Ok. So we still have no explanation of how you came to misapprehend "=". — Banno

Did you not understand the example I gave you in the other thread? I suggest you go back and read that post you made for me when you fed that example to Chat GPT. It totally agreed with me. It said, in much arithmetic and mathematics "=" signifies equality, not identity. Chat GPT does not lie you know. The simple fact, as my example shows, an "equation" would be completely useless if the left side signified the very same thing as the right side.

Is Metaphysician Undercover a product of the New Maths? :wink: — Banno

I do not think I was ever subjected to new math. I simply learned at a very young age not to follow rules without a reason for doing so. I was not interested in the things which mathematics was useful for, so it was dismissed from my curriculum, as soon as possible, until the need was developed. So my education in mathematics was done in an 'as required' way, rather than a force-feeding of conventional 'fact' to memorize, like history.

Infinity pools can indeed be awesome — ssu

You get the same effect when you take a boat on a reservoir, up toward the dam, the higher the dam the better. It's like empirical proof that the earth is flat, and you're at the edge of the world.

I am not sure if this is so much a problem with mathematics though as it is with how it gets applied to the sciences and philosophy. It seems to me that infinite divisibility might be worth investigating even if it doesn't accurately reflect "how things are." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think there is a very close relationship between "mathematics" as the principles, rules etc., and the application of those principles. As Plato said, the people who use the tools ought to have a say in the design of the tool. And in reality they do, because the ones using the tools choose and buy the ones they like, therefore design and production is tailored for the market of application.

So in the case of "infinite" for example, the principles of calculus allow for the representation of an operation which is carried out without a limit. The limit is infinite, which essentially means there is no limit, and the operation proceeds endlessly. This representation proved to be very useful in application.

The issue we can look at, as philosophers, is what exactly is the effect of such an untruthful representation. First, we need to accept the fact that it is untruthful. To allow into any logical "conclusion", that an operation has been carried out without end is a false premise. In reality, the need to carry out the operation endlessly would deny the possibility of a conclusion.

The next step I believe, is to apprehend the level of ignorance which this untruthful representation propagates. There are some very specific problems produced from our conceptions of the continuity of space and time, which were demonstrated by Zeno. The mathematical representation (or more properly misrepresentation) as a premise in calculus, creates the illusion that these problems have been resolved, and so there is denial and ignorance concerning the reality of the problem amongst many people.

Finally, we can see how allowing this untruthful representation actually magnifies the problem rather than resolving it. When the usefulness of the misrepresentation is apprehended and recognized, it, and similar forms are allowed to pervade throughout the logical system (we can call this the propagation of self-deception). This creates the issue pointed to by the op, the need for different types of infinities, infinities of infinities, and the transfinite in general. The issue with the transfinite being, that some applications require the truth, a finite number, while others require the impossible, or false representation of a conclusion drawn from an endless operation, so some applications require a relationship between the two, hence the "transfinite". We can look at it as a bridge between the untruthful, and the truthful, a bridge which enables the self-deception.

You have mentioned, for example, that the limit concept is flawed, although it works well most of the time. But I don't recall your argument beyond that point. A more complete knowledge of space and time and points and continuity? Oh yes, something about the Fourier transform and the Uncertainty principle. What are your suggestions to fix that up? Intuitive mathematics? Remind me where doing something specific makes it better. — jgill

I think the obvious point to start with is divisibility. Generally, mathematics provides that a quantity, any quantity, can be divided in any way. We can call that "infinite divisibility". In reality, there is very clearly many division proposals which simply cannot be done. Because of this fact, that there are real restrictions on divisibility, there is a very big difference between dividing a group of things, and dividing a single object. Each of these two types of division projects has a different type of restrictions or limitations on it.

For example, to divide a group of seven human beings into two equal groups is a project that cannot be done, even though common math would say seven divided by two is three and a half. So we'd have to chop a person in half. But then we'd have eight objects instead of seven, because we'd have have two halves, which are two objects, but unequal to the other six objects. So we have to conclude that the way we divide a group, or quantity of things is seriously restricted.

Further, the way that we quantify something dictates the way that the quantity can be quantized. So if we use weight for example, to measure the volume of a group of grains of sand, we do not count the grains and divide the number of grains evenly, we look at the sand as one thing, with one weight, and divide that weight however we will. But there will still be a issue with precise division, when we get to the point of needing to divide individual grains of sand.

This leads into the problem of dividing single objects. An object is a unit, and this is fundamentally a unity of parts. If there is an object which is not composed of parts, like the ancient atomists proposed for the "atom", this object would be indivisible, and provide the basis for the rules of all division projects. However, such an object has not been found, so the guidelines for dividing a unit must follow the natural restrictions provided by the divisibility of the type of object. Different types require different rules, so mathematics provides for all possibilities (infinite divisibility). What physicists have found, is that the true restrictions to divisibility of all things, are based in mass and wave action, rather than composite "parts".

This means that in order to provide the proper rules or guidelines for the division of units, unities, we need to understand the real nature of space and time. Mass is a feature of temporal extension at a point in space, and waves are a feature of spatial extension at a point in time. Where the common principles of mathematics mislead us is the assumption of "continuity", and this is closely related to the simplistic notion of "infinite divisibility".

Now we have two closely related, but faulty principles of mathematics, infinite divisibility and continuity. They are applied by physicists, and people believe they provide a true representation of reality, when physicists know that the evidence indicates the presence of discrete quanta rather than an infinitely divisible continuity. Therefore our representations of spatial and temporal features need to be completely reworked. To begin with, as I've argued in other threads, representing space with distinct continuous dimensions (Euclidian geometry) is fundamentally flawed. The separations within space indicated by quantum physics, must indicate distinct incommensurable parts. These distinct parts are the parts which may be represented dimensionally, and the parts which cannot be represented that way. However, they must be incorporated together in a way which adequately represents what's real. At the current time, we have a dimensional, continuous line (numberline), with non-dimensional points (real numbers) which may divide the line infinitely, but this is just an unprincipled imaginary concept which in no way represents the real divisibility of space, and it becomes completely inapplicable when physicists approach the real divisibility of space.

Except incompleteness (in the sense of the incompleteness theorem). — TonesInDeepFreeze

That's a specific, restricted definition of "incompleteness". The term is slightly different in physics for example. So this is an example of what I am talking about. Mathematics also uses a specific, restricted definition of "infinite", a meaning exclusive to mathematics, determined by the axioms. The mathematicians designing the axioms tailor the meaning of the term, to suit their purposes.

Here's actually some advice to all non-mathematicians (from a non-mathematician):

If you really can ask an interesting foundational question that isn't illogical or doesn't lacks basic understanding, you actually won't get an answer... because it really is an interesting foundational question!

Yet if the answer is, please start from reading "Elementary Set Theory" or something similar then yes, you do have faulty reasoning. — ssu

I disagree. The "math boys" here at the forum tend to respond with 'go read some math texts' to anyone who disagrees with them on fundamental principles. In that case, the issue is not a matter of better learning the mathematical representation of the fundamental principles, and how to apply them mathematically, as a math text will demonstrate, it is a matter of disagreement with those mathematical representations. Therefore the reply of "please start from reading 'Elementary Set Theory' or something similar", is usually just a copout, a refusal to engage with the philosophical matter at hand as if further reading of the mathematics will change a person's mind, who already disagrees with it. That's like telling an atheist to go read some theology, as if this is the way to turn the person around.

The point I was making is that concepts like infinity, incompleteness, and even computability, extend beyond mathematics. So, the mathematical approach is only one approach to such concepts. The philosophical approach, specifically the dialectical approach, is to consider the way that such concepts appear in all the different fields. The way that each field deals with the concepts demonstrates how that field fits, or does not fit, within a consistent whole philosophy. To say that such concepts are the domain of mathematics, therefore mathematicians ought to define them, is to make a statement not consistent with the world we live in.

And sometimes people post questions about mathematical subjects that have bearing on philosophy, such as about infinities, incompleteness and computability. — TonesInDeepFreeze

You have this inverted. These are actually philosophical issues which have a bearing on mathematics. The way that a particular mathematician deals with these issues exposes their philosophical inclinations, or lack thereof.

It's interesting that you title the thread "the art of thinking". I believe the key to bringing anxiety into the category of beneficial is to provide it with direction. Notice what is stated in your first sentence, your inclination is to ask the person in distress, what do they want. But if the distress is anxiety related this is a useless question, because anxiety only creates distress if the anxiety in undirected. Rather than the fear of the unknown, anxiety is the unknown of fear.

Anxiety can be said to "create" distress, and the purpose for anxiety in general is to motivate the creative act. But if there is nothing substantial being created, the anxiety is undirected and the result is distress. The key to making your anxiety beneficial (and this means to progress beyond simply coping with anxiety) is to be creative. Anxiety is a reflection of your living disposition toward the future. When you are fearful of the future and the reason for being fearful is unknown, that thought, the reason why you are fearful is replaced by anxiety. When you are actively doing something, being creative, you bring the future into your control, by knowing what you are doing. If a reason for fear arises, it is in relation to what you are doing, and you know the reason for it.

So my answer to "Does my anxiety help me in something?" is yes, it most certainly does. It helps you to be creative. Without any anxiety you would not do anything. However, it is very important that when you feel anxiety you actually do something. So the anxiety is first, it is fundamental to the living being, and it is from the subconscious, the drive to be active. If you are actively doing something your fears will be revealed to your thoughts, and your anxiety will continue to seek more unknowns (as curiousity), to be revealed through action. If you are inactive, the unknowns will overwhelm you.

What is the proper interpretation of the cosmological constant Λ? I understand that it corresponds to a vacuum energy density, pervading all reality. Such energy is called dark energy, I gather. Since I'm sketchy on field theory, I don't know how this goes, but somehow this energy density produces a repulsive force beween any two objects in spacetime (within each other's lightcones?). Matter remains cohesive because Λ is very small compared to other forces, so that its effects really only show at an intergalactical scale (megaparsec). — DanCoimbra

I would say that is one interpretation of "dark energy", but here would be a number of possible interpretations.

ow, somehow this leads to the expansion of the Universe even in the case where the Universe is finite and bounded, which is a possibility considered by cosmologists. In this case, the Universe is increasing in total size, but not increasing *into* anywhere, so it becomes bigger because it has more internal spatial structure. This is what I meant. Why do you think this is incorrect? — DanCoimbra

What I meant is that "more internal spatial structure" is not consistent with Einsteinian relativity, because that would render a whole lot of predictions about the motions of things as inaccurate. We can posit "dark energy" as the reason why the predictions are inaccurate, but then where is this dark energy, and what is it doing other than making the predictions inaccurate,
.

I just think if mathematical axioms are to be selected, they have to be such that they do not lead to what is contradictory to Existence/Truth (or just semantics in general). — Philosopher19

The problem inherent within pragmaticism is that whatever is the purpose at the time (the flavour of the day), the axioms chosen will support that purpose. As time goes by, and needs change, other axioms will be produced to satisfy the evolving needs. At this point, the new and the old are not necessarily consistent, so there may be a degree of contradiction between different logical structures, depending on the purpose which they each serve,

If a mathematician or a philosopher decides on an axiom or theory that requires belief in the following (or at least logically implies it or leads to it): Nothing can be the set of all things (which logically implies Existence is not the set of all existents), or one infinity is a different bigger than another (or is a different quantity than another), I believe that axiom or theory should be disregarded or at least viewed as contradictory to Existence/Truth (or at least contradictory to the semantic of infinity). — Philosopher19

I agree that it is appropriate to set a standard of "truth" for mathematical axioms.

What the Universe's expansion means, whether it is infinite or not, is that its local energy density is decreasing. In other words, there is more spatial structure between each of its internal field excitations (particles, energy). — DanCoimbra

Hi Dan, I see you're new here, so welcome to this space.

I don't think it's proper to say that expansion means "more spatial structure" between internal field excitations, unless you are speaking of a "spatial structure" which is other than Einsteinian space-time.

So true. The OPs lay out belief systems in one form or another, and sometimes they don't budge. Which I find acceptable in Metaphysician Undercover's pronouncements, for he dwells with the ancients as they ponder space, time, and points and curves - although he balks at 1+4=5 and has little patience with Weierstrass and his limit ideas: admittedly useful, but fundamentally flawed. But I see where he is coming from there. Others, like this thread, are more or less unmovable in their opinions, which clash with standard mathematics. How you deal with the frustration of offering knowledge to those unwilling to accept it is admirable. — jgill

Now, now, let's have fair representation. I balk at the claim that "1+4=5" implies that "1+4" refers to the exact same thing as "5" does. And, I have no patience for people like fishfry who simply assert over and over again, that the axiom of extensionality proves that "1+4" and "5" must refer to the exact same thing in common applications. Further, although I am very interested in the fundamental incompatibility between the proposal of non-dimensional points, and the proposal of a continuous one-dimensional line, I believe no one until today has brought Weierstrass to my attention.

I tried dealing with 1. and 2. earlier, in mathematical analogues, but there was no interest. I could easily deal with 3. as well, but that takes the thread away from the spectacular leap from a first cause being something imaginable to an existential realm. — jgill

I dealt with the existential realm, but there was no interest in that either. So where does that leave us?

Suppose someone produces an axiom. Will it not be the case that that axiom will either be contradictory in relation to certain truths or consistent in relation to certain truths? Existence determines what is true and what is false. Whether any belief or axiom highlights truths or is contradictory to truth is determined by Existence/Truth. If not, there is no truth or semantics to work with to deduce further truths. — Philosopher19

I really don't think "truth" in this way is relevant. This is more of an issue of pragmatics, mathematics is a tool. You wouldn't say that one saw is more truly a saw than another saw, or on shovel is a more true shovel than another. So the axioms which are accepted, "which are bought", are the ones which mathematicians like to use. It may well be the case that existence determines truth, like you say, but that's not relevant to the selection of mathematical axioms.

I do believe we can bring "truth" into the picture in a different way though. Since mathematicians can choose to use whichever axioms they feel comfortable with, we can say that the axioms follow use. That means that they are a reflection of what mathematicians are doing. Therefore we can say that they are descriptive rather than prescriptive. The axioms do not give mathematicians rules for how to do things, because the mathematicians get to create and choose their own axioms. So the axioms simply provide a representation of what mathematicians are doing. Since they are descriptions, "truth" is to be found in how well the axioms represent what the mathematicians are actually doing. As an analogy, consider looking at a dictionary and judging how truthfully the definitions represent how people are actually using the words which are defined there.

Of course: nuclear reactions have emergent aspects by themselves, but you should distinguish these from emergent chemical features.
You can of course lump everything together and say that the universe, with everything in it, is emergent as a whole. But that means that the various properties of the universe are obscured. — Ypan1944

Well, I think if we're talking about emergency, we ought to consider the whole category, not just "emergent chemical features". If the reality of the situation is "that the various properties of the universe are obscured", then we need to respect that, rather than trying to obscure that fact by hiding it or denying it.

My belief is that we can't just produce axioms. We can only recognise truths about Existence such as 1 add 1 equals 2 or the angles in a triangle add up to 180 degrees or one cannot count to infinity. — Philosopher19

Axioms are simply produced, created. The ones which prove to be useful are put to use, and they persist by becoming conventional. "Truths about Existence" is irrelevant to the mathematicians who create axioms.

That is the heart of the issue. With logic, we might demonstrate the "validity" of the non-physical, but if the logic is sound, it would also demonstrate the truth or "reality" of the non-physical. The physicalist would argue that valid logic does nothing to prove the non-physical because so much logic proceeds from fictitious, fantasy, or imaginary premises, and such is the claim to a priori.

The task of metaphysicians then, is to ground the a priori in sound principles. Sound principles are derived from the way that we "experience" reality. Principles consistent with experience are considered to be sound. Now "experience" must be allowed to extend beyond simple sense observation (the trap that empiricism gets looked into), to include the inner most experiences of being, as phenomenology does for example. In this way the metaphysician brings the validity of the arguments for the non-physical into the position of being sound as well. We just need to escape the empiricist trap, which is a metaphysical belief that sound principles of "experience" can only be provided by sense observation.
And if the physicalist argues that all experience is simply a response to sense stimuli this is demonstrably false.

Nuclear reactions have nothing to do with the features of an atom or molecule. For reactions between atoms or molecules, only the "outside" of an atom (i.e. the outermost electrons of the atom) plays a role. The emergent feature of an atom or molecule depends only on its outermost electron configuration. — Ypan1944

So I assume you are restricting the concept of "emergence" so that the products of nuclear reactions are not included as forms of emergence. How would you classify this activity then? Surely it's not downward causation. What type of causation is it?

One is free to propose different axioms that prove differently. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Since there is a whole lot of difference between the different types of numbers you outline, I think it a very good idea for a mathematician to look for a whole new set of axioms to better deal with the problem of having different types of numbers. This could avoid the problem of needing principles to relate the different types of numbers to each other, in an attempt to reconcile the sometimes irreconcilable difference between them. Attempting to reconcile the incompatibility between them tends to create a new type of infinity. So every time a new type of number is produced to deal with a specific problem that has arisen, a new type of infinity is produced. One could get rid of a whole lot of unnecessary complexity with a more comprehensive set of axioms..

I don't agree with you. The features of an atom are totally dependent on the electron configuration of the atom, which you can describe with quantummechanics (harmonic oscillator etc.). The internal structure of the nucleus is irrelevant. You only need to know the electric charge of the nucleus. — Ypan1944

I believe 99.999 per cent of an atom's mass is in the nucleus. And you claim the internal structure is irrelevant to "emergent phenomenon". I think you've unnecessarily restricted your definition of "emergent phenomenon" to include only the activity of electrons.

Also in chemical reactions, only the electron configuration of the participating atoms or molecules is important. — Ypan1944

What about nuclear reactions though, as we find in the sun and other stars? On the scale of the universe as a whole, nuclear reactions are more significant than chemical reactions.

One might argue that the latter encompasses imagining that the count to infinity is complete, but one cannot imagine such a thing. — Philosopher19

The answer to your problem is quite simple. In mathematics things are done by axiom. If you want to count to infinity and beyond, simply produce an axiom which allows you to do that, and bingo the infinite is countable, and you're ready to go beyond. Look closely at the following:

The way set theory proves there exists a set with all and only the natural numbers is by an axiom from which we prove that there exists a set with all and only the natural numbers. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Then why do you think bijection requires counting? — Banno

Actually, the inverse is what is the case, counting is a form of bijection. But this does not necessarily imply that all bijections are a form of counting. And, some might still argue that there are forms of counting which wouldn't qualify as bijections. It all depends on how one might restrict these concepts though definition.

The reality of non-physical actuality is demonstrated by logic, and the logic proceeds from premises derived from physical activity. The aspects of physical activity which lead to the conclusion of the non-physical cannot be understood by "physics", so the non-physicalist concludes that these aspects of reality can be approached through other processes of understanding, metaphysical principle which allow for the reality of the non-physical.

The physicalist metaphysics however, renders these aspects of reality as fundamentally unintelligible. So for example, we have everything within the realm of science which gets designated as "random" (random mutations of genes and abiogenesis, random fluctuations of quantum fields and symmetry-breaking), being rendered as fundamentally unintelligible by physicalism, whereas the non-physicalist would argue that such things are actually intelligible, if approached through non-physicalist premises.

"Strong emergency" in the title is very eye-catching. I thought it was going to be a thread about the relationship between down-ward causation and global climate change, as an example of a strong emergency.

In my opinion, this addition by Bedau is superfluous: you do can actually describe the properties of an emergent phenomenon with "normal" physics, where its substructure is usually irrelevant, so a form of "coarse graining" will happen (f.i. with Bohr's atomic model the substructure of the atomic nucleus is irrelevant, only the electric charge of the nucleus plays a role; and you need a new theory (namely quantum mechanics) to describe that phenomenon) — Ypan1944

I don't think this is correct. The strong force of the atom's nucleus is not understood by physics. And since the negative charge of the electrons is balanced by the positive charge of the nucleus, separation of the electrons from the nucleus is not possible. There would no longer be electrons if separation occurs, but free energy as photons. So the electron's "electric charge" is dependent on the atom's nucleus for explanation, and the nucleus cannot be left irrelevant.

Supervenience is therefore completely different from "downward causation". — Ypan1944

I find you have not provided a good explanation of "downward causation", only giving a general outline, and stating distinctly what downward causation is not.

Problems occur if you consider the elements of a set to not be themselves sets. Set theory only talks about sets. It does not, for example, talk about individuals.

The lists only list other lists... — Banno

The question of what "a set" is, the definition of "set", becomes an issue when you consider the possibility of an empty set. If a "set" is taken to be the type, category, or definition which indicates the criteria of membership, then an empty set is possible. If "set" is supposed to refer to the group or collection of elements itself, then an empty set is impossible because that would be a non-existent collection of elements. The "non-existent collection" could not be understood by that definition, because that would mean "set" is understood by the category, not the elements in membership, So it is at this point, when we consider the possibility of an empty set, that we need to make a judgement about the relationship between individuals and sets.

It wasn't meant to be a literal example, it was meant to give you a visual of something not being there, then there. The big bang is another typical example. Does that work better? — Philosophim

No, the big bang does not work better. Something not being there, then there, is not the problem, because the thing could move there. What is the problem is absolutely nothing, then something.

And I've asked you to give a concrete example. I've even noted that I believe you aren't doing it because you know if you do, your point will collapse. That's a challenge anyone who believed in their point would rise to. — Philosophim

It was a logical argument I provided. Concrete examples are unnecessary, either you can show me the weakness in the argument or not. You have not even tried, asking for a concrete example instead.

Ok, and a first cause is that which is not caused by something else. This does not show that what I stated is wrong. Cause 'implies' change? What does that mean? The definition of cause has been clearly noted, you've recognized it, and this doesn't address the point at all. Also, no example despite my request. — Philosophim

You still have not addressed the argument. A "cause" must have an effect. This means that something is caused to change. That is the effect of the cause. The thing which changes exists prior to the cause, and posterior to the cause. It doesn't matter whether the cause is a "first cause" or not, the thing which is caused to change by the cause, exists prior to the cause.

I've already gone over reason and prior reason. I was the one to say these words first to Ludwig, " All causes are reasons, but not all reasons are causes." So are the words I used to validate my points now invalid? — Philosophim

Yes your argument is invalid. You say, if there is no prior cause then there is no prior reason. That is an invalid conclusion if "not all reasons are causes" is true.

So I think we're done. I hope our next conversation doesn't have as much animosity from you next time. Especially after we started off so nicely when I said it was good to see you. Remember that? Lets end this on a high note. — Philosophim

There's no animosity on my part. It just seems like you get upset when you start to apprehend your mistakes.

So what judgement call are you actually hesitant in making? That the approaching object is John? Haven’t you tacitly made that call already, by not thinking it is any particular object at all, insofar as your proposition makes no mention of what you think the approaching object may or may not be? In effect, you’ve thought it unjustifiable to name the approaching object, which your proposition in fact represents. Another way to say you’re hesitant in making a judgement call, is to say you just don’t know. Which is fine, of course. — Mww

The judgement I was speaking of was whether or not the approaching object is John. But I think I see your point, this implies that I've already judged that it is a person, and for some reason, or reasons, I've singled out John as the person it may be. This would be what is at issue, the reason why I've decided it may be John, because this would be the "evidence " which I am considering, what justifies naming the approaching object with that name.

So the situation is, that the name "John" has come to my mind as possibly the correct name for the thing I already have judged as an approaching person. And "John" I associate with a particular individual whom I am acquainted with. Since the name "John" has come to my mind, and is the name I am considering, I ought to conclude that there is some thing, or things, which I have already judged as evidence of John. We have distinguished two types of evidence, direct evidence, as the consideration of the visual image, and the indirect, incidental, as things like the quality of my visual capacity, and the fact that I am expecting John.

It appears to me, like as @Michael pointed out, the incidental evidence is actually much stronger than the direct empirical evidence. The direct evidence in this case relies on making an association between the immediate visual image, and the memory. But this association must be allowed to be overruled by the incidental evidence. This means that direct, immediate, empirical evidence is at a low level in the scale of reliability. Incidental evidence, prior knowledge, like knowledge about the fallibility of the senses and memory, and in this case knowledge about John's habits and intentions, must be allowed to overrule direct empirical evidence.

In relation to arguments for "Physicalism", I would say that this is strong evidence against physicalism. Physicalism is mostly supported by the idea that direct empirical evidence is the most reliable. However, it is now quite clear that direct empirical evidence places very low on the scale of reliability. We must allow that logical arguments based in prior knowledge are far more reliable as evidence for or against physicalism. And the logical arguments which have stood the test of time are mostly against physicalism.

I understand and can accept most of that, with the exception of suspending judgement. From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible. — Mww

I think that the exact relation between thinking and judgement is a very difficult issue. And, depending on how one would define each, both being somewhat ambiguous in general use, would dictate the relationship established. But if "judgement" occurs on a multitude of different levels, then some thinking would be prior to some judgements and posterior to other judgements. Any way, if you feel inclined, I'd like to see the principles from which you draw that conclusion: " From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible."

It's not the judgments are compatible, its that the experience is compatible with both conclusions. If it was not compatible with both conclusions, then there would be no doubt. — Bylaw

The simple claim "the experience is compatible" is simply meaningless without clarification. Experience is meaningless without some sort of interpretation of it, and this would require a description in words, or at least some form of association. How we choose the words, such as "John" in the example, as a form of association, is a form of judgement. So talking about "experience" without judgement makes no sense. There is judgement inherent within any sort of reflection on experience.

The parts of the experience that might lead you to think John is approaching
are hard to consider evidence that John is not approaching.

But in in a situation where you are not sure John is approaching, but you think he is, the overall experience you are having contains evidence that he is not approaching. There is something about the entire experience that leads to doubt. — Bylaw

As Mww has (I believe) accurately described above, these different judgements are completely distinct judgements. "The thing looks like John", and "my eyes are faulty" are not necessarily related at all. Even distinct judgements of the visual impression itself are not necessarily related. "The coat looks like John's", "The type of walk does not look like John's", for example. Without the question "is that John", the individual parts of the sensual experience are unrelated, "red coat", "favours the right leg". Then, upon the question "is that John", the incidental evidence also becomes very important, "I am expecting John", "my eyes are bad so the visual sense experience is not reliable", etc., are now very important aspects of the overall experience.

The doubt, is dependent on how the various distinct judgements, direct empirical, and the indirect incidental, which are all part of the overall "experience", are related to each other. So, we must apply a further formula, or system of judgement to classify the distinct judgements as reliable and unreliable. And, as I showed above, direct empirical judgement needs to be be classed as low on the level of reliability.

So, there must be elements of the experience that FIT with it not being John approaching.

(and for what it's worth, it seems to me FJ has been fairly patiently trying to get his point across and felt it was important that you come up with the scenario and also that the scenario had specific features. I certainly could have missed things, but it seemed like your reactions included some negative assumptions about his attitudes and intentions which did not help the discussion. ) — Bylaw

FJ refused to separate different judgements which are very clearly distinct, as Mww shows. "That coat looks like John's coat", "my eyes are not very good", and "I am expecting John at this time", are all very distinct, and fundamentally unrelated judgements. FJ refused to separate these very distinct judgements, conflating them as one self-contradicting judgement. That is what my scenario shows, that FJ conflated very distinct judgements into what was claimed by FJ to be one judgement, which was demonstrably a self-contradicting judgement if it was actually one judgement.

I don't see your point, rain is the effect, the cloud is the cause. The water though, preexists the cloud.

Please articulate an argument supporting this premise. — ucarr

A cause, by definition, has an effect on something. The thing which it has an effect on must preexist the cause. In other words, "cause" implies "change", and "change" implies something which changes.

Naive question. Am I not right that, strictly speaking energy is work done - the capacity to do work is called "potential energy", isn't it? — Ludwig V

I don't think this is quite right. Energy is the capacity to do work. Something active has the capacity to do work, and this energy is kinetic energy. Something inactive, but in a condition to become active has potential energy. So for example, the energy within a fuel source is inactive, therefore potential energy, requiring ignition to become active and become kinetic energy. Each is the potential to do work, in slightly different forms.

I've given several examples. All I'm asking is for you to do the same. I'm not asking for proof that such a thing exists, just give me a possible example of something which makes logical sense that could exist. In my mind you're dodging the issue here. — Philosophim

I've seen you put up some examples of a possible first cause, (like a photon suddenly coming into existence from nothing), but none of your examples make any sense to me. A photon is a quantum of electromagnetic energy, it comes from an electron, it doesn't just come into existence from nothing.

Metaphysician...I've been kind so far and given you as much benefit of the doubt I can. This is stupid. You are better than this. Go to anyone else besides me and say that sentence and watch their confused looks. This is why I keep asking you for examples. If you cannot show how such a statement can logically exist I'm going to assume you're trolling or you are arguing in bad faith. Work on this and give me something good to think about please. — Philosophim

I've told you why it is illogical to say that there is nothing prior to the first cause, it's restated at the very beginning of this post, in my reply to ucarr. Please read it. All you do is make illogical assertions and say that anything other than your illogical assertion is "stupid".

What? No. If there's no prior cause, then there is nothing prior which caused a first cause to exist. If there is nothing prior to cause something, there is no prior reason for the existence of it either. — Philosophim

Reasserting the same invalid conclusion gets you nowhere. That there is no prior cause does not imply that there is no prior reason, because reason is the broader term. Do you not understand this? All causes are reasons, but not all reasons are causes.

Now we can reason about the existent thing. But we cannot say there is a prior reason, as there is nothing prior that caused it. Please demonstrate a situation in which there is no prior cause for something, yet there is a prior, and by this I mean temporal, reason for it. — Philosophim

And, as I've explained repeatedly, that there is not a cause prior to the first cause does not mean that there is nothing prior to the first cause. This is another instance of invalid reasoning.

I'll try explaining again. Lets take an example of a photon that appears without prior cause. Now, once it exists, it is bound by causality by what it is. Meaning it can't suddenly act like an atom, because it is a photon. It can't interact with other things as an elephant suddenly, because it is a photon. It is the first cause in a causality chain only because nothing caused it to exist. But its continued existence begins a causal chain with whatever happens at the next time tick of its existence. — Philosophim

A photon appearing uncaused makes no sense. Photons are known to have a source. This is how the history of the universe is understood through analysis of cosmic background radiation. If photons could appear from nothing, then the universe could not be understood in this way.

If there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. — Philosophim

Invalid conclusion repeated again.

Random is not inconsistent with an explanation, — Philosophim

"Random" explains nothing.

Quite so. It's perhaps worth noting that the same applies to what happens after the heat death of the universe. — Ludwig V

The supposed "heat death" is an interesting issue. The heat death is the result of entropy which is the natural effect of the passage of time. "Entropy" refers to energy which is unavailable to the system, but cannot be shown to have escaped the system. So by the rules of the conservation law, that energy must still be within the system somehow, only not available to the system.

This leaves us with the question of, "what form could this energy have?". It is not "energy" as we know "energy", because "energy" is defined as the capacity to do work, and this energy is denied of that capacity. It is only "energy" because the law of conservation dictates that it must be conserved as "energy".

This is very similar to the problem I exposed with Philosophim's "first cause". There must be something prior to the first "cause", but it cannot be a "cause" by the definition which Philosophim says we must adhere to. Thus my suggestion of a different type of "cause" (which is analogous to a different type of "energy" produced by entropy, a type of energy inconsistent with the definition of energy).

Since Philosophim insists that we cannot use "cause" in this way, we have to look at "the reason" for the first cause. So this is analogous to "the reason" for entropy, which is a violation to the absoluteness, or ideality of conservation of energy, in a way similar to "the reason" for the first cause being a violation to the absoluteness or ideality of "the first cause".

As for your eyes…..the weather, the crowd, you’re being intentionally tricked, a whole menagerie of incidental evidence….. each is the content of an individual judgement, the compendium of which determines the experience you’re going to have, affirming your thought, in which case it is John, or negating it, in which case it isn’t. — Mww

So this is the doubt which flannel jesus is obsessed with. Flannel seems to think that the doubt created by all that "incidental evidence" implies that when I judge my experience of the empirical object, either "evidence of John", or "not evidence of John", I am assuming that the one judgement is compatible with the opposing judgement.

As this appears to be illogical, then how does a person actually relate to this incidental evidence, doubt, which is contrary to one's actual judgement? I believe this would be a psychological issue and the answer would vary between one person and another, and even within the same person, from one situation to another, depending on the type of doubt involved.

So, consider this example. The object is approaching at a distance, and my eyes are not very good (incidental evidence), so I'm hesitant to make the judgement call. However, I am expecting John (incidental evidence), so I am inclined to make the judgement that it is John. Now we have two distinct types of incidental evidence, my past experience of weak eyes inclining "do not judge", and my anticipation, intention to meet John, inclining "make the judgement".

Notice what I've done. I've classed the incidental evidence as influencing whether or not the primary judgement is actually made. I believe that is the proper representation of "doubt". When an individual is in doubt, judgement is suspended. Some forms of incidental evidence remove doubt, increasing certitude, (like @Michael's example), and incline "make the judgement" while others increase doubt inclining "do not judge".

So, when we go back to look at the primary judgement, the object is approaching at a distance, and I am considering whether my experience of seeing that object is evidence of "John is approaching" or not. Some incidental evidence will incline me toward a hasty judgement, and some will incline me toward a tardy judgement. A hasty judgement is a feature of an underlying attitude of certitude (I'm expecting John, it must be him), and a tardy judgement is a feature of an underlying attitude of doubt (my eyes are weak I ought not judge). The same person will have certitude in some respects, and be doubtful in other respects, depending on how the individual apprehends one's own strengths and weaknesses. And in some situations, like if my eyes are weak and I am expecting John, the two attitudes will be conflicting.

You said your evidence was that you saw a guy who looks like John approaching — flannel jesus

Strawman. I said:

I'm standing on the street and I see something at a distance. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't have to write paragraphs and paragraphs about the minutiae of the philosophy of judgement... — flannel jesus

That is why I am disinterested and have designated discussion with you as pointless. I'm here for the philosophy.

Something circular going on here. It's a feeling I have had for this entire thread. — jgill

It appears there is a vicious circle. Philosophim removes the infinite regress, or eternal circle of causation, breaking the chain by inserting "reason" instead of "cause" at some unspecified temporal point. The breaking of the chain produces a "first cause". But there is no reason given for why the chain begins at one point in time rather than another point in time, i.e. why X cause is the first ,rather than Y or some other cause being the first, leaving the selection of the point in time at which the first cause appears, as totally random. But random is inconsistent with "reason". So philosophim refers back to causation, saying the reason for the first cause is the first cause itself, and that produces the vicious circle. But a vicious circle does not constitute a reason or explanation.

You have demonstrated that you have no interest in discussing the judgement by which something is labeled as evidence, not even agreeing with me that a judgement is required to label something as evidence. Discussion is pointless.

also agree this would be a problem. But I am not using the term reason to explain another cause. That would clearly contradict my notion that a first cause is absolute, so I think even a moderately charitable reading of what I've been expressing would conclude I'm not attempting to blatantly contradict myself. — Philosophim

But you are making unjustified claims about "the reason" for the first cause's existence.

I have noted many times why this must be, but it might have been missed. First, I'm using 'reason' as an explanation. "Why is this a first cause?" Reason: Because it has no prior cause which caused it. Pretty simple. — Philosophim

It's not as simple as you make it sound. The question is not "why is this a first cause" because you have not identified a particular "concrete" cause which you claim is a first cause, and asking why is this a first cause. You have provided an argument which shows the need for a first cause. So the question is the more general, "why is there a first cause?". And you might answer it in a similar way, "because there is necessarily a cause without a prior cause". But this does not suffice because it does not answer the question of what is prior to the first cause, and why whatever it is which is prior to the first cause cannot be called "a cause". That's what makes a first cause a first cause, it is the explanation why a first cause is a first cause, the reason why whatever it is that is prior to the first cause cannot be called a cause.

See, "because it has no prior cause" does not answer the reason why any particular cause is a first cause, because that requires showing the reason why whatever it is which is prior to the first cause cannot be said to be the cause of the first cause. We cannot simply assume that there is nothing prior to the first cause because that is unjustified.

And I'll note again, "reason" is not being used as "cause", but explanation. So to your point, "Because it exists" marks the limits of our explanations, yes. — Philosophim

"Because it exists" does not suffice as an explanation for anything.

Your point has largely been, "Maybe there's a prior cause to the first cause." This is what I'm addressing. I have not seen a concrete example that demonstrates a situation in which there is a first cause, then you show that logically, there is actually a prior cause to that. If we had a concrete example, we could look at that. And if you have and I've missed it, don't get mad, just repost it. — Philosophim

Since you refused to accept conventional philosophy concerning different types of causation, I've found that I have to approach your argument from the distinction you've made between "cause" and "reason". I realize that it is pointless to try to explain something to someone who has no interest in understanding, because understanding would demonstrate that person to be wrong, so I have given up trying to talk to you about final causes. Going forward I will talk about "reason" instead, because this is a term you used.

Look, if there's no prior cause for something, there's no prior reason for something either. — Philosophim

That is unjustified. To make that claim, you need to demonstrate how all reasons are necessarily causes. But you've already admitted that there are reasons which are not causes. And, you said that the first cause has a reason, but not a cause, so you support that admission in your usage. Furthermore, you have no premise which allows you to conclude that the reason for the first cause is not prior to the first cause, because you have not properly established the reason for the first cause. All you've said is that the reason for the first cause is that there is no prior cause. But that's only the reason why it is "first", it is not the reason why it is "cause". And that is a requirement for the reason for "first cause", that we have the reason for it being called "first", and the reason for it being called "cause".

Give me a concrete example of what you mean by a first cause having a prior reason without that prior reason being the cause of the first cause. — Philosophim

I don't know what you're talking about here. You've excluded the possibility of a prior reason being the cause of the first cause through definition. Therefore a prior reason of the first cause must necessarily be something other than a cause, and what you ask is nonsensical. A concrete example of the prior reason for a first cause is not required until you produce a concrete example of a first cause. I tried giving you concrete examples of first causes already, with free will acts, but you ended up rejecting them because they refuted your argument.

Give me an example. — Philosophim

Example of what?

I just typed out the definition of reason and noted I'm using it as a synonym to 'explanation'. I'm uninterested in your opinions that I have no logic, I'm interested in if you can take the logic I've noted, and give a good example of counter object that would demonstrate that my logic is wrong. — Philosophim

As said above, "it simply exists" does not qualify as an explanation. So if you are using "reason" as synonymous with "explanation", you'll have to do better.

Incorrect. You only have empirical evidence of things which have prior causality. As I've noted, we do not have empirical evidence of things which do not. This does not negate the logic that there necessarily must be a first cause. — Philosophim

I don't dispute your argument about "there necessarily must be a first cause", I dispute the further unjustified conclusion you make, that the first cause cannot have a prior reason.

No, I don't need to do anything. I've clearly laid out what a cause and first cause is as defined here. You need to demonstrate with some concrete examples why this definition is either impossible, contradictory, or doesn't make sense. — Philosophim

Your request for concrete examples is completely out of place. You have a purely abstract logical argument about an abstract concept "first cause", and you make an unjustified conclusion concerning the first cause, i.e. that it cannot have a prior reason. This is all abstract logic, there is no place for a concrete example.

If you simply don't like it, that's not my problem. Its on you to demonstrate how one of the most basic logical statements you can construct, "There can be no cause prior to a first cause" is somehow illogical. To my mind where I have given you every benefit of the doubt I can, you have not done so. — Philosophim

I've already demonstrated that. How quickly you forget. A "first cause" is "first" in relation to a specific chain. There may be a multitude of different chains. The "first" of one chain may be prior in time to the "first" of another chain. Therefore the assertion "there can be no cause prior to a first cause" is illogical.

Do you understand that if there is something which caused the Big Bang, then the Big Bang is not a first cause? A first cause is not an opinion or belief. It is a reality that we either know about, or do not know about. — Philosophim

As I've explained to you already. Your conception of "first cause" is a product of an unnecessarily restrictive definition of "cause", one which does not provide for all the things which are commonly, in philosophy, known as causes. Therefore it really is an opinion, your opinion. But you got tired of hearing about that, and I got tired of telling you that.

You spoiled the fun. I was waiting to see how long it would take flannel jesus to actually justify what was claimed, through a description of probability like you did, rather than repeatedly asserting the same thing over and over again without justification.

The first ball being blue is strong evidence that the box now contains 99 blue balls. However, the first ball being blue is compatible with the box now containing 99 red balls, i.e. the first ball being blue does not prove that the box doesn't now contain 99 red balls. — Michael

The only thing I can say here is that maybe probability does not actually qualify as "evidence" in a strict and proper sense of the word. I'd like to dismiss your example, because it is manufactured,. The scenario must be staged, two boxes, with the right coloured balls must be produced, and then the person who doesn't know which is which, must choose a blue one and make the judgement. So I'd say your example, and therefore the evidence of what you are trying to prove, is manufactured. In other words, you've manufactured evidence to support flannel jesus' claims.

So let me offer a different example. Take my example of seeing something approaching on the street. Now suppose that since I've seen John approaching everyday at about the same time for the past month, I apply this probability as "evidence" that what I see is John approaching. This supposed "evidence" is not directly related to the thing being judged, but related through some general principles of inductive reasoning. So the problem which Hume demonstrated is relevant. I agree that the observations of John at all those other times, and the resulting probability is still "evidence", as it still supports the truth of the claim, but it is a slightly different sort of "evidence". Rather than being directly related, it relates through a logical inference. So we can categorize two distinct types of evidence. Isn't this other type of evidence what is commonly known as "circumstantial evidence"?

The same principle would apply to your box of balls example. Even though the example is structured so that you can assert "strong evidence", nevertheless, it is still circumstantial evidence, not being directly related to what is in the box, but related by some form of inference.

What? YOU'RE the one who told ME it was evidence. If I'm prejudiced by granting that it's evidence, SURELY you are too, right? YOU told ME it was evidence. — flannel jesus

That's exactly the point. You ought not take someone else word for it, when they hand you something and say "this is evidence of X". You need justification, and this allows you to make the judgement yourself as to whether or not it is evidence. Otherwise, someone will hand you many different items saying these are all evidence of X, and you'll come away thinking X must be true because there's a mountain of evidence for X. That, I propose is the way that you behave toward physicalism. Someone else makes the judgement "X is evidence of physicalism", and since it's consistent with the hypothesis you already believe (physicalism), you accept "X is evidence" as true.

That is prejudice, no judgement of what is claimed as evidence, by you, because it is claimed to be evidence of what you already believe. Then more and more people may claim it as evidence in that prejudiced way, while the originators of that claim die off, until there is a small percentage of those who believe that it is evidence, who have actually judged whether the supposed evidence is evidence or not.

Then "X is evidence of Y" could become the bias of convention. And, we could have a large percentage of the overall population claiming "X is evidence of Y", and only a small percentage saying "X is not evidence of Y", solely because "X is evidence of Y" is the bias of convention. But if we look only at the people who have actually judged for themselves, whether X is evidence of Y or not, it could turn out that the vast majority of them believe X is not evidence of Y.

n fact, that's the entire reason why I asked you to come up with a scenario and an example of evidence instead of providing one myself - I was predicting exactly this sort of thing from you. I present a scenario, I say such-and-such is evidence, and you find some weird reason to decide "that's not evidence". — flannel jesus

If you cannot defend you judgement "X is evidence" by justifying this claim, then I suggest that there is something wrong with that judgement. If you are simply saying "X is evidence of Y", because you have a prior belief in Y, and someone told you that X is evidence of Y, then you are prejudiced.

The "evidence" points to one thing being the case, but it's not certain, and you can always conceive of ways in which you would have that eviddence, even if that conclusion is not the case. Fingerprints - a person can be on trial, and have evidence be submitted that their fingerprints are at the crime scene, and nevertheless they didn't commit the crime. It's possible for your fingerprints to be somewhere and you still did not commit a crime there? Those two things are... compatible. — flannel jesus

I already pointed out to you, that context is the key factor to evidence, so this type of example is simply useless. Just because a person's fingerprints are at a crime scene doesn't mean that those fingerprints are evidence against the person. So this type of example is pointless.

Evidence is not synonymous with proof. — flannel jesus

You are not understanding what I am saying. In no way did I say that evidence is proof. This is because the judgement of "evidence" is subjective in the way that I described. And, the opinion of a subject does not constitute proof. That is why I need to justify my claim of "evidence", and you ought not take what I claim to be "evidence" as evidence without justification.

As I said, an individual knows oneself, and also knows one's own judgements to be fallible. So when I recognize what I see down the street as John, I take this recognition as evidence that John is approaching. However, I am in no way certain that John is approaching because I also recognize the fallibility of my capacity to recognize a person at such a distance.

The only logical permission for the evidence to not support the approaching object as being “John”, is upon the instantiation of additional evidence in the form of different empirical qualities derived from subsequent perceptions, but not of the same evidence by which the representation was determined. It is by the analysis of these different qualities, and those of sufficient disparity from the antecedents, that the thought of the approaching object cannot in fact be “John”, which is, of course, a significantly distinct and entirely separate judgement in itself. — Mww

What about the factor I mentioned though, an underlying doubt, or attitude of uncertainty, recognition that my judgement may be mistaken? I think that this would have a source other than empirical evidence. So as much as I believe that the approaching thing is John, I am uncertain because I know that my eyes are not good, and this uncertainty would be circumstantial evidence supporting the approaching object as being not-John.

To me, it makes perfect sense how I framed it. — flannel jesus

I know it makes sense to you, because as I've already mentioned you think, in an illogical way. Some study of critical thinking may be useful.

You have evidence. The evidence you have increases your confidence that John is approaching, but you're not certain it's John approaching because the thing you're experiencing as evidence, you could also experience if John were not approaching. — flannel jesus

You demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of "evidence". Evidence is a judgement that the object supports the hypothesis. However, you begin with the assumption "you have evidence", without reference to the required judgement. Therefore you have prejudice, you believe that the object supports the hypothesis prior to the judgement, because it is taken for granted as "evidence".

This prejudice is clearly evident in your reference to physicalism. You seem to think that the occurrence of a physical reality, and the scientific understanding of it, are evidence of physicalism, without the requirement of a judgement against these objects which are supposed to be the evidence. They are received as "evidence". So you seem to say, it could still turn out to be the case that physicalism is wrong, but I'll adhere to physicalism until someone proves to me that physicalism is false. In the meantime, I will not review the evidence because it has already been granted the status of "evidence".

I don't think there's anything outlandish about what I'm saying here. — flannel jesus

It's not outlandish, just prejudiced, which unfortunately is the norm.

It does not mean that Kant is correct. Scientists showed us in the 20th century that time and space are affected by physical facts. — Lionino

Do you mean, scientists show us that they adapt their conceptions of time and space according to the different problems which arise, and the new evidence?

However, that information you have, that evidence, is COMPATIBLE with the statement "John is not approaching", isn't it? — flannel jesus

No, of course not! Why would I judge it as evidence of "John is approaching" if I thought it was compatible with "John Is not approaching"?

You're not certain John is approaching - the only reason you're not certain is because you know there's a way where you could experience seeing what you're seeing, while it's simultaneously true that John is not approaching. — flannel jesus

I am not certain because I know I might be mistaken. I do not in any way think that "John is not approaching" is consistent with what I see, or else I would be inclined not to judge what I see as evidence of "John is approaching". That "I might be mistaken" is a completely distinct judgement, a recognition of my underlying fallibility. It is not a judgement that what I see is compatible with "John is not approaching".

So the statement "I see what I think is John approaching" is completely compatible (but not evidence for, just compatible) with the statement "John is not approaching" - compatible because they can both be true at the same time. — flannel jesus

That statement is a strawman. The correct representation is "I judge what I see as evidence that John is approaching". When you acknowledge the proper representation you ought to see that if I judge what I see as evidence of X, there is no way that I can consistently claim that I also judge it as compatible with not-X.

If they couldn't both be true at the same time, then you would be certain John was approaching.

Make sense? — flannel jesus

Not at all, you use a strawman to make your point. When you say "I see what I think is..." you incorporate the judgement about the fallibility of my judgement, about what I see, into that statement. The fallibility is implied by "what I think is...". But this statement represents the conditions posterior to the two distinct judgements. That is to conflate two distinct judgements, that I judge what I see as John, and that I judge my judgement as fallible, incorporating them into one statement.

Obviously, if I couldn't recognize the thing I saw, as John, I could not claim that it is evidence of John. And that is what makes your representation plainly wrong. I must recognize what I see as John, judge it to be John, and incompatible with not-John, or else I have nothing that would indicate that what I see is evidence of John. There are two distinct levels of judgement which must be respected if you want to properly understand the situation. Each is a judgement of "is" which excludes "is not". I judge what I see as John, excluding is-not John. And, I judge my judgement as fallible, excluding is-not fallible. If I in any way allow doubt into my judgement as to whether or not what I see is John, I have no warrant to "evidence of John".

So, let's look at the situation properly. I know myself to be fallible, that is an underlying attitude. I see something which I judge to be compatible with "John is approaching" and incompatible with "John is not approaching". Since I know my underlying fallibility, I conclude that what I see is "evidence" of John approaching, rather than certainty that John is approaching.

Make sense?

In the case of the Big Bang, time and space are created by it and do not exist before it. — Ludwig V

Time and space are conceptions we apply toward the understanding of our surroundings. Kant calls them pure a priori intuitions. It does not make sense to say that they are a part of the things which surround us, just like it doesn't make sense to say that numbers and geometric shapes are a part of our surroundings.

If you see a ball for example, and say "that is a sphere", this is a description, and "sphere" refers to the concept used to describe the ball. You are not saying that there is a conceptual sphere there in your environment, rather you are saying that there is an object there which is representative of the concept, so that "sphere" is the acceptable concept to describe it.

Likewise with time and space, these are concepts we use to describe the world around us, so it doesn't make sense to say that time and space were created by the Big Bang. It is more appropriate to say that the universe, which we understand through the concepts of time and space was created by the Big Bang. However, it is acceptable in common vernacular to say "time and space are created by it", just like it is acceptable to say, when pointing to a ball, "that is a sphere".

So nothing can be prior to it, whether cause or reason. — Ludwig V

Based on what I said above, this is not a sound conclusion. It appears like the intuitions and concepts which we use to understand our world, and our universe, would not be applicable toward understanding the reality of whatever the conditions were prior to the Big Bang, but this does not imply nothing can be prior to it, in any absolute sense. What it is that was prior to the Big Bang would most likely require a completely different conceptual structure to understand it.

But, it seems to me that a cause cannot exist outside time, whereas a reason can. So there is reason to think that there might be a reason for the Big Bang. But I don't see that there could be a cause for it. (I have no idea what the reason might be, but there seem to be some interesting speculations around.) — Ludwig V

If you adopt a separation between the world around us, and the conceptions employed by us to understand that world, as I explained above, this provides the premises required for logic to extend beyond the world of empirical evidence. This is what we find in pure mathematics for example, logic which goes beyond the empirical world. I suggest that in this way we can find the principles required to understand statements like "prior to the Big Bang". It's simply a matter of recognizing that concepts naturally conform to the things which they are applied to, and if we want to understand what is outside of those things, like cause of and prior to them, we need to provide the concepts which can do this.

Can you think of a situation where you have evidence for a claim, but the evidence does not leave you certain that the claim is true? Please describe that situation, the evidence, and why you're not certain the claim is true even after finding that evidence. — flannel jesus

OK, if you don't want to come up with your own example, here's something nice and simple for you. I'm standing on the street and I see something at a distance. I think that it is a person approaching, and I think that it is John, so I conclude that what I see is evidence that the claim "John is approaching" is true. I'm not certain that it is John approaching, yet I conclude that what I see is evidence that "John is approaching" is true.

Does this suffice?

I know where the information can be found. You have not demonstrated any specific type of other cause, only vague, "maybes". So far the main point is that a "first cause" means there can be no prior cause by definition. Since you cannot give me a concrete example that gets past this, I see no evidence of any refutation. — Philosophim

My discussion of intention, free will, final cause, did not consist of vague maybes.

Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason. — Philosophim

That, as I demonstrated is a faulty conclusion. The conclusion is that there cannot be an event prior to the first cause as the cause of it. The conclusion "there is not a prior reason" is unsupported.

Just like I told him, there is overlap because if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. — Philosophim

You have no premise to draw this conclusion. A "cause" as described by your "chain of events", is an "event". We might say that a cause, or an event suffices as "the reason" in some instances, but it does not in all instances. This implies that "reason " is the broader term, with a wider range of meaning. If the inverse was the case, if all reasons were causes, then "no prior cause" would imply "no prior reason". But that is not the case, so "no priior cause" does not imply "no prior reason". Conversely, "no prior reason" would imply "no prior cause" as "reason" has logical priority over "cause", "cause" being included within "reason".

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue? — Philosophim

Again, you have no logic to support this conclusion, that the reason for the first cause could only be "it simply exists". Your argument does not deal with reasons at all, it deals with causes, so any assertions you make about the reasons for the first cause are only unsupported opinions.

This is not an empirical argument. This is a logical argument. When Einstein constructed his theory of relativity in regards to large bodies, logically, it was sound. It was only after they observed and measured an eclipse that they could empirically confirm it to be true. I make no empirical arguments here. I simply note that logically, if we continue to examine any chain of causality, whether that be finite or infinitely regressive, we will eventually run into a first cause. So no, there is no empirical observation as of yet that refutes this claim, nor any empirical observation that confirms this claim. This discussion is not an attempt at empirical proof, but a logical proof. As such, unless you can logically refute it, it stands.

And this, so far, is the only weakness I've seen in the argument. It is only a logical argument. A logical argument does not mean empirical truth. By the way, Bob Ross is the only other poster to my mind who understood and communicated this right off the bat. Well done, I consider him one of the best philosophers on these boards. :) So, if you wish to say, "I don't care about what logic says, I only care about empirical proof" then I will simply nod my head and state, "That's fine." But that in itself does not show it is a false logical argument. — Philosophim

My reference to empirical evidence was simply to show that your definition of "cause" is not consistent with empirical evidence, it is therefore a false premise. And this inconsistency, false representation, is why it is difficult to understand the nature of "the first cause" which is necessitated by your argument. Your definition of "cause" is false, and as I've explained many times to you already, you need to broaden your understanding of what a "cause" is. Otherwise you're just stuck with an unsound argument, based on a false definition of "cause", produced by a misunderstanding.

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