurscience. I suggest www.theneuroscienceforum.com

The quote is from Hana Arendt's essay on Freedom. I came across it in an article from the Ethics Institute, Freedom and disagreement: How we move forward. The article makes the obvious point that
When debates are being waged over freedom, we must begin with the acknowledgement that we (as individuals) are only ever as free as the broader communities in which we operate. Our own freedoms are contingent upon the political systems that we exist in, actively engage with, and mutually construct.
This is obviously in tune with the point I've found myself obliged to make a few times recently, that ethics begins not when one considers oneself, but when one considers others.

Anyway, I'm linking to the Arendt essay in order to ask again her question: What is freedom?, and to give a space for considering her essay. Given the "freedom convoy" that trickled into Canberra yesterday, and the somewhat more effective equivalent in Canada, It seems appropriate. — Banno

Thanks Banno, for the chance to consider this essay. So many here take it as a stepping stone to discuss free will. That is not what the essay is about. It is indeed about the history of the notion of freedom and raises the question what political freedom, philosophically understood, looks like.

I also do not see the paradox you bring up and over which so many of the writers here trip. The question you ask presupposes a notion of freedom Arendt rejects, namely freedom as a kind of faculty of the will. The paradox she highlights is another one in my opinion and one that reveals itself when one views the concept of freedom in a historical light. Freedom for the Greeks was political, a concept which played in political life, contrary to philosophical life. Arendt apparently sees as philosophical life as singular, lonely, a-political. I think here she follows Heidegger, but also a lot of the Western tradition as seeing philosophical knowledge as self knowledge.

When freedom became a problem, in Christian philosophy in the context of conversion and the ability to embrace Christ, freedom was 'married' so to speak, to this lonely philosophical life and became seen as a kind of mastery, mastery over oneself. Mastery requires power and so freedom became drawn in a register of power, control, subordination and sovereignty. So much so that freedom became equated with sovereignty as it still is apparently for @Judaka.

The paradox here is that freedom as sovereignty immediately distorts the notion of freedom. Only the soveriegnty is truly free, but that means my freedom is dependent upon the unfreedom of others. It has become antithetical to the communal, reciprocal life of a community. So I think her idea is to rethink freedom and locate it less into a discourse of singular mastery and in the political realm of communal relations. Only if we establish relationships towards others that are free, might we be free. That requires relinquishing sovereignty. (I read the Arendt essay, not the article you also linked to).

For those of you who get all horny about free will, it is not unlike Strawson's concept of it, who is firmly rooted in the analytic tradition. However also for him free will resides in a relation to the other, not in some sort of mastery over oneself. I am not going to dwell further on it, because it detracts from the topic of freedom in a broader sense.

@Ciceronianus might be happy to note the essay can also be read as criticism of Heidegger, who still holds on very much to an idea of freedom and authenticity in conversation with oneself. Arendt invokes the political.

Nancy Cartwright, Ian Hacking, Isabelle Stengers, Peter Galison, John Dupre, Bruno Latour, Lorraine Daston, Alexandre Koyre. — StreetlightX

:up: :100:

Both ends of the spectrum seem to magnify my existential angst. At one extreme, 'I need to live much, much longer because all of this so far has been a bit boring and rubbish, or even painful at times' and at the other extreme 'please don't take this away, this is just a blast, I need it to last hundreds of years' :D — Yvonne

Yes, but isn't this volatility exactly the tension between knowing and feeling? You jump into the feeling and you want more and more, either because it is boring and rubbish or because it is too much of a great time. Is not the bottom line of these feelings that you experience a need to be alive? Now if that is the bottom line and you are also living, isn't that a sign of grace? ou are actually having what you are demanding, namely life. Why worry so much about the end of it? You know basically that life is worth living. I think that knowledge is someting to hold on to.

I can accept existential meaninglessness because I can imbue my own meaning. But I cannot avoid my own death and it will come well before I am even close to "done" exploring life. That cannot be right, can it? Are these philosophies of finitude's bringing purpose/meaning just platitudes or wishful thinking? Isn't terror the natural and most justified human condition? — Yvonne

I think that death is indeed unacceptable. I also think the philosophies of finitude are erely balms for the soul. They sooth us to sleep but cannot takethe unacceptabilty of death away. They actually know they cannot.The philosophers of finitude argue against traditional metaphysics that they do have a way of embracing finitude. that is a lie. Providing a diagnosis is something else than providing a cure. The only cure here is a certain kin of 'grace'. The grace 180 Proof and T Clark speak of and maybe Ciceronianus, an acceptance of death because you accept life is done. I very much share your sentiments though.

Those philosophers of finitude do however, point out one thing, they show the ineluctability if that experience and its cencessity as a backdrop for life to be enjoyed. We know that now, so rationally it should be possible to accept death as a part of life. You know Nick Cave has a point.

So we are caught in a bind: our experience fights death, it is a limit experience, or a limit to experience an as such abhorrent, unacceptable, mindless meaningless annihilation. And your knowledge, wisdom or rationality tells you that death is unavoidable and therefore better accepted than fought off, and that mortality is a necessary condition for this thing we do called living.

What to do? Well in such conflicts I think faith comes to the rescue. Not faith in a traditional sense, I am not theistic, but faith in everyday sense, faith you have when biking that you will not fall, faith that your beloved won't just leave you, faith that when you are kind to someone, probably the other will also be kind in return. The language of faith works here. How do we acquire such faith in bucycles, love, and other people? By practicing, learning and watching others do it. Engage in it.

Apparently grace is available. There are peoople who mmanage to lift the fear of death. Study them and learn, watch and emulate. What I have seen is that fear of death seems to fade when people actually feel fulfilled in life. The people least afraid of death are actually happiest with their living. That is an interesting and telling contradiction. It suggest that the way to grace does not lead through dealing with death but to make sure you live happily. So the only way to avoid death is to live...

(And welcome to the forum. Study those who know how to live, they tend to be the best writers on the forum as well).

That's very interesting and I did not know. But in the Netherlands isn't the country's Parliament sovereign? I mean, the law-makers can decide that it's legal in Netherlands to apply e.g. Turkish civil law in those circumstances. Turkey cannot make that decision for the Netherlands. But if the two jurisdictions were operating in the same State, I don't understand where sovereignty would lie. Perhaps that's why it's a modern problem and a democratic problem. If a monarch can say 'OK, Church, you can do whatever you want in these aspects of law', then so be it. But where law-makers are democratically accountable then it looks more complicated. — Cuthbert

Well in our current system the state, whether democratic or otherwise, is considered sovereign in the area of international law. The rules of Private International Law are usually laid down in treaties. Turkey cannot decide it for the Netherlands but Turkey and the Netherlands can engage in a treaty on the matter.

It might be more complicated in a democracy... but I do not see any principle dificulties. There are many different inds of states, some more unitary some very decentralized. If everybody (or a majority)thinks it is a good idea that law making is devolved to lower administrative bodies, also under parliamentary sovereignty they can engage in this form of self restriction.

A pretty big if. I'll opine that the question of principle and practice yields to the question of how much torque the agreement can stand. And whether in principle or practice, I think not a lot. A consideration that comes to mind is the greater interest of the community. If either of B's or C's differing practices harm the community, the community may move to end or modify the practice in question.

Anyway, I think you've made your case. I merely suppose that at the extremes of stress and tension, cooperation breaks down. — tim wood

Sure, that needs empirical work to find out. There is empirical work done in this field by legal anthropologist and legal sociologists. They study such systems and its difficulties and interrelationships. Sometimes actually it may also build trust between communities that have been in conflict. Establishing one legal order may then prove to be very difficult as it may be seen as colonizing or oppressive. So for the time being the communities in conflict might settle their differences by allowing forms of legal pluralism, in order for each community to keep its own identity.

I am sure having citizens living under two separate codes would present difficulties but is there any reason in principle why it is wrong for there to be two (or more) legal codes in effect in one nation state. — usefulidiot

In short my answer to the question would be no, there is no reason in principle why it is wrong for there to be more then one legal code, unless you hold on to the notion of law as the command of some leviathan like sovereign who cannot be limited. A bit of a Hobbesian view. That view is rarely held though nowadays, at least not among sociologist of law. There is though an ongoing debate as to how much law needs to be tied to state institutions in order to be called law. The two separately existing legal orders would both be bound to the state though so that problem is not in view here.

What might a good rule be in case of disagreement on jurisdiction? This would seem to matter. It goes to the question of the OP. Which imo is answered by observing that there cannot be two separate systems, but that one yield to the other, or both to a third. — tim wood

It is a good question. Well consider this: There is a Country A. In country A two ethnic groups live, Group B and group C. Group's B and group C. have a different system of inheritance law. For instance: In group B children may be completely disowned. In group C. the children are protected and cannot be disowned from at least a portion of their inheritance. This is only a simplified example, maybe there are many different regulations in their inheritance law, maybe in their family law at large, and perhaps also in other areas of law, but let's keep it to inheritance. Now, we have two different legal systems. What do we we need to have to make this system coexist? In any case we need rules about who belongs to group B or group C, because that determines the regime of inheritance law. Moreover, we need a court that decides on conflicts arising about the law of being part of group B and C. But for every conflict internal to group B and group C, different courts may be established. Let's call this court that determines whether one belongs to C or to D, court E. Now is that court E more powerful? Not really, it does not deal with matters relating to inheritance law of C or D. It only has competence over determining whether one belongs to group C or D. These courts may be comprised of judges of both group C and D for instance.

You might say, well that is still one legal system because both have to submit to court E. However, notice how court E does not deal with anything substantive. It just decides on procedure. What I do grant you is that both C and D have to agree to settle their disputes over jurisdiction to court E. That is where they are connected. Nonetheless, people in the same state are subjected to different inheritance laws, maybe different family law, property law and what not. We have two different systems of law, not totally unconnected. I am thinking about what it would look like if they would be totally unconnected. That might be possible, but than the state has to devolve de facto law making to these different groups C and D. It is well thinkable still. Then the two systems will have to establish their own rules for what people they have competency. It might well be less stable than the previous system discussed above, but I see no objection in theory.

In any case, also in the system discussed above, we have two different legal systems, coexisting in the same territory. Sure some arrangements need to be made. It does not necessarily lead to civil war, if both agree on the rules of procedure to determine the jurisdiction of the different legal systems.

As to civil - as to any law - the underlying issue is what I can force you to do, whether to pay a fine or a judgment, perform or not perform an action, or send you to jail. And, subject to correction, I cannot see a how a society works if it supports contradictory legal systems. The US an example: where laws contradict, society doesn't work, and remains broken until the issues of law are fixed, requiring legislation, the US Army in a high school, or even a civil war. — tim wood

Well, in the Ottoman Empire different courts existed from different societal denominations. There can be different codes of inheritance law for instance for different ethnic groups. As long as the state guarantees both and there are good rules in case of conflict between choices of jurisdiction there is no problem, as long as it is clear which jurisdictions are chosen. Like I mentioned above, the Netherlands has two different highest courts of law. It works because of the 'una via' principle. When you bring your case through the administrative law courts, you cannot submit it again under civil law. There have been contrary decisions on a similar case now and then, that is interesting, but also that can be dealt by, for instance via the 'lex posterior' rule, a later verdict supercedes and earlier one. I do not know if that is what you mean, but there might be different codes of law for different people, even if there is one supreme court. That court must then be versed in the law of denomination A and denomination B.

And, it is not accurate to say that some Muslims want someone dead. It's called a fatwah, and that's not some Muslims. it is Islam itself. — tim wood

Huh? Last time I checked islam itself had no voice. A Fatwah is a religious verdict. In Turkish society and under Turkish law for instance such verdicts are not recognized. The official stance of the papacy is against anti conception, so do all Catholics have sex without a condom? Moreover there are different branches of Islam. So 'Islam itself' is another silly generalization.

To be sure, nearly as I can tell, Islam itself is evolving, and many evolved, but not so much in many places, or within many authorities — tim wood

I do not even understand what you mean. What do you mean with 'many authorities'? There is no Islam itself just like there is no Catholicism itself or Protestantism itself, let alone 'Christianity itself'.

Reducing this to the behaviors of a few, "some," wackos speaks ill of your cognitive abilities. (If you want to take just this on, I prefer PM; because it's an ugly topic all the way 'round.) — tim wood

Ohh no need for a PM, but rest assured my cognitive abilities are perfectly in order. Indeed this discussion detracts from the topic at hand, but hey, I did not start making ill informed generalizations about swathes of people having little in common but a religious belief.

Are you quite sure they're distinct? Are they civil, criminal, both? I have a tough time believing that while I cannot do something to you because it would be a crime for me to do it, that I can summon my bro.-in-law to do it because it is not a crime for him to do it. — tim wood

Usually civil law arrangements. On criminal law I have less knowledge, because as a branch of public law it is much closer tied to the state. Differences are thinkable though, though probably not on violent crime, also because there is not much controversy about violence being prosecuted. However, some laws concerning blasphemy or libel, insult, for instance may be treated differently, though I do not know myself of any country that does so.
However, criminal law is in comparison to civil law a small branch of law. Most law you are dealing with every day is contracts, tort, family law, tax law etc.

Edit: in criminal law for instance I could see for instance laws against male circumcision being applied differently because of religious grounds. Usually, in a rather unitary country, some exception will be taken up in the article that prohibits assault, but it is in principle thinkable that there are different criminal codes. States will be reluctant to have it, because criminal law is seen as a competence of the state par excellence, but it is by no means unthinkable.

And this snark simply won't do as being hopelessly ignorant of and inadequate for whatever it is you have in mind. E.g., is Salman Rushdie still in hiding? (Ans., I find this online dated 2020: "Rushdie was given police protection, adopted an alias and went into hiding, on and off, for a decade. He still lives with the fatwa, which has never been revoked, but now he lives more openly. He has said this is due to a conscious decision on his part, not because he believes the threat is gone.") — tim wood

Sure, but the fact that some muslims want Salman Rushdie dead is for you an indication that muslims will not do well in a country that has freedom of speech. That is just a silly generalization. There are people who want Pelosi dead because of her ideas, unfortunately. Do you conclude that Republicans will not do well in a country with freedom of speech? Of course not. Many people unfortunately face death threats because of their ideas, from a lot of different corners, far left, Islamic radicalism, extreme right. If we start equating everyone on the left with far left and everyone on the right with far right, than, by your logic we will soon run out of people for whom freedom of speech is acceptable. Protestants are generally against gay marriage, do you think they will not do well in the Netherlands, a country where gay people may officially marry? The snark is unfortunate, but deserved, because you simply made a rather ignorant and offensive remark. Your last post was not and so I will not give a snarky reply, but, I hope, a reasonable one.

By the way many muslim countries actually prohibit membership of extremist religious groups under anti-terrorism laws, because they might well be perceived threats to the order of the state.

Just for example, I don't see Muslims doing well in a society that embraces free speech, for the simple reason that recent history shows that at least some Muslims even think they have a duty to abuse and kill anyone espousing ideas they don't like. — tim wood

Because like, sure, all Muslims are the same you know and there are no countries with a predominantly muslim population but also a secular legal systems and like the muslims that live in Western countries all secretly want to abolish free speech, yeah man, haven't you seen it on Fox new?

Let me write it down in two line so even the less than useful idiots on this forum can gain an modicum of comprehension:

A: no, not every secular society agrees on the same legal principles. Contentious issues like the death penalty and 'good Samaritan' laws attest to that.
B: There are indeed countries that offer distinct legal systems to different segments of the population, it is called legal pluralism.

No appeal to highest authority. Legal disputes can be taken to higher courts. In the case of dual systems, there would be two authorities. each the highest court in its own system. There would be no way of settling disputes between these two authories - unless there is some authority higher than both. Which then re-creates a single system. — Cuthbert

Not necessarily. In the Netherlands there are two different distinct highest courts and there have been different rulings on the same substantive subject though rarely. One just needs to delineate competencies very carefully or allow a choice of legal system upfront, but prohibit 'forum shopping'. It happens in the world of international business quite often that they choose a certain jurisdiction. There is no reason that should not be possible inside country.

It is not all that difficult. I have been married under Turkish law. When we moved to the Netherlands, it remained a marriage according to Turkish private law. If we would have been divorced in the Netherlands it might well be that the Dutch court would need to settle the matter by Turkish private law. That could have well have been important for the division of assets and so on. It was not an issue, but could have been. Actually there is a whole area of law called private international law that regulates such matter. Still, we might end up demanding national courts to practice the laws of another nation. I would find that a lot more complicated than allowing for a different code of laws in another area of the country or for a certain ethnic group. The hang up over this is actually quite recent. In Europe's past they allowed all inds of different sources of law, local custom, clerical (canonic) law, Roman law etc.

There is no reason they cannot do so. It happens and is known as legal pluralism. It can be found in some countries, countries for instance running a centralized legal system but also accepting the verdicts under customary law of some indigenous communities. I believe the UK ran an experiment with shari'a courts. There is no reason in principle, but for the state wanting to determine the content of the law and extending its centralizing and unificatory force. The fear may be that that communities will start to live separate lives not feeling themselves part of the same nation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_pluralism

If a man and a woman were in a fight and the woman was kicking ass, well, in this man's world that would just not be okay. Sure we can all cheer to the call for women's empowerment, but when you get your ass handed to you by a woman, that's too much. Equal perhaps, but not more powerful. — praxis

In my line of work you will not get very far if you do not accept that there are women having more success and wielding much more power than you do yourself ...

There is still much to do everywhere. The Netherlands is quite conservative when it comes to the participation of women. Probably there are no mono-causal explanations. Institutions and cultural values are skewed against the participation of women. Maybe there are also biological differences I do not know. However you see more and more traditionally male professions being entered into by women, like the judiciary. Therefore I think it has much to do with culture expectations and institutional set up.

Though if you look at professional philosophers today, there are more men writing than women. It might be related to the constant arguing and competition, as you point out. — Manuel

Well, and to the uneven division in the higher ranks of academia. Even though women generally perform better, in the Netherlands at least, the majority of profs is male. The work of full profs is most often published and cited, so you will notice more males noted as philosophers than females. It might change though. For instance there are more female judges now in the Netherlands than there are males.

On a serious not, though, it is true that even today (not even mentioning the Western tradition), women tend not to be too interested in these kinds of subjects. Not that most men are either, but proportionally it's still very skewed to males. — Manuel

I do not think women are uninterested in philosophy. When I studied philosophy the balance was more or less 50/50. I taught philosophy courses at some private institution and the balance was 50/50 as well. When I look at the balance of the Philosophy and Law Group I am in at my faculty it has slightly more men than women, but it is nothing like I think the gender balance that is found here on this forum. I think rather that women are more focused. If they do philosophy they will do so at a career level or they take a course instead of the jousting that goes on here. Contrary to say fiction writing, this forum is quite competitive, women might not find that sort of environment worth their while. The pressure on women to spend their free time caring for children or do house work is also (unfairly) higher on women still. So in other words, women just have better things to do.

"Don't Give Up" (6:33) album version — 180 Proof

:up:

This is one of my favorite song. It is a Turkish song. I heard it for the first time when I was reading philosophy in a water pipe cafe in Istanbul. I was reading N's Zarathustra. For me the song fitted the mood perfectly. Of course I could not make out anything of the lyrics at the time, but slowly my Turkish improved and eventually I could. The song recounts a man travelling through mountains. The song is a bit hard to translate, because my Turkish is not great, but also because Turkish is a totally different kind of language, so some of the meanings and metaphors lose some force. For instance Turkish is very precise in the use of different tenses for verbs and in using adjectives to words conveying a slightly different meaning. Anyway, you may find the lyrics below.

The song struck me as well because the lyrics have a double meaning. It is first and foremost a love song and recounts the longing for a loved one. The band is very political, critical and leftist. It is also about political struggle and the sacrifices made for it. One might even conjecture a religious / philosophical interpretation. In our travel to come to knowledge and discover the world we will eventually fall, but be taken up in the cycle of life. The ambivalence is strengthened because Turkish is a gender neutral language.



When this city is overcome by solitude
A bird dies silently in its sleep
you wish to get up and leave it all
the dark streets blind, deaf and mute

Hey, you who sets out wrapped in love
You should know these roads wind through mountains.
And if you fall before you reach her (him / it),
the echo of your longing will still ring tomorrow

Hey you who sets out wrapped in love
You should know, these roads wind through mountains.
And if you fall before you reach her,
the echo of your longing will still ring tomorrow

At dawn and new day breaks
your heart is sharpened by longing
A small stream springs from you
The river will grow
and flowers will bloom at your banks

At dawn and new day breaks
your heart is sharpened by longing
A small stream springs from you
The river will grow
and flowers will bloom at your banks

Hey you who sets out wrapped in love
You should know, these roads wind through mountains.
And if you fall before you reach her,
the echo of your longing will still ring tomorrow



Bu kente yanlızlık çöktüğü zaman
uykusunda bir kuş ölür ecelsiz
alıpta başını gitmek istersin karanlık
sokaklar kör sağır dilsiz

Ey sevda kuşanıp yolara düşen
Bilesin bu yollar dağlar dolanır
Yare ulaşmadan düşersen eyer
Yarin hasretinin yankısı kalır

Ey sevda kuşanıp yolara düşen
Bilesin bu yollar dağlar dolanır
Yare ulaşmadan düşersen eyer
Yarin hasretinin yankısı kalır

Gecenin ucunda gün aralanır
Yar sevdası ile yürek bilenir
Sızılı bir ırmak uğurlar seni
Su olup akarsın
Kır çiceklenir

Gecenin ucunda gün aralanır
Yar sevdası ile yürek bilenir
Sızılı bir ırmak uğurlar seni
Su olup akarsın
Kır çiceklenir

Ey sevda kuşanıp yolara düşen
Bilesin bu yollar dağlar dolanır
Yare ulaşmadan düşersen eyer
Yarin hasretinin yankısı kalır

However is this far, and what "logic is being suspended". If we are parts of a whole, why can't Schopenhauer view be "logical"? — KantDane21

I have not read 'the knot of the world', so I can only go on what you describe here and what I otherwise know from Schopenhauer and his relationship to German Idealism / Kant. I guess Schopenhauer would not be convinced that knowing subject and willing subject are part of a whole. It is the knowing subject that knows itself as willing subject as well, but there is no transcendental subject that perceives itself as willing subject and as knowing subject, as aspects of itself. That transcendental subject is equal to the knowing subject for Schopenhauer, because such knowing is what the knowing subject does.

If knowing subject and willing subject are not parts of a whole than their identity becomes inexplicable. Like you, I am not so convinced they are not parts of a whole, but I guess we need to get more out of Schopenhauer to know why he thinks this is not convincing.

I just thought the debate would interest you, that is the only reason I mentioned you. It is rather pointless to discuss with someone who misconstrues your arguments seemingly on purpose.

Yes, it is toying with the ambivalence of 'is'... 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication. I always sucked at formal logic ;)

Thanks InPizotl, makes a lot of sense. It depends on the Ayes Bees and Seas being defined as substances or properties, right. Thanks!

Why not A? Seas and Bees are equivalent at least in their aspect of all seas being bees. If all seas are Bees and if some ayes are bees as well than some ayes must also be seas since they are equivalent to bees.

What's your point? What is the inconsistency or claim you find in Kant that disqualifies him as an ethicist? What mistake has he made? That is, that can be presented in something less than 29 pages of tying complicated knots. He des not tell people what to do; he tells them what they ought to do and why within the limits of his arguments. And how often have I read some citation that claims to undermine or throw over Kant, only to find the writer very likely has not even read his Kant, or not understood him on the points in question, or the one citing has in some way failed. — tim wood

I think we are talking past each other. I am not finding inconsistency in Kant and would never be so bold and so foolish as to disqualify him as an ethicist. I do not think your beef is with me actually. I am not a Kantian, but I greatly admire him and his ethical system and think that the main thrust of it, at least what I consider the main thrust, 'think for yourself, not for others and respect them as autonomous and free agents' is nothing short of brilliant.

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy? — Tzeentch

No, your decision not to answr is. Not answering is not a thought it is an act. You are intentionally misreading me.

Well, I am interested in your opinion. If I wanted to know Kant's, I'd read Kant. — Tzeentch

Kant's opinion is relevant in a thread about Kant.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly. — Tzeentch

No, you do actually, because you apparently you think that ethics is independent from the expectations of others, dependent on the social good in the case of lying, but independent of the social good in case of violence... apparently there is some Tzeentch who determines the nature of ethics, like I pointed out in the earlier thread.

Kant thought we could rationally understand our duties or at least the grounds from which they sprang. He called that 'the moral law within'. It is not Kant that tells you, it is reason, at least according to Kant.

That last thread was not about lying. It was about violence. We may have discussed Kant's ideas of lying, but only insofar as it was relevant to violence. — Tzeentch

So in case of violence we have a context independent ethical ethical system and in case of lying we do not. Thank you, much more consistent now.

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things, — Tzeentch

Well, that rather depend on the ' thing' under discussion doesn't it? When you grab someone's hand and start to pump it up and down it is helpful when the other person expects this behavior and understands it as a greeting. That is by no means self evident though, but a product of social expectations.

I don't see how they're all that different for the person who walks past. — Tzeentch

the situation is different because in the situation you have been asked a question you have ignored someone whereas in the situation you have not been asked a question you have not ignored someone. Indeed also ignoring or not ignoring are socially determined behaviors / situations. However I see now that the mere existence of social world has been so far a mystery to you.

Should I go about having expectations and desires towards other people, and then derive all sorts of moral rights to have those things reciprocated? Or is this the moment we need to start appointing people with opinions on "what is reasonable", and we are back in the mud? — Tzeentch

I am not saying the father has a moral right to your answer, you determine whether you answer or not. The only point I am making is that not answering is an act as well and so does not absolve you from the dilemma of whether you have to tell the truth or not. You are just trying to wiggle out of that question by shifting the subject. I am not arguing for any rights on someone whether it is a right not to be ignored or a right to hear the truth.

I don't credit lawmakers with having a particularly solid grasp on the nature of things, and morality by extention. — Tzeentch

Well, this assertion merely proves your utter disregard for decades of learning. Your phrase ' the nature of things' is unintelligible. I can therefore not comment on whether they have a grasp on 'the nature of things' as I fail to understand what that may mean. I do know your phrase displays unjustified contempt.

Cite? The ideas of one right answer is naive. In some cases there might well be one right answer, but certainly not always. — tim wood

Here is an article on the matter. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30317932.pdf However, I easily concede there might be different ways to view it.

The question of a theoretical right answer is not that naive, it may well be necessary. The problem of a categorical imperative is that it is well categorical, applicable in all cases. The question is if there is theoretically speaking a best solution. It might be we cannot find it, but I think in a Kantian structure there has to be one. Actually also in law this claim is sometimes made as per Ronald Dworkin's discussion of 'Judge Hercules'.

But unbeknownst to you, the victim went out your back door and went home, and you have in effect killed him! Kant argues that with your lie, you make yourself part of the problem, and thus take on a share of responsibility and liability that the truth or silence would not have imposed. — tim wood

Yes, I know that is Kant's answer to the problem.

Kant is concerned with the pure formulations of duty, understanding that between the rule and its application could be considerable slip twixt cup and lip.

As to what to do in the case of conflict, in his Metaphysics of Morals he is explicit. If CIs conflict, then the better rules and the lesser falls away - there being then no conflict. From Mww again,
The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions.
— Mww
Wisdom that "might be engraven on a Queen Anne's farthing.., which necessitates a vast volume of commentaries to expound it" (Melville). — tim wood

Yes.... but is this contrary to what I said, or just an addition / clarification? I believe Kant himself refused to accept conflicts of duties always claiming there is one right answer.

That's not a violation of someone's autonomy. Whether one decides to answer or not isn't a matter of someone else's autonomy, but of one's own! — Tzeentch

Yes but you decide by assuming he does not want to have the answer. That is the violation of autonomy not your not answering per se.

And that duty is one you have taken upon yourself, or do you also impose it on others? — Tzeentch

It is imposed on others via the categorical imperative (at least according to Kant).

I am not a Kantian at all. — Tzeentch

Ok. I belief you like to decide the moral order solely for yourself and do whatever suits you. That is fine.

They're two entirely different discussions. — Tzeentch

Well either ethics is context dependent and then it matters that there are different discussions, or it is not and then it really does not matter what the case at hand is. In the other thread you answered it was not, lying was always wrong.

One is not entitled to my response, my time, attention or even basic politeness, just because they asked a question. What gives one the right to impose any of these things? — Tzeentch

I am not saying anyone is entitled to your response, I am saying you responding or not are both acts. Whether you like it or not we live in a world with others and with social expectations.

Further, inaction is not an act. Not giving a response is not an action - it is inaction, and thereby fundamentally different. — Tzeentch

I gave you an argument, namely that the situation is different when you walk past someone who asked you a question or whether you walked past someone without him asking a question. You may counter that by some assertion on your part but it is hardly convincing now is it?
Just because you say so something is such and such does not make it such and such. Luckily you are not a lawyer because you would have a damn hard time wrapping your head around crimes of omission.

The relative texts in Kant’s corpus make clear to lie is always an affront to a good will, from which is derived to lie is never a moral practical objective. From that, it is just as clear the perfect duty is always more compelling. — Mww

I would think that follows as well yes.

I would rather be responsible for a guy’s possible torment that may not even manifest seriously, or that torment which subsides over time, than to jeopardize my moral character by lying in order to not cause it. — Mww

That I would say is also correct Kantian reasoning.

The water pipe or 'nargile', is my tipple of choice. I have a nice one at home which I use with Turkish double apple tobacco or with Syrian lemon mint. It is very mild compared to the stuff mentioned here. Those, for me, I found not to be conducive for thinking, but the water pipe aids in concentration and when reading I tend to stop every paragraph to note new ideas down. Purely the large quantities of nicotine I guess for an otherwise non-smoker, but it works.

:lol: In the old days, I left home early in the morning and did my own thing all day and then went home when people began turning their lights on. I don't think it is safe to give our children that much freedom today. We didn't lock the doors to our house or car and we lived in a Los Angeles suburb. :lol: If you can find the movie "Blast From the Past" it makes an interesting statement about social change where I grew up. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AhMQOb0tEmI More has changed than our understanding of science. We no longer have the culture that we and that is why I write! — Athena

Nahh, I think you are more scared than you used to be. That is because there were the dangers that you know, now you do not know the dangers anymore. Crime rates go up or down but the trend is downward.

This does not mean I am stuck in the past because I believe if we do not self-destruct, we are transitioning into a New Age, that is so different from the past, people in the New Age will not be able to relate to our primitive past. Exploiting each other and nature as we have done up to this point will be unthinkable. Dressing people in uni-forms and having them march into the enemy's weapons will be unthinkable, but dropping bombs on the enemy may still occur? I like what Alisdair Mcintyre says in the speech because he mentions what a culture and time in history has to do with our concept of morals. It is also a political matter. We now have reactionary politics based more on our feelings than our intellect. When making decisions we look inward to see how we "feel" about this or that, not evaluate how it fits with our principles. What are principles? We have a culture that is so unsure of everything we are powerless to do anything but follow orders to get what we want. This is not a good stopping place for the future. — Athena

Well I hope for this new age, but how do we get there? I reappraisal of the classics, yeah might be... Perhaps indeed also a reevaluation of our relationship to our world. However, things look very dire. They look dire according to me because of the accelerating economic inequality between people. The working class has been dismantled and share holder capitalism triumphed and profit is of no benefit anymore to the people who created it. The result is 'immiseration', an alienated class of people who's only option is to love from day to day and enjoy what they can without thinking ahead. They will not read the classics or care for the environment through no fault of their own, but just because they are busy making a living. This will increase polarization in society because they will defend what little they have from the masses that have even less. Therefore it will have to start somewhere and the answer might well be one you do not like, more interference in the economic lives of the citizens.

Okay, I have to read that! He published a few books and I am not sure which one is the most important to my effort. I am too tired to figure it out now. — Athena

The Worker: Dominion and Form. He also wrote about his experiences in war but that is not of interest to you. I do think though he will describe and affirm exactly what you will dislike. However, that is why he needs to be read, or at least why I think you should read him. He thinks Prussian knowledge of duty is great and that we will become technological 'workers', but it will be up to us to give technology soul. It is a book way ahead of its time I think.

Thanks @Mww, it touches on the very thorny subject of the conflict of duties in Kant. What if an imperfect duty, say taking care of the moral well being of others conflicts with the perfect duty not to lie, as in Amalac's case. What to do?

Isn't the crux of the dilemma that telling the truth would cause the man significant emotional harm, and thus it was not a question he truly wanted answered?

If that's not the case, then what are we even here for? If the man wants to know the painful truth, then it certainly isn't bad to tell it to him, and lying would be even more clearly wrong. — Tzeentch

The problem is we never know. We can only do our duty, but not think for someone else. If you have perfect knowledge that he did not want this question answered he might be right. However, you never have, so all we can do is accept the other person as an autonomous individual who chooses his own path in life. He chose to ask that question. If you decide he really does not want it answered, you violate his autonomy.

What duty? — Tzeentch

The imperfect duty to help.

Well, if one no longer takes the position that telling the truth causing significant harm, disproportionate to the harm of telling a lie, then there is no dilemma. — Tzeentch

You are using an utilitarian calculus, Kant would not. In another thread you argued that context does not matter. You are an inconsistent Kantian.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention. — Tzeentch

Because you were asked a question. Not answering a question is an act too. You make it seem like it is not an act. That is a wrong assumption. If I ask you in the street "may I ask you a question?" and you are basically ignoring me, you are being rude, or you did not hear it, or you were in a hurry, but at least I am going to think about why you plainly ignored me. You indeed do not owe me an answer, but me asking the question drew you and me into a kind of relationship. However when I pass you by on the street and you say npthing at all I will not think anything of it.

No, he decided that fate for himself, however tragic that may be. — Tzeentch

No, he asked the question, so he wanted to know. At least presuming people act rationally. Which we have to, we assume people are rational, that is what accords them human dignity at least according to Kant. You deliberately did not help him and thereby violated an imperfect duty.

There's no reason the cause of his worries and emotions should be projected on some innocent bystander. — Tzeentch

Nor is there if you just told the man the truth. He asked for it, you gave it, what can be wrong. Instead you chose to make yourself the owner of the problem by not telling him.

The claim was made (or at least the impression was given) that answering the man truthfully or not answering the question was bad.

I disagreed. — Tzeentch

I disagree too. I took your position (ore or less) for the sake of this debate. We disagree on not answering the question. I would say that is bad. You let your own desire not to hurt the man's feelings control you. that is a sign of bad faith... bad faith so it is...

Not to answer is to choose non-interference, and such is one's right. — Tzeentch

Not answering is veiled interference. There is no such thing as a non-answer to a question. The situation when you do not give an answer while a question was asked, is not the same as the situation that there was no question asked to begin with. The man will suffer his anxiety until the bitter end and will not even know, whereas he did ask.... You have decided he should suffer that fate. He decided to ask a question.

One doesn't owe the man any answers, respect or one's attention. The fact that the man is dying doesn't create a special situation where that would be the case. — Tzeentch

I do not have to answer, but I was asked a question. Why would I not answer? Not answering a question is ignoring. Why would ignoring someone be a good act?