No, because those events, as I explained in my previous post, are either global (the Big Bang) or statistically invariant. In the case of the Big Bang the conditions for its advent are completely unknown, and we cannot say it is statistically invariant because it is the one and only truly causeless event (in the sense that it could have no cause from within the system for obvious reasons). — Janus

You only need one uncaused event to refute PSR.

I happen to disagree with you about the status of knowledge about the big bang, and your apparent assertion that "statistical invariance" can have any meaning or significance. However, if you assert the existence of an uncaused event, then it's curtains for a principle that claims no such thing can happen.

In the case of microphysical events, they are statistically invariant, which points to the them being the result of the nature of the system itself. The problem is that the general tendency is to think only in terms of efficient causation. Microphysical events might have no causes more fundamental than themselves but may be the result of global 'formal' or 'final' constraints that come about only at a certain stage in the evolution of the system itself. — Janus

Uncaused microphysical events are incompatible with PSR, it's that simple. And, as we know, there are certain famous experiments that demonstrate, without loopholes, the existence of uncaused events.

No, I agree, most typically the PSR implies the existence of a cause, whether known or not. — SophistiCat

But what if you can prove there is no cause, that there cannot be a cause, and back that up with real world experiments?

The same is true for scientific explanations: once we adopt some theory as our explanatory framework, it does not matter for us whether the theory and it posits can be further reduced to a causeless ground of all being or some such; giving account of phenomena in terms of the theory counts as providing an explanation regardless. — SophistiCat

What if the only theory we have is non-explanatory, such as the Shut-up-and-Calculat version of quantum mechanics, or the Copenhagen Theory?

So whether the Big Bang is uncaused, self-causing, or caused by something unknowable, we are not precluded from conceiving it as an event in terms of its observed consequences. But it can only be understood in terms of its consequences, a fact which itself supports the PSR, it cannot be understood 'in itself'. So, in other words, events like the Big Bang or the decay of uranium atoms are conceivable in terms of their consequences, but not conceivable in themselves. — Janus

But if there are uncaused events, like the big bang and nuclear decay, the PSR is refuted, surely?

Again, this has nothing to do with my issue with you, which is that there's no point in bringing up the free will theorem. This just seems like a weird excuse to plug a favourite theory of yours. — Michael

It's not a theory, the clue is in the title.

OK, well I guess the authors meant something like "the choice is not the outcome of a function..." so it seems reasonable to think that the PSR does rule out free will in that sense. So, the next question for tom would be: why would it follow that science is not possible if every choice an experimenter makes must be the outcome of a function of some or all of the information accessible to him or her? — MetaphysicsNow

If choice is not possible, then there can be no sense in which there is information on which a choice can be made.

As I mentioned earlier, because of quantum mechanics, if we can't make choices, Reality must be super-determined i.e. it is an acausal conspiracy.

Just say that humans having free will falsifies the principle. — Michael

And claiming that humans cannot choose what button to press also falsifies the principle.

Notice the antecedent. The rest of the argument is irrelevant (on this issue) as the principle of sufficient reason has already been rejected from the start. — Michael

As I mentioned earlier, I find it strange that people are willing to abandon science to protect a treasured principle.

I also mentioned earlier, that if it is not possible to choose which button to press, then the type of determinism that exists must be acausal.

I also mentioned that the PSR does not seem to survive either way.

The FWT is a conditional theorem to the effect thatif there are uncaused events of one specific kind, then there are other uncaused events. — MetaphysicsNow

Choices are not uncaused. All that is required is that choices exist and that in this particular case, choosing which button to press is possible.

As I have already pointed out, the choice could be relegated to a computer program, or any number of computer programs in series.

Another way of expressing the ability to choose, would be something like the assertion, "Science is possible." For surely, if an experimenter is not free to choose which experiments to perform, then science is impossible.

Probabilistic conceptions of causality attempt to keep some aspects of causality, but drop that specific conception of determinism, allowing that future states of systems have a probabilistic distribution, but are nevertheless in some significant sense caused by the existing state of the system, thus rendering causation compatible with (some interpretations of) QM. — MetaphysicsNow

This is refuted by FWT, and therefore by quantum mechanics, which is a theory that adheres to the axioms of FWT. Probabilistic causality is ruled out, as are hidden variables.

Even if you insist that your decision of pseudo-random number generator, and its output, and your mapping, is determined by the big-bang, probabilistic causality is refuted.

Yes: take a look here for instance — MetaphysicsNow

Your claim that probabilistic causality is compatible with quantum mechanics, how?

Not really - there are probabilistic conceptions of causality that are perfectly compatible with QM. — MetaphysicsNow

Really?

The proof given in the FWT for uncaused events, has absolutely nothing to do with virtual particles.

Pseudo-random number generators are not truly random - their outputs are in principle predictable and explicable and at base a matter of cause and effect, and that feeds through into any measurements finally made on their basis that the measurements to take are "chosen" by such a machine. — MetaphysicsNow

Which pseudo-random number generator do you propose to use? How will you map the output of the number generator to the buttons?

The FWT also holds if the decision is made by a random number generator, which exist BTW.

Odd, perhaps, but if that's where a true principle or an apriori principle of thought or whatever it is taken to be leads, so be it: a principle that drives human discovery in one way or another is not to be discarded simply because it leads to apparently unpalatable results. — MetaphysicsNow

The PSR has never driven human discovery. It can't do that.

2. Every event has a cause — TheMadFool

This is proved false by quantum mechanics.

2 and 3 seem to be saying the same thing. They too lead, inevitably, to a causal formulation of the Munchhausen trilemma. — TheMadFool

I thought we had given up trying to prove theories true since at least the advent of the scientific method. Instead, we try to find problems with theories and find solutions.

So, disproving or denying the PSR becomes a mere academic exercise having little effect on how we actually deal with knowledge seeking. — TheMadFool

We have a deep theory of reality that says PSR is false. But yes, PSR has nothing to do with knowledge seeking.

You cannot refute a principle on the basis of an assumption which the principle (arguably) entails is false: that's called question begging. — MetaphysicsNow

It seems odd that someone would give up the ability to chose which button to press, rather than question a cherished principle.

The FWT would still hold if the choice was made by a pseudo-random number generator.

That is true, but I thought your position was that the FWT refutes the PSR. It doesn't, and precisely because of the fact that the theorem is a conditional whose antecedent bears on the PSR, and they don't establish that the antecedent of their theorem is true. — MetaphysicsNow

The PSR is refuted because the laws of physics disagree with it. The assumption being that an experimenter possesses sufficient freedom to press one of a number of buttons.

If the assumption of the ability to choose a button is false, then the laws of physics tell us that we inhabit a superdeterministic conspiracy. I'm not convinced that PSR has any meaning in that scenario.

The authors do absolutely nothing to establish that the antecedent is true, and do not even put any flesh on the bones of what they take to be "free will". — MetaphysicsNow

If all they need to assume is "that the experimenter can freely choose to make any one of a small number of observations", what would be the point of complicating matters by adding unnecessary assumptions?

I have only skim read it - but as it stands my feeling is just to lump the authors into the category of competentent physicists but bumbling philosophers, and since the status of the PSR is a philosophical issue, they don't really have a great deal to contribute. — MetaphysicsNow

As if ad-hominem was relevant, neither Kochen nor Conway is a physicist. One is a pre-eminent mathematical logician with several important theorems in his name, the other, one of the most famous mathematicians alive.

And, If I remember correctly, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not mentioned in either of the FWT papers

Admittedly I've only just started reading the article, but they appear to be helping themselves to the notion of free will, which is precisely one of the notions that the PSR bears upon, and if so, they are not so much falsifying the PSR but begging the question against it. I'll continue reading their paper, but the philosophical roughshod-riding they engage in at the begining gives me initial reason to doubt that they have anything philosophically cogent to contribute to the debate about the PSR. — MetaphysicsNow

I think you can go a little bit further: While the PSR is falsified if we have free will by the Free Will Theorem, if we do not have free will, then I'm not sure anything meaningful can be recovered.

If the universe is deterministic, then the FWT informs us that we inhabit a super-deterministic hell. There can be no "reason" that the distant entangled particle behaves the way it does, beyond "it was thus determined".

Both Schopenhauer and Darwin can provide relatively irrefutable observational evidence for their respective assertions. And yet, modern biology operates upon the basis of the veracity of the theory of Evolution, whilst the 'Theory' of Determinism remains outside of the scope of mainstream thought. Even Philosophers do not accept that Determinism has been established or proven by Schopenhauer and others. — Marcus de Brun

It's even stranger than that. Modern biologist who argue against free will would never apply identical arguments against evolution.

Darwin wrote about this metaphysical problem in his most important work "The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication", in which he claimed that if determinism was true, evolution would be false. Evolution requires metaphysical randomness.

While the implications of determinism may be ignored, determinism in science is far from "outside the scope of mainstream thought". Our two main physical theories, when interpreted realistically, are entirely deterministic.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason has been falsified by the Free Will and Strong Free Will Theorems of Kochen and Conway.

How so? — charleton

Well, you claimed, based on no argument, that fatalism isn't true. In which case General Relativity is not going to work for you, you are going to need a new theory. GR is fatalistic.

Quantum mechanics is also compatible with fatalism, which is called Superdeterminism in that field.

Oh well, if I'd known that the Oxford University journal was silly I wouldn't have been citing it all these years — Pseudonym

Now you are jumping the shark. You don't even read the papers you cite, let alone comprehend them. If you did you wouldn't cite them!

Allow me to repeat: I have not claimed that QM is deterministic or indeterministic. Can you understand that?

This implies fatalism which is not true. Nothing is 'already' determined in the sense it is know. Things are determined by antecedent conditions. That does not imply anything 'already'.
Unless you believe in God. — charleton

Or you accept the consequences of General Relativity.

You're missing the point of what I'm saying entirely. The simple fact is that some equally intelligent people have come to an alternative conclusion, as the paper I cited shows, meaning that nothing has been proven, it has only been theorised. — Pseudonym

Don't be silly! And by the way Bohmianism is refuted by the Free Will Theorem, and Bell, and Kochen-Specker, and experiment.

And, because you weren't paying attention, allow me to elaborate. I did not claim that the Reality is deterministic, or indeterministic. I did not claim it is causal or acausal.

No one has proven anything, it is a perfectly legitimatlt contested theorem — Pseudonym

For a start, the incompatibility of determinism and causality is an empirical fact, unless we radically alter our conception of the Reality.

Secondly, it is proved by the Free Will Theorems precisely that determinism and causality are incompatible with reality.

Now, you claim that:

No one has proven anything — Pseudonym

Really? Literally nothing has ever been proven?

For your information, Kochen is a rather famous mathematical logician, and Conway one of the most famous living mathematicians. They know what they are doing, and know what they have proved. What I claim they have proved, is less than they claim, because I am taking into account the Superdeterministic loophole.

My view is that determinism must be true.

At the most basic level, things happen because they are caused by other things. — RepThatMerch22

Since the discovery of quantum entanglement, you can't have determinism and causality; they are incompatible unless you make a radical change to our conception of the Reality.

Also, results like the Free Will Theorems of Kochen and Conway prove you can't have determinism and causality.

Free will must be an illusion. You only do things because something in your brain told you to. If you understood all the chemistry and physics behind the operation of your brain, you would be able to see why you do things. — RepThatMerch22

This isn't even true of computers, so I have no idea why you think it is true of brains.

There is an advantage to this approach. Mathematicians are not constrained by a definition of number, which allows them to discover new types of numbers all the time. — fishfry

If you don't like the fact that numbers are defined in terms of set theory, and further properties deduced from there, I guess you won't like the fact that numbers are also defined in terms of field axioms.

And no, new types of number are not "discovered all the time".

There is no general definition of number anywhere in mathematics. Of course there are perfectly clear definitions of particular types of numbers. Integers, reals, quaternions, p-adics, transfinite ordinals, and so on. But nowhere in mathematical literature will you find anyone who ever says: "A number is defined as such and so." — fishfry

At least Frege, Russell, and Whitehead defined what a number is. There are probably several others.

Hang on, there's even a Wikipedia page:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set-theoretic_definition_of_natural_numbers

Post that reference and my thesis stands refuted. — fishfry

Follow the Wikipedia links, do some Googling, you are refuted.

To me it's quite clear in the context of everything else Trump has said and done that he's a xenophobe/racist/bigot. — Benkei

Do you think the National Ethnic Coalition of Organizations should ask for their Ellis Island Medal back? It was for services to black inner-city youth after all.



Or do you think he is a racist because he has reduced black unemployment to record lows, and already restored black median income to levels before Obama reduced it by $1000pa?

Oh, and that's Rosa Parks in the picture, by the way.

Finite might be an important qualification don't you think? — apokrisis

The entire observable universe is finite.

Of course I realise that you take as unarguable that the MWI interpretation (your so-called non-interpretation interpretation :) ) is proven and quantum computation tapping unlimited resources is as good as a done thing. But I wonder what Popper would have said about such unqualified conviction? — apokrisis

Quantum computation has nothing to do with interpretation. I merely asks new questions that are unanswerable in interpretations other than MW. A bit like the old questions, only more pressing.

Popper wrote a book on the subject, "Realism and th Aim of Science".

It's a philosophical curiosity that there is no definition of number in mathematics. In other words if you major in math, get a Ph.D. spend a career as a professional mathematician, you will never encounter a book or a paper that says, "A number is such and so." — fishfry

Really? What is number theory about? What is Principia Mathematica about?

Sorry but you are bullshitting to an extraordinary level.

* What is quantity?

* The imaginary unit i with i^2 = -1 ... what quantity does it represent?

* Do you regard i as a number?

* Does i exist? — fishfry

You think numbers are defined in terms of quantity?

i represents the square root of -1.

i is a number.

i exists.

Simples.

Problems with this: Pretty much the countries that are not-so-nice have histories of gross exploitation first by the nicer countries, and then by the thugs they left in power. But what really matters is that Trump is equating the people with the not-so-niceness of their countries, and he's doing it by race. That's racist racism 101. — tim wood

Sweden is a shithole. Rape, shooting, grenade exploding, car burning capital of Europe.

Zimbabwe is a shithole.

Saudi Arabia is a shithole.

Yemen is an utter shithole.

There are plenty of shitholes, even though Trump never uttered the word.

Then what did you mean by this?
"We've known that all Turing machines are equivalent since 1930s" — charleton

Since the 1930s, we have known that all Turing-complete architectures are EQUIVALENT. i.e. they can all perfectly emulate each other. Because you seem to be struggling with this, perhaps I need to point out that equivalence does not mean the SAME.

Architectures can be different, and because of that we know that computational states cannot be determined by the state of the computer, even if the computer is itself an abstraction. The identical computational state may be implemented in an infinite number of ways.

Now, you asserted it was logically impossible for computers to emulate any physical system. Please explain.

What sort of mind-bendingly ridiculous statement is this?
Computers shall never fully emulate any physical system. It is logically impossible.
But since you think its already been done; please give us an example of such a machine from the 1930s??
LOL — charleton

Maybe you should re-read my post.

I explicitly made the distinction between Turing machines and physical universal computers; one being a mathematical abstraction, the other a real physical system. There were no universal computers in the 1930s.

The paper that proves that any finite physical system may be emulated on a universal computer by finite means is this one:

http://www.daviddeutsch.org.uk/wp-content/deutsch85.pdf

It also happens to be the paper in which the quantum computer was invented. Don't let that worry you because the brain does not rely on quantum coherence, so a classical computer will suffice for a perfect emulation.

Now, you mentioned something about logical impossibility. Would you care to explain? LOLS

One obvious rejoinder to your analogy is that it's a poor one: 'computer and computational' don't easily map on to 'brain and mental' without remainder. — mcdoodle

We've known that all Turing machines are equivalent since 1930s and that all physical universal computers are equivalent since 1980s and that they are capable of emulating any physical system.

It's not an analogy, it's known physics. Once you have achieved computational universality, there is nowhere else to go.

It's a mid-20th century scientistic fantasy. I do think it's an interesting way of putting it, in that it spells out some of the ground that a lot of people evade: just what sort of factors would need to be aligned to make an ultra-physicalist view work. — mcdoodle

Physicalist or not, you can't tell what a computer is doing from its state.

One problem anyway is 'state' versus ' process'. A still picture, if that is the equivalent of 'state', can be very deceptive about what 'process' is going on in the course of movement, taken in isolation. — mcdoodle

I'm not sure "process" helps you either. Why would a sequence of states tell you what is going on? The only way to tell what's going on, is to run the program.

It's interesting then how hard it is to imagine 'I believe' being represented by 'I am in state 44: 34: 22: 67 :98'. I suggest that one issue is that 'belief' has an emotional, or at the very least a commitment component to it that natural language gives us. — mcdoodle

What makes anyone think brain and mental states are correlated, when computer and computational states aren't?

Suppose that we had a complete knowledge of neurophysi-ology and that we could order all possible human brain states (if not metrically, then at least topologically) in a phase space of n dimensions. Every point in this phase space would then represent a fully specific type of brain state. And, taking isomorphism for granted, a subset of these points would also represent the total set of possible mental states. — Feigl

I'm not sure this could even work for a computer, let alone a human brain. We can, as a matter of fact, identify all possible states of a computer, yet dong so helps us in no way to understand what it is computing. In fact the same computer-states will be used in different computations for different purposes.

Assuming isomorphism is a mistake.

See the source in (1.a). — ProgrammingGodJordan

I doesn't seem to indicate how entropy maximization either is selected for, nor could be selected for by evolution. Replication seems totally absent, as is variation.

Unless I have missed something of course?

Perhaps you could explain?

The Big Bang thing is just Genesis and GTR makes no such prediction. It only concerns itself with measurements by clocks. As it turns out clocks are affected by gravity as are photons. I'm not surprised. So are waves in the ocean.

I love it when Determinists have to defend their faith. You figure all you have to do is throw out you God (Super-Duper-Determinatism) and people are going to fall over trying to be converted? Truly bathing in their own self-admitted illusions. You are living a life of illusions right? — Rich

How does one request a "Mute" or "Block" feature on this forum?

It says no such thing. It's a simple equation. The rest of the story is just made up. In fact, there isn't even time in the equation. It is all about time as expressed in clocks and how acceleration affects then. There is nothing there about human experience of duration. Humans are not clocks. — Rich

Sorry, but GR predicts many things like, the big-bang, time dilation, gravitational waves, and that we inhabit a stationary block universe.

Google it. — Rich

The last refuge of the bull-shitter.