Also to assess risks on hypothetical and counterfactual scenarios you need arguments or evidences to support them.
Quite, like words of agressors being backed up by actions.
To my understanding, the risk you are referring to is more specifically grounded on Western divisions, decisional weakness, and military unreadiness, than on Putin’s anger. If the West showed a united front, stable resolve and readiness to make the needed military efforts, Putin could have been and could still be very much deterred from pursuing a war against the West over Ukraine. And notice Putin frames this war mainly as a war against the West, but still Western public opinions are far from getting how existential this war can be to their prosperity and security. That’s why Putin can count on the possibility that the West gets tired of supporting Ukraine.
Of course, the complacency in Europe failed to act as a deterrence against Putin’s expansionism. But the EU along with U.S. attempted to appease Russia following the collapse of USSR and bring her into the fold. Which is something you were suggesting U.S. could do as an anti China policy(appease). An approach which has failed, at least while Putin is in office. Lending weight to my position that Europe will now pull back from cooperation and collaboration with Russia and with help from U.S. weaken Russia and strengthen the boundaries and defence of EU. Thus discredit Russia on the world stage.
The logic is analogous to the one compelling military units to destroy their own military equipment, for example during a withdrawal, out of fear it may fall in enemies’ hands. To the extent Russia comes out emboldened and empowered from this war, the West may experience a surge of anti-Americanism which could further weaken the US power projection and leadership in Europe. So the US, along with Russia, will be compelled to try to play such divisions on their favour at the expense of the rival.
Yes, something an idiot like Trump might do. We see now that under Biden’s leadership $60billion has now been provided to prevent it.
You provide a good reason there for why the U.S. and EU should now form a strong coalition.
Such a claim sounds overly bold given the available polls. I get that such polls can be wrong and there is still time for Biden’s campaign, but no chance of winning looks definitely as an overkill.
I’m thinking ahead to Trump’s name being dragged through the courts throughout the summer. He is currently sitting in a courtroom with a porn star every day for 6 weeks to avoid being arrested for contempt of court.
Non sequitur?! Doubt because...? These are the facts I’m referring to:
I’ve read your links, although apart from them being an interesting read, I don’t see a compelling case for squabbles between U.S. and EU being the cause of why Ukraine hasn’t yet joined NATO. What is often missed in such articles is the complexity of considerations of the political and economic conditions in the countries involved. So what appears as a protracted disagreement on the surface, may just be posturing following negotiations considering these circumstances. While beneath the surface the calculation had been reached and agreed between the players involved.
I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria,
Perhaps, by international equilibria, you are talking about balance between superpowers. I’m not seeing it. The presence, or not of U.S. in the region would make a big difference, otherwise, who’s going to do what?
While Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are regional powers in the Middle Eastern area which are engaging in a hegemonic struggle in the Middle East. They are hegemonic because they are vigorously supporting military and economic projection beyond their borders to primary control the middle-east, but also in Asia and Africa
I don’t see anything out of the ordinary here. Most states are involved in escapades like this. Get back to me when one is about to invade another. If they did, it would risk them becoming a failed state like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Lebanon.
Iran is now military supporting Russia and pressing Israel with its proxies, related to two strategic regions which have compelled, still compel, and risk to compel further the US’ intervention at the expense of pivoting to the Pacific.
Yes, vocally Iran would conquer the whole region. It’s not happening though. Iran is a weak unstable country. The majority of the population would overthrow the regime if an opportunity arose.
As I say, what I see in the region is lots of small countries either in economic trouble, or wanting to hold onto their wealth, or controlling their countries through authoritarian control. All trying to keep quiet in the hope they won’t become one more failed state. They will be well aware of what has happened in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Lybia (this list would be a lot longer if countries in a precarious position were included) in recent years and watching Israel, perhaps becoming a failed state now.
We are talking risks, right? I argued for the risks I see through historical evidences (which you admit but downplay without any counter-evidence) and strategic reasons potentially appealing to geopolitical competitors (which you conveniently narrow down based on hopes).
Perhaps the difference is how we each interpret the available information.
Besides “hopefully” doesn’t mean “probably”, the point is that this wake up call is too recent to have set a stable and compelling trend in Western security.
Oh, so Europe might not rearm now, right oh.
Furthermore also non-Western and anti-Western powers had a wake up call at the expense of the West: Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel are acting accordingly.
Yes, perhaps. The whole region is a tinder box, I doubt that will end well.
I didn’t reference that link to argue that desalination will produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. There may be more methods available to tackle water crisis depending on available and evolving technologies. I limited myself to argue that governments in the Middle East show self-awareness wrt climate challenges (as much as geopolitical challenges) and are already making efforts to deal with them. So it’s not evident to me that in the next ten years or so the Middle East will turn into a Mad Max style location because of a water crisis, and will stop playing any significant role in international equilibria.
I’m referring to a fresh water crisis, something which will be widespread in the future. There isn’t a technology that can replace it in sufficient quantities.
Notice that I do not need to argue for the emergence of a superpower in the Middle East. A dominating regional power can be already enough to contain the American power projection on the globe if the US' power projection is already offset by Russia and China's in Europe, Asia and in Africa.
U.S. is just protecting its oil interests in the region. No one is containing their spread in the region and they’re not spreading.
It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.
Yes, I have said that Russia might play games in the region and China is gradually spreading her economic involvement like an amoeba, like she has been across the world. These things are and will be perceived as a threat to Israel, not so much U.S.
Russia’s deal with Iran is Putin asking for help in a desperate attempt to salvage his catastrophic foreign policy failure in Ukraine.
We didn’t agree on how to measure geopolitical risks.
Well you just seem to be playing the devils advocate. I agree with most of what you say, I just come to a different assessment as to where the risks lie.
My arguments are based on my understanding of how threats are perceived and acted upon by the actual players. The US intervened in support of Ukraine and in support of Israel. And the latter even happened at the expense of the former. This is not what one would expect if the conflict in Ukraine was evidently of grater strategic importance.
It seems now that support for Israel didn’t come at the expense of Ukraine, now that the money has come through ( delayed for internal reasons in U.S.) A couple of days ago PM Sunak described the threat to Europe, NATO, from Putin as existential and that he is putting U.K. arms production on a war footing. Along with similar from Macron yesterday.
than Israeli-Palestinian conflict one can’t reasonable use the former to downplay the latter
I haven’t done this.
two reasons: there is a link between the two, and up until now the US never managed to disengage from both areas to pivot to the Pacific (and that, to me, doesn’t depend only on domestic factors like the pro-Israel lobby or the military-industrial complex)
I don’t subscribe to the pivot ideology. My position is that a pivot is not needed provided Russia is neutered.
Concerning your reasoning, as long as the West and the Rest runs on oil from the Middle East, the Middle East is strategically important for geopolitical developments.
Yes for the foreseeable, on this issue I am talking longer than 10yrs. The U.S. is providing stability here, I don’t see a change in that for now.
I think however that their importance goes beyond that since Middle Eastern’s power projection goes beyond the middle-east. So they can play a role on securing/controlling commercial routes (https://newsletter.macmillan.yale.edu/newsletter/fall-2010/american-grand-strategy-middle-east, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative), immigration trends and political networking (through Islamism, financial means, military aid, etc.). And not only in the Middle East.
Yes I’m aware of all these things and U.S. will continue to secure her interests in the region, namely oil and her coalition with Saudi. Isreal is giving them a headache atm. But it is becoming clear now that despite how provocative Isreal is, her neighbours are not going to be drawn into a wider conflagration, as I explain.
Some anomalies may be more than conjunctural events. See, also re-arming to face the Russian threat is an anomaly in EU foreign policy, yet it happened under the pressure of historical circumstances. And now you may wish to argue it will grow further into a stable, effective and comprehensive defence strategy. On the other side, the prospect of Trump running for a second presidential term suggests me the possibility that Trump’s political base may be wide, strong and persistent enough to survive him. As much as the burden of the imperial overstretch inducing the US to downgrade its commitments to global hegemony. Even more so, if the EU will remain structurally weak.
I have listened to a republican yesterday saying that they had not been prepared for how disfunctional Trump was in office and that they will be prepared now, as he is a liability. Also Republicans against Trump are quite vocal.
Here some more evidence for you to downplay (while you provided none as usual):
I’m not disputing this, European countries became complacement since the fall of USSR. Oligarchs snoozing with European politicians has been going on for a long time now. Again things are changing.
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Dude, we clarified our different positions enough. At this point we seem to disagree so much on what constitutes an interesting, if not compelling, argument in support of some claim that I really don’t see the point of dragging this exchange further.[/quote]
No worries, it’s been fun.
Arguing that U.S. should, or may, throw EU to the wolves in some sort of power play with China was never going to end well.