The rejection of naive realism is like obscurantism: a habit among intellectuals to expect a phenomena or its explanation to be sufficiently complicated to appear advanced, learned, intriguing, surprising, absurd, or incomprehensible even... anything but mundane or naive. If the explanation is too obvious, then it won't be taken seriously.

Yet I don't know of any good arguments against nsive realism, so perhaps it's worth investigating (but in a separate thread) :cool:

So we have an superficially enigmatic situation in which the ball does not change colour but the colour changed. Is this a paradox? Not at all. We understand the background of each description, and we acknowledge the truth of both: this is what a red ball in part shade looks like. — Banno

Right, in white light that has the energy of daylight the pigments emit photons of about 700 nm. In shade (ambient light) they emit photons with less energy. Hence the red is darker or less saturated in the shade.

A damaged eye, brain injury, spectral inversion, colour blindness, hallucination, illusion etc. may impair one's ability to see things as they are, but an impaired ability won't change what there is to see: a coloured world of pigments, shapes, varying behaviour of light.

The percept of the ball changed, but its color stayed the same. — Leontiskos

No, the change is the shadow falling over a part of the red ball, making that part look dark red. That's what there is to see.

The "percept" (or mental phenomenon) is the seeing, not the colour that one sees. Even if the colour is a systematic hallucination, it is not a percept. What makes it systematic is the fact that the hallucination is causally constrained by the eye's interaction with wavelength components of light.

I don't have a copy of Searle, but according to this:

Searle presents the example of the color red: for an object to be red, it must be capable of causing subjective experiences of red. At the same time, a person with spectrum inversion might see this object as green, and so unless there is one objectively correct way of seeing (which is largely in doubt), then the object is also green in the sense that it is capable, in certain cases, of causing a perceiver to experience a green object.

This seems to be arguing that colours are mental phenomena, and that the predicate "is red" is used to describe objects which cause red mental phenomena. — Michael

:roll: According to Searle, colours are systematic hallucinations, and what characterizes hallucinations is that you're having experiences without experiencing anything, not even percepts.

"Every effect has a cause" may be true, in a way. But it does not follow that every effect must have a cause which is a specific component of the building. The cause of utility might be an effect of the totality of the building as built, rather than as a collection of components. — Ludwig V

No, its utility may become available when it's built, but just being available does not cause anything, unless it already has the property, which can attract and initiate use.

Short version - holistic aspects of the building. — Ludwig V

Here's a sketch of different levels of composition that I'm thinking of:

Architecture is a composition of practical, beautiful, sustainable parts.

The practical, beautiful, sustainable parts of architecture are composed of materials, structures, processes.

The materials, structures, processes are composed of minerals, organic or other chemical compounds, geometries, structural design, causal chains, relations to contexts etc.

utility, beauty and sustainability are the result of other components, but not one of them. — Ludwig V

True, but I'm not saying they're components of themselves. They're components of the architecture.

Their own components result in practical, beautiful, and sustainable parts of a building, but the building won't be successful as a building by merely having such parts.
These, in turn, must be composed (e.g. balanced or distributed) in ways that make the building successful as a building.

That's composition on a more general level than the compositions of utility, beauty, and sustainability (which in turn are composed of more specific parts, features, configurations, materials, chemical compounds, atoms, or particles in fields of force).

I am left wondering about the spectrum of eternal ideas and how these come into play in the human imagination — Jack Cummins

All ideas are expressed with words, and words come into play by the principle of compositionality. Meaningful expressions are built up from other meaningful expressions.

We can understand a large—perhaps infinitely large—collection of complex expressions the first time we encounter them, and if we understand some complex expressions we tend to understand others that can be obtained by recombining their constituents. — SEP

That should answer your question, unless you're an opponent of compositionality, e.g. assume that the meaning of an idea depends on the intentions of the speaker, or on the context, regardless of the meanings of the words that express the idea.

So it seems reasonable to me, to see understanding of emergence as something particular experts have,
— @wonderer1
Yes. I like the idea that it is about particular cases, rather than some very general abstraction. Generality is there the hand-waving comes in. — Ludwig V

one can have a rather good understanding of how tornadoes work while being entirely ignorant of particle physics. The point generalizes to more complex and longer-lived entities, including plants and animals, economies and ecologies, and myriad other individuals and systems studied in the special sciences: such entities appear to depend in various important respects on their components, while nonetheless belonging to distinctive taxonomies and exhibiting autonomous properties and behaviors...
...
The general notion of emergence is meant to conjoin these twin characteristics of dependence and autonomy. It mediates between extreme forms of dualism, which reject the micro-dependence of some entities, and reductionism, which rejects macro-autonomy — SEP

So in the case of architecture, there are parts, features, and configurations from which three general properties emerge: utility, beauty, and sustainability.

Those properties are functionally separate, and they typically counteract eachother in ways that call for compromises, because the success of the composition is dependent on them.

In this sense, they are both emergent properties and components of the architecture.

The special sciences won't answer how they causally emerge, nor how a balanced or distributed composition satisfies the success of a building. Yet every effect has a cause, and for millennia we have known that buildings should be practical, beautiful, and sustainable.

"utility, beauty, and sustainability", I would say are not components of the building, but aspects (properties) of the whole. So I agree with your sentiment, but am inclined to think that "causal relations" - which implies that they are distinct parts (components) of the whole - is not quite the right way to articulate the point. — Ludwig V

The components have properties, and when they interact with each other, other properties emerge. I think the utility, beauty, and sustainability of a building are Emergent Properties, and the parts, features, and configurations from which they emerge are not so distinct. They can depend on each other, or emerge from one and the same part.

For example, the durability of reinforced concrete slabs means that they can be carried by a sparse grid of columns (instead of a forest of columns or thick walls) which, in turn, enables freedom for efficient, flexible, and aesthetically varied organization of the spaces (e.g. with thin walls or open plans). Such a building is easy to change and adjust to passing trends and uses, hence sustainable. If we change the durability of the slabs then we also change the building's practical, beautiful, and sustainable properties, since they emerge from the same part and its configuration.

I don't quite understand "causally" here. — Ludwig V

Architecture consists of its components, but there are causal relations between them and the composition.

As in cooking. A cook selects specific ingredients based on their looks/taste, nutrition, structure etc. and prepares them in ways that cause the ingredients to interplay with eachother. From their interplay emerges a meal that has a specific taste, utility, and sustainability.

The traditional ideas that there are certain proportions of buildings that make them beautiful are another approach. — Ludwig V

Yes, good looking proportions are rare in times prioritizing maximum exploitation per square unit.

The three qualities: utility, beauty, and sustainability can be balanced or distributed, but in some cases they seem to coalesce, such as in roman arches, catenary arches.

I meant seeing reality in an objective way, because belief is subjective and we already discussed that it can lead me to error. — javi2541997

Belief in scientific facts is not so subjective...

What is an example of an objective or subjective way of seeing reality? Perhaps a Sunday painter might try to depict an object in some "subjective" way of seeing it, like a drunken poet might think that reality looks more "subjective" through a foggy glass of beer? Others might look for "objective" ways of depicting things, e.g. photo realistically. But does reality look like a photo? Of course not. Would you be seeing reality in a more "objective" way if you could make reality look more like a high-definition photo? No, seeing reality is not like depicting reality.

There's something wrong with the idea that there are such ways of seeing reality. I think the root cause is the metaphorical idea that seeing things is like seeing a picture inside your head. But sensory experiences are not representations, they are presentations.

No, I am not assuming anything. I actually wonder if there is a possibility to see the representation of reality without being cheated by my own beliefs. — javi2541997

You assume that there exists such a thing as the representation of reality. I'd say that's what keeps you away from the possibility of seeing things as they are.

Imagine, what could such a representation look like? Is it flat or in 3D, does it contain all the visible colours and shapes all at once? No, the idea of seeing as representational is based on a simple but fatal misunderstanding of the nature of observation.

So, because belief can lead to mistakes, I tend to have a distorted view of reality because what I believe when I experience rain is frequently wrong. But 'it rains' as a preposition is the truth. Therefore, the latter will help me see reality in a correct manner rather than through belief. Am I right, or am I missing something? — javi2541997

From 'belief can lead to mistakes', it doesn't follow a tendency to have a distorted view of reality, nor frequently wrong beliefs.

The sentence 'it rains' expresses a proposition. That alone doesn't make it true, nor does your belief. It needs justification. But also justified beliefs can lead to mistakes. Hence the classic definition: justified true belief.

I have no idea what you mean by a "correct manner" to see reality. Unlike beliefs which, indeed, can be more or less correct, any manner of seeing reality is correct. None of them could be incorrect, just like there is no correct manner for rain drops to fall. They fall exactly as they are under such and such conditions.

But if you assume that you never see reality, only your own representation of it, well... that will inevitably lead you to doubt whether your manner of seeing reality is correct.

If experiencing the rain is a casual sensory interaction with the rain, my belief cannot be false. — javi2541997

Why not? You can separate your belief from the fact that it rains by ignoring the fact, or by doubting or dismissing the splashing sounds of rain as "fake".

But you can't separate the splashing sounds of rain that you hear from your awareness of their presence (or whatever causes your awareness). Even if it's just water from a garden hose, or a stipulated hallucination, the experience is inseparable from the conditions from which it arises.

That's what makes illusions possible: you experience something but believe it's something else. It's the belief that goes wrong, while the experience is a fact that arises under whatever conditions that satisfy it

how can I experience the belief and the sentence separately? — javi2541997

Because they are separate. Physically, the belief is a mental state, whereas the sentence is a string of symbols expressing a proposition. Logically, the belief is about the sentence.

What is a belief, and what is an attitude? — Noble Dust

The SEP article on Belief is fairly clear, I think.

An attitude is a mental state, e.g. hope, doubt, confidence, certainty etc.

A belief is an attitude about a proposition. It can be expressed in the form: S A that P

S is the individual having the mental state
A is the attitude
P is a sentence expressing a proposition

For example, when I believe that it rains, I'm feeling confident about the truth of the sentence 'it rains'. The belief is representational, it can be true or false, unlike experiencing the rain, which is a causal sensory interaction with the rain, not sentences.

Will they ever be able to say "the firing of this specific number of these neurons in this part of the brain will produce this specific intensity of this emotion"? — Gregory

One doesn't have to be a scientist, nor to study the neurons in my brain, to be able to say what will produce this specific intensity of this emotion when I taste a piece of chili pepper. It's the chili pepper!

Sometimes i'll feel two different feelings while making a choice and they feel equally strong yet I definitely want one over the other for which reason i have no explanation. — Gregory

Right, we sometimes form opinions and make choices in haphazard, thoughtless ways, by habit, or by going with the flow, relying on herd intelligence, or we have inherited dispositions to chose this over that, or there's social pressure, fashion etc.

No, science is not epistemically subjective. Opinions are, for example, my opinion that 'classic jazz is better than hip-hop' is epistemically subjective.

If could be that my opinion is not just an opinion but refers to my actual experiences of classic jazz and hip-hop. We can research and compare the mental states that arise when I listen to the two styles of music, e.g. notice if my toes tap to the rhythms, check my dopamine levels, brain activity etc. and correlate the results with my reports. That's possible science about phenomena in an ontologically subjective domain.

We can also research the ontologically objective properties of the two styles of music, e.g. their structure, complexity, harmony, etc. and find out that jazz differs from hip-hop in many ways that have correlations to my behaviour and reports.

I am prone to florid sentences myself sometimes but this is just too much for me to stomach anymore. — I like sushi

What would philosophy be without dubious sentences?

A more charitable interpretation of that sentence is that it is based on the dubious assumption that art and science are opposite modes of inquiry, and somehow ecology meshes them together. But the assumption is proven wrong by the fact that both in the sciences and in the arts we use pretty much the same modes of inquiry, e.g. abductive.

what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology. — ucarr

Are they mediated? There are geometric forms that allow durability, utility, and beauty to coalesce, as in arches or catenary curves. Just being present or available satisfies a versatility that is adequate for many areas of human interest, e.g. architecture.

Health care and medicine are other areas where the wedge between the sciences and the humanities has had polarising effects on practices.

For example, the idea that consciousness is subjective, but science is objective, and therefore we can't have a science about consciousness, conflates two different senses of 'subjective'.

Consciousness is ontologically subjective as it exists only for the one who has it, but that doesn't mean epistemically subjective. We can be conscious of science, and we can have science about the conscious states of individual organisms.

It is hard to know how ideas are constructed, in brains and beyond. — Jack Cummins

It seems fairly clear that the brain constructs conscious awareness, which in turn, can be about ideas, regardless of whether they're constructed, discovered, mind-dependent or independent, subjective, objective, intersubjective etc.

I don't know of a good reason to believe that there's a dependency relation between the brain and the ideas that one thinks of (disregarding the obsessive etc).

There is inner and outer aspects of experience and the interface between this is important. — Jack Cummins

The assumption that there are inner and outer aspects of experience is what makes it seem hard. Berkeley understood correctly that there is no way to make sense of such a relation. Therefore, he ditched the outer aspect of experience. Kant tried to reconcile the two within an ontology of conceptual schemes.

Naive realism, however, is the assumption that experiences are direct. Problem solved!

Are ideas mind-dependent, subjective, objective or intersubjective constructs in human semantics? — Jack Cummins

It takes a mind to think about ideas, but the ideas are not necessarily mind-dependent. Some ideas are constructed naturally or socially, others are discovered individually or by different minds independent of each other.

Yeah, those three (or closely related varieties of each) are the essential components of all successful structural designs. Also known as the Vitruvian Triad.

When the sciences divorced the humanities, many intellectuals (e.g. Schopenhauer) became reluctant to see architecture as an art. It just seemed too pragmatic, concerned with functions etc.

They failed to see the bigger picture, and so did many architects who arbitrarily began to reinterpret the meanings of the Vitruvian components to fit their special interests, e.g. by assuming that the beauty of what's practical is an invisible kind of beauty that can replace the Vitruvian component.

But invisible beauty doesn't interact with anything, so the architecture gets entirely determined by what's practical, or sustainable. The architecture became one-sided, brutal, or bland. But the counter-movements became equally one-sided when they prioritized beauty or sustainability at the expense of what's practical.

A building is not a machine to live in, nor a humanistic work of art, but the interplay of both. This is old ancient knowledge relevant today and forever.

Does such a causal relation exist? — ucarr

Yes, in the sense that architecture causally emerges from the building's practical, aesthetical, and sustainable qualities.

The use of an aesthetic that makes an unsustainable building appear sustainable won't make it sustainable, the causal relation is not satisfied. Likewise, minimalists used an auster practical looking aesthetic that was not so practical, often overly complicated and expensive to achieve.

There are fields that are an tightly meshed combination of both, such as architecture. A good number of architectural rules have been experimentally tested for safety. Still, subjective aesthetics have always been a major consideration in the construction of new buildings. The same can be said about the design of cars or any consumer product. — Tarskian

That's right.

For millennia, humans have understood that buildings should be practical, beautiful, and sustainable, because if any of these qualities are omitted or prioritized the buildings become practical but not beautiful, or beautiful but unsustainable, or sustainable but regardless of how.

Yet the modern functionalists systematically disregarded the beautiful (or reinterpreted it as a function) as they prioritized practical qualities of planning, engineering, economy, service etc.

Other architects did the converse, became aesthetes or humanists with an interest in anthropology, sociology, ecology etc.

Nowadays many architects are neither engineers nor humanists but coordinators or sales people who use the aesthetic features of engineering or humanistic declarations for symbolic advertising purposes.

The relation between the practical, the aesthetic, and the sustainable is detached.

For example, some postmodern buildings are designed to appear sustainable (e.g. covered in solar panels, roof gardens etc.) despite being less sustainable than conventional or retrofitted buildings. There's no causal relation between the aesthetics and the sustainability and the practical reason for solar panels.

I really think everyone is over-thinking my initial thought. — Mp202020

True, but your initial thought is expressed with words such as 'experience' which can be used in two different senses. That's why some of us talk past eachother, and a few vacillate between the two senses without noticing it.

Your initial question is about the relation between mind and experience: Is the experience outside of the mind?

That could be easy to answer, if we'd use the word 'experience' consistently.

It could also help if we notice that the initial question refers to the relation between experience and mind, not other relations, such as experience and word, experience and object, or word and object.

The sciences are concerned with “what,” whereas the humanities are concerned with “how.”

Write an elaboration of what you think this means. — ucarr

The wedge between sciences and humanities was socially constructed after the industrial revolution and rapid development of natural sciences evoked an exaggerated belief in the methods of natural science, followed by an equally exaggerated defensive response within other areas of intellectual life.

In the Renaissance there was the science of art, and the art of science.

Sciences and humanities are not mutually exclusive, and both are concerned with "what" and "how" in their respective areas of interest.

I don't see how that suggests that color of the pen is part of the pen and not the person's perception. — Hanover

The blind can't see the red pen, and if brain-stimulation is insufficient for making the blind see it, then I don't know of a good reason to believe that the red pen that we see is a brain event.

We can also stimulate non-functioning auditory nerves in the profoundlly deaf by implanting a cochlear implant. Once implanted, the person will begin experiencing beeps that he learns to translate into words and sounds so that he can properly respond to them. — Hanover

Yeah, perhaps some functions are easier to replace with prosthetics? Echolocation can to some extent replace some of the functions of vision, but it ain't vision. The human eye is so sensitive that one single photon causes a measurable response in it. The visual system discriminates intensities and wavelength components, and the brain develops and adjusts neural connections accordingly. A comparable prosthetic visual apparatus seems implausible, but who knows?

Even so, it seems fairly clear that brain-stimulation is insufficient. The blind could learn to use an artificially applied vibration inside the brain for identifying objects and states of affairs, and we could call it "vision". But it's a meaningless or different use of the word vision. Our behaviours would begin to differ, I imagine.

Regarding direct realism, I won't discuss it here. It has its own long thread.

The fact that we know that phenomenal states can exist without external stimuli and that phenomenal states can be manipulated to provide varying perceptions of the same external stimuli forecloses direct realism as a viable option. Yet it persists. — Hanover

Well think about it.

A blind person doesn't have visual experiences. Without a working light-sensitive organ that stimulates the brain to develop the necessary neural connections for having visual experiences, the blind guy can't have any visual experiences. There's no way a neurologist could artificially evoke visual experiences without the necessary neural connections in place. They're developed naturally when our working light-sensitive organs interact with the behaviour of available light in our environment..

It is indeed possible to temporarily evoke visual experiences while blindfolded, dreaming, hallucinating etc i.e. when we don't see anything. But then we are exploiting the neural connections that our brains developed when we did see things.

I see colours when I dream and hallucinate. — Michael

No, those are experiences evoked by stimulation of the neural connections that your brain developed when you were awake and did see colours.

When you dream or hallucinate seeing a colour, you have the experience, but you don't see anything, and that's why they're called dreams and hallucinations.

Brain stimulation is insufficient for colour-experiences. Stimulation from a sense organ that interacts with light and discriminates between different wavelength components is necessary for colour experiences. Therefore, colours exist outside of the brain. They emerge from the interaction between the whole visual system and available light and pigments

I know. And colours, as ordinarily understood, are properties of the experience, — Michael

Evidently, you don't know. :roll:

One does not see the properties of one's own seeing, but the properties of what the seeing is about, the colour.

I understand what intentionality is. ...
Experience might be about (or of) some distal object, but the properties of the experience are not the properties of the distal object. — Michael

No-one says that the word 'red' has the properties of the distal colour that it refers to.

Evidently, you don't understand intentionality.

The intentionality of perception means that there's a difference between the experience that you have, and what that experience is about. Even if nothing is seen and you only remember or imagine a colour. You conflate these two senses in your blind marketing of percepts.

I'm not sure what "aboutness" has to do with anything being discussed here. — Michael

You're not discussing what the rest of us are discussing: perception, under General philosophy. But you claim the topic is not philosophical, hence your disregard for argument and reference to the authority of science..But that's not so scientific either.

Regarding aboutness, see Intentionality

What is the individual to the collective? If it has been collectively decided to aim for happiness on an collective level, then what meaning could individual happiness mean to anyone? — Shawn

The individual is a member (or outcast) given obligations and rights. The individual can both be obliged to maintain collective happiness and have the right to maintain individual happiness. I suppose that problematic cases, were an obligation is incompatible with a right, can be solved pragmatically depending on context.

Is arguing about semantics that interesting? — Lionino

You know there's more at stake. Philosophy of perception is philosophy of mind, a tangle of philosophies of language, science, and some metaphysics.

Semantic externalism is one argument that can support the belief that colours exist outside the mind. But also internalists distinguish between the internal experience that you have and the internal object of the experience.

Conscious states have intentionality, i.e. they're about things. So even in case the experienced object is a construct of the brain, there's a difference between its constitutive sense and its intentionalistic sense. *

In the case of seeing the colour red, the brain constructs the experience (seeing), but doesn't construct the colour, it doesn't have to, since the colour emerges from the brain's encounter with the external state of affairs (light, cone- ells etc). Hence the experience is direct.

*) edit

I'm going to believe what these scientists say over what you say. — Michael

Selective references to authority are unscientific.

colour perception is all about neuroscience
— jkop

Are you suggesting that the science of vision doesn't explain Red? — AmadeusD

No, are you trolling?

when seen under ordinary conditions
— jkop

I smell Tuna... — AmadeusD

Why, would you prefer extraordinary conditions?

For example, why would you select the colour for painting the exteriors of a house at night when you barely see it and not in daylight?

Hmmm this seems a really, really difficult account to accept. Is this to say that there is a 'correct' mode of seeing, and anyone who sees 430THz and does not accept they are seeing 'Red' is objectively wrong, or has retarded(in the medical sense) vision? — AmadeusD

Why difficult, and where does that idea come from that there could be a 'correct' mode of seeing?

Color-vision is a biological phenomenon, like photosynthesis, digestion etc. Would you ask if there is a 'correct' mode for digestion?

Perhaps if you fear that your digestion might malfunction or the like. Some seem to think that their visual system malfunctions, as in hallucinations, and a few think that all vision is hallucination, which would be an intellectual disaster to say the least and life threatening if it was true.

But to answer your question, no there's no duch thing ss s correct way of seeing a colour. To see it is a biological fact, just how nature works, and some of us may have better eyes than others. Eagle eyes are impressive, the eyes of a mantis shrimp are super weird.

But for a science-buff like you they're all "percepts"
— jkop

Yes, that’s what neuroscience shows. — Michael

Nope.

Other science-buffs believe that physics shows that only particles in fields of force exist, and everything else, including neuroscience and percepts, is delusion.

Which is just as selective, unscientific and false as your belief that colour perception is all about neuroscience.

Do you deny that dreams and hallucinations have colour? — Michael

Everyone denies it. Dreams may use memories and imaginations of colour that evoke a feeling that you incorrectly pass for color-vision.

Children who draw pictures are aware of the difference between an imagined colour and a visible colour on the picture in front of their eyes.

But for a science-buff like you they're all "percepts" :lol:

And some of those things, like colour and pain, aren't. — Michael

You confuse them.

I sense a headache by having it, but having a brain-event is insufficient for having the systematic colour experiences that we have under ordinary conditions

A colour is open to view, while its seeing is in the head. The seeing is just the conscious awareness of the colour, while the colour is the bundle of lights and pigments that emerge as a colour when seen under ordinary conditions. It's a way of using light, which is open for anyone who has the ability. It ain't in the head.

The "naive" belief that the world is coloured, and that colours exist outside the mind, is perfectly compatible with ordinary language and the science.

It means that the colour ain't in the head.
— jkop

No it doesn't. — Michael

It does, and it's open to view. The prosthesis is at best a functional replacement, not a duplication of colour vision.

We see what is open to view, but only the seeing is inside the head. Some of the things we see are complex, context-dependent, dispositional, emergent etc.