They can if they are infinitely small. Is it possible that you can imagine that? Is there any argument that will settle the issue either way? — Ludwig V

Obviously, a sensor cannot be infinitely small. It consists of components.

If spacetime is continuous and infinitely divisible, as is assumed, then an infinite number of two dimensional sensors can fit within finite space. — Michael

That is not necessarily the case. A sensor is a material object, space and time are not material objects. There is no necessity that the limitations of a material object are the same as the limitations of space and time. In the end, it's all conceptual, and the problem is in making the conception of an object consistent with the conceptions of space and time.

What these "supertasks" show us is that there is a disconnect between the conceptual structures of mathematics and the concepts of the empirical, natural philosophy, (science). The problem is compounded when mathematicians assume that their conceptions are objects, and these supposed objects get integrated into the work of scientists so that the boundary between the two incompatible conceptual structures is lost. This is the case in quantum physics, where the influence of mathematics allows for a non-dimensional object in the physical world, virtual particles. The purely imaginary concepts of mathematical objects is allowed to penetrate the theories of physics to the point where physicists themselves cannot distinguish between the real and the imaginary.

But if you prefer then we can stipulate that only one sensor exists at a time, the next placed only when the previous has been passed. — Michael

Come on Michael. Fire Ologist explained the problem with "placing", and you said, we could assume that they are already placed. Now I show you the problem with "already placed", and you say we can assume placing. What's the point in switching back and forth, when both are shown to be problematic? Move along now.

A thought experiment like this is perfectly appropriate in philosophy. — Michael

Sure, and the purpose of such thought experiments is to determine the underlying conceptual problems. If someone denies that the exposed conceptual problems are problems, then the purpose of the thought experiment is defeated.

For the sake of the argument the sensors just exist at their locations. — Michael

To avoid the problem , you just assume the impossible. There is a limit to the number of sensors which can exist in that space, depending on the size of the sensors, Because a sensor takes up space. Or, are you assuming that an infinite number of sensors can fit in a finite space?

The way Aristotle dealt with the good indicates that he was a true Platonist.

But is this not essentially cultivation of certain states that are not natural? These jhanas are not normal everyday experiences, rather they are only possible during the practice of deep meditation. As soon as one gets back to daily life, work, stress, family... *poof* meditative states (of heightened awareness, or blissful jhanas) are gone. My question is: why would a cultivated state be considered as basis for the true nature of reality? Especially a state that most people cannot experience. — Heracloitus

To answer this the way that Plato does, the natural way of apprehending reality is not the best way, because the natural human body with its senses misleads and deceives us. So the world, as presented to us through the sensing activities of our body, is not reality, its an illusion. The cave allegory presents the illusion as a sort of reflection of reality. The "cultivated state" you refer to is necessary to get one beyond the natural inclination toward complete reliance on, and faith in, the empirical illusion. The vast majority of human beings do not provide what is necessary for their minds to ascend from the prison of the body, with the punishment and rewards of sensation.

I think we have to distinguish between the means and the end. The end is the goal itself, and that is final cause. What happens with the plans, is that they consist of individual ends subordinate to the final end, parts required for the whole. So each aspect of the plan is an end in itself, but in carrying out that particular aspect it is actually a means to the final end. In Aristotelian philosophy there is a distinction between the end as final cause, and the formula, or formal cause, as designated means to the end.

And ideas as existing, even fictions, just not in any usual material sense. — tim wood

Ideas exist, sure. But the idea of a house does not imply that there is a corresponding existing material object. In other words, the idea of a house, exists as an idea, not as a house.

Very simply the distinction between a "logical" and a material subject. — tim wood

The distinction is between a logical subject, and a material object. A material object necessarily exists, as an essential aspect of what it means to be a material object, is to have existence. The logical subject on the other hand has no necessity of existence, and this is what allows us to talk about fictional things. So when someone talks about "the house" they may be talking about a material object which stands over there, or they may be using "the house" as a logical subject, in which case it doesn't necessarily correspond with a material object. When we judge for truth, in the sense of correspondence, we look for correspondence between the subject and the object.

Now to stir the ashes and perhaps add new fuel, with respect to Aristotelian action and passion, I'll amend my claim. That is, that corresponding to the activity, the action, of the builder building, is the passivity, the passion, of the logical house's being built. Or, that is, the builder is doing something and it must be to something, the one active, the other passive, and that the exact meaning of Aristotle's action and passion, passion here having nothing to do with anything affective. — tim wood

The builder is doing something with the raw materials, wood, concrete, whatever. That is the action of the builder, working with materials, and the passive aspect is the materials which are being worked with.

In Aristotle's teleological ontology, "the house", as subject, is the end, the goal, therefore final cause. As the final cause it is active, not passive. The goal, or end, represented as "the house", moves the builder to act, to build, as an active cause, the final cause. "The good" represented by Aristotle as "that for the sake of which", is the desired end, and it acts as final cause to move the person to act in a way apprehended as the means to the end. These actions of the person are efficient causation. Efficient cause is the immediate cause of the effect, and final cause is prior, as the cause of the efficient cause.

As I explained, Aristotle's description is like this. At t1 there is not-being of the house. At t2 there is being of the house. The time in between involves change, becoming. Becoming is incompatible with being, and cannot be described in the same logical terms, (subject/predicate). This is because we need to allow that the thing which is becoming either violates the law of non-contradiction (both is and is not at the same time), or it violates the law of excluded middle (neither is nor is not). Aristotle opted for the latter, becoming violates the law of excluded middle, and proposed that the concept of "potential" could account for the reality of that which neither is nor is not.

We could proceed to discuss the relationship between Aristotle's proposal of a violation of the law of excluded middle, and some modern day metaphysics like dialetheism and dialectical materialism, which following Hegel, propose a violation of the law of non-contradiction, if you could obtain an adequate grasp of this problem.

And this is plain language. And plain language is what I find in Aristotle, Doesn't mean he leaves it unquestioned, but I am not aware of any instance where he overthrows plain language. — tim wood

Wow, I don't think you've read Aristotle, if you think his writings are "plain language". Why do you think there has been endless discussions as to what he meant, for thousands of years, if his writing is "plain language?

There's no miracle. Motion isn't continuous; it's discrete. — Michael

Yes there is a miracle. The miracle is the start, the initial act, or force, which breaks the previous inertia, causing the new motion toward its end (in this case the beer in the (fridge).

In the case of the op, and also the lamp, the defined start is a rate of acceleration which will continue without an end. This is why it confuses it is acceleration without end. That is not an unusual way to define the effect of a force though, gravity is defined in this way (9.8 metres per second squared). The universal law of gravity describes an acceleration without end.

The commonplace nature of such a description, acceleration without end, makes it appear like there is no miracle involved with acceleration. But this is only because, in these commonplace activities, there is always contrary forces which negate the acceleration before the speed becomes infinite. There is commonly an end to acceleration. So this only serves to confirm our belief that there is no miracle involved with acceleration. However, the unintelligibility of examples like the op and the lamp, where no contrary forces are invoked, demonstrate to us, that acceleration truly is miraculous.

You made that conclusion that a house cannot be being built, not I, and you did so because you misunderstood me. I said that when we say "a house is being built", we refer to a project, not to a particular house. And the subject "house" is a goal, objective, or end, not a material object. You appear to be fooled by the deficiencies of human language, into believing that "house" in this context refers to a material object when it really does not. It refers to an idea.

The way to reveal your mistake is to distinguish between the particular and the general, or universal. "A house" refers to something general, a universal concept, not a particular which has material existence. So "a house is being built" clearly does not refer to any particular material object. Furthermore, if in an attempt to refer to a particular house, we say "the house" is being built, or "my house" is being built, then we see very quickly that the particular house referred to, which is being built, exists only as an idea, a plan, or goal, not as a material object.

the lamp cannot be either on or off after two minutes. — Michael

That's what I've been arguing since the beginning of the thread. And the reason why it can't be on or off is that in the described 'possible world' two minutes cannot pass. So the possible world in which "after two minutes" makes sense is incompatible with the possible world of that lamp.

I don’t understand. How do you ever arrive at the two minute mark?
1 minute, half a minute later, quarter minute later than that, etc., infinitely…you never arrive at the two minute mark. — Fire Ologist

You are exactly correct. In the described scenario, the stipulated possible world, the two minute mark cannot be reached. It's a Zeno-type argument. Michael insists that two minutes will pass, but that's a reference to a different, incompatible, possible world, the one designed around our empirical experience.

Two minutes just pass. That's how the world works. — Michael

See, you are referring to a different possible world here, the one derived from empirical experience. But this possible world is inconsistent with the one that the lamp is in.

Then stop talking about at two minutes or after two minutes. That’s some other scenario.

Don’t you see that? — Fire Ologist

Believe me Fire Ologist, I tried my best. Two months later Michael is still stuck in the same infinite loop.

So what is true? The absurd conclusions of tortured language? Or language that accurately describes/represents the world? (This not to say that description/representation is always problem-free, but instead to say that absurdities are not solutions - and at best signal that the thinking that has led to them has to be re-thought.) — tim wood

You are the one who used language to come to the absurd conclusion, that houses cannot be built. So it's your thinking which needs to be rethought. I believe that houses are being built all the time. However, much of the process remains unintelligible and indescribable to us, because it consists of things we do not adequately understand, namely the relationship between final cause and material cause.

And as pointed out quite a while ago, the consequence of all of this is that a house cannot be built. — tim wood

That is a deficiency of language, not a deficiency of action. And Aristotle has much respect for that type of sophistry which issues forth from this deficiency. Consider the following problem which Aristotle pointed out.

If at t1 the sate of being is describable as A, and change (becoming) occurs, so at t2 the state of being is describable as B, then there must be something which occurs between t1 and t2 which is signified by the term "change". If we propose another describable state of being, C, as the middle, between A and B, then change must occur between A and C, and C and B. Therefore we'd have two more describable states of being, D between A and C, and E between C and B. This leads to an infinite regress of distinct describable states of being, where the actual change between the states never gets described.

Aristotle used this argument to show how we must allow for either a violation of the law of non-contradiction, or a violation of the law of excluded middle, in order to account for the reality of change, becoming. The issue is that becoming is distinctly incompatible with being, and if we adhere to those formal laws of logic, the sophists (like Zeno, and you), can prove absurdities. Aristotle insisted that we maintain the law of non-contradiction, and allow for a violation of the law of excluded middle, with the concept of "matter". Matter, being potential, allows for the reality of what may or may not be. And this is why dualism is required to understand the nature of reality. "Form" refers to the intelligible aspect of reality, while "matter" refers to the unintelligible aspect.

So it is not the case that it is impossible for a house, or anything else, to come to be (be built), as your sophistry concludes. It is simply the case that there are aspects of this process which we cannot describe, as they are unintelligible to us. And you seize on the reality of this failure of the human intellect and the language which enables it, to conclude that because we cannot describe it, it cannot occur.

I take your point that generation is the counter example of the productive arts. — Paine

By art is one type of generation, by nature is another type.

But you were making a claim about when beings actually existed 'materially'. — Paine

Yes I was. "Being" for Aristotle implies having both matter and form. We cannot attribute properties of "a house" to matter which is does not yet have the properties of a house. The house is not being acted on because the matter being acted on does not have the form of a house when the matter does not yet have the properties required for it to be a house. When the house is being built, what is acted on is matter in the form of something else, stones, cement, boards, etc. A house is not being acted on at this stage, because the matter does not have the form of a house. And when the matter does have the form of a house, the house is no longer being built, it is already built.

Can you point to some place in the text where this is claimed? Where do beings move from the not-material to the material? — Paine

That is called "generation", or "coming to be", when a thing changes from not being to being. It's discussed at length by Aristotle in a number of different places. A good discussion of the principles of generation can be found in Metaphysics Bk 7, principally Ch 6-8. He distinguishes coming to be by nature, by art, and spontaneously, and discusses how the matter receives the form which it gets, in each of these circumstances.

In school we learned that something/someone can act and that someone/something can be acted on. — tim wood

And did you learn that something which doesn't exist yet can be acted on? Or, did you learn that it is really a project (goal or intention) which was being acted on, and not the non-existent thing which is being acted on? I learned the latter, when the mentioned object has no material existence, and is being built, it is a project which is being acted on.

That can only mean that for you, it is meaningless to say that anything is (ever) acted upon. — tim wood

For me, no object which does not yet have material existence is ever acted on. You cannot act on a thing unless it exists materially. However, a project, goal, or final cause, is acted on. But this is a case of an individual being moved by the project (having passion for it), not a case of the project being moved by the individual.

The window is broken by Bob absent any intention on his part - not that that makes any difference - an accident, Bob need not even be aware the window is broken. — tim wood

Then this example is irrelevant to what we are discussing, the intentional activity of building. Also, the noun "passion" is related to this activity, only as the emotion of the one carrying out the activity. There is no coherent meaning for "the passion of being built".

But then the pendulum swung too far the other way. From everything being 'informed by purpose', modern science declared that nothing is. In the physicalist view, all biological processes, including those that seem goal-directed, are ultimately reducible to physical interactions and can be fully explained by the laws of physics and chemistry. — Wayfarer

Plato's "tripartite soul", as described in The Republic, allows for causation in both directions, mind ruling the body, and body influencing the mind. The intermediary between mind and body is commonly translated as spirit, or passion. By Plato's description, virtue occurs when the passion or spirit is allied with the mind, in ruling over the body. However, poor disposition allows that the spirit may ally with the body, to overwhelm the mind, when the person is overcome by emotion or sensation. So the well-tempered individual rules the body with the mind through the medium of spirit or passion, while the ill-tempered has a mind which is often overwhelmed by passion, thereby having one's mind improperly moved by the appetites and sensations of the body.

Plato extends this principle by analogy to the existence of the State. The State is healthy when the relations between the three classes. rulers, guardians, and working class, is ordered such that rulers rule with good philosophical principles. The guardians, in honour, are subordinate to the rulers, and the trades and activities of the workers are governed by the guardians. There is a principle associated with each of the three classes, rulers-intellectual, guardians-honour, workers-material goods. In the corruption of the State described by Plato, the honour of the guardians becomes tainted, and they turn toward the money of the class associated with material goods, rather than staying true to the intellectual principles of the ruling class.

How this relates to the difference between "the physicalist view", and the "informed by purpose" view, is the reversal of causation which the physicalist view has imposed on us. Ever since Newton's first law was established as the base for understanding cause and effect, the cause of change has been understood as necessarily external to the body which is changed. This principle, which sets the foundation for determinism, excludes the possibility of the source of change being internal to the human body, in the way that free will, intention, and final causation, was traditionally understood. The role of "purpose" is thereby excluded from this view.

The modern scientific view holds that causation is always sourced externally. The acts of human sensation are described as the external world having an effect on the body. the body then has an effect on the mind, in a chain of efficient cause. You can see how this perspective allows only for the existence of the ill-tempered soul (by Plato's principles). The virtuous, well-tempered soul is described by causation in the other direction, final cause, with the mind ruling the body, and causing it to do what is good, rather than being caused to do whatever the external world forces it to do through efficient causation.

Please ignore claims that I am identifying causes and effects. I am not. What is identical is the action of A actualizing the potential of B and the passion of B's potential being actualized by A. Clearly, a builder building is not a house being built. Still, they are inseparable because there is no builder building without something being built, and vice versa . — Dfpolis

You are ignoring the middle term, C. Aristotle uses a middle term, and if you include it, it becomes evident that you have reversed the representation to make final cause appear as efficient cause. The action of A is caused by the goal, C, the intended end, "a house". A is the means to the end. And, B, "the house being built", is nothing other than the end being actualized by the activity A.

In the particular instance in which a house is being built, the builder building is a house being built. The two are exactly the same. This is why we need the third term, "the house", which refers to the intended end of the activity. Otherwise you are simply insisting that the more general statement "a builder building" is different from the more specific "a house being built". But this is just a semantic difference which provides no information relative to causation.

Bob had been affected by the window and had a passion to break it? — tim wood

The important aspect to recognize in understanding Aristotle's teleological metaphysics, is that the goal, end, or objective, is intermediary between the human being and the material world. The human being only affects the material world through the means of intentions, goals, ends or objectives, and likewise, material world only affects the human consciousness through the intermediary which is the person's intention.

The idea of an intermediary is derived from Plato who solved the interaction problem of idealism through the introduction of a third aspect "passion", which is the intermediary between the mind and body. The well disposed, tempered individual, has control over one's body, directing it toward the good, through the medium of passion. However, in the the ill-tempered individual the role of passion is reversed, such that the body influences the mind's goals and objectives in a bad way, through the means of passion. The latter is the case in your example, when Bob's mind is affected by his passion he desires to break the window, and this is an ill-tempered act.

The nature of the intermediary is what Aristotle addresses in that part of Posterior Analytics which Df referred to 94-95. In the case of final causation the role of the intermediary is reversed from that of efficient causation.

Incidentally, here the order of coming to be is the reverse of what it is in proof through efficient cause: in the efficient order the middle term must come to be first, whereas in the teleological order, the minor, C, must first take place, and the end in view comes last in time.

94b 22-25

The efficient cause is his skills as a builder, the skills themselves and the skills as he possesses them, so yes, informally, he is. — tim wood

"Efficient cause" refers to the particular action which leads to the existence of the item. But "the skills" refers to something general. Therefore the skills are not the efficient cause.

So the efficient cause of the house is the property, or art or skill, of the builder as a builder. Material cause not the material itself, but the property or capacity - or passion - of the material to be worked in an appropriate way. Formal, not the plans, but the quality of the plans which makes it possible to build from them. Final, the property, or capacity, of the thing built to be used as intended. — tim wood

Sorry tim, I just can't understand this at all. It's not the Aristotle that I know.

Let's try this: In as much as you say the house is the goal, the final cause, and you imply that before it is, it isn't, what then is the builder building? — tim wood

The builder is building a house. But a material thing in the condition of becoming, being created or produced, has no material existence until after it is produced. These are some of the issues which Aristotle dealt with in his discussions of "change", the difference between the prior condition and the posterior condition.

And there a regression here, because the implication - your implication - is that anything built as a final cause, not existing before it exists, cannot be built. — tim wood

The final cause is the house as a goal, an end, the intent, that is how Aristotle describes final cause, as "the end", and this signifies what we call the goal or objective. Take a look at Aristotle's example, the final cause of the person walking is the goal of health.

The goal, or end is the cause of the person's activities. The activities themselves are the efficient causes, as the means to that end. The person has choice, not only in the decision as to which ends are desired, but also in the determination of the means (efficient causes) required to produce the end. However, since the specified means are often seen as the only way to produce the desired end, there is often a logical necessity linking the means with the end.

So if (from above) the window was broken by Bob, Bob had been affected by the window and had a passion to break it? — tim wood

In the case of an intentional act, that is almost what I said, but not quite. Bob is affect by the goal, or end, which is to have the window broken. So he breaks it. His action is a passion caused by that goal or end (not by the window itself, but the goal of breaking it), as his action is the effect of that final cause. Why is this so hard for you to understand? Are you not affected by your goals? And does this affection not cause passion within you? Do you have any understanding of the concept of "affection" at all?

it occurs to me to ask you just what exactly you think a cause is for Aristotle. — tim wood

I will answer this one. Aristotle describe four principal ways "cause" is used, material, formal, efficient, and final. Also he outlined two accidental uses, which are not to be understood as proper causes. These are luck and chance.

Again, the point is that we are discussing efficient, not final, causality and digressing into final causality only leads to confusion. — Dfpolis

The problem though, is that "house", referring to something not yet built, is a final cause. You refuse to acknowledge this, and keep trying to portray this final cause, the goal of building a house, a house being built, as an efficient cause. So your attempt to simplify the intentional action of building, to describe it as consisting solely of efficient causation, when final causation is obviously involved, produces a false representation of the activity.

"A house being built" refers to a project, an end, a final cause. The builder is affected by that project and has the passion to build. Therefore the builder building is the effect of that final cause which is the project of "the house" which is being built.

Since you apparently don't like this question, it occurs to me to ask you just what exactly you think a cause is for Aristotle. While I suppose you must know, it's not clear in your usage. And I think maybe you get it mixed up with a modern understanding of the word. Give it a try; doesn't have to be a treatise; a paragraph or two should be adequate for present purpose. — tim wood

I've grown accustomed to ignoring your questions which appear to be completely irrelevant. If you would explain to me why you are asking something which looks really stupid, like do I believe it is possible to build a house, and why you think this is relevant, I might see the need to answer it.

I think what Plato was showing is that persuasive discourse produces friends, and friends are a multitude united as one. The power of the unity of the multitude is stronger than the might of one individual. Therefore the power of argument is actually the strongest might.

It seems to me that Thrasymachus, with respect to what history can tell us, isn't entirely 'wrong.' — Shawn

This may be true, but only in the sense that "might" turns out to be a chameleon with a number of different presentations. True strength or "might", turns out to be hidden within the power of language, as demonstrated by argumentation and rhetoric. Therefore to understand what gives language this might, this power, to determine what is "right", we need to understand how people are persuaded.

If you acknowledge intention as causal, in the sense of final cause, then you would see that "house being built", as referring to the intention of the project (the end), is the (final) cause of "builder building". Therefore you have things reversed when you say "builder building" is the cause of "being built" which is the effect.

This is very consistent with what Aristotle says in the context of your reference, Posterior Analytics 94b 7-26. "E.G. why does one take a walk after dinner? For the sake of one's health." Your example is comparable. Why is the builder building? Because there is a house being built.

Do you agree, if we adhere to Aristotelian principles (regardless of what Duns Scotus says), "house being built" is the cause, as referring to the intentional project, the end, and "builder building" is the effect?

If I say that Hesperus is Phosphorus, I am saying that they are the same object. — Ludwig V

That's not the case. "Object" is not implied. You are simply saying that whatever it is that the two names refer to, it is one and the same.

The issue with "=" in mathematics is that the meaning of, or what is referred to by, "2+2" is not the same as what is referred to by "4". Someone might stipulate by axiom, that these two do refer to the exact same thing, but that does not reflect the way that the symbols are commonly used in the application of mathematics. In this way the axiom would be false, in the sense of a false definition. That's why such an axiom is misleading. This is also the problem with formalism, what is stipulated by the formalist is not consistent with the way that logic is applied, therefore it is a false description of logic.

If I say that Ringo Starr is Richard Starkey, I am saying that Ringo Starr is the same person as Richard Starkey. — Ludwig V

Again, this is not true. When you say Ringo Starr is Richard Starkey, all you are saying is that these two names have the same referent. It is only upon analysis, if one seeks to determine whether it is true or not, or something like that, that one would determine that the two names both refer to a person.

I ran across these references just now.

Posterior Analytics II, 12, 95a14-35 discusses simultaneous and time ordered causality.

Cf. “In an essentially ordered series of causes, both the existence and causal function of the effect are caused and preserved by the simultaneous coexistence of the cause.” Juan Carlos Flores, “Accidental and essential causality in John Duns Scotus’ treatise ‘On the first principle,’” Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie Médiévale 67, no. 1 (2000): 97f. — Dfpolis

Hey, thanks for the reference Dfpolis. I checked it out, and I think you are vindicated to an extent. Aristotle does discuss this simultaneity of cause and effect, but I still think this concept is misapplied by you in your example.

Aristotle gives two examples of the way in which the cause is simultaneous with the effect in this way. The first is an eclipse of the moon. The moon was eclipsed because the earth intervened. It becomes eclipsed when the earth intervenes. It is eclipsed when the earth is intervening, and it will be eclipsed when the earth will intervene. The other example is the freezing of water. Ice forms when a failure of heat is occurring, it has formed when there was a failure of heat, and it will form if a failure of heat occurs.

The reason why I still think you misapply this concept, is because "the builder building", and "the house being built" both refer to the very same activity, as you agree. In both of Aristotle's examples, there are two distinct things, one the cause of the other. The earth intervenes with the light from the sun, and the effect is the eclipse of the moon. Two distinct things. There is a lack of heat, and the effect is that the water freezes. Two distinct things. And careful scientific analysis reveals that Aristotle was wrong, there is a time difference for each of these, as the effect does not actually occur instantaneously. Your example however, is not even similar because there is not two distinct things, only one activity described in two ways.

Again, you spout nonsense. See my "Evolution: Mind or Randomness?" Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 22 (1-2):32-66 (2010) — Dfpolis

Well then, why don't you accept what I've been telling you, that "being built" is a predication which implies the thing being built, "the house" as its subject. And, the house exists only as a goal or intention (final cause) at this time of being built. The house is not an existing thing affected by the activity of being built, it is created intentionally by being built..

The answer is he's building a house. And Aristotle makes explicit an observation that most folks wouldn't bother with: if someone is building, then something is being built. If someone or something is acting, something is being acted on. And he calls that πάσχειν, translated as passion, or being-affected. — tim wood

Yes, something is being acted on, and that is the raw materials. The form of the materials changes due to the activity called "building". That is how Aristotle described change. The problem with Df's representation is that he portrays the house as that which suffers the passion, by saying "the passion of being built". And this is incoherent because there is no house in existence, to undergo a change of form, only the raw materials undergo that change, as described above. But the raw materials are not "being built", the house is. But the house does not yet exist. It exists only as a goal or end, and as such it is the final cause of the builders activity. So in this way, Df represents what Aristotle would name as the final cause, as some sort of "necessary efficient cause".

Not so. Aristotle did not rule out the concept of “prime matter” as incoherent with his cosmological argument. In fact, “prime matter” is a fundamental concept in his metaphysics. — Wayfarer

This has been a subject of debate for some. But a thorough reading of the "Metaphysics" ought to display to you that he actually does rule out prime matter. He discusses it thoroughly, treating it as if it might possibly be a viable concept, because it was accepted by many, only to reveal in the end, that such a thing is impossible. To put it simply, prime matter would be pure, absolute potential. And any potential requires an actuality to act as cause to bring about anything actual from it. The concept of pure, absolute potential, does not allow for any actuality, and therefore could not actualize itself. So if there ever was pure absolute potential (prime matter), this would always be the case, and there would never be anything actual. But observational information reveals to us that there is something actual. Therefore "prime matter" is ruled out.

This is basically the argument against being coming from nothing. Pure potential, prime matter, is actually nothing. It is assumed as an original chaos or some absolute disorder, what some called apeiron. From this complete and absolute randomness, organized actual existence (form), is supposed to come into being by some chance occurrence. Apokrisis presents this as symmetry-breaking. You can see how this is illogical, to assume that formed being springs spontaneously from absolute potential, prime matter.

Aristotle’s concept of prime matter (hylē) refers to the underlying substratum that has no form or qualities of its own but can receive various forms. — Wayfarer

Actually, what Aristotle reveals in his Metaphysics, is that the true underlying substratum is actually formal. That it is material is just an illusion produced from the assumptions of empirical sciences. This is why Aristotle is truly idealist rather than materialist, as "form", being what is actual, becomes the first principle. You'll see this principle taken up by Christian theologists like Aquinas, choosing actuality as the first principle over the "pure potential" of the Neo-Platonists.

In his cosmological argument, particularly in the “Physics” and “Metaphysics,” Aristotle posits the existence of an unmoved mover, a necessary being that causes motion* without itself being moved. This unmoved mover is pure actuality**, having no potentiality. The concept of prime matter, in contrast, is pure potentiality and plays a different role in his metaphysical framework. — Wayfarer

This is good, but if you look closely you'll see that the concept of "pure actuality" excludes the possibility of "pure potentiality", and vise versa, because "pure" excludes the other category. So, when you see that the assumed unmoved mover is pure actuality, you know that pure potentiality is ruled out. Therefore, "pure potentiality" is the ontology which he is refuting. This is the position of the Pythagoreans, and those that Aristotle refers to as "some Platonists", those who adopt pure potentiality as a first principle.

*’Motion’ in Aristotle means something different than modern physics ‘velocity’. Aristotle’s notion of motion is broader and more encompassing, dealing with the transition from potentiality to actuality in various aspects, not limited to spatial movement. This understanding of motion as a change of state is a fundamental difference from the modern physics definition, which typically focuses on the change in an object’s position over time (velocity). — Wayfarer

Yes, Aristotle distinguish two types of change, change of place (locomotion), and internal change, which is change of a thing's form. Modern science, with its propensity toward dividing objects into smaller parts, reduces all change to change of place. What was internal change, or change of form, is now change of place of the parts. However, as we get to smaller and smaller parts, we reapproach the problem of the ancient atomists, which Aristotle had to deal with.

We cannot assume infinite divisibility of the parts, because this leaves us with nothing, no substratum at the base of things. So the atomists proposed fundamental parts, and these fundamental parts must be unchangeable or else they'd be divisible into further parts. The fundamental parts would be prime matter, that which all things are composed of. However, this creates the need for a completely different perspective. There is a requirement for a 'force' of actuality which organizes the fundamental parts, and this 'force' must be internal to the objects we know. The 'force' becomes the principle for actual existence, organized being. Then by Aristotle's refutation, the cosmological argument, the fundamental parts (atoms) as prime matter, get ruled out, and we are left with this 'force' as the fundamental substratum of all being. Aristotle's primitive representation is the divine activity, the thinking, thinking on thinking.

Clearly, you know much less about Aristotle than you would like to believe. Further, you are not open to learning. So, once again, I leave you to your own beliefs. — Dfpolis

You, Dfpolis, are unable, or simply unwilling to engage with teleology, the foundational aspect of Aristotle's ontology. Instead you incessantly attempt to represent the intentional activity of final causation as some sort of necessary efficient cause, refusing to engage with the true Aristotelian principles.

Substantial form actualizes its prime matter here and now. — Johnnie

Aristotle ruled out "prime matter" as an incoherent concept with his cosmological argument.

The immediate effect is progress toward completion = the house being built. If there were no immediate effect, the house would never come to be. — Dfpolis

"Progress" is a judgement in relation to the final cause. So you continue to conflate final cause with efficient cause.

I never made such a stipulation and I deny any such separation. They are not physically separate, but logically distinct. — Dfpolis

If "the builder building", and "the house being built" are not physically separate, then they are one and the same, as I've been saying. So we agree here. You say they are logically distinct, and I've said that the distinction is that "the builder building" is more general than "the house being built". This is because the builder building is not necessarily building a house. Would you agree with this logical distinction?

Suppose we say "the builder is building a house", and "a house is being built". Would you agree that the logical distinction is that in one case, "the builder" is the subject, and in the other case, "the house" is the subject. But now there is a problem, the house, as the subject does not yet exist, it's existence is, as you say, predicted. Do you agree, that "the house" as the goal or end, is the final cause, just like in Aristotle's example, the goal of health is the final cause of the man walking? So when we say "a house is being built", we are talking about final causation, because what indicates that "a house" is being built, is reference to the intended goal of the project, the end.

Therefore the logical difference between "the builder building", and "a house being built", is that the former is a description of efficient causation, and the latter is a description of final causation. "The builder building" refers only to the physical activities of the person putting things together, while " a house being built" refers to the goal, end, or intention of the person putting things together.

What is different is that the builder (not the house) builds and so is the cause of building, and the house (not the builder) is being built and so is the effect of building. — Dfpolis

I would disagree with this because the house is not yet built. Therefore it cannot be the effect described as "a house being built". It is only the effect after the house is built. Only after the house has been built can we say that the house is the effect.

Prior to the project being completed, the house is an idea, a plan, or goal, and as the goal or end, it is the cause of the builder building, in the sense of final cause. So, to explain what I am saying, consider that the material house comes from potentially existing, to actually existing, through the the activity of building (the means to the end). When the material house potentially exists, it is actually an idea, or goal in the builders mind, and therefore acts to inspire the builder to build, as final cause.

Therefore the builder is the cause of building, as you say, but only as final cause, not efficient cause. Building, itself, is an efficient cause, but if we say the builder is the cause of building, we are referring to the freely willed choice of the builder, to build, and this is final cause.

In that process, one element (the boulder building) is source of actualization of the materials' potential to be a house and so the cause, and the other element (the house being built) is the result of the actualization, and so the effect. — Dfpolis

I completely agree with this, and I believe that you and I both have a good understanding of Aristotle on this point. However, where we seem to disagree is that I think that under Aristotelian principles, what you describe as "source of actualization of the materials' potential to be a house" is final cause, while you seem to argue that it is a type of efficient cause.

Essential causality looks at the process, not the end result, and sees that that process (building) involves two concurrent aspects (the builder building as cause, and the house being build as effect). — Dfpolis

This still makes no sense to me. All you are saying is that there is two different ways to describe the same physical activity, There is no logical reason given to conclude that one is cause and the other effect. In fact, the affirmation that they are concurrent seems to negate the possibility of a cause/effect relation.

"Being done to" means an on-going activity. — Dfpolis

Sure, but the point is that there is no house in existence to be having anything done to it. And if we look at the raw material as having something done to them. there is no "effect" in this description, just something being done.

I have already addressed this. When my houses were being built, my wife and I went to see our "house," and spoke of it. No one was confused by the term, because they knew it could refer to a house under construction. Please do not quibble about this again. It is unbecoming. — Dfpolis

Of course no one is confused when we speak of the things which only exist as goals, because final causation is an integral part of our lives, and influences all sorts of conversations.

You ask me not to quibble about this, but it is key to understanding Aristotle's thesis on causation. To understand the reality of change we must recognize the difference between "the house" as a goal in people's minds, and "the house" as a completed material object. Do you agree that "the house as a goal in the minds of people, is a cause of action, and "the house" as a completed material object is the effect of that same action?

The words in question are ποιεῖν poiein and πάσχειν paskein. Boiled down, the first means to make or to do - active/action, and the second, "to be affected by anything whether good or bad, opposite to acting of oneself," (A Lexicon, Liddell and Scott, 1977, p. 536) - passive/passion. — tim wood

I know what passive means, it's Df's usage which makes no sense. If you think it does make sense, then explain how Df's expression "the passion of being built" makes any sense to you.

And this, Metaphysics, 1066a:
"That motion is in the movable is evident; for it is the complete realization of the movable by that which is capable of causing motion, and the actualization of that which is capable of causing motion is identical with that of the movable. For it must be a complete realization of them both; since a thing is capable of moving because it has the potentiality, but it moves only when it is active; but it is upon the movable that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality of both alike is one; just as there is the same interval from one to two as from two to one, and the hill up and the hill down are one, although their being is not one; the case of the mover and the thing moved is similar." italics added. — tim wood

As I said, the two are one and the same, "identical", when it is the actualization which is being discussed. It is Df who wants to cast one part of the actualization as cause, and another part of the actualization as effect, and say that these two, the causal part and effectual part of the actualization are concurrent. But that is not Aristotle at all.

Temporal priority is not logical priority. — Ludwig V

I know, but if there is an existing law, and someone does something that is contrary to that law, then that person violates the law. That is a simple fact.

There is no unqualified sense of "same". — Ludwig V

I believe that what is attempted with the law of identity is to express an unqualified sense of "same". You seem to think it fails. Why?

Now you are claiming that builders are houses. — Dfpolis

You continue to be ridiculous. In the hypothesized scenario there is a builder building a house and there is a house being built. A proper description refers to both, but this obviously does not imply that builders are houses. In that hypothesized scenario, the description of a builder building refers to the very same situation as the description of a house being built.

Again, that is the point. Actions are identically passions from a different perspective. That does not make causes (builders building) the same as effects (houses being built). — Dfpolis

The effect of the builder building is a house, and the house is posterior in time to the builder building. The effect of the builder building is not a house being built, as these are one and the same thing. The effect is the house.

You are stipulating a separation between the "builder building" and the "house being built", in order to claim that there are causes and effects which are simultaneous and not chronologically ordered. I disagree, and so I am demonstrating that your argument is simple sophistry. Your argument amounts to employing two distinct descriptive styles to describe the very same activity, and then claim that one description is of the cause, and the other is of the effect, when both descriptions are really descriptions of the very same thing.

The house has some existence = a partial existence as a work in progress. Once building has begun, the house has a partial existence. If you do not like the term "house," substitute "house in progress." The logic works as well as it depends on the facts. — Dfpolis

Perhaps we can make some progress here, by breaking down the coming into being of the house, into parts. Do you agree, that when each part comes into existence, it does so as an effect, from the prior activity of the builder which is a cause of it, and the activity of the builder is always prior in time to the existence of the part? So, for instance, the foundation comes into existence, and it only exists after specific activities of the builder. There is no simultaneity of cause and effect here, the effect, which is the existence of the part, is always posterior in time to the cause, which is the activity of the builder. Can you agree to this simple principle?

Doing is causing and being done to is being effected. — Dfpolis

Right, but "being done" implies finished, complete, the end. And "being built" implies unfinished, and this is completely incompatible with "being done". Further the concept of, "being done to", "being effected", as is your claimed meaning of "passion", which is really "passive", requires an object which the action is being done to. In the hypothesize scenario, this object is supposed to be the house. But the house does not exist, and this is why your proposal is nonsensical and impossible to understand. If you would propose a passive object which the action is being done to, then we'd have a place to start. However, you insist that the passive object which supposedly suffers the passion, is the activity of "being built", and this is nonsense.

All the rest of us are able to distinguish builders building from houses being built even though they are inseparable. — Dfpolis

That's unabashed bullshit. Provide for me an accurate description of a house being built which does not involve builders building. The only difference is as I explained earlier. Since "builders building" is more general, there is no necessity that the builders building are building houses, yet there is necessity that houses being built involves builders building. This, as I explained to you, is the nature of final cause, the free willing agent has choice, which is most general, and decision moves toward the more specific without necessity. So there is no necessity between cause and effect in this direction. But when we look from the direction of the more specific, "houses being built", there is the necessity of builders building.

If we were discussing causation completely, yes. However, you asked about efficient causes and that is what I am explaining here. — Dfpolis

There is no such thing as efficient causation in which the cause and effect are simultaneous, concurrent. You simply use a sophistic trick of description in an attempt to prove that there is.

"House" is being analogically predicated. It does not mean the completed house, but the work in progress, which does exist. — Dfpolis

So the object which suffers the passion is a predicted object? How can it suffer the effects of the activity it doesn't even exist, and is only predicted to exist?

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26170042 — Dfpolis

If you believe that this text is consistent with your claims, then provide some references from it. I think you and Duns Scotus are talking about two different things, but using the same terms. You have an odd way with terms, as is evident from your use of "passion".

So why don't you conclude that the use in the context of the law of identity violates the use in the context of set theory? It seems to be an arbitrary choice. — Ludwig V

I'd agree except that the law of identity was first, set theory came along after. So set theory violated the law of identity, which was already established. If it was the other way around, then we'd want to look at the reasons why someone would be trying to enforce the law of identity, which seems like a useless, obvious, self-evident tautology, in violation of how set theorists were defining "same".

Well, if the law of identity is an obvious self-evident tautology, then it appears like there must be something wrong with set theory if it's in contradiction with what is obvious. We can see something like this in Aristotle's work to establish the law of identity. He claimed that the law of identity was necessary to battle against sophists who could logically demonstrate absurdities. If the base axioms of a logical system are contrary to what is self-evident tautology, then that system will be able to prove things which are contrary to what is obvious, one can prove the absurd.

The meaning of "same" depends on its context. — Ludwig V

Very true, but we need to pay attention to subtleties to avoid deception. Suppose you and I both drive the same make and model of car, and same year and colour as well. Notice, that "same" is being used in a qualified sense, referring to different properties "same make", "same model", "same year", "same colour". Now, suppose I say that I drive the same car as you. This would be incorrect. But why is it incorrect, because everything about it seems to be the same? The thing is that everything about it is not the same, only those named qualities are the same, and that's why it's incorrect to say that it is "the same" in that unqualified sense.

Now, when we say that "two sets are the same", this is incorrect for the same reason. Not everything about the two is necessarily the same, only the stipulated required qualities. So it is incorrect to say that the two sets are the same, in the unqualified sense, because some features like the ordering of the elements may be different.

The builder building is the cause. The house being built is the effect. Of course they are concurrent. That is the whole point. — Dfpolis

As I explained, "the builder building", and "the house being built" are just two different ways of describing the exact same thing. There is no distinction of cause and effect here, and that is why there is concurrency, there is not separation. They are the same.

But, building is not being built. so the cause is not the effect. — Dfpolis

Yes, "building" is "being built". Why can't you comprehend this? The two are the very same, identical activity, described in two different ways. As I said in my reply to Tim, "building" has the builder as the subject, and "being built" has the house as the subject. So the two are just different ways of describing the exact same activity. One way is to describe a builder building, and the other way is to describe a house being built. But both are descriptions of the exact same activity. There is no separation of cause and effect because there is only one activity being described.

Further, since "the house", as subject does not yet have any existence, it cannot suffer any passion, or have any properties at all. And that's why your claims make no sense. At the time of "being built", the house exists only as a plan, a goal or end. This is why "the house" which is implied as the subject of "being built, can only be referred to as a final cause at this time, not an efficient cause. The house exists in the mind of the builder only, as a goal or end, and the cause of the builder building. This is just like Aristotle's example of final causation, where "health" exists in the mind of the man walking, as the cause of him walking.

You do. I don't. In essential causality they are inseparable. In accidental causality (time-sequence by rule) they are separate. That is why there are two kinds of efficient causality. The first is necessary, the second is not. — Dfpolis

Now you are just being ridiculous. If the cause is inseparable from the effect, then how do you know that "being built" is not the cause, and "building" is not the effect? And maybe it constantly switches back and forth, with the two continually changing places, each being sometimes the cause and other times the effect. If the cause is inseparable from the effect, then there is no principle by which you can say one is cause and the other effect.

Do you see why I say that your claim is ridiculous? You claim to be able to distinguish "building" from "being built", one the cause the other the effect. Yet you also claim that the two are concurrent and the cause is inseparable from the effect. Therefore whenever you describe the scenario, there is no way to know whether the description is of the builder building, or the house being built. In reality though, it is just one activity, and you've devised this elaborate way to say that it is two distinct activities, one cause and the other effect. And when it comes to telling me how to distinguish one from the other, you admit that the cause cannot be distinguished from the effect, "they are inseparable".

By referring to a good dictionary when you see a term used in a way that is new to you. — Dfpolis

I referred to my OED, and "passion" is said to be a noun. The nearest definition to fitting your usage was: "4a strong enthusiasm (has a passion for football). b an object arousing this." There is nothing anywhere similar to your usage in my OED. However, there are definitions of "passive" which are similar. For example: "1 suffering action; acted upon." I think maybe you confused words, and meant "passive". However, if you tried to talk about the passiveness of the house being built, this would more clearly reveal the nonsense of your expressions. So you try to hide it behind a strange use of "passion".

Yes, I am but I am not saying it is a completed house, but a house under construction. — Dfpolis

OK, let's ignore all our differences, and start here, where we agree. Do you agree that at the construction site, there is not a house, there is activity which we can call "the construction of a house", or, "a house under construction". Both these phrases refer to the exact same thing, and "the house" only exists as a plan, a goal, or the end of that construction project. Do you agree that to talk about causation here, we need to include "final cause"?

And continuing, corresponding to the action of the builder building, is the passion of the thing being built. And all of this makes perfect sense. — tim wood

How does this "make perfect sense to you"? The passion is in the builder, not the thing being built. And even if we take "passive", which means "suffering action; acted upon", instead of "passion", the passivity is in the materials which the builder works with. The "thing being built" doesn't even exist, it is an idea, a goal in the builder's mind.

The substance, then, is the house. The accident applied to it in this case is passion. Not that the house is doing anything, but rather something is being done to the house: it is being built. — tim wood

You're missing the point tim. The house does not exist, it is a goal in the builder's mind, existing as a formula. The accidental properties of the house only come into being after each part of the house is built.

This is out of context, and misapplied by Df. What is described in your quoted passage is the difference between accidental and essential properties of things. How Df is using the term is as a property of an activity, "the passion of being built". Df states that being built is something which has the property of being acted on (passion). That is a category mistake.

Df is not saying that there is a house which is being acted on, and this "being acted on" is a passion of the house, because there is no house, the house does not yet exist, it is being built. What there is, is a project, a goal, intention, or end, which is being acted on. Df takes this final cause, and attempts to convert it into an efficient cause, through the category mistake mentioned above.

Df applies Aristotle's distinction between accidental and essential properties of things, to activities of causation, to create the appearance that acting and being acted on are two separate properties of a single activity which is called "building" or "being built" depending on whether the subject is the builder (building), or the house (being built). But the house is not yet built, it exists as a goal, and that goal acts as a final cause. Therefore the house cannot be described as a thing being acted on (having a passion). What is "being acted on" is the project, or goal, the end.

If you can make sense of what Df is saying, other than as the category mistake I describe above, then I would be very grateful to see your explanation. Df simply reasserts what has been said, which makes no sense to me because it appears as a category mistake.

In set theory, two sets that are equal are the same set. — fishfry

Conclusion: set theory is in violation of the law of identity. I've explained to you why this is the case. Do you agree with me?

Again, you are missing the point. The necessity is not in the decision to build, but in the relation between the act of building as cause and the passion of being built as effect. — Dfpolis

This doesn't make any sense Df. Passion is emotion, feeling. The phrase "the passion of being built doesn't make sense. You claim "passion in the technical sense", but Google doesn't even come up with any such thing.

If we remove "passion", then all we have is "the act of building", and "being built". But these two are exactly the same thing. Of course they are concurrent, as they are two different ways of saying the same thing. But there is no cause and effect here, they are one and the same thing. If we add "passion" into the scenario, then we are talking about the passion of the builder, and this acts as a cause, not an effect. And, the ambition to build is prior in time in relation to the acts of building which follow from it.

The concurrent necessity between building and being built is being asserted, not a necessity in the choice to build. — Dfpolis

The only necessity here is that these two expressions "building", and "being built", both refer to the exact same thing. Look: "we are 'building' a house", or "a house is 'being built'. They are both just different ways of referring to the exact same thing, the house that we are building. There is no cause or effect here, just one thing, described as a house being built, or the house that we are building. In one case "builders" are implied and in the other "builders" are explicit.

If you want to separate cause from effect, you separate "builders" from the act of building, as the cause of that act, or the act of building from the house, as cause of the house. But you cannot divide the act into "building" and "being built", and say that one is cause and the other effect, because they both refer to the very same thing. And the fact that they refer to the same thing is the reason why you can say that they are concurrent. But it's also the reason why they are not cause and effect.

That does not mean that the activity of producing the effect (e.g. building) is prior to the passion of the effect being produced (e.g. being built). — Dfpolis

Again, you are speaking nonsense, attributing "passion" to "being built". Passion is a human emotion, feeling. In no intelligible sense, is "passion" used to refer to what "being built", or "being produced" feels like.

Try assuming that I know what I am talking about and see if you can make your interpretation of my words fit that assumption. When I say I am only discussing efficient causality, I mean that I am only discussing that one of the four causes. I do not mean that there are no other causes. It is only by looking for ways in which I might be wrong that these two ideas can be confused. — Dfpolis

How can I possibly assume that you know what you are talking about when you use "passion" in that way? Please, at least try to explain what "the passion of being built" could possibly mean. The only way that you separate the act of building from the act of being built, to say that being built is the effect of building, as a cause, is by saying that being built is a passion. Clearly though, you have this backward. The builder has a passion for building, and as such passion is a cause in the building process, not an effect.

Making a commitment is not an isolated event. It sets up a committed state. If I am walking and decide to stop, that commitment (the state of being committed to walking) ends, as does my walking. — Dfpolis

But it is not concurrent, it is prior. The state of being committed to walking ends before the walking ends, even if it's only a fraction of a second, it's still prior, and causal.

So, you are claiming that building and being built are not concurrent? If so, we have no common basis for continuing. — Dfpolis

The activity of the builder, as builder, is prior to the activity which is the house being built. This is because the builder must study and understand general principles (and this qualifies as activity of a builder) prior to the activity which is the particular house being built.

I see we have no common basis for continuing. You insist on nonsensical use of "passion" which makes passion the effect of the builder building rather than use a true description which recognizes passion as a cause of the builder building. And you assert that what you argue is Aristotelian.

I never claimed that any and all acts of the builder are concurrent with being built, but only the act of building. Please do not extend what I say to make it wrong. I never denied that builders plan or have free will. — Dfpolis

OK, have it your way, only the acts of the builder which are identical to the acts described as being built, are concurrent. Of course, they are one and the same thing. So there is no cause/effect here.

No, it does not. I do not have time to deal with your negativity. You can take my word for it or Google it. — Dfpolis

You claimed to have quoted Aristotle's definition of change. A quote requires a reference.

We need not use the word same if it bothers you. — fishfry

Great, I prefer the word "equal". It's better suited for that purpose. "Equal" generally allows that the two things which are said to be equal are not necessarily the same. "Same" is defined by the law of identity as indicating one thing only. That is the commonly expressed difference between "same" and "equal". "Equal" indicates a similarity of two things by both sharing an identifiable property, while "same" means that you are referring to one thing only.

Then why are you disagreeing with me? — fishfry

Generally I disagree with your wording, as indicated above. The axiom of extensionality indicates what is required for two sets to be equal, yet you state this as "the same". That I take as a mistaken use of words.

And if you say it's a useful deception, that's fine. — fishfry

I didn't say that though. I simply gave an example of how fiction is useful, one that was obvious. Many times fiction is used in ways not intended to deceive, like the use of counterfactuals in logic, for example. So, the issue is complex, because mathematics, like fiction in general has many uses.

May I ask, is chess similarly a useful deception? Language? You didn't respond to my point earlier that language is also a formal symbology that attempts to capture, however imperfectly. some aspect of abstract thought. — fishfry

These are broad generalizations which I can't relate to because I do not accept them as valid generalizations, so I do not reply. For example, you say that language "attempts to...". But language doesn't attempt anything, individual people attempt to do things with the use of language. And, there is such an extremely broad range of things which people attempt to do with language, that it doesn't make sense to make the generalization that what people attempt to do with language is to capture "some aspect of abstract thought".

What is wrong with that? — Ludwig V

I don't see how recursion qualifies as an infinite activity.

2 + 2 and 4 symbolize the same set. You are the one strawmanning the claim that somebody says they're the same thing. — fishfry

My point has always been that "same" in this context is not consistent with "same" in the context of the law of identity. So, to say " 2+ 2 and 4 symbolize the same set" is to use "same in a way which is in violation of the law of identity.

Whether we are talking about "same thing", "same set", "same number", or "same kick in the ass", is irrelevant. The point is that this specific use of "same" is very clearly in violation of the law of identity. If the law of identity indicates that only a thing can be said to be "the same", and you do not believe that a set is a thing, and you want to say that a set is the same, then I suggest that you do not agree with the way that "same' is used by the law of identity. Is this the case? Do you believe that mathematicians have a better definition of "same"?

If math is a flagrant fiction, why's it so darn useful? — fishfry

In case you have never noticed, fiction is extremely useful. I suggest you begin with a look at the obvious, deception. Deception demonstrates that fiction is very useful in convincing others, to help us get what we want from them. And, so is mathematics.

The necessity is bilateral and in the present tense. There can be no builder building without a building being built and vice versa. — Dfpolis

The necessity is not bilateral because from the perspective of the builder, to build is a freely willed choice. The so-called necessity of "a building being built" is a feature of the way that you describe the agent, as "a builder". If the agent decided to do something other than build, this would not negate the existence of the agent, it would negate the descriptive term "builder".

So the relation of "necessity" between builder and building involves two distinct senses of "necessity" and the conclusion that "the necessity is bilateral involves equivocation. From the perspective of seeing an existing building, or even a building being built, it is logically necessary that there is a builder. But from the perspective of the builder, the building is "necessary" in the sense of something needed, desired as an end. These two senses of "necessary" are very distinct. The builder is a "builder" whether that person decide to work on this particular project or not therefore there is no logical necessity between the builder and the project, from the builder's perspective..

Furthermore, it is very clear, from the nature of planning, that there truly is a builder acting on the project, by preparing for the possibility of it, "without a building being built". That is to say that the builder acts on the project before the project even exists, and this is a matter of gaining experience.

This is proven by the fact that plans are most often general, and the general plan for a type of building, a house, preexists actual building of the particular house. Therefore the builder is building, studying general plans and building codes, for some time before there is actually a building being built.

To deny the temporal priority of the general formula, or plan, for a house, in relation to a particular house being built, is to completely ignore the principal problem being dealt with by Aristotle in his Metaphysics. This is the issue brought forth in Plato's Timaeus, the question of how it is that a general idea, a universal form, in its temporal priority, acts to determine the form of the particular, when that particular comes into being. To take Aristotle's example of the potential of an acorn, the general form, or universal type of "oak tree" precedes the growth of the seed, and determines the type of thing which the particular will be, prior to the existence of the particular.

Your way of portraying the actions of the agent as concurrent with the effects of those acts, and as a bilateral necessity, completely obscures this issue, of how it is that an intentional agent can work with universal principles, a general formula, to create particular individuals of that type.

Baloney. The builder is an efficient cause, and that is the only cause I discussed. — Dfpolis

You described an instance of the act of building, and this act is caused by final causation, intention, as per Aristotle's description of the four senses of "cause". That you call this "efficient cause" only indicates that you do not understand Aristotle.

Read what I said. I said it is a passion of the house being built. It is not a passion in the emotional sense, but in the technical sense of suffering an action. — Dfpolis

The act of building is prior to the house, as efficient cause, and the will or intent to build is prior to the act of building as the final cause. If we look backward, at the house's coming into being through a causal chain of efficient causes, the end of that chain (which is the beginning in time) is the final cause, the intent of the builder. That is how a freely willed act works, the agent desires something and causes (through final causation) the efficient causes which are seen as required, as the means to that end.

If I do not wish to build now, I will not build now. Planning may be prior, but the commitment to act now is concurrent with acting now. — Dfpolis

No, this is a false description. The act follows the commitment (decision) which is prior to, as cause of the act. The two are not "concurrent". I decide to walk, and the activity of walking is the effect which follows from this cause. The person may deliberate, and decide to act at a very specific time, but the physical (observable) act is posterior to the mental (unobservable) decision to act.

I did not deny that because I did not discuss final causation, but efficient causation. — Dfpolis

Your failure to take into consideration the role of final causation is what produces the faulty description that there is a "bilateral necessity" and that the acts of the builder, and the building being built, are concurrent. They are very clearly not concurrent because the planning of the building is an act of the builder which is prior to any building being built. If you would take into account the role of final causation you would understand that there is no such bilateral necessity, and no concurrency. In reality, if you just look at the actions of the builder, you might not even know that there is "a building being built", until the builder is well into the project. You refer to the end, the final cause, "the building" when you say that there is "a building" which is being built. So you refer to final causation yet claim you do not discuss final causation.

Again, there can be no building a house now without a house being built now. — Dfpolis

Yes there is activity of the builder as "builder" of a house, now, without a house being built because the planning, which requires understanding of general principles, is a part of the activity of building which is prior to the activity that is referred to as "a house being built". This is the difference between what is observable and what is not observable. The planning is a part of the builder's activity of building which is prior to the observable activity which is described as "a house being built. That the two are distinct is true and proven from the fact that the planning may be generic, while "a house being built" is particular. And learning the general principles is a necessary part of "building a house" while it is not a part of "a house being built, because the former refers to the general and the latter refers to the particular. Therefore it is very clear that there is activity of the builder which is prior to, cause of, and necessary for, the particular instance of "a house being built".

I quoted Aristotle's definition of change, not mine. — Dfpolis

That would require a reference.

...then buy Twitter, now known as X... — Shawn

That's a cool name, "Twitter, now known as X". When will the sublimation be complete?

Aristotle and the Scholastics distinguish two kinds of efficient causality: accidental, which is the time sequence by rule Hume and Kant discuss, and essential. Accidental causality involves two events separated in time. Because they are separated, an intervening event can prevent the cause from bringing about the effect. Hence Hume was correct in arguing that time-sequenced causality lacks necessity. — Dfpolis

I do not agree with this interpretation. Aristotle did not distinguish accidental efficient causation from essential efficient causation in the way you describe. Nor did the scholastics. Aristotle classed luck and chance as accidental causation, and the four commonly referred to causes are the essential conditions for change. Efficient causation is an essential condition, described by Aristotle as "the primary source of change" and it follows the time sequence described by Hume.

It is from the perspective of the effect that the efficient cause is apprehended as necessary. If the building has been built, it is necessary that there was an act of building.

In essential causality there is one event, and cause and effect are concurrent. Aristotle's paradigm case is a builder building a house. The cause is the builder building. The effect is the house being built. Yet, the action of the builder building the house is identically the passion of the house being built by the builder. — Dfpolis

Here you conflate final cause with efficient cause to create a new concept which you call "essential cause". This is not Aristotelian. The efficient cause of the house is the action of the builder, the act of building. The cause of the builder building, what you call "the passion" of the builder, is the final cause. Why is the builder building? Because the builder desires a house. This is just like Aristotle's example. Why is the man walking? He is walking because he desires health. The final cause of the builder's activity of building is the desire for a house, just like the final cause of the walker's activity of walking is the desire for health. That is the nature of "intention" which is how we understand "final cause".

When final causation is given it's proper position, instead of conflating it with efficient causation, the temporal succession is evident. The desire to build (intention, final cause) is temporally prior to the activity of building, which is the efficient cause of the house.

As there is only one event, no intervention is possible, and this kind of causality (the actualization of a potential by the concurrent action of an agent) has intrinsic necessity. Since potentials are not yet operational, they cannot actualize themselves. So, something else that is already operational (actual) must work to actualize any potential. That is one of the most fundamental insights of Aristotle's metaphysics. — Dfpolis

And this is not quite correct either. The action of the agent is volitional therefore there is no intrinsic necessity to that act. Yes, in hindsight the final cause (will) of the agent is necessary, just like the efficient cause is necessary, in hind sight. But, we cannot distinguish one from the other in the way that you propose, as one being essential, and the other accidental. They are both essential conditions of the house, as are the material and the formal cause as well.

However, I agree that you are correct to say that something else, which in this case is the intentional act of the agent, (final cause), is necessary as the act which actualizes a potential, causing what we know as activity. And, I agree that this was a great achievement by Aristotle. But I do not like your characterization of this cause of activity, as "essential efficient causation". Since efficient causation is activity itself, then characterizing the cause of this activity as a further efficient causation, would just create an infinite regress of efficient causation. That's what the idea "concurrent action" as simultaneous cause and effect induces, an infinite regress of action.

Aristotle put an end to that infinite regress with "final cause". So conventional interpretation, as well as Scholastic interpretation, understands the cause of the builder's activity of building as final cause, the will to have a house. Likewise, God's activity of creating is caused by the final cause known as God's Will. Why did God create the earth? He saw that it was good.

Since God is unchanging, and time is the measure of change according to before and after, God is timeless. — Dfpolis

This is not valid logic. Time is stated as the measure of change, it is not stated as change itself, or even derived from change. Since time is the measure of change it must transcend all change. That which transcends change cannot be timeless, or time itself would be timeless. Therefore even if God is unchanging, this does not mean that God is timeless.

So, there is no separation of plan and execution in God. Thus, God's will for a being to exist creates the being. As would be the case when the builder stops building, if God were to stop willing the being of a creature, the effect (the existence of the creature) would cease. Thus, creation is not a launch and forget process, but an on-going activity. — Dfpolis

I agree with this, in a way. But the classical Christian conception of God is as a trinity, so we can still consider a separation, in principle, between plan and execution, in God. Augustine compared the trinity of God to the trinity of the human intellect, which consists of memory, reason (understanding), and will. If the plan exists in memory, then there is a separation in principle, between the plan and the execution. It may be the case that the act of God is inseparable from God's Will, but this would mean that God is changing in accordance with His Will. Therefore we could not say that God is unchanging.

Because God is the end of the line of concurrent explanation (essential causality). Since He is the end of the line there is nothing prior to actualize any potential He may have. So, God can have no potential. That means that God is pure act = fully actualized being. Change is the actualization of a potential insofar as it is still in potency. Since God has no unactualized potential, He cannot change. Since he cannot change, there is no before and after in God => God is timeless. — Dfpolis

This is where your interpretation becomes problematic. The end of the line of efficient causation is known under Aristotelian principles as final cause. The terms "end" as what is intended, and "final" in final causation are not merely coincidence. We agree that God can have no potential, and is pure act, but this does not mean that he does not change. That "change is the actualization of a potential", is your condition, produced from your interpretation, which appears to be a little bit faulty.

According to Aristotle change is the result of causation, and causes are of four principle types. One of these types is final cause, and we find examples in acts of free will. That the will is free implies that it causes a type of change which is not dependent on potential.

sign game of perfect information — sime

See that phrase, "perfect information"? That's why I say formalism attempts to do the impossible. In other words, it assumes an ideal which cannot be obtained, therefore it's assumption is necessarily false.

So I think your problem is actually with Platonic myths that have become psychologically wedded to innocent formal definitions, and in particular the formal definitions of limits and total functions that are ubiquitously misinterpreted in both popular and scientific culture as denoting a non-finite amount of information, E.g as when the physicist Lawrence Krauss misleads the public with nonsense about the physical implications of Hilbert Hotels. — sime

I view formalism as a form of Platonism. It's a Platonist game in which the participants deny their true character, that of being Platonist. Notice "perfect information" is the foundational feature of Platonist idealism. That perfection is the only thing which supports the eternality of Platonic ideals. So formalism and Platonism are really just the same thing, even though the formalists will claim otherwise.

But I don't think I have, because before that you refused to even acknowledge my proof that 2 + 2 = 4 from the Peano axioms. — fishfry

I have no problem acknowledging that 2+2=4. I have a problem with people who claim that "2+2" symbolizes the same thing that "4" does. And so, I refused to accept your claim to have proven that "2+2" signifies the very same thing as "4" does. Simply put, if the right side of an equation does not signify something distinct from the left side, mathematics would be completely useless.

You can say that I have a problem with formalism, because I do. Like claiming that accepting certain axioms qualifies as having counted infinite numbers, formalism claims to do the impossible. That is, to remove all content from a logical application, to have a logical system which is purely formal. If such a thing was possible we'd have a logical system which is absolutely useless, applicable to nothing whatsoever. Attempts at formalism end up disguising content as form, producing a smoke and mirrors system of sophistry, which is riddled with errors, due to the inherent unintelligibility of the content, which then permeates through the entire system, undetected because its existence is denied.