OK.

That actually does sound interesting. Thanks.

I think the point you're missing is that it's what people think it means that's important. Thus I asked what people think it means. Plus the title of this thread is a double entendre.

The reason I asked why you thought I should read it is that I thought you were saying it's REALLY worth the read. It appears you're just saying I should try harder to look smart.

Fuck that.

I'm sure you have a learned butt. It does occasionally stink, though.

This thread is on a little nothing website in the middle of Nowhere, Internet. If it ain't impressive, I'm not concerned. I may have learned something about how people take Wittgenstein through this thread, though.

Can't say I learned a damn thing from you, though. :P If you'd like to change that.. tell me if you think "language game" should be considered a pawn in a language game.

Not really trying to teach anything about Wittgenstein. I asked a question.

If at some point I failed to point out that I was expressing my limited understanding.. sorry. I've seen you on multiple occasions, specifically in regard to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, talk out of your butt. I assume you were doing the same thing... working through the concepts without having understood the text (if you did read it).

I think the consensus of the folks I've talked to in this thread is that the concept of language games is not as distinct from propositional meaning as I had thought it was. In fact, I can't really tell the difference. The examples given in this thread to try to point to the meaning of "language games" actually involved all the conceptual apparatus involved in deriving a proposition.

Really? Why do you say that?

Nope. This thread is based on a comment from mcdoodle in another thread.

You didn't follow my point (you'd have to keep reading.) But you and I are in agreement. Sometimes reference is inscrutable. Sometimes it isn't.

If language games means that language is not a tool for communicating ideas, then it's wrong. If it simply means that there are a variety of social settings where language is used and each of these settings has distinct rules.. yes, of course. That's pretty obvious.

Here, though, there are only words, ordinary words in ordinary language, even to explain to use how we ought to use meta-language. I don't see how that can mitigate any difficulties. I think philosophers on the whole do indeed try to explain the formal meaning they intend their terms to have, but there is a neo-Derrida in my head sometimes who can always find a connotation lurking in the most precise of definitions. — mcdoodle

This is why I appreciate sime's take: philosophy is one area of life in which the flexibility of language can become a pain in the ass. So as to avoid a constant "No, that's not what I meant.." an attempt might be made to nail down certain words to certain meanings.

Another area is technical writing where ambiguity could get someone killed. In these cases, there is nothing game-like about language use. I don't advise in a manual that the power switch be left off and then work through some drama with the reader where the reader comes to understand through social conditioning what I mean. That's ridiculous. When I say "power switch" I mean power switch. There is no inscrutability of reference here. See what I mean?

?

I believe I understand 'language games' as a concept, — mcdoodle

Cool. So you see language itself as a means of communicating ideas?

But Witt's 'Philosophical Investigations' is also indeed a pawn, or possibly a knight or bishop, in the language game of philosophy. There's a certain social and intellectual milieu where such games are mostly played. — mcdoodle

I respect that this perspective is meaningful to you, but it just isn't particularly to me.

I do believe language is sometimes rule-based and game-like, but I just don't see that becoming a general rule.

In passing, it's interesting that your imagined example is of written language, whereas the Witt notion applies to all forms of language-exchange, and is rooted in talk about 'utterances'. — mcdoodle

That's because no one in my spoken language community ever uses "language game." I'm only familiar with it from seeing it written.

(Y)

Very similar to that.

I think we'll take off into outer space and become Lords of the Universe.

I already toldja. Read my above post starting with "looking at it propositionally"

I think he's just one of those old school dudes who has problems expressing emotion.

Firstly, I am confused by your use of the term "propositional". — Luke

Yes. I know. You're confused by my usage because you don't know what a proposition is.

The US nudges China to start dealing with it. China will start dealing with it.

Cool.

Sure. So I think "language game" is supposed to be anti-propositional.

Looking at it propositionally, we would read W's writings, maybe talk amongst ourselves, and then agree on a set of propositions that we believe W was expressing in his writing. You'd be able to tell that we're thinking propositionally because we would say: "Witt said that..." And then we'd paraphrase.

We would definitely, beyond any shadow of a doubt, assert that we considered context when we derived those propositions. That's how propositions work. You must consider context of utterance to know what proposition is being expressed.

However, when applying the concept of language games to "language games," one of the first things we're going to do is deny that "language games" expresses any concept. I don't think it would really be appropriate to try to discover some proposition that's being expressed. Rather, "language game" should be thought of as sort of pawn in social interaction. And that pawn is the exact words written and how those words were presented. And then how that pawn functioned in terms of actions.

It becomes a little dubious to even discover meaning in W's writings because I'm not in a social relationship with him. ?

So on the one hand, I think of W's thesis in propositional terms (which pays close attention to the context of an utterance). By that means I arrive at what I think W meant.

But when I apply that gleaned meaning to "language games" I find that it's probably fruitless for me to try to uncover a particular meaning.

Agree?

It depends on how you define "ideas." I will stick with my answer as written for now. — aletheist

You said "reasonable inferences." I'm not trying to advance a thesis here. I'm asking. Do you picture reasonable inferences as something other than a sort of processing or manipulation of ideas?

So ideas. Right?

Sure. Something other than sensation. What is it?

So the OP is asking if "language game" is a pawn in a language game. Is it?

For those who believe viewer and tree exist, the OP is asking something about the viewer's experience. What the viewer sees changes from moment to moment.

Something other than visual content is included in the basis of belief in the tree. What is that other thing?

I'm not suggesting in the OP that one should doubt the existence and temporal integrity of either tree or subject viewing the tree.

You exist. The tree exists. OK? Otherwise it would be meaningless to say that you were looking at the tree.

If you want to say that you or the tree are illusory..ok. The question in the OP isn't directed at you.

True dat.

"Meaning requires context" is a philosophical insight. Is it socially conditioned instinctive word application?

So W used a philosophical doctrine to conclude that philosophy is a waste if time. Self-undermining?

So, if W means to say that the philosophical usage of the term 'substance' creates the philosophical problem of substance, I am wondering whether, instead, the various (but related both to each other and ordinary usage) philosophical definitions of 'substance' evolve out of the need to find ways to formulate and imagine clearly already (perhaps not so clearly) imagined philosophical problems. — John

Per Soames, W was saying that philosophy in general is a waste of time because he assumed that any philosophical truth must be analytic, apriori, and necessary. The world doesn't need philosophers to establish anything. Linguistic competency is an instinctive application of words amidst social conditioning. There's no valid questioning to be done. Philosophers should shut up and get a real job.

Soames, unlike W, is very rigorous. When he reveals the holes and inconsistencies in W's outlook, it's one careful step at a time... which is cool.

I was just recently thinking about jargon, though. I got interested in the history of Scientology, whose members are jargonites. Jargon sets one off from the crowd, so it serves to reinforce a sort of inbred community. It creates unity, possibly drawing people to bypass thought. 'We don't care if you think about what you're saying.. just say the special words in the right order...'

Folks are pretty insistent that W had a theory of meaning. :-d

Interesting. Thanks.

Positivism died. It's baloney.

A presentation of a theory of truth will draw questions about whether it meets its own criteria. Same thing for a theory of meaning. Does the language it's presented in gain meaning according to the content of the theory?

With Witty we don't have to worry over that. He offers no theory of meaning. If you have a favored theory of meaning, that's fine. There's nothing blocking you.

But it does not imply that W. denied the existence of meaning. Instead he just had nothing to say on it one way or the other. — ernestm

This is correct. He became deflationary about meaning theories. One may occasionally learn a definition ostensively, but there's so much language one would already have to understand to learn that way (foreshadowing Chomsky), that the point doesn't generalize. Likewise there may be cases of rule following, but people frequently speak without thinking at all (in line with what csalisbury said earlier), he actually finally ditches language games as well as a theory of meaning. He concluded that there's nothing to theorize about.

Not sure why he didn't go the route Chomsky did.. he was close to it.

I think that your view of having "a transcendent viewpoint on language" is the kind of metaphysics that Wittgenstein is trying to dispel with his introduction of language games. But please clarify if this does not address your enquiry about language games. — Luke

This is true. What I failed to understand is that "language games" is not a theory of meaning. It's a lead up to a rejection of any such theory.

Wittgenstein did recognize that there's more to language use than rules. He saw the impetus to conform in action and interaction.

So at least it's interesting to ponder what sort of action and interaction one might find in the vicinity of a theory of meaning.

I've got my speculations..

I didn't mean to sound obscure. I only meant that 'visual field content' sounds scientific, and thus requires a certain level of precision. To be very precise, both you and the tree are changed entities in the course of your short narrative, but by convention, we still call you you, and the tree the tree. It all depends how precise you want to be. — mcdoodle

I think it's more existentialist than scientific. In fact the gist of the OP is existential. Maybe that means one can't actually approach it logically, but only by pointing. But the pointing is pointless where experience with trees and visual field content differs.

Hmm.