Please explain how extinction events happen without implying causation. Explain how physical traits arise and are propagated or filtered out of a gene pool without implying causation. — Harry Hindu

The initial conditions at the big-bang determine, through the laws of physics, the universal wavefunction for all times.

And "all times" means the universe is a static block, the past and future exist.

An alternative formulation would be, the final state of the universe determines, through the laws of physics, the universal wavefunction for all times. And if you play determinism backwards, you get surprising spontaneous creation events.

You obviously do not understand the basic concepts of natural selection. — Harry Hindu

Don't make an ass of yourself.

Aren't 'natural laws and regularities' among the very 'patterns' you're referring to here, but which you then proceed to dismiss as 'inductive principles' which are 'not scientific'? — Wayfarer

The laws of physics that we have discovered do not depend on any inductive principle, and their discovery has nothing to do with the mythical principle of inductive inference.

The laws of physics stand on their own merit.

The problem with this is that including 'everything we have yet to discover' makes it so open-ended as to be meaningless. If you simply re-define the term 'physical' to include 'anything that might be discovered', then it can mean anything; and a term that includes everything, means nothing. Something can only be defined by saying what it is, which implicitly also says what it isn't. — Wayfarer

So, you have no problem with my use of the words "metaphysical" and "instantiated", but great difficulty with the word "physical"? You think "physical" is meaningless, but "metaphysical" is not?

Science implies causality in its explanations. This reaction happens as a result of this combination of chemicals, while using these chemicals causes that reaction. Natural selection is a causal process of organisms evolving over time from previous ancestors, etc. — Harry Hindu

How can natural selection cause anything in a deterministic universe?

I don't see the relevance. The fact that in most cases science models causal relations doesn't entail that it always does, nor that it cannot, on the basis of those models, predict as yet unobserved phenomena. After all that is precisely what Maxwell's equations did, and those were very definitely the result of modelling events that were taken to be causally related. — MetaphysicsNow

I see. You claim that science merely models causal relations, but somehow manages to model unknown, unexpected, surprising causal relations, even when those relations, as in the case of quantum entanglement, are explicitly not causal?

That makes no sense.

There is actually an impressive list of features of Reality that were discovered theoretically long before technology became advanced enough to test these discoveries:

Quantum Entanglement - 50 years.
Higgs Boson - 50 years.
Gravitational Waves - 100 years.
Cosmic Microwave Background - Can't remember, but maybe 30 years.
Quantum Computer - Discovered in 1980s, still haven't got one.
...

But you claim not to see the relevance.

What notion of determinism are you working with here? One very typical one connects it explicity to the idea that each state of a system is ineluctably caused by the previous states of the system, so I don't see how a determinisitc theory in that sense is able to render causality meaningless. — MetaphysicsNow

The laws of physics are time-invariant. The past no more causes the future than the future causes the past.

This is right, but also misses the point to some extent. The laws of physics are usually expressed in terms of mathematical equivalences, but those equivalences are often developed on the basis that they model the relations of causes to their effects. — MetaphysicsNow

If that is the case, then how can quantum entanglement be discovered in the theory, 50 years before technology was capable of testing, or observing that prediction?

No doubt someone is going to shout "but quantum mechanics proves there is no causation". It proves no such thing - if it proves anything at all, it proves at most that we require a probabilistic conception of causality when dealing with some specific kinds of events. — MetaphysicsNow

Both quantum mechanics and general relativity are deterministic theories. Deterministic physical theories, being time-invariant, render causality meaningless.

What is physical is what is causal. Anything that has a causal relationship (which would include God's relationship to the world, soul's interactions with the body, mind's interaction with the body, etc.) would be deemed physical. Everything else would be non-physical and therefore pointless to ponder. — Harry Hindu

The laws of physics don't seem to mention causality, anywhere.

You don't seem to understand how electromagnetic radiation was discovered. Maxwell gave us electromagnetic radiation as a new theoretical concept, Hertz gave us its empirical confirmation. Prior to Maxwell, physicists working in electricity and magnetism worked - like Maxwell - on electromagnetic fields. Maxwell brought together the previous work of those other physicists into "his" four field equations. It turned out that those equations have a solution which describes the wavelike propagation of electric and magnetic energy in a vacuum at the speed of light. After Maxwell's theoretical discovery/invention of electromagnetic radiation, that radiation became an object for physical research, and most famously Hertz's which culminated in confirmation of Maxwell's theory.
That's entirely consistent with the OP's suggestion is non-physical up to Maxwell's conceptual apparatus suggested its existence. — MetaphysicsNow

But in the end, Newton was right.

Sorry, I think you may be confusing the 2nd Law with dialectical materialism. — TimeLine

I'm quite familiar with the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics. It might be informative if you could use an inductive principle to derive it, though? I don't think dialectical materialism will help in this case.

Unless you expand on what you mean by "physical" that description is unilluminatingly circular. — MetaphysicsNow

That's quite funny. You, of course are completely confident in the definition of "metaphysical" or even "instantiated".

Try reading all of the post.

Of course it does. If physical outcomes couldn’t be predicted by mathematical algorithms, then science couldn’t get out bed. [That is precisely why Hume’s ‘criticism of induction’ was said to undermine science by Bertrand Russell in HWP] — Wayfarer

Science doesn't use induction or any other mythical principle.

I refer you to Logic of Scientific Discovery, by Karl Popper.

My view is that science doesn’t explain itself; the natural laws and regularities which science assumes and relies on, are not themselves explained by science. — Wayfarer

Science doesn't assume or rely on any such inductive principle.

You might expand on that. I had the idea that physicalism and materialism were basically two different names for the same general position. — Wayfarer

You are probably right, but I feel compelled to draw the distinction. Materialism seems to indicate that not only is everything constituted of mater interactions, but that is all there is.

Physicalism seems to admit, in accordance with the 2nd Law, that pattern is real, causal, and as fundamental as matter.

My concept of the non-physical is phenomena that cannot be detected by our senses and the scientific extensions of our senses and which cannot be explained by existing scientific paradigms. The non-physical is associated with our current state of scientific knowledge. For example, prior to the work of Maxwell and Hertz, electromagnetic radiation was non-physical, but became physical as a result of the knowledge that they generated. At the present time, self-aware consciousness is non-physical.

What is your concept of the non-physical? — johnpetrovic

I have never encountered the claim that the scientists working on e.m. radiation thought they were trying to understand something non-physical before. I just doesn't make sense.

I don't think I am misrepresenting physicalism too much by describing it as the metaphysical assertion that everything that is instantiated in Reality is physical. This includes everything we have discovered, and everything we have yet to discover.

There are actually more examples of entities that were once thought of as physical, but were discovered not to exist - the ether, flogiston, elan vital ...

Non-physical things we have discovered so far, are objects that only exist in symbolic form, such as the objects and necessary truths of mathematics.

As for the mathematical truths not yet discovered, then I am forced to conclude, by my preferred epistemology, that they already exist.

I would have thought if a materialist agreed there were non-physical things then they would be abandoning materialism, wouldn’t they? Materialism means ‘there are no non-physical things’. — Wayfarer

If I ever encounter a materialist, I refer them to the 2nd law of thermodynamics. Then they are forced to join the physicalists.

3. Is it an ontological principle?

The only ontological formulation that I can think of is something along these lines:

3*. The world is "rational" (perhaps necessarily so): it is such that everything is amenable to explanation. Or, in a more standard form: Nothing can exist unless it has sufficient reasons for its existence and for the way it is. — SophistiCat

It is a physical principle that any finite physical system may be perfectly emulated on a universal computer operating by finite means.

I can't detect any difference between this principle and the ontological formulation of the PSR. Reality is constituted thus.

Think of it as a barrier to understanding, if you like. Until I know what's wrong with Zeno's argument, I don't really understand the physics. — Srap Tasmaner

There is nothing "wrong" with Zeno's argument beyond the PRESUMPTION that the properties of abstract entities are identical the the properties of real entities that bear the same name.

If Zeno is complaining about the mathematical notion of infinity, then we can refer him to Cantor. If he is complaining that motion does not make sense, then we can refer him to the laws of physics. That only leaves the complaint that what is mathematically infinite and what is physically infinite are not the same thing. Why should they be the same?

Only the laws of physics, whether you understand them or not, can tell us what is finite or infinite in Reality.

It's a mild disappointment though, that no one seems interested in examining what the laws of physics tell us about motion. I suppose they already know.

I think the argument would still work even if you replace 'know for sure' with a simple 'know'. According to the skeptical argument, all possible evidence for any proposition cannot support the proposition any better than its negation. If every experience of the external world you could have could turn out to be mistaken, then what reasons (even weaker than perfect certainty) could you possibly have for believing that you are not radically mistaken about the external world? — Fafner

"Radically mistaken" may be extreme language, but we "know for sure" we labour under certain misapprehensions.

The fact that we are mistaken about the external world (and the internal world) does not render our knowledge useless or completely without truth.

Theories do not require support. They stand on their own merit.

(1) Either (a) I see that I have hands or (b) it merely seems to me that I have hands because I’m deceived by Descartes’ evil demon.
(2) According to the skeptic, whenever I seem to see that I have hands, it is always logically possible that I’m deceived by Descartes’ evil demon.
(3) Hence I can never really know for sure whether I really have hands. — Fafner

But why do you want to "know for sure"? How is that any better than to "know".

We are fallible beings, and we should be open to criticism of our theories. To "know for sure" serves no purpose than to deny criticism, thus preventing error correction.

Are you saying that Zeno's argument is sound, and that it shows that if space-time is continuous, then motion is impossible? — Srap Tasmaner

Can someone remind me why anyone should assume that the abstract properties of an abstract idea (in this case infinity) should have any bearing on physical Reality?

Only the laws of physics can tell us what is physically infinite, and they tell us that when motion occurs, nothing physically infinite happens.

It really does not matter the discrete being discussed here is really effectively discrete. — Jeremiah

I see. The proposal makes even less sense than I had previously thought. Thanks.

You don't have any empirical proof that movement is either discrete or continuous; — Jeremiah

Our best theories tell us space(-time) is continuous.

Infinite divisibility is the problem, which was Zeno's target all along (although in his case he wanted to argue that all is one, whereas I'm suggesting that there must be some fundamental unit of space/time (or at least movement) that cannot be halved). — Michael

What law of motion are you using? If you are using Newton's laws, then you might want to reconsider.

Anyway, when we consider even the classical equation for the time evolution of the state variables (p,q) or any function of them F(p,q,t), one is not immediately struck by the impossibility of motion, or the need to render space as discrete. Everything takes place in the continuum.

$\begin{align}\frac{\mathrm{d}F}{\mathrm{d}t} &= \{F,H\} + \frac{\partial F}{\partial t}\end{align}$

If we leave Hamilton's equation behind and take a look at the quantum equivalent, the continuum is still there, but there are also some other features that might be worth noticing.

$\begin{align}\frac{\mathrm{d}\hat F}{\mathrm{d}t} &= -\frac{i}{\hbar}[\hat F,\hat H] + \frac{\partial \hat F}{\partial t}\end{align}$

This is an equation for the time evolution of operators, so, instead of the law of motion being about a particular value of interest, it is about a matrix of values. This indicates, to me at least, that what is going on in reality is quite different from what our classical intuition tells us.

Perhaps the most famous implications of the Heisenberg equation are the uncertainty relations, which have to have some bearing on Zeno's paradox.

As I have mentioned before, you can make deductions about Reality from physical laws, you are mistaken if you think you can make similar deductions from abstract mathematical ideas.

Any container or solid object that has an endless surface area, but a finite volume is paradoxical, abstractly or otherwise. — Jeremiah

No such object can exist in Reality, so it cannot be "abstractly or otherwise".

So you are suggesting if it was filled with paint, you could use a finite amount of paint to paint an endless surface. — Jeremiah

It is trivial to divide any volume to cover an infinite surface. There are plenty of convergent infinite series that will divide the volume for you.

It seems to me, that you'd run out of paint, and even if so that still does not resolve the paradox. As abstractly what you have is a cone with a converging volume and a diverging surface area. — Jeremiah

Like I said. You are confusing abstract and physical properties that happen to have the same name.

So how it is possible this horn can have limited volume but endless surface area? — Jeremiah

In mathematics, any volume can be divided in such a way to cover any surface.

This is just like Zeno's paradox. The paradox arises from the confusion of abstract properties with real ones of the same name.

Anyway, that's why I suggest that Planck units solve the paradox--space is not infinitely divisible.
Kant explains in the Critique of Pure Reason why it's hard for us to accept finite divisibility--it's outside of anything humans ever experience, so we can't wrap out heads around it. — NKBJ

Planck UNITS don't solve the "problem".

So to reiterate, what can and what cannot happen in Reality cannot be deduced from mathematics. In particular, the assumption that our understanding of the abstract infinity tells us anything about what is finite or infinite or possible in Reality is a mistake.

But of course, it is interesting to look at what our best theories tell us about motion, and how it happens.

Anyway, that's why I suggest that Planck units solve the paradox--space is not infinitely divisible. — NKBJ

Not a smart move. All physical theories that work require the continuum.

Even if the net sum is finite, if it were infinitely divisible, you'd always have one more halfway point to reach. In fact, the paradox would damn us all to complete inertia, because there's halfway points between us and the halfway points, and halfway points to those, etc. — NKBJ

Quite. The paradox has nothing whatsoever to do with the finiteness of the sum, it has to do with a finite entity being unable to perform the infinite sum in finite time.

If my memory serves me correctly, there is a similar paradox referring to the impossibility of firing an arrow, or taking a single step.

Yes. Unless a number is given at which to stop. — NKBJ

Sheesh, I must have missed that when I did my maths degree.

Though experiments in physics are very real things. — Michael

Yes they are, and the whole point of Zeno's paradox is that it purports to be one, but it is not.

Because in math ". . ." means the pattern repeats forever and that was easier to type. You know shorthand. — Jeremiah

You mean literally FOREVER? Literally infinite time?

Watch, I a finite creature will converge an infinite partial sums to a whole.

.3 +.03 + .003 + .0003 + .00003 . . . — Jeremiah

Why stop there?

Distance is definitely mapped with real numbers. — Jeremiah

You will never encounter a distance expressed in anything more than the set of computable numbers.

I said in that very post you qouted it converges to a finite number. — Jeremiah

But THAT is not the paradox.

The series obviously converges, but how can it ever reach the limit, if the entity performing the infinite sum is a finite creature in finite time? That is the (apparent) paradox.

But realism about abstracta has the same problem. See, realism's problem is epistemic, inasmuch as realists have never been able to provide a convincing story about how our particular, concrete minds manage to get ahold of abstracta. — Pneumenon

The Critical Rationalists are, I believe, realists, and they have the epistemic story.

As for discrete rather than continuous space, see quantum spacetime, loop quantum gravity, and [url=]strign theory[/url]. — Michael

There is precisely zero evidence for a discrete space-time.

General Relativity is a theory of a continuous space-time, and Quantum Field Theory os a theory of continuous fields in a continuous space-time.

And, despite your claim, String Theory also takes place in a continuous space-time.

P1. Zeno's paradox shows that either motion is not a supertask or supertasks are possible.
P2. Thomson's lamp shows that supertasks are not possible.
C. Therefore, motion is not a supertask. — Michael

Does P2 show that all supertasks are impossible, or just a certain class of tasks?

Are we not labouring under the conflation that certain abstract attributes are the same thing as physical attributes that share the same name? Why should the abstract idea of infinity and its properties determine what can and what cannot happen in reality?

If the laws of physics tell us that Achilles will cross an uncountably infinite number of points in a finite time to catch the tortoise, then that is what he will do. Nothing physically infinite has occurred.

So,

1. What Achilles can and cannot do is not deducible from mathematics.

2. Stop confusing abstract infinity with physical infinity.

That is the different between a convergent series and a divergent series. We know the distance between Achilles and the turtle converges to a finite number, so you are kind of arguing a moot point. — Jeremiah

What laws of physics do Achilles and the turtle obey? What do these LAWS say will happen?

Map/territory confusion. — Baden

I don't think so. It seems much more like an unfamiliarity with the laws that govern reality, and the mistaken assumption that these laws admit the (decoherent) continuum.

The realm is physics. If the mathematical models (maps) cause paradoxes so much the worse for their application in this instance. — Baden

The statement of what exists in reality, how it behaves, and why, can be expressed in any language. Mathematics lends itself to a particularly efficient expression of the laws of reality, in a form amenable to testing. It's not a map, it's an assertion.

You are just talking about a continuous number line, which is actually a requirement for the FTC. The curve must be continuous from a to b. — Jeremiah

But isn't it simply the case that you are confusing the continuum with reality?

Don't tortoises and demi-gods obey the laws of physics rather than the rules of certain branches of mathematics?