Verbal assent would be acceptable except the two parties might later have disagreement as to what exactly was agreed to. The handshake helps to reinforce the memory that there actually was an agreement which took place, but it does little or nothing to ensure that the two parties have consistent memories about what was agreed to. Therefore if there are any important details it's wise to put them on paper.



Assent is assent. There is no distinction to be made between the lowest threshold and the highest threshold of assent. Verbal agreement, the handshake, and the signed document, are all indications of assent. One is not a higher threshold and the other a lower threshold, they are all different forms of assent.

The issue you speak of appears to involve what @javi2541997 calls "implied" assent. If there is not some form of explicit assent, then the threshold of "assent" is not really crossed. In that case one might request a handshake to actually cross the threshold.

Implied consent is really very problematic as many rape trials indicate. All sorts of subliminal and unconscious actions may be claimed to have been interpreted as consent. Imagine if I suddenly grabbed your hand, and forcefully shook it, because your actions implied to me that you had crossed the threshold of assent. Then, I later claimed that you shaking my hand was proof that you had actually crossed the threshold. Really, I shook your hand and you did not shake my hand, and there was never assent.

This is why my first post on this thread stated:

Therefore the "freedom" perspective and the "consequentialist" perspective of moral virtue are inherently incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that you want the right to choose which of my choices ought to be protected indicates that you are interested in restricting my freedom rather than protecting it.

What does lowest threshold of assent mean?

I'm not sure what is meant by "evolved independently" when we are talking about things evolving in one species.

However, having a greater number of neurons available, to associate in more complex ways, things going on in visual cortex and things goings on in auditory cortex, might have been rather important. — wonderer1

The point is that spoken language and written language have fundamentally different purposes. The principal use for spoken language is communication, so it would have evolved in ways to facilitate that end. The principal use for written language is to serve as a memory aid, so it would develop to facilitate that end . Therefore the written language is fundamentally personal, rather than communicative. Consider Wittgenstein's private language example. Being personal, there may be aspects of written language which are designed to make it intentionally non-communicative, like secret code is for example. In any case, you ought to be able to see how the two are fundamentally different, as the principle purpose of one is to communicate with others, and the principle purpose of the other is to communicate with oneself at a later time.

This means that it is very probable that the essential aspects of one are not essential aspects of the other, so the development of each of the two, needs to be considered separately. History and archeology may be misleading to us because what persists from ancient times, and is available to us now as evidence, is only the written material. So anthropology. to the extent that it relies on archeology, cannot provide an accurate history of the development of spoken language.

It is relevant to the OP in that Everett follows Peirce in arguing for an evolution of language where indexes led to icons, and icons moved from signs that looked like the referents, to symbols where the relation was arbitrary. — apokrisis

I think you ought to notice that "signs that looked like the referents" indicates written language. And written language is viewed, while spoken language is heard. The two are very different, and have very different uses, so it is quite reasonable to consider that they evolved independently. At some time, in the relatively recent past, the two began to be united, when spoken words were given written symbols, and vise versa. This unification may have produced the "explosion" you refer to, but it in no way signifies the beginning of language use.

In an analysis of many different spoken words, Plato shows that this distinction, between spoken words that sound like the referent, and spoken words which have an arbitrary relation, is not a useful distinction. The ones which appear to have an arbitrary relation may be just so old that the word has evolved so as not to reveal its origins in some sort of similarity. So unless the history of the symbol is clearly known, the distinction may be completely misleading.

You have misunderstood. — Dan

No, I don't think I have misunderstood. You state explicitly what I have already acknowledged, there is only a specific type of freedom which you believe should be protected, the freedom to act in a way which is acceptable by your moral principles. To me, this is not "freedom" at all. In reality, freedom of choice allows one to make choices with complete disregard for any preconceived principles, moral or otherwise. So if one wants to protect freedom then this is what needs to be protected. Your proposal to protect a certain type of freedom, and disallow that there is any moral value to the other types of freedom, as not morally relevant and therefore valueless, is nothing but a proposal for a veiled restriction to freedom.

It is true that I am claiming that a certain type of choice should be protected, specifically those choices that belong to the person or persons in question. I have discussed the reasons for this in the primer I provided and more deeply in the material referenced within. — Dan

OK, so do you see that preferring one type of choice to be "protected", over the other types, is not an instance of protecting freedom, but the very opposite?

Look at Saddam Hussein's WMD for example. When there is a faulty interpretation of the intelligence, people are not "making stuff up", because they firmly believe in the truth of their interpretation. It's a failure of the intelligence system.

Regardless, when a person provides false information which they believe to be true, the person is not guilty of making stuff up.

Obviously you can't stop Trump from just throwing random bullshit out there, but that could at least be framed by consistent messaging. — Echarmion

Yeah, well now that there's been a switch in the competing candidate, the crew focused on consistent messaging will become irrelevant, and the random bullshit will inevitably ramp up, to fill the void. Should be interesting.

But they did. — NOS4A2

No they didn't. Read the closing of the article which you yourself referred:

"There is no evidence to support Musk's claim that Sussmann or the Clinton campaign peddled information they knew was untrue. Multiple witnesses testified that respected cyber experts harbored genuine national security concerns about the data. Sussmann's lawyers repeatedly said he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the material when he provided it to the FBI."

I am saying that only a certain type of freedom is being used as the measure of value, specifically the freedom of persons over their own choices. Only this limited kind of freedom is what ought to be protected, rather than freedom of all kinds. — Dan

Ok, so this is what I am saying is problematic. To protect the freedom for a certain type of choice, while excluding the freedom for other types of choices as having no value, is really a matter of restricting one's freedom rather than protecting it. Those other types are denied value so as to deny the possibility of choosing them. So what you are proposing is that freedom ought to be restricted rather than protected.

I didn't say that commiting an act of violence to prevent you stealing my car wouldn't violate/restrict your freedom. When I said "stop you from doing so" I wasn't implying that I was going to physically attack you. Commiting violence in such a circumstance would restrict/violate your freedom, though of course it may be justifiable to do so as long as it prevents greater violations of freedom. — Dan

Well, how else would you stop me from stealing, with a threat? And of course the threat would not constitute a restriction to my freedom of choice, because that choice does not belong to me (not one that I am free to make under your proposal because it has no value).

Here's a question. Why the inconsistency in your principles, between one's freedom of choice, and one's freedom to act? If you physically prevent me from stealing your car, with the use of violence, you accept that this is a restriction of my freedom. Therefore I am fundamentally free to act in that way. However, when we discuss my choice to steal your car, you say that I am not free to make that choice, because that choice does not belong to me. Therefore I am fundamentally not free to make that choice.

Do you apprehend the inconsistency I am talking about? In the case of making choices, I am not free to make certain choices (let's say bad choices), so persuading (by threatening for example) me to change my mind does not violate my freedom, because that sort of freedom has no value in this context. However, when it comes to acting out choices, using violence to prevent one's actions is a violation of one's freedom, even if the act has no value (is a bad act) in this context.

To physically prevent me from stealing your car, with the use of violence, requires that you restrict my freedom to act. You do not apply your principle that I am fundamentally not free to make that act, because it has no moral value. But to persuade me not to steal your car, does not restrict my freedom of choice, because you apply the principle that this is a choice which I am not free to make in the first place because it has no value.

It appears to me, like your principle is a reversal of what is really the case, if we made a real description. What is really the case, is that I am completely free to make the choice to steal your car, and nothing (neither persuasion nor threat) can actually prevent me from making that choice. But I am not free to carry out that act, because I may be prevented with physical violence. Furthermore, the prevention with violence is not a restriction on my freedom because principles of law dictate that I am not free to act in this way, so the prevention is justified therefore not a restriction of my freedom. However, there are no principles of law which dictate that within my mind I am not free to decide to steal your car. So long as I do not end up acting in that way, nothing will restrict that freedom.

Therefore you really have things reversed. People are fundamentally not free to make certain actions, because they will be prevented with violence, and this violence is not a restriction to their freedom. And these free actions of authority over one's own body and property are the type of freedom which serves as a measure of value. Other actions (bad acts), we are not free to make because of physical prevention, and such prevention is not a restriction to our freedom because it is justified, and so these acts cannot be admitted into the freedom value scale. In the case of choices however, we are inherently free to choose anything because and nothing justifies a restriction to the freedom of choice, therefore all choices must be allowed some value. We can use means of persuasion and even threats, but these do not qualify as a restriction on one's freedom of choice. And freedom of choice is fundamentally unrestricted.

We don't need to weigh your choice to steal my car against my choice to not have my car stolen, because one choice is the sort that should be protected morally and the other isn't. — Dan

This is precisely the example of why your principle is a vicious circle. The good choice ought to be protected. Which is the good choice? The one which "belongs" to the person to make. How do we know which choice "belongs"? It is the morally good choice.

In reality, we need to question which choice "should be protected morally". And this means that we need to weigh one against the other. You seem to assume that we can just take for granted which one ought to be protected. But this locks us in the vicious circle produced by 'what has been taken for granted', in the moral context. And as you demonstrate, we are not free to make decisions outside of this moral enclosure because they are designated as void of moral value. In other words we get entrapped within our own preconceived moral principles, what we take for granted morally, and deny ourselves the freedom to make any moral choices outside those preconceived boundaries by designating them as having no moral value.

Again, I am not defining "freedom" generally as only the kind I refer to here, but I am using "freedom" within the context of freedom consequentialism as a shorthand for "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". That is the thing that I am claiming is morally valuable, and I will sometimes say the freedom to make one's own choices to make that clear. I am using the word "freedom" because it seems like the most applicable of the available options, but if you have a better suggestion, I'd happily use that instead. — Dan

It appears like what you are actually doing is giving priority to moral consequentialism over "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". You take one type of choice, which has been designated by some preconceived moral principles (taken for granted) as "the sort that should be protected morally", and you propose that the ability to make this sort of choice ought to be protected. But this is not at all a matter of protecting "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices", it is a matter of protecting their ability to make a certain type of choice. In fact, what you are proposing is that the freedom of rational agents to make their own choices ought to be restricted in a way such that only those which are consistent with the preconceived moral principles ought to be protected.

I am not defining freedom by reference to what is morally relevant. I am defining what is morally relevant by reference to freedom. I'm not begging the question, you have just misunderstood what I said. — Dan

You've referred to "morally relevant" in relation to freedom of choice, a number of times. Here are some examples.

I mean, the type of freedom is quite a limited one already. It isn't the freedom to do anything that is to be protected, it is the freedom to make choices over what belongs to the person in question. If you want to steal my car and prevent you doing that, that hasn't violated your freedom in a morally relevant way (depending on how I do the preventing) because stealing my car was not your choice to make. — Dan

Here, you appear to be limiting the meaning of "freedom", to a "type of freedom" which you believe to be relevant, which you call "morally relevant". In this example, you claim that your act of violence which prevents me from doing what I have freely chosen to do, does not violate my freedom. You make this claim by saying that I am not free to make such choices over your property See, you are restricting the meaning of "freedom" to circumstances which you believe are "morally relevant", in order to say that you can physically prevent me from carrying out an act, without violating my freedom. That is clearly a highly restricted sense of "freedom". A person is free to choose what is morally good, but not free to choose what is morally bad. So "free" and "not free" are defined by reference to what is morally good and bad.

No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me and not something that you get to make choices over, morally speaking. As I mentioned in the primer, the kind of freedom being protected here is specifically over those choices that belong to you. Whether or not to steal my car is not a choice that belongs to you, because it is [my car. — Dan

Here again, you refer to a "kind of freedom" which is being protected, the freedom to make choices about things which belong to oneself. So, as I pointed out, in order to determine which free choices qualify as those which need to be protected, we first need some moral principles to determine property ownership. Therefore you are producing a very special definition of "freedom", a special type of freedom, and this is the only kind of freedom which qualifies as "freedom" to you, in relation to your proposed principle that freedom ought to be protected. That other forms of free choice do not qualify is evident from the fact that you proceed to argue that a person does not have the freedom to make choices about someone else's property. In reality, you want to protect the freedom to make good choices, but not the freedom to make bad choice, so you argue that making a bad choice is not a free choice, (in a morally relevant way), so that you can claim to be protecting freedom of choice.

These bad choices, the choices to do things with others' property (steal for example), you claim are not "morally relevant", but this is blatantly false. Clearly the choice to steal someone else's property is a choice which is morally relevant, as morally bad, and it is a choice which one freely makes.

No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the person, their mind, their body, and their property. — Dan

Now you continue with that blatant falsity expressed above. Clearly, the kinds of free choices which are morally relevant extend far beyond choice concerning what belongs to the person making the choice. As I explained, a very large portion of morally relevant choices actually concern other people's property, such as when I decide whether or not to steal your car, in the example. Clearly, this is a morally relevant choice, which I freely make, concerning someone else's property. Restricting the meaning of "freedom", such that I am not "free" to choose to steal your car, because you assert that this choice is not "morally relevant" is complete nonsense. You have totally distorted the meaning of "morally relevant", to support your unjustified opinion that this sort of "freedom" ought not be protected, therefore it ought not be classed as a choice which can "freely" be made. Obviously, that is nonsense.

I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way. — Dan

Here, we find the crux of the problem. Any threat to restrict one's freedom is morally relevant. However, you have totally distorted the meaning of "morally relevant", to say that restricting one's freedom to do a morally bad act is not morally relevant, so that this form of restricting one's freedom is not a morally relevant restriction of freedom. This allows you to hang on to your principle that freedom (in the morally relevant sense) ought to be protected. In reality though, the very nature of "freedom", what it means to be free, implies that one may freely choose to do what is morally bad just as much as what is good. And choosing to do bad is just as morally relevant as choosing to do good. But you do not want to protect that sort of "freedom", true freedom, you only want to protect "freedom" by some twisted distorted definition which suits your morality.

I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way. — Dan

I have a problem with this approach. We are attempting to define "freedom" for the purpose of setting moral principles. If we proceed by reference to what is "morally relevant" then we produce a vicious circle. We define "freedom" by what is presupposed as "morally relevant", and this produces moral principles based on those presuppositions. To put it bluntly, this is the fallacy known as "begging the question". You are basing what constitutes a restriction to one's freedom on your preconceived ideas as to what is "morally relevant", consequently the moral principles derived from your conclusions will simply be a reflection of your preconceived ideas of what is "morally relevant".

Instead, I have proposed that we analyze the nature of "freedom", and proceed from there toward determining moral principles which would respect a person's freedom. This would utilize an understanding of "freedom", with a true definition of the word, based in an analysis of the human condition, rather than a definition based in one's preconceived ideas about what is and isn't morally relevant.

So, I proposed that we start with a distinction between the freedom of choice and the freedom to act, as I think that understanding the difference between these two could assist us in understanding the nature of freedom. However, you seem to have no interest in understanding the nature of freedom, only a desire to define "freedom" relative to some preconceived notions of morality. That sort of discussion, where the person demonstrates oneself to be completely unwilling to free oneself from the constraints of one's own preconceived ideas does not interest me.

I don't think this is convoluted in the least. I think I have been fairly clear from the beginning that what is morally relevant is a person's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. If you keep that in mind in reading my responses, I think it will be clear what I mean. — Dan

As I said already, in my opinion, restricting "morally relevant" to the "choices that belong" to the person, simply excludes the true essence of "moral value". "Moral value" is a principle of judgement aimed at judging choices which we make concerning what belongs to others, how we treat others, including respect for their goods and chattels. We cannot restrict "morally relevant" to choices which concern 'one's own' body, mind, and property, without losing track of what morality truly is.

Furthermore, as soon as I mentioned that this would require principles to determine what is truly "one's own", this started a seemingly infinite regress of principles required for a person to accurately determine what is "one's own". You started with body, mind, and property, but then you had to make exceptions to include freedom and rights which refer to a person's position relative to the public world, rather than what is "one's own". As soon as you included freedom you produced the vicious circle by defining "freedom" with "morally relevant", in an effort to bring it into the category of "one's own", having already defined "morally relevant" in reference to "one's own".

Simply put, you are trapped within your own ideas of what is morally relevant, refusing to accept, and denying the relevance of the ideas of others, because "morally relevant" for you implies that the ideas must be your own ideas to be morally relevant. As soon as you accept that the ideas of others might be morally relevant, and open your mind to them, freeing yourself from the restrictions of your self imposed solipsism, we might make some progress.

Only threats that threaten to restrict/violate your freedom would be morally relevant. So "I will shoot you" clearly would, but "I won't be your friend anymore" wouldn't be, because someone else being your friend is their choice to make, not yours. — Dan

Let me see if I follow you. A threat against one's freedom to act constitutes a restriction to one's freedom of choice, but a threat concerning anything else does not. Does this mean that a threat to take one's property, or threats against other rights which a person has, which do not involve one's "freedom", do not qualify as coercion? Sorry Dan, but your restricted definitions are getting too convoluted and difficult for me to understand.

Yes. Yes it does. The only other option is to say that one is prisoner of their own moral outlook. Which would be weird, to say the least. — AmadeusD

Why do you say this is weird? I think it's not only reality, but obvious. Are you familiar with the concept of original sin? We are all prisoners of our moral outlook, that kind of goes without saying.

Im unsure we're using these words in the same way, if this is your response.
"could have done otherwise" is the metric generally used, and the fact that you know something means it could have come to mind. There's not much more to that, in terms of what we're talking about. — AmadeusD

We must adhere to the facts though. The fact is that the other option did not come to mind. This implies that the reason why the person 'could not make the appropriate choice' is because the person did not put enough effort into the decision making. It does not absolve the person from responsibility, it simply provides an explanation as to why the person made a bad choice. The person has lazy decision making habits which restrict one's freedom of choice.

Otherwise, we are never free to choose anything, at any time. We are restricted by our current conscious access to whatever is in our minds and this changes drastically from moment-to-moment depending on environmental triggers (or lack of, i suppose). If you have a different metric you're using, please outline it. — AmadeusD

We are always free to choose, we are just not free to choose our restrictions. You seem to believe that a person is free to choose the restrictions which one's own body serves up, as if one could choose one's own body, or one's parents or that kind of thing. There are restrictions to our decision making capacity, which our physical bodies force upon us, which we cannot overcome no matter how much effort we make. So in the process of decision making there is two extremes, the rash, quick decision (which I called the lazy decision above), and also the overly extended, lengthy effort of trying to consider every possible relevant piece of information, when this is impossible for a person's mind to do anyway.

You seem to be using post-hoc "Well, it happened in way X therefore way Y wasn't possible" which is clearly wrong. If it's not that, i'll need some help. — AmadeusD

No, that's not what I'm saying at all. So I'll repeat. When the person makes a choice, there are specific options present to that person's mind. And; it is impossible for the person to choose an option which is not present to one's mind at the time of choosing. To state it very clearly, in the terms of your example, I am saying that it was not possible for the person to choose Y, if Y was not present to the person's mind as an option at the time when the choice was made.

You look at the situation and you determine Y was possible. I agree, Y was possible. Further, you might judge and say that the person ought to have chosen Y, and I might agree, yes, the person ought to have chosen Y. Further, we might agree that the reason why the person did not choose why is because Y, as an option was not present to that person's mind, if we agree that Y would have been the obvious choice for the person. So, our only point of disagreement seems to be that I say it was impossible for the person to have chosen Y at that time, because Y was not present in the person's mind, as an option, at the time when the decision was made. You seem to think that it is possible for a person to choose an option not present in the person's mind at the time of making the choice. I think that this is impossible.

You're conflating post-choice with pre-choice. I doubt Dan intends (and I dont) to suggest one can retroactively change one's decision. You could override it, but you can't undo it. Obviously. — AmadeusD

You seem to be agreeing with me, that choice occurs at a point in time. Now, do you understand that weighing options occurs pre-choice? Then a choice is made. Do you see, that when the choice is made, the chooser cannot then proceed to weigh options not brought up, as if the choice wasn't yet made? At this point in time, the point when the choice is made, it is impossible for the chooser to consider options not brought up, because the time of considering options is pre-choice. Therefore it is impossible for the chooser, at the time of making the choice, to consider any options not already present in the mind.

Once a choice is made, you're not free to choose otherwise due to the law of identity — AmadeusD

Yes, so this is the key point. A choice is made at a point in time. After the choice is made one cannot choose otherwise (except by changing ones mind, reversing the choice). So, at the point in time when the choice is made, if the person has not brought all the relevant information into the decision making process, then the decision making capacity of the person is impaired, restricted, by that failure to bring up the relevant information.

You can argue all you want, that the person could have brought more information to bear on the problem, and therefore could have made an unimpaired, or unrestricted choice, but the simple fact is that in the example, the person did not, and therefore when the person acted to choose, the person's choice was restricted by that habit or laziness, or whatever it was which caused the person to not bring forth the pertinent information.

You're just, for whatever reason, assuming that the example is one in which nothing brings the option to the subject's mind. I have been explicit that this isn't what I'm describing. — AmadeusD

It's my principle, my description, and that is exactly what I am describing, a case when nothing brings the other option to the person's mind. You and I look at the person, and say the person should have seen option Y, but the fact is that the person did not. Now, we have to separate the act of choosing, as a point in time, from the act of bringing forth and analyzing the information, which goes on for a period of time. In that period of time when the person is analyzing the information, for some reason option Y did not come to mind. Then, at a point in time, the person chooses, and I am claiming that the person's freedom of choice is restricted by the fact that option Y did not come to mind. The person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted by not having all the possibilities present. Therefore the person's freedom to choose is restricted The reason why option Y did not come to mind is irrelevant. .What is relevant is that at that point in time, when the person makes the choice, the person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted, therefore the person's freedom of choice is restricted, because that option is not there, in the person's mind.

No. It would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time, say after a concussion. It is possible that anything could bring something not currently in ones waking consciousness. Again, your bar is way the hell too high. — AmadeusD

You are not distinguishing between the process of bringing options to mind, and the point in time when the decision is made. You recognize that when the decision is made, it cannot be otherwise, by the law of identity. You also recognize that "it would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time". Now, you need to also recognize that the possibility of something bringing up a thought "not currently" accessible, is an irrelevant possibility, because it would be post hoc to the choice being made. At the point in time when the decision is made, only currently accessible information is relevant. So it does not matter that something could potentially bring up some other information. At the point in time when the choice is made, all the bringing things up in the mind is in the past. Because this is all in the past at that time, it is impossible that something else could enter into the decision making process. It's in the past, therefore it is impossible for it to be otherwise.

No. They are obstacles, I'd say, but not restrictions. Having no legs is a restriction on your choice of mobility. — AmadeusD

You are not recognizing the difference between freedom to choose and freedom to act. Having no legs is not a restriction on your freedom of choice, it is a restriction on your freedom to act. Without legs you can still choose to stand up and walk, you just cannot actually do it. People often choose to do things which are physically impossible. And, it is very important to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act because threats appear to restrict one's freedom to act, but they do not restrict one's freedom to choose.

These aren't facts. Not meaning to be rude - but there are no facts being discussed. — AmadeusD

We are very clearly discussing facts, the facts about the temporal order of the process of making a choice. It is a fact that a person cannot choose an option not present to one's mind. And, it is also a fact that at the time when the person makes a choice, other options not considered are irrelevant to the choice which is made. What is a matter of opinion is whether this constitutes a restriction on one's freedom of choice. Once we get the facts sorted out we might be able to reasonably discuss the matter of opinion.

Good to know. :up: — apokrisis

I think you already knew that.

We are what we eat and we now eat fossil fuel. Coal saw world population explode from 0.5 to 2 billion. Fertilizer and oil resulted in a population increase to almost 8 billion by 2020. For a while, until middleclass antinatalism started to kick in, we were going not just exponential but super-exponential. — apokrisis

You are framing things to suit your purpose. There was many factors involved in the population explosion,, medicine, antibiotics, etc..

We "is" constrained by our genetics... — apokrisis

Being constrained by genetics is quickly becoming a thing of the past.

No, ideologies, biases, and prejudices do not restrict someone's freedom (generally). Religious faith may do so more often as there is often a threat of eternal damnation or something similar involved. Freedom is restricted by threats because the choice is coerced rather than free. If I point a gun at you and tell you to give me your wallet, your choice to do so isn't free, it is coerced. I have restricted your freedom to choose what to do with your wallet by forcing you to choose between giving it up and being shot. That is how coercion restricts choices, and the same thing is going on with laws. — Dan

OK, so your principle is that freedom of choice is restricted by threats, because a threat is an act of coercion. It appears to me, like restricting one's freedom is something which one person does to another person. And a good example of this is through threat. I have a couple questions.

First, are there specific types of threats which qualify as restricting one's freedom, and other types which do not? For example, if I threaten to not be your friend if you do not share your desert with me, is that a restriction of your freedom? To put it simply, does every instance of "I will punish you if you do not..." constitute a restriction of freedom? Further, does the threat to withhold a reward, or deny a pleasure, constitute a restriction to one's freedom? Suppose for example, a man's wife says "no sex unless you...", does this constitute a restriction to the man's freedom of choice? If it isn't the case that every threat is a restriction to one's freedom, how would you draw the line between ones that are, and ones that aren't?

The next question concerns the possible situation where the person doesn't care about the threat, so that the threat has no effect. Suppose the person puts a gun to someone's head and demands the wallet, and the person says "fuck you" and keeps walking. Is the threat still a restriction to the person's freedom of choice? It doesn't appear like it restricts the person's freedom of choice whatsoever. But this produces a problem. The very same threat might restrict a person's freedom in some cases, and not restrict the person's freedom in others. This becomes more evident in the other examples I gave above, where the punishment threatened is milder. Depending on how the severity of the threat is perceived, some people will respond to the threat, others will not care about it. Then the very same act may or may not restrict the person's freedom

It appears to me, like threats restrict freedom sometimes, but do not restrict freedom other times. Is that a fair conclusion? Depending on how the threatened person responds, freedom may or may not be restricted by a threat. If this is the case, then the restriction of freedom is really an attribute of the response to the threat, not an attribute of the threat itself. This is what I have been arguing, it is the thinking of the threatened person, which follows from the threat, rather than the threat itself, which actually restricts the person's freedom. This is very evident from the fact that some threats "work" while others do not.

For a clear example of how not knowing about an option does not restrict one's choices, let's consider how I might get to work tomorrow. Let's imagine that I am considering driving or walking, but I don't know that a bus route has opened up near my house and goes right by my work. My lack of knowledge about the bus route here doesn't make my choice less free. My freedom isn't restricted by the fact that I could have done things that I didn't know about or just didn't consider. I am still able to apply my rationality to the choice in question and make it freely. That there were other options I didn't consider is not a problem. — Dan

Obviously, your freedom of choice is restricted in this example. The freedom to choose the bus as your mode of transport was denied from you. That is a restriction to your freedom of choice. Another person who knew about the bus could choose the bus, and therefore that person's freedom has less restrictions than yours.

I think that we need to recognize that in no situation is a person's freedom of choice absolute, it is always restricted to some degree. We always say that a person's choice "is free", but it is also always implied that there are restrictions to a person's capacity to choose. So a person is always capable of making one's choice "freely", but there is also always restrictions to that freedom. Whether or not you knew about the bus does not affect the fact that you made your choice freely, but it does affect the degree of restrictions to your freedom. Not knowing about the bus made your freedom of choice more restricted than someone who knew about the bus, regardless of the fact that you both chose freely. Knowledge affects the restrictions to the freedom, not the freedom itself.

Biosemiosis helps us get our global metaphysics right. — apokrisis

That... is highly doubtful. Definitely not a map I would follow.

The future is open. The question becomes how we can expect the predictable state of the world to reshape our social values at a fundamental level. — apokrisis

First principle for the mapmaker to acknowledge, as the essential aspect of making a good map for the future, is that the future is in no way predictable. To start with a principle of predictability will not produce a map, but a step toward hell.

It has already been discussed that rules may be considered objects. — Lionino

...

I am correctly stating these two are distinct views, one may be a formalist without being a platonist and vice-versa.[/quote]

The question then, is how do you think that rules can be taken as objects, in a way which is not platonist? I already explained how the concept of "intersubjective objects" is inherently platonist.

You talk about "rules" without specifying what kind of rule you are talking about. — Lionino

I am talking about prescriptive rules, as I said, ones which people follow when they are doing what they should do, such as when they are doing mathematics. All prescriptive rules can be classed together as the same type, and this distinguishes them from descriptive rules which are commonly understood as inductive principles. Any further division of type is not necessary at this time.

If it is a mathematical rule, see the first line in this post and then this post. — Lionino

I don't deny that rules are subject to the platonist/nominalist debate. In fact that's what I am claiming, and that's what we are debating. I am saying that if you state that rules are understood as objects (whether or not those objects are claimed to be fictional is irrelevant), then you have taken a platonist stance in this debate. Further, I am claiming that all common formalist positions on this matter are platonist as well. I am not saying that it is impossible to produce a nominalist ontology of rules, I am saying that formlism relies on platonist ontology. And I've supported my claim with explanations. I am waiting for you to produce evidence which is contrary to what I am claiming, but you do not seem capable of finding any.

And I have no idea what Tones has been talking about.

The language must have been invented by satanists...I mean...platonists. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Our language is very much platonist. And this is the reason why Plato's writings are still available to us after more than two thousand years. He has had great influence over our culture, and those human beings in authoritative positions have had great respect for platonism, so platonism is extensive through our institutions. Therefore our culture and language have extensive platonist features. If you had education in the history of philosophy, you'd know this. Furthermore, the Catholic church was very much platonist influenced, and the Church, for an extended period of time, controlled the use of language through the use of force. This is known as The Inquisition.

The fictionalist position is that mathematical truths are fictional (that was already explained further by me above), and, since they are nominalists, that there is no such thing as abstract objects. That is the position, engaging in a debate about "object this object that" is pointless as you will choose to tailor the meaning of "object" to suit your ends. — Lionino

I think we've gotten beyond this talk of "objects". We've moved on to "rules", because rules are what formalism takes for granted. Platonism takes mathematical objects for granted, formalism takes rules for granted. These seem very similar to me, though you seem to have a desire to drive a wedge between platonism and formalism. That is why I said we need to look into the ontology of rules. If rules are supposed to exist in the same way that platonic objects are supposed to exist, then there is no real difference between the two.

Your reference to fictionalism inclines me to think that you want to portray rules as fictions. But this does not suit the nature of rules. Rules are guidelines for behaviour, principles of what one ought to do. Rules fall into a completely different category from fact and fiction and cannot be classed as either.

Ok, am I supposed to disagree? Formalism is still not disguised platonism, much less nominalism. — Lionino

We still haven't determined that yet, because we haven't determined how formalists account for the existence of rules. I think formalism generally takes rules for granted. Then the rules simply "are", just like platonic objects simply "are", and formalism is a form of platonism.

I don't think that is how habits work at all, but even if we imagine that it is, not realizing an option was available to you (generally) isn't a restriction on your freedom either. You are setting too high a bar for freedom. — Dan

Why do you say that not knowing a specific option doesn't restrict your freedom to choose it? I don't understand what you think freedom is. Do you think freedom is the capacity to do the impossible? That's what it seems like, if you think that a person can choose an option which is not present to the individual's mind.

I think you're somewhat glossing over the difference. The thread of enforcement creates a materially different scenario. You can - literally - have your freedom removed, rather than be unable to access it (for lack of a better way to delineate). I'm not saying this is the best take, but I think there's a difference here. — AmadeusD

You're not getting anywhere. The threat to -literally- remove one's freedom does not remove the person's freedom. You are jumping from the possibility of loosing one's freedom, to the conclusion that this is an actual restriction on one's freedom. A threat is just that, a threat. It is not an actual restriction to one's freedom, just a threat to it, that is plain and simple. The possibility (threat) of me being locked up in jail if I steal Dan's car, in no way limits my freedom to choose to steal Dan's car. I have a very difficult time believing that neither you nor Dan can understand this. I think that both of you are simply denying the facts because the facts are inconsistent with what you believe.

Just because it didn't occur to you in the moment doesn't mean you aren't capable of having made that choice. — AmadeusD

Yes it does mean exactly that. If you truly believe what you say here, explain to me how you think that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the person's mind. If the option did not occur to the person at the moment when the person is making the choice, then the person was not capable of making that choice.

This is actually the issue which Dan and I started with. I said that making a choice restricts your freedom, because you are constrained by that choice made, while not choosing, deliberation and contemplation, provides you with greater freedom. At the moment when the choice is made, a person is constrained, and restricted, by that choice, and being only capable of choosing the options present to mind at that time. But it is only the act of choosing which forces those restrictions. If the person does not choose, one is allowed to find other options at a later time. If the person chooses, and something comes up later, it's too late to alter the choice already made.

You ought to see that it is logically impossible for a person to be capable of making a choice which does not come to one's mind. "Choice" requires something that is chosen, and the one choosing can only choose from the options present. Therefore it is impossible that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the one's mind.

Something as simple as having encountered a slightly different shade of green prior to making the decision might have put you in mind of the 'other' option/s. — AmadeusD

Sure, if something different had happened, then the options might have been different. But we can only take into consideration what actually did happen. Counterfactuals are irrelevant because they refer to what did not happen. And, it is impossible to change what has already happened. Therefore counterfactuals deal with what is impossible, and are therefore irrelevant when considering these possibilities.

The different shade of green did not happen. The other option did not come to the person's mind. It was impossible for the person to choose that other option, when the choice was made, because that option was not present to the person's mind. The person's freedom to choose that option was therefore restricted.

I think if you were to make your point as one about things you don't know then it could be run, but in it's current form its basically saying "it's in the shadows, so it can't be real" as regards these other options' availability. — AmadeusD

I don't understand what you\re trying to say. The other options are not "in the shadows", they are simply not present to the person's mind at the point in time when the decision is made. Since they are not present to the person's mind it is impossible that the person can choose them. It's very simple and straight forward. I really cannot believe that you guys have such a hard time to understand something so obvious.

Yes, you very much can. There are entire therapies dedicated to this mechanism. Memories are very, very rarely actually lost. This is why I made the point earlier that, sure, if you didn't know the thing you couldn't drag it up even with the aid of environmental triggers. — AmadeusD

It doesn't even matter if it is possible to drag up the memory or not. What matters is whether the person actually does drag up those particular memories. If the memories are not pulled up, then the person cannot use the information (which may be deep in the mind somewhere anyway) in the decision making process. Not pulling up the information restricts one's freedom of choice by leaving options concealed. It is impossible for the person to choose an option not revealed. This is why habit is so important as a restriction to one's freedom. A lazy habit inclines one not to pull up all the relevant information which is stored in the brain, and this restricts the person's freedom to choose other options.

It's very clear, that lazy thinking habits restrict one's freedom of choice. I find it very difficult to believe that intelligent people like you and Dan actually dispute what is so obvious. Do you not agree that prejudices, biases, and ideologies in general are real restrictions on one's freedom of choice? What about religious faith? Is this not a restriction to one's freedom in your mind? Where would you draw the line? Prejudice, ideology, and religious convictions do not restrict one's freedom, yet respect for the law does restrict one's freedom? How so, by threat? As explained above, threats don't actually restrict one's freedom of choice. I think you and Dan need to reconsider.

It's just you not thinking about an option that you had. — Dan

It's a lot more than simply not thinking about something, it's knowledge not held, information not available to that thinking mind. An observer might say option X was available to the person, but if the person was lacking in that information, the option was not available to the person.

A restriction would mean you are unable to do the thing. In this case, you're just misguided. — AmadeusD

But that is exactly the case with Dan's perspective. Dan thinks laws, and the threat of punishment are restrictions. But these do not prevent one from carrying out those acts. Neither of us assumes that it is necessary that a restriction prevents in an absolute sense, to be a "restriction", so this criticism is completely irrelevant.

This is why we need to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act. Here we have the basis for impossibility, restriction in an absolute sense. Some things chosen are impossible to achieve in actions due to physical restrictions. This is the case when someone is physically prevented with violence for example. Physical impossibility is an absolute restriction, making the chosen act impossible.

And, in the context of freedom of choice some options are impossible for a person to chose because they are not present to the person's mind. Do you agree that a person is unable to choose an option which is not within that person's mind? This would be the case when the person has a lack of knowledge for example. An observer with more complete knowledge would say that the person should have chosen X, but in reality it was impossible for the person to have chosen X because the person did not have that knowledge. This impossibility of choice is comparable to physical impossibility of action.

Any instance where a further option is suggested to you leaves you open to considering it. Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really. Habits are flimsy, mentally speaking, versus the ability to take on new information. — AmadeusD

Yes, suggesting a further option makes that option available, and the restriction is no longer complete, absolute, in the sense that this choice is no longer impossible for the person. But that is irrelevant to the fact that this choice was impossible at the prior time.

Now the force of habit is very relevant. If choosing the newly presented option requires thinking in a way not familiar to the person, the option will automatically be rejected. This is very evident in discussions at TPF. People are firmly entrenched in their habits of thought, so that it is extremely difficult to teach them to accept a new perspective. This relates to the attitudes underlying one's use of language, which Wittgenstein talked about in On Certainty, as bedrock propositions or something like that. These underlying principles, which are actually attitudes, are what a person assumes cannot be doubted. This makes it extremely difficult to change a person's habits of thought, and accept a new option which is unacceptable from the perspective of the existing attitude. Therefore mentioning a further option brings that option into the realm of possibility, but existing habits still restrict one from choosing it.

What do you mean by "not really" in this sentence?
"Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really."
Your habits dictate the information available to your thinking mind, information in memories. This is a very real and absolute restriction, you simply cannot dig up information which has been forgotten. And, the way that your mind works, in its habits, greatly restricts your capacity to take on new information. The new information must be taken up in a way which is consistent with the existing way of thinking. If it's not, it's rejected as incomprehensible, or nonsense. This fact is very evident at TPF.

In the case of the habit, the person's choice isn't being restricted at all. — Dan

I explained why the person's choice is restricted by habit. The habit prevents the person from properly considering other options. This is a very real and very strong restriction to one's freedom to choose. The most significant restriction to one's freedom of choice is a failure to consider all the possibilities. The person is free to choose any option, but literally cannot choose an option which doesn't come to mind. The best option may not come to mind, due to the person\s preexisting habits of thinking, so the person's freedom to choose that option is restricted accordingly.

And, back to the point we started with, making a choice restricts one's freedom in much the same way. The choice is made, and the person proceeds accordingly. Proceeding with the choice firmly decided restricts one's freedom to choose otherwise.

It sometimes looks as if people are talking about different things - Does anxiety have an object, real or imagined, towards which it is necessarily directed - final exams, getting cancer, or whatever - or can one just be suffused with a feeling of anxiety about everything and nothing? — unenlightened

I think that when anxiety is directed toward a specific thing it is understandable, and therefore generally not in itself disconcerting. Depending on what the object is, the anxiety will reach a level corresponding with the importance of the object. This is understandable as the level of anxiety tends to remain consistent with the importance of the object.

When anxiety appears for no apparent reason, and has no specific direction, this is a completely different situation. Then it feeds on itself, unnerving the individual, making that person a victim. This I believe is the nature of a panic attack, anxiety without an object.

A threat to one's freedom is not an actual restriction of one's freedom.

So we're right back to square one. Coercion restricts one's freedom by having an influence on the way one thinks, and therefore one's choice, just like habits restrict one's freedom by influencing the way that one thinks, and therefore one's choice. It is the person's choice which actually restricts the person freedom to act, not the threat, because the person could choose to disregard the threat. Therefore the threat is not a real restriction. You say that a threat coerces, but only if it succeeds, and the fact that it may fail demonstrates that it doesn't actually restrict one's freedom to choose. The necessity required for causation is lacking. It's something else (how the person who is coerced responds to the threat) which actually does the restricting.

Your refusal to acknowledge the reality of the restrictions on the freedom of choice, and the freedom to act, is just evidence that the habits of a closed mind restrict one's freedom to adequately judge an hypothesis.

For anyone who doesn't understand what the number 1 is, it makes perfect sense to ask: "What kind of thing is the number 1. The answer, for a platonist is: "It is a mathematical object". The answer, for a nominalist is: "It's not a thing".

Pick your choice. Or, you can maintain your position as someone who doesn't understand what the number 1 is, and keep asking "What kind of thing is the number 1?"

To say, "the number 1 is a fictional thing," provides nothing by way of explanation, because we are left with essentially the same question; "What kind of thing is a fictional thing?". That's just an evasion; an indecisive move of avoidance practised by a slippery sophist. The sophist then slides off and starts talking about the number 1 as if it is a platonic object, hypocritically insisting that it is not.

You want "endless" growth. Well what if we stop a minute to let you define that as some sustainable balance over a long enough term. Let's hear what you really want out of "a life". — apokrisis

Endless growth is the idea which I said we should give up on. It's like the idea of endless life, impossible and inherently selfish.

You want "endle — apokrisis

Or if instead this is the moment to rewrite the script – in a way that is rationally believable – then let's see what that looks like as a social balancing act. Pragmatically it might mean 90% more time with the family, as you all dig the homestead dirt, and 90% less time consuming stuff so that wealth no longer has that demand side plughole to flush the global ecology down. — apokrisis

My point was that a "balancing act" is not the appropriate alternative. We still need something with an upside, but with an upside which is other than growth, based on external changes rather then internal changes. And whether something is external or internal is dependent on how we define the fundamental unit.

But ecologically growth doesn’t have to end. The limits to growth are limits in terms of certain unchecked exponentials. Population. Atmospheric carbon. Ecosystem destruction. — apokrisis

I don't see how you can say that growth doesn't have to end, then go on to list the restrictions which will necessitate an end to growth.

Also it is arguable that given time we could run civilisation much as we know it off the solar flux and a big investment in sensible green tech. — apokrisis

Maybe we have your catchy slogan right here: "time to start living off the solar flux". What is the solar flux?

That is like saying that nailing your hands to a wall doesn't restrict your freedom, since it is your hands that are preventing you from moving. The two thoughts are not morally similar, as one requires the person to choose while their freedom is at risk (due to the threat of punishment) while the other is just someone choosing not to do something. — Dan

You know, there is always reasons behind one's choices, whether it's a threat, a deadline, love, friendship, hate, revenge, or one of a myriad of personal goals. Your characterization of "the other is just someone choosing not to do something", appears to be intended to mislead. There is no such thing as "just someone choosing", choices are made for a reason, or reasons.

The issue is whether a choice is unduly restricted. We live in a dangerous world, one's freedom is always at risk, that is why we ought not take decision making lightly. However, the issue is not the ways in which one's freedom is at risk, it is the ways in which one's freedom is actually restricted. Nailing a person's hands to a wall is not analogous with a threat. This is why you need to differentiate between the freedom to choose and the freedom to act. It's one thing for you to deter my freedom of choice with a threat, and quite a different thing for you to restrict my freedom to act on a choice I've freely made, with physical violence.

You mean you would sign up for Elon's death trip to Mars? Or do you expect warp drive to exist in 20 years? :smile: — apokrisis

No, I think we need to consider this difference between internal change and external change when developing policy. Growth is inherently selfish as internal change. External change, as change in relations with others has moral value. So it might be a question of whether we want to prioritize a selfish policy (based on growth) or a moral policy (based on relations with others).

The "flat" 'equilibrium forever' goal is not a realistic alternative to growth because it does not reflect an organism's true nature as a active being. So if we remove priority from growth, as a goal which inevitably runs into restrictions (nothing grows forever), then we still find the need to be active in some other way. So we can assign priority to doing what is morally good instead, as a goal which begins where growth ends.

So that is the challenge. If you agree that the world is into its new era needing a new ethics, a new politics, then what is the algorithm that scales? What key idea drives the idea into every mind? — apokrisis

I think you ought to consider that there are two distinct types of change, change of form (internal change) and change of place (change in external relations). "Growth" is a change of form. If growth is the primary goal, then going places and doing things is neglected as a goal. It may be time to look at change of place as a primary goal over change of form.

What I am claiming is that the measure of moral value is the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. By "their own choices" I mean choices over those things that belong to them, their minds, bodies and property. — Dan

I really do not think that this could suffice for a foundation of "moral value". It requires a determination, or judgement as to what qualifies as "one's property". This begs the question of the right to ownership. This would place laws and government, which determine ownership, as logically prior to moral principles. The principles which determine ownership would be amoral, being outside of morality. Then those with power would dictate who owns what.

I mean, a choice being "difficult" in that sense is morally irrelevant. It's not a real restriction on the choice. — Dan

I don't know about you, but I find that difficulty is a very real restriction on choice. If there is a very easy way, and a very difficult way, to achieve the same end, no one would choose the difficult way. Clearly the degree of ease or difficulty is a real restriction on one's freedom of choice. Look, if I apprehend something as so difficult that it is impossible, the restriction becomes virtually absolute, I will not choose to do what I know is impossible.

Again, laws restrict our freedom because they come with threats attached. If laws didn't carry the threat of punishment, they wouldn't restrict our freedom either. — Dan

I know, but you are not paying attention to the way that threats can restrict freedom of choice. The threats only act to deter the deciding agent, through the person's mind, via thoughts. The threat of punishment makes me think twice about stealing your car. It is this activity of thinking, I might get caught, I might get punished, which is what really restricts my freedom of choice. Threats of punishment don't deter, and therefore don't restrict the freedom of, the person who doesn't care, or who doesn't think about getting caught. Therefore it is not the threat of punishment which restricts freedom, but the thinking of the person who apprehends the threat of punishment, which restricts the freedom. This is no different from the restriction of freedom involved with the choice about something which is difficult to do. One restricts freedom with the thought of "I can't do that, I might get caught and get punished", while the other restricts freedom with the thought of "I can't do that, it's too difficult".

Note: it is platonism with lower case, we are not talking about Plato when the discussion is modern mathematics. — Lionino

OK, I was unaware of that convention. We are definitely not talking about Plato, but modern day platonism (my spell check does not like the lower case).

But nominalists deny that mathematical objects are real, some think they are useful fictions. — Lionino

If the so-called mathematical objects are fictions then they are not really objects, but fictions. Therefore we cannot correctly refer to the tools of mathematics as "objects". If we're nominalist we'd say that anyone who speaks about mathematical objects is speaking fiction; fiction meaning untruth, because abstractions are simply not objects for the nominalist. And to call them objects would be false by the principles of that ontology.

That is a deep topic in itself and, though related, distinct from the metaphysics of mathematics. — Lionino

The point though, is that if we reject platonism, then we need some other ontology to support the reality of rules. We cannot defer to "intersubjectivity", because that makes a rule something between subjects, therefore outside the subject, and this external existence of rules is just a disguised platonism. Therefore we need to properly locate "rules" as properties of subjects, internal to thinking minds. I have my rules and you have your rules. Then the reality of agreement, convention, needs to be accounted for, and pragmaticism is designed for this purpose.

Application, just like 2000 years ago. — Lionino

So truth for you is pragmatic then?

He said they are mathematical objects, not platonic objects. — Lionino

I don't see how one could ever distinguish between these two. When an idea is said to be an "object" this is Platonism, by definition. Platonism is the ontology which holds that abstractions are objects.

The two key words you used. Social rules are (inter-)subjective because, as soon as we die, they are not carried out, the "rules" of physics are carried out independently of an observer. — Lionino

It appears like you are confusing descriptive rules with prescriptive rules. This is why we need a good definition of what a rule is. The laws of physics describe the way things behave. Social laws prescribe the way we ought to behave. The latter requires an agent who understands, and intentionally conforms one's activity to follow the law, the former is an inductive conclusion derived from observations of how things behave.

Some philosophers mix the two, so that a social rule is just a descriptive principle of how people behave in general. I think this is done to avoid the fact that people choose to follow rules. But this is problematic, because many people step outside the bounds of social rules, so it would be faulty induction.

If that is the case, I think MU's argument simply dissolves and rules are subject to the same debate of nominalismXplatonism as numbers. — Lionino

Tones is arguing that rules are Platonic objects just like numbers are. If that is the case, then formalism does not escape Platonism, it is a deeper form of Platonism, just like I said.

To pull this structure out of TIDF"s Platonic cesspool, and give it a nominalist foundation, you need to address the problems which I stated above. How do we get beyond arbitrariness? What makes some rules more acceptable than others. This commonly leads to pragmaticism

As these references to pragmatic theories (in the plural) would suggest, over the years a number of different approaches have been classified as “pragmatic”. This points to a degree of ambiguity that has been present since the earliest formulations of the pragmatic theory of truth: for example, the difference between Peirce’s (1878 [1986: 273]) claim that truth is “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate” and James’ (1907 [1975: 106]) claim that truth “is only the expedient in the way of our thinking”. Since then the situation has arguably gotten worse, not better. The often-significant differences between various pragmatic theories of truth can make it difficult to determine their shared commitments (if any), while also making it difficult to critique these theories overall. Issues with one version may not apply to other versions, which means that pragmatic theories of truth may well present more of a moving target than do other theories of truth. While few today would equate truth with expediency or utility (as James often seems to do) there remains the question of what the pragmatic theory of truth stands for and how it is related to other theories. Still, pragmatic theories of truth continue to be put forward and defended, often as serious alternatives to more widely accepted theories of truth. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-pragmatic/

No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the person, their mind, their body, and their property. — Dan

No, no, no, this is not true at all. The most morally valuable choices we make are concerning others, when we help them, or choose to hurt them. You know, like "love thy neighbour". The choices derived from that principle concern other persons.

You can characterize them as neural pathways if like, but a reinforced neural pathway does not prevent a person from choosing to think differently. — Dan

Remember, I didn't say that a habit restricts freedom in an absolute sense, it restricts in the sense of facilitating one specific decision at the expense of others. It doesn't make it impossible to choose otherwise, as will power, and the will to break a habit demonstrate. It restricts by making one choice the easy choice and anything else much more difficult.

People are able to act against their habits and, in some cases, they are morally required to do so. Knowing the right thing to do and not doing it does not show that you were unable to do it. — Dan

I've been through this already. I'm not talking about absolute restriction, making something impossible. I am talking about restrictions in the same sort of way that laws restrict us. Laws don't make criminal activity impossible, yet they are understood to restrict our freedom.

No, I am not saying that being "under the influence of habit" affects whether a choice belongs to a person at all. I am saying that habits are not a relevant factor because they don't restrict freedom. I am also saying, seperately, that the only freedom that is morally relevant is the kind over those things which belong to us. These are two seperate claims. — Dan

You are inconsistent, because you say that laws restrict our freedom, but habits do not.

If any rules at all, the idea that every rule we may come up with is a platonic object is silly, especially when so many rules are absolutely dependant on us being around. If you are talking about rules of logic and mathematics, then wonder why it is only such rules that get a special status. — Lionino

Yes, I think this is the issue, why would some rules get special status, and if they do, how could we know which ones deserve that special status. For example if we say some rules are objective, and other rules are subjective, what would distinguish the two?

? Those are set up by convention. — Lionino

So it appears like you want to start with the basic premise that rules are fundamentally arbitrary. Why should we agree to some rules and not to others then? Why would we want to start with something like "truth tables" as the primary rule?

It seems to me, that rather than jump right into the process of deciding which rules to accept, and which not to accept, we ought to first determine precisely what a rule is, When we have a complete understanding of what a rule is, then we will be much better prepared for making such a choice, by having some understanding of what the consequences of that choice might be. So rather than start from a truth table, as the basis for which rules to accept, we should start with the definition of a rule, as the basis for which rules to accept.

No, I don't imply that you shouldn't make that choice (though in this case you shouldn't). What I am saying is that your freedom to make that choice is not morally valuable because that choice doesn't belong to you. My freedom to keep my car on the other hand is valuable because my car does belong to me. — Dan

Now you've lost me. You appear to equivocate with "belong". Your car belongs to you. A choice which I freely make has no moral value because it does not belong to me. Are you insinuating that a choice I make is not my choice?

It doesn't matter whether you are habituated to good action or bad action, both are still available to you. You have free will and your habits do not get in the way of you exercising that to choose to do good, or do bad. — Dan

I think you are in denial, refusing to recognize the reality of the situation. When a person is habituated in a specific way, that person naturally proceeds in the way of the habit any time that the circumstances warrant that activity. Your behaviour in this discussion provides a real example. Through your education you have been inclined to think in a specific way about freedom. This habituation of your thinking patterns closes your mind to what I am saying, so you continually deny that what I am saying is the truth.

Maybe it will help to understand if we characterize habits as neural patterns. Once initiated, the pattern is followed, restricting the possibility of choice in that thought. That habituated way of thinking is a restriction on the person's freedom to choose and to act.

If you studied Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas, instead of whatever philosophy you did study, you would understand that habits truly do get in the way of one's freedom to choose and do what is good. Directed by Socrates, Plato questioned the relation between virtue and knowledge. It was claimed at the time, that virtue is a form of knowledge. However, Socrates demonstrated that a person can know what is good, yet not do it. Augustine, delved much deeper into this subject, how it is possible that a person knows what is good, yet may consistently act in a contrary way. Aquinas developed the role of "habit" in restricting one's capacity to choose to do what one knows is good. In other words, the person has the knowledge of what they ought to do in the circumstances, yet does otherwise, because the person's freedom to choose to do what is good is compromised by the person's preexisting habits.

Whether that choice belongs to you is very much morally relevant, because that is the type of freedom that FC is trying to protect: that over those choices that belong to the person in question. — Dan

This statement appears to rely on an incoherent sense of "belong". You appear to be saying that when a person chooses to do something while under the influence of habit, the choice does not "belong" to the person. I assume that criminals will be using that defence in court. "I am not responsible for my criminal activities because those choices don't belong to me." Are you saying that a person is not responsible for one's habitual actions because the choices involved don't belong to the person, they come from the teacher? is that how you account for education? A person acquires ways of thinking from one's teachers, such that the ways of thinking involved don't actually belong to the person who acquires them?

unlike logic. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Confession is the road to redemption. Nice start!

No, a habit isn't a restriction of one's freedom. — Dan

So says you, but I say you do not understand freedom and the true nature of its restrictions.

No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me and not something that you get to make choices over, morally speaking. — Dan

When you say "morally speaking" you imply that I ought not make that kind of choice. But oughts, moral principles, do not restrict one's freedom, they give us rules which serve as guidance in our decision making. The actual decisions are what restrict one's freedom.

Therefore I get to make choices concerning your property whenever I want, and I refer to moral guidance whenever I do. Nothing restricts my freedom to do this, even though some would say that I ought not covet any property of anyone else. However, it is the responsibility of each individual to follow the moral principles, and establish ways of curbing one's own inclinations toward making choices which one ought not make. The principal way of restricting one's own freedom of choice is by developing good habits. This is begun when we are very young, being trained by our caregivers, and it continues through schooling, and to some extent throughout our lives.

Whether or not to steal my car is not a choice that belongs to you, because it is [my car. — Dan

Whether the choice "belongs" to me or not, is irrelevant. The issue is whether I have the capacity to freely make that choice. And clearly I do. Therefore it is incorrect for you to say that I don't get to make a choice on this matter. If I didn't get to make a choice in this sort of matter, then every time I was inclined toward taking someone else's property, I would, and every time that I wasn't inclined to take someone else's property I wouldn't, because there would be no decision making going on, no choices, I would be acting on impulse. However, what is really the case, is that every time that I get inclined toward taking someone else's property I decide not to. Therefore I truly do make choices concerning whether or not to take someone else's property. Because I am morally responsible, I decide not to. But for you to say that I don't get to make choices in this matter is nothing but a falsity.

Freedom of choice vs freedom to act is not a distinction I am drawing. — Dan

I've noticed that. However, I think it is very important to make this distinction if you desire to understand freedom. Otherwise you'll believe that just because I am not free to actually steal your car, because you will kill me if I try, I am also not free to choose to steal your car, which the act of you killing me would demonstrate that I am free to make that choice. See, the very nature of "punishment" demonstrates that we are free to choose what we are not free to do. Therefore the distinction is a requirement if we want to understand freedom.

What "ontology of rules"? — Lionino

The ontological status of rules. If rules are real, then they have some form of existence. Ontology is the study of what there is, and the possibility of different forms of existence. An ontological study of rules will determine if there is such a thing as rules, and if so what type of existence they have.

Consider it is the same sort of issue as the ontological status of numbers, for comparison. We can ask, is there such a thing as rules, just like we can ask is there such a thing as numbers. If we answer yes, there is such a thing as rules, then we may proceed to ask questions like are they objective, and if the answer to this is yes, then we are in Platonism. If we answer no, rule are only subjective, then we are faced with a whole lot of problems as to how such a thing as a rule could actually exist.

For example:

https://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/Hart_Rawls_Searle.pdf