What about Nietzsche... I don't want to discuss him at this thread, because that's not the point of it.
And my interpretation of him radically differs from mainstream — kirillov

Ok!

For me, life (in general) isn't finite. In Buddhist word's, Samsara will make another turn. — kirillov

Ok. But notice that religions that accept samsara generally posit some kind of transcendence of the transitoriness, suffering, death present in it. They do not 'affirm life' by accepting death, suffering etc but they generally try to find a 'way out'. That's why detachment is generally a common attitude you find in them (as well as compassion for other beings trapped in the prison of samsara).

And there's situations where you can't avoid/moderate pain & suffering (that's what I'm dealing with) , so Epicurus is not for me. — kirillov

Agreed. But in a purely 'secular' worldview, I would say it is the best approach. Suffering can't be eliminated or even reduced in certain circumstances and, in fact, Epicurus also suggested to find way to make it more bearable.

I find Epicurus' philosophy depressing in a way but I do think that given the assumptions of his worldview is the most rational.


FWIW, I am sorry for your situation BTW. I hope it will get better.

I know that suffering is unavoidable. As I said: "life is eternal suffering".
My goal is to affirm it, accept it. To love this life despite all the suffering it entails. — kirillov

Well, as I said, religions that accepted samasara generally tried to escape and not 'affirm' samsaric life. If we are indeed in samsara and we can't transcend it, I think that 'affirming' it inevitably will make samsara worse. We can't transform samsara in a positive state.

There is a reason why historically the 'escape' from samsara was put in term of knowing a 'higher reality' and/or recognizing that is a sort of illusion and so on rather than try to see it in a more 'affirming' way.

It would just mean that the theory is completely useless. If a necessary condition of the theory is perfect conditions, and it is demonstrated that perfect conditions are impossible, then the theory can be dismissed as useless, because that premise can never be fulfilled. — Metaphysician Undercover

I feel that we are going to have to agree to disagree here. Perhaps there are no isolated systems but the law of conservation of energy had been incredibly useful and, in fact, you can deduce the deviations and confirm them experimentally.

It's not the law of conservation which produces consistent predictions, as is obvious from the fact that it is inaccurate. Predictions can be produced from statistics, and the statistics might concern deviations form the conservation law. Then the conservation law would not state anything true about the world, it would just be a useful tool for gathering statistics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Galileo discovered that, without the friction of air, falling object would move under the influence of gravity with an uniform rettilinean accelerated motion. Still, here on Earth we can't be without air (except in some void chambers) and, therefore, the conditions of free-fall are not met. Does this mean that Galileo was simply wrong?

Approximation is key in physics. Same goes for idealizations. The same goes for the awareness of the limitations due to them.

Isn't that exactly what we are debating, whether the conservation law is true or false? You've already decided that it is merely approximate, why not take the next step, and accept that it is false? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because I believe that even if there are no isolated systems, the usefulness of the laws prove to me that they do tell something true about the 'order of nature'. To use out of context St. Paul's phrase "we see through a glass darkly", but we aren't blind.

That's exactly what measuring the temperature is, work being done. The energy acts on the thermometer, and this is an instance of work being done. Therefore taking the temperature is an instance of work being done. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even if the thermometer responds due to the work that the particles of the constituent do on it, you can't convert all the heat transferred via e.g. friction in a thermometer and then use that stored energy to do work again. The second principle of thermodynamics just says that: it is impossible to have total control of energy.

QM doesn't have a reduction postulate, but some of the interpretations do. Each seems to spin the role of measurement a different way. — noAxioms

Yes. In order to get definite outcomes without interference you need that axiom (or some modifications of the mathematical apparatus of QM as in dBB)

It seems to be enough given an interpretation (MWI say) that explains it that way. — noAxioms

MWI was developed before decoherence. MWI supporters like decoherence because it seems to explain the branching. It doesn't IIRC remove interference however. I believe that it is legit to ask if it is 'enough' to explain our experience.

Interference is a statistical effect, so with no particle can interference be measured, let alone measured by the particle in question. But it can be concluded given hundreds of thousands of objects all being treated identically. So I suppose a really huge crowd of people (far more than billions) could collectively notice some kind of interference if they all did something identical. I cannot fathom what that experiment would look like or how any of those people could survive it. — noAxioms

Ok. But this still doesn't refute my point. It is conceivable to observe interference it it exists. So, perhaps, some versions of MWI are falsifiable?

So the cat is in superposition of the interior definite state of being dead and alive, but the cat is not in a exterior definite state, meaning it is still in superposition relative to the lab. And yes, they can measure interference in principle. — noAxioms

But in this relationalist view, the basis is selected via the experimental apparatus. In MWI one should IMO expect to derive everything from the universal wavefunction. I don't think that your view is affected by that argument.

There's no preferred basis in MWI. That much I know. Can't speak for MMI. — noAxioms

Yes, but there is a preferred basis in our experience. How does MWI account for that? Here what Schwindt concludes:

I have shown that it is always possible to factorize the global Hilbert space into subsystems
in such a way, that the story told by this factorization is that of a world in which nothing
happens. A factorization into interacting and entangling subsystems is also possible, in
infinitely many arbitrary ways. But such a more complicated factorization is meaningful
only if it is justified through interactions with an external observer who does not arise as
a part of the state vector.
The Many World Interpretation is therefore rather a No World Interpretation (according to the simple factorization), or a Many Many Worlds Interpretation (because each of
the arbitrary more complicated factorizations tells a different story about Many Worlds
[7]).

So, perhaps, there are 'Many-Many Worlds'...

(This has been explored by credible academic sources, moving beyond popular mysticism, to examine genuine philosophical parallels. Theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli, founder of loop quantum gravity, has written seriously about how Nagarjuna’s philosophy of emptiness—the idea that phenomena lack intrinsic existence—resonates with quantum mechanics’ relational ontology, where particles and properties exist only through measurement relationships rather than independently. Academic journals have published rigorous analyses, such as SpringerLink’s examination of “Two Aspects of Śūnyatā in Quantum Physics,” which argues that both quantum mechanics and (Middle-Way) Buddhism suggest there are no intrinsically existing particles with inherent properties, but rather that all phenomena arise through dependent relationships. This philosophical convergence centers on the idea that reality is fundamentally relational rather than consisting of purportedly mind-independent objects, challenging the classical scientific assumption that the objective domain has fixed, determinate properties independent of observation. It dovetails well with aspects of the Copenhagen and QBist interpretation, not so much with classical realism.) — Wayfarer

Notice that Rovelli IMO overstates the similarities. Yes, his interpretation has a lot in common with Madhyamaka. But Madhyamaka has an (epistemic) 'idealistic' bent to it that Rovelli doesn't capture. Ultimately, all apperances are illusion-like or equivalent to illusions. I doubt that Rovelli would agree with that. QBism perhaps is closer to Madhyamaka but perhaps QBism risks to reify 'agents' in a way that Nagarjuna would not have approved.

Still, I am happy that physicists find inspiration in those views. It might mean something... not sure what but I don't think that it doesn't mean anything.

Yeah, I see that I also went on to comment excessively on Nietzsche's philosophy. Anyway, in the first paragraph of my response I pointed out that, in my opinion, kirillov sought to find a way to affirm life in the same degree as Nietzsche did if there is no possibility of transcendence and/or ultimate redemption. If that is what they were asking, I believe that a more rational way to approach life would be something like the Epicurean model. That is cherishing and delighting in life in moderation, i.e. we should remind ourselves that life is finite and try to avoid to attach to it too much importance. — boundless

Also, if death means the definitive separation between people that are dear to us, the rational way to process the separation is with grief. Because by grieving we recognize the intrinsic value of these persons and we recognize that value is now irrimediably lost. So, it would seem that without any hope of transcendence and/or redemption it is impossible to avoid to suffer and attain any kind of solid happiness.

Folks keep posting thoughts and comments about Nietzsche or Schopenhauer when the OP clearly stated that their philosophy no longer satisfies him. So, there is no solution for the moment. He just asked us what to read now, not what you guys think about these German boys. :grin: — javi2541997

Yeah, I see that I also went on to comment excessively on Nietzsche's philosophy. Anyway, in the first paragraph of my response I pointed out that, in my opinion, @kirillov sought to find a way to affirm life in the same degree as Nietzsche did if there is no possibility of transcendence and/or ultimate redemption. If that is what they were asking, I believe that a more rational way to approach life would be something like the Epicurean model. That is cherishing and delighting in life in moderation, i.e. we should remind ourselves that life is finite and try to avoid to attach to it too much importance.

I do believe that, if there aren't any kind of trascendence and/or redemption, ultimately, life is quite a tragic endeavour where death has the 'last word'.

To assume that one could impose a criterion for the goodness of a value system, the ‘best way’ to affirm life, from outside of all contingent perspectives, a god’s- eye view, view from nowhere or sideways on, is to impose a formula which is meaningless. In Nietzsche’s sense such aesthetic ideals are the definition of nihilism. And given the fact that most of the suffering in this world comes at the hands of those who act on behalf of supposedly perspective-free principles and criteria of truth and righteousness, it may be time to think differently. — Joshs

While I would say that there are some things that are always morally good or bad, I also think that in some cases it is context dependent. Anyway, my point is different.

If, according to Nietzsche, all manifestations of life are manifestations of the 'will to power', and there is no ultimate 'right' or 'wrong' way to manifest it (someone in the classical tradition would perhaps say that the 'right' way is what fulfills the nature of the will, but Nietzsche rejects that), it is somewhat inconsistent to write books glorifying some way of living and criticizing others. You would expect that Nietzsche would say something like: "ultimately, there are different forms of the will to power. There is no good or bad ways to express such a willing/power. So, do what you want to do without any 'moral' concern!". Instead, he wrote many books to show how inadequate were religions, especially Christainity.

Mind you, I think that Nietzsche had pretty interesting things to say (e.g. about how resentment works and can condition our thoughts, about creativity and so on). But his extreme 'voluntarism', expressed in his mature 'amoralism' and 'will to power' etc is IMO more consistent with an empty philosophy rather than a philosophy that can teach a 'way of life'. To put it differently, the 'pars destruens' was so pervasive than no 'pars construens' seems consistent with it, not his.

If there is no transcendence of and/or redemption from transitoriness, suffering and death, however, I don't see how and why we should 'affirm' life at the level that Nietzsche would like. We can certainly cherish life but it is also true that without any form of transcendence death has the 'last word' so to speak both for the individual and for our species. Life is a completely tragic phenomenon and the tragedy is amplified the more we affirm it. If we affirm it like 'tragic heroes', it doesn't change the fact that, however, 'death wins'.

Furthermore, the problem with Nietzsche's philosophy is that it is inconsistent here IMO. If the 'highest form of life' is a life where we impose our values and there is no critierion in which we distinguish, in a non-arbitrary manner what is the best way to 'affirm life' then a 'life affirming' stance is no 'better' than a 'life denying' one, as both are said to be manifestations of the 'will to power'. Why should a manifestion of the will to power be better than another if there aren't criteria to tell which is better? In other words, I do not see in Nietzsche's philosophy enough convincing arguments for avoiding a compeletely arbitrary stance of life where absolutely any stance is no better or worse than any other.

I do not think that your claim is reasonable. No experiment has provided 100% conservation, so it is actually unreasonable to say that results are consistent with conservation laws. For some reason, you think that stating that the law is an "approximation" makes the law reasonable. What if I told you that 9 is approximately 10, and so I proposed a law that stated 9 is always 10? Would it be reasonable to claim that this approximation justifies the truth of my law? I don't think so. Why would you think that approximation in the case of the law of conservation of energy justifies a claim that the law is true? — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what you mean. But suppose that a theory tells you that if the conditions are perfect you get 10 and if they aren't you get 9. You never get perfect conditions and you always get 9. This doesn't refute the theory, far from it!

So, if there is no 'isolated system' and you observe that energy isn't perfectly conserved it is hardly an objection of the law of conservation of energy if it gives consistent predictions also in the cases where it is expected that energy isn't conserved.

Yes, the use of conservation laws does "point to something true about the physical universe". The evidence indicates overwhelmingly, that conservation laws are false. That is the single most important truth that we can abstract from the ongoing use of conservation laws. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. What your objection actually point to is that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the universe as a whole. Which is BTW interesting, but it doesn't refute the laws of conservation.

Your objection however does raise the problem of how to interpet the fact that idealizations seem never to find a 'realization' in nature. That's a perfectly fine area of inquiry but is different from what we were debating.

The very act of measuring the temperature is in fact an instance of using that energy as work. — Metaphysician Undercover

Honestly, I am not sure of what you are saying here. When you measure temperature (or internal energy) you don't tranform it to work.

Yes. Enformationism*1 is similar in some ways to ancient World Soul and Panpsychism worldviews. But it's based on modern science, specifically Quantum Physics and Information Science. The notion of a BothAnd Principle*2 illustrates how a Holistic worldview can encompass both Mind & Body under the singular heading of Potential or Causation or what I call EnFormAction. Here's a review of a Philosophy Now article in my blog. :smile: — Gnomon

Interesting, thanks!

From a purely speculative metaphysical perspective, bottom line is, one’s decision on his relation to himself follows necessarily from whether or not the volitions of his will justify his worthiness of being happy. Clear conscience on steroids, so to speak. — Mww

I prefer thinking about these things in a virtue ethics framework, but I think we aren't say different things here. I would say that 'clear conscience on steroids' fulfills our nature...

You'd have to show where QM says anything like that. QM does not contradict empirical experience. — noAxioms

Yeah, I should have phrased it better. I meant something like 'QM without the reduction postulate'. If you do not accept collapse, you still have superposition and interference. So, you need to explain why we do percieve everything in a definite state. Many claim that the 'appearance of collapse' given by decoherence is enough. Others disagree.

Right. There's no cat experiencing superposition or being both dead and alive. There's (from the lab PoV) a superposition of the cat experiencing living, and of experiencing dying by poison. A superposition of those two experiences is very different than the cat experiencing both outcomes. Each experience is utterly unaware of the other. — noAxioms

I know. But I was questioning if decoherence is enough for the appearance of collapse. Interference terms remain, they become however very, very small. Is that truly enough to explain our 'definite' experience (same goes for the cat's experience)?

'Definite states' sounds awfully classical to me. MWI is not a counterfactual interpretation, so is seems wrong to talk about such things. — noAxioms

Definite means something like this. Consider a spin 1/2 particle. When we measure the spin (say) in the z-axis we obtain either '+1/2' or '-1/2'. So, '+1/2' and '-1/2' are 'definite states'. The general quantum state of that particle can be written as a linear combination of these 'definite states'. Let's call this basis 'basis 1'.
But again the same is true for the states '(1/sqrt(2))*('+1/2' +'-1/2')' and '(1/sqrt(2))*('+1/2' -'-1/2')'. These two states are an orthogonal basis but they do not correspond to anything in our experience. Still, a genral quantum state of the same spin 1/2 particle can be written as a linear combination of these two vectors. Let's call this basis 'basis 2'.

Here things go tricky, however. Why, when we make a measurement, does the quantum state collapse or appear to collapse in one state of the 'basis 1' instead of 'basis 2'? Certainly 'basis 1' describes the states that correspond to our experience. But if MWI-supporters do not want to make any reference to experience to explain how we have the quantum-classical transition, then why systems evolve as if they have to appear to collapse in a state of the 'basis 1', which happens to correspond to our experience?

This is a part of, as I understand it, the 'preferred basis problem'. MMI posits that 'basis 1' is selected by the mind. But 'pure MWI' claims to be 'QM without the collapse postulate' and no other additional axiom like the collapse/reduction.

I don't think that this objection is fatal, though. But to me it suggests that there is more in the story than just states in the Hilbert space and their evolution as MWI would claim.

Hard to read, lacking the background required, but it seems to say that there are no 'worlds' from any objective description of say the universal wave function. It has no 'system states', something with which I agree. There are no discreet worlds, which again, sounds like a counterfactual. I think the paper is arguing against not so much the original Everett paper, but against the DeWitt interpretation that dubbed the term 'worlds' and MWI and such. I could be wrong. — noAxioms

Yeah, the paper is a bit technical and also beyond my paygrade. Basically, however, it tries to reject MWI by adducing that if a MWI supporter doesn't add some postulate to 'pure QM without the collapse postulate' you can't explain how the universe decompose in subsystems, how the preferred basis is selected etc. So, I would say that it does apply to any Everettian interpretation with the universal wavefunction. RQM seems unaffected by the criticism.

Yet, QM taken literally tells us that we should perceive an interference of mutually exclusive states. For instance both states of the cat in Schroedinger's (in)famous experiment. In order to avoid that conclusion, decoherence is taken as an explanation of the appearance of 'definiteness'.

Any interpreter of QM must give an account of why we do not experience mutually contradictory states.

Also there is the preferred basis problem. Basically, in MWI the branching is explained by saying that there is a superposition of definite states. Yet, there seems no reason from 'first principles' that tells us that the branching should be between definite states. In fact, it seems an a posteriori assumption that is made in MWI. This is not a fatal objection to MWI but, if I am not mistaken, the fact that the branching happens in the way that is consistent to our experience is a ad hoc assumption that we need to add to MWI.
This problem is found in all interpretations that claim to not add any additional structure to the quantum state of the universe. This objection doesn't apply to de Broglie-Bohm due to the presence of particles and to Copenaghen-like views due to the presence of observers. Also perhaps MMI escapes this problem via the 'minds'.

See on this this paper: "Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation" by physicist J. Schwindt.

@noAxioms

Do you have a solid concept of what the experience of interference would be like? What kinds of experiences would you be expecting, if there were interference? — flannel jesus

I have no idea. That's might be taken as a suggestion that there is no interference in the world we experience. Hence, decoherence is not enough. In fact, I do agree with this.

Conversely, MWI supporters would say that our experience is not precise, has been proven wrong before and, therefore, should not be trusted here.

Yes that what MWI supporters point out. If interference is very, very small it is reasonable to say that it is negligible after all. You don't need a 'perfect classicality' when you have a classicality FAPP ('for all practical purposes' to borrow a phrase of John Bell used in a different context).

Note however that our experience does seem about definite outcomes without any interference, i.e. our experience suggests to us that there is no interference, period. Of course, it can be wrong.

Honestly, I think that it is one of those situations where you get a stalemate between two positions.

Interestingly, you find a similar problem in epistemic interpretations different from QBism vs QBism. Here, probabilities that have a value of 0 and 1 do not represent probabilities, rather they represent the situation when you get a certain knowledge. And from here you get the speculations about a supposed role of observations to bring 'into being' definite outcomes from an indeterminate state. In QBism, probabilities with a value of 0 and 1 still represent a 'degree of belief' like all other probabilities.

I have no disagreement with the idea that the law of conservation of energy is "a very good approximation. But the point is that it is not what is the case. Therefore it is not the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would be careful here. Yes, it seems that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the whole universe, but our experiments tell us that when the approximation is reasonable, the results are coherent with conservation laws. Also, when we know the deviations that we expect from a non-isolated system (i.e. when we know 'how much' the system is not isolated), we find a coherent result.
This certainly points to the fact that, at least, conservation laws do point to something true about the physical universe, even if the conditions where they hold without errors are never actualized. Or maybe they are valid when you take the entire physical universe all together.

Furthermore, the conservation of energy (and of linear and angular momenta etc) has been a very good source of discoveries. For instance, in particle physics, the neutrinos weren't observed initially. Some energy seemed to be missing. But the neutrino were discovered.

The point being that "a very good approximation", which leaves aspects of the concept of energy, such as "entropy", accounted for by unacceptable descriptions, is misleading, regardless of whether it is a good approximation. — Metaphysician Undercover

But note that entropy is not a form of energy. Even its physical dimensions (measurement units) are different. Also, there is nothing like an energy-entropy equivalence like there is a mass-entropy equivalence.
Entropy is more like how energy is distributed than a measure of the quantity of energy that is 'lost'.

The point is that if some energy cannot be controlled, then it cannot be detected, because detection is a type of control. And if it cannot be detected it cannot be called "energy". So "entropy" serves as a concept which consists of some energy which is not energy, and that is contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope, you can measure the increase of temperature (and hence, internal energy) due to friction. But you can't recover it to use it again as work.

No, I am saying that a perfectly closed system is impossible and the law of conservation of energy is demonstrated as false because it requires a perfectly closed system for its truth. And, this is due to the nature of time, what is known as the irreversibility of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an interesting, if contentious point. But it is unrelated to entropy. If there are no perfectly isolated systems, the law of conservation seem to never hold. But, again, note my points at the beginning of my response.

It's also why I coined a new term, EnFormAction, that refers to the constructive force in physics, formerly labeled dismissively as Negentropy. :smile: — Gnomon

Note that physical laws seem to be passive constraints, however. They are holistic in a sense but not like the 'holism' you see in living beings, where the whole actively and purposively seem to 'guide' its parts.

So, your model seems to me a bit like the 'world soul' present in some hellenistic philosophies, i.e. the universe as a whole as a sort of living being. So it seems to me that you are proposing a dualistic model or a dual-aspect monism, where mind and the 'physical' are two aspects of the whole.

I never got that interpretation since it being different definite outcomes is relative to anything, not just information processors. I suppose I'd need to delve into it more to critique it more informatively. — noAxioms

Ok. I admit that I am also not that familiar with that interpretation. Also it doesn't make completely sense to me. I mean: I have one body in a superposition of states and a myriad of minds for each? Still, I do think that it is an interesting 'take' of MWI. For instance, MWI supporters generally claim that decoherence is enought to have 'classicality'. But IIRC, interference isn't eliminated. The terms relative to interference become very, very small but not zero - so apparently MMI supporters claim that to have true classicality you need minds.

Inability to express something complex as a function of trivial operations doesn't mean that it isn't a function of trivial operations, but of course it also isn't proof that it is such. — noAxioms

Agreed. Both positions are possible until one gives enough evidence for one of them. I think that it is not unreasonable to hold both of them.

Empirical knowledge is exactly how we correct our initial guesses, which are often based on intuition. — noAxioms

I agree. I just think that the block universe takes things too far. Fortunately for me, GR is not the whole story.

Yes, quite. I understand it as a contract (written or not) with a society. Many would define it differently. My assertion about the isolated person works with my definition, and not with some others. — noAxioms

Agreed.

Compulsion is when you make one choice, but are incapable of enacting it. Cumpulsion is not the inability to do two different things, which is what 'could have done otherwise' boils down to. — noAxioms

I would say that compulsion is when our deliberative power is coherced to act in a certain bway by internal (e.g. severe mental illnesses) or external constraints. I disagree with compatibilists that excluding these factors is enough to retain accountability.

To get to the bottom, though, it might be closer, to say morality is that by which one decides what his relation to others ought to be, irrespective of the particular incident for which a morally predicated act is required. What I mean is, how one relates to others, or, the manner by which the relation manifests, requires some relevant act, but something else must be the ground for determining what the act ought to be. — Mww

OK, interesting. I would also add: how is that by which one decides what his relation to himself is.

Caveat: this under the assumption morality, in and of itself, is an intrinsic human condition, and if so, can only be represented in himself, by himself, because of himself — Mww

Human beings are also essentially relational. I don't think that a human being is conceivable in total isolation (at least in potency). So, I would say that morality also is about how one relates to others.

Interesting that you distinguish ethics and morality in that way.

I think the realist position (and not just the direct realist position) is that there would still be the world (quantum definition of the word), relative to something measuring it (a rock say), but yea, all that synthesis that the human mind does is absent, so it would be far more 'the world in itself' and not as we think of it. Time for instance would not be something that flows. Rocks have no need to create that fabrication. — noAxioms

:100: The universe that most believe would be there in the absence of any observer would not have any form, as form is discovered by the mind (per Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order). The world 'in itself' is formless and therefore meaningless. We mistake the form discovered by the mind as something that is there anyway, not seeing that the mind is the source of it. Kant 101, as I understand him. — Wayfarer

Interestingly, there is the 'many-mind' interpretation (MMI). In this view, the physical universe evolves in the same way as is described by MWI. In MMI, however, the 'emergence' of a classical universe is, in fact, due to 'mind'. That is, the definite outcomes in which the wavefunction 'splits' are observed by different minds.

First, consider the condition "closed system". There is no such thing as a system which is absolutely closed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. But in open systems neither principle is applicable. There are situations, however, where the model of a closed system is a very good approximation.

There is some controversy on the status of the universe. Some physicists do claim that, due to the expansion of the universe, the universe can't be considered a 'closed system'. There is disagreement here however.
Furthermore, there are those who also say that the 'universe as a whole' can't be considered as a physical system.

No system could even approach an efficiency of a hundred percent, and the classical explanation was that this is because of absolute closure being physically impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

One explanation is that. Yes, there are no perfectly closed system. But the other one, the one that takes into account 'entropy' isn't based on that. It tells us that a certain quantity of energy can't be controlled.
Friction is a good example of the increase of entropy, in fact.

Honestly, I think you conflate the two explanations here. But you do raise an interesting point about closed systems, yes. But the increase of entropy doesn't in any way negate the conservation of energy.

This probable (probable because an absolutely closed system cannot be produced to test it) loss of energy, to the idealistic, absolutely closed system, (which would be a violation of the conservation law) is understood as a feature of the passing of time, and this is why we know time as asymmetrical. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand here your point. Are you claiming that the absence of perfectly closed systems is the reason of irreversibility?

Tell me. It not being mathematical is also great because it challenges something like MUH. And there's no falsification test for the random/determined issue either. — noAxioms

Well, unless you can show me a mathematical model that can predict (deterministically or not) choices, I don't think you have shown that everything can be described mathematically.

Roger Penrose for instance has argued that our reasoning isn't algorithmic. Certainly, this goes against the 'computable universe hypothesis', according to which all phenomena are computable.

In any case, it is quite speculative to say that everything can be described mathematically.

Which is why BiV, superdeterminism, and say Boltzmann Brains all need to be kept in mind, but are not in any way theories, lacking any evidence whatsoever. — noAxioms

Yes. Interestingly, I made a similar objection to the 'block universe', where all events past, present and future have the same ontological status. If we can be so wrong in our experience, how can empirical knowledge (which is needed to falsify/verify scientific theories) be trusted?

So some societies operate, but such societies are quite capable of rendering such judgement using deterministic methods. And yes, I think morals are relative to a specific society. A person by himself cannot be immoral except perhaps to his own arbitrary standards. — noAxioms

I think that it depends on how one understands morality. If one understand it simply as a social contract, then sure. But if one adopts a kind of 'virtue ethics', then, one can be moral or immoral even when alone.

An you do have the opportunity to act otherwise. Brains were evolved to make better choices, which wouldn't work at all if there were to choices available. Determinism shouldn't be confused with compulsion as it often is in these discussions. — noAxioms

How so? Yes, you can argue that a human that is compelled to act in a certain way isn't 'acting properly'. But if all actions are determined by the initial conditions and deterministic laws, how can we say that we have an opportunity to 'act otherwise'? And if we do not have it, how can we attribute responsibility to someone in a non-trivial way (a 'trivial way' would be something like: the 'lightning' is responsible for the destruction of the tree)?

I don't think there's any relevance at all, so the question is moot to me. — noAxioms

Yes, probabilism is no better. We need something else.

Honestly, I do not find that convincing at all.

If our actions are truly deterministic and we could not have acted otherwise, the only way I can think about 'ethics' is being exactly like medicine. So, we act wrongly and we are held accountable and get punished in order to 'get well' later on. I guess that upo to a certain point I agree. In fact, I am ok with the classical 'virtue ethics' where good act are good because they fulfill our nature. So, in a sense, yes, I agree to treat ethics in a medicinal way. But, as always with analogies, we also have to avoid to take them too far. When we do wrong it is not that we were coerced by internal or external constraints to act in that way. We are influenced by those constraints, but there is a 'window' of freedom that we can't ignore and that 'window' is what makes 'accountability', 'culpability', 'moral responsability' meaningful.
So, yeah, I guess that my view is that compatibilism gets something right but can't tell the whole story.

Also, if we were not free, I even doubt we could consider ourselves as distinct beings from the 'rest of the universe'.

Such blatant refusals to discuss the topic, only indicate that you know that you are wrong so you will not approach the issue. Why twist the facts of physics to support your metaphysics? If the facts don't fit, then you need to change the metaphysics or else dispute the facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

With all due respect you made some controversial claims here:

So, we have to consider the reality of every aspect of a "physical system", to see how successful we can really be. I believe that the reality of entropy demonstrates that no physical system actually evolves in a completely deterministic way. That aspect of the activity of a physical system, which escapes determinability is known as "entropy". Therefore "purely physical systems" refers to an impossibility, if that implies completely deterministic evolution.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Conservation laws do not hold, to the contrary, they are always violated. This is the nature of entropy, that part of reality which is in violation of conservation. It's a loss which we just write off, and work around. — Metaphysician Undercover

The second principle of thermodynamics tells us that entropy increases in a closed system. The first principle of thermodynamics states that the total energy is conserved. No physicist I know of have ever made the claim you make here, i.e. that the increase of entropy entails a violation of the law of conservation of energy. So, in my view, you are in the position to give a justification of what you are saying here. Unless you prove your claim (you can also link to a scientific paper if you want), it is reasonable to think that you are wrong here.

A "weak"*1 scientific interpretation of evolution from simple to complex is specifically formulated to avoid any metaphysical (teleological or theological) implications. But a "strong"*2 interpretation directly addresses the philosophical implications that are meaningful to systematic & cosmological thinkers*3. Likewise a "weak" interpretation of the Anthropic Principle*4 can avoid dealing with Meaning by looking only at isolated facts. Both "weak" models are reductionist, while the "strong" models are holistic. The Strong models don't shy away from generalizing the evidence (facts). Instead, they look at the whole system in order to satisfy philosophical "curiosity" about Why such appearances of design should & could occur in a random mechanical process. :smile: — Gnomon

Yes. In other words the problem for the physicalist is: can we explain the 'strong emergence' of life and mind in purely physical terms given that reductionism seems to fail?

So far as I can see, and I may be wrong, many, if not most, philosophers are compatibilists and are trying to cash that out by re-conceptualizing the problem. To put is another way, the approach is that both traditional free will and traditional determinism are interpretations of the world. If they jointly produce absurdity, we need to think of both differently. Have a look at Wikipedia - Determinism — Ludwig V

Yes, that's a possible solution. But still, it seems to me that compatibilists simply do not address the problem. If we cannot act differently, how can we be held accountable?
The reason why we do not attribute guilt to those who are considered 'not guilty' by reason of insanity it is because we do not think they have been able to act otherwise. Their mental state was too compromised.

Unless someone gives a solution to this problem, I am afraid that, despite its popularity, I can't accept compatibilism.

Antony Valentini — boundless

@noAxioms, if you are interested in this 'variant' of dBB, there is this lecture by Valentini: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYZV9crCZM8 that I watched years ago.

Here, among other things, he suggests that his version of dBB can make different predictions with respect to standard QM. In fact, IIRC he suggests that these deviations might be observed in the early stages of the universe. Interestingly, if that happens it would be possible to send faster than light signals.

My comments on mind (in)dependence were mainly to illustrate that what it means is not as obvious as many would think. — Wayfarer

Agreed. Unfortunately, however this is also because there is a tendency to use the same words with different meanings. But this isn't a problem only for philosophers. Think about how much the term 'observer' varies among the various interpretations of QM.

Bell didn’t prove anything. At the time, the required experimental apparatus and know-how didn’t exist. He worked out what needed to be proven, but the actual proof had to wait for those guys that won the Nobel (well after Bell had died). — Wayfarer

Well, Bell proved mathematically that no 'local realistic' theory can make the same predictions of QM (outside some problematic loopholes like superdeterminism). In itself it is a powerful result. Of course, the 'experimental proofs' came later. The first experiments however were made in the 80s and Bell was still alive.

Nice article BTW.

Realism neglects the role of the mind in this process. It takes the world as given, without considering the role the mind plays in its construction. That is the context in which the idea of mind dependence or independence is meaningful. — Wayfarer

Right. Honestly, part of the problems in these discussions is that 'realism' is often assumed to be the position that there is something that exists even in the absence of our minds. This of course gives an incredible amount of 'realisms'. Physicalism is a type of realism. But also theism is. But even epistemic idealism is a form of 'realism' becuase it doesn't say that reality is only minds and mental contents.

'Realism' is, however, also an epistemic position. It claims that there is a reality different from minds and mental contents that can be known by mind as it is. Of course, even with this definition realism covers a lot of positions. But with this definition realism excludes an epistemic idealism or a skeptical position where nothing outside minds and mental contents, representations etc can be known and also an ontological idealism where there is nothing outside minds and mental contents ('weaker' forms of ontological idealism, which claims that fundamental reality is mental but do not deny the existence and the knowability of something different from minds and mental contents however are in fact forms of realism).

In order to prove 'realism' in this sense one should be able to identify what can, with certainty, be said to be different from minds and mental contents (including representations). That is, one should be able to distinguish 'what pertains to reality as it appears to us' and 'what pertains to reality as it is itself'. Contrary to appearances, when one considers the regulating role that the mind has in ordering our experience it becomes quite hard to just do that.

Classical (Newtonian) physics is not deterministic, and if they thought so 1.2 centuries ago, they didn't think it through. Norton's dome is a wonderful example, but that was published only a couple decades ago. — noAxioms

What? Interesting, wow. Anyway, I don't think that at that time people thought that it wasn't deterministic. Even chaotic systems are deterministic despite the appearances.

We're not so certain, but can you even think of an alternative? One alternative is that the system isn't closed, but non-closed systems have always failed to be either deterministic or random. — noAxioms

I can think of an alternative but I can't formulate it mathematically and I can't think of how to make a scientific test that can be used to falsify the idea.

Yes. Empirical data cannot be trusted, and that's why it's not an interpretation of evidence, but rather a denial of it, similar to BiV. Yes, superdeterminism can be locally real. It's a loophole. Still is even under the new improved 'proof' 3 years ago. — noAxioms

Agreed. If emprical data can't be trusted, what even is the point to do science?

That's the line, yes, and its a crock. FW is only needed for moral responsibility to something not part of the deterministic structure, such as an objective moral code. But I've seen only human social rules, hardly objective at all. — noAxioms

We generally do not held accountable people if they could not act otherwise (e.g. for instance, one might be regarded as 'not guilty' due to reason of insanity - the assumption here is that the transgress didn't have the capacity to act otherwise). If determinism were true, the same would be true for all. I guess that one can think that punishments could have some utilitarian sense but I can't make sense of talking about of moral responsability.

The alternatives are randomness and not-closed system. The former doesn't yield external moral responsibility either (as you point out), so the latter is required, in which case the system is simply larger, and we're back to determinism or randomness again. — noAxioms

Right, if closed systems are either deterministic or probabilistic nothing really changes. I think that it is a questionable assumption but I respect it. After all, there are good reasons to regard it as true so it's not irrational. I do believe, however, that a more 'complete' picture that gives the due importance to ethics suggests that such an assumption might not be valid. Or at least that there are heavier consequences than what it is generally assumed.

That does not absolve you of responsibility (to something within the closed system) for your choice. This has been fact for billions of years. You are responsible to eat. Punishment is death. Nothing unfair about that. — noAxioms

In a sense, yes, I agree death by starvation is a sort of punishment for death. But if one that dies of starvation didn't have the possibility to act otherwise can we held that person accountable?

Not much. They're not particularly social. My point was that moths find utility in, if not randomness, at least unpredictbility. Utilization of randomness has nothing to do with morals. — noAxioms

Ok.

My, but we're digressing, no? — noAxioms

Yes, sorry for that. But I don't treat different areas of culture as separated from each other. Scientific knowledge isn't something that has no effect on ethics and vice versa. Both are quite important and if they contradict each other there is something amiss in one or the other. From a practical point of view, I would say that ethics is even more important. So, I don't think that we should ignore the fact that some of its constitutive assumptions seem to be in tension with what science tell us.

But yes, it is off-topic.

I don't know enough about QM to comment about wave functions being anything but nonlocal. I mean, they're supposed to describe a system, or at least what's known about a system. The latter suggests that the real wave function is different than the one we measure. It being a system means that it's nonlocal since systems are not all in one place. That it sort of describes a state implies a state at a moment in time, but a nonlocal moment in time is not really defined sans frame. So we really need a unified theory to speak the same language about both theories. — noAxioms

In the 'wave function as a law' model the laws are simply descriptive. There is no 'pilot wave' that guides them, no causal agent for their motion. That's why I said it is a kinematic model. Both the Bohm-Hiley and the Valentini-Bell variants do have a dynamics. In the first, there is a 'quantum potential' that depends only on the form of the wavefunction (that's why in later years Bohm thought that it is a kind of 'informatiuon pool' and the particles have some kind of ability to decode information) that act on the particles with a 'force' which in turn causes an acceleration - all is described as in classical physics with second-order time derivatives. The other 'realist' model doesn't use the quantum potential. It is also a model that uses only first derivatives of positions and, according to Valentini, it is a very big difference with respect to classical mechanics.
Still, both models treat the wavefunction as a causal agent. This isn't true for the 'wave function as a law' model. While the latter is better than superdeterminism, it is still curious that one wants to make a CFD model without a dynamics.

This is a bit of a distraction. However, let me say that I think that most philosophers do actually decide to live with the dissonance. Perhaps they actually prefer the argument and would be disappointed if they couldn't have it. — Ludwig V

Ok, but I think that 'truth' is not contradictory. Philosophers seek truth and I would assume that there is a way to reconcile these things. If determinism and probabilism can't give a reasonable account of moral responsability it is quite a deep problem.

Suppose you started with recognizing two facts. First, we sometimes act freely. Second that the world appears to be deterministic. The only problem is to develop an account of those two facts that recognizes both. Doing that will require rejecting the concepts that are taken for granted in formulating the problem. For example, free will is defined in opposition to determinism, so we need to get rid of that concept. It doesn't make any sense anyway. Determinism, on the other hand, is treated as if it was true. But if it is true, it is empirically true, and I don't see how we can possibly know that, so we need to think that through again. — Ludwig V

Not sure about your point here. Are you saying that we can still 'believe' in free will even if all empirical evidence goes against it because, even if there is no free will, we can't be certain of it?
To me that would be self-deception.

Also, perhaps different model of justice are adequate in different cases. So, in certain cases, using a 'restorative' process is the best choice but in some other cases it might not the best way (either for the victim or the offender).

The Materialist explanation for the evolutionary emergence of animated & motivated matter is based on random accidents : that if you roll the dice often enough, strings of order will be found within a random process*1. But they tend to avoid the term "Emergence", because for some thinkers it suggests that the emergence was pre-destined, presumably by God. And that's a scientific no-no. So, instead of "emergence", they may call Life a fortuitous "accident". — Gnomon

Well, I think that 'emergence' in fact doesn't have 'theological' or even 'teleological' connotations for most people. One example I made is how 'pressure' of a gas 'emerges' from the properties of the particles it is composed of. Yes, for the reductionist version of physicalism life is an 'accident'. Still, it is curious that in a reductionist model something like 'life' would eventually happen.

However, another perspective on Abiogenesis*2 is that the Cosmos is inherently self-organizing. And that notion implies or assumes a creative goal-oriented process, and ultimately Teleology. My personal Enformationism*3 thesis is an attempt to provide a non-religious philosophical answer to the mystery of Life & Mind emerging from the random roiling of atoms. But if you prefer a "theory" from a famous & credentialed philosopher, check-out A.N. Whitehead's book Process and Reality*4. :smile: — Gnomon

Well, that's a possibility. But it assumes that the cosmos is a sort of living being itself. IMO it is not a form of physicalism.

The alternative on offer to retribution is not natural justice, but restorative justice. — Banno

Honestly, I don't know how much this changes things.
I already said in my post that 'punishment' is one goal of justice and not the only goal. In Christianity, furthermore, for the blessed it is assumed that there is an eternity of beatitude that will, among other things, heal them for the harms that eventual crimes did to them. Furthermore, I believe that Christians generally accept that the activity of justice should aim to protect the victims and to the repentance of the offenders, when this is possible. In fact, i also said that I think that in certain cases punishments (both in the form of an active punishment and of a passive 'let the transgressor experience the bad consequences of what he have done') can be educative.

It is undeniable however that even restorative justice involves punishment for the offenders. So, really, I am not sure what your point is. Also, I have my doubt that it actually works in some cases like, say, sexual offenses, murder and so on. In an extreme case, I am not sure how it works in the case of, say, genocide. But even in the case of, say, sexual abuse I am not sure that involving the victim or someone close to the victim is the 'right way' to go - the victim might be traumatized and to protect the victim perhaps the best way is to avoid to trigger the memories of the trauma. In the extreme case of genocide I am not sure how this model of justice would work.
In order, however, to avoid to be misinterpreted here, I think that, yes, restorative justice, in some cases, can be a better form of justice.

Let's however assume, for the sake of discussion, that restorative justice is the best possible model of justice and let's say that for the victims, their loved ones and so on are perfectly ok to adopt the restorative model. In any case, it clearly involves a punishment of the offender. But I have some questions here I wish you could give your opinion. What if the offender is unrepentant for the crime? What if the offender deosn't cooperate with the activities intended for the programme? What if there are cases where, in fact, the best way to induce repentance in the offender is a more 'traditional' way of justice?

Does asking that help nail down a mind-independent reality? Perhaps the answer to that question does. — noAxioms

Yes. Because if intelligibility is due to the 'representation' of the cognitive faculties of the mind, then anything intelligible can be a 'mind-independent' reality.

Maybe there are, but they'd still have to conform to the theory. — noAxioms

Before early 20th century it seemed uncontroversial that everything is deterministic. Then, QM happened and experts debate. Why do we have to be so certain that, in the future, we will find out that physical laws allow that some events are neither probabilistic nor deterministic?

Newton is not wrong, and it is all still taught in schools. But it is a simplification, and requires more exactness at larger scales. — noAxioms

Yes. It might be that both deterministic and probabilistic models are a simplification or, better, they are valid in a determinate context.

What does the rest of the world say? How does that acronym convert to metric? — noAxioms

I meant that I am aware that my views here are unconventional. But I do not find the arguments that they are wrong persuasive. And I certainly understand people who think that determinism and probabilism are the only allowed possibilities. I disagree. But fine.

Unsure of the difference. A local interpretation asserts neither nonlocal correlation nor interaction. — noAxioms

According to superdeterminism, there are correlations that 'trick us' in believing that either 'realism' (CFD) or 'locality' is wrong. But superdeterminists argue they are mere coincidences.

Isn't that kind of what Copenhagen does? — noAxioms

Yes, right! I mean why not embrace Copenhagen if one is content with a purely kinematical model?

Well, plenty of folks want to assert free will because it sounds like a good thing to have, and apparently it is a requirement for some religions to work, which makes it their problem, not mine. If I'm designing a general device to make the best choices, giving it free will would probably be a bad thing to do. Imagine trying to cross the street. — noAxioms

Well, if all my actions are deterministic, it is quite controversial to attribute to myself moral responsibility. After all, I literally could not have behaved otherwise.
Probabilistic choices are no better. Yes, I could have acted otherwise but, again, how can I be blamed if, ultimately, my choices are a result of a blind mix of deterministic and probabilistic mechanism?

To make sense of moral responsibility, you need to impute to moral agents some deliberative power and a sense of right and wrong.

Of course, ethics is something external to physics. But I would like that my 'worldview' is something coherent, a stable unit. It is difficult to 'believe' to have free will half of the time becuase I have to assume it to have a coherent concept of moral responsibility and in the other half 'believe' that I have no free will. Cognitive dissonance is quite a risk.

How about a moth? Moths fly about in unpredictable ways, making them harder to catch, and thus more fit. That's a benefit over deterministic (or at least predictable) behavior. Maybe moths are the ones with free will. — noAxioms

Would you consider moths as moral agents?

What does that mean? I only know 'entangled'. Is there a difference between locally entangled and nonlocally? Anyway, I presume the marbles to be entangled, in superposition of blue/red. You'll measure one of each, but until then, they're not any particular color. The marbles are far apart. — noAxioms

Yeah, sorry I mean 'entangled' in a way to produce nonlocal correlations.

Well, my only comment here is that this sounds a lot like your prior quote about time being entanglement, and space as well, all this being a sort of solution to the different ways relativity and QM treat time. — noAxioms

Well, Rovelli proposed that in reconciling GR with relativity, the spacetime of relativity gets quantized because it is the gravitational field and like other fields become quantized. However, 'time' as a measure of change remains. Same goes for space, if it is interpreted as a relation between things.

So, perhaps uniting GR and QM resolves the 'tension' between the apparent denial of the 'flow of time' and our experience.

I just picked this bit out. What is a nonlocal law of motion? Example?

I do appreciate links since you've already sent me down several new pages I've not heard of before. Always good to read new things. — noAxioms

It is good to hear that, thanks. The model I had in mind is described in this paper: "Reality and the Role of the Wavefunction in Quantum Theory" by Sheldon Goldstein and Nino Zanghì. It is an interpretation of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation (dBB) where there is no mention of a quantum potential that 'guides' the particles in a non-local way as Bohm and Hiley believed (and was the concept that inspired Bohm to have more speculative ideas like the 'implicate order', 'active information' and so on that also have been adopted by Hiley) and the somewhat more 'restrained' but still different versions of dBB by people like John Bell and Antony Valentini, who treat the wavefunction as a physically real field that guides the particle but make no mention of the quantum potential. Anyway, according to the variant in the linked paper, the wavefunction should be thought as a 'law of motion', a sort of kinematic law that, however, is explicitly nonlocal. There is no explanation of why particles move in they way they move. They just move that way. The only advantage with respect to a 'Copenaghen-like' view is that here you can easily visualize 'what happens'. But there is absolutely no explanation of why particles behave the way they behave.

Dangerous. I don't think you'd be fit if you had that realization. Part of it would be the realization of the lack of need to be fit. — noAxioms

I believe that our life is, among other things, a learning process where we can learn to become more and more rational. It would be quite weird to me that, ultimately, deceiving myself is something that is good for me. Perhaps, however, it is too dangerous to 'take a step too far' or 'learn things before due time' etc.

Which is why I said 'only one value', because yes, otherwise it's something like MWI, which is back to full determinism, and you wanted an example of block randomness. — noAxioms

I need to reflect on this. I still can't make sense of a probabilistic block. Perhaps I have a wrong idea of what a block should be.

↪boundless To answer that, we would have to pin down exactly what kind of being Jesus is. Is he God? Part of some trinity? The son of God? The son of mad? What, exactly, is he? — RogueAI

Yes, right, perhaps in order to answer that one might have an understanding of what a given model of the incarnation entails. I prefer that Christians give their responses to your question here. I am not, in fact, sure that my previous post was an adequate response.

Note that historically there have been controversies about how to understand the incarnation among Christians. And, honestly, I have not study that controversies in the same way I studied about other matters. So, I prefer that someone else answers to your question - hopefully some that does have a sufficient konwledge of these matters.

Similarly, the holistic process we call "Life" emerges from a convergence of natural laws & causal energy & material substrates that, working together, motivate inorganic matter to grow, reproduce, and continue to succeed in staving off entropy. — Gnomon

Sorry I missed your post. Anyway, assuming that what you are saying here is right, we should ask ourselves to explain how it can be right. Life has goal-oriented behavior, how does that 'emerge' from something that doesn't have anything like that. And assuming that in some ways it can, can we give a theoretical explanation for that?

If there were some kind of 'latent intentionality' in the inanimate or even in the universe as a whole, it can be perhaps the emergence of living beings with goal-oriented behavior might more be easy to understand. If, however, there is such a thing, do we still have a 'physicalism'?

If it can be detected, it is usable. If you are proposing a type of energy which cannot be detected, then that's not really energy, is it? Energy, by definition is the capacity to do work. The idea that there is such a thing as energy which is not usable energy is just contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps 'unusable' is a wrong way to call it. 'Uncontrollable' would be better. You can't make a perfect thermal machine because some energy is dispersed as heat and that heat can't be recovered and used again as work.

In any case, the fact that the first principle of thermodynamics tells us that energy is conserved would suggest that the conservation of energy in a closed system doesn't contradict the second law, that is entropy increases in a closed system. It is quite difficult that all physicists got that wrong for centuries.

I slighty edited my comment. Anyway, one might say that he experienced the suffering of sacrifice as a human can. Did Jesus have certainty that he was to be raised from the dead? Honestly, I don't know.

In any case, Jesus died and then resurrected. This would probably mean that he fully experienced death as humans do. Also, perhaps when he experienced abandonment he didn't have the expecation that such a state would end someday. Does this change anything for you?

In any case, I would like to hear what Christians have to say on this.

Not quite. A soldier throwing himself on a grenade to save his comrades is heroic. A soldier with a ring of immortality jumping on grenades and in front of enemy bullets isn't doing anything heroic. — RogueAI

Well, one can point out that Jesus felt the experience of abandonment ( "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?", Mk 15:34) at the cross and at he experienced agony at the Getshemani as also the Catechism says:

612 The cup of the New Covenant, which Jesus anticipated when he offered himself at the Last Supper, is afterwards accepted by him from his Father's hands in his agony in the garden at Gethsemani,434 making himself "obedient unto death". Jesus prays: "My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me. . ."435 Thus he expresses the horror that death represented for his human nature. Like ours, his human nature is destined for eternal life; but unlike ours, it is perfectly exempt from sin, the cause of death.436 Above all, his human nature has been assumed by the divine person of the "Author of life", the "Living One".437 By accepting in his human will that the Father's will be done, he accepts his death as redemptive, for "he himself bore our sins in his body on the tree."438

I believe that you are approaching the issue in a somewhat rigid manner.

'Retributive' punishment when "one gets the deserved punishment" and/or a 'punishment' that consists of "experiencing the natural consequences of one's choices" aren't mutually exclusive with the possibility that said punishment can also have other functions. In fact, sometimes it is the experience of experiencing the 'bad consequences' of one's actions that can be an occasion for 'repentance', education, positive transformation etc. Also note that the 'retributive' punishment and the 'punishment as a natural consequence of one's attitude' in some cases can be the same thing. For instance, if a man steals from another an amount of money, we might say that the thief deserves, as a punishment, to give back to the first man what he has stolen. Of course, for the thief it is not a 'pleasant experience' and, in fact, it is obvious to me that it is the natural consequence of his action. A loving parent, if some other attemps have failed, can let his child to experience bad consequences of his or her choice. Now, if these 'bad consequences' are 'natural', one might say it they are 'deserved'. And, again, such experiences can be educative.

Of course, in the case of hell, most Christians believe that that the state of damnation is irreversible and entails a punishment (of some kind) that is without end. IIRC, there are different explanations for such a state that, also, do not involve hatred, revenge etc on God's part. For instance, some say that humans can commit sins of infinite magnitude that deserve an infinite punishment because no finite punishment is adequate for intinitely grave sins. Others say that the problem is that the problem is that the damned are incorregible: their state of damnation is not irreversible becuase God doesn't want them to escape but because they reached the point that it is simply impossible for them to convert*. The second one seems consistent with what the Catechism teaches about hell and, in fact, I believe that it is also consistent with what Pope Benedict said in his book 'Eschatology' (see the section about hell here). As I said before, one can even reconcile the two views: by committing sins one damages oneself and, perhaps, it is possible that infinitely grave sins might damage oneself in an irreversible way, at least if one dies without repenting from them (see the section of the Cathechism on venial and mortal sin).
*One might ask why 'repentance' is necessary if God loves us. But IMO this can be understood even in human terms. A true communion of love between two persons has to be bidirectional. For instance, if a husband ceases to love his wife but the bond of love between them is broken even if the wife never ceased to love him. The bond can be restored if the husband sincerely repents and begins to love again his wife. In a similar way, if the damned can't repent, they can't be in a communion of love with God.

Personally, however, I don't find the argument that damnation must be irreversible compelling. But I do find that some truths.

The message, I believe, is quite powerful and immensely influential. Consider how influential it is in our concept of 'heroism', i.e. self-sacrifice to save others and Christianity says that God incarnate did that. Also, its message is also quite original, as philosopher Simone Weil remarked: "The extreme greatness of Christianity lies in the fact that it does not seek a supernatural remedy for suffering but a supernatural use for it." (Gravity and Grace). The fact that God himself incarnated an participated in the human condition, in suffering and mortality (in fact even in violent death) is certainly a strong message.

Note also that I think that the resurrection is even more central than the death on the cross. That is, by his self-sacrifice Jesus defeated death and that is the source of the Christian hope for eternal life or, in other words, the fact that God participated in humanity is the reason why humans can hope that death will be defeated and to attain eternal life in communion with God.

The whole message is quite powerful. That's the reason I believe, after all, Christianity survived...

Look into Plato's "tripartite soul". — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I was familar with the concept but admittedly I never tried to apply it to understand how to solve the interaction problem. I'll try to reflect on this.

Actually, every experiment done demonstrates that energy is not conserved. The loss is known as entropy. This is why we cannot have one hundred percent efficiency, or a perpetual motion machine, So contrary to what you say, conservation laws have been disproved repeatedly in experiments. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, what isn't conserved is usable energy, not total energy. The second law of thermodynamics is quite depressing in fact. It says that not only we can't 'generate' energy but also that we will never be able to use the total energy there is. Some of it will inevitably fall outside our control.

The Universe is a hierarchy of constraints. But note that constraints are more a passive than an active thing. It is like putting a fence around a flock of sheep. The fence is just there, but by its presence the sheep are more limited in their free action

So the basic symmetries of Nature – the Noether symmetries that create the conservation laws – act like boundaries on freedoms. Spacetime is a container that expresses Poincare symmetry. It says only certain kinds of local zero-point fluctuations are possible. All others are prevented. — apokrisis

Well, good point. And, in fact, if they were 'active', then, it would be like saying that there is a 'World Soul' or that the universe is a living being. If that were the case, it would not be a physicalist model, anymore.

So, the only viable route for a physicalist to explain life and mind in physicalist terms seems to be what you are proposing here. A non-reductionist kind of physicalism where global constraints are properties of the wholes which allow, when the right conditions are met, the arising of life.

I am not convinced that this strategy works and fully explains the arising of life and mind due to the fact I am not convinced that these passive 'allowances' have enough explanatory powers. For instance, I can't imagine a mathematical model that explain the arising of 'life' as a particular state. But I can't say that it is impossible.

Certainly, even if it is correct, one might still ask why these allowances were there in the first place. Of course, there might be no 'because'...

(Slighty edited for clarification)

Totally doesn't follow from what he writes. Not impressed. All that follows is that nothing thought of goes un-thought of, a trivial tautology. — noAxioms

His point seems to me that there are limits to our 'imagination' and our conceptual models. Our minds is not a passive 'recorder' of 'what is outside of us'. In fact, they actively try to interpret things according to their own categories. So, it's not obvious that 'the world we see' isn't a representation. And, in fact, the same goes for unpercieved objects.

I cannot agree. 1) An apple is typically presented as mind-independent, but it is intelligible. 2) (Caution: new word coming) The thing in question could be entirely intelligible, but lacking anything in any way experiencing, imagining, or knowing about it, it merely fails to go itelligiblated. — noAxioms

The question you should be asking is: why is the apple intelligible?

You mean independently, one not supervening on the other? Yea, then there'd be no precedence between those two. — noAxioms

They might depend on a common 'source', for example, or maybe they are aspects of the same thing. In both cases, the mental would not 'supervene' on the 'physical'.

Those seem to be the only valid alternative in QM. Even the consiousness-causes-collapse interpretation doesn't have mind doing anything deliberately. There's not control to it. All the interpretations exhibit phenomenal randomness. — noAxioms

Yes. Before QM, all physical theories were deterministic. With QM, we found out an apparent probabilism, the status of which is of course controversial. Assuming that such a probabilism is 'real', why can't we think that there are other possibilities besides determinism and probabilism?

Then we're wrong, being insufficiently informed. — noAxioms

In a sense, yes. But I would not even call newtonian mechanics 'wrong' tout court. Our physical theories give us incredibly precise predictions. They have to be at least partially right.

Those correlations might be widely separated, but never is there superluminal cause-effect. Thus is is considered a local thing, but not an interpretation. — noAxioms

Yes, I know. I just find bizzarre that a 'scientific realist' would prefer to say that there are 'unexplained nonlocal correlations' than saying that, perhaps, instead there are nonlocal interactions of some sorts. If we renounce to find an 'explanation' of those correlations, why not simply take an epistemic interpretation of QM?

No it doesn't. Time is experienced normally for all observers in both views. Under presentism, you simply abruptly cease to exist at the event horizon. The experience under eternalism is of being inside, also with time phenomenally flowing as normal. — noAxioms

Interesting, thanks. Not sure, however, how this address my point about relationalism.

Maybe you're not the person to ask then, as I'm also not. — noAxioms

Well, for the purposes of our discussion let us ignore that part.

We all have that impression, but as said, I give little weight to that evidence. — noAxioms

Yes, I know. And I am not in a position to tell you that you are being 'unreasonable' here. In fact, I find your motivations quite valid. I was just saying why I find that a problem.

I find my actions deterministic in the short run, but very probabilistic as the initial state is moved further away. So sure, given a deer crossing in front of my car, my reaction would likely be the same every time. On a longer scale, it is not determined in the year 1950 that i will choose vanilla today since it isn't even determined that i will exist. Under MWI for instance, fully deterministic, I both choose and don't choose vanilla, but under the same MWI, almost all branches (from one second ago) have me swerving (nearly) identically for the deer. — noAxioms

Ok, I get that. Also, despite saying what I said, I also recognize that perhaps we are less free than we naively think we are. But I still can't renounce that I have a 'little spot' of freedom that allows my choices to be neither fully determined nor probabilistic. YMMV.

There is dualism, which is something other. But immediate impression isn't good evidence for that one since the determinism and probabilism both also yield that same impression. — noAxioms

Good point. Perhaps, it is me that I should explain how my 'impression' isn't compatible with determinism and probabilism.

Don't understand this. This marble is red, that one is blue. How is that not distinguishing objects, and what the heck does lack of locality have to do with that? — noAxioms

If the two marbles, however, are in some way 'nonlocally entangled', you can't treat them as two separate objects but perhaps as two parts of an undivided whole. In fact, what is common between, say, most readings of de Broglie-Bohm interpretation* and Neumaier's thermal interpretation is that entangled systems do form an undivided wholeness. Perhaps this also means that two different 'objects' can occupy the same position (or limited region of space).

*There is also a 'Humean' reading of that interpretation that denies that there is a real interaction between entangled particles and/or they form an undivided whole. For that reading it 'just happens' that particles follow a nonlocal law of motion. Just as with the superdeterminists, I don't get these realists that do not seek an explanation...if you are interested, I'll link some sources.

It has immense pragmatic utility to be so deceived. Evolution would definitely select for it. — noAxioms

Fair enough. But I find the thing curious. I can accept that a limitation of our knowledge might be useful. But (self-)deception? I find it curious, but I admit that this doesn't refute your point, of course.

Granted. A torrid universe is a possibility for instance. Finite stuff, but no edge. I think a torrid universe requires a preferred orientation for the spatial axes. I wonder if one can get around that. — noAxioms

Right!

My investigation makes us fundamentally irrational, but with rational tool at our disposal. This is kind of optimal. If the rational part was at the core, we'd not be fit.
So for instance, I am, at my core, a presentist, and I act on that belief all the time. The rational tool is off to the side, and instead of being used to rationalize the beliefs of the core part, it ignores it and tries to figure things out on its own. But it's never in charge. It cannot be. — noAxioms

I respect this. But my view is that 'being rational' is a full realization of our own nature. So, for me, it is more difficult to accept what you say here. Perhaps, however, it isn't impossible. And, also, I have different reasons to say that unrelated to the topic of the discussion.

Suppose physics says that the next state is the square root of the prior state (9). Determinism might say subsequent state is 3, but randomness says it could be 3 or -3. Either value in the block is not a violation of the physics, but if there can only be one answer, it can't be both. It can be there, so eternalism isn't violated, but it can't be predicted from the state 9. — noAxioms

Well, I don't understand how it isn't violated except if both values actualize, i.e. a MWI-like scenario (not of the modified type I imagined before)

They don't make predictions at all. If they did, only one would be true. Hence falsifiability. — noAxioms

Yes.