Firstly, I asked you to give me an example of a duration without math and without observation of a material object changing its position in space. Instead, you ask me to imagine (along with you) half a Planck time. A conjecture, which has a measure of scientific and logical formalism, falls short of an example, which is evidence from the real world. The act of imagination you invite me join as proof of time's independence from measurement doesn't even have the nascent persuasiveness of a conjecture.

Secondly, even if we grant the existence of half a Planck time, such a reality of Planck time means material objects occupying that space, so how does that show time's independence from measurement via math tracking the change of position of a material object in space? It doesn't.

Your two closing lines indicate you are making your argument for time's independence by knowingly imagining something unreal and thus devoid of material objects. Of course, this argument also doesn't work, because, as I've said, unreal things don't count as evidence.

Thirdly, if we assume future technology will empower observation of material reality below the Planck scale, then continuing on this path, which you argue for logically, we make an ever more close approach to the present moment as a theoretical vanishing point with zero dimensions. I think this is the third time that your attempt to argue for your theory has you instead arguing for its refutation. — ucarr

To be clear. My example was time passing without any change occurring. I said "imagine what it means for time to pass, then imagine this happening without anything in the world changing". I then referred to Planck time to demonstrate that my example is logically possible. The example is not "unreal" as the Planck time demonstration shows. Therefore all of this criticism is misguided and not at all relevant.

our attempt to spin away from the present as zero dimensional doesn't work because your uni-directional time, future to past is just a word game. It has no effect whatsoever upon physical spacetime. We all know this because we all know that all we ever experience in reality is our asymptotically close approach to the present moment of time, and that's the very near past chasing the very near present. When you declare that tomorrow is prior to today in time, you always make this declaration in the nearly present moment. Our thoughts are not prior to our position in time, regardless of the word games we play. Even if it's true our minds make decisions before our conscious awareness of them, the neuronal activity at the subconscious level is still the near past chasing the near present. The arrow of time for the real, physical time is the near past chasing the near present. — ucarr

There is no such thing as "physical spacetime". Spacetime is conceptual. And none of this makes any sense. Your reference to "near past", and "near present" are incoherent. What could you be referring to with this other than "future"? But that would mean that you are saying that all we ever experience is the future. But that's my proposal, that we experience the future as near to the past, and you want to be arguing against my proposal. So this argument makes no sense at all.

If the arrow of time has breadth, then it is an area and not a line. How does this change time's operations within the context of relativity, which shows us some of its operations in three dimensions? You also say time has thickness; that means the arrow of time has three dimensions. Does your arrow of time merge into relativity? — ucarr

Relativity theory is not applicable, being an incompatible theory as I explained last post.

Your desire to expand the present tense (of the timeline) positions you to explain how your reversal of the arrow of time doesn't also reverse the direction of entropy. — ucarr

The arrow of time is not reversed! It's simply a different model. I've told you this numerous times now, but you just don't get it. Switching from the geocentric to the heliocentric model of the solar system does not change the direction that the planets move, it models the very same movement in a different way. My model does not change the arrow of time, it models it in a different way.

So your criticism about entropy is misguided and irrelevant, as is the rest of your criticism in this post.

And...does that mean I can't trust anything science says? — Darkneos

First, science does not say anything, scientists speak.

And of course, anything claimed as "science" ought to be approached with a healthy skepticism just like when the guy on the other end of the phone calling you says "I'm from the Windows department of your computer, you have a problem in here". This is what Socrates demonstrated the need for critical thinking. Unless we have good reason to trust and respect the person making the statements, then we ought not trust what the statement says.

There's a bit at the end of the paper that shows that theories can override our memory and interpretations even if the data is strong. — Darkneos

The way that one's attitude affects what the person remembers, is very interesting. Even a healthy person has a sort of selective memory. And that's the best scenario. A person with mental illness tends to have a creative memory. The person with the creative memory will remember things in a way which would be judged as unreal. Then, there are all sorts of variations between these two extremes.

A lot of it has to do with how a person "attends" to things, how one's attention is focused. And this focusing of one's mind is greatly influenced by one's intentions. For example, if you are speaking to a very selfish person, the person will be "intent on" (meaning having one's attention focused on) strategizing ways to get what they want from you. This will influence the way that they hear what you say. If the selfishness is to the degree of mental illness, the memory will fabricate, according to the strategy one is intend on. When you approach that person later there will be much "you said this", and "you promised me that", which is inconsistent with what you remember.

In saying we can (correctly) model the world either way, you're basing your faith in the correctness of absolute time on New Age Physics? Since absolute time encompasses the entire world, then relative time, being incompatible, cannot coexist with it. So you must be proposing a multiverse containing two incompatible universes. Isn't such a multiverse a contradiction? Please click on the link below. — ucarr

As I said, I'm basing my faith in what I believe to be a self- evident truth, free will. I don't see how this relates to multiverses.

Please click on the link below.

New Age Physics — ucarr

This theory is actually very different from mine. There is a sort of starting premise which is similar to one of mine, what I said about the passing of time being a force, the future forces itself upon us. Here's the similar statement from the New Age Physics article:

One crucial component of my ‘Theory of Universal Absolutivity’, is that the flow of Time is the source of all kinetic energy because it enables all movement. This becomes very apparent when not ‘at rest’, i.e. when subject to a force other than just the forward progression of Time. Owing to the curvature of space created by the Earth’s mass, all human beings experience the ‘force’ of gravity, that being the Earth’s resistance to our continual forward momentum through space-time towards the centre of the Earth. We still progress through the universe at exactly the same speed of Absolute-Time – (there is no other option!) – but we are in resistance to this speed because we are not in an inertial frame of reference. So, for example, when we walk up stairs, or sharply change direction in a car, the additional pressure we experience is our increased resistance to vectors of Absolute-Time.

The big difference though, is that the New Age theory does not take the very important premise of free will. It is the premise of free will which makes the future to past flow of time evident, as we seek the means to avoid being swept into the past (the means to survival), by the force of the future becoming the past. The other thing which the New Age theory doesn't provide, which is necessitated by free will, is the multi-dimensional present.

The issue of free will is what makes time relevant to the op.

If you don't at all understand what I'm asking above, then this might be evidence you, no less than I, have a fundamental problem with the rolling out of your theory in the fullness of its detail. You, like I, appear to be struggling to achieve a clear and full comprehension of some possibly important ramifications of the details of your theory. Take another look at what you posted earlier: — ucarr

Yeah sure, I agree with this. As I said, time is a very difficult subject which no one has a good understanding of. And of course, that includes me.

I think a dimensionally extended present - it contains a future_present_past timeline - entails nesting a second temporal timeline within a larger structure that also has a future_present_past timeline. — ucarr

You are not understanding the breadth of time at all. Start with this. How long is the present? That depends on context. The present might be 2025, a full year, it might be this week, today, this hour, this second, etc.. This way of determining the length of the present is completely dependent on one's purpose, so we can say it's arbitrary. Another way, to simply stipulate that the present is a dimensionless point between past and future, is demonstrably unreal, as we've discussed.

So, I propose that there is a true, non-arbitrary breadth of the present. So, not only do we have an arrow of time, the flow of time, but that arrow is not one-dimensional, it has a second dimension, breadth, the arrow has thickness. This is necessary to avoid the falsity of "the point of the present", and the arbitrariness of a duration of "the present".

This larger structure is the temporal timeline: future_present_past, including in its present, the second, nested future_present_past timeline. This multi-tiered complexity implies physical relationships whose questions about which you don't understand at all. — ucarr

So this is irrelevant being based in that misunderstanding.

If the Planck time is the shortest possible time duration, then half of that duration doesn't exist, so it can't be an example of time independent of a material object changing its position in space. — ucarr

The Planck length is not the shortest possible time duration, nor did I say that it is. I said its the "shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world". Notice the difference. The limit here is imposed by the restrictions to empirical observation. However, it is not a logical restriction. A shorter time period is still logically possible. Just because we do not currently have the capacity to observe it, does not mean that we ought to rule it out as a logical possibility.

Do you speak to the deep interconnection of existing things, as in the context of the butterfly effect? — ucarr

No, I mean that if we have to conceive of the relation between space and time in such a way as to allow that some specific objects are recreated at each moment of passing time, it wouldn't make sense to also use another conception of that relation to represent the existence of other objects. We'd have two distinct and incompatible conceptions of the relations between space and time. Imagine if someone wanted to model the earth as orbiting the sun but have the other planets and stars modeled the geocentric way. It would not work.

You're committing your temporal theory to a uni-directional arrow of time featuring a future that progresses to the present, and then a present that progresses to the past? — ucarr

Not really. Time is unidirectional, future to past. This is an activity of the world, what we know as the future becoming the past, The day named as "tomorrow" becomes the day named as "yesterday" through this activity, this process of the future becoming the past. And, this activity is what is known as "the present". The real activity of this, in the assumed independent world, is what we termed "present-natural". However, "the present" also refers to how we represent this activity, for the sake of temporal measurement. That is "present-artificial". And these two constitute the two senses of "time", "time" as the thing measured being the former, and "time" as a measurement being the latter.

Does this process of continuous recreation entail an oscillation between construction/deconstruction of every existing thing? If so, why is the universe unstable in this way? — ucarr

There is no need for deconstruction. The existing things as constructed simply move into the past. Imagine a "flipbook", except each page is created at the moment of the present, instead of preexisting. The page then moves into the past. Remember what I described, the force of time is from future to past.

How are: a) Object A moves toward its future and b) the future moves toward Object A, its past decidable given that time moves in both directions, albeit in two different senses (one relative and one true)? — ucarr

As explained above. These two are incompatible. It's like the difference between relative time and absolute time, or geocentric/heliocentric. We can model the world either way, but we cannot use both because there will be incompatibility where the two overlap. So we cannot, in one inclusive model, represent object A in both ways.

Give me an example of a duration without math and without observation of a material object changing its position in space. — ucarr

Simply imagine what it means for time to pass, then imagine this happening without anything in the world changing. Here's another way. Imagine that there is a shortest period of time which provides for observation of the physical world, a Planck time duration. Now imagine half a Planck time. That is a duration of time during which an object changing its place in space is impossible.

If this is what is already taking place, then how is your theory adding anything to the world? — ucarr

The free will activity is taking place, that is what you acknowledge. An accurate temporal representation of it does not exist because our representations are determinist. That's the problem.

Suppose you could say “Through manipulation of the timeline of time, I can calculate when the human individual can access freedom of choice at its maximum." That would be an example of you adding something useful to the world. — ucarr

This is exactly the misconception that I am trying to avoid. You are saying, instead of representing time and space in a way which allows that free will is real, let's just assume that someone, some day, will provide a way to show that determinism is true, and free will is not real. This is simply denial of the self-evident truth, which I referred to earlier, the truth of free will.

If the present is dimensionally extended, and if two different things are both in this dimensionally extended present, with one of the things overlapping this present with the past, and the other thing simply being in the present, then: a) what is the physics of the thing simultaneously in the present and the past; b) how are these two things related to each other within the present? — ucarr

I don't understand this at all.

n your context here, is movement from the past into the future a reversal of movement from the future into the past? — ucarr

It's just a different representation of the very same thing, like geocentric/heliocentric. In this case it is the determinist representation as compared to the free willist representation. One can represent either way.
But the two are incompatible so we cannot have one model which uses both, one to represent some aspects of reality, and the other to represent other aspects of reality, because things which interact between the two will be unrepresentable.

If time can move backwards in the relative sense, and yet time stays unidirectional in the true sense, are you implying time in the relative sense is something other than true? — ucarr

What I described is not "time moving backward". That is impossible. What I described is a hypothetical "thing", which could not be a natural thing, moving from the past to the future (reverse direction of time) by crossing the relational spectrum of "the present of different types of objects", essentially by moving faster against the flow of time, than the speed of the flow of time.

You're saying free choice remakes the universe? — ucarr

No, I am saying that in order for human beings to be able to act freely to change the universe at will, at any passing moment, these parts of the universe must be made anew at each passing moment. It does not makes sense to think that only some specific parts of the universe are created anew at each passing moment, so we need to assume that the entire universe is.

Consider "X exists". As time passes, at each moment, X continues to exist. Consider now, that at any moment of the present, as time passes, a free will act could annihilate X. Since it is possible to annihilate X at any moment of the present, then X cannot have any necessary existence prior to the present, i.e. in the future. If, at any moment of passing time, the existence of X at the next moment is necessary, then the free will act could not act to annihilate X at that moment. So X's existence in the future is not necessary. And since the free will could act at any moment, then there can be no existence of X in the future at any moment of the present. Therefore we must conclude that X must be recreated at each moment of passing time.

dimensional extension does not demand a specific direction, — ucarr

A specific direction is demanded. As I explained making the future prior to the past does not involve reversing the flow of time, it just involves recognizing that the future is prior to the past. For example, Jan 5 is in the future before it is in the past. The flow of time has that portion of time named as Jan 5, in the future prior to it being in the past. This requires a sort of reifying of time, such that the day which we know as Jan 5 (that portion of time), can have a proper place "in time".

Are you interacting with a lot of readers who find your two above paragraphs to be a clear, thorough and easy to understand narration of your ontological theory? — ucarr

As far as I know you are the only one who read those paragraphs. And, I know from the fact that I have to repeat for you, that you have difficulty understanding me.

I claim that a good definition of time says it's a method of tracking motion by means of a numerical system of calculation and measurement. In other words, time is mathematics. — ucarr

What you are talking about is "time" as a measurement, mathematics. Aristotle, in his physics, thousands of years ago, explain how there is two distinct senses of "time". One sense is what you say here, "time" as measurement, but also there is a sense of "time" as what is measured. This is the distinction I made with present_artificial, and present_natural.

Consider for example, the existence of a clock. The clock is a device which is measuring the passing of time. So there is something real, independent from the mathematics, which the clock is measuring, the passing of time. This is "time" in the sense of what is measured, what we know as the passing of time, and this real passing of time is what grounds the so-called "arrow of time" as necessary.

On the other hand, we can also take the clock, and use it as you propose, to measure motion. This is a distinct sense of "time", because here "time" refers to principles for comparing motions using a conceptual structure. So if I time myself with a clock, and determine that it took me ten minutes to walk to the store, then what I am doing is comparing the temporal extension of that activity, to the temporal extension of whatever activity the clock is doing, calibrated by some principles, mathematics applied, and the conclusion, "ten minutes" is derived.

Notice, that in the second sense of "time", the one you describe, the real activity of time, the passing of time, is not even a required aspect for the measurement. It is implied that there is such a real passing of time, in the concept of "temporal extension", but it is not at all a required part of the measurement. The measurement is simply a product of comparing two different motions, through the application of principles.

Aside from slogging around in the verbiage you’ve been presenting, how are we to understand “discontinuity at the present, such that the world can ‘change’ at any moment of the present, according to a freely chosen act.”? Since this is what is already taking place, then how is your theory adding anything to the world? If, on the other hand, you could say “I can calculate when the human individual is present in the present at such time when the scope of freedom of choice is at maximum,” then, if true, your calculation would be adding something to the world. — ucarr

Sorry, I can't understand this.

Let's take the dictionary's word for that. And let's read that literally, as in, it is not open to interpretation. That being the case, if a qualification is literally a statement or assertion that makes another (statement or assertion) less absolute, then, by definition, it makes them (the statement or assertion in question) more relative. In general, to be less absolute is to be more relative, and to be less relative is to be more absolute. That, from a purely technical, formal standpoint. — Arcane Sandwich

Ucarr asked me if my temporal theory involves a unidirectional flow of time. I said yes, but since the present has dimensional breadth, the unidirectional aspect is somewhat qualified. The bread of the present allows that some types of objects move into the past prior to other types moving into the past, so that relatively speaking, if something were able to extend itself across the present (similar to acceleration in relativity theory), this thing could move from the past into the future, instead of the natural flow of time which has the future moving into the past. But this is a relative movement, which allows backward motion, across time, so time stays unidirectional in the true sense.

.

Here is a passage from Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity:

In De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle asserts that nous does not fall within the domain of physics. It does not lie within that domain, not because it lies outside it, in a different domain alongside that of physics. Rather, nous does not lie within the domain of physics because it cannot be included in any domain. For, just as the science of perception includes the object of perception, so the science of judgment – knowledge of the nature of judgment – is at the same time the science of the object of judgment – knowledge of the nature of the object of judgment. And the object of judgment is everything . . . Its object is illimitable.
— Rödl, p. 55

I know we have several Aristotelians on TPF. Could one of you tell me, first, whether this is an accurate account of what Aristotle argues, and second, whether it is a standard interpretation of Aristotle on this point? Many thanks. — J

I believe there is an important issue of translation/interpretation which needs to be dealt with here. This is a question of the way that we attribute "the powers of the soul", to the soul itself. In order to do this as a predication, we need to allow that "the soul" is an acceptable subject for predication. If we are inclined to deny the reality of "the soul" as an acceptable subject, then we simply move to avoid this predicament altogether by interpreting "the powers of the soul" as "the parts of the soul". The latter allows that "the soul" is simply the united living body, and "the parts" refers to a division of this body into separate organs or something like that. This latter interpretation allows for a materialist understanding.

From context, especially reference to "De Anima", we can see that Aristotle is proposing "the soul" as a proper subject for predication. "The soul" is proposed as an actuality in the sense of substantive form. And, that "form" itself, is substantive is supported by his "Metaphysics". This allows for the proposition "the soul is our subject of study".

However, we must respect the various ways in which propositions are presented. They are not necessarily offered as true, and what is very common with Aristotle is that he presents them as hypotheticals for the purpose of argumentation. So for example, he might be saying, "if it is true that the soul is a proper subject for study, what would be some of the logical conclusions we can derive from this premise". Then he judges those potential conclusions for acceptability, to determine whether or not "the soul is a proper subject for study" is a sound premise. I would say that this is the sort of interpretation we need to make of what is offered in the op. This is made more clear by the passage presented by

Personally, I never cared much for De Anima, but what makes it seem so odd to me, from a merely bibliographical standpoint, is that Aristotle's concept of the "active intellect" only appears once in the entire works of Aristotle, and it appears in one specific passage in De Anima. That's what most odd about that book, specifically. — Arcane Sandwich

I believe that the principle issue here is that prior to Aristotle it was understood that the human mind must be passive. This was assumed in order to allow that the mind receives the forms of objects. In perception and abstraction, it was assumed that the form of the material object was received by the mind. This represents the mind as passive in this event, and this is the common physicalist representation of today. The senses, and consequently the mind, are acted upon by the physical world, and the physical world is understood as causing an effect within the brain, or mind.

I believe Plato proposed an active component of the mind in (I think) "The Theaetetus". He described visual perception, seeing, as an activity extending outward from the eyes, meeting an activity coming from the object seen. You can see how this divides the active part of "seeing" into two distinct activities, the activity coming from the thing seen, and the activity originating in the mind. Aristotle furthers this distinction between the actuality of the physical world, and the actuality of the soul.

Post-Aristotelian thinkers had much difficulty, and consequently much discussion, as to how to properly locate both the passive and active parts of the intellect. If I understand correctly, the root of the difficulty was the problem of accounting for the reality of the passive intellect. Passivity, in Aristotelian principles is associated with matter, and allowing the intellect passivity is a move toward denying the immateriality of the intellect, and its assumed independent, eternal existence. So the difficulty was to allow for passivity, yet still allow for an eternal immaterial intellect. Aristotle's metaphysics denies that any potential could be eternal. This produced debate as to where the passive intellect is located, and depending on one's proposition for this, the active intellect would be assigned accordingly.

You need visual aides that will sharpen the clarity of what you're envisioning. — ucarr

I actually have produced some visual aids in the past, consisting of horizontal and vertical lines. These simple drawings are not difficult to produce. The difficult aspect is accepting the required premises. The reality of free will requires that some aspects of, or even the entire physical universe, must be created anew at every passing moment of time. This is very difficult to fathom, and most people prefer to just fall back on the determinist representation showing the continuity of a physical universe.

Your conceptualization of the present as dimensionally extended and bi-directional entails radical changes to establishment physics’ conventional view of time:

If the present has duration due to dimensional extension, then I ask if you’re nesting a tripartite past_present_future within the present? This is a big escalation of the complexity of the picture of time.

If the present is bi-directional,* then I ask if you’re nesting a tripartite past_present_future within the present that includes reversal of entropy. Since establishment physics’ conventional view of entropy is that it, like time, is unidirectional and only moves towards increasing disorder, then your “breadth of the present… would be a qualification to the unidirectionalness,” suggests your belief in a contrarian physics entailing a stupendous increase of complexity of the timeline of time. — ucarr

It is not the case that the time proposed is bi-directional. What I propose is that physical things come into existence (are recreated) at each moment of passing time. Once it is created at the present it cannot be changed, but until that moment it is not determined. The second dimension of the present allows that some types of objects move into the past (receive material existence) prior to others, at the present. This means that the present is multidimensional because some types of objects are already in the past (fixed), while other types are just beginning to materialize. Empirical evidence indicates that massive objects are created and move into the past first, that is why they have inertia, obey basic determinist laws, and it is more difficult for freely willed acts to change them. Massless things are created last, having their moment of the present later, and this provides free will the greater capacity to use them for change.

So consider the premise that anything, any state of being, which comes into existence at the present. must be predetermined (principle of sufficient reason) by something. Now imagine a number of parallel horizontal lines, as arrows of time, in the same direction, arrows pointing left. At the top of the page is the most massive type of object, and at the bottom is the least massive type. At the top line, the present is to the right, so that the entire line is in the past. At the bottom line, the present is to the left, so the entire line is in the future. "The present" refers to when each type of object gains its physical existence. Notice that at any moment, massive objects already have physical existence before massless objects do. This allows that a slight change to a massive object, through a freely will act, is capable of producing a large effect on massless objects. This effect we observe as our capacity to change things.

Your stupendously complexified timeline of time figures to be the centerpiece of your theory of time. If you persist in your claim the clarifying visualizations of math graphics is bad procedure for explicating the physics of time, I’ll start leaning heavily towards the conclusion you’re proceeding with a word-salad laden approach thoroughly benighted. — ucarr

Again, the key point is conceptualizing and contemplating time in such a way which allows for freedom of choice. This does not require mathematics, it requires accepting a discontinuity at the present, such that the world can "change" at any moment of the present, according to a freely chosen act. This implies that the physical world must be recreated at each moment of passing time. Once this principle is accepted, the dynamics of how this occurs (like the proposal above) can be discussed. Only when some of these basic principles can be ironed out, would diagrams and mathematics be useful.

Regarding your three paragraphs above, try to walk a mile in the shoes of one of your readers. You're describing a complex timeline nested within the present. The interweave of the three temporal phases (past, present, future) plus parallel lines featuring particles both massive and massless presents a very complicated concept. Visuals depicting the interactions of the parts is the right way to go.

Having to think your way through the visuals will usefully confront you with perplexities you're unlikely to see from the point of view of a verbal narrative. — ucarr

I have great respect for the "perplexities", and I've worked out a few, but I know there is far more left. If any mathematician, physicist, or cosmologist, will take the premises seriously, I would guide them through the application of their tools. However, any such effort would be pointless without agreement on fundamental premises, and this cannot be produced through mathematics or diagrams.

For Peirce, abstraction is dynamic, relational, and grounded in semiosis (the process of sign-making and interpretation). — Mapping the Medium

That sounds like nominalism to me. But I think it misses the point which separates Peirce from nominalism, making him closer to Platonist. For Peirce, the universal is an "object" and this name is supported by the assumption of "sameness", what you called "functional continuity across interpretations".

This assumed "continuity" of sameness, despite differences, is what allows the universal to be known as one object instead of many distinct conceptions in many distinct minds. This is analogous to the observed temporal continuity of the physical object which enables our assumption of "same", despite differences of change over time, instead of assuming a new object at each passing moment.

Notice that the title "object" is supported by an assumed continuity of existence, in both cases. The continuity of the physical object being supported by the assumed temporal continuity between distinct moments of existence, and the continuity of the universal being supported by the assumed coninuity produced from the use of signs.

The problem being that Peirce's semiosis, and proposed triadic structure cannot support this assumed continuity required for his determination of "sameness", and "object". By placing the object outside the relationship between interpretant and representamen, as your diagram neatly shows, as something distinct, (independent with its own continuity),having its own distinct relation between each of the other two, Peirce provides a misleading model. A true analysis of the relationship between the interpretation and the sign would reveal that the sign actually breaks any supposed continuity of the universal, between one interpretation and another.

So to make a true representation, which would support the supposed continuity of "the object", the category of "object" would have to include both interpretant and representamen as united in continuity, within "the object". This is what is commonly known as the transcendence of Platonic objects. The existence of the universal, as am object, transcends the existence of its composite parts, the sign and the interpretation of the sign. That the object transcends both, and is therefore of a distinct class produced by a unity of the other two, is a necessary condition for the the continuity of the object.

What Peirce does with the triadic semiotic structure, is remove the transcendence which supports the continuity of "the object", yet he still claims an object with continuity. This allows that the continuity of "the object" may be understood as a property of the interpretant, or it may be understood as a property of the representamen, in his proposal of ambiguity. So all we have is a nominalist sign-mind representation, with an assumed continuous "object" which may be assigned to the sign, or it may be assigned to the mind, depending on one's theoretical purpose.

This is why it is useful to refer to those who apply Peirce's triadic structure, to demonstrate the inconsistency in application, produced by that ambiguity. In "objective" science such as biosemiotics, it is evident that "the object " is a property of the representamen, yet in social applications of semiotics, it is clear that "the object" is understood as property of the interpretation. A true representation of a united interpretant/representamen, to support a continuous object, is not required, because "the object" may simply be assigned to one side or the other.

This is because Peirce takes a nominalist sign-mind model, and adds "an object" without any rigid principles of sameness or continuity. This allows those who apply the model to assign "object" where there is no support for an object. The defense of that assignment is that it is a "Platonic object", but Peirce has denied the ontological support for Platonic objects.

Peirce's approach stands out by addressing the limitations of nominalism (over-reliance on discrete categorization) and Platonism (over-reification of abstractions). — Mapping the Medium

This is exactly why Peirce' project fails. Asserting compatibility between incompatible ontologies is not a solution. Taking a nominalist structure of "discrete categorization", and imposing an assumption of continuity, without justification, just to make it more "Platonic", is not a solution to the discrete/continuous dilemma.

You're still in the hunt for an understanding of the present_natural not yet supplied by your theory. — ucarr

That's right. What we've termed "present_natural" is extremely difficult. I think the best understanding of any human being barely qualifies as a start to this subject.

It looks like a major goal of your theory is to promote freedom of choice over and above determinism. — ucarr

No, I take freedom of choice as a strong premise, being a self-evident truth, supported by empirical observation of the human condition. Argumentation in support of free will is pointless because anyone who denies what is self-evident will never be convinced by argument. The goal is true understanding.

It looks like another major goal of your theory is to develop a concept of the present that includes dimensional extensions of spacetime. — ucarr

The need for multi-dimensional time is a conclusion drawn from the two basic premises, the truth of free will, and the usefulness of the determinist principles of cause/effect.

"Spacetime" is not an appropriate concept for the quest for truth, because it makes space logically prior to time, instead of time being prior to space. In other words we can conceive of time without space, providing the potential for space, but space without time is absolute nothing, from which nothing can come. That's the point of Aristotle's cosmological argument, actuality (therefore time), is prior to material existence (therefore space). Many people dismiss this argument, but it's actually very strong. So the reason why time (therefore "the present") is so difficult, is because we haven't figured out what type of activity occurs without space.

I see clearly your need to develop your math literacy. It will facilitate the clarity and precision of the complicated details of your theory. It will empower you to provide diagrams, charts and tables that effectively communicate your ideas, analyses and conclusions. — ucarr

I firmly believe that good ontology is not done with mathematics, although some Platonists think it's nothing but mathematics.. In fact, I think that mathematics distracts from truth, and misleads, being designed and conventionalized for other purposes. Cosmological mathematics has been diverted to serve "spacetime" conceptions, so the majority is useless toward truth.

No. This is where the misconception lies. Perhaps you didn't read what I posted on the other thread. I will post it here for your review.

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Intrinsic Properties are characteristics that an object has in itself, independently of anything else. For example, the shape of an object is an intrinsic property.

Extrinsic Properties are characteristics that depend on an object's relationship with other things. For instance, being taller than another person is an extrinsic property.

Essential Properties are attributes that an object must have to be what it is. For example, being a mammal is an essential property of a human.

Accidental Properties are attributes that an object can have but are not essential to its identity. For example, having brown hair is an accidental property of a human. — Mapping the Medium

This just demonstrates Peirce's use of "object" is not only ambiguous, but equivocal as well.

By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. Nominalism argues that properties, types, or forms only exist as names or labels and does have the effect of concretizing abstract or relational properties. When we use labels to categorize and identify properties, we often treat them as more concrete than they might actually be. — Mapping the Medium

This makes no sense to me at all. I see no logical connection between a nominalist saying that the concrete existence of any specific property is nothing more than a label to be interpreted by a mind, and your conclusion that this "concretizes properties". Clearly, the only concrete thing here is the label, and it's obvious that the label is not the meaning. Also, it's clear that when we use a relational label, like "near" for example, we are not "concretizing" this property to say that it is part of the thing referred to as "near". Even with labels like "red", the nominalist respects that this is a word to be interpreted for meaning, conceptually, and it does not refer to a concrete part of a named object. That is just naive realism which you are criticizing, and that's worlds apart from nominalism.

In Platonism, 'Forms' are abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world. According to Plato, the physical world is just a shadow or imitation of this realm of Forms.

Unlike nominalism, which treats properties as mere labels, Platonism asserts that these properties have an essential, independent existence in the world of Forms, but the issues with concretized identity are the same as in nominalism. — Mapping the Medium

I can't follow what you're saying here. The law of identity "concretizes" identity by placing a thing's identity within the thing itself. This means that a thing's identity is not the whatness we assign to the thing by naming its type, nor is it a collection of properties which we define, or anything like that. it is not even the name we give to the thing, as a proper noun assigned to that particular thing only. The thing's identity is the thing itself.

Platonism, as you describe it here, does not run a foul of the law of identity. However, when these "abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world" are given identity as objects, then this is a problem. And that is what Peirce does with his conception of "sameness" which you describe as "functional continuity across interpretations". It is this "sameness" which allows a conception to have an identity as an object. But it's a qualified "sameness", relative only to the specified function. So that sort of "sameness" exists only within the domain of a specific purpose, and is not a true identity.

Platonism provides a framework where properties and identities have a deeper, more substantial existence beyond the physical realm, which SEEMS to contrast sharply with the nominalist view, butthe premise is based on the same historical development of nominalistic thought. This has its origins in religious theology. As I explained before, the view was that God can only be omnipotent if able to damn an individual sinner or save an individual saint. Discrete, individual forms/objects is the foundational idea behind both nominalism and Platonism. Continuity is disrupted in both of them. — Mapping the Medium

I agree with most of this, and that there is really very little difference between traditional Platonism and traditional nominalism. These two are just different ways of interpreting the relationship between the physical world, and the world of ideas. The big difference is that nominalism pays respect to the role of signs and symbols, as a necessary, and essential aspect of human concepts. This perspective denies the characterization of "abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world". Human abstractions and conceptions are understood to rely on physical signs and symbols, this makes it impossible for them to exist independently of the physical world.

This makes the described form of nominalism and the described form of Platonism incompatible. Now Peirce wanted to pay respect to the importance of signs and symbols, in the nominalist way, but he also wanted to hang on to the benefits of Platonism (as an easy ontology) at the same time. So he proposed that triadic system which allows for that separate, independent object, as an idea or concept, along with the signs of nominalism, all together. But what this does, as I've argued, is annihilate the distinction between a physical object and a concept. And that is not a good ontology.

..proposing a more flexible and relational understanding of "object"... — Mapping the Medium

I agree with this, but I prefer the term "ambiguous" over "flexible".

You are suggesting that Peirce’s approach violates the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle, but Peirce doesn’t see these laws as universally applicable to all aspects of reality. — Mapping the Medium

That's true, these laws are not universally applicable. That's exactly what I was arguing with RusselA earlier in the thread. In the case of a thinking subject, in the process of deliberation, and decision making in general, the person has the two opposing and contradictory ideas in one's mind, at the same time. As we discussed, having opposing ideas at the same time, "I should stay", I should go" violates the law of noncontradiction. This violation is because the person has as a property of one's mind, contradictory ideas.

However, these fundamental laws of logic are intended to dictate what we can and cannot say about physical objects. A physical object has an identity, as itself, and it does not have contradictory properties. Thinking subjects though, along with all of their thoughts and ideas, are not objects. and that is why they can violate those fundamental laws with their thoughts. The conceptions we produce do not need to follow the laws which apply to physical objects. This demonstrates a very clear difference between physical objects and ideas.

Peirce, with his "semiotic framework" attempts to annihilate this difference with his "flexible" understanding of "object". But this is a recipe for problems, because it removes the boundary, the principles of distinction, which separates the aspects of reality which obey those fundamental laws and those which do not.

Instead of the simple, and very useful division between the mind which interprets, and the thing which is interpreted (be it the physical world in general, an object, or a sign), Peirce posits the object as what is represented by the sign, as in my example, the numeral 2 represents the number two. This adds an unnecessary layer, and leaves the sign itself as a distinct category, outside our capacity to understand. The sign itself is impossible to understand, because understanding consists of knowing its object. This leaves signs themselves as inherently unintelligible, because a sign would have to be represented by another sign, and another sign, in an infinite regress.

The "sameness" in Peirce’s framework is not about static, metaphysical identity but rather about functional continuity across interpretations. — Mapping the Medium

Yes, well this is the problem. An "object", as a physical object, is "the same as itself" in every aspect, that's what makes it an object, it's uniqueness. But if we look at "functional continuity across interpretations" as what defines "sameness", relying on the concept of "differences which don't make a difference", and call this the defining feature of "the object", then we have no words left to describe the reality of physical objects in their uniqueness. "Object" now has been taken to be used in referring to this new type of object, which has a compromised form of sameness. And so we must also compromise the meaning of "same" so as to exclude the relevance of differences which don't make a difference. Then "same" just means similar. Clearly this is debilitating to ontology.

He views the "object" in the triadic relation as that to which the representamen refers, not necessarily something with a rigid ontological identity. — Mapping the Medium

This is exactly the ambiguity I am talking about. A representamen could refer to a physical object, as is common in day to day speaking, or it could refer to an idea, or concept, as is common in higher education. Traditionally we'd distinguish between these two, and assign identity to physical objects, and apply the basic laws of logic in speaking about these physical objects. The other type of referent we'd understand as an idea, a concept, a subject of study, or something like that. So we'd have a clear distinction between these two.

Now Peirce allows both of the two types of referent to be classed together as "object". But since the one type, ideas and concepts, don't have a proper identity, by the law of identity, yet he wants to give them some form of identity as the object referred to, he is inclined toward a compromised meaning of "same". This is a meaning of "same" which allows for differences, and it really means similar. But "similar" will not do the task required by Peirce, to support "the object", as one rather than many.

This is not really a problem in itself, to corrupt the use of "same" this way, but it robs us of the capacity to talk about, and understand the reality of what we know as physical objects, in their uniqueness, by stealing that word "same", and giving it a different meaning. Of course, if you're a staunch idealist like Peirce seems to be, you'll deny that there is any reality to the assumption of independent physical objects, but this denies the capacity for truth, as correspondence. And so it really just produces more problems.

Thanks for your patience ucarr, sticking with me, and your encouragement to help me through this process. I think you will find that this post will elucidate a lot, and thorough reading of it should give you a much better understanding of my perspective on this.

The main premise of the theory says: a) the truth resides within the present_natural; b) the present_natural supplies the true picture of reality to the observer. — ucarr

I'd clarify this by saying that an understanding of the present_natural would supply a true picture of reality, but we do not have that required understanding.

Question - Does the future_past continuum of this theory assert a unidirectional arrow of time from future to past? — ucarr

Since it is the case, as I described, that the present must be dimensional, then this dimension (which I call the breadth of the present) would be a qualification to the unidirectionalness.

Try looking at it this way. We understand "the flow of time" from our observations of motions. And, we observe motions as relative. The relativity of our perception of motion is the important feature of reality revealed when the heliocentric model of the solar system replaced the geocentric model. We now know, from the application of relativity theory, that "the flow of time" must also be understood as being perceived as relative, and this forces unintuitive conclusions about "the natural present", produced from our perceptions which make time relative. This is demonstrated by the principle called the relativity of simultaneity.

What I believe is demonstrated, is that if we model a single dimensional line, "an arrow of time", the present cannot be adequately positioned on that line, because the different types of objects moving relative to each other (massive vs massless), would require a different position on the line. We could simply make the area called "the present" wider, but the way that relativity theory deals with massless objects would require that the whole line would need to be "the present" at one boundary, and the other boundary would assumingly be a point. This allows for an infinitely wide present.

Clearly this is not an acceptable representation. So, if instead, we model a number of parallel lines, each representing a different type of object, from the most massive to the most massless, then each could have its own point of "the present" which would distinguish that type of objects future from its past. Then the multitude of lines, marking the flow of time for each different type of object, would be placed in relation to each other, revealing how "the past" for some types of objects is still the future for other types, in relation to the overall flow of time. This allows for the breadth of the present, the second dimension of time, where the past and the future actually overlap because of the multitude of different types of object in the vast field of reality, each having a specific "present" at a different time, making the general "present" wide..

This is a reversal of the conventional conception of the unidirectional arrow of time from present_theoretical to future. Moreover, the flow of time from future to past feels strange and counter-intuitive. In terms of human history, this reversal suggests human progress is going backwards from sophisticated to primitive. What would be reason for that? — ucarr

Modeling the flow of time as from future to past is actually much more intuitive than modeling it as past to future. The past to future model is a learned (acquired) way, derived from empirical observation, and the concept of "causation", which is entrenched by our scientific/deterministic world view. This is the model derived from the perspective of having the present as independent from (outside) of time. When we observe the passage of time from outside of time, at a point of "the present", we observe an order of the occurrence of events. One event is seen as prior to another, meaning it goes into the past first. This inclines us to position furthest past events as first (prior) and later events as posterior.

In reality, I believe, we must actually learn to suppress our truly intuitive way of looking at time, to construct that perspective which puts the observer outside of time. This is done at a very young age with the learning of moral principles, and even earlier, derived from the act/reward process. Certain types of acts result in rewards or punishments, and this is conducive to us learning the cause/effect, determinist flow of time.

But that type of moral training suppresses our true perspective, which is a more selfish perspective, placing priority on future events, what is wanted, desired. This more natural perspective assigns priority to intentions, representing the individual as a person active in the world, attempting to do things, and get what one wants. We really have very little, if any "representation" of this, because it is inherently not a representation. it is an understanding of one's own actual role in the world, as agent.

Now, when the person understands oneself to be an actual individual within the world, the eternal present, outside of time, is gone. The person is inundated with duties, responsibilities, obligations, and simple needs, things which must be done. The future then, is a source of stress and anxiety, and the passing of time is a force of immense pressure on the person, so that the individual is inclined by instinct to rush around like a squirrel collecting nuts before winter sets in.

So from this perspective, the flow of time is an oppressive future, attempting to force all that is at the present, into the past. For us this is death, and for inanimate objects, this is their breakdown and annihilation. This is why it is ultimately more intuitive to place the future as prior to the past. The coming event, the anticipated, predicted, "future event", is in the future before it is in the past. And, there is a critical condition which must be fulfilled before it can even get into the past, it must actually occur, therefore we have anxiety and stress. So the event is in the future first, as potential. The critical condition of occurrence (with its lack of necessity, which forms the concept of "contingency") is second, the present, and the event being in the past is third, posterior to the occurrence, which is posterior to the potential..

Notice that the difference may be exemplified by the way that we understand freedom of choice. The determinist way places priority in the past, making all future events caused by the past. The free choice way recognizes a lack of necessity in the occurrence of events at the present, and this invalidates the determinist model. That produces the need for a model which includes as real, the contingency of being. This model needs to include the freely willed choice, and that puts priority in the future, because the choice is the will toward a future state.

Question - If what is perceived is in the past at the time of its perception, then there's only perception of the past. So there's only perception of the past (as if the present) in MU's description of present_natural. — ucarr

Well yes, this has to be a key point, which comes from our modern understanding of light, electrical energy, and the nervous system in general. There is always a medium between the thing perceived, and the mind which perceives. You see an object a metre away, a hundred metres away, whatever, you do not see the light in between which acts as the medium. The required activity of this medium ensures that the thing seen is in the past by the time it's seen. And the same thing occurs within the nervous system itself, with the sense of touch for instance, there is a time delay, reflex time.

Question - Is there not a difference between the actual future and the anticipation of the future, a mere speculation about what the future might be? If so, then we see the present is just whatever is happening presently, including speculations about the future. So, again, there's only perception of the past (as if the present) in MU's description of present_natural. — ucarr

Talking about "the future" is when words fail us. This is due to the representative nature of the most common words. We watch, and talk about what we have experienced, and when we turn around to face the future, we get absorbed into our own minds, where our own goals and intentions take priority. Since we are always looking out for ourselves, we must fend against deception when talking about the future. So, we learn the moral principles of cause/effect, described above, and this allows us to talk about the future objectively, in the sense of predictions which are grounded in good scientific principles. However, this suppresses the individual's true view toward the future, the subjective perspective, and replaces it with the false determinist perspective. This false perspective being the one imposed by educational institutions facilitates talk about the future, but in an untrue way.

So, I think it is important to note, that "the true future" is the anticipation of the future. This is the truest view of the future that we have, just like observation and memory is the truest view of the past. The other view, where we use determinist principles of causation, to project in "objective predictions" is not a true view. It's not true because it produces a view of the future which does not respect the contingency of the present, by making the cause/effect relation necessary.

The failing of words inclines us to say things like "the actual future". Because activity occurs at the present, and anticipated events of the future have not yet reached the present, they cannot be "actual" in thi sense. "Actual" here means having activity. But there is another sense of "actual" and the difference between the two was well described by Aristotle in his Metaphysics. The second sense of "actual" means real, substantial, "having actual existence" rather than imaginary or theoretical. This sense applies only to the past. What has actually occurred at the present, is now in the past, and this is real, substantial. Future events are not substantial in that way, and have no actual existence in that sense. However, under the determinist principles of cause/effect, and objective prediction, we may extend this form of "actuality" to talk about "the actual future", to say things like "the sun actually will rise tomorrow". But this way of using "actual", to refer to things which are essentially possible, having not yet crossed the boundary of contingency, the present, is really very misleading. The determinist perspective then denies the real (substantial) difference between past and future, by referring to both with "actual"..

The two above questions point to the possibility MU's language, in both instances, circles back around to a theoretical point both dimensionless and timeless as the representation of the present. — ucarr

The theoretical "present" has some truth in its representation, as a divisor between future and past. It's principal fault is the "dimensionless point" representation, which facilitates the illusion of accurate temporal measurements. That it puts the separation between future and past outside of time, causing the interaction problem of idealism, is evidence that it is faulty. So we do not need to throw away the entire conception of "present", just what is required to bring consistency between the theoretical present and the natural present.

MU's conception of the correct representation of present_natural entails a confluence of past/present/future into one unified whole. As an example, consider: the combination of red, green and blue to form gray. — ucarr

Not quite. It's not a unified whole in the sense of your example, where the distinct colours combine to make one colour. That is more like what some people think now, future, present, and past are commonly combined and presented as a unified whole, "time". But this always involves inconsistencies. So the need is somewhat opposite, to see the distinct elements, future, and past, as completely distinct, because the present exists between these two, inserting contingency. The determinist way is to ignore contingency, represent a unified past and future, and dismissed the "the present" as unreal eternalist ideal, which is problematic. But this provides no base for understanding of the natural present, and what we call the passing of time.

So instead of "unified whole", it is an attempt to establish compatibility, consistency, commensurability between distinct features which appear to be incompatible. That is, if we deny the determinist unification because of the faults that it shows, as not a true representation, we need to come up with something else. The principles which invalidate the determinist representation, essentially the contingency factor, leave the past and future as completely distinct, with a mere appearance of incompatibility. That produces a very difficult problem.

I contemplate with horror a temporal complex of undecidability, e.g. an inhabitant of such a realm could not know where s/he was in time. — ucarr

The "undecidability" you refer to is due to the breadth of time, and the fact that we do not know our position on that spectrum. This is because our understanding of concepts like mass and energy is very primitive. It's comparable to the geocentric model of astronomy. We didn't know where we were in space. Now "the universe" is a temporal concept, having been detached from the idea of an eternal background, and we use it to provide us with a position in time, X number of years past the big bang. But in reality, we really don't know where we are in time because we do not apprehend the breadth of the present, so our way of relating small objects to huge masses like galaxies, is very faulty. .

Again, Secondness is not an object, as in your interpretation. — Mapping the Medium

As I said, "object" is left ambiguous by Peirce. I haven't offered any interpretation of "object" due to this problem. And you are wrong to say that secondness is not the object.

My point is to notice that he says "called' its object. He is not calling it "object", he is referring to what is commonly "called" 'object'. — Mapping the Medium

Mapping the Medium, face the reality, he is explicitly saying that it is what is commonly called "object". And he uses that term to say that it's called "its object". Why argue this. it's essential to understanding the triadic relation he proposes? Secondness is what we commonly call "object",

Now the problem is that there is ambiguity as.to what is commonly called "object". There is a physical object, and there is an object of the mind which is better known as an idea. Peirce intentionally exploits this ambiguity, because he seems to think that this will somehow solve some ontological problems.

It does not, and that is because physical "objects" have an identity according to the law of identity. Mental objects (ideas) cannot be assigned identity. So when you say "the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant", it could only be "the same object" if it was a physical object. Only physical objects have this "sameness" assignment by the law of identity. But Peirce wants this principle to apply to mental objects (ideas) as well, and this forces him to make exceptions to the law of noncontradiction, and the law of excluded middle, to account for the reality of these supposed mental objects, which are not really objects with identity, at all.

You're really touchy aren't you? It's as if you are actually afraid of being infected by the dreaded "nominalism thought virus".

I also want to mention here that it is absolutely necessary to study Peirce and not "those who have followed him". It is a severe problem in the arena of Peirce studies that there are all sorts of 'gleanings' of snippets of his work to support ideas that would cause him to jump out of his grave and beat someone over the head. — Mapping the Medium

Let me remind you, that when I engaged you above, I discussed explicitly the quote you brought from Peirce himself, and I addressed directly what I believed to be "The fault in the quoted passage". That fault is labeled as "taking the object for granted".

You told me, "Please take Peirce as a whole" as your way of avoiding my criticism of that passage. So when I then turned to what others say about Peirce, as a whole, you criticized me for using secondary sources.

How can I take your essays as anything other than secondary sources? And it appears like you will not discuss the problems with Peirce's philosophy with anyone other than someone who has read all of his material, and is able to take him as a whole, without referring to secondary sources. At this point you would probably just dismiss the person anyway, as having an incorrect interpretation, because you seem to think that Peirce has solved all the ontological problems of the world.

Here's a link to some notes I wrote some time back. .... Phenomenology or Phaneroscopy? — Mapping the Medium

So, I read the notes you linked to, and I'll show you how "the problem" I referred to above is revealed in that writing.

First, Peirce's term "Phaneron" characterizes a consciousness as an object instead of as an activity. It is the sum total of one's thoughts at any particular moment in time, rather than characterizing a consciousness as actively changing thoughts, all the time. So he uses that proper name "Phaneron" to name that object. So he starts from a mistaken assumption, a premise that the entirety of a consciousness can be taken as "an object". That's expressed here:

I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total content of anyone consciousness (for anyone is substantially any other,) the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive value.

Then, in the quote from Merleau-Ponty we can see the difference between this perspective, Peirce's which takes the object for granted, and the phenomenological perspective. Here:

Attention, then, is neither an association of ideas nor the return to itself of a thought that is already the master of its objects; rather, attention is the active constitution of a new object that develops and thematizes what was until then only offered as an indeterminate horizon.

Notice the difference. What is given is an "indeterminate horizon", and from this an "object" is constructed.

The problem which develops from Peirce's "taking the object for granted" is demonstrated later in your writing about "secondness", what is described as "bumping up against hard fact". Here we find the root of the problem, what I called Peirce's category mistake. Secondness is described as the physical constraints of the material world, such as walls and doors, yet it is also describe as "hard fact", and this refers to a description of the physical constraints, "fact" is corresponding truth about the physical world. So secondness, as the assumed "object", has dual existence which crosses a boundary of separation between the traditional categories of material and ideal. The "object" may be the physical constraint which we actually bump into, or it may be the supposed "hard fact" concerning that constraint.

The problem ought to be very evident to you now, as the ambiguous nature of "object". An "object" can be an aspect of the physical world, or it could also be an idea in a mind. "Secondness" is an attempt to make it a sort of medium between the two, but as I argue, that medium is fictitious, imaginary, created as a part of the interpretant.

Referring to the quote from Merleau-Ponty, we can see that "the object" is really a creation of the mind. Now Peirce, in his desire to take the object for granted, when it really cannot be taken for granted, because it is created within the mind, introduces ambiguity with his concept of "secondness", which allows "the object" to be conceptualized as either a mental object or a material object. It really cannot be conceived as something distinct and independent from the two, as a third category, like Peirce desires with the proposal of "secondness", because Peirce has not properly provided that category which is required to serve as that medium which he desires. He's really only provided ambiguity in "object" which allows "object" to be conceived of (constructed) as on one side or the other, of the two traditional categories, depending on one's purpose.

Nominalism is deeply ingrained in Western culture (and the now-global-world in general), and it is very difficult for most to step outside of it and look at its history and influence when they are so influenced by it themselves due to 'thought as a system'. ... We are within what we are trying to examine. Nominalism tends to evoke the idea that the examination is objective. It is a case of recursive smoke and mirrors.

Again, I have written about this extensively. I don't want to spend a lot of time on it in threads here. It's just not a productive use of the forum. — Mapping the Medium

As much as you think that nominalism holds sway in the western world, I find that it has been supplanted by Platonic realism, in the last few hundred years as the ontological support for materialism, "matter" being nothing but a concept. Not only that, but all forms of realism are grounded in Platonic realism. Realism is generally the default perspective, but since it requires no philosophy, many realists refuse to admit to the Platonic premises required to support their metaphysical perspective.

Since realism is what gives importance to the idea of "objects", while "object", as a concept loses importance in nominalism, it is really Platonic realism which evokes the idea that any examination is "objective". In nominalism, interpretation by the subject, is what is important, so it is inherently a subjective perspective. If nominalists claim objectivity, then they are hypocritical or self-contradicting.

I also want to mention here that it is absolutely necessary to study Peirce and not "those who have followed him". It is a severe problem in the arena of Peirce studies that there are all sorts of 'gleanings' of snippets of his work to support ideas that would cause him to jump out of his grave and beat someone over the head. — Mapping the Medium

I've read enough Peirce to see the problems I point to. As I said, I have a lot of respect for him, being very intelligent and keenly able to expose ontological problems. The issue though, is that he proposed solutions when he ought not have, because the solutions just aren't there. So his proposals aren't solutions at all, they simply mislead. In other words, his analysis is good, his synthesis is not. His proposed solutions only blur the subject/object distinction so as to veil the category mistake which the supposed solution is built on.

I can either point you to my essays or post the very long essays in entirety here. Which would you prefer? — Mapping the Medium

OK, post some links, quote some relevant passages, or just express some of what you think, whatever. Thank you.

If this is a mis-reading of your theory, then I'm still fundamentally unclear about the structure and logic of the continuum of past_present_future within your theoretical context. — ucarr

What I keep saying, is that there is no such past_present_future continuum. The continuum would be future-past, and the present is distinct, outside time. This is the discrete/continuous incompatibility. If there actually is a present within the continuum, it would break the continuum into discrete sections, annihilating the continuum.

I'm now inclined to think your theory can be rendered with greater clarity through mathematical language. For example, by interposing a timeless present between a temporal past and future, it makes sense to think of a timeless present as a theoretical point of zero dimensions. — ucarr

This rendering sort of works, so long as you adhere to the point you made, that this is a "theoretical present". In this particular model, there is no "natural present". This "present", the zero dimension point of the model, is artificial, a theoretical point and the "interposing" you refer to must be understood as a theoretical act of inserting the the theoretical point into the future-past continuum in various places, for the purpose of temporal measurements, discrete temporal units.

However, we must still respect the reality of "the present", the true, "natural present" which serves as the perspective of the living subject. This natural present is what the human subject has tried to represent with the artificial, conceptual "zero dimension point" which serves as the means for measurement. The natural present is much more difficult to understand.

There's some difficulty of communication of your theory because verbal language, being about actions and actors and thus being rooted in animation, does a poor job of representing non-temporal phenomena, which are, by definition, devoid of animation. — ucarr

Now we approach the key point. The "theoretical present", in its traditional form, as a zero dimension point served us well for hundreds, even thousands of years, in its service of measuring temporal duration. However, though it is useful, it is not acceptable as an accurate representation of the "natural present". The "natural present" is the perspective of the human mind, the human being, in relation to the future-past continuum. This is the natural perspective, how we actually exist, observe and act, at the present in time, rather than the model which makes the present a point in time.

The traditional representation of the theoretical present puts the human soul as "outside of time", as discussed, and this, as you say, renders it "by definition, devoid of animation". This is a representation of the classical "interaction problem" of dualism. The properties of the immaterial soul, ideas etc., being eternal, and outside of time (because they exist at the zero dimension present), have not the capacity to interact with the future-past continuum.

What this indicates is that the conceptualization of time employed, with a zero dimension point that can be inserted as the present, for the purpose of measurement, is faulty. It's not a true representation of the "natural present". To understand the natura present, we need to review the human perspective. What I glean from such a review, is that the natural present consists of both, the past, as sensory perception (what is perceived is in the past by the time it is perceived), and the future, as what is anticipated. Therefore to provide a true modal of time we need an overlap of past and future at the present, instead of a zero dimension point which separates the two.

This implies that future-past is improperly modeled, if modeled as a continuum. We need overlap of future and past, at the present, to allow for the real interaction of the living subject. This implies a dimensional present.

Can you tell me what written work of his you are referring to? — Mapping the Medium

That "unnecessary" layer is my interpretation. As I explained, it can be understood with reference to mathematical Platonism. We understand "the number two" as the object between the numeral "2", and the interpretation performed by a person's mind. I believe this "object" is superfluous, a completely unnecessary layer added into the interpretation for various reasons within mathematical theory. In other words, it's simply part of the interpretation, serving a specific purpose, rather than a separate layer.

As for Peirce's 'representamen' and triadic model, we need to recognize that he is pointing to what the sign means to the interpreter. ... It does take on a different identity than just considering what some might refer to as a specific ideal form.

For instance, here is an image that can mean different things to different cultures. ...



The 'object' is exactly the same, but the 'representamen' has a different identity. — Mapping the Medium

This issue is, why do you, and Peirce assume "an object", which is "exactly the same"? I apprehend a sign, and I interpret the sign. The sign is interpreted by me, in a way which may be different from others. For what purpose is "an object" posited? The only answer I can find for this question, is that it provides a grounding for the claim that there is a right, or correct, interpretation.

The problems with Peirce's triadic model become evident in the work of those who have followed him, and actually employ it. The issue is 'the rules for interpretation', as indicated by Wittgenstein. The rules must comprise 'the object', in order that "the object' supports a correct interpretation. In other words, the supposed 'object' is nothing but the rules for interpretation. With Peirce's model, the rules for interpretation cannot be within the mind of the interpreter because the differences between various minds would not support the premise that "the 'object' is exactly the same". And since there is nothing between the sign and the mind which interprets, to support the independent reality of those rules, the rules must be within the sign itself. This is evident in biosemiotics.

Placing the rules for interpretation within the sign itself is very problematic because these rules would need to be interpreted. The interpretations of the rules by various minds would differ, and nothing would support the premise that "the 'object' is exactly the same", unless the sign itself, and the rules for interpretation are one and the same, as 'the object'. But then there is just the interpreter and the sign, while 'the object' is superfluous, and there is no intermediate layer.

Furthermore, placing the rules for interpretation as within the sign itself is very problematic because then it is not the mind which is doing the interpretation, having no rules for that, but the sign must be interpreting itself, and this ends up leaving the interpreting mind itself as superfluous, unnecessary. And this is exactly how biosemiotics has been mislead. The sign becomes self-interpreting and the requirement of an agent which interprets is lost, as the sign is both passively interpreted, and actively interpreting.

This all indicates that the triadic model has as a premise, an unnecessary third aspect. The superfluous aspect 'the object' may be placed as desired, depending on the application. In mathematical Platonism 'the object' is associated with the mind of the interpreter, as an independent idea grasped by that mind. In biosemiotics, 'the object' is associated with the sign, as the rules for interpretation inhering with the sign itself.

Phenomenology is definitely not my cup of tea, due to it being historically influenced by nominalism that was nurtured in the arms of religious theology. — Mapping the Medium

You seem to have a strong prejudice against nominalism. Why?

There is a science of perception. — Janus

The science of perception, like every other science suffers the same problem. Why would you think that it would be exempt? Suggesting that it would be exempt only demonstrates a denial of the problem, which is a display of the attitudinal illness I referred to.

My question was as to how including considerations of the subject (however that might be conceived) would improve the methods and results in sciences such as chemistry, geology, ecology or biology. — Janus

Respecting the reality of the subjective input in science greatly improves one's understanding of the results, through an enhanced ability to recognize where deficiencies lie. This provides the scientist, philosopher, or anyone reviewing any scientific results, with an approach which is known as "critical thinking".

Accordingly, the scientist might also look for ways of minimizing the subjective input, or even devising ways of exposing it as much as possible, to be studied by philosophers. This is in stark contrast to the attempt to hide the subjective influence which results from the aforementioned attitudinal illness.

↪180 Proof :100: As I have pointed out several times science performs a methodological epoché in the opposite direction to the epoché of phenomenology. But this falls on deaf ears. I have repeatedly asked Wayfarer to explain how the idea of the subjective would be helpful in the pursuit of any of the hard sciences. He does not even attempt to answer, but rather just ignores the question. — Janus

I can give you a very clear answer to this question by way of the tinted glass analogy. When looking at the world through a tinted glass, it is necessary to determine what the tinting of the glass "adds" to the observation, in order to derive a "true" interpretation of the observation.

Since the method applied by the hard sciences, as "the scientific method" is carried out by human subjects, it is necessary to understand what the subject "adds" to the scientific method, as the subjective aspect of science, in the very same way that it is necessary to understand what the tinting of the glass "adds" to the observation.

When the existence of the subjective element is known about, and respected as a true feature, and a deficiency of the scientific method, we naturally account for the reality of this "blind spot", and there is no great problem, just a healthy scientific skepticism and a respect for the fallibility of science. But when the reality of the blind spot is denied, and the relevant deficiencies of the scientific method are ignored, that is an attitudinal illness which is a problem.

I have a lot of respect for Charles Peirce, but from what I've read, he misses the mark with his ontology of "the object". This might be due to a desire to disprove nominalism, but he allows unintelligibility to be an essential aspect of "the object" and this leads to the acceptance of vagueness as an ontological principle.

He posits an unnecessary separation between sign and object. For example, the sign is the numeral 2, and the object is the number two. There is no need for "the number two", as the numeral might serve as both the sign and the object. This unnecessary separation produces an unnecessary layer between the sign and the interpretation of the sign, the unnecessary layer being "the object".

That produces an inaccessible, unknowable, relation between sign and object. Therefore both the object and the sign, lose their otherwise assumed to be necessary identity, as identity being the same as the thing itself, by the law of identity. Neither the sign has a necessary identity, nor does the object have a necessary identity, as there is merely an undefined relation between these two. The result is that the object is no longer restricted by the law of identity, because of the assumed relation between the object and the sign which is not a relation of identity, i.e. the sign is other than the object. So if the sign, and the object are both present to the mind, these two are distinct, not the same, and there can be no necessary relation between the two, unlike when the sign and the object are one and the same by an identity relation.

I believe that phenomenology, especially as developed by Derrida, provides a better ontology of objects by allowing that the sign is the object.

I'm trying to picture what it means for temporal experience to be distinct from a world timeless. If the present is outside of time, how can observations, which take time to be made, be carried out from its perspective? — ucarr

Imagine standing still, and watching something pass you from right to left. You, in your perspective, or point of view, are "outside" that motion, being not a part of it. You can, however, choose to act with your body, and interfere with that motion. Or, you can simply observe.

This is what I mean about your point of view at "the present". You can watch from that perspective, as the entire world around you, passes you, proceeding from future to past, while you maintain your perspective at the present. You might choose to move your body, and interfere in that temporal world, or you might just choose to observe the temporal world as it go past. The meditative position is to do neither, observe nor interfere.

Since neither past nor future can approach the present, how does past become present, and how does present become future? It seems common sense to think the past and the future somehow connect with the present. Is this not the case? — ucarr

As I said, "present" is distinct as referring to that position from which the passage of time may be observed and interfered with. The only connection is through observation and interference. These two, observation and interference, are intertwined in experimentation, and this forms the base of "the connection". That is how the past and future "connect with the present". The meditative position, mentioned above disconnects the present, so that the future simply becomes the past, all around the meditating subject, and the subject has removed the connection by neither observing nor interfering.

Do I exist in the past_present_future, abstract concepts, outside of time? If past_present_future all exist as abstract concepts, where does my physical life occur? — ucarr

Your "physical life" remains the unknown. All that is known, is known through the means of abstract ideas.

You're saying we observe and act with free will within a timeless realm called "the present?" — ucarr

Yes.

You're saying that when I act with free will, I'm doing things outside of time, but somehow my actions crossover from the outside of time to the inside of time? — ucarr

Yes.

Explain "...outside of time (to the inside)." — ucarr

I thought I did explain this. Time is the world of change, which we experience as external to our mind or consciousness. The immaterial, nonchanging perspective of the mind, as "the present" is deep within us, as internal. This perspective, being the nonchanging "present", is outside of time (timeless). But since this timeless perspective is internal, and time is external, then it is "outside time to the inside".

Consider the existence of a physical object for an explanatory analogy. We may posit an external boundary to that object, and this serves us as a means of judging that object's activities relative to other objects, it's relative motion. We might model the object as a bounded area of space, or we might model it as a center of gravity, a point, but no matter which way, its external relations determine its changing position, and this provides for what we know as its temporal existence, its position relative to other things. Now the present, as I described, is derived from our experience of an internal principle. The internal principle provides the perspective of "the present" which is demonstrated as necessarily outside of time, but to the inside of the subject. So this produces the need for an internal boundary to separate the temporal (external) from the nontemporal internal. If the material body is modeled as a point which marks the center of gravity, then the boundary which provides for the non-temporal must be internal to the point.

By what means is a point of separation established and maintained? — ucarr

This separation, as any theory, may be established and maintained, through expression of the principle, and validation through experimentation. In other words, the principle "there must be no time within the point of separation between past and future, in order for temporal measurement to be accurate", is expressed as a principle (theory), and then it may be verified by experimentation. The success of relativity theory helps to verify that principle.

Since the immaterial aspect is non-dimensional, how do you go about ascertaining its position "deep within us"? — ucarr

This is verified by experience. But it doesn't really matter if it is inside or outside, as we could turn the whole thing around, and argue that everything we experience as external is really internal. Then, what we experience as internal, our perspective of "the present", is really external, flipping the whole thing around. This turn around assumes s true, the skeptic\s claim that the external world is entirely an illusion. It is all internal. Everything, the entire physical world, is within, and there is nothing outside us whatsoever, as we ourselves form the outside boundary, as the static, unchanging "present". Then all physical existence is internal to us, and also inside time, while the immaterial, that which is outside time, is properly external to this. Therefore the skeptic's claim that the external is an illusion might actually provide a better representation of reality, as it allows for what is outside time, to be properly external.

Does our free will and intellection connect to our brain? Are you talking about our everyday thoughts and decisions? — ucarr

The free will and intellection, being immaterial aspects of the immaterial "soul' (for lack of a better word), which has the timeless perspective of "the present", are connected to "the brain", as a temporal, physical aspect. This way of connection is described above. There are two aspects of the connection, observational, and active. The meditative mode moves to disconnect both.

The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject every belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort. The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. — Mapping the Medium

I think we need to distinguish between doubting the means, and doubting the end. Notice that this passage takes the ends (desires) for granted, so that the doubt being talked about is doubt of the means.

"It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires;...".

When the belief 'satisfies our desire', as the means to the end, then we are not inspired to doubt the means because the result, end, is insured as that satisfaction. So long as the desire itself, the end, is never doubted, and the means are observed to be successful, then doubt is only relative to the efficiency of the means. Now means are empirically justifiable, as we demonstrate that action A produces the desired end Z. Then various ways of producing Z can be compared, A, B, C, analyzed, and the resulting "settlement", which method best produces Z, can obtain to a level higher than mere opinion.

However, such justified settlements rely on taking the end for granted. It is only relative to the assumption that the end Z is what is truly desired, that the means are in this way justified. Doubting the end itself puts us squarely into the field of opinion, unless the end itself can be justified as the means to a further end. In traditional moral philosophy there is a distinction made between the real good, and the apparent good. The apparent good is nothing but personal opinion, but the real good is assumed to somehow transcend personal opinion.

The fault in the quoted passage is the following:

" And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort."

This statement inverts the real, or true, relation between the being with knowledge and the object of that being, which is its goal or end. Knowledge, as justified opinion, explained above, is always justified as the means to the end. But the end which justifies the knowledge is simply assumed as an opinion, and this places "our object", which is the goal that motivates us, as outside of knowledge itself, as unjustified opinion. This is what Plato demonstrated in "The Republic", "the good" must be apprehended as outside of knowledge.

So the statement incorrectly asserts that the motivating object, the end, or the good, cannot be outside "the sphere of our knowledge". A proper analysis indicates that only the means to the end can be justified as knowledge, while the object itself, the end or good, must be apprehended as outside the sphere of knowledge. Therefore moral traditionalists characterize the apparent good as opinion, and the real good as understood only by God. This places "our object" as firmly outside "the sphere of our knowledge".

Making this switch produces a completely different understanding and conceptualization of the division between active and passive elements of reality, outlined by Aristotle. Notice in the quoted statement, that the mind must be "affected" by its object, to be motivated by it. This characterizes the end, or object, as active, and affecting the mind. But when the end, or object is understood as opinion, then it is necessary to assume something within the mind which is other than knowledge. Opinion is not knowledge. Being created within the mind, by the mind, opinion is the effect of the mind, and improperly represented as affecting the mind, with "the motive for mental effort".

This reversal is what allows us to doubt the object, or end. Being created by the mind, it is within the mind, and therefore can motivate, but being unjustified leaves it outside of knowledge. Therefore it ought to be doubted. In other words, the mind creates its object, goal, end, or good, and this created object "acts" as the source of motivation for knowledge, and the means, as human actions in general. When we take the object, goal, end, or good, for granted, we represent this as the object affecting the mind to produce knowledge in the form of means. And this is what is expressed in the passage. But to properly understand, we need to doubt that which is taken for granted in this representation, the object, goal, end, or good. Therefore we ought to doubt, that which is taken for granted in this passage, the object, goal, end, or good. And this exercises the mind's true capacity to actively create the object, rather than simply allowing the object to affect the mind, by taking the obect for granted.

And when we get beyond this assumption, of taking the object for granted, we learn that the mind actually creates its own object, goal, end, or good, in a field which is other than knowledge, the field of opinion. Then the "motive for mental effort" is not something which affects the mind, but something created by the mind, and this places that object firmly within the mind, but outside of knowledge. And of course this validates, the self-evident truth that the motive for mental effort, the existence of the unknown, is outside the sphere of knowledge.

If Determinism is the case, a person has no choice in what they choose. — RussellA

OK, I'll accept this as what you are trying to say then. By "determinism" you mean that a person chooses but they have no choice in what they choose, i.e. something is chosen without a choice having been made.

And I'll present this as very good evidence of what I said before:

"This is why any rational person will reject determinism."

— various sources including Wikipedia — Wayfarer

"Various sources"? What does that mean, that it's an AI generated piece of crap, compiled from cherry picking sites most often visited? Isn't that just internet mob mentality?

If Determinism is the case, their choice had been determined, not by themselves, not by someone else, but by the physical temporal nature of the Universe. A Universe of fundamental particles and forces existing in space and time over which no person has control. — RussellA

As we discussed, and you agreed, choice is impossible if determinism is true. Simply put, "choice" is not an appropriate word in this context, otherwise we'd be saying that water makes choices, rocks make choices, etc.. But we don't say that, because we recognize the difference between the moves which these inanimate things make, and the moves that a human being makes.

Do not qualify yet. Once infinity and it's opposite are well defined (and infinity isn't just taken as an axiom), they likely would be Platonic objects. At least I have enough belief in the "logicism" of mathematics that it is so. — ssu

The point though, is that "infinity" and "infinitesimal" refer to completely different things. That "infinity" refers to a Platonic object does not imply that "infinitesimal" does.

Another meaning of "choice" is "a person or thing chosen", such as a person chose the option to stay.

If Determinism is the case, in one sense people do make choices, such as do I stay or do I go, but in another sense cannot choose, as their choice to stay has already been determined. — RussellA

So if determinism is true, then someone made the choice for the person? Who would that be, God?

So, time -- if it exists, and it may not -- can only approach the present from the past, or from the future, without arriving. You say the present is outside of time. — ucarr

Being outside of time, the present would be categorically distinct from the future and past which are the components of time. So neither can be said to "approach the present". "The present" refers to a perspective from which time is observed. Think of right and left as an analogy, where "here" is similar to "the present". Right and left are determined relative to the perspective which is "here".

According to my understanding, I exist in the present and not in either the past or the future. By this understanding, the past and the future are abstract concepts that occupy my mindscape as relativistic things; I know mentally, but not existentially, both the past and the future in relation to my existential presence within the present. — ucarr

The first sentence here is good. You, as the observer, and the free willing agent, exist in the present. But the next part appears to be confused. "The present" is an abstract concept, we use it to substantiate our existence. But so is "future and past" an abstract concept. The future and past are what we attribute to the external world, what is independent from us. But since it is the way we understand the world, it is still conceptual.

And since the future and past are time, this is what makes us outside of time. But we are "outside" time in a strange way, because we understand time as external to us, and this makes us "outside time" to the inside. Our position at "the present", from which we observe and act with free will, is beyond the internal boundary, This makes us outside of time to the inside, beyond the internal boundary.

If the present contains no time elapsed, then must I conclude my perception of time elapsing occurs in response to my existential presence in either the past or in the future? — ucarr

Imagine your perspective, at the present, to be a static point, and everything is moving around you. It is this movement around you which provides the perception of time passing. But your point is not necessarily completely static in an absolute way, because you can act, by free will. This act comes from outside of time, to the inside.

What does it mean to say we live in the past or in the future only? It suggests we aren't present anywhere. The pun is intended because presence denotes the present, but I don't immediately see how there can be presence of a thing in the past as the past, or in the future as future. Is it not so that wherever we are, we are there in the present? Where are you now? How can you be present in your own past? — ucarr

I'm not saying we live in the past and future. I am saying the opposite, that we are at the present. This is our perspective. But this puts us outside of time (to the inside). It has to be this way in order that we can measure time passing. If our perspective was not outside time, then any measurement of time passing would be tainted because there would be time passing within us, just like judging colour through a tinted lens.

If the present is timeless, how does it maintain the separation of past/future? Maintaining the separation implies an indefinite duration of time for the maintenance of the separation. Also, separation implies both a spatial and temporal duration keeping past/future apart, but spatial and temporal durations are not timeless, are they? — ucarr

There must be no duration of time in the point of separation. If there was we couldn't have an accurate measurement of time. Imagine if the duration was a day, then our measurements would be accurate to within a day. If it was an hour, our measurements would be accurate to within an hour. If the duration was a minute, our measurements would be accurate within a minute. And so on. If there is any time within the moment of the present, this would affect the accuracy of our measurements by the amount within the moment, because there would be a corresponding vagueness in the start and end point of the measurement.

How does a material thing sustain its dimensional expansion, a physical phenomenon, outside of time? Consider a twelve-inch ruler. Its twelve inches of extension continuously consume time. Relativity tells us the physical dimensions of a material thing change with acceleration of velocity accompanied by time dilation, so we know from this that physical dimensions consume time. — ucarr

It is the immaterial (nondimensional) aspect, deep within us, what is responsible for free will and intellection, that is outside of time, not our physical bodies.

I'm asking if infinitesimals exist in the sense that would satisfy mathematical platonism. — Michael

Have you still not answered this question? I think it's very clear that "infinitesimals" do not qualify as Platonic objects, because they do not have the "well-defined", or even "definable" nature which is required of a Platonic object.

This creates a schism in mathematics because calculus requires infinitesimals, while set theory assumes Platonism. So instead of employing infinitesimals, set theory views infinities as well-defined objects.

Of course mathematicians will not admit to an inconsistency between calculus and set theory, they would just claim that one is an extension of the other, just like many physicists would not admit to an inconsistency between Newtonian laws (governing objects) and Einsteinian laws (governing spacetime) . What they do instead, is veil the inconsistency behind a whole lot of extra axioms and principles, designed to smooth out the bumps, and hide the inconsistencies which exist between different applications which use different principles.

Simply put, "infinitesimal" refers to the continuity (like a "dimensional line", or space) which is assumed to lie between discrete objects (which may be infinite in number), as required to maintain separation between the assumed objects, making them discrete.

So the two, infinitesimal space, and infinite objects, require completely different accounting principles. The infinite objects are given by Platonism, but they require a "space" to be, in order to account for them being discrete objects, and since the objects are infinite, the "space' where they exist must be infinitesimal. Notice that "infinitesimal" refers to what is outside the Platonic objects.

Not true.

If a person believes in Determinism, not only i) do they believe that their choices have been determined but also ii) it has been determined that they do make choices. — RussellA

You agreed with my argument which showed that having both of two contrary ideas in the mind, at the same time, is a requirement for making a choice between them. This is necessary to be able to compare and choose between them. Then you said, if determinism is true, choosing is not required: "3) This means that it is not necessary to choose between two contradictory ideas at 1pm."

Therefore you contradict yourself. You admitted that people do not choose if determinism is true, based on my explanation of the requirements for "making a choice". Now you claim a premise which contradicts this. You say "it has been determined that they do make choices". Clearly, it has been determined that if determinism is true people do not make choices, if we adhere to what has been agreed to, about what constitutes "making a choice".

Sure, and working out complex problems is where the use of symbols is very effective, for the reason I just explained. That's why mathematics, which employs symbols, is the means by which very complex problems are worked out.

But I would say that the use of symbols is what enables advanced thinking to work with entirely different types of ideas at the same time. And that's exactly what complex mathematics is doing, combining completely different types of thoughts by establishing relations of value. So, I believe that "higher levels of complexity" in a sense, actually refers to "thinking entirely different types of thoughts" at the same time, if we allow the condition that the different thoughts are just represented by symbols, rather than the whole idea being thought of in completion. For example, "mass" and "acceleration" are completely different types of ideas, which are combined in the conception of "force", which is a complex concept, but made quite simple, and easy to use with f=ma.

I'm mulling over the idea that time as you describe it above doesn't exist at any time: the present exists outside of time; the past, once the non-existent present, continues to be non-existent as time gone by; the future derived from the non-existent present, does not yet exist until it becomes the non-existent present and then continues its non-existence as the past. — ucarr

The question of whether time exists or not is not relevant here, it's just a distraction. What is relevant is that all of time is either in the past or in the future, and the moment of "the present" separates these two and contains no time itself. This make the present outside of time.

I glean from the above you think a first cause exists outside of time. — ucarr

No, I think "first cause", without serious explanation and manipulation, is an incoherent notion. However, "final cause" is not incoherent, and can be conceived of as outside of time in the way I described.

Does time pass within the present? This is an issue because if it doesn't, the question arises: How does the present become the future?; coming at this same issue from the opposite direction: If time doesn't pass within the present, how does the present become the past? — ucarr

In the model I described, the present does not become the future, nor does the present become the past. The present is outside of time, and time consists of future and past. The future becomes the past, as time passes, and the present is a perspective from which this is observed. Also final cause acts from this perspective, as a cause from outside of time, which intervenes in the events which are occurring as time passes.

This is a description of causation outside of time? Consider: The accumulation of falling snow on the roof caused it to cave in. Is this an example of timeless causation? — ucarr

No, causation outside of time would be the freely made choice (free will act) which causes a shovel to be picked up and the roof to be shoveled, which would be an intervening in the "accumulation of falling snow on the roof", preventing the roof from collapsing. The being with free will, observing from the perspective of "the present" which is outside of time, makes a choice which causes the event of the roof being shoveled, and this would prevent the roof from collapsing. The cause of this event, shoveling the roof, is outside of time.

Time is a universal context, unless you can think of something that exists outside of time. — ucarr

The present, "now" exists outside of time. All existent time consists of past time and future time, whereas the present, now, is a point or moment, which separates the past from the future. So all of time has either gone by (past) or not yet gone by (future), and the present is what it goes past. This means that the present is "outside of time" by being neither past nor future.

The upshot of what I'm saying is that time is relevant to everything, even the supposedly totally self-sufficient first cause. If first cause pre-dates everything else, doesn't that put first cause into a temporal relationship with what follows from it? — ucarr

It doesn't make sense to speak of that which is outside of time, as pre-dating everything, because that is to give it a temporal context, prior in time to everything else. So "first cause" is not a good term to use here. This is why it is better to think of the present as that which is outside of time, rather than a first cause as being outside of time. The latter becomes self-contradicting.

This provides a perspective from which the passing of time is observed and measured, "now" or the present. Then also, the cause which is outside of time, the free will act, is understood as derived from the present. But, you should be able to see why it is incorrect to call this cause a "first cause", or a cause which "pre-dates everything else". It is better known as a final cause.

Finally, I'm saying the practice of cons of any type involves elapsing time, so that includes cons_creative. — ucarr

I agree, the practices of con-creative, i.e. its actions, necessarily involve elapsing time. However, the cause of those actions, the free will act itself, may occur at the moment of the present, and this need not involve any elapsing time; the moment of the present being outside of time as described above.

You make a strong argument. — RussellA

Thank you RussellA, I take back what I said about you refusing to acknowledge things which are contrary to your belief.

If Determinism is the case
1) It has already been determined at 12.50pm that I go at 1pm
2) This means that no decision needs to be made at 1pm whether to stay or to go, as the decision has already been made prior to 1pm.
3) This means that it is not necessary to choose between two contradictory ideas at 1pm. — RussellA

This is why any rational person will reject determinism. It means that choice is not real, and this implies that we do not need to deliberate or weigh options. And if we do not do this we will be overcome by various forces, and rapidly exterminated.

However, Determinism can also account for my going at 1pm without any necessity to fuse two contradictory ideas into a single idea. — RussellA

Sure, but believing in determinism is by this description, a belief that choice is impossible. This would also mean that only an irrational person (a person who believes that doing the impossible is possible) would even attempt to make a choice if that person believed in determinism. Therefore the person who believes in determinism, in order to be consistent with one's believe, would not choose to do anything, would be overcome by forces, and would be dead very soon.

By Occams Razor, Determinism is the simplest explanation, as it doesn't require the metaphysical problem of how two contradictory ideas may be fused into a single idea. — RussellA

Sure, and not choosing to do anything is simpler than having to choose, and dying is simpler than having to stay alive. Therefore by Occam's Razor we should all believe in determinism, choose to do noting, be dead soon, and get it over with.

I'm sure it can be done to at least some degree, even if not to that which people generally assume. — Patterner

Having a multitude of different thoughts at exactly the same time, is exactly what a complex concept is. Consider a relatively simple complex concept, like "right angle triangle". That concept consists of "triangle", which is itself complex, and also "right angle" which is complex. So there's a number of different ideas tied up in understanding "right angle triangle". Now consider "Pythagorean theorem". This consists not only of "right angle triangle", but a bunch more ideas about the relationships between the lengths of the sides of that type of triangle. It appears that to adequately understand "Pythagorean theorem", a person must be able to have all these ideas in one's mind at the same time.

But this brings up the issue of the use of symbols. One symbol can adequately replace a complex concept, which consists of a number of united ideas. So the spoken word "triangle" for example is one aural symbol which represents a number of ideas. Then, when we think in words, the one word can stand in for a number of ideas, instead of needing to have all those ideas in the mind at the same time. I think that this, in a sense, is "the meaning" of a word, a complex relation of ideas which the word itself substitutes for in the act of thinking.

Both indecision and deliberation require consecutive ideas. Perhaps I will stay, no, perhaps I will go. — RussellA

That you are wrong, is logically demonstrated in the following way:

Consider our example, "should I stay, or should I go". Suppose I think first "should I go?", then I relegate this thought to memory, and I start to think "should I stay?". According to your stipulation, each of these thoughts could only occur while the other is in memory, one following the other, without the two ever intermingling. This means that no thought could ever be produced which includes both of these two. Accordingly, the two could never actually be compared to each other.

One would consider "should I go", and all the merits and reasons for going, independently from "should I stay", and all of its merits and reasons. But the two distinct groups of values could never be compared, or related to each other in any way, because that would require having both of the two contradictory thoughts united within the same thought. Of course this would completely incapacitate one's ability to choose, because a person could never have the two distinct, and incompatible sets of values within one's mind at the same time. To think of one the other would have to be completely relegated to memory, Therefore the two could never be compared.

Obviously though, we do actually compare and unite contradictory thoughts within the same idea, when comparing the value of each, in order to decide. Ideas are often very complex, having many distinct ideas, as elements, united within, and nothing prevents the imaginative mind from uniting contradictory ideas. So when the person in the example, compares the value of staying as value X, and the value of going as value Y, and is able to decide one over the other, it must be the case that the two have existed together, in thought, at the same time, or else no comparison could have ever been made.

We can see this very clearly in simple arithmetic. The value assigned to "1" is inconsistent with, or contrary to the value assigned to "0". When a person says "1 is not equal to 0", it is necessary that the two contrary ideas, "1", and "0", must exist within the person's thinking, at the same time. Otherwise the person could only state the value of "1" at one time, then the value of "0" at another time, and never be able to actually compare the two, and understand that the two are contrary values. In reality therefore the entire complexity of mathematical ideas, which is constructed to compare inequalities, relies on the coexistence of contrary ideas. Without such coexistence of unequal values in one's mind at the same time, no one could understand or do any mathematics.

You are saying that a person can have two contradictory ideas at the same time. — RussellA

Yes, that is what I am saying. And, I think that any degree of serious introspection will reveal that any type of decision making would be impossible if the contradictory ideas could not actively exist within the same mind at the same time. In fact, if distinct ideas could not coexist then no relations between ideas, or comparisons between them could ever be established. But that is exactly what complex ideas consist of, comparisons and relations made concerning distinct ideas.

So the most simple logical demonstration that you are wrong, is this. The simple judgement, that two distinct ideas (such as should I stay and should I go) are contradictory, is itself a relation established between the two distinct ideas. In order to make such a judgement truthful, or accurate, the two ideas must be compared (i.e. exist together in the mind at the same time) or else any such judgement would be arbitrary or random. Therefore if one contrary idea could only come into the mind after the other left, it would be impossible to even judge, in any way other than a random guess, that the two are contradictory. To judge them as contradictory requires that both actively coexist within the mind at the same time, to be able to decide that the two fulfill the criteria of "contradictory".

I don't know, you'd have to put that into context. Anyway, "time", and "cons-creative" are not at all the same thing, so I don't see how that would be relevant here.

I still cannot understand how a person can feel a pain and not feel a pain in their finger at the same time. — RussellA

You are changing the subject we are not talking about what the person is feeling, we are talking about the ideas that at a person has. So, as I said, if the person is just learning the word "pain", the person might have a feeling, and consider both thoughts at the same time, "this is pain", "this is not pain", not knowing whether it is pain or not pain, and trying to decide which it is. You should have no problem imagining this, in the case of a tickle or something like that, for example. The person might at the same time think "this is pain", yet "this is not pain" being unsure whether it ought to be called "pain" or not.

That is exactly what I am saying, attention is switched between events, first one, then the other. But not at the same time. — RussellA

I noticed your quoted passage from Wikipedia mentions "little" conscious effort. Little effort is still effort. So these cases of multitasking where the secondary action requires little effort, and the primary action requires much effort, refute your claims and support mine.

That's my position, where attention is directed towards one activity only. — RussellA

If one activity requires a lot of attention, and the other a little attention, this does not mean that all the attention is directed at one activity.

Even if it were impossible, as I think it is, to have a single thought about two contradictory events, this raise the question as whether it is possible to have a single thought about the relation between two contradictory events — RussellA

Again, you are changing the subject. We were talking about having contradictory ideas, at the same time, concerning one event. I don't see why this is so hard for you to understand, It's called "indecision". It appears you want to deny the obvious just because it's evidence against what you believe.

I totally agree that people have contradictory ideas within their memories, but not that they are thinking about two contradictory ideas at the same time. — RussellA

Thinking about two contradictory ideas at the same time is commonly called "deliberation". The example was "should I stay or should I go". Your counter argument was that because we state these ideas one after the other, this implies that we must think them one after the other. But, as I explained, this is a faulty conclusion because thinking and stating are two very different actions with different limitations. So. I'll tell you again, you deny the obvious because it's evidence against your belief.

P1 - If Determinism is false, then my thoughts have not been determined
P2 - If Determinism is true, then my thoughts have been determined
P3 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought may or may not have been determined

P1 - If Determinism is false, then my thoughts have not been determined,
P2 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought has not been determined

P1 - If Determinism is true, then my thoughts have been determined
P2 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought has been determined

Having a thought is not sufficient evidence for either Determinism or Free Will. — RussellA

I don't see the point to any of this. As I said, free will concerns the capacity to act, in general. Thinking is one type of act, and the question is whether having contradictory thoughts at the same time is evidence of free will or determinism. You fear that it is evidence against determinism, so you deny the obvious, that we have contradictory thoughts.

2. The determinator catches up and re-determines from when an improbable act occurs. — Barkon

What's "the determinator", the hand of God? Is that like if your clock gets left behind, you have to reset it or else all your actions get at the wrong time?

If it were possible to have two contradictory thoughts at the same time, then I could feel pain in my finger and not feel pain in my finger at the same time. — RussellA

One example of contradictory thoughts, which you personally would not have, does not prove that contradictory thoughts, in general are impossible. As I said, contradictory thoughts are present in deliberation. Accordingly, if a person does not know whether oneself is feeling pain in the finger or not (perhaps that person is just learning the meaning of "pain"), and the person is deliberating on this, one could be considering both thoughts, I am feeling pain in my finger, I am not feeling pain in my finger, as real possibilities, at the same time.

A cyclist multi-tasks when they pedal and watch the road ahead at the same time. But thoughts about the road ahead should not be confused with the muscle memory of pedalling, which doesn't require thoughts.

A student multi-tasks when writing an essay and listens to music at the same time. But thoughts about what to write should not be confused with an instinctive pleasure in hearing music. — RussellA

Muscle memory does not exclude conscious thought. People whistle while they work. The work clearly requires conscious thought, but so does the whistling, just like pedaling a bike, and walking require conscious thought. We do not pedal, or walk without any conscious thought.

The issue is that when we multitask in this way, we prioritize one action over the other, paying more attention to one than the other. However, if you have ever taken a look at how this multitasking actually occurs, you'll see that there is constant switching of which act receives priority. So if whistling while you work involves a difficult aspect of work, attention will be focused on the work, but if the work is significantly mundane, effort can be focused on practising the whistle. In general, there is a continuous balance of priority between the two, enabling both efforts to flow smoothly, but the moment that a difficult aspect of one or the other is apprehended, more attention is focused in that direction. Notice, that's "more attention", not all of one's attention. this is the way that goals and intention work in general, we prioritize things.

I agree that there is ongoing debate amongst neurologists etc., concerning how many different tasks a person can "focus" on. But the problem with most experimental data available is that the scientists involved in these questions start with a faulty premise of what "focus one's attention" means. They assume the phrase to mean directing one's attention toward one activity only, and they judge experimental data from this perspective, neglecting the other things of lower priority, within one's field of attention, assuming the one thing is the only thing focused on . However, this excludes from the outset, the possibility that "focus one's attention" means to prioritize a number of things within one's field of attention. From that faulty premise, the prioritized activity becomes the only activity within one's attention.

I have many memories, none of which I am actively thinking about at this moment in time. — RussellA

This does not resolve the problem. The issue is the existence within a person's mind, of contradictory ideas. You deny the reality of this fact, so you point to a person's actions, and say that a person cannot express, or demonstrate, through speaking, or writing, contradictory ideas at the very same moment. But all this really does, is demonstrate the physical limitations to a human beings actions.

So, I have proposed that we look at a person's memory, where we can see very clearly that a person very often holds contradictory ideas within one's mind, through the use of memory. You reply by saying that you are never "actively thinking" about all your memories at the same time, again appealing to the limitations of activity. However, your appeal does not provide the argument you need. It is very clear that we actively think about a multitude of ideas at the same time, that's exactly what the act of thinking is, to relate ideas to each other. The use of memory allows us to increase the number of ideas currently being thought about, by relegating those with lower priority at a specific moment, to memory, then bringing them back when priority demands. Further, it is very clear that we "actively think" about contradictory ideas in the process of deliberation.

What has become very clear, is that when we include memory as part of the mind, there is no doubt whatsoever as to the fact that a person can have contradictory ideas within one's mind. However, since you are unwilling to accept the reality that people have contradictory ideas within their minds, you have now proceed to exclude the memory as part of the mind. All your are doing is demonstrating that you will take ridiculously absurd steps to support an untenable position.

Philosophy has as its purpose the desire to learn. If your prejudice is so strong, that you are forced into absurd assumptions to support this prejudice, instead of relinquishing it, to adopt a more true path, I consider you are not practising philosophy at all, but professing faulty ideas.

If I had not been born, then I would not be writing this post
I am writing this post
Therefore I was born

If Determinism is the case
then all thoughts are determined
I have the thought that my thoughts are not determined
therefore my thought that my thought has not been determined has been determined — RussellA

To make a proper comparison, you would need to say, as the second premise in the first argument, "I have the thought that I am writing this post". But then you do not have a valid conclusion. So, to be consistent in your analogy, and to have valid conclusions, we have to state the second premise of the second argument as ""my thoughts are not determined".

This is why the words in the proposition "should I stay or should I go" are sequential. First one asks "should I stay" and then at a later time one asks "should I go". — RussellA

Speaking is a physical act, and that requires a choice to say one or the other first, as I said. However, the fact that they cannot both be said by the person at the same time does not imply that the person cannot have both ideas within one's mind at the same time.

Clearly people multitask, so they are thinking different ideas at the same time, required to do a number of different things at the same time, even though they cannot say everything that they are doing, all at the same time. S o why can they not have contradictory ideas at the same time?

The fact that people have many different ideas in their minds at the same time (required for multitasking) demonstrates that the subject matter of your criticism is just a limitation on the physical capacity of speaking, not a limitation on the capacity of thinking. How do you account for a person having many different ideas, in one's memory, all at the same time, which one cannot all say at the same time? Not being able to say everything which one has in one's memory, all at the same time, does not imply that the person doesn't have all those ideas in one's memory, all at the same time.

If Determinism is the case, and determines all our thoughts and actions, then your thought that you are free to choose is just another of those thoughts that have already been determined. — RussellA

Sure, you can state irrelevant conditionals, just like I can say that if I was not born yet, I would not be writing this right now, but such conditionals are not relevant to reality.

The question was, how does introspection reveal to you that determinism is the case, and free will is an illusion. Your if/then statement reveals nothing more than "if I was not born yet I would not be writing this right now" reveals. How do I get from this to believing that I was not born yet? And how do you get from your if/then statement to believing that determinism is the case?

This is what you are saying: it was determined since the beginning, thus I have no control. That's false. What's true is that if it was determined since the beginning, it's probable that the acts that follow are the determined ones. — Barkon

In this form of determinism, how do you account for acts which fall outside of being probable, the acts that occur which were not probable? These would not be deterministic, and there would be a whole lot of acts which follow from each improbable act, all not determined from the beginning.

Cons-creative, itself, must have a cause, and therefore is not the first cause.