It is not the creation of novel particles it is just normal light waves such as are all around us, and seeing how the electrons that comprise the light waves exist in a state of uncertainty as probability waves until observed / detected. — ken2esq

You keep referring to "probability waves", but you give absolutely no explanation as to what a probability wave is. So you claim to have a grand theory which employs a mystical substance, "probability waves", along with the self-evident reality of "consciousness", to magically solve all the problems of physics. That's fine, but it really doesn't do anything for metaphysics unless you can show how this mystical substance, which your mind attributes magical powers to in your fantasies, has any real existence.

Bottom line is, this is the only explanation that resolves Fermi's Paradox. — ken2esq

You insist that this theory of a magical mystical substance called "probability waves", along with an equally obscure conception of "consciousness", is "the only" explanation which resolves "Fermi's paradox". And this is how you justify the credibility of your theory. Perhaps you ought to explain how you understand Fermi's paradox, and what leads you to believe that your theory is the only theory which could explain it.

All I see is a very naive form of Cartesian dualism in which "matter" is replaced by "probability waves" and "mind" is replaced by "consciousness".

All the particles created in labs are just that, particles created in labs. There is no necessity that anything like these particles might actually exist in a supposed independent reality. We know that human beings have created many substances, even elements. They also create supposed fundamental particles.

What the wave function represents might be claimed to be some sort of independent reality, but those conceptions are so deficient and insufficient, that true reality remains completely unknown.

One has to choose whenever roads diverge. And in order to make a choice, one has to believe one can freely choose, and has to choose or else remain forever in the wood. It is always some other philosopher or poet who claims that one's choice is not free but predetermined, but for oneself, as for that other herself, one has to make the choice whatever one believes just as if one were free to choose. — unenlightened

This is exactly the point Aristotle made. We can can ask about whether or not the truth about a chosen act precedes the act itself, as if whatever happens will happen necessarily, and even claim that it does (determinism), but we cannot live this way.

So, to avoid the hypocrisy of living our lives in a way other than what we claim to believe, we ought to admit to ourselves that we do not believe in determinism.

@Corvus
Check this reading group: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13614/reading-group-humes-of-skepticism-with-regard-to-the-senses

Hume displays a slightly faulty way of understanding sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Any relevant quotes from Hume? — Corvus

What do you want me to do, quote all the places where Hume is wrong?

Look at his Treatise of Human Understanding Bk 1, Sec 4, part 2 where he discusses the skepticism in regard to the existence of body, for example. The issue is stated as the continued and distinct existence of body. He proceeds from his earlier described premise, that sensation produces "impressions", and says "...they convey to us nothing but a single perception... ", p189. What I argued is that this is a simple misrepresentation. The senses do not provide us with any individual impressions like that. There is a multitude of senses active all at the same time, and time involves duration, so what the senses are sensing is itself activity, not single perceptions. The 'activity' which the senses are actually directed toward, then gets misrepresented by Hume, as what occurs in between the distinct instances of single perceptions, making a temporal succession of instances of perceptions, the sensations of single perceptions.

The problem is that Hume has actually reversed the roles of sense and mind here. The senses actually provide us with a continuity of activity, extended in time, which is only broken by turning one's attention away from the world being sensed. But Hume represents the senses as producing "single", distinct and individual impressions, which are already divided into discrete units, instead of properly representing the senses as providing the fundamental continuity of activity, which is only broken by the mind imposing interruptions to the continuous act of sensing. Notice in the following quote, how he begins from the assumption of a multitude of individual "impressions" provided by the senses, rather than the continuous activity which the senses actually provide us with.

First, That, properly speaking, ’tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses ; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present. — Hume, Treatise of Human Understanding, p191

And according to Hume, reason keeps asking and tries to ensure more accuracy and certainty on the knowledge it is inspecting, but the more it reflects, the less accurate, and less certain the knowledge and beliefs becomes due to the nature of the external world - changing and fleeting. But that is the nature of human reasoning, so why does he deny the point of reasoning for justification of the beliefs on the existence of the world? Doesn't it sound like a contradiction?
Should he not have said that for more accuracy and certainty of the belief on the existence of the world, on-going reasoning is needed accompanied by new up-to-date sensory perception on the world when and wherever possible, which will provide us with more justified belief on the existence? — Corvus

Hume displays a slightly faulty way of understanding sensation. He thought that we sense the world to be in a specific condition (like a state of existence) at one time, then we sense another condition at a later time, but in reality sensation always occurs over a period of time, and we sense activity in that time, a world of change rather than a state of existence. The 'state of existence' or the specific condition of the world at a point in time, is a conceptual product derived by the mind, not the senses.

This is an important difference because if one looks at an area at one time, then looks away, and looks back in the same direction later, all the sameness which one sees must be a product of the mind rather than a product of the senses which are sensing activity, change, and not unchangingness. Our conception of "the world", or "a world" is therefore based in this idea of the temporal continuity of sameness and not directly supported by sensation. It is only the mind reviewing empirical information which produces this idea of "the world".

Because of this way that "the world" is produced, it is logically impossible to deny that the world exists when one is not looking at it, or sensing it, because this would be self-contradictory. "The world" itself, as a concept, is a concept of something not sensed in the first place, so it has no reliance on sensation. And, since the concept is produced to account for the reality of the unchangingness which is not sensed, and is understood to continue through time while not being sensed, it would be contradictory to say that this unchangingness which is not actually sensed in the first place, requires being sensed to be real.

The proper approach then, to deny the reality of "the world" is to demonstrate that the idea is flawed. This would mean showing that the temporal continuity of sameness which the mind projects onto the world is somehow a flawed principle. Hume takes the reverse perspective, assuming that we sense the sameness (when we really sense activity), and then he argues that change to the world must be justified by the mind. But in reality a temporal duration of change is what is directly sensed, so it need not be justified, and the idea that there is "a world", something which remains the same with an identity of being the same thing, "the world" over a period of time during which change is being sensed, is what needs to be justified.

When I say "t=0" in this case, I'm using it as a shorthand for the much more difficult-to-characterise hypothetical boundary where our mathematical models interpolate the existence of spacetime itself, as we know it, to exist on this side, and to not be able to exist on the other side. This is very different from what you are talking about; the arbitrary assignment of t=0 on a number line to define the subset of a Cartesian plane that we care about. Though I admit that I did not communicate that at all (in fact, I deliberately avoided it). — Jaded Scholar

What I\m talking about is better understood through principles of calculus. The "t=0" represents the limit, and the problem is in approaching the limit. We use a t=0 for any type of temporal measurement, so any measurement made very close to t=0, i.e. a short period of time, has that problem.

This claim about Newtonian mechanics does not make sense. It confused me so much that I honestly think you can't be as wrong as I think and you are more likely to be referring to something I'm not getting. One of the biggest benefits of Newtonian mechanics over pre-Newtonian classical mechanics was that the second law eliminated the artefact of infinite acceleration (except for massless particles). — Jaded Scholar

Suppose something is at rest. Then it is moving because it has been subjected to a force. There is a point in time, when it changes from being at rest, to being in motion. At this point in time, its rate of acceleration must be infinite.

But I am confident that in your next line you really are just misinterpreting the nature of wave mechanics and/or Fourier transformation. The temporal uncertainty you refer to here has nothing to do with time itself, and is a straightforward result of transformation between any given noncommutative dimensions - none of which are *necessarily* time. — Jaded Scholar

I believe the uncertainty is based in a time/frequency relation.

Again, I agree, but do not think this is actually meaningful here, and comes across as actively un-meaningful. Along the lines of: "Sure, we don't understand the Big Bang, but like, do we really understand ANYTHING, man?". — Jaded Scholar

Exactly, our understanding of anything is incomplete, therefore deficient, lacking,

So I'm incredibly confident that the problem of Platonic idealism has been solved, as far as it applies to our mathematical and scientific culture. — Jaded Scholar

I don't think so. Set theory in general, presupposes that numbers are objects, Platonic Idealism. This results in numerous problems starting with the empty set, and the infinite set, and stuff like Russel's paradox. Set theory is relatively modern, the problems have not been solved only made more complex by attempts to cover them up through the introduction of more and more axioms.

I think it is both safe and responsible to assume that one of the fundamental barriers to our full understanding of the universe is that mathematics itself may not yet be sophisticated enough. — Jaded Scholar

I agree with this to an extent. But I do not think that it is sophistication which makes good math, I think the opposite. Good math is based in simple principles with universal applicability. When the principles are lacking in universal applicability, instead of throwing them away and starting at the bottom with more applicable ones, the tendency is just to adapt the old, add a few new axioms to make things work in the difficult areas. This works for a while, until new problems present themselves, so new axioms are added. The mathematics gets more and more sophisticated, but the sophistication is not evidence of good principles, but the contrary, it is evidence of basic principles which are faulty, not universally applicable. So they require addendums to work in different areas.

Whatever the gaps are, they are not what you described - if we could label them, we could have fixed them by now. — Jaded Scholar

The problem is that no one wants to fix them. The principles work in most situations, so they do not need fixing. Then for the places where they do not work, keep using them and add some more principles to make them sort of work. Look, thousands of years ago Pythagoras label pi and the diagonal of a square as "irrational". To me, this indicates that there is something fundamentally wrong with the dimensional representation of space. But who cares, the principles work, and when it turns out that real circles in the real world are not actually circular, but ellipses and things like that, we just adapt "the circle" and pi principles to make them work in the real world. But you cannot say that these problems haven't been labeled.

Understanding is inherently tied to reason, which serves as an explanation or justification. If something cannot be articulated in a logically consistent manner, it implies a lack of understanding. Reason and mathematics are effective precisely because the universe operates fundamentally on principles of reason and mathematics, which leads to determinism. "In the beginning was the Logos", the fundamental logic behind the universe, underlying the natural order of things. — punos

Of course you recognize that there is an agent involved in such understanding and reasoning. All logic is an activity carried out by an agent. Generally we say that human beings perform this activity. So when you say "the universe operates fundamentally on principles of reason", I assume you mean that the universe operates in a way which can be understood through reasoning.

There is a slight problem here because until we actually understand the fundamental operations of the universe, we have no proof of that, and this is just speculation on your part. Problems with quantum mechanics, and the uncertainty principle in general, indicate that maybe the fundamentals might not be understandable by human reason.

This primordial logic, while maximally simple, serves as the dynamo of the universe, perpetually executing its function. Primordial time can be likened to a unitary logical NOT operator, representing the creative and destructive force of time, while space is dualistic and represented by binary logical operators [AND, OR]. The logic of being and determinism in our universe is intertwined with these temporal and binary spatial operators, likening the universe to a literal computer with time as the processor and space as the working memory. This perspective views fundamental particles and numbers as essentially the same, and 'quantum mechanics' can be reframed as 'number mechanics' or 'number logic,' emphasizing the fundamental connection between math and logic and the way the universe works. — punos

Since only an intelligent being can act to create things according to reason, or logic, I assume that you are saying that God is the agent who employed "primordial logic" and created the universe and also created "primordial time" according to some principles of reason.

According to the principle of causality which i have no reason or evidence to deny, every event is caused by a preceding event or set of circumstances. — punos

I gave you very good reason why there is very significant problems with "the principle of causation" as you state it. If every event is caused by a preceding event, then this would mean that there is an infinite regress of events extending backward in time, with no possibility of a first event. This would make aspects of the universe fundamentally unintelligible, as I explained. That contradicts what you say above, that there is a " fundamental logic behind the universe". Therefore your believe in "the principle of causation" contradicts your belief in a "fundamental logic behind the universe".

The idea of an event in the present not being caused by a past event but still causing an effect in the future seems to defy this principle. — punos

Yes, the idea of an event in the present not being caused by a past event but still causing an effect in the future does defy "the principle of causation". However, this principle is defective as I explained, because it denies the possibility of a beginning to time, a first event, and it renders the universe as unintelligible because it makes "initial conditions" which are required for understanding any system, impossible. Consider, that when time started to roll, there was a future but no past. An event at this time would be at the present, and it would have an effect in the future, but not an event in its past.

When you realize that it is necessary to include this type of event, the event with no prior event as its cause, in any complete understanding of the universe, as a very reasonable proposition, then you will see that there is no reason to exclude this type of event from occurring at any moment of the present, as time passes. The inclusion of this type of event, an event which starts at any point in time, a zero point, with no preceding event linkable to it causally, makes issues of free will, and quantum uncertainty very reasonable.

You can characterize this type of event in a number of different ways, but what is required is to understand "time" in a way which is unconventional. We tend to characterize "the universe" as everything which fits within a space-time representation. From this perspective we'd have to place these acts as coming from outside the universe, as not fitting into the space-time representation because of the need for a true "zero time" at each moment of the present, as time passes, marking the time when the uncaused event starts. The common practice of calling such events "random" assumes that the universe is fundamentally unintelligible, instead of moving to recognize such events as still in some way "reasonable".

No, i do not believe that time had a beginning, because time itself is the measure of beginnings and endings, and thus to ask if time had a beginning is like asking at what time did time start? If you are speaking of entropic or thermodynamic time then yes it did have a beginning, but primordial time never did. You should think about this: If there were ever a 'time' before time where time was not, then why would time decide to start all of a sudden? Notice how incoherent the question is, like asking what's north of the north pole?. If time were ever not, then nothing could have ever happened to make anything happen ever. Nothing would change since there is no time to change it. That is why primordial time necessarily must have always been and will always be. Primordial time was active before our universe, and will be way after our universe is long gone. — punos

Inquiring about the beginning of time does not necessarily mean asking what time did time start. That is already self evident in the question, it is the "zero point" of time. What is required is simply to put "time" into the context of something larger, just like when we ask about the relations of any particular thing. We put that thing into a larger context. That is what you do with "the universe" in your concept of "primordial time", you tie "time" to something larger than the universe, and allow that the universe had a beginning in time, primordial time.

The problem with your approach is that you propose nothing real to tie the concept of "primordial time", prior to the universe, to. You assert that time is something bigger, a wider context than "the universe", such that the universe can have a beginning and ending in "primordial time", but primordial time is just a purely imaginary thing, providing no link to our universe, whereby we could apply some principles of reasoning or logic, to bring the concept into our fold of intelligibility. My perspective is based in real observed empirical principles (free will acts which appear to be random), and logic (the need for a true "zero time", and therefore provides a real perspective for relating the smaller context (inside time or the universe) with the larger perspective (outside time or the universe).

Every force in the universe including gravity manifests as a result of some broken symmetry. The topology of space is such that it is repelled by matter or mass (like opposite charges), and as a result causing a rarification or thinning of spacial energy in the vicinity of that matter. Matter which is the inversion of space, is attracted (not repelled) towards gravity wells simply as the universe's attempt to "fill the hole" so to say, and repair the broken symmetry of space. — punos

A break of symmetry is fundamentally unintelligible, as random, and outside the governance of logic or reason. That is the problem with this approach, we start to see at the fundamental level, that all forces derive from outside the realm of intelligibility. This is completely at odds with your claim of a primordial logic at the base. I propose to you, that the reason why this basic uncertainty and unintelligibility arises in our representations or models, is our failure to be able to determine a true "zero point" in time. When time is passing, we cannot adequately determine "a point" from which measurement might be made. We might assume an infinitesimal, but this does not give us a proper point. Then all things that start to happen, and all measurements we try to make, get enveloped by uncertainty.

I should then clarify here that i myself do not preclude the possibility of non-deterministic events either, but these events do not count as free will, simply random. Never the less i am still somewhat skeptical as to the veracity of true randomness. — punos

You should see, that "randomness" is contrary to your opening statements about "the fundamental logic behind the universe". To say that an event is "random", is to say that no logic can explain it. When we allow randomness into our explanations, and do not distinguish between "appears like it's random" from "it truly is random", then we allow that the reason for the event cannot possibly be understood. This becomes a problem for the philosophically inclined person, who wants to be able to understand everything, and therefore is inclined to think that there must be a reason for everything (principle of sufficient reason). If we keep a philosophical mind we keep looking for the reason, if we designate "random" we do not even look for the reason. A free will event is not random. Nor is it deterministically caused, because it has a cause which is not consistent with "deterministically caused".

I've already stated that i'm not convinced that quantum fluctuations are random; they are most likely caused. The only thing that does not have a cause in my book is time, since in my view, time (primordial time) is the first cause of all things that exist in time, but it has nothing to do with free will because it did not choose to cause anything, it is forced to cause, it has no choice to cause, and the only thing it can cause is the manifestation of simple and fundamental virtual particles in the quantum foam. The rest is up to determinism to work out. — punos

If we posit time as "the first cause" of all things in time, as you propose, then when time acts as the first cause, isn't it true that time would be just like an absolutely free will, having infinite freedom as to what it chooses to bring into existence. Consider this, there is nothing except primordial time, then primordial time brings something into existence. Doesn't this imply that in its capacity of "first cause", primordial time is just like "free will", only having an infinite capacity of freedom to cause the existence of absolutely anything. There would be no prior existents, therefore no events in the sense of physical events which could act as determining causes of what comes into being, because there is nothing but time.

So I think that you are completely wrong in saying that primordial time must cause, is forced to cause, and does not choose to cause. Clearly, as "first cause" there is nothing to force it to be a cause in the determinist sense, because there is nothing prior to this first act which could cause the first existents. How can you conceive this first act, which brings existents from nothing, a forced act? In reality, your concept of "primordial time" if you think it through logically, is nothing but an infinitely free act of will.

"Once you allow the reality that 2 + 2 = 17, then it would be reasonable for of course 2 + 2 to equal 17, since you decide. This is true because 17 is not caused by 2 + 2, but the free will of the person doing the calculation to freely choose the answer. — punos

I don't understand your analogy. Things like "2", and "17" are just symbols, and we assign meaning to the symbols freely. We could make "2+2=17" correct, simply by changing the meaning of the symbols. However, we already have a different convention, so convincing people to make the switch would be difficult.

In my understanding there is only really one kind of time, and if it was completely up to me i would never mention a second kind of time (entropic). Most people it seems are not able to perceive or comprehend what i mean by primordial time (except you apparently), and insist that thermodynamics is actually time. For me thermodynamics or the entropic or thermodynamic state is not time, but simply the arrow of time. Time and the arrow of time are not the same thing. Thermodynamics emerges only in the context of extended space or dimensions where things have the probability of being in different states, and are constantly changing their relationships to each other. — punos

We probably really need to say what each of us think "time" actually is. I would describe it as a process, the process by which the future becomes the past. Also, since we apprehend the future as possibilities, and the past as actualities, the present is when this process occurs, and the activity we observe at the present is the result of this process. Free will fits in because something must select which possibilities will be actualized. We tend to think that the inertia of being, from the past, necessitates which possibilities will be actualized, in a deterministic way, but this is not realistic because an intelligent creature with a will can step up at any moment, and break this supposed necessity.

That is why we need to allow for acts which are derived directly out of the present. So if we apprehend the passing of time as a process, there is necessarily a force involved with this process. This means that some future possibilities must be actualized due to the very nature of passing time (entropy perhaps). The being with free will can make use of this force to direct it toward the various possibilities it selects for.

choose: pick out or select (someone or something) as being the best or most appropriate of two or more alternatives.

carefully: in a way that deliberately avoids harm or errors

I've already stated that i believe that every part of the universe has agency of some kind, including the universe as a whole. Consider how electro-magnetism works and how careful it is to never move towards a charge equal to itself (or move away from an opposite complimentary charge to itself) since this would be an error and harmful for the overall purpose of the universe. Electro-magnetism picks out or selects the charge it will move towards as being the best or most appropriate of two or more alternatives. It is so deliberate that it never makes a mistake... that is how careful it is. — punos

Ok, so you think that electro-magnetism "deliberately" avoids harm and errors. I think that's ridiculous, "deliberate" implies intentionality, and careful thinking, which I do not think is an appropriate description for electro-magnetism.

An agent, like the definition says is a person or thing. That it mentions 'person' is redundant since if a thing can do something, then obviously a person can too. So the definition is not making a distinction between something or someone, it means anything can be an agent. — punos

That's right, an "agent" is anything active causally, it may be animate, inanimate, or inconclusive. However, inanimate agents are observed to act causally in a way consistent with determinism, while living things are known to make choices and act in ways not consistent with determinism. Therefore we have two distinct types of "agents", and we ought not equivocate between the two.

The Wikipedia article about 'threshold potentials' should have been enough to answer your question, and the video was just supplementary. — punos

The "threshold potentials" article mentions a "threshold" for action, so similar stimulation would always cause action, being above the threshold, and similar below the threshold stimulation would not cause action. So it really doesn't indicate that the neuron can decide to fire or not fire, in equal cases of stimulation.

Meta is notable for apparently not having even mentioned Austin on a thread about Austin. — Banno

Incorrigible! I thought you'd never notice. I happen to have a strong aversion to certain words, and some names can be even worse for me.

I would prefer to use the null hypothesis in a situation like this since it seems more reasonable to assume nothing outside the box until what is in the box has been investigated thoroughly. — punos

I explained why what's "in the box" is insufficient to account for the complete reality of human experience, and why it is logically necessary to conclude something outside the box. But if you're happy to be constrained within the box, that's your choice. However, I see that your appeal to "primordial time" show that you are in some way inclined to step outside of the box. But it looks more like a falling out of the box to me.

If it is free should it not be free from reason as well? — punos

The thing discussed, the will, is free from reason in it's activity, as not determined by reason, but this does not imply that it cannot be understood by reason (i.e. that it is random). There are many things in the world which are understood by reason, but not controlled or determined by reason.

The statement that "an event at the present which was not caused by an event in the past, but which will still cause an effect in the future" does not make sense. — punos

You have not explained why this does not make sense to you. Yes, the event which is uncaused becomes a past event, but it remains as an event which was not caused by an event prior to it in time. Why does it not make sense to you that there are events in the past which do not have a cause which is prior to them. The alternative implies an infinite regress of events. Do you not believe that there was a beginning to time? If you do, then you ought to conclude the logical necessity that there was at least one event without an event prior to it in time, as cause of it. And if you recognize the logical necessity of one such event, why would you exclude the possibility of others?

Like i said it wasn't an explanation. It was a claim without a justification, i presume because according to you free will doesn't need a justification even though you claim it does have a reason. — punos

Yes, as I explained above, we recognize the reality of many events in the world which have a reason, but are not justified. Take the effects of gravity for example. Something falling has a reason for falling, the effect of gravity, but that activity, falling, is not justified. Likewise, a freely willed act may have a reason for occurring, the effects of free will, but the act might still not be justifiable.

This says nothing because i can restate it like this: "The free willy however, allows only free willy principles to be the reason for an event, and therefore excludes the possibility of a deterministically willed event as an unreasonable proposition." — punos

That's not a fair analogy. It is a false representation, a straw man, because the free willy allows also that there are events which can be explained by determinist principles. Therefore this part of the statement "the free willy however, allows only free willy principles to be the reason for an event" is a false representation. So, as I explained, the principles which underlie determinism, such as Newton's first law, must be accounted for within the context of a reality which also allows for free will. This inclines many, such as Newton himself, to state that Newton's laws are upheld by God's Will. Therefore, contrary to your claim, "a deterministically willed event" is actually very reasonable.

Neither you, nor i can understand or predict something that is experienced as random, so it makes no difference between free will and determinism. My suspicions are that there is no such thing as true randomness. Randomness is a word that we have applied to describe our ignorance while saving face. Scientists used to wonder why particles and dust would move or jitter apparently randomly, until they discovered Brownian motion and random motions suddenly became deterministic (determined by Brownian motion). — punos

Right, at least we agree on the nature of "randomness". Now, the next step for you, in understanding free will, is to understand that an event which appears to be a random event, might actually have a cause which is not prior to it in time. So you replace "Brownian motion" in your example with "free will cause", and suddenly events which appear to be random, have a cause. The difference is that the cause is not deterministic, because it is not prior to the event in time. This type of causation will account for many events which are often spoken of as if they are random. To begin with, we have the first event in time, mentioned above. This is often called a random quantum fluctuation or something like that. And quantum physics is full of such "random" symmetry-breaking, and that sort of thing, where an event simply flies out of the present, as purely uncaused by an event in the past, so it is said to be "random". Then in the field of biology there are many other events which are often said to be "random"; the first living being, genetic mutations, etc., and of course our topic here, a freely willed decision.

Once you allow for the reality of such causation, an act at the present which is not caused by anything in the past, then many such events which are "called" random will be reasonable, instead of being random. Then you can understand what Aristotle called "final cause", as completely distinct from what we call "efficient cause". Efficient causation is central to determinism, and it is always understood as requiring a cause which is prior to it in time. This produces a problem of infinite regress in causation because there is always required a prior time. That is a very real logical problem, because any current state of existence can only be understood as the logical result of the initial conditions, which constitute the boundary conditions. But the infinite regress renders true initial conditions as impossible, and this renders any state at any time as fundamentally unintelligible.

So that's a real logical problem which "final cause" resolves. Not only does it resolve that problem, but it is completely consistent with observed experience of intentional actions. However.it is a completely different type of causation, which does not require that there is a further cause prior to it in time, putting an end to the infinite regress, hence the designator "final". Once we see that it is a real logical necessity to include the reality of such a type of cause, it becomes a "first" cause in relation to chains of efficient causation, not requiring a cause prior to it in time. Then we can see evidence of this type of causation everywhere in reality, such as freely willed acts, and we escape "the box" of determinist thinking.

This is precisely what free will does; not determinism. Free will is the claim that some external force to the universe impinges on the present moment to cause an action that would violate a deterministic path. Determinism does no such thing because determinism is simply what the universe is doing and what it will do free from external influence. It can be argued that the definition of free will is the freedom of determinism to do its will without interference from an external will to the universe, including personal free will. — punos

Yes, if "universe" is restricted in that way, such that the entire universe is deterministic, then the free will act must come from outside the universe. As explained above, it is logically necessary to assume such a type of act to break the infinite regress of "the universe". That infinite regress renders the universe at anytime as unintelligible because it makes the current state of the universe dependent on initial conditions, but also denies the possibility of initial conditions with the infinite regress. Therefore to bring "the universe" into the realm of intelligibility we must assume another sort of cause, which has been named "final cause".

The continuity is caused because of previous effects which is the reason why existence suddenly doesn't collapse into chaos. — punos

This way of thinking produces the infinite regress, by always requiring "previous effects" when looking backward in time, and that produces the logical problem of no initial conditions, explained above.

Entropic time is deterministic as opposed to primordial time which is not. This concept that you're describing is what i call primordial time which is what keeps an object persistent through multiple moments of existence. Without it the universe would at most be a virtual soup of virtual particles that never exist past one Planck moment. Entropic time is dependent on and emerges from primordial time. — punos

See, here you propose two types of time, coexisting at the present moment, primordial time which keeps an objects persistent, and entropic time, which allows for deterministic change. But you propose nothing to establish a relationship between these two "times". So the fact that you insist on determinism forces you (logically), to propose a completely different type of time. In other words your clinging to determinism has rendered the universe as unintelligible, in the way I described above. Then, in your resistance to the traditional and conventional way of dealing with this problem "final cause", you instead propose something completely irrational and ridiculous, two types of time coexisting with no principles for interacting with each other, only the implication that they must interact because things both persist through time, yet also change through time. This is nothing but an extremely unintelligible form of dualism.

There is no implication that selection must be performed by an agent... — punos

Are you kidding? "Carefully chose" signifies an activity as a verb, and the phrase implies an agent acting with care. How can you interpret this otherwise? Is there an effect of this act of carefully choosing? If so, there is necessarily an agent by your definition, "a person or thing that takes an active role or produces a specified effect". You could deny the need for an agent by denying that there is an effect from the act of choosing, but that would leave selection as irrelevant to our discussion of causation.

This video may also help, the relevant part to your question is addressed between 1:50 and 4:00. — punos

There is nothing there that supports your claim, only an indication that "a neuron" cannot be sufficiently isolated from its environment to test what you claim. In other words you have made a very simplistic claim about something which is much more complex and that complexity invalidates your claim.

Would you say that one should believe in the existence of the world, when one is dead or in deep sleep? — Corvus

No, I think that believing in the existence of the world, during deep sleep, is what turns pleasant dreams into nightmares. And believing in the world when one is dead seems to be impossible.

Surely Plato does differentiate between the Forms and the ordinary world? The traditional view, as I understand it, is that he believes that the Forms are in some sense superior to the ordinary world. How would you describe that difference? — Ludwig V

The Forms are prior to what you call "the ordinary world", and it is this priority which makes them more real. The "priority" in this sense, is the sense of a temporal priority, such that the Forms are causal. Being the cause of the things of the ordinary world is what makes them as you say "superior". The "ordinary world" would mean how we perceive things to be, through sensation.

So the people in the cave see the world of artificial, ordinary things. 'Ordinary things' we can describe as temporal things, coming into existence and going out of existence in time having a temporal beginning and end. The people in the cave do not understand that these artificial ordinary (temporal) things are just a copy, representation, or "shadow" of the idea or form from which they are created. An ordinary bed is made as a copy of an idea of what a bed is. "The good" is the purpose for which the thing is created, and in the allegory it is the source of light, the fire. The good, along with the idea, cause the existence of artificial, temporal things. Once a philosopher comes to understand how this is the cause of existence of these temporal things, one can go beyond the existence of artificial things (leave the cave) and understand that the cause of all natural temporal things must be a similar causal process.

I'm afraid the question is whether it is us or Plato who is being misled. — Ludwig V

That is a good question, and with some effort of philosophical inquiry it can be answered. First, we'd have to address the scenario in the cave. Is it true that the idea, or form, of an artificial thing is prior to, and along with the purpose, is in some way a cause of existence of the material thing in the ordinary world.

If we decide that Plato is correct in this representation, i.e. not being misled, or misleading us, then we proceed to the second step, as Aristotle did in his Metaphysics. This is the question of in what ways is the coming into being of natural things similar to that of artificial things. And this is a much more difficult question which requires education in metaphysical principles.

Simpler cells than neurons make decisions all the time like moving towards food or away from toxins, fungus as well. Just because they are not complex decisions like we make doesn't mean they are not making decisions. One neuron can only make very simple decisions, but when connected to a vast network of other neurons 'talking' to each other you get the emergence of swarm intelligence capable of more complex decision making. — punos

I'll put my reply to the last part of your post first punos, just so you can have a better understanding of my position before reading the rest. I think that it is necessary to conclude that free will underlies all activities of living things. They all make use of the features of temporal existence which cannot be understood by determinism which I discuss below. Any "self" motivated activity like "self-subsistence", "self-nourishment", "self-movement", etc., must be supported by a type of causation known by the concept of "free will". This is best called "intentional" activity, or purposeful activity.

Is there a reason why an agent might select one option over another? If there is a reason then it's determined, and if it has no reason then it's random. — punos

We discussed this already on this thread, when the principle of sufficient reason was mentioned. That there is a reason for the choice does not imply that the choice was determined. To be determined, the choice must be consistent with determinist principles. Determinist principles dictate that there is a direct causal relation between past events and future events. This excludes the possibility of a free will event. This is an event at the present which was not caused by an event in the past, but which will still cause an effect in the future.

Such an event, the freely willed event, is not unintelligible (as it is explained above), and it is not without reason. The determinist however, allows only determinist principles to be the reason for an event, and therefore excludes the possibility of a freely willed event as an unreasonable proposition. The determinist then argues that any event which cannot be understood under the precepts of determinism must be "random". Here, "random" really means a cause, or reason for the event which cannot be understood by determinist principles. This allows for the reality of causes and reasons for events which the determinist classifies as "random" simply because they are not able to be understood by determinist principles. Examples might be random mutation to genes in evolutionary theory, and random occurrence of life on the planet, to begin with.

The free willy may argue as I have, that this is because the determinist misunderstands the nature of time. The misunderstanding of time inclines the determinist to deny the possibility of an event at the present which does not have a cause in the past. The determinist understands time in terms of a temporal continuity of necessity between past and future, which is best exemplified as Newton's first law of motion. Things will continue to be in the future, as they have been in the past, unless a "force" is applied. This is a statement of necessity. It is necessary to apply a force to break the continuity of existence at the present.

The free willy may argue that such a statement of the necessary continuity of existence through the present, is a false statement. There is no such necessary continuity of existence at the present, and evidence demonstrates that absolutely everything, and anything has the possibility of changing at any moment of passing time. This means that instead of a cause of change at the present (the requirement of the application of force as described by Newton), in reality there must be a cause of things staying the same at each moment of passing time. From this perspective, "random" means that at every moment of passing time, every aspect of what we know as "existence" could be scrambled in any possible way. However, we observe continuity therefore the continuity must be caused.

The cause of the observed continuity of observed existents through the present, from the past, to the future, is the aspect of temporal reality which the determinists do not apprehend, and therefore misunderstand. They take this continuity for granted, as Newton's first law. However, the free willy knows that this observed continuity must be caused. This cause cannot be understood by determinist principles because it is prior to, therefore independent from, and necessary for, determinist causation, as producing the conditions for the temporal continuity required for deterministic causation. In other words, there is a type of causation which produces the required conditions for deterministic causation, and this type of causation cannot be understood as deterministic causation. This is reasonable and not random.

Additionally, environments are able to select genetic expressions in organisms for example and whether they live or die. Selection happens all up and down the hierarchies of nature and the universe, it's what evolution is made of (variation and selection). Even fundamental particles make decisions in how they respond to different electrical charges for example. A simple particle can be seen behaving the same way a cell does when it moves towards food or away from toxins and when the particle moves toward its complimentary charge and away from a self-similar charge. — punos

There is equivocation between two distinct meanings of "select" here. That is why I was clear to say that "to select" is an act carried out by an agent. So, one meaning requires an agent which "selects", but "selection" in biology, under Darwinian principles requires no such agent. Darwin blurs the boundaries between human beings as agents of selection, doing selective breeding, and breeding under natural conditions, such that this can be called "natural selection". Thus Darwin sows the seeds of ambiguity in "selection". "Selection" in this sense can then be understood as the result of determinist forces which annihilate some things while others survive. So if you and I were both in the same plane crash, and I died while you lived, this would be an example of that type of "selection", where no agent actually "selects". Notice that there is no need to assume an active agent which "selects" in this meaning of "selection". It is this equivocation which generally supports compatibilism.

Yes, of course what did you think they do? Why do you think it fires sometimes and sometimes not, even when in both cases it is receiving signals (contributing factors). It obviously has a preference for certain signals. — punos

I've never heard this before. You are saying that in distinct cases when the same neuron is subjected to what can be said as "the same conditions", it will sometime fire under those conditions, and sometimes not fire under those conditions. Can you provide some supporting documentation which I can read?

I have been asked by ↪Ludwig V in another thread, if I believed in the existence of the world, when I am not perceiving it. — Corvus

Is it possible for you to be not perceiving the world while you are still alive? Would this be when you are asleep? But don't things still wake you up? Are you not in some way perceiving the world even when you are asleep?

Though there's no doubt that language can mislead - as it is clearly misleading Plato when he concludes that all we see is shadows. — Ludwig V

The cave allegory is explicitly presented as a metaphor, that's why it's known as an "allegory". Plato does not conclude that all we see is shadows, he presents that as a symbolic representation to elucidate how the average person is wrong in one's assumptions about the nature of reality. And as I explained, it is the common way of using language which misleads us in this way.

I would be very interested in seeing a comprehensive list of these contributing factors if you can provide one. Also, am i to understand that contributing factors no matter how many or which ones are not responsible for any choice determination? Besides contributing factors, what else is there? Once the contributing factors are in place what makes or determines the choice according to you? It appears to me that without a final determination a choice is not possible, free or not. — punos

There is no need for a list of contributing factors to demonstrate free will. The fact that not one of the multitude of contributing factors can be said to be the cause of the choice, and that the agent chooses from a multitude of options is enough to demonstrate free will.

So to answer your question, besides contributing factors, there is the thing which selects, we might call this the agent. The multitude of contributing factors provide a mutitude of options for "the agent", and a selection is made.

By considering the cumulative effect of all present contributing factors in conjunction with prior contributing factors, the neuron makes a discerning determination to emit a signal back into the environment, thereby instigating an action that informs the future state of the neuronal environment (the brain). — punos

Are you proposing that a neuron itself makes a selection, it decides whether or not to fire when stimulated? That's what seems to be implied when you say "the neuron makes a discerning determination to emit a signal...".

Is there anything else you would add or modify in this neuronal model of decision making to make it compatible with free will? — punos

I really do not think that a neuron makes a selection, or decision at all. So I think your terminology, "discerning determination to emit a signal" is not accurate.

I'm arguing that we don't make decisions without the influence of the past. — Patterner

Of course, I don't think anyone would disagree with this, so it doesn't need to be argued. But I don't think it's relevant to the question of free will.

Perhaps there can be specialized philosophical terms. But they can only amount to a dialect of English. So ordinary language is inescapable. — Ludwig V

The point though is that ordinary language misleads us when we discuss the nature of reality, therefore the philosopher must be very wary about this. Take the example of "see" discussed by . It appears like the ordinary use of "see", being the activity that the specific sense, the eye is involved in, is the "literal" use of the term. But just like in my example of "good", ordinary language is based in what "appears" to us, and it often has no consideration for what is "real", i.e. reality, as in what is really the case. This misdirection from ordinary language inclines us to alter our definition of "real", such that it fits with what is apparent to us through the senses, rather than adhering to rigorous logic in determining what is "real". That is the problem which Plato's cave allegory exposed. The vulgar are looking at the appearance of shadows as if they are the real things, because that's how the vernacular leads them.

However, the philosopher sees beyond this. What really happens in the act of seeing is that the brain produces an image, and it is not the eyes which are producing the image, nor is it the eyes which are "seeing". The eyes are the medium, a tool used in the act of seeing. Then the real, more literal sense of "see" is the one based in the imagination of the mind, rather than the one based in the sense. And that this must be "the real meaning" of the term is evident because it refers to what is really occurring in both situations, seeing with the eyes, and imagining, rather than simply referring to what appears to be occurring. This is demonstrated more clearly with my example of "good", and it is the reason why the common, vulgar or naive people, who will not resist the restraints imposed by common language, will remain in Plato's cave, refusing to follow the philosopher's ascent.

We don't make decisions with no memory of the past. And, remembering the past, we don't ignore it when we make decisions. — Patterner

Like I explained, that does not imply that the past determines the decision.

You probably don’t often make something you have never tried before. — Patterner

There must be a first time for everything. Have you never heard of a process called trial and error?

Knowing you are going to want to enjoy your lunch in the future, you likely make something that you know you like because you’ve had it in the past and you liked it. When you are shopping at the grocery store, you think about what you were going to take to lunch for the next several days. You pick out things that you have enjoyed in the past. That’s why you pick them out. — Patterner

Not necessarily, that's the point, we often like to try different things. Since we actually do choose, and try things we've never done before, your argument that choosing familiar things is evidence of determinism fails. Those examples are all irrelevant because we actually do sometimes choose otherwise, therefore the necessity required for determinism is lacking.

What you think about the future determines what you will do, but what you think about the future is determined by your past, or more precisely, your memory of the past. — punos

But what you think about the future does not "determine" what you do. It is only a contributing factor. There is also many other factors, like what Patterner argues, the force of habit.

So you and Patterner are arguing two very distinct things that "determine" the choice. Patterner says that it is habits you've formed in the past, things you've come to be familiar with and like, while you are arguing that it is something you think about for the future which determines your action. However, it is quite clear to me, that both of these play a role, and neither one "determines" the choice.

And neither one of you has addressed the fact that the choice is made at the present. If the future is determined by the past, there is a continuity of necessity through the present, which lies between these two. This implies that nothing can really happen at the present, because if something actually happened it would break the continuity and alter the relationship of necessity. Of course evidence is contrary to this, we see that everything happens at the present, and freely willed choices at the present will have an effect on the future which is not determined by the past. Therefore we ought to form the obvious conclusion that determinism is based in a faulty understanding of the present.

Well, that's one way of putting it. But I can't see that it is Plato's way. Surely, for him, there is only one real good, i.e. the Form of the Good? The good things of this world may participate in the Form, but they are "shadows" of the Good and so not real (really) good. — Ludwig V

I suggest you read Plato more closely. The "Form of the Good" is unknowable, even to the philosopher. So what Plato talks about is "the good", and the good is particular to the circumstances. Whether or not a particular good participates in the Form of Good can never be known, because the Form of Good cannot be known. Are you familiar with Plato's Euthyphro? This is where such an independent "Form of Good", which the goods of this world would participate in, is shown to be an incoherent idea. This is the start to Plato's refutation of the theory of participation. Look at The Republic, there is no such thing as the Form of Justice, which all instances of "the just" would participate in, there is only individual ideas as to what "just" means.

I agree that the alcohol can be regarded as a cause of the alcoholic's actions (in some sense of "cause"). But nothing follows as to whether it is a good thing for the alcoholic or not. — Ludwig V

Consider precisely what "good" means in the context of Plato's philosophy. It is what motivates a person to act, what Aristotle called "the end", 'that for the sake of which', and what we call the goal or objective. As such, the "real" good must be what motivates a person to act. If the desire for alcohol has motivated an alcoholic to act, then we must say that it was the real good. If you want to make a further judgement about whether alcohol is "a good thing" for the alcoholic, then you are going to need a completely different sense, a different meaning, of "good".

This different meaning of "good" is based in some moral principles or some other standards. But these standards suffer the problem pointed out in the Euthyphro. We cannot say that this meaning of "good" is anything real or independent, because it is only supported by a code of ethics or something like that, and the attempt to make it something "real" produces incoherency. Therefore we can only say it is an apparent good not a real good.

So when you judge whether the alcohol is a good thing, or not a good thing for the alcoholic, this judgement is only as it appears to you. There cannot be any real truth or falsity to this judgement because it is only based in appearance, how things appear to you through the application of some standards. However, when we see that the desire for alcohol motivates the alcoholic to act, as an end, or a goal, what Plato called "the good", and Aristotle called "final cause", we can definitely say that the alcohol is a "real" good, because it has caused real activity, in the real world.

I'm inclined to think that this discussion, interesting though it may be, does not fit well with the main topic of this thread. So perhaps we should leave this there, until another opportunity arises. — Ludwig V

Perhaps our discussion is a little off topic, but it points to the fundamental problem being discussed in the thread, concerning the difference between the philosophical use of words, and the ordinary use of words, and how this difference starts to significantly mislead us when it comes to discussing the meaning of words like "real".

See, ordinary language would have us believe that "good" refers to some judgement based in a code of ethics. However, if we try to make this ordinary language sense of "good" into something "real" we end up with incoherency which would incline us toward a fundamentally incoherent definition of "real" in order to make this sense of "good" the real good. And this demonstrates why, when doing philosophy, we must adhere to rigorous philosophical meanings of the terms, and not be corrupted by ordinary language, because this corruption leads us into incoherent metaphysics.

I believe he's saying that, if things in my past aren't causing my decisions in the present, then my decisions are random. — Patterner

There's no logic to support that conclusion. The decisions are made concerning the future, and they are made at the present. The present is prior in time to the future, so a decision made at the present can have an effect in the future. And there is no need to assume that a decision made at the present, which is free from being determined by the past, is random, because it is made with respect to the future therefore not random. This takes into account the reality of all three aspects of time, past, present, and future.

I don't understand how this is supposed to fix things. It's still the case that our thoughts, beliefs, memories, rational decision making process, knowledge, etc. all pre-exist our choices. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, all of these pre-exist the choice, just like the past condition of the physical world pre-exists the choice, but none of these can be said to be the cause of the choice. This is because the choice is made in relation to the future. So the thing which chooses, the agent, considers all sorts of past things, and possible future things, and makes a decision, at the present, concerning the future. If the decision was caused only by pre-existing things, the agent could not consider the future. Yet the future plays an integral role in the decision.

If those things don't determine our choices, then it's hard to see how our actions are "free. Moreover this seems to fly in the face of phenomenological experience and the social sciences as well. E.g., I am generally hungry before I decide to go make lunch, my past sensations determine my current actions in that case. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think you are paying close attention to your own experience. I prepare my meals, and I think this is the case for most people, before i get hungry, by some sort of schedule or habit. Then I am ready to eat before I get too hungry. This is known as thinking ahead. I make my lunch even before I go to work in the morning, and bring it with me, so I in no way wait till I am hungry before I make my lunch.

Determinism is just the view that: "events are determined by previously existing causes." The Principle of Sufficent Reason gets you there by itself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The principle of sufficient reason does not get you there, because as I explain above, the cause may be a freely will act of a free willing being, at the present, rather than previously existing causes. This is consistent with the principle of sufficient reason, but not consistent with determinism.

But if the act isn't determined by anything in the past what is determining it? If you say "your will," does this will involve your memories, desires, preferences, etc.? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The free will act is caused by a choice made at the present, free from the past. And as I said, the past is definitely considered, but the past does not determine the choice. The future is also considered. And since the thing which is desired, the good which is acted toward, is something in the future, the future has the principal position as providing the primary influence on the choice. So it is clearly incorrect to say that the act is determined by the past.

Surely, the reliable way in which drugs and hormone injections affect behavior suggest some relation between past events and actions, no? Drinking alcohol changes how people decide to act. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Obviously, I do not deny that there is "some relation" between the past, and the choice which is made. However, there is also a relation to the future, and the relation to the future is the principal one. That's why the free will choice is more properly represented as a relation between the present and the future. But the being which makes the choice must make careful consideration of the past in order to adequately know its position at the present, and make the best choices.

This is an example of past choices dictating future choices. Hence, not consistent with "free will that unaffected by the past." Our past choices affect our future choices, and how they do so depends on how they have affected us and the world around us. That is, past choices determine future choices. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I never said that the free will choice is "unaffected by the past". I clearly said precisely otherwise. What is being discussed is whether the choice is determined by the past.

I agree, it's asking for a contradiction. That's why libertarian free will makes no sense. The idea of "us" choosing in a way that is autonomous from the past - our experiences, memories, desires, past thinking, etc. removes "us" from the will. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It does not remove "us" from the will. As I explained, it inverts the relation so that "us" is attributed to the will rather than "will" being attributed to us. Attributing "will" to us, as you do, actually removes "us" from will, in order to have an autonomous self which has a will as a property.

To say that such a "free will," "isn't actually totally free, that it's constrained by (determined by) all sorts of things like past experience, memory, desire, physics etc." is to simply grant the main claim of compatibilism. This is what I mean by "libertarianism turning itself into compatibilism." — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is not compatibilist because the will is not necessarily constrained by determinist 'laws of nature' which is what is inherent to determinism. So, at any moment in time, the will is free to act in a way which is inconsistent with determinist laws, even though the action produced can be described as consistent with those laws, to a degree. The "to a degree" is what makes compatibilism appear to be correct, but the "inconsistent with determinist laws" is what makes compatibilism actually impossible. In other words, determinist laws are not complete in their capacity to explain what happens in reality, and there are things which happen which cannot be explained by determinist laws. Freely willed acts have a source which is outside the governance of these laws. That makes free will not compatible with determinism. However, in so much as the free will act which occurs at the present, can only act on whatever is already existing, it is constrained by the past.

If you say "no, only most of our decision making is pre-determined, there is an extra bit of free floating free will that isn't determined by anything in the past," then I'd just repeat the same question: "what does such a will have to do with me?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

The free will act is not determined by anything in the past. However, it is constrained by the fact that it can only act at the present. This means that its capacity to have an effect in the material world is limited by the time when it occurs. Notice that the act itself is not determined, therefore not compatibilist, but the effect that the act has, is restricted and therefore limited by the temporal conditions produced in the past.

It basically comes down to this; "If something is not determined by anything in what way is it not random?" The uncaused is random, and there is no reason anything uncaused should tend towards any choice and not another. It seems incoherent to me to say "our wills are determined by our past experiences, thoughts, desires" but then also that there is also an "extra bit" that isn't determined by any of these. Ok, even if this is true, it doesn't result in more freedom, it just makes my actions partly random and unfathomable. If I can't possibly know what determined my actions, how am I to become free? — Count Timothy von Icarus

When we do not understand the cause of an act, we might be inclined to say that the act is random. This is due to our failure to understand, and it does not necessarily mean that the act is truly random in any absolute sense, it may just be that we do not have the ability to understand the cause. The determinist will say that if the cause is not a determinist cause then it must be truly random, because the reality of a freely willed cause, as a true cause, is not allowed by the determinist.

Therefore your statement reduces the act which is caused by a free will to an "uncaused" act, in the determinist way of excluding free will causes as possible causes, and concludes that such an act would be "random". The mistake is in categorizing the act of the free will, which is a type of act we do not completely ,understand as "uncaused", rather than categorizing it as a cause which is inconsistent with "cause" as defined by determinist principles, and therefore not understood by those principles.

The point isn't about whose will is involved, it is that, in every such instance of positive freedom the past dictates what we are free to do in the future. I have no problem saying that "past free choices influence future free choices." But this is still the past determining the future. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The free will act is neither past nor future, it is at the present. So in saying that the past necessarily determines the future, you exclude the possibility of a free will act at the present, and you have determinism. The concept of free will allows for an act at the present, which is not determined by the past.

If you don't learn to read, you're not free to read War and Peace. This is past states of the world determining freedom of action. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, but the will to learn allows one to learn how to read, and then read War and Peace. So it is not true to say that if you do not know how to read you will not ever read War and Peace, because you can learn and then do it. And the choice to learn is freely willed, therefore not determined by the past.

I don't know what makes this understanding "proper". It is defensible as a view. But people often do things that they think are in their interests, but actually bring them harm. Moreover, it clearly wasn't Plato's view. (Only philosophers can understand what the real good is) — Ludwig V

If the person acts on it, it must be a "real" good, because it caused the person to act. Whether it is later judged as being a mistaken act is irrelevant to whether or not the good which is acted on is "real". It is necessary that this "good" the one which is acted on, is real in order that it may be said to cause action.

This is a very important point in understanding Plato because it brings actuality, "act" into the idealist realm of intelligible objects, resolving the so-called interaction problem which is intrinsic to the prior theory of participation. Now the objects of the intellect may be understood as real and actual. Through the medium of "the good" intelligible objects can be known as prior to, and cause of all artificial material objects which are like shadows or reflections of the intelligible objects, making the intelligible as higher in priority. "The good" is said to illuminate intelligible objects in a way which is analogous to the way that the sun illuminates visible objects (Republic Bk.6), the will to know. It provides the basis for Aristotle's conception of "final cause". I say it is the "proper" understanding because it is the only way to make "real good" intelligible, rather than the incoherent mess which Ayer presents us with.

Because there doesn't seem to be a problem is freedom is grounded in "self-determination." It doesn't seem like much of a definition stretch to say that we are free when "we do what we want and don't do what we don't want," and that "we are the cause of our own actions." Such a definition doesn't clash with determinism. The definition the clashes with determinism is: "we are free if we can do other than we actually do,"which just seems like a bad definition since, by necessity, we only do what we actually do. The freedom we care about lies in how we make our actual choices, not the metaphysical potentialities re choice, so this ends up being a non-sequitur. Not to mention that free will as self-determination makes it much easier to define how we can be relatively more or less free, which certainly seems to be the case. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problems described here arise from a misrepresentation of the nature of time. We would require a better representation of freedom in relation to passing time, in order to sort out these issues. We are free in relation to the future, and not free in relation to the past, is a position which does clash with determinism, and it does not require that we are free to do other than we did.

Ok, that still doesn't answer how such decisions are "mine"... — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are just asking for a contradiction. You want to say "the decisions are mine", as if you are determining them, so that you can say "this contradicts 'the will is free'".

You can declare by fiat that free floating "will" is ours, but what exactly does it have to do with us if it isn't determined by our feelings, memories, etc? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is not declared by fiat, it is known by evidence. Your parents preexisted you, and so did the will which brought your body into being. It is only when you move to make the will the property of the individual, instead of the individual a property of the will, that you separate a multitude of wills, the wills of your parents, and yourself into individual wills. But you do this only because you are asking for contradiction.

Then there is the whole issue of how any will can possibly effectively work to bring about states of affairs they prefer, and prevent states of affairs they don't prefer, if their actions lack determinant effects. If my showing my son books might make him forget how to read, how am I free to teach him to read? I am only free to do this because I know that specific acts help with the aquisition of literacy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not understand this criticism. Learning is attributable to the combined and unified will of both teacher and student, with the unified goal of education. If the will for education was only on one side, as you portray, there could be no education.

Finally, consider the alcoholic, drug addict, sex addict, sufferer of OCD, or "rageoholic" They are influenced by internal causes outside their control in a way many who suffer these conditions liken to "slavery." But how can we explain this sort of internal bondage if our freedom isn't determined by our personal history? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not understand this criticism either. The will is free to choose, but it must live with the consequences of its choices. That is the nature of time. Mistakes happen and we suffer from the consequences. That we suffer from mistaken choices of the past, does not imply that those choices were not freely made.

And, as I also explained to Viskane above, in no way is "free" ever used to signify something absolute. There is always restrictions to freedom. It is only by asking for absolute freedom in the concept of "free will", that the incoherency which you find, arises. But that incoherency is really the result of making "free" something which it never is in reality, and that is absolute. In reality, "free" is always qualified.

But there is a reason incompatibilism is no longer a dominant position in debates free will. It's arguably incoherent, as I've tried to point out. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, compatibilists are generally people who do not want to think out the problems, so they insist there is no problem.

You say this makes us somehow unfree, by virtue of our rationality, desires, knowledge, and preferences pre-existing our actions. My question is: what doesn't preexist our making a choice that is meaningfully "us," such that this non-prexisting force has anything to do with us and thus can be an extension of our will? The demand that some core element of "what is doing the choosing," not pre-exist our choosing seems to preclude that any
of the freedom described is actually "ours." — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are characterizing "the will", and the freedom which the will has, as a property of "us". But if you allow that each person is an individual, and the free will as a property of "us" is something which preexists the individual, (and this is evident by the nature of life), then you will see that an individual's free will is an extension of the will which precedes the individual. As I said to Vaskane above, consider that to have a body was a choice made by the will.

Plato placed emotion as the intermediary between contrary forces, the body and the mind. Sometimes emotion takes direction from the mind, like when the law is being enforced, and sometimes it takes direction from the body, like when the law is being broken. Sometimes it might even be left directionless, when a person is lost and confused.

No one expects that the will is free in an absolute way. That is not how we use 'free", and it seems like a sort of ridiculous idea. That's what I was trying to say. You and I are "free", but we cannot break the law without being punished. Freedom always has its limits.

Have you ever considered that perhaps the will chose to have a body, so that it could use the body as a tool? Then having a body is the means by which the will is expanding is boundaries.

Ayer's problem (which is common to most modern philosophers) is that he approaches the distinction between the real good and the apparent good from the preconceived idea that "the real good" must have some sort of independent objective existence, supported by some divine unity like God, and that "the apparent good" is the good which the individual person apprehends.

However, this distinction between the real and apparent good, needs to be understood through the Platonic principles from which it was derived. Proper understanding reveals that "the real good" is the good apprehended by the individual, as one's goal or objective. Because the individual's apprehended goal or objective is "the good" which actually motivates the individual to act, it must be known as "the real good". This leaves any proposed independent good, supposedly supported by a divine unity, or God, as the "apparent good". Inverting this, and trying to understand "the real good" as some sort of independent, objective good, supported by God, leaves "the real good" as completely incoherent, as demonstrated in Plato\s Euthyphro, and this incoherency is what confronts Ayer.

The will without the body was your proposition. Do you accept it or not?

Why would I want to remove the potential of the underlying matter or substance? — Ludwig V

That seemed to be the objection you were raising, that Berkeley's and Locke's arguments removed the need for potential, as matter.

My suggested explanation doesn't even eliminate the counterfactual phenomenon; it simply provides a fully explanation of the causes that produce it. — Ludwig V

I explained, the explanation you provided was far from a full explanation. When you come to grips with that we might be able to continue the discussion.

Somehow people do regularly distinguish real from unreal, for all practical purposes anyway. It's not merely a logical thing, it's more at the level of innate capability. — frank

But the example was when a person was under the influence of LSD. It is in this situation that the real parts of the experience are not so easily distinguishable from the unreal. We could say the same about someone suffering mental illness like schizophrenia.

We know, for instance, that if a person is blind from birth, but then gains sight, they won't be able to distinguish a picture of an apple from a real apple. That's not a logical issue. It's something about perception. — frank

I don't see how you draw the conclusion that if it's something about perception, it's not a logical problem.

Which my response is making a claim -- lets see how free the will is without the body. — Vaskane

Wouldn't it be absolutely free, without any boundaries or limitations whatsoever? But that's just my guess, I really don't know what you're talking about.

Remove your body from the equation and tell me how well you will. Also record us your will typing out your reply free from your body. — Vaskane

What?

LSD is not a "true" hallucinogenic, which means you know at the time that what you're seeing isn't real. — frank

You might try increasing the dosage. You cannot dismiss all that you see while you're on acid as not real, because you must see some real things or else you\d be completely lost in a completely unfamiliar surrounding. So some of what you see must be real.

The problem of course is how do you distinguish between what is real and what is not real. And if you cannot make the distinction you cannot know that what you are seeing isn't real, at any given time, nor that what you are seeing is real at any given time.

Or alternatively the answer might be yes it is. — flannel jesus

Sure, if you have free will, you might answer as you please.

Well, surely it's possible just by pure chance. If I asked a hundred people to guess a number between 1-100, I might guess the number they guessed correctly once or twice - that's not impossible by any means. He didn't really clarify how the painter got it right, he just said he got it right. — flannel jesus

Notice though, that the only way you make the correct prediction possible is by restricting the possible choices of the agent. The more you restrict the possibilities of the agent, the easier it is to predict. So when you change the perimeters to 1-50, or 1-10, you make the prediction easier, but if you change to 1-1000 you make the prediction more difficult.

So in reality, in this type of scenario, the agent's actions are only becoming predictable by forcing the agent (contrary to free will) to make a choice within a specified range of possibilities. In the op, the agent must clear a line from one corner to another, and this denies the agent's free will, as a premise. So the op denies the possibility of free will, by starting with a premise that the agent must do as he is told to, thereby denying him the free will to do what he wants to do.

But the accusation of belief without evidence is often raised on this forum whenever any vaguely religious sentiment is expressed. — Wayfarer

Not only that, but the meaning of "evidence" to some here has been so narrowed down by empirical principles, that it could only mean something which appears directly through an individual's sensations. This effectively renders "evidence" as completely subjective which is the exact opposite to what these people intend.

This is the result of removing the requirement of a logical relation between the thing which is evidence, and the thing which it is evidence of. And this logical relation is the essence of "evidence". The empiricist attempt to remove this necessary logical relation, to make "evidence" an empirically based concept would render the concept completely subjective and worthless.

That's right, the example is nonsense, because it has not been proven that the perfect prediction of an individual's actions which is described by the example, is even possible. @Art48 might just as well have described a world in which all actions are completely predetermined due to causal determinism, and asked if there is any free will in this world. So the question Art48 is really asking is whether free will is compatible with determinism, and the answer is no it is not.

MDR doesn't explain the relationship of theoretical models to their observational semantics and truth-conditions, neither does it give any guidance as to how and when to select a model among "equally good" alternatives, let alone for deciding what is a good model, and neither does it serve as an explanation for theory-change.

So what exactly does MDR solve? — sime

MDR has no provision for "truth-conditions". And that's what it solves, the need to define truth conditions.

But we can probably agree that there is a feeling that simply to analyse a disposition (potential, capacity, ability, skill, tendency, liability, habit, custom) as a counter-factual that x would happen if... is not enough. But I notice that you never specify what would count as the bottom of it. But we do look for, and often find, a basis for the disposition. Petrol is flammable because its' molecular structure is such that it easily reacts with the oxygen in the air and so forth. Most ice floats because its molecular structure makes it less dense and therefore lighter, than water. But these are empirical discoveries. So the most that we can say is that a disposition includes the idea that there is a causal basis for the counter-factual, but no more than that. In the end, it's just an application of the principle of sufficient reason. — Ludwig V

You are not at all paying attention to the difference between capacity, or potential, and a disposition, which I explained. They are opposing terms in the sense that capacity is the freedom to act in a multitude of different way, while a disposition is a restriction to that capacity, resulting in one specific type of action. That is why explaining potential, capacity, skill, liability habit, custom, etc., in terms of dispositions can never be sufficient.

It's very clear to me, that we do not ever get to the bottom of a disposition, because the singularity of the disposition becomes unintelligible when we try to make it consistent with the underlying multitude of possibilities. Molecular structure is not "the bottom" . We must look at the structure of atoms and electron shells to understand the underlying potential which gets tied up in the disposition you call "molecular structure". Then we get faced with the reality of quantum particles being described as possibilities. Ultimately the question of why specific possibilities are selected to be actualized (wave function collapse) cannot be answered. The tendency, in the modern mindset is to ignore the necessity of the act of selection, therefore deny the logical requirement of an agent which selects, and simply assume that the underlying potential restricts or limits itself (self-organization) in an habitual way, resulting in the describable disposition.

My problem with your view is that, so far as I can see, your view of capacity and potential are wide open to the objection that Berkeley rightly levels against the scholastic idea of matter as pure potential and Locke's view that substance is something unknown - that it is empty. — Ludwig V

These arguments both, can only remove the potential of the underlying matter or substance, by replacing it with something actual. This is the actuality of God. The problem though, is that the reality of potential cannot simply be replaced by the actuality of God, because this produces determinism, which is inconsistent with our experience. Therefore to maintain the reality of free will we must maintain the reality of potential. However, since the concept of free will in human beings cannot account for the agent involved in the selection from the possibilities which underly the natural dispositions you refer to, such as molecular structures, we do not avoid the need for the Will of God.

Thanks for this. But isn't it also true that the Theory of Forms presents an idea that seems to be a generalization of mathematics and provide a basis for his view that the things of this world are but shadows of reality? I would have thought that Plato was quite able to hold a view and recognize difficulties with it at the same time. — Ludwig V

The problems with the Theory of Forms, are more complex than you might think. It became evident to Plato that there was a need for "the good", as that which makes the Forms, as intelligible objects, intelligible, in the same way that the sun makes visible objects visible. Then he started to outline his understanding of the requirement of a medium between the Forms and the things of the sensible world. This medium was Plato's solution to the interaction problem often attributed to dualism.

Showing that Ayer's metaphysics is misconceived is itself a deeply metaphysical activity. — Banno

Has anybody here actually read any Ayers? — frank

I've read enough of A.J. Ayer to know that the way to show his metaphysics as misconceived is through his moral philosophy. He seems to misinterpret the classical (Aristotelian) distinction between the apparent good, and the real good, such that he cannot find any principles which might distinguish these two. I think Copleston provides a good approach.